

# INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1971

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## PREFACE

This is the fifth annual volume of the series *International Documents on Palestine*, which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University. The purpose of the series is to collect and put on record in an easily accessible form political attitudes, policies and initiatives relating to the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict emanating from national and international organizations, and other bodies reflecting important aspects of world public opinion. The collection is divided into three sections: International (which includes Israel), Arab World and United Nations.

The contents of the International and Arab World sections have been selected from among policy statements issued by governments and important political organizations, speeches and statements by political leaders and government officials, parliamentary debates, diplomatic dispatches, joint communiqués and resolutions adopted at conferences and congresses. In order to give better representation to important currents of opinion on Palestine, the volume also contains statements by non-governmental groups when these are of special significance. Similarly, for countries where editorials in the press media are used to voice official policy, such as the Soviet Union and China, some editorial analyses have been included.

The collection is by necessity selective and, due to rising printing costs, this year's edition has had to be subjected to even more rigorous selection procedures than were previous volumes in the series. For no country has exhaustive coverage been attempted. The incidence of documents in the International section is naturally higher for Israel, the Great Powers and countries politically or geographically close to the Middle East. Representation in this collection then provides a rough index of interest in or influence on the affairs of this region. The policies of many smaller nations not directly concerned with the conflict are, however, represented in resolutions or statements of regional or other international organizations; for easy reference, participating countries have been listed in the footnotes to such documents.

The Arab World section, selected for the most part from the comprehensive documentary collection published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies, *Arab Political Documents on Palestine*, similarly reflects the degree of involvement with the Palestine problem among Arab nations and organizations with, not surprisingly, the Palestine Resistance, Egypt and Jordan being most heavily represented.

In the case of documents of which only the part or parts of the text related to the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict have been reproduced, this is indicated either in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the addition of the word *Excerpts* after the title of the document. In some Arab World documents and in some speeches to the U.N., material that, though relating to the Palestine question, is inconsequential or repetitive has been omitted; these deletions too have been indicated as described above. Footnotes are

somewhat more extensive than in previous years with the aim of providing a clear record of the text as published in this collection. An analytical index follows the documents.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in original versions. In translated documents Arabic names already familiar to the reader appear as they are most commonly printed in the English language press; others are transliterated according to a system which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

Within the International and Arab World sections, documents are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of "Early," "Mid" or "Late" attached to the month is used. Documents within a section having the same date are arranged geographically from east to west according to place, unless logic in some way precludes this. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; the exception to this is U.N. documents which carry no place except in the case of speeches to the Assembly. Within the United Nations section, documents are arranged with reference to the organization's structure as outlined in the relevant section of the list of documents. Due to shortage of space, the UNRWA report is this year represented by only the summary provided in the introduction. Other U.N. documents which might prove somewhat harder to obtain are reproduced here in full.

The Institute expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and to its Secretary-General, Mr. Anwar al-Nouri, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute further expresses its gratitude to Dr. George J. Tomeh, former Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic at the United Nations and presently General Consultant at the Institute for Palestine Studies, for his valuable assistance and advice on the United Nations section.

Translations from the French were done by Meric Dobson, Rosanna Prince and Anne Zahlan; from the German by Eberhard Boecker and Graham Birkin; from the Italian by Adeline Asfour; from the Spanish by Laure Daher and Anne Zahlan. Rosanna Prince was assisted with the manuscript typing by Ghorra Franjiyeh and with the proof-reading by Hiyam Bortcosh and Helena Cobban. The index was prepared by Eileen Olmsted.

The Institute for Palestine Studies extends thanks to the staffs of the libraries of the American University of Beirut, the United Nations Information Center in Beirut, and the Near East Ecumenical Bureau of Information and Interpretation for their cooperation.

## LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, annual reports, radio monitoring services, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their place of publication and frequency:

<i>Action</i>	New York	weekly
<i>l'Action</i>	Tunis	daily
<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	daily
<i>American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism</i>	New York	quarterly
<i>Amnesty International Annual Report and Newsletter</i>	London	annual and monthly
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i>	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	fortnightly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>BBC Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	London	daily
<i>al-Bilad</i>	Jedda	daily
<i>The Bulletin</i>	Bonn	weekly
<i>Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung</i>	Bonn	daily
<i>Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism</i>	London	bi-monthly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington D.C.	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i>	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
<i>Current Notes on International Affairs</i>	Canberra	monthly
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington D.C.	weekly
<i>La Dépêche</i>	Casablanca	daily
<i>Disisleri Bakanliğı Belleteni</i>	Ankara	monthly
<i>Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy</i>	Stockholm	annual
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Economic Review</i>	Jerusalem	monthly
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	fortnightly
<i>External Affairs</i>	Ottawa	monthly
<i>Fateh</i>	Damascus	daily (weekly from August)

<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Washington D.C.	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i>	Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>Free Palestine</i>	Washington D.C.	monthly
<i>al-Hadaf</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i>	London	daily
<i>al-Haqiqa</i>	Benghazi	daily
<i>al-Hayat</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Hisad al-Asifa</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Hurriya</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Ila al-Amam</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Information Bulletin (MAKI)</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>International Affairs</i>	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Committee of the Red Cross</i>		
<i>Annual Report</i>	Geneva	annual
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	daily
<i>International Review of the Red Cross</i>	Geneva	monthly
<i>Israel Digest</i>	Jerusalem	fortnightly
<i>Israel Government Yearbook</i>	Jerusalem	annual
<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i>	New York	bi-monthly
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i>	Washington D.C.	monthly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriya</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bath	weekly
<i>Lillit</i>	Jerusalem	monthly
<i>Middle East International</i>	London	monthly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>Moscow News</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Mujahid</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i>	Washington D.C.	monthly
<i>Near East Report</i>	Washington D.C.	weekly
<i>New Middle East</i>	London	monthly
<i>New Outlook</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Newsletter of the World Council of Churches</i>		
Committee on the Church and the Jewish People	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Newsweek</i>	New York	weekly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	daily



<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i>	Wellington	monthly
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>L'Opinion</i>	Rabat	daily
<i>L'Osservatore Romano</i> (French weekly edition)	Rome	weekly
<i>Palestine Digest</i>	Washington D.C.	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>La Politique étrangère de la France</i>	Paris	twice a year
<i>The Pope Speaks</i>	Washington D.C.	quarterly
<i>al-Ray al-Amm</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	fortnightly
<i>Revista de Política Internacional</i>	Madrid	bi-monthly
<i>Revue roumaine d'études internationales</i>	Bucarest	quarterly
<i>Saut Filastin</i>	Damascus	monthly
<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Soviet News</i>	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	Munich	daily
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i>	London	fortnightly
<i>Survival</i>	London	monthly
<i>Tadmit Newsletter</i>	Tel Aviv	fortnightly
<i>Time</i>	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental Bulletin</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>U.N. Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	monthly
<i>U.N. Official Records of the General Assembly</i>	New York	annual
<i>U.N. Official Records of the Security Council</i>	New York	annual
<i>U.N. Official Records of the Economic and Social Council</i>	New York	annual
<i>U.S. News &amp; World Report</i>	Washington D.C.	weekly
<i>USSR and Third World</i>	London	monthly
<i>Die Welt</i>	Hamburg	daily
<i>World Marxist Review Information Bulletin</i>	Ontario	monthly
<i>Die Zeit</i>	Hamburg	daily



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International





**Resolution on Israel's Resumption of Talks Under U.N. Envoy Jarring, Adopted by a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH)<sup>1</sup>**

**Early January, 1971**

The Central Committee met with satisfaction the decision of the government and Knesset on Israel's return to peaceful negotiations under UN envoy Dr. Jarring, viewing the resumption of the talks as a gain for the peace-loving forces. The isolation of the U.S. and Israeli governments that was evident at the last UN session and that proved that the relation of forces in the world and in the region is to the disadvantage of the U.S. imperialists and the executors of their plans, compelled the U.S. rulers and then those of Israel to discontinue the policy of "freezing" the peace talks aimed at implementing the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

At the same time the Central Committee notes that the refusal of the Golda Meir government to implement the Security Council resolution, its intention to annex the occupied territories and the flaunting of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine confirm that the Israeli government is not interested in the successful outcome of the peace talks. It decided to continue its course of thwarting the discussion of essential problems and protracting the talks. The main aim of the government is to preserve the existing situation and thereby to perpetuate the occupation.

The Israeli ruling quarters harbor the illusion that they can achieve their expansionist aims and deprive the Arab people of

Palestine of their rights by carrying out the criminal plans of U.S. imperialism in our area. The Central Committee warns the Israeli people against the danger presented by the adventurist and unrealistic policy of the government, which is in the service of U.S. imperialism, the common enemy of the Israeli and Arab peoples.

Egypt and other Arab states aspiring for peace are prepared to recognize Israel as a sovereign state with secure and generally recognized borders, provided Israel withdraws its troops from the territories occupied in the course of the June 1967 war and agrees to a just settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees in keeping with the UN resolutions. Influential forces in the Arab world are ready to establish a just peace on the basis of full implementation of the Security Council resolution.

The Soviet Union, along with other peaceful states, exerts great efforts to achieve a political settlement of the crisis in the area, to establish a durable peace on the basis of respect for the rights of peoples and states. Together with other great powers and the Security Council, the Soviet Union is prepared to participate in effective international guarantees, making it possible to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries.

Thus there is a historical possibility of establishing a just peace in our region. Peace is the only guarantee of Israel's security.

The Central Committee calls on peace-loving forces of Israel, irrespective of their party affiliation and views, to unite and step up the fight to ensure the success of the peace talks under the aegis of Dr. Jarring, to prevent further clashes, implement the Security Council resolution and establish a just peace.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the resolution (*al-Ittihad*, January 8, 1971), *World (Marxist Review) Information Bulletin*, IX, 3-4 (187-188) (April 14, 1971), pp. 20-21.

## 2

**Statement of Soviet Middle East Policy  
Made by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin in  
an Interview with a Japanese News-  
paper<sup>1</sup>**

January 2, 1971

The Soviet Union stands for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

As is well known, this resolution demands the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the establishment of a just and lasting peace, and recognition of the right of every state in that area to live in peace without being subjected to the threat or use of force. The Security Council's resolution thus rules out the possibility of encroachment by the aggressor and demands the restoration of justice, which has been flouted by him. There can be no just and lasting peace in the Middle East without the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories.

The United Arab Republic and Jordan have stated clearly their readiness to implement this resolution and to enter into contact with the special envoy of the United Nations secretary-general, Ambassador Jarring. A political settlement, however, is not making any progress, because of the obstructionist attitude of Israel and of the United States, which is supporting Israel. Without American money and arms deliveries, the aggressor would long since have had to restrain his warlike ardour.

Israel's ruling circles are pursuing a policy aimed at implementing the imperialist plans directed against the peoples of the Middle East and towards maintaining a dangerous centre of the war danger. This policy has once again been condemned by the United Nations. The 25th session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the immediate implementation of the Security Council's resolution.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of Kosygin's interview, (*Asahi Shimbun*, January 2, 1971), *Soviet News*, No. 5575 (January 5, 1971), p. 2.

In Israel they evidently cannot but think about where the shortsighted and dangerous policy of enmity with the Arabs may lead the country and its people. Not only the peoples of Arab countries but, to no less a degree, the people of Israel as well are interested in a peace settlement.

The Soviet Union is sincerely striving for the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. All the allegations, made by those who wish us ill, about any other aims of Soviet foreign policy in that area are deliberate lies and slander. The preservation and strengthening of peace has always been and continues to be a paramount task of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. This is a Leninist principle, and our Communist Party and our state cherish their principles and strictly abide by them.

## 3

**Television Interview Statements by U.S.  
President Nixon Reaffirming U.S. Sup-  
port for Israel, Denying the Need for  
Any Formal Alliance and Calling for  
Big Power Diplomacy in the Interest of a  
Middle East Settlement<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, January 4, 1971

*Mr. Seavareid: Mr. President, we have no formal alliance with the State of Israel. But isn't it really a fact that we are now so deeply committed morally to the Israelis that if they were in unmistakable danger of defeat wouldn't we have to intervene?*

*The President: Mr. Seavareid, to speculate on that question would not really be in the interests of peace in that area, as I see them at this point. Let's look how far we have come. We have had a cease-fire for 5 months, no killing, and for 3 or 4 years before that there were killings every day in that part of the world.*

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from excerpts from the transcript of Nixon's interview with representatives of NBC, PBS, CBS and ABC as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1648 (January 25, 1971), pp. 109-110.

Second, as you know, the Israelis have gone back to the Jarring talks and also the other side will be there. That doesn't mean that the prospect for an early agreement is very great. It does mean, however, that there is some chance that there will be discussion.

And, third, it seems to me that we must take into account the fact that the people in that part of the world, the people of Israel, the people in the countries that are Israel's neighbors, that they are overwhelmingly on the side of peace—they want peace. Their leaders are going to have to reflect it.

I think that we are at a critical time in the Mideast, a critical time over the next few months, when we may get these talks off dead center, make some progress toward a live-and-let-live attitude, not progress that is going to bring a situation where the Israelis and their neighbors are going to like each other—that isn't ever going to happen, perhaps—but where they will live with each other, where they won't be fighting each other.

Now, to speculate about what is going to happen in the event that Israel is going to go down the tube would only tend to inflame the situation with Israel's neighbors. And I won't do it.

*Mr. Severeid: Would it, Mr. President, calm the situation and help the prospects for peace if we did have some formal alliance with the State of Israel?*

*The President:* No, I don't believe so, because I think that what we are doing for Israel is so well known to them—and also incidentally it is quite well known to their neighbors—that it provides the balance that is needed.

We just provided a \$500 million aid program for Israel. I say "aid"—they are going to be able to purchase weapons to that extent. We have made it clear time and again that we would help to maintain the balance of power in the area, so that Israel would not be in a position that its neighbors could overwhelm them with their superior manpower or with the forces that they got from the Soviet Union. But I do not believe that a formal

alliance would be—is either necessary or would be in the interest of peace in the area.

*Mr. Smith: The kind of thing that bothers me is the tendency toward adventurism in that part of the world by the Russians. They are manning the SAM sites, and last summer—it wasn't widely publicized, but eight Israeli jets were on patrol, they ran into eight Egyptian MIG's, there was a fight, and over the radio they heard they weren't Egyptians, they were Russian-piloted MIG's. The score was four Russians shot down. But how frightfully dangerous that is. If the Russians had been tempted to retaliate, then it could have become terribly complicated.*

*The President:* Mr. Smith, you will remember in the last 5 minutes of our conversation a year ago, we didn't get to the Mideast till the last 5 minutes, but I mentioned this very point, that the key to peace in the Mideast is held by several people: first, the parties involved, the Israelis and their neighbors, primarily the U.A.R. and Jordan; but second, the key to peace is in the hands of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France—the four major powers.

If the Soviet Union does not play a conciliatory peacemaking role, there is no chance for peace in the Mideast, because if the Soviet Union continues to fuel the war arsenals of Israel's neighbors, Israel will have no choice but to come to the United States for us to maintain the balance to which Mr. Severeid referred. And we will maintain that balance.

That is why it is important at this time that the Soviet Union and the United States as well as Britain and France all join together in a process of not having additional arms and additional activities go into that area, because that will only mean that it produces the possibility of a future confrontation.

This is the time to talk. Let me say one other thing with regard to the talk. I would hesitate to give advice to other nations as they enter such delicate talks, but I am sure of this: These talks will have no chance for success if they are done in a public forum. It is very important that it be done quietly, because every time an offer is made or a suggestion is made, it is talked about in the

parliaments of one country or another, on the radio—you can forget it. So, if these talks can be quietly conducted, there is a chance for success, and in the end we want to remember that the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France must all be, and I think will be, in a position to guarantee whatever settlement is made through the United Nations.

#### 4

### **Purported Israeli Proposals for the Conditions of a Middle East Settlement As Allegedly Contained in a Memorandum Presented by Premier Meir to U.N. Envoy Jarring on a Visit to Israel<sup>1</sup>**

Jerusalem, January 8, 1971

The central purpose of the discussions between Jordan<sup>2</sup> and Israel is the establishment of peace between them. All the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 242 are within the context of the establishment of the just and durable peace which is the paramount aim of this resolution.

Israel regards peace with Jordan<sup>2</sup> as a concept embracing good neighbourly relations and cooperation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. But whether or not peace receives its full expression in the immediate future, there are certain indispensable essentials without which a situation cannot be regarded as a situation of peace. Peace involves amongst other things:

1. The declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict as finally terminated.

2. Respect and acknowledgement by the parties in explicit terms of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

3. Establishment of secure, recognized and agreed boundaries.

4. Other additional arrangements for ensuring security.

5. Withdrawal of military forces from territories lying beyond positions agreed in the peace treaty.

6. Termination of all states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency.

7. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in its territory against the population, citizens or property of the other party.

8. Termination of all discriminations or interferences, economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott. This obligation is not dependent on anything except the conclusion of the state of war.

9. Provisions laying down the obligations accepted by the parties towards the settlement of the refugee problem, after which neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

10. Arrangements concerning places of religious and historic significance.

11. Arrangement for free port and transit facilities.

12. Non-participation in hostile alliances and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the other.

13. Non-interference in domestic affairs and non-interference in the normal foreign relations of the other party.

14. Peace must be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal law and precedent.

<sup>1</sup> Text of Third Section, that dealing with Jordan, of memorandum reportedly given by Israel to Jarring, as obtained by and published in *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), No. 525, January 26, 1971, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Or UAR or Lebanon.

## 5

# **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Yugoslavia of Foreign Minister Zahedi of Iran (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Belgrade, January 8, 1971

At the invitation of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Empire of Iran H.E. Ardeshir Zahedi paid an official visit to the SFR of Yugoslavia from 5 to 8 January 1971.

. . . . .

Reviewing the situation in the Middle East the two Ministers expressed their concern over the continuation of the crisis and the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and considered the full implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and the General Assembly resolution of 4 November 1970 essential to a satisfactory solution of this long pending problem. The two Ministers emphasized that withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories is a necessary condition for the solution of the crisis. They expressed their determination to exert every possible effort to ensure the establishment of a just and lasting peace, while preserving the legitimate rights of the Arabs, including the people of Palestine.

. . . . .

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 499 (January 20, 1971), p. 15.

## 6

# **Commentary on Clashes Between the Jordan Army and Palestinian Commandos, Published in U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Moscow, January 11, 1971

The fratricidal clashes in Jordan only play into the hands of the most vicious enemies of the Arabs. The present clashes weaken their common front, destroy their unity and distract attention from the main task—the struggle against the imperialist machinations in the Middle East and for the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

There are serious grounds for believing that the exacerbation of the situation in Jordan was provoked by agents of imperialism.

[Drawing attention to the fact that a flare-up of the Jordanian crisis coincided with the resumption of the Jarring mission]:

Tel Aviv, compelled under the pressure of world public opinion to agree to resume contacts with Dr. Gunnar Jarring, is trying to bargain about the conditions of a settlement.

In this context, a weakening of the eastern flank of the Arab states resisting the Israeli aggression and attempts to destroy the Palestinian resistance movement were among the strategic aims of Tel Aviv, supported by Washington.

[Referring to the efforts of the Arab countries to quench the flames of civil war in Jordan]:

All the friends of the Arab peoples and all those who are interested in the triumph of the cause of justice and peace in the Middle East want to see the Arab states overcome the difficulties that have emerged as quickly as possible.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Russian commentary by Y. Glukhov (*Pravda*, January 11, 1971), *Soviet News*, No. 5576 (January 12, 1971), p. 10.

## 7

# **Statements Pledging Soviet Support for the U.A.R., Made by President Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. on an Official Visit to Egypt<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, January 13, 1971

In defiance of the will of the peoples of the world, the UN Charter and international law, the Israeli extremists continue illegitimately to hold the Arab lands they occupied in the summer of 1967. More than that, they are trying to perpetuate their occupation and are refusing to withdraw their forces.

The expansionist policy of the ruling circles in Israel poses a direct threat to peace. They have established a serious source of war in the Middle East which had long been increasing tension in the international situation as a whole. Nobody can doubt that Israel would not have been able to pursue such a policy without the active support of the United States and its generous financial grants and military equipment.

Recently, the Israeli leaders finally announced their agreement to start negotiations through the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, and have even established contact with him. However, it appears from world press reports that they do not approve of full withdrawal of their forces from all the Arab territories they usurped in 1967. The demonstrations of the Israeli leaders' military spirit have not abated; rather have they intensified and become more

active. Naturally, all this requires extreme vigilance.

The UAR and the other Arab countries are valiantly waging a just struggle in defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The UAR people and leaders have shown to the whole world their goodwill and readiness and work to reach a peaceful political solution for the Middle East crisis on the basis of complete implementation of the UN Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967. The constant adventurist Israeli policy prompts the UAR to couple its political and diplomatic activity with constant work to strengthen its defence potential. The Soviet people understand the line pursued by the UAR leaders. You can, dear friends, as in the past, rely on USSR support in pursuing this multi-sided policy.

## 8

# **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Spain of Foreign Minister Bel Abbas of Morocco (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Madrid, January 13, 1971

On the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senor López Bravo, and in the context of the regular contacts carried out between the Spanish and Moroccan authorities, His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Kingdom of Morocco, Dr. Youssef Bel Abbas arrived in Madrid last Monday [January 11, 1971] at the head of a high-level delegation of Moroccan government officials.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Podgorny's speech at a banquet in his honor given by U.A.R. President Sadat as broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3584/A/2; reprinted by permission.

Podgorny reiterated U.S.S.R. support for the U.A.R. on other occasions during this visit, including the rally marking the opening of the Aswan Hydroelectric Complex on January 15 (see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 3 (February 16, 1971), pp. 8-9), and a banquet he gave in Cairo on January 18 (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3588/E/3 and E/4).

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Spanish text of the communiqué, *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), No. 113 (January-February, 1971), p. 170.

Spanish Foreign Minister López Bravo paid an official visit to Morocco March 12-15, 1971, at which time the Middle East was again discussed; the resulting joint communiqué, issued March 16, 1971, made no new points on the two nations' views on the Middle East.

In these meetings and talks with General Franco and other high officials—which took place in an atmosphere of great cordiality, reflecting the fraternal relations which have traditionally prevailed between the two countries—there was a wide exchange of points of view on the present international political situation, and in particular an analysis of the various tensions which at present exist throughout the world.

The two parties reiterated their common concern about the development of the Middle East problem and reaffirmed their conviction for the necessity of finding a solution within the framework of the United Nations and with absolute respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

They likewise emphasized the firm desire of both countries—situated at the gateway to the Mediterranean—to make of this sea an area of peace, stability and fruitful cooperation among all the coastal nations.

## 9

### **Statement by Premier Demirel of Turkey Expressing Turkish Support for U.N. Resolution 242 and Opposition to the Acquisition of Territory by Force<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, January 15, 1971

Turkey believes all nations must try to establish peace and stability in the world. . . . Turkish insistence on a peaceful solution to the Middle East issue is based on this belief. . . . We support all efforts aimed at a lasting and just solution to the issue according to the UN Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967 and considering the legitimate rights of our Arab brethren. We have never changed

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Demirel's speech at a banquet in honor of visiting Vice-President Ammash of Iraq from the report of the banquet broadcast on Ankara Home Service in Turkish; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3587/E2/1; reprinted by permission.

our contention that the territories occupied during the 1967 war must be evacuated within the framework of the UN resolution. We always oppose territorial extension or political advantage through force. We do not favour *faits accomplis*, we do not recognise the unilateral measures in Jerusalem, and we do not believe that efforts aimed at changing the status of this holy city will be fulfilled.

## 10

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.A.R. of U.S.S.R. President Podgorny (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Cairo, January 19, 1971

Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, paid an official visit to the United Arab Republic from January 13 to 19, 1971, at the invitation of President Anwar Sadat of the UAR.

Nikolai Podgorny and the party accompanying him took part in the celebrations held in the United Arab Republic on January 15, 1971, on the occasion of the completion of the construction and commissioning of the Aswan hydro-electric complex. The distinguished guest and those accompanying him attended a mass meeting devoted to this event, inspected the high dam and the hydro-electric station built with the Soviet Union's technical and economic assistance and met workers, builders and engineers who took part in this great project.

Special attention was given to the dangerous situation in the Middle East resulting from Israel's aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab states. Israel's aggression is another link in the general chain

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué as published in *Soviet News*, No. 5577 (February 16, 1971), p. 22.

of the policy of imperialist forces which want to stop the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Arab East. Israel, which is carrying out an aggressive expansionist policy that is made possible only by the unceasing support given by imperialist forces and, first of all, the United States, is flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law and is committing aggression against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Arab countries.

Both sides noted with satisfaction that their views coincided on the principles of struggle against imperialism and colonialism and also noted that the development and strengthening of co-operation between Arab countries was one of the most important conditions for success in the struggle to curb Israel's criminal policy and to eliminate the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression, with the aim of securing the further prosperity and progress of Arab states.

Examining the question of the peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, the two sides expressed their firm conviction that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East could only be ensured by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and by the fulfilment in full of the November 22, 1967 resolution of the United Nations Security Council, as well as by the fulfilment of the United Nations resolutions confirming the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The UAR leaders noted the great importance of the joint actions of socialist countries in support of the just struggle of the Arab peoples against the aggression of Israel and the United States which is backing it. They especially noted the importance of the statement by the meeting of the political consultative committee of Warsaw Treaty member-states held in Berlin on December 2, 1970, on the establishment of lasting peace and security in the Middle East.

The Soviet side again assured the UAR leaders and the entire Egyptian people that the Soviet Union would continue to support the UAR people in their just struggle against the Israeli aggression, for the liberation of all

Arab territories occupied by Israel and for a just settlement of the Middle East conflict.

## 11

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Turkey of Vice-President Ammash of Iraq (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Ankara, January 20, 1971**

In response to an official invitation extended by the Government of the Republic of Turkey, His Excellency Staff General Saleh Mehdi Ammash, Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq and Member of the Revolutionary Command Council, paid an official visit to Turkey from the 15th to 20th January 1971. He was accompanied by His Excellency Mr. Abdul Karim Al-Shaikhly, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a number of specialists and experts.

The two sides reviewed the serious situation prevailing in the Middle East. They outlined their respective positions on this problem and restated their belief in a solution based on equity and justice. His Excellency the Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq expressed the thankfulness and appreciation of the Republic of Iraq for the support of the Turkish Government to the legitimate rights and interests of Arabs in this question. He also expounded in detail the viewpoint of the Iraqi Government on the Palestinian question and reiterated the full adherence and support of the Republic of Iraq to all Arab rights and in particular to the cause of the Palestinian people in order to secure their free legitimate rights.

The Turkish side, reaffirming the friendship and sympathy of Turkey towards all Arab countries, restated Turkey's firm opposition

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué as published in *Dişişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni* (Ankara), No. 76 (January, 1971), pp. 37, 39.



to the use of force as a means of securing territorial gains and political advantage and the use of such gains to impose unilateral solutions. The Turkish side also called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories in conformity with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and expressed their conviction in the necessity of the continuation of the present talks and efforts.

## 12

**World Council of Churches Central Committee Recommendations Calling for Support of the Jarring Mission and Implementation of All United Nations Resolutions on the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

Addis Ababa, January 21, 1971

3. The Central Committee calls upon the member churches of the WCC to urge their governments to assist the UN in the effective implementation of its Security Council's resolutions conceived to bring about self-determination and independence or to contribute to peace-making in especially explosive areas, such as the Middle East.

With reference to this conflict, the Central Committee, in reaffirming its statement of Canterbury 1969 welcomes the resumption of the peace efforts and calls upon the member churches to urge their governments to support the mission of Ambassador Jarring and to urge the parties concerned to take immediate, practical and effective steps towards the implementation of all United Nations resolutions concerning this conflict.

4. The Central Committee instructs the CCIA to mobilize the support of non-govern-

mental organizations to these same ends and to stimulate its Commissioners and national CCIA's to give a high priority to these concerns.

## 13

**Reply to a Press Conference Question on the Possibility of the Duration of a Middle East Settlement Ignoring the Rights of the Palestinians Made by President Pompidou of France<sup>2</sup>**

Paris, January 21, 1971

*Q. Mr. President, the resumption of the Jarring negotiations makes it possible to envisage a compromise between Israel and the Arab countries. Do you believe, Mr. President, that a solution that ignored the political and human rights of the Palestinian people would have any chance of lasting?*

A. Being by nature optimistic, I try never to jeopardize the prospects for peace. Consequently, I dare not say that we can now still have any hopes for the Jarring negotiations. However, I observe that they are underway, that both sides are responding and that, consequently, we can hope that a step has been made.

*Q. In what direction?*

A. France took a position at the start. She has never changed it, and if people sometimes think that they can detect changes this is because, perhaps as a result of strong feelings or lack of attention, they did not listen carefully enough at the start. We have always maintained Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized frontiers and Israel's obligation to withdraw from all the territories occupied after the Six Day War.

This position is unchanged. It would be turning our backs on every chance of peace

<sup>1</sup> Recommendations 3 and 4 proposed by the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs and adopted by the W.C.C. Central Committee meeting January 10-21, 1971 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; text from *Central Committee of the World Council of Churches: Minutes and Reports of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1971), pp. 67-68.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the excerpted French text of Pompidou's press conference as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1971), p. 57.

not to give priority to an agreement among states and, consequently, to an agreement subscribed to by Israel and the United Arab Republic, naturally, and by Jordan, at the very least. As for the problem of the Palestinian people, which I was, perhaps, the first to raise, I simply say that it will be settled, that it must be settled, when the time comes, by free consultation of peoples. And I also think that if peace were to be established, that is what might happen; at least, that is what King Hussein himself told me.

#### 14

### **Commentary on the U.S. Role in the Suppression of the Palestinian Commandos in Jordan Published in the China Weekly Peking Review<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, January 22, 1971**

U.S. imperialism has set Jordan's reactionaries on the Palestinian guerrillas again. A full-scale armed suppression campaign has been in progress since January 8. Tanks and heavy artillery were used by the Jordanian troops called out to do the job. It was the U.S. imperialists' and Jordanian reactionaries' hope to liquidate the Palestinian revolution with one fell blow. The manoeuvre makes it clear once again that for all its mouthings about "keeping the peace in the Middle East" U.S. imperialism is in fact mainly responsible for the slaughtering of the Palestinian people. It is the sworn enemy of the 100 million Arab people.

This fresh suppression of the Palestinian guerrillas was engineered from beginning to end by U.S. imperialism. It was another insidious application of the so-called "Nixon doctrine" of using "Arabs to attack Arabs" with the money and guns supplied by the United States.

Last September, U.S. imperialism instigated the Jordanian reactionaries to eliminate

the Palestinian guerrillas. The plot failed to come off. Since then Washington has stepped up its efforts to groom Jordan's reactionary forces militarily, politically and economically. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence David Packard openly declared, as early as September 25 last year, that the United States intended to make up for the arms lost by the reactionary Jordanian forces in action against the guerrillas. He said the "continuing military capability" of the Jordanian reactionaries should be ensured. U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon indicated the next day that the United States "will assume this responsibility to make good the losses suffered by the Jordanians in the recent struggle." To give the Jordanian reactionaries a shot in the arm, he authorized appropriation of five million U.S. dollars for these stooges. U.S. planes, tanks, field pieces and ammunition were shipped to Jordan in a steady flow from the end of September.

Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization pointed out early last November that U.S. imperialism and the Jordanian reactionaries "are preparing for a second battle. This has been shown in the activities of airplanes unloading in Amman bombs, tanks and weapons of various kinds and ships unloading at Aqaba (port in southern Jordan) other tanks, guns and weapons. The United States is supplying the Jordanian Government with complete equipment for an armoured division." By redoubling its efforts to equip the Jordanian reactionaries, U.S. imperialism has enabled the Jordanian army not only to replenish its losses in arms quickly but increase its troop strength on a big scale, in preparation for a new attack against the Palestinian guerrillas.

On November 18, 1970, Nixon asked the U.S. Congress to provide the Jordanian reactionaries with 30 million U.S. dollars. He praised the Jordanian authorities for their "determination and capacity" to liquidate the Palestinian guerrillas "which oppose a peace settlement." In the course of his closed-door meetings with Nixon during his December visit to the United States, King

<sup>1</sup> *Peking Review*, XIV, 4 (January 22, 1971), pp. 15-16.

Hussein of Jordan asked the U.S. president for 200 million U.S. dollars in "military aid." He was quoted as being very much encouraged by his talks with the U.S. president. As revealed by the U.A.R. paper *Al Ahram* on December 11, during Hussein's stay in the United States the U.S. Government promised to provide the Jordanian authorities with 110 light armoured cars, 45 Patton tanks and 18 Starfighter interceptors. In addition to the U.S. dollars and weapons, U.S. imperialism sent a large number of military advisers, experts and officials to Jordan to take a direct part in the spade-work to be done for suppressing the Palestinian guerrillas. In the massacre of last September, a U.S. command unit directed operations in Amman for the Jordanian reactionaries' armed attacks on the Palestinian guerrillas. In this connection, mention may be made of the identification card of a U.S. marine corporal named Mark Lenner which fell into the hands of the Palestinian guerrillas in Amman. These so-called U.S. advisers, experts and officials have stayed put in Jordan, where they are cooking up plots from behind the scenes to liquidate the Palestinian guerrillas. As disclosed by Chairman Yasser Arafat, violations of the ceasefire agreements reached between the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian authorities were, he said, "carried out with the actual and direct help of the American Ambassador (in Amman), American military advisers and American civilians. We have evidence to prove that those who were in the operational command (in Jordan) were American experts. They are still there."

Facts prove abundantly that U.S. imperialism is plotter and instigator in the suppression of the Palestinian guerrillas. U.S. State Department spokesman John King was obliged to admit at his January 12 news briefing that about the fighting in Jordan "we have information. We're, of course, in contact with the Jordanian authorities." But when a newsman asked him whether the Jordanian authorities had "begun a new effort to wipe out guerrillas," he lamely hedged with a disclaimer. "No, no, no. . . . I can't speak for the Jordanian Government." He contra-

dicted himself, trying to conceal what he had already unwittingly revealed. It was precisely the plotting and instigation of U.S. imperialism that led to the Jordanian reactionaries' frenzied armed attacks on the Palestinian guerrillas in defiance of world opinion and in disregard of the angry condemnation by the 100 million Arab people.

U.S. imperialism must repay in kind the blood debt it incurred in instigating the Jordanian reactionaries to massacre the Palestinian people. The Palestinian guerrillas are today fighting valiantly in self-defence in order to smash the criminal attempts of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys to stamp out the Palestinian revolution. The Arab people including the Jordanian people share an intense hatred for the enemy. They have excoriated U.S. imperialism and the Jordanian reactionaries for their crime in suppressing the Palestinian guerrillas. A revolutionary storm is striking U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in the Middle East. No one on earth can check the march of the Palestinian and Arab people.

## 15

### **Report Issued by the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, Adducing Abusive Policies and Practices on the Part of the Israeli Authorities in the Occupied Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>**

**Tel Aviv, January 23, 1971**

The legend about the "liberal occupation" has been broken to pieces.

In a meeting of students *Moshe Dayan* said:

A year ago an order was issued to the Israeli forces in Gaza, to shoot at attackers in the streets, so that if one shoots at our soldiers, they should fire back even if other persons were wounded.

<sup>1</sup> English version of report, entitled in English "The Horrors of Gaza Must Cease," issued by the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights (Tel Aviv, January, 1971).

I have been responsible for this order, and I would not complain if people would be hit in the streets. But the soldiers did not execute the order. They refused to shoot into the crowd and explained that they simply cannot do so. One has to shoot but one has also to see the common future. (*Yediot Ahronot*, January 7, 1971)

We can learn from Dayan that the situation in Gaza is such that soldiers of the Israeli army refuse to execute an order which permits mass murder, because the elementary human consciousness tells them that even an order of state authority cannot allow murder of innocent civilians.

By the way, as far as we know, Dayan was not accurate: not all Israeli soldiers have refused to obey his order; but we congratulate the ones who did refuse.

However, the Israeli paper with the greatest circulation had a different opinion, which it expressed in the following proposal to the Israeli commanders: "Let them take care at least to explain very carefully to the soldiers that sometimes one has to take some drastic steps which are 'not pleasant'..." (*Ma'ariv*, January 7, 1971).

Of course a permission for mass murder needs a great deal of explaining...

Some days later the Israeli papers announced that for the first time units of the Border Guards (the "Green Berets") were transferred to the Gaza Strip "in order to execute police duties in the area" and that "they are well known for their strong hand" (*Ha'aretz*, January 11, 1971).

As it is known, the Border Guards, who are called "Green Berets," were found guilty in the past of committing the Massacre of Kefar-Kassem, in which they murdered in cold blood 49 people, among them children, on one day. The maximum punishment then inflicted for this foul mass murder was—3½ years of actual imprisonment. The man directly responsible for the order to kill, Colonel Shadmi, was fined one Agora (about one cent). Since then, these units, especially after inception of the occupation, have written a glorious chapter in the history of the oppression of peoples.

And thus, as soon as the Green Berets arrived in Gaza, the following reports were published in the Israeli press: "The police minister said: 'We are taking matters into our hands'" (*Ha'aretz*, January 5).

*Ma'ariv* wrote: "The population of the Gaza Strip will have to pass through a very prolonged 'course' of 'good behaviour'" (January 4).

How is a course of 'good behaviour' passed? This is shown in the following reports:

The Green Berets and men of the Israeli army continued yesterday to act with a strong hand. In Gaza 3 persons were wounded yesterday, when they did not obey an order to stop and identify themselves. The Green Berets react to every provocation and disobedience. This morning they shot and wounded 2 persons in Gaza. In the first case, Green Berets saw 2 boys who *incited* to close stores. The patrol demanded of them to identify themselves, but they started to run away. One was shot and wounded, the second one was caught without being wounded. Half an hour later, Green Berets opened fire upon a boy who did not respond to their calling him. By these shots a girl passer-by was wounded. (*Ha'aretz*, January 12)

Five inhabitants were wounded last evening by shots of the Israeli army. The patrol had ordered a number of inhabitants to stop and identify themselves. Instead of stopping, they ran away and entered a local bus. The patrol opened fire on the lower part of the bus, in direction of the inhabitants who had taken shelter in the bus. By the shots 5 persons were wounded, 3 were hospitalized (*Ha'aretz*, January 15).

Perhaps the Israeli press can explain how one shoots at a bus full of civilians and is able to hit precisely those who had run away...

Persons who live in the areas under curfew and who work outside, have been allowed to leave the area—but sources in the military government confirmed that they are not allowed to return to their homes once they have left. The director of Nasser Hospital added that there were 6 women in the hospital who delivered babies recently, but who could not be discharged because they live in Shati (a refugee camp) and cannot go home... (*Jerusalem Post*, January 15).

For the first time since the war, the Israeli press admits that this is not a "liberal occupation." These are most extensive oppressive operations. There are entire areas, inhabited by tens of thousands of people, which are under curfew since several weeks. Workers strike. Pupils strike. Store-keepers strike. Mass detentions. Mass trials. Shots at passers-by.

But the reports published in the Israeli press are fragmentary, and mostly incorrect. The situation is much worse.

The following are additional reports. They were extremely carefully collected by us from Israeli eye-witnesses, from those few who said: "We cannot see such things and keep silent"—and they acted according to their conscience. We report to you about the situation in Gaza as it is in reality:

The Green Berets who patrol the Gaza Strip are equipped, in addition to their weapons, with clubs or whips. They stop inhabitants, beat them savagely, literally 'break their bones, in order to scare them. They use whips on people as one uses them on beasts. The cruel beating and whipping causes many inhabitants to run away as soon as they see Green Berets. This is the real reason for what is later described in the press as "shots at persons who had tried to run away." In this manner hundreds of people, among them women, children and old people, have been hit. The Israeli press, as usual, tries to deny. In the *Ha'aretz* of January 15, the following passage appeared:

Reports of foreign correspondents, according to which hospitals in Gaza are filled with persons beaten or wounded by shots of the security forces, are wholly untrue. On visiting yesterday 3 hospitals in Gaza (the Baptist, Shifa and Nasser Hospitals), I found in all three of them three inhabitants.

This description of *Ha'aretz* is not only contradicted by Israeli eye-witnesses, but it does not stand the simple test, when compared with the daily reports in the Israeli press about the number of the wounded.

And indeed on the very same day the correspondent of the *Jerusalem Post* saw that "...the Baptist Hospital treated six men

in the out-patient clinic for lacerations which doctors said had been caused by beatings, and at Shifa Hospital, Dr. Tarazi pointed out two male patients who said they had been beaten by soldiers" (*Jerusalem Post*, January 15).

But naturally most of the wounded do not reach any hospital in the situation now prevailing in the Gaza Strip.

*Interrogation* of suspects is carried out with extreme brutality. A doctor, who had worked in the Gaza Strip, reported:

A person was brought to me, who had been wounded by shots in his legs. My first diagnosis was, that one leg was lost and the second leg could be saved if the wounded person could be quickly transferred to the hospital in Askalon (in Israel). The security forces refused, and in accordance with an order given by a highranking officer, the wounded man was taken away and returned after four hours and by that time the second leg too was lost....

*Searches* in the refugee camps and in the poor neighbourhoods are carried out accompanied by maltreatment of the inhabitants and wholesale destruction of their wretched possessions. These searches are carried out by the Green Berets and the Reconnaissance Unit. These usually strip women naked under the pretext of a "search", and stand them nude or almost nude against a wall. In the same way they treated a busful of nurses on their way to hospital. In the same manner they acted in main streets. After the intervention of international factors this maltreatment on main streets ceased, but it continues in side streets. Jewelry and watches of the women are robbed in bright daylight and the few belongings of poor families are savagely shattered and destroyed.

*Thousands of people are detained.* Because of "want of space" in the ordinary jails, a huge concentration camp has been opened on the sea shore opposite the "Employment Battalion." Horrible cries are heard for hours on hours from that place, which is out of bounds even for Israeli soldiers.

*A Concentration Camp for Families* of "wanted persons" was opened in the Central Sinai

Desert, at Nahl, in the district of Kosseimeh, and this camp is being speedily enlarged. Women and children, whose only crime is that they are relatives of "wanted persons," are confined in this desert place. With this criminal action against women and children the Government of oppression has reached a new record of barbarity. Adding hypocrisy to crime, the order was given that at least one man must be deported and confined together with such a family, "so that it might not be said that we desecrate the honour of Arab women."

*Male relatives of "wanted persons"* (brothers, nephews, cousins etc.) are confined in another concentration camp in the Sinai Desert, in the Abu-Rudeis District, in accordance with an "official deportation order," as instructed by an explicit order of the highest authorities. The only crime of those confined is that they are relatives of a person who himself is not more than merely suspected!

*Do not try to evade responsibility for these crimes under the pretext that you did not know.*

*Do not try to hide behind miserable claims to some imaginary honour. Do not try to say that the events truthfully described here are an "insult to the whole State" and a "profanation of the Knesset"—the Israeli parliament—as was attempted by Mr. Gideon Hausner, the attorney general in the Eichmann trial. (Ma'ariv, January 21)*

*True honour is the revelation of the whole truth. True honour is respect for human rights.*

*Your true honour, citizen, is to demand the immediate stopping of the oppression and maltreatment.*

*We call upon all Israeli citizens and upon all persons of conscience anywhere in the world:*

*Lift your voice against the horrors committed in Gaza!*

*We warn: possibly the situation will still more deteriorate.*

*We demand to establish an independent public-judiciary commission in order to investigate the situation in Gaza.*

*We call upon all soldiers and civilians who are in Gaza or in any other occupied area, not to keep silent, but to testify about what they see and hear. Do not pass without reacting any place from which you hear the cries of tortured human beings! Do not*

*pay any attention to orders calling for silence. Remember: the one who is silent, helps the torturers!*

*We call upon all Israelis to join us in the demonstration on Monday, February 1, 1971, at 3.30 p.m., in front of the Knesset, Jerusalem!*

## 16

### **Statements Condemning Israeli Aggression in and Occupation of Arab Territory Issued in Resolutions Adopted by the Fourth Congress of the All-African Trade Union Federation<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, January 24, 1971**

The Conference, having studied the dangerous situation in the Middle East resulting from Israel's June 1967 aggression against the UAR and Israel's persistence in defying the world public . . . condemns the imperialist Israeli aggression against the UAR and the other Arab countries and the continuation of this aggression.

The conference emphasises that the establishment of a permanent and just peace in the Middle East depends on Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the Palestinian people's right to return home in accordance with the Security Council and UN resolutions. The conference also condemns the United States which supports and backs this aggression. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from excerpts from a report of the resolutions broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3594/E/2; reprinted by permission.

Information provided by the A.A.T.U.F. General Secretariat indicates that organizations represented at the Fourth Congress came from the following countries: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Réunion, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia.

## 17

**Statements on the Status of Progress Towards a Middle East Settlement Made by Foreign Minister Schumann of France in a Magazine Interview<sup>1</sup>**

January 26, 1971

*Q. How successful has the "Rogers Plan" been?*

A. One provision of the "Rogers Plan" has been applied: the cease-fire. In spite of the grave difficulties involved in its implementation, the cease-fire is still in force, and that is an important achievement.

There have also been a certain number of other positive consequences. For one thing Israel, stating her position on this subject, has been brought to do something she had never done before, to state that she accepts the November 22, 1967 resolution. Also the U.A.R. and Jordan have confirmed that they recognize Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized frontiers. Finally the Rogers Plan has made it possible to reaffirm Dr. Jarring's role.

However, it is difficult to see how the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be able to carry out his task to the end, that is to say to facilitate an amicable solution to the conflict, as long as he has no directives from the four permanent members of the Security Council.

*Q. Has France a plan to "relaunch" negotiations by the Four?*

A. It is not necessary to "relaunch" consultations by the Four; they are still going on. Unfortunately they have made scarcely any progress since the end of last spring. More immediate problems in the news, the implementation of the cease-fire or the incidents in Jordan, have distracted attention. I regret this, because if the "Big Four," out of their collective responsibility to the international community and more precisely to the Security

Council, do not propose, as I have already said, the main lines of a settlement that the parties would be free to accept, reject or modify, there is a danger that Dr. Jarring may be unable in 1971—just as he was in 1969—to perform the whole of his mission. Having no proposal to make he runs the risk of being confronted by his interlocutors with extreme and contradictory demands.

It will never be too late to resume a task already well begun. So I shall insist more and more adamantly that the "Big Four" respond to the confidence that opinion has placed in them.

## 18

**Statement Supporting the U.A.R. and the Palestinian People Made by Vice-Chairman Kuo Mo-jo of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China<sup>2</sup>**

Peking, January 27, 1971

The people of the U.A.R. have a glorious tradition of opposing imperialism and colonialism. Today, under the leadership of President Sadat, the U.A.R. people are waging an unflinching struggle against U.S.-Israeli war threats and political blackmail.

In international affairs, the United Arab Republic pursues a policy of opposing imperialism and colonialism and safeguarding Afro-Asian unity. The just struggle and stand of the U.A.R. have won extensive praise and support among the Afro-Asian countries and people.

The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao issued the call in his solemn statement of May 20, 1970: "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!" The Middle East is an important battlefield where the world's people are dealing blows at U.S. imperialism

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of the Schumann interview conducted by Nicolas Martin, *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), No. 525 (January 26, 1971), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted English text of Kuo Mo-jo's speech at a banquet honoring visiting U.A.R. National Assembly Speaker Shukair, *Peking Review*, XIV, 6 (February 5, 1971), p. 3.

and its lackeys. Millions upon millions of Arab people have come to realize ever more clearly through the practice of struggle that only by defeating U.S. imperialism and driving all the forces of aggression out of the Middle East will it be possible for the Arab people to achieve complete national independence and sovereignty. The struggle of the Arab people and that of the world's people against U.S. imperialism co-ordinate with and support each other.

U.S. imperialism and all decadent forces on the verge of extinction will never be reconciled to their defeat. Recently, U.S. imperialism has flagrantly dispatched planes, warships and ground "advisers" to support the Lon Nol reactionary forces and the south Vietnamese puppet troops in their desperate attacks on the Cambodian National Liberation Armed Forces. In the Middle East, it has again instigated the Jordanian reactionary forces to carry out sanguinary suppression of the Palestinian guerrillas. Yet the outcome of the U.S. imperialist expansion of the war in Indo-China is that brilliant new victories have been won by the Cambodian patriotic armed forces and people. The perverse acts of the Jordanian reactionary forces have enabled the Palestinian people to experience a new tempering. In the future, the Palestinian people may yet encounter difficulties of this or that kind in their anti-imperialist struggle. But we firmly believe that the Palestinian people, who are resolved to be masters of their own destiny, will never lay down their arms in face of the butcher knives of the enemy. No enemy scheme can prevent the sure victory of the just cause of the Palestinian people!

The Chinese people have consistently given support to the just struggle of the U.A.R. people, the Palestinian and other Arab people. The Chinese people will forever remain their reliable friend in their anti-imperialist struggle.

19

### **Press Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers Expressing Optimism on Progress Towards Middle East Negotiations and Rejecting a Possible Return to Rhodes-type Talks<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 29, 1971

*Q. Could you tell us what your assessment of the present situation [in the Middle East] is as it regards the end of the cease-fire in February, and could you give us the basis for your assessment?*

*A.* Yes. We're encouraged by the developments in recent weeks. We are convinced that the parties may be on the verge of actually entering into serious negotiations. By and large, the exchange of the documents has been nonpolemical, and there is, I think, a growing awareness of the serious need to resolve this conflict by negotiations. Secondly, we think that the controversy has gotten to the point now where a mere exchange of papers is not the best way to proceed; and we think that negotiations should now take part on a more active basis, possibly over an extended period of time, with oral exchanges in private sessions.

We are very much encouraged by the very constructive attitude of Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring]—he's been working diligently, effectively, with the parties—and by the action of the Secretary General. We would hope that their actions will result in an extension of the cease-fire, because we think it's time now for the parties to discuss these matters without any outside interference, without any threat of deadlines, in a quiet atmosphere. So we are encouraged by what's happened.

We do hope that the process will continue. We are working quietly behind the scenes. We think this is the time for quiet diplomacy and military restraint.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from transcript of Rogers' press conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1651 (February 15, 1971), pp. 194, 195, 195-196.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, with reference to your comment about your hope that the negotiations on the Middle East may take a more active basis with oral exchanges, are you envisioning direct face-to-face talks between Israelis and their Arab neighbors in New York, or somewhere else?*

*A. No, I am not talking about face-to-face; I am talking about the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, but you don't have to have face-to-face negotiations to be more active in your discussions. I think discussions up to this point have consisted largely of exchange of views on paper. And although that is helpful to provide determined areas of agreement, it is not very useful when it comes to resolving the tough questions that remain.*

*Now, the fact is that the exchange of documents that have occurred recently under Ambassador Jarring's auspices have provided areas of agreement. And we would hope that the parties would use those areas of agreement as a foundation upon which to discuss the areas of disagreement that remain. And we think that the way to discuss those areas of disagreement is to do it actively and not be tied down to exchanging views on paper.*

*Q. Thank you. When you speak of more active talks on the Middle East, would you see returning to a Rhodes-type formula? And, if so, what is your definition of a Rhodes-type negotiation?*

*A. No, we would not see a return to the Rhodes-type formula. We would expect that the present Jarring-type formula would continue in existence. That is the essential part of our initiative. It has worked quite successfully so far, and we hope it will continue to. You have to keep in mind that we proposed that the parties stop fighting and start talking.*

*Now, they have done both of those things, and our initiative provides how the procedures can be worked out. We are giving Ambassador Jarring the authority to work out the procedures—times and places, and so forth, consistent with what he thinks will further the negotiations. We would hope that that process continues.*

*Q. Could you be more specific, sir, about the*

*areas of agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis?*

*A. No, I don't want to go into all of them, but I can give you a couple of examples.*

*A year ago, Israel resisted the use of the word "withdrawal." And the Arabs said, "Why doesn't Israel use the word 'withdrawal'?" They concluded from that [that] Israel had no intention of withdrawing at all from any territory. So that was a principal hurdle.*

*Israel said, "The Egyptians have no interest and willingness to recognize us as a sovereign nation because they will never say that they recognize Israel's right to exist." They said, "Egypt will use the words 'All the states in the area have a right to exist but not Israel.'"*

*Well, as a result of the initiative that we have taken, Israel used the word "withdrawal" to secure and recognized boundaries as provided in the Security Council resolution. Egypt, on the other hand, indicated a willingness to recognize the sovereign right of Israel to exist as a nation.*

*Then, there are other areas of agreement. I won't go into all of them. Those are two that are public knowledge. But there are other areas where there is substantial agreement.*

## 20

### **Remarks by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin Pledging Soviet Support to the Arabs, Supporting a Peaceful Settlement in the Middle East and Urging Arab Unity Made at a Dinner in Honor of Visiting Premier Assad of Syria<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, February 1, 1971**

*The C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the condensed translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, February 2, 1971) of Kosygin's speech, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 5, pp. 2, 3. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

Soviet government will strive for the further strengthening and expansion of Soviet-Syrian ties.

We assess Soviet-Syrian cooperation not only through the prism of our bilateral relations but also as a factor facilitating the strengthening of peace in the Near East.

The Soviet Union approaches the search for a settlement of the Near East crisis from a position of the establishment of a lasting and just peace.

The Soviet Union firmly and consistently stands on the side of the just cause of the Arabs and gives them all-round support. We demand the complete elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. The policy of Israel, which, relying on the forces of imperialism and reaction, is trying to retain the occupied territories, represents an encroachment on the independence and sovereignty of the neighboring Arab states. This policy closes off prospects of peaceful development and co-operation for the peoples of the Near East and creates a constant threat that a new conflict will flare up. It is also impossible not to see that the Near East crisis is fraught with the danger of serious international complications. It is natural that questions connected with the situation in the Near East and the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries must hold an important place in our talks.

A very important moment has now come in the development of events in the Near East. Under the pressure of world public opinion and as a result of the constructive policy of the U.A.R. government, Israel has agreed to a resumption of contacts with Gunnar Jarring, the representative of the U.N. Secretary General. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that in the present situation the most realistic path leading to a solution of the Near East crisis is the fulfillment of the Nov. 22, 1967, Security Council resolution, taking into consideration the legitimate rights of all states in the Near East, including the Arab people of Palestine. Further procrastination and attempts to bargain from positions of brute strength will not lead to the resolution of the question but will only intensify the critical nature of the situation. If we are to

strive for peace, for conditions in which all the peoples of the Near East will be able to live as good neighbors, then we should be guided first of all not by the ideas of the extremist politicians but by the genuine vital interests of the peoples. Now everyone awaits concrete peace-loving actions from Israel.

Guided by concern for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, the Soviet Union is developing its cooperation with the friendly Arab states and is giving them all necessary support. This applies in full measure to our relations with Syria.

The situation that exists in the world today makes the use of force for the solution of political problems hopeless. This applies not only to the Near East but also to Indochina and other parts of the world. . . .

We believe that the Arab countries will unite their efforts more closely in the anti-imperialist struggle, in the struggle for the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. During all these years, at all stages of the Near East crisis, imperialism has placed its stakes on the lack of unity in the world. Counting on this disunity, it unleashed aggression, and again counting significantly on this, it is at present trying to prolong the elimination of the consequences of aggression. The Soviet Union hails the efforts of the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Libyan Arab Republic aimed at strengthening the unity of their actions in the anti-imperialist struggle, and it has no doubt that all the other countries of the Arab East will also make a contribution to the strengthening of this unity.

. . . . .

## 21

# **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the Soviet Union of Premier Assad of Syria (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, February 3, 1971**

In response to the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet government, a party and government delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic, headed by General Hafez Assad, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Member of the Provisional Regional Command of the Baath Party, paid a friendly official visit to the U.S.S.R. February 1-3, 1971.

After discussing relevant questions, the two parties decided to continue to develop long-term Syrian-Soviet relations and expressed their readiness to promote and expand relations of full cooperation between the two countries.

They devoted special attention to discussing the situation in the Middle East that arose after the Israeli aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and the other Arab countries.

The two parties noted the dangers involved in the adventurist policy being pursued by Israel with regard to the problem of peace, which aims at maintaining the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories usurped in the June 1967 aggression. They also agreed that Israel would not have been able to continue her aggression and maintain her policy but for the support provided her by the forces of colonialism and imperialism headed by the United States of America and that this Israeli policy is a flagrant violation of the

United Nations Charter and the principles of international law which creates a direct threat to world peace, and a challenge to world public opinion.

In the view of the two parties it is essential that there be an early withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and that the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab nation, including the Palestinian Arab people, be guaranteed.

The Syrian delegation paid tribute to the firm and constant attitude of the U.S.S.R. in providing support and comprehensive aid to the Arab countries in their struggle to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli 1967 aggression.

The two parties believe that the statement on the Middle East situation issued by the meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact held in Berlin in December 1970, is of great support to the Arab countries in their struggle against Israeli aggression and the forces of world imperialism and Zionism for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories.

The two parties express their conviction that united action in the Arab countries in the present critical situation will contribute to the success of the just struggle in which the Arabs are engaged for their national independence and their social and economic progress, and for an early solution of the Middle East crisis.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 4, 1971. The main points contained in this communiqué were reiterated in the party communiqué issued June 21 following talks in Damascus between a U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Praesidium delegation and representatives of the Syrian People's Assembly (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3716/E/1-E/2), and that issued on October 27 on the occasion of the return visit of a People's Assembly delegation to Moscow (see *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 28, 1971).

## 22

**Tunisian Press Interview Statements Supporting the Jarring Mission, Expressing West German Readiness To Exercise Its Influence for a Middle East Settlement and Commenting on the New Realization of the Importance of the Palestinians, Made by F.R.G. Chancellor Brandt During a Visit to Tunisia<sup>1</sup>**

February 5, 1971

*Q. Do you think, Mr. Chancellor, that the justice and peace loving countries could play a role in speeding up the settlement of the Middle East conflict?*

A. I assume that all the countries which are making serious efforts to put an end to the Middle East conflict are guided in their policy by the principles of equity and the maintenance of peace. In my view the early realization of a peaceful solution does not depend on other states taking part in the present peace efforts but, first and foremost, on the success of the United Nations special envoy, Ambassador Jarring, on the basis of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. In any case, it is quite clear that the Federal German Republic is determined, to the extent of its limited resources, to use its influence in this area too in the interests of a secure peace.

*Q. Do you think that the Arab-Israeli conflict has taken on new dimensions through the affirmation of the Palestinian fact?*

A. The "Palestinian fact," as you call it, has always been an important aspect of the conflict because of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Perhaps a new element is the development of a world opinion which is today becoming more and more conscious of the importance of this problem and of the fact that a satisfactory settlement of the question of the refugees is necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Questions and answers relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict excerpted and translated from the French text of Brandt's exclusive interview conducted by Abu Ziad, *l'Action* (Tunis), February 5, 1971, p. 7.

## 23

**Knesset Speech by Premier Meir of Israel Clarifying Israeli Policy on an Interim Suez Settlement and on Various Steps Towards Peace, Made in Response to U.A.R. President Sadat's February 4 Proposals for a Thirty-Day Extension of the Middle East Ceasefire<sup>2</sup>**

Jerusalem, February 9, 1971

In my statement in the Knesset on December 29, 1970, I reported the Cabinet decision to terminate the suspension of our participation in the talks under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. I made it clear once again that we would act in accordance with the basic principles of the Government's policy and its decisions, which had been approved in the Knesset.

In other words, we shall act in accordance with the agreed policy of the Government to safeguard Israel's complete independence, the strengthening of her security and the advancement of peace between her and the neighbouring states, which will be founded on peace treaties achieved in direct negotiations between the parties without preconditions. In the peace treaties the agreed, secure and recognized borders will be laid down.

In the absence of peace, Israel will continue to maintain the situation as fixed at the cease-fire and will strengthen her position in keeping with the vital needs of her security and development. I also stressed that Israel is entitled to defensible, agreed frontiers. Israel will, therefore, never return to the borders of June 4, 1967, which heightened the temptation for aggression against our country.

I have repeatedly stated that we will continue to examine every possibility of achieving the longed-for peace, and in this connection I clarified our decision to respond to the American peace initiative on the cease-fire and the renewal of the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

<sup>2</sup> English text of Meir's speech as published in the *Jerusalem Post*, February 10, 1971, p. 3.

I think it is appropriate to recall the Government decision which was approved in the Knesset on August 4 last year, in which, *inter alia*, the following was stated:

"... (3) The discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices shall be held within the framework of Security Council Resolution (242) on the basis of the expression of readiness by the parties to carry out Security Council Resolution (242) in all its parts, in order to achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace agreement between the parties which will ensure:

(a) Termination by Egypt, Jordan and Israel of all claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Each of the parties will be responsible within its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military forces or para-military forces, including irregular forces, against the armed forces or against civilians living in the territory of the other party.

(b) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements.

(4) Israel will participate in those discussions without prior conditions. Israel will not claim the prior acceptance by the other party of her positions, as Israel does not accept in advance the positions of the other parties as communicated publicly or otherwise. Each party will be free to present its proposals on the matters under discussion.

After the Knesset approved my statement of December 29 and our participation in the talks was renewed, Ambassador Jarring was invited to visit Jerusalem. On the eve of the renewal of the talks we felt it advisable to clarify to him once again the principles of our policy, and to propose an efficient method and a suitable agenda for the conduct of the talks.

We aimed at a substantive clarification without delay. We had and we still have certain views concerning the venue and level

of the talks. But we did not press this aspect in order to avoid delay over procedural arguments.

I must note here that our discussions with Ambassador Jarring during his visit to Jerusalem were useful not only in our view, but also according to the testimony of the U.N. envoy himself.

We submitted to Ambassador Jarring detailed proposals, including fundamental principles for peace, and requested him to transmit these to the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee has been given detailed reports on this subject, and, for the time being, I still prefer to refrain from making these documents public.

Our aim in submitting these documents, was to ascertain whether each of the three governments was prepared to make peace with us. We focused the discussion from its inception on one simple, basic question: is each of the three neighbouring states indeed prepared to make peace with Israel—a peace the clear meaning of which would be to put an absolute end to the conflict and the fighting?

We did this in the conviction that only after a positive reply to this question had been received would the time come for discussion in detail with the aim of reaching agreement on all the clauses.

In these documents we raised simple, basic and elementary principles accepted in the world at large and incorporated in the concept of peace among nations and states—principles in the absence of which no "peace" can be a real peace. We emphasized our readiness, pursuant to the decision that I have just read to you, to enter into a discussion with the other parties with a view to reaching agreement on all the clauses of Resolution 242 of the U.N. Security Council, including withdrawal to secure and agreed borders to be determined in treaties of peace.

I firmly reject Egyptian and Jordanian charges that Israel has been evading discussion of any subject whatever contained in the clauses of the Security Council resolution.

The governments of the Arab countries submitted to Ambassador Jarring documents

which did not contain direct replies to the proposals we had made. The documents of the Arab states were nothing but a restatement of known positions, heavily coated with polemics. These documents evade the giving of direct replies. In accordance with our aim, which is to strive towards substantive talks, we preferred to refrain from replying to them with polemics, and to concentrate on the problems requiring clarification and agreement in the framework of peace agreements.

I must state with regret that in the documents submitted so far to Ambassador Jarring the representatives of the Arab states took care not to state expressly that it is a question of establishing peace with Israel, and they spoke only of "peace in the region." These governments have not kept their undertaking to conduct talks between the parties under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the purpose of "establishing a just and lasting peace between them," as is explicitly stated in the peace initiative of the U.S., which they accepted.

It is not by chance that they speak of the need for the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the region, but refrain from mentioning the name of Israel in this context.

Experience accumulated over 22 years proves that the expression "states of the region" has been adopted by the Arab governments for the purpose of excluding Israel and not in order to include her. When Egypt announced, on many occasions, that the Suez Canal, for example, would be open to "all states" she was referring in fact to "all states" except Israel, whose international rights Egypt does not recognize. Therefore, the repetition of this expression in Egyptian statements today gives us cause for concern. It reinforces the impression that the Arab rulers see the main function of the Jarring talks not in the attainment of peace, but in bringing about our withdrawal and achieving what they term: "the rights of the Palestinian nation."

So far the Arab delegates have not budged from their demand that the only subject to be considered should be withdrawal, despite the refusal to state explicitly their willingness

to make peace with Israel and to discuss the principles of peace proposed by us.

The Israel Government has instructed its representative, Ambassador Tekoah, to request a reply to the questions and proposals which we put, as, unless we receive a clear and positive answer to them, we see no point in discussing the clauses preferred by the Arab representatives. These clauses are included in the agenda which we proposed, but the time to discuss them will duly come in the framework of the discussions on the content of peace.

Following the resumption of the talks the Egyptian leaders did not stop uttering new threats every day or two for the purpose of arousing apprehension that they would open fire on February 5. These threats aroused passions in Egypt with the aim of creating an atmosphere of tension.

Since the beginning of January 1971 the campaign to inflame the atmosphere inside and outside Egypt, to prepare men's hearts for total war, has been intensified. This campaign has included declarations by leaders, mainly President Sadat, and also certain practical steps. I shall mention only a few declarations.

On January 4 (in Tanta), President Sadat spoke once again about the expected total war, "which may not only encompass the armies deployed opposite one another, but spread to every factory, plough, village and homeland." It should be noted that on that occasion thousands shouted their agreement with Sadat on Egypt's readiness to fight Israel.

On January 11 (at Assiut) Sadat said: "Israel will not escape punishment, no matter how long it takes." On this occasion also the crowd repeated 30 times "we shall fight."

In a television interview given to CBS (on January 10), Sadat repeated the threat that the fighting against Israel was likely to break out again on February 5, unless the four powers agreed on a practical settlement to the Middle East conflict.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad said in Paris (on January 9) that the war was likely to break out again in the Middle East after the end of the cease-fire period if the four powers did not intervene to impose peace.

The success of the regime in creating war

hysteria may be seen in the reaction to a speech of Sadat before the Egyptian People's Council on February 4. The crowd broke into prolonged, stormy cheering when Sadat said: "Our sacred duty, which no man can evade, is to free our soil and (that is) the reason for a clash with the enemy." Whereas not one assenting voice was heard when he stated the need to refrain from opening fire.

With all this, military preparations for the renewal of the war continued in Egypt—and all this while discussions were being held under Dr. Jarring's auspices. The people of Israel displayed exemplary coolness and maturity, in contrast with the bellicose atmosphere in Egypt. At the same time, the Israel Defence Forces were ready and prepared to fight back if war had been forced on us by the Egyptians.

Israel was still willing to continue with the cease-fire, not in order to perpetuate the *status quo*, as Sadat charges, but achieve the peace we desire.

All this time, and especially in the most recent period, Egypt has been resorting to steps and stratagems aimed at getting the four powers to do something to "implement the Security Council resolution." Egypt accepted the American initiative calling for talks under the auspices of Dr. Jarring in order to achieve a peace agreement between the parties. She even submitted documents to Dr. Jarring, but from the point of view of content evaded substantive discussion which was likely to lead to peace. On the contrary, and at the same time, she made deliberate efforts to get the four powers to take action leading to an imposed solution.

Instead of striving for an agreement between the parties on peace within secure and agreed frontiers, Egypt is seeking to endow the four powers with the authority to impose a settlement. Not only is this intention incompatible with the mission and authority of Ambassador Jarring under the terms of the Security Council resolution of November 1967, but it is aimed at sabotaging his mission.

The function of the U.N. envoy, as defined in the Security Council resolution, is to foster agreement and help to attain it by peaceful means. This was given added force by the

American initiative, as a result of which it was agreed that talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring should be started.

The four powers have no legal standing in connection with the Security Council resolution of November 1967, or in connection with other resolutions of the Security Council. The only thing that characterizes these four powers is their permanent membership of the Security Council, but that does not endow them with any special or additional authority in the settlement of the present conflict in the Middle East.

This is nothing but a group of countries with no formal status which meets to exchange views, without the authority to make decisions or issue guidelines to Ambassador Jarring.

Among the means to a political settlement raised by the Arab states—and, together with them, from time to time, in various versions, by other political elements as well—we hear vague talk about "international guarantees" and "policing units." The Government of Israel rejects any idea of regarding these concepts of international guarantees, or of a police force sponsored by any international authority whatever, as a substitute for a contractual and binding peace that includes defensible borders to be agreed upon in free negotiations between Israel and its neighbours.

The Government of Israel has not adopted any conception with regard to guarantees. The Government of Israel will be prepared to discuss additional security arrangements only after agreed security borders, specified in a peace treaty, have been determined.

Any discussion on the subject of guarantees in an international forum before there is agreement on peace and the borders of peace tends to help the Arab leaders in their purpose of exploiting the idea of guarantees in order to evade having to make peace, in the plain sense of the term, and presents guarantees as a substitute for the conditions that will lead to genuine peace.

Upon my accession to my present office, at the presentation of the Government to the Knesset on March 17, 1969, and on May 5, 1969, the early stages of the four-power talks,

I clearly stated in the Knesset that the four-power talks were an invitation to blackmail. As long as the illusion was implanted in the hearts of the Arab leaders that a solution was possible without negotiations between the Arab states and the State of Israel, the cause of peace was not advanced and a solution was being postponed. Like any independent state or any free nation, Israel will not allow its fate to be decided by anyone but itself.

I note with satisfaction that, so far, the U.S. Government has not given support to those groups that have tried to impede the progress of the talks under Dr. Jarring's auspices by discussions on substitutes and on the issuing of instructions to Dr. Jarring. It was the Soviet Union that demanded that the four powers issue instructions to the U.N. envoy, whereas the U.S. opposed this trend.

Recently, however, the U.S. had declared its readiness to discuss additional guarantees in the four-power forum. I shall not withhold from the Knesset the fact that I view this readiness to enter into such a discussion at this time and within the framework of the four powers, with grave concern, even after the U.S. has notified us that it is opposed to guarantees as a substitute for an agreement between the parties on peace borders but regards guarantees as supplementary to borders which will be agreed on.

We still demand firmly that the U.S. Government should refrain from supporting moves that may be exploited to facilitate efforts to evade peace. We have solid grounds for demanding this of the U.S. Government, knowing that it fully recognises the importance of reaching an agreement between the parties and firmly maintains the position that not a single Israeli soldier need withdraw from the cease-fire lines before a contractual and mutually binding peace has been achieved.

I wish to reiterate and emphasize our position that the achievement of a peace agreement with defensible and agreed borders must precede any discussion on supplementary arrangements.

On February 4, the President of Egypt delivered an address to the Egyptian National Council. To our great regret it was not a

speech of peace. In the course of the entire speech the President of Egypt refrained from saying that Egypt was ready to make peace with Israel—plainly and clearly: "Peace between Egypt and Israel."

He complains that Egypt had to wait several months for Israel to come to the Jarring talks. Sadat knows very well why Israel suspended its participation in the talks. He pretends not to know about the violation of the standstill agreement and the redeployment of the missiles, as though this was some minor matter, a mere pretext.

In his speech the Egyptian President restates the well-known Arab position—the doctrine of stages for "the implementation of the Security Council resolution," in other words, the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from all the areas up to the armistice lines and, following that, "the realization of the rights of the Palestinian people," which, in effect, is an expression of support for the plan of the terrorist organizations for the destruction of the State of Israel.

He even assures himself with a declaration that Egypt is not authorized to forgo this right. We will not divert our attention from this passage in Sadat's speech, which strengthens our conviction—made clear to Ambassador Jarring and included in our documents—that peace means the total and absolute termination of the Israel-Arab conflict, including, of course, an agreed solution of the refugee problem.

We believe that the refugee problem is a humanitarian problem. It is vital that the refugees be redeemed from their inferior position.

The refugee problem must find its agreed solution within the framework of peace. For this reason, and in view of the human aspect of the problem, we proposed to Ambassador Jarring that priority be given to this subject, and we have plans and proposals for a suitable solution of the problem to be arrived at by common effort.

On November 4, the President of Egypt stated, and I quote: "We are complying with the call of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and agree to refrain from opening fire



for a period which we cannot allow to exceed 30 days, which will end on March 7. It is therefore up to the Secretary-General of the U.N. and to international society to make sure that in that period there will be real progress in the essence of the problem and not only in its external manifestations."

I am sure that not only the Israel Government, but every man in Israel is glad that the war was not renewed on February 5. We want peace, not another victory. And so long as the firing has not been resumed, it is to be hoped that the renewal of the war can be prevented.

But to my great regret I must state the grave truth: That the announcement of abstention from shooting for not more than 30 days is equivalent to a threat to renew the war on March 7, 1971. We are invited to continue with talks in an eve-of-war atmosphere, in the shadow of an ultimatum, and on the basis of the unrealistic claim that agreement can be reached on such a complex subject in such a brief period.

It should be remembered that the talks are not being conducted directly, but by a system in which each party submits a document to Jarring and waits for the response of the other party.

This announcement of abstention from shooting which "we cannot allow to extend for longer than 30 days," is not calculated to create the essential conditions required for real progress.

I affirm that Israel has no interest in or intention of engaging in the Jarring talks for purposes of procrastination. With all our hearts we want to get progress on an agreement on all matters. An announcement of abstention from shooting for not more than 30 days is equivalent to the declaration of a date for the renewal of the war and adds a heavy weight on the Jarring talks.

We cannot permit ourselves to ignore systematic and practical measures which reveal large-scale warlike preparations on the part of the Egyptians. The fixing of a term of 30 days has aroused great disappointment and alarm in world public opinion, which hopes for serious and free negotiations.

I indicated the gravity and the danger of the

statement by the President of Egypt on February 4. That statement contravenes the Security Council resolution of June 1967 on a cease-fire unlimited in time. Nevertheless, as long as Egypt has not renewed the fighting, in spite of the threat implicit in that statement, Israel will continue with her efforts to attain through the Jarring talks real progress towards a peace settlement.

From the speech by President Sadat we learn that in his eyes the essence of the problem is to attain a withdrawal by Israel forces, whereas the main problem, also according to the Security Council resolution, is to achieve a peace settlement, the ending of the war. As I stated on August 4, we are not ignoring the subject of withdrawal to agreed and defensible frontiers, but this and other clauses will be implemented only in the framework of peace agreements which put an end to the war.

I wish to dwell on another subject which President Sadat defined as "a new Egyptian initiative." He says, and I quote: "We demand that within the period when we shall refrain from opening fire a partial withdrawal be effected by the Israeli forces on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal as the first stage towards a timetable to be determined thereafter for the implementation of the remaining clauses of the Security Council resolution."

And he adds: "If this is realized during this period we shall be ready to begin at once with the clearing of the bed of the Suez Canal and its reopening to international navigation and the service of the world economy."

Egypt demands of Israel a partial withdrawal of the Israel forces on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal as a first step in the fixing of a timetable for the implementation of the remaining clauses of the Security Council resolution. In return for the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces, Egypt does not promise to implement the main clause of the Security Council resolution, which is the achievement of a peace agreement between the parties and of secure and agreed borders. The sole return that is offered us is to begin at once with the clearing of the Canal and its reopening for navigation—and this

too without making it clear that navigation will be free and that within the framework of the service that is to be rendered to the world economy, Israel's right to free navigation in the Canal will also be honoured.

I must make it unequivocally clear that Israel is wholeheartedly prepared to lend its support to the opening of the Canal to free international shipping for all states, including Israel. It is not we who are responsible for the blocking of the Canal.

Ever since the cease-fire in June 1967 authorized representatives of Israel have clearly stated our readiness to negotiate with Egypt with regard to arrangements for operating the Suez Canal. Here is what Foreign Minister Abba Eban said on the Israel Broadcasting Service on July 29, 1967: "Israel will be prepared to arrive at an agreement in the matter of the Suez Canal, apart from an overall solution, on condition that the waterway will be open to all states, including Israel." Later, he said that "Israel's position in this respect is absolutely clear."

On October 18, 1967, the late Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was asked: "Mr. Prime Minister, what did you mean when you spoke of separate negotiations with Egypt on the activation of the Suez Canal?" The late Levi Eshkol replied: "I was asked whether we would be prepared to settle the matter of the Canal on its own, and to this I answered that we are prepared for the activation of the Canal on the explicit condition that anything granted to the states of the world, and the rights that they will enjoy, should be granted to, be enjoyed by Israel as well."

That was our policy. Had Egypt maintained the cease-fire agreement according to the Security Council resolution of June 1967 it would then have been possible to arrive at agreement with Israel on clearing the Canal and opening it for free navigation. But Egypt preferred, as we know, to try her strength in the war of attrition, and clung to the belief that a blocked Canal is preferable to a sea-lane which would be open to Israeli shipping.

Opening the Canal to international navigation could be an expression of the desire

and aim to attain peace. However, President Sadat's proposal, as presented in his speech, tries to achieve a strategic advantage by the withdrawal of Israel's forces without actual progress towards peace. To me it seems strange to propose the withdrawal of our forces from the Canal outside a framework of agreed arrangements for the absolute termination of the war.

There is more that is obscure in President Sadat's proposal—in its present version—than what is expressly stated. The proposal is simply not clear. The essence is missing. At this time I do not propose to detail the serious questions which the President of Egypt has left obscure.

Direct face-to-face contact between us would make it easier to examine every proposal on Egypt's part or on Israel's part with the purpose of achieving unequivocal agreements on all provisions, including the conditions and times for the implementation of the agreements.

Our position on the opening of the Canal has not changed. We are in favour of the opening of the Suez Canal to free navigation and would even willingly discuss proposals aimed at leading to normalisation of civilian life in that area and mutual de-escalation of the military line-up.

But does the President of Egypt believe that it is possible to carry out the work of clearing the Canal while the threat to renew the war is still in force? At any rate, Israel is ready today, as in the past, to hold discussions with Egypt on arrangements for opening the Canal, even as a separate issue from other provisions.

Since my last statement in the Knesset the dangerous involvement of the Soviet Union in the Egyptian war-machine has continued and deepened. Since the death of Nasser the Soviets have taken further steps to consolidate the attachment of Egypt to the Soviet Union as "a faithful ally." We have no signs that indicate that the Soviet Union has urged Egypt to maintain the cease-fire with no time limit in accordance with the Security Council resolution of June 1967.

On the contrary, the increased military aid, the massive flow of weaponry, including

weapons of an offensive character (bridging equipment, heavy artillery, planes and ground-to-ground missiles), the growth in the number of Soviet army personnel, pilots, technicians and advisers, have encouraged and heartened the extremist elements in Egypt.

This process has clear militant anti-Israel implications, which are not lost on either the Egyptians or the Soviets.

But the process has global implications as well, and it is vital that these should not be lost on the nations of the world—and, in the first instance, on Israel's friends, who are in a position to take deterrent political measures and to aid us in procuring the tools and the means that are necessary for our self-defence.

An extension of 30 days is too short a period for us to be complacent. We must be alert—but not frightened. The strengthening of the Israel Defence Forces continues apace. As time goes on our strength grows, and it will continue to grow. If war should be forced upon us we will face it and we will win. At the same time, now as before, our efforts will be directed, to the very best of our ability, to the removal of the danger of a resumption of the war and to the attainment of peace.

## 24

### **Press Conference Statements by Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain on Spanish Interests in and Efforts To Promote Peace in the East Mediterranean and Reiterating Spanish Friendship for the Arabs<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, February 10, 1971

Above all, I have come in response to an invitation from my Egyptian counterpart, Mahmoud Riad, which is something customary between friendly countries, and with sincere wishes and hopes for maximum co-operation between us so that we may arrive

at a formula which permits us to achieve a just peace in the Mediterranean area.

It has been a brief business visit which I prepared conscientiously with His Excellency the Chief of State, to try to bring about collaboration within this brief term of thirty days of "ceasefire," with the object of taking positive steps, Spain thus acting as is consistent with her friendship for the Arab states. We are conscious of being not only a Western country but also a Mediterranean one which pays special attention to everything related to the security and the defense of the Mediterranean.

[After pointing out that Spain is perhaps the best friend of the Arab countries he referred to the relations between the United Arab Republic and the U.S.A., for whom Spain serves as a channel of communication, having, as we know, looked after U.S. interests in Egypt since the June War of 1967.] Since we take care of American interests in the United Arab Republic, it is natural for us to wish to do all that we can so that the projects and ideas of both countries—Egypt and the U.S.A.—are concluded satisfactorily.

[Emphasizing that Spain was acting on its own initiative, because it had particularly good relations with both the United States and the U.A.R.]: Spain also wants to introduce her own ideas and suggestions for reducing the existing tension, given until March 7 when the present truce ends, and all of this explains my presence here.

Today I have had long conversations with President Anwar Sadat, with the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, and with the Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad. I have once more verified that the United Arab Republic has the will to cooperate to its utmost in finding a peaceful solution to the present conflict, within the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. In our talks we did, of course, take into consideration the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the excerpted Spanish text in *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), No. 114 (March-April, 1971), p. 215.

## 25

**Resolution on the "Struggle of the People and Students of Palestine Against Zionism and Imperialism" Adopted at the Tenth Conference of the International Union of Students<sup>1</sup>**

**Bratislava, February 10, 1971**

Taking into account the following facts:

1. Israel is an imperialist base and a spearhead for aggression against the Arab liberation movement and the existence of the Palestinian people.

2. Israel is a base and intermediary for penetration by the United States and other imperialist and neocolonialist powers into the newly independent countries of Africa and the countries of Asia and Latin America.

3. Israel's expansionism and its annexation of Arab territories, which are the result of its being an imperialist-colonialist base, first made their appearance when the State was established in Arab territory in 1948, and have been clearly illustrated by its conduct in the occupied Arab territories, and especially in Arab Jerusalem.

4. The brutal measures taken by Israel against the Arab population of the occupied areas and the grievous repression and terrorism to which the people and students of Palestine are subjected.

5. The policy of evicting patriotic leaders and elements engaged in opposing the occupation, the confiscation of Arab properties and lands, and the total destruction of villages, not to mention the establishment of detention camps in Sinai to which Arab families are banished.

6. The inhuman conditions in which more than a million Palestinian Arab refugees are living, which figure has been increasing since June 1967.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Resolution I of the conference, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), February 27, 1971.

The conference also adopted resolutions on Patrick Arguello Ryan, on Jordan, and on the "Struggle of the Arab Peoples and Students against Imperialism, Zionism, Colonialism and Neocolonialism" (see *al-Hadaf*, February 27, for the Arabic texts of these additional resolutions).

7. The racist and reactionary character of the Zionist movement which has tried, in cooperation with the imperialists, to mislead world public opinion on the truth about the anti-imperialist character of the struggle of the Palestinian people, by trying to present it as a racist struggle, in an attempt to conceal the reactionary, aggressive and expansionist character of Zionist Israel and to distract the attention of the progressive forces in the world from the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their legitimate rights in full.

8. The struggle of the people and students of Palestine against imperialism and Zionism was imposed on them as a consequence of imperialist and Zionist encroachments on their rights. It is thus a struggle which concerns not only the Arab peoples and the Palestinian people, but also all progressive anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces in the world.

9. The legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in the territory of their homeland, which has been usurped as a result of imperialist conspiracies prepared by the United States and Britain and carried out by the joint efforts of the Zionist movement and the reactionary Arab regimes.

10. That the aim of the struggle of the Palestinian people is to achieve their right to self-determination in their homeland.

11. That Israel has made changes in the curricula of the Arab schools in the occupied areas in an attempt to turn Arab pupils against their national history and guide them along the lines of Zionist ideology.

12. The heroic endurance of thousands of Palestinian patriots in Israeli prisons and detention camps, in spite of the various kinds of brutal torture and inhuman maltreatment to which they are subjected.

13. The attempts made by the reactionary regime in Jordan to achieve the physical liquidation of the Palestinian armed struggle and the progressive forces in the country in February, June and September 1970, and in January 1971.

14. The fact that Israel has entered into alliances with the reactionary regimes in southern Africa and with the Portuguese colonialists who are persecuting the peoples

of Africa and denying them their independence.

The Conference condemns:

I. The imperialist-Zionist aggression against the Arab peoples and the Palestinian people.

II. Imperialist-Zionist-reactionary maneuvers intended to liquidate the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people by denying their rights.

III. The brutal and inhuman measures that Israel is taking against the Palestinian and Arab inhabitants of the occupied areas, and its policy of eviction, confiscation of lands and possessions, and destruction of houses, and also of intimidation and terrorism directed against Palestinian patriots and students in the occupied areas and prisons.

IV. The racist character of Zionism as a reactionary colonialist movement whose aim is to serve the interests of imperialism.

V. The support provided by imperialist forces, in particular the United States, Britain and West Germany, to Israel.

VI. Israel's attempts to obtain or manufacture nuclear arms which will increase the tension in the Middle East and the whole world.

VII. The aid Israel provides to the racist regime in South Africa, to the colonialist and fascist government of Portugal and to Ian Smith's regime [in Rhodesia], the object of which is to undermine the liberation struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe for their national independence.

VIII. Israel's actions to undermine Arab education in the occupied areas, which threaten the national aspirations of Palestinian and Arab students.

The Conference resolves:

I. To support and assist the students and people of Palestine and to enable them to exercise their right to self-determination in the territory of their homeland.

II. To salute and provide material and moral support to the armed struggle of the Palestinian people, under the command of the Palestine Resistance, against Israeli occupation and for the liberation of their homeland.

III. To affirm the resolute support of the International Union of Students for the people and students of Palestine and for the General Federation of Palestine Students, which is playing an effective role in the progressive movement in the Arab world by recruiting its people and students to serve the cause of the Palestinian people.

IV. To call on all student organizations to hold a worldwide week of solidarity with the struggle of the people and students of Palestine from May 15-22 and to do all they can to make known the stand of the General Federation of Palestine Students on the Palestinian cause through pamphlets or any other information media available to them.

V. To authorize the secretariat to organize a campaign against the torture of prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons with the object of relieving their sufferings and securing their release.

VI. To authorize the secretariat to assist and support all initiatives with the object of making known the struggle of the people and students of Palestine.

## 26

### **Commentary Supporting the Demands of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.) Published in the People's Daily of China (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, February 13, 1971**

To safeguard their state sovereignty and protect their resources, the ten member states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.) which includes Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Kuwait and Venezuela have been waging a resolute struggle recently against the oil consortiums of imperialism headed by the United States. Victims of wanton plundering by imperialism for a long time, these oil-producing coun-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from English translation of commentary, *Peking Review*, XIV, 8 (February 19, 1971), pp. 25, 25-26.

tries have now closed their ranks and are taking concerted action against the rapacious and ruthless international exploiters. This is an important event in the current anti-imperialist struggle of the countries and people in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The demand of O.P.E.C. member states for higher oil posted prices and tax rates reflects the strong desire of the people of these countries to rid themselves of imperialist plunder and exploitation. It is entirely justified. But the Western countries, U.S. imperialism in particular, have taken open, hostile actions against this legitimate demand. U.S. imperialism has been canvassing for support everywhere and lining up a number of Western countries to back the oil consortiums' stubborn resistance. It has repeatedly exerted pressure on some petroleum exporting countries in the Persian Gulf (the Arabian Gulf) and even declared that it would export U.S.-produced oil to Western Europe to offset the possible embargo that may be carried out by the petroleum exporting countries. In so doing, U.S. imperialism has once again exposed itself as the most ferocious enemy of the Asian, African and Latin American people. It is however worth noting that at this juncture the other super-power openly indicated that it would increase its oil exports to Western Europe. This is a flagrant act of undermining the just struggle of the petroleum exporting countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is a despicable act of robbing one's neighbour while his house is on fire. It once again lays bare the hypocritical features of this other super-power, which dresses itself up as a "friend" of the Asian, African and Latin American people.

The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "To defeat the reactionary rule of imperialism, it is essential to form a broad united front and unite with all forces that can be united with, excluding the enemy, and to carry on arduous struggles." It is a historical trend for the Asian, African and Latin American countries to strengthen their unity in the struggle against imperialism.

Unity is strength. By uniting as one, supporting each other and acting in concert, the petroleum exporting countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have pushed forward their struggle against the Western petroleum monopoly capital groups. This is further proof that so long as the small countries unite closely and fight shoulder to shoulder, they can resist the imperialists' pressure, frustrate their wicked schemes, and finally defeat these colossuses.

After the breakdown of the recent talks between O.P.E.C. and the Western oil monopolies, O.P.E.C.'s Ministerial Conference decided at its plenary session that if the Western oil companies refuse to accept the demands of the six Persian (Arabian) Gulf countries for increasing oil incomes by February 15, the latter will take action to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. The Chinese people fully support this just struggle of the petroleum exporting countries. The people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the rest of the world are also on their side. So long as they sharpen their vigilance against all sorts of imperialist intrigues, unite as one and persist in struggle, the oil exporting countries can be sure of winning still greater victories.

## 27

### **Resolution Adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) Commenting on Actions of the Israeli Army in the Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>**

**February 13, 1971**

The Maki Central Committee expresses deep regret about cases of harm done to innocent people during actions against the criminal terrorism in Gaza and the towns of the Gaza Strip.

The Central Committee welcomes the firm

<sup>1</sup> English text of Resolution IV adopted at the 15th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of MAKI as published in *Information Bulletin (MAKI)*, 1971, No. 3 (March, 1971), p. 5.

steps taken by the Chief-of-Staff following reports on these illegal acts that are incompatible with the moral principles of the Israel Defence Forces and roused concern and protest among the Israeli public that identifies itself in its heart and soul with the defence forces of the people.

It is the Central Committee's opinion that the publication of the investigating officer's report in full will strengthen the confidence of the people and of world public opinion in the purity of the Israel Defence Army and in the foundations of Israel's democracy, and will be a further guarantee that such incidents will not happen again.

## 28

### **Television Interview Statements by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco Expressing Support for Dr. Jarring and a Limited Optimism As to the Possibilities of a Settlement in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

February 14, 1971

*Mr Herman: Secretary Sisco, reports from Israel this morning say the Israelis consider U.N. Ambassador Jarring's latest set of questions to be in fact a set of thinly disguised substantive proposals. Do you agree with this evaluation?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Mr. Herman, Ambassador Jarring is mandated by the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, to promote an agreement between the two sides. We feel he has a very broad mandate, and he is acting strictly in accord with that mandate.

*Mr Herman: Mr. Sisco, I take it that the answer was not exactly no. Is it yes—that these are in fact some kind of proposals that are being put to the Israelis and the Egyptians on the behalf of the U.N.?*

*Mr. Sisco:* I'm not, of course, going to get into the specifics of the discussions between the parties under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. I will say this—that Ambassador Jarring is now getting at the very crucial questions that have long divided the Arabs and the Israelis. We think these talks have reached an important stage. We think that there are difficult decisions to be made for both sides, and we hope that both sides will respond positively, because we think that this is an important stage.

*Mr. Trehwhitt: Mr, Sisco, do you think it perhaps possible that the Israelis are less opposed to this kind of role for Mr. Jarring than they were in the past? I seem to detect that sort of note in Mrs. Meir's speech last week.*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first of all, Henry, I would recall that last June the Israelis accepted the American initiative, and as part of that proposal the Israelis as well as the U.A.R. and Jordan committed themselves to abide by whatever procedures Ambassador Jarring decided to pursue his mandate. And as I say, this, coupled with the Security Council resolution, we feel gives Ambassador Jarring very wide latitude indeed.

*Mr. Kalb: Mr. Sisco, you said that he has this wide latitude. Do you see Ambassador Jarring as a mediator or as a negotiator?*

*Mr. Sisco:* I think in the broadest sense his job is, in the words of the resolution, to try to promote an agreement between the two parties. He has explored various ideas over the months, and these talks at this stage are reaching some of the core questions. He is free under that resolution to take as little and as much initiative as he desires, and I think that one of the problems has been that neither side has been willing really to take the kind of decision and take the kind of initiative which would give assurance to the other. There are two principal concerns, Marvin, as you know. The question of whether in fact the Arabs want to make peace with Israel—this has been a fundamental concern of the Israelis. And in turn the Arabs have been concerned with the whole question of withdrawal. And I'm not revealing any

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Sisco's interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System's television and radio program "Face the Nation," *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1654 (March 8, 1971), pp. 291-295, 295-296.

secrets when I say that these are the two key issues that are being addressed at the present time.

*Mr. Trewitt:* Would you pursue that, Mr. Secretary? One has the feeling that there has been considerable movement in the last year; yet it's terribly hard to pin down the specifics. Would you take a look at those core issues you mentioned and suggest to us what changes have occurred in the last few months?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, yes. Before I do that, Henry, let me say this—that you mentioned, for example, that a year ago the situation was considerably different than it is today. For example, in looking back, the situation along the Egyptian-Israeli border, for example, there were incidents, exchanges of fire, a great deal of tension. The efforts of diplomacy were at an impasse. The situation in Jordan was quite shaky. The *fedayeen* were expressing themselves in very strong terms in favor of a forceful solution. Now, it was in these circumstances that Secretary Rogers, with the full backing of President Nixon, decided on the American initiative of last June. Now, that initiative was a very simple one, in order to get the parties to stop shooting and start talking. And we feel that as a result of President Nixon's initiative, the situation today affords an opportunity for both sides which did not exist a year ago. We are now in the seventh month of the cease-fire. Ambassador Jarring's efforts in the context of negotiations between the parties are focusing on the key issues.

The situation in Jordan, while we will see from time to time that incidents will occur, but the situation in Jordan is much better today than it was a year ago. And King Hussein has embarked upon a policy of reconciliation and reconstruction; and even in the *fedayeen* movement itself there are some very modest signs—and I don't want to overdramatize this—that at least some Palestinians are thinking about the notion of a political solution based on the idea of coexistence with Israel. So that the American initiative of last June, in our judgment, was the principal catalyst, and we think the situation is improved. There are many, many risks that are still there, but at least

the minimal conditions are prevalent, in a nonshooting context, whereby Ambassador Jarring can pursue private diplomacy with the parties.

*Mr. Kalb:* Do you think the time is near when Ambassador Jarring will be able to sit down with the Israelis and the Egyptians in one room and discuss these issues?

*Mr. Sisco:* In accepting the American initiative of last June, it was stated quite specifically that Ambassador Jarring would decide what procedures he would utilize. In my judgment, both parties are committed to abide by whatever procedures Ambassador Jarring decides to pursue and no procedure is barred, and I think this is a judgment which Ambassador Jarring will have to make, dependent upon the progress in the negotiations.

*Mr. Kalb:* Well, I mean do you think so, though?

*Mr. Sisco:* We definitely—

*Mr. Kalb:* What does the State Department think?

*Mr. Sisco:* We definitely feel that no procedure is barred. At the moment the discussions are indirect, under his auspices.

*Mr. Herman:* When Ambassador Jarring makes, in any form, under whatever procedure he wishes to, proposals to both sides, have these proposals been discussed with the Big Four, the Big Two, with the United States, specifically with your office?

*Mr. Sisco:* Ambassador Jarring is conducting the negotiations. Obviously he is in consultation with not only the major powers and the principal parties but a number of other U.N. members and the Secretary General himself.

Yes, he is consulted with, broadly across the board, but whatever ideas he's discussing are his own; he is the man who is conducting the negotiations.

*Mr. Herman:* If you do not approve of them, if you think there's something wrong, you are presumed free to tell him so. It's his discussion.

*Mr. Sisco:* We're not trying to second-guess the negotiations. Our objective is to give support to Ambassador Jarring's efforts. Our role is to encourage both sides to try to make the



painful compromises that are going to be required in order to achieve a peace settlement. I've said on previous occasions that neither side can expect to achieve their maximum positions. I believe that the talks have reached a stage where some of the painful decisions really have to be made. It is time for a decision.

*Mr. Herman: Well, if you think that the American initiative of last June was the catalyst, is there a second-step catalyst in sight—for the United States to make some new move, some new helping hand that we should be contributing at this point or in the near future?*

*Mr. Sisco:* No, the central process of negotiation is going on under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. We will help; we will try to encourage the parties; but the negotiations are in his hands.

*Mr. Trehitt: Mr. Sisco, did— isn't actually the United States, in an indirect sense, taking a form of initiative by agreeing in the Big Four discussions to discuss supplemental guarantees for whatever sort of peace might be reached in the Middle East?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Yes, we have agreed to begin preliminary talks on the question of supplementary guarantees. However, let me make clear that the principal focus of the effort has to be the negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. The discussions of supplementary guarantees in the Four cannot be a substitute for negotiations. Guarantees cannot be a substitute for a peace agreement between the parties. The principal element of security for both sides must be a binding peace agreement.

*Mr. Kalb: Mr. Sisco, Secretary Rogers stated—and I think I'm quoting you correctly—the parties themselves are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of security arrangements. Now, why are the Big Four even getting into this kind of an operation?*

*Mr. Sisco:* For this reason—first of all, because the Big Four have a direct interest in this matter, and in particular the United States. Here is a situation where there is very heavy Soviet involvement. We feel that

the Middle East today is perhaps the most dangerous area in the world. Now, we feel quite strongly that the Four cannot substitute themselves for the parties, that Big Four guarantees cannot be a substitute for the primary reliance of the parties upon themselves. But if a common understanding can be achieved on guarantees by the Four, it would add, as a minimum, an important psychological and political support of the agreement between the parties.

*Mr. Kalb: Isn't "pressure" a better word than "support"? I mean, doesn't this—the Big Four stand there and negotiate this thing, and the little powers underneath with this above them I would imagine could feel only pressure, not support.*

*Mr. Sisco:* On the contrary, the discussions as they relate to guarantees are very general at this stage. Moreover, before the Four could in any way come to any concrete judgments, it's going to be necessary to know just what is to be guaranteed, and that's another way of saying that in the first instance a peace agreement has to be negotiated by the parties themselves and the question of guarantees can only be supplementary and can only add in a marginal sort of way.

*Mr. Herman: What's the climate? What's the status of the negotiations among the Big Four? Is there a climate that the Soviet Union, for example, would like to see total stability in the Middle East rather than the unbalanced situation which they've been apparently so fond of?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first of all, I wouldn't say that there are negotiations going on between the Four. I think there are general discussions. Insofar as the Soviet attitude is concerned, I would say this. We feel that we and the Soviets have a common interest in avoiding a confrontation over this area. We have the impression that the Soviets would be as concerned as we would be in the event the Middle East were to break out into a broad hostility once again.

Where we have had reservations about the Soviet attitude is whether in fact they are willing to put their full weight behind a stable peace settlement. And in this connection, let me say this—that we feel that from the point of view of the United States there is only one real

answer, a peace agreement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides. And President Nixon has embarked upon a policy of active diplomacy simply because there is such an inherent and high degree of risk in this area. We would be remiss if we didn't pursue all avenues of diplomacy.

*Mr. Trewwhitt:* Mr. Secretary, look at the other side of that coin for a second. You speak of American interests in the—and the common Soviet-American interest in avoiding confrontation. But do you believe that the Soviet Union has made a fundamental decision that they can preserve their interest in the Middle East during a situation of general stability between the Arabs and the Israelis?

*Mr. Sisco:* Henry, it's very difficult to say. What the Soviet Union has to weigh is what unilateral advantage it may feel it can derive from the turmoil against the risk that this situation could get out of control. And that is the crucial factor, insofar as we're concerned, as to what has to be weighed in a given instance in the Middle East.

We feel quite strongly that stability is required. We feel that the parties need to take risks for peace, and we think that these risks are in the mutual interest of not only the parties in the area but the major powers as well because a situation which is as unstable as the Middle East has been over the last 3 years, is one with—which is obviously rife with difficulty and very risky indeed.

*Mr. Kalb:* Mr. Sisco, do you feel that Egypt at this point is a thoroughly sovereign state or in part a Soviet protectorate?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first of all, we're impressed with the fact that following the death of President Nasser, the leadership was able to succeed into power without any instability having occurred in the country. Secondly, we're equally impressed that the new leadership promptly announced basically the continuation of the policy of trying to achieve a political solution pursuant to the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967. We do feel that it is sovereign; we do feel that it is in a position to take the decisions in order to achieve a peace settlement.

*Mr. Herman:* The cease-fire, which has just barely been agreed to, or at least that's the impression that was given, expires in 3 weeks—on March 7. One of the conditions is that there—at least as imposed by Cairo—that there be some signs of progress, of motion, by that time. Is 3 weeks enough time so that we will see some signs of motion, enough to please the Egyptians?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, George, we regret the short deadline very much. We would have strongly preferred a longer extension. And as you say, this is the seventh month of the cease-fire that really began with the American initiative last June. Three weeks is a short time; we think these deadlines do not facilitate either agreement or facilitate negotiations. On the other hand, there is this time, and I think this is one of the reasons why Ambassador Jarring is pursuing the matter quite vigorously.

*Mr. Herman:* If you were a betting man, would you put some money down that there would be another extension, that there will be some progress?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I am always cautiously optimistic by nature—

*Mr. Herman:* I seem to have heard that word from the State Department before.

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I borrowed it at the moment from U.N. Secretary General Thant. But you see, in this problem on the Middle East one has to take it on a day-by-day basis, and I can recall a year ago the expressions of doom and gloom. And here today I think there is—without again overdrawing it—an opportunity. There is an opportunity to make progress which may not be in existence 3 months from now, 6 months from now, a year from now. And I think that the question of building a peace in the Middle East is a step-by-step process, building block by building block.

*Mr. Trewwhitt:* Mr. Secretary, the Israelis have pretty generally held out for the proposition that they would not take partial measures toward a settlement outside of a broad framework of settlement. Yet in the last week—the last couple of weeks—we've heard a great deal of discussion of details, of specifics. And now we have this very, very

*specific matter of the possibility of reopening the Suez Canal. Has the thinking in Washington changed on that, on that possibility of partial agreements leading to a broader agreement?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first of all, let me say that the—in our judgment—the statement made by President Sadat last week, and the statement made by Prime Minister Meir, leave the door open. We don't feel that any doors have been closed with respect to a proposal to open the Suez Canal.

Our position has long been that the problem of the Suez Canal was really one of the key elements of an overall settlement. There is now some indication on the part of both sides to consider this matter as at least an initial step. Our own feeling is this—that any step that the two sides can agree to, that will help diminish tension, any step that will be a step toward a peaceful settlement, we would have a positive attitude on such a step.

*Mr. Kalb:* Including a partial Israeli rollback from the Suez Canal?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well again, I'm not going to be very specific, because actually what all of us have to go on are largely the two public statements that have been made by the leaders of the U.A.R. and Israel.

*Mr. Kalb:* We assume that you're in pretty close touch with the Egyptians and the Israelis, much more than we are.

*Mr. Sisco:* Oh, I think that's a fair assumption, but I would merely add, Marvin, that we've not made any judgment with respect to the specifics. All that I'm saying is that this matter, as the Secretary said the other day, rests with the parties. And if the parties desire to explore this further, if they're able to achieve a common understanding, our attitude would be positive.

*Mr. Kalb:* Back on the Middle East, if I might. Do you see a trip by Secretary Rogers to that area coming up soon?

*Mr. Sisco:* There is no immediate trip planned, Marvin. I am sure, as the Secretary has said on several occasions, that if the time comes when such a trip would be useful, I'm sure that he would be quite disposed to go.

*Mr. Kalb:* I know that that has been said before, but I was wondering if that, since you feel that the time is so ripe for decisions, whether the Secretary feels a trip on his part there soon, say before March 7—

*Mr. Sisco:* No, I don't believe so; and as I say, the principal focus of discussion is under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The United States is not running the negotiations—Ambassador Jarring is.

*Mr. Trewhitt:* Mr. Secretary, would you address yourself to the changing military situation, just briefly. Everyone, I think, assumes that the situation is more stable than it was just a few months ago. Do you think there is a military standoff in the area?

*Mr. Sisco:* I believe that the situation, militarily speaking, is such that both sides do not want to resume the fighting, and I think that both sides do not want to resume the fighting because there is a recognition that such a resumption is very likely to be costly to both sides and not be decisive, if it were to occur.

*Mr. Kalb:* When you talk about the Middle East being the most dangerous part of the world, what do you have in mind—a war between Russia and the United States over this area?

*Mr. Sisco:* I have in mind that there is a large Soviet presence in the area.

*Mr. Kalb:* How large? Could you tell us that, too?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I again don't want to get into specifics, but I think you can assume that there is a very substantial Soviet presence in the U.A.R. and, by virtue of that presence, if there were an outbreak of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis again, that there is a greater—that there would be a greater risk of confrontation than in the past. We have vital interests in this area, political, economic, and strategic. So has the Soviet Union. And the object of diplomacy is to try to create conditions where the inherent risks of confrontation are diminished. I think I know a little bit about the feeling of the American people in this respect, and I think that the overriding objective is to try to help establish a peace, because confrontation and the pos-

sibility of confrontation is a serious risk if this can't be achieved.

*Mr. Herman:* As you know, Congress is chronically unhappy with the lack of consultation—their lack of consultation with the State Department over Southeast Asian affairs. How is consultation between your office and Congress on Middle Eastern affairs? Are they well informed of what you're doing in Israel and—

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first let me say that I don't accept the view that there hasn't been ample consultation, both on the question of Indochina and certainly on the Middle East as well. We are in constant touch, and I might add that I don't believe the Middle Eastern issue is a partisan issue. I was struck with the fact that Senator Muskie, just several weeks ago, visited the area and said quite clearly that he thought that the policy of the Nixon administration was sound. I was equally struck the Senator Birch Bayh just returned from the area and made a statement of a very similar character. I think that there is a bipartisan approach to the Middle East because all Americans want to avoid a war over this area. We are anguishing in Viet-Nam; the President is engaged, I think, on a very solid policy of disengagement; he is trying to turn over the responsibilities to the Vietnamese; and I think that how that situation in Indochina comes out is very relevant to the Middle East.

If we had adopted a cut-and-run policy in Viet-Nam, one would have wondered as to what the other side would have thought as to whether we would have given the signal that we see what our vital interests are and are ready to protect those vital interests. So I think that there is a direct relationship between the outcome in Southeast Asia and the situation in the Middle East, and I happen to think that the President is on the right track.

*Mr. Herman:* We have about 30 seconds left. Do you think that continuing this policy of withdrawal from South Viet-Nam is going to be all right with the balance of factors that you have mentioned in the Middle East?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I think that the policy of disengagement—

*Mr. Herman:* We are withdrawing.

*Mr. Sisco:* Yes, we are, and I think that the American people are withholding final judgment, and I think that we will know in a year or a year and a half whether this is really successful or not.

*Mr. Herman:* Thank you very much, Mr. Sisco, for being with us here on "Face the Nation."

## 29

### **Resolution Calling for the Liberation of Palestine and the Recovery of Jerusalem Adopted by a Joint Meeting of the International Muslim Organizations<sup>1</sup>**

**Mecca, February 15, 1971**

*This joint meeting of the International Moslem organizations,*

*Noting with appreciation the continuous efforts of the various Moslem Governments and Moslem peoples' organizations for the liberation of Palestine, specially for retrieving Jerusalem,*

*Urges that the above efforts must be continued, nay multiplied, till the objectives are achieved, namely the complete liquidation of all traces of Israeli aggressions,*

*Upholds the fullest support to the comandos and to all freedom-fighters for the restoration of the basic human rights in all the affected areas,*

*Demands the continuous urging of the Islamic spirit of struggle and sacrifice so as to strengthen and fortify them to achieve victory as even did their forefathers,*

<sup>1</sup> English translation of resolution adopted by a convention of the International Muslim Organizations, including representatives of the World Muslim Congress, Karachi, Pakistan; the International Islamic Organization, Djakarta, Indonesia; the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, Cairo; the General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem (now in Amman); and the Muslim World League, Mecca, as included in a letter dated March 9, 1971 sent by Secretary-General al-Sabban of the International Muslim Organizations to the U.N. Secretary-General, and circulated as U.N. Document S/10152 and A/8297.

*Decides* to send a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Islamic secretariat, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Heads of Moslem States, with the view to calling a halt to the continuance of the inhuman Zionist aggression, specially to save the Holy City of Jerusalem from Judaization and to save the Arab citizens of the Holy City from becoming refugees, in short to maintain the 1967 *status quo* and the historical features of the city.

## 30

### **Appeal Issued by the Second International Symposium on Palestine Calling for World Support of Palestine Armed Struggle<sup>1</sup>**

**Kuwait, February 17, 1971**

The Second International Symposium on Palestine (Part II) was held in Kuwait from 13 to 17 February, 1971 under the joint sponsorship of the General Union of Palestine Students and the Kuwaiti Graduate Society.

About 300 participants representing scholars, political parties, popular organizations and liberation movements from all parts of the world attended the five day conference to discuss the historical background of the Palestine cause, the Palestinian Revolution and the Palestine-of-Tomorrow.

The discussions focused on:

1. The connivance of world Zionism and the world imperialist system to wrest Palestine from its indigenous population and to establish therein an expansionist, terrorist, racist and imperialist settler-state, which now occupies the whole of Palestine as well as parts of U.A.R. and Syria.
2. The Palestinian Revolution as the vanguard of the Arab Revolution and as an

integral part of the world liberation movement.

3. The humane objective of the Palestinian armed struggle for national liberation—namely, the establishment in liberated Palestine of a unitary non-sectarian, democratic state.

In the light of these discussions, the Symposium calls upon world conscience to extend unequivocal support to the armed struggle of the Palestine people for national liberation and against any political settlement and to condemn repeated and continued attempts by the Jordanian regime to liquidate the Palestinian Revolution.

Participants in the Symposium also take it upon themselves to relay the views of the Palestinian Revolution as expressed at this Conference to their respective peoples.

## 31

### **Press Conference Statements by President Tito of Yugoslavia Summarizing His Impressions During His Visit to the U.A.R. and Commenting on Egyptian Reaction to the Jarring Note and Big Four Reactions to His Own Initiative<sup>2</sup>**

**Cairo, February 19, 1971**

I can tell you that the talks we have had here have taken place in an atmosphere of sincere friendship and full mutual understanding. It is clear that the talks have primarily related to the main problem of the UAR, the crisis in the Middle East. My general impression about the situation, after these talks, is much better than before my arrival here.

I must say that the leaders of the UAR pursue a policy of tolerance. In fact, they have continued to pursue President Nasir's policy and are going even further in this respect,

<sup>1</sup> English text of the appeal issued by the Second International Symposium on Palestine (Part II) from the Archives of the IPS.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the text of the report of Tito's press conference for Yugoslav journalists broadcast on Tanyug in English; BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3616/E/1 and E/2; reprinted by permission.

thus winning sympathies in the world and proving that they really want peace, but peace without any concessions in view of their just demand for Israel's withdrawal from all the invaded Arab territories.

I must say that they are patient and deeply confident in the justice of their cause. For our part, we shall lend them moral and political support, because we are unable to lend them the material support they require.

Understandably, what is required now is the activity of all the non-aligned countries, and this not only with regard to the situation in the Middle East, but also with regard to the developments in other parts of the world, for instance in Africa and in the Far East, where the situation is deteriorating. But we should be most satisfied if we were to succeed at least in liquidating this hotbed in the Middle East.

We are impressed by the self-confidence which we have felt here in the UAR not only among the leading men but also among the ordinary people. We have been impressed for instance by their working and building as though peace reigns, although they are near the front lines, where a conflict may break out any moment. This is proof of their self-confidence and determination to resist any assault and to win that which they are entitled to.

The sympathies of the people here for Yugoslavia is deep and they deserve that our people reciprocate those sympathies. During the talks we noted that economic co-operation between our two countries is not adequate to the degree of our political co-operation and understanding, and because of this we have said that it is necessary to eliminate what hinders the expansion of our economic relations.

[Asked how he viewed the reply of the Egyptian Government to the last Note from the special UN Envoy, Gunnar Jarring]:

The Government of the UAR favourably replied to Jarring's Note. I think that its reply is very good and that with this reply Israel has been placed in an extremely unenviable situation. But instead of yielding

in its interest Israel is only getting bogged down still more.

. . . . .

[Asked to say something about the messages he recently received from the Heads of the four big Powers in reply to his messages]: The replies I have received from President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath are more or less identical. President Nixon in his reply states that he expects that we shall press here for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and for patience. Prime Minister Heath's reply is slightly more flexible.

Yesterday I received a reply from the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev. He also expects us to work usefully in this direction towards a peaceful solution. The Soviet Union is extremely eager for such a solution. Clearly, the UAR wants peace and in this respect it displays great patience. But, there is also a limit to patience. We cannot request of them to be infinitely patient, and it is their affair to decide where the limit of this patience lies and when they will be capable of using also other means to gain their just ends. The UAR cannot go further than it has in its reply to Jarring's Note.

## 32

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Libya of President Hamani Diori of Niger (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Tripoli, February 19, 1971**

At the invitation of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, President of the Revolutionary Command Council, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Republic, His Excellency President al-Hajj Hamani Diori of the Republic of Niger, and his wife,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Haqiqa* (Benghazi), February 21, 1971.

paid an official visit to the Libyan Arab Republic *Dhu al-Hijja* 21–23, 1390 A.H. (February 17–19, 1971 A.D.)

The two sides discussed the grave situation in the Middle East and believe that it is absolutely impossible to accept Israel's occupation of the Arab territories, and unreservedly support the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

The two parties affirm that for peace to be established in the Middle East there must be total withdrawal by Israel from the occupied Arab territories.

### 33

#### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.A.R. of President Tito of Yugoslavia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Belgrade and Cairo, February 20, 1971**

In response to an invitation from the President of the United Arab Republic Anwar el Sadat, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, accompanied by Madame Broz, paid an official visit to the UAR between February 14 and 20, 1971.

During the visit, in the course of which the Arab people manifested wholehearted and firm unity, and gave the Yugoslav President an enthusiastic reception, the two heads of state conducted talks and exchanged views on international problems and bilateral relations between the two countries in an atmos-

phere of cordiality and mutual understanding.

The two presidents considered recent developments in the Middle East, particularly in the light of the newest initiatives undertaken by the UAR and the efforts being made by Ambassador Jarring. They condemned Israel's persistent refusal to implement Security Council Resolution 242 and its ignoring of UN resolutions for a just solution of the problems of the Palestinian people.

The two leaders agreed that prolongation of Israeli aggression not only undermines peace and security in the Middle East but also poses a threat to world peace. Israel would not be so stubborn in its aggressive posture were it not for the encouragement and assistance it receives from the USA which supports it with financial and military help enabling it to pursue its expansionist plans to the detriment of the Arab peoples.

Indulgence of such behaviour would give incentive to new aggressions which would jeopardize the independence and territorial integrity of other countries and world peace. It is therefore the most important task of all peaceminded peoples, and especially of the United Nations and the Security Council, which are responsible for guarding world peace and security, to assume a firm position in defense of the principles inscribed in the UN Charter, to prevent Israel from seizing Arab territory and to oppose all expansionist tendencies in any form whatsoever and under any pretext. The two presidents fully uphold the UN Secretary-General and the mission of Ambassador Jarring, in the conviction that failure of these efforts would inevitably lead to escalation of armed conflict in the Middle East with possibly serious consequences to world peace and security.

The two presidents reiterated their belief that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination.

They expressed their support for the just struggle of the people of Palestine for restoration of their usurped rights in line with UN resolutions.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the excerpted English text of the communiqué as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 502 (March 5, 1971), pp. 29, 29–30.

In early June Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Tepavac visited the U.A.R.; in the joint communiqué issued in Cairo on June 7 (see *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 509 (June 20, 1971), p. 17), no new points were made.

President Tito tendered recognition to the positive and constructive efforts of the UAR to achieve a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East and its readiness to implement all parts of the 1967 Security Council Resolution and to undertake all the obligations deriving therefrom. However, Israel, ignoring the UN decisions, still refuses to implement the Security Council Resolution passed on November 22, 1967, and continues its occupation of Arab territories in the wish to dictate conditions for solution of the present crisis from positions of strength. Israel's policy is directed toward maintenance of the status quo for the longest possible period so as to realize its expansionist plans under the pretext of establishing secure boundaries.

President Sadat expressed his appreciation to the Yugoslav Government for the numerous contacts it has made and the activities in which it has engaged to help find a just solution to the Middle East problem.

President Tito confirmed that the Yugoslav Government would continue to extend comprehensive support to the efforts of the UAR for restoration of its sovereignty over the territories wrested from it by force and would endeavour to the limits of its possibilities to make the maximum contribution to efforts for finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Middle East.

The two presidents were in agreement concerning the significance of non-aligned policy and dedication to it. They underlined the role of non-aligned countries in solving international problems by peaceful means and consolidating peace and security in the world parallel with the strengthening of the principles of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation.

Presidents Tito and Sadat consider it the duty of non-aligned countries as members of the UN to take determined steps against any member-state who does not discharge its international obligations or implement UN resolutions, or obstructs their implementation. The two presidents said they were convinced it was of paramount significance

for the world organization to preserve the confidence of member-states.

They also expressed the hope that non-aligned countries would be able to persevere in achieving the closest possible international cooperation amongst themselves and with other countries. Cooperation among non-aligned countries would help raise the living standard of the people and terminate exploitation of their wealth by others. In this connection, the two presidents underscored the significance of the conference in Lusaka and expressed their determination to uphold implementation of its decisions. They are certain the non-aligned countries will continue rendering support to the Arab countries for the purpose of removing the consequences of the aggression in line with the resolution adopted in Lusaka.

### 34

#### **Statement Issued by the Government of Israel Welcoming U.A.R. Readiness To Seek Peace and Pointing Out Divergences in the Israeli and Egyptian Positions<sup>1</sup>**

**February 21, 1971**

The Government of Israel views favourably the expression of the readiness of the Government of Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and expresses its own readiness for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

The Egyptian Note demonstrates the concrete differences between Egypt's positions and those of Israel, and particularly the substantial gap which exists on the issue of borders and refugees.

For example, Egypt demands total withdrawal to the armistice lines, while the position

<sup>1</sup> English text of Israeli cabinet statement as published in *Jewish Chronicle*, No. 5314 (February 26, 1971), p. 2.



of Israel is, as indicated in its statement of August 4, 1970, in response to the American peace initiative, that it will be ready to discuss the withdrawal of armed forces towards secure, recognised and agreed boundaries, to be established in peace agreements. The Government of Israel reiterates its position as confirmed by the Knesset, that Israel will not withdraw to the armistice lines of June 4, 1967.

Israel's view is that discussions should continue under the auspices of Mr Jarring on the positions of Egypt and of Israel in negotiations between the Governments concerned, with the aim of reaching an agreed peace treaty between the States, and that the negotiations should not be subject to prior commitments on the outstanding issues.

The Government of Israel hopes for a positive response by Egypt and for progress in the negotiations, in order to reach a peace agreement between the two States.

## 35

**Statement by Israeli Gahal Party Leader Begin Stating Objections to the Response of the Government of Israel to the U.A.R. Notes Submitted to U.N. Ambassador Jarring (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

February 22, 1971

The Cabinet and its spokesman, the Foreign Minister, yesterday ruled that the replies the Egyptians gave to Ambassador Jarring which contained the words "to enter into peace agreement with Israel" amount to something new, that these were voiced for the first time since the six-day war.

This is an absolute mistake and one wonders

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Begin's statement broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3618/A/10; reprinted by permission.

how it was made. Why the Israeli Government should create the impression, or help create the impression, that a revolutionary change has taken place in Egypt's attitude under Sadat's leadership at this very time is very difficult to understand. I want to state on the basis of these documents that no change at all has taken place.... The Foreign Minister said yesterday that the Egyptian statement is not a tactical one but a basic one. In other words, for the first time Egypt received from none other than the Israeli Government an unreserved recognition of the UAR's readiness to enter into peace agreement. This is an illusion.... The conditions for Egyptian agreement are known. They have not changed from Abd an-Nasir's days to Sadat's speech a few weeks ago. It is clear that peace will not be achieved in the Jarring talks, but harm has already been done by these talks.

## 36

**Declaration of Belgian Middle East Policy Made at the Close of a Parliamentary Committee Session by Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium<sup>2</sup>**

Brussels, February 23, 1971

On November 22, 1967, the Security Council discharged the responsibility entrusted to it under the Charter by adopting a resolution which lays down the rules which must be followed if peace is to return to the Middle East.

The principal provisions of this resolution are:

- The establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
- The withdrawal by Israel from the territories occupied as a result of the Six Day War.

Since this decision, the crisis has continued. Happily, following the persistent activity

<sup>2</sup> Translated from French text of Harmel's declaration as provided, on request, by the Embassy of Belgium in Beirut.

of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and thanks to the diplomatic efforts made by several states, and in particular by the American Secretary of State Mr. Rogers, a cease-fire was enforced on August 7, 1970, and the special representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, has been able to resume the task entrusted to him under favorable conditions.

In view of recent developments, the Belgian government:

1. Accords its full support to the action undertaken by Mr. Jarring with the object of creating the conditions for real negotiations on the basis of the Security Council resolution.

2. Has learned with great interest of the positive response made by the United Arab Republic to the various questions put to it by Mr. Jarring and holds the view that this attitude is likely to facilitate the quest for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

3. Has learned with equal interest of the Israeli government's decision to open negotiations under the auspices of Mr. Jarring.

The Belgian government, as a member of the Security Council, will do all in its power to ensure that the hope thus created may take definite shape so that peace may at last return to this part of the world.

Our government is convinced that the time has come to take major political decisions to put an end to the conflict.

It is in this spirit that we will take part in the discussions now in progress among European powers and among members of the Security Council at the United Nations.

### 37

#### **Announcement Issued by the Office of Premier Meir of Israel Reiterating Israel's Refusal To Return to the Borders of June 4, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

February 24, 1971

With reference to reports which have

<sup>1</sup> Announcement broadcast on Israel Radio; English text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3619/i; reprinted by permission.

appeared in a number of papers to the effect that the Cabinet has discussed a draft—or that a draft has been submitted to the Premier and the Foreign Minister—in which it was not stated that Israel refused to return to the 4th June borders, the Premier's Office announces that these reports are unfounded. The draft of Israel's reply to Egypt's proposals conveyed by Dr. Jarring includes the Government decision as stated in its official statement, namely, that Israel will not return to the armistice lines of 4th June 1967.

### 38

#### **Statements of French Support for the Positive Attitude of the U.A.R. to the Jarring Mission, Made by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs de Lipkowski of France in a Television Address During a Visit to the U.A.R.<sup>2</sup>**

Cairo, February 24, 1971

We have great hopes for Dr. Jarring's mission and France supports it unreservedly.

The very positive attitude to the representative of U Thant adopted by the U.A.R. and the Egyptian government's decision to keep its armaments silent to provide every opportunity for a political settlement, have been fully appreciated in France, and have encouraged us to continue along the course we initiated: that of talks by the four permanent members of the Security Council, whose agreement is essential for a settlement.

Our efforts are being directed toward discussion among the Four to work out international guarantees which could allow a withdrawal in security and lead to an agreement between states. Finally, as you know, France is not unaware of the problem of the Palestinian people and believes they must be given the right to choose their destiny in freedom when the time comes.

In the course of the talks I have just had, I could observe how sincerely and realistically

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the excerpted French text published in *Le Monde*, February 26, 1971, p. 4.

my interlocutors want to cope with the problems posed. Since the reactivation of the Jarring mission, a new climate has been created, to which Egypt's attitude has undoubtedly contributed.

### 39

#### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Tunisia of Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Madrid, February 24, 1971**

In response to an invitation from His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohammed Masmoudi, His Excellency Don Gregorio López Bravo paid an official visit to Tunisia February 22-24, [1971].

This was the first official visit of a Spanish Foreign Minister to Tunisia since her independence.

During his stay in Tunisia, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs was received in audience by His Excellency the Prime Minister, Mr. Hedi Nour, who, in the absence of the President of the Republic, is charged with directing the affairs of state.

In the course of their talks, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs carried out a full exchange of opinion on problems of mutual interest. In particular, they examined the situation in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean basin.

They were satisfied with the atmosphere of profound cordiality and warm friendship in which the talks took place and expressed their satisfaction with the coincidence of views revealed in the analyses of all the problems treated.

The two ministers, wishing to give a new impulse to Spanish-Tunisian relations, reach-

ed agreement to set up a mixed inter-governmental commission.

Mr. Masmoudi stressed the necessity for all the coastal nations to increase their development efforts to promote cooperation, and to strengthen solidarity in order that the Mediterranean cease to serve as a field of confrontation for foreign interests so as to become a site for peaceful meeting and cooperation among peoples. To this effect, the two ministers declared their conviction of the growing usefulness of regularly coordinating their positions.

The two ministers, considering it essential to reach this objective, to this effect agreed as a first step periodically to exchange points of view, taking practical circumstances into account.

Considering the Near East crisis, the two ministers expressed their anxiety as to the prolongation of a conflict which gravely threatens the peace and security of the Mediterranean basin and insisted on the urgency of a solution which, while taking into account the interests of the parties concerned, will respect the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

As a result of the traditional friendship and particularly privileged ties which unite Spain with the countries of the Maghreb, Mr. López Bravo was particularly pleased with the efforts of those countries to draw closer together.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Spanish text of the communiqué as issued by the Diplomatic Information Office of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provided, on request, by the Embassy of Spain in Beirut.

## 40

# **Middle East Section of the Foreign Policy Report Made by U.S. President Nixon to the American Congress<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1971

*The Middle East is a place today where local rivalries are intense, where the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are both involved. Quite obviously, the primary responsibility for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East rests on the nations there themselves. But in this region in particular, it is imperative that the two major powers conduct themselves so as to strengthen the forces of peace rather than to strengthen the forces of war.*

Address to the United Nations  
General Assembly  
October 23, 1970.

Vietnam is our most anguishing problem. It is not, however, the most dangerous. That grim distinction must go to the situation in the Middle East with its vastly greater potential for drawing Soviet policy and our own into a collision that could prove uncontrollable.

There are three distinct and serious aspects of the Middle East problem, each by itself difficult enough to resolve. They cannot, however, be treated in isolation. They have become enmeshed, and each tends to exacerbate and make more intractable the others. The Middle East crisis must be recognized as the product of these three dimensions:

— *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, which for more than twenty years has festered when it has not burned. It is the core problem of the Middle East crisis, and its intensity today is undiminished.

— *Intra-Arab differences*, which focus primarily on whether a negotiated settlement of

the Israeli conflict is acceptable or whether force is the only solution. There are also differences over how Arab nations should be governed, which have led more than once to civil conflict. And there are rivalries growing out of disagreement about the relation of Arab states to each other in the quest for unity in the Arab world.

— *The conflict between the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States*, each of which is now more deeply than ever engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Events surrounding the hostilities in Jordan in September showed how fragile are the barriers to direct great power confrontation in the Middle East..

America's interest in the Middle East—and the world's interest—is that the global structure of peace not be allowed to break down there. But this objective has to be pursued in a situation in rapid flux:

— The relationship between Middle East countries and outside powers has changed. The system of outside control that characterized the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is gone; the peoples of the Near East have achieved national independence. There is a continuing search for a new balance between the strong nationalisms of the area and outside forces.

— The character of the outside influences has changed. The nations of the Middle East must now come to terms on various levels with the technological, capital, political, and military presence of the United States; with a new projection of Soviet power; and with a new Europe establishing economic association through the Common Market with a number of nations in the area.

— The relationship among the outside powers has changed. With lines between the U.S. and Soviet Union firmly drawn in Europe, their contest has spilled over to the south where no such lines exist and where local conflict and rapid change draw them into new competition. This takes place against a background of changes in their own global strategic relationship and changes in their respective national postures toward global involvement.

This protracted and bitter struggle lies at the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace," *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1656 (March 22, 1971), pp. 389–394.

A brief summary of the points made here was included in Nixon's radio address on foreign policy broadcast to the nation on February 25 (see *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1655 (March 15, 1971), pp. 308–309). The Middle East was also mentioned in the section of this address dealing with U.S.–U.S.S.R. relations (see *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1656 (March 22, 1971), p. 405).

heart of the Middle East crisis. Its harmful potential is, to be sure, enhanced by great power involvement. But the simple fact remains that the continuation of this conflict grievously damages the interests of all concerned:

— It has drawn the Soviet Union and the United States into close military association with the combatants, with all the danger that poses to world peace.

— It has caused the disruption of normal U.S. relations with a number of Arab countries. This, in turn, has increased the already excessive Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore their dangerous vulnerability to excessive Soviet influence.

— It has provided an issue which has been exploited and manipulated by radical elements to undercut the internal stability of the Arab nations.

— It has, for two decades, kept the 50 million people of Israel and the adjoining Arab nations in a permanent state of hostilities, and in constant fear of attack.

— It has forced both the Arab states and Israel to divert a tragically disproportionate share of their resources to the instruments and activities of war.

— It has condemned to squalor and to soul-searing hatred the lives of the Palestinian refugees, who include not only those who originally fled their homes upon the establishment of Israel, but a whole generation born and reared in the hopelessness and frustration of the refugee camps. They are the material from which history creates the tragedies of the future.

That is the outline of the situation which prevails. It is, and was when my Administration began, of deep concern to the American people.

We faced a choice. We could have elected to stand aloof from the problem, on the theory that our diplomatic intervention would serve only to complicate further an already excessively complex problem.

We rejected that course. We did so for three reasons. First, the stakes involved are too high for us to accept a passive role. Second, we could see nothing resulting from our restraint but the steady deterioration of the situation into open war. Third, it would have been

intolerable to subordinate our own hopes for global peace and a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union to the local—if severe—animosities of the Middle East.

Therefore—with no illusions about the difficulty or the risks—this Administration embarked upon a major and prolonged effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. In that effort, we have encountered in full measure the difficulties we expected. We have had disappointments as well as a limited degree of success. Because this problem is so important, and because our role is central to the chances for settlement, I wish to discuss in detail our assessment of the problem, and our efforts to resolve it.

The interests of all concerned require a settlement. The purpose of the United States has been to help the parties work out among themselves a peace agreement that each would have a stake in maintaining. We have proceeded with a sense of compassion for their concerns.

The Israelis seek recognition as a nation by their neighbors in secure circumstances. In any settlement they will seek more than simple declarations of peace and of Israel's legitimacy. They also seek physical security. For Israel, peace must be something more than a paper peace.

The Arab governments seek the recovery of territories lost during the June war, justice for those who have lost lands and homes through more than twenty years of conflict, and a sense of dignity and security that will permit them to feel no longer vulnerable to attack. Peace for them must also be real.

If these concerns are to be reconciled, three conditions must be met:

— Judgment on each side that the other is *willing* to make and live up to commitments that could produce a just and lasting peace.

— Judgment on each side that the other will be *able* to keep its commitments.

— Judgment on each side that the world community can provide realistic supplementary guarantees of whatever agreements may be reached.

*The United States Initiative.* Throughout 1969, the United States sought a framework for an agreed settlement through bilateral talks

with the Soviet Union and in the multilateral channel of the Four Power talks, as well as through continuing consultation with Israel, Jordan, and the UAR. We sought to work out common guidelines which Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, could use as a catalyst for talks between the parties.

By May of 1970 these efforts were stalled. And while they had proceeded, the intensity of the conflict had again reached the critical level. Fighting was taking place daily along the Suez Canal. In retaliation, Israeli air power had reached deep into Egypt. Fedayeen attacks had provoked serious incidents on the ceasefire lines between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The Soviet Union had taken steps to alter the military balance in the UAR's favor. Forces opposed to any kind of settlement were increasingly assertive in many Arab countries.

Obviously, the situation was once again about to go out of control. A new approach in the search for a settlement was urgently required.

Our experience over the past year had convinced us that no serious movement toward peace was possible unless the parties to the conflict themselves came to grips with the issues between them.

On June 19, therefore, the United States launched an initiative to get both sides to:

- re-establish the ceasefire.
- observe a military standstill in an agreed zone on both sides of the Israel-UAR ceasefire line.
- agree on a set of principles as the basic starting point for Arab-Israeli talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

The essence of this proposal was described by Secretary Rogers publicly on June 25 as a major political initiative "to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking." The UAR, Jordan, and Israel accepted the proposal, as did the Soviet Union. Our initiative produced significant results:

- It halted the bloodshed along the ceasefire line, and thereby helped reduce national passions to a level more conducive to sober consideration of a political settlement.

— It obtained, for the first time, agreement by Israel, Jordan, and the UAR to seek "a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with" the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

However, the ultimate goal of our initiative, a serious peace negotiation, did not follow immediately. For the Soviet and Egyptian buildup of military forces along the Suez Canal continued after the ceasefire went into effect on August 7, in violation of the agreement for a military standstill. The fragile opening toward peace was further endangered in early September by the actions of Palestinian groups which attempted to force the Government of Jordan to withdraw from the effort to reach a settlement.

The situation in Jordan deteriorated into open conflict, and the subsequent intervention of armored forces from Syria created the gravest threat to world peace since this Administration came into office.

More was at stake than Jordanian policy. As always with dangers avoided, it is not easy in retrospect to demonstrate how close to greater dangers the world really came. But the prospect which threatened can be described: If Jordan had succumbed to either internal subversion or external aggression, the danger of another fullscale Middle East war would have been at hand. With the Soviet Union so deeply involved in the military operations of the UAR, and with firm U.S. support for the survival of Israel, the risk of great-power confrontation would have been real indeed.

The United States had no responsible choice but to prevent events from running away with the ability to control them. We took a firm stand against the Syrian intervention. We acted to stabilize but not to threaten, to discourage irresponsibility without accelerating the momentum of crisis.

The Syrians withdrew, the Government of Jordan re-established order, and a fragile agreement was reached on the future role of

the organized Palestinians.

This sobering experience should demonstrate to all the parties involved the extreme volatility of the present state of affairs. The entire world has seen how precarious is the balance and how great the danger in the Middle East.

*The Shape of Peace in the Middle East.* It is not for the United States to attempt to set the precise terms of a Middle East peace settlement. That can be done only by the parties directly in conflict, and only by a process of negotiation with each other.

However, some of the principles and elements that must be included if a settlement is to be reached are clear and evident:

— The Arab Governments will not accept a settlement which does not provide for recovery of territories lost in the 1967 War. Without such acceptance, no settlement can have the essential quality of assured permanence.

— Israel will not agree to withdraw from occupied Arab territories, which she sees as enhancing her physical security, unless she has confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement. She also believes that the final borders to which she will withdraw must be negotiated and agreed in a binding peace settlement. She must, therefore, have confidence that no attack is forthcoming, and confidence in her acceptance by her neighbors and in other assurances.

— The lack of mutual confidence between Israel and the Arab countries is so deep that supplementary major power guarantees could add an element of assurance. Such guarantees, coupled in time with a reduction of the armed strength of both sides, can give the agreement permanence.

— No lasting settlement can be achieved in the Middle East without addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people. For over two decades they have been the victims of conditions that command sympathy. Peace requires fruitful lives for them and their children, and a just settlement of their claims.

The immediate task is to help the belligerents construct an agreement that will achieve a workable balance between the security and

recognition that Israel seeks and a just resolution, which the Arab states seek, of the territorial and Palestinian issues. Only in such a balance can peace be found.

For over a century the Middle East has been an area of great concern to the major powers. To NATO and Europe its independence is vital, militarily and economically. Similarly the Soviet Union has important interests which we recognize.

Despite the depth of these interests—perhaps to some extent because of them—the major powers have not established a pattern of relationships with the Middle East which accommodates the interests of all. The concern caused by that fact is magnified by the instability and volatility of the region.

Any effort by any major power to secure a dominant position could exacerbate local disputes, affect Europe's security, and increase the danger to world peace. We seek no such position; we cannot allow others to establish one.

We believe that the stability of the Middle East requires establishing a balance in the activities of the various outside powers involved there. Each must be free to pursue its own legitimate interests, but within the limits imposed by respect for the legitimate interests of others and the sovereignty of the nations of the area.

On this basis, the United States sought in 1969 and 1970 to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union on the Middle East question which would have global significance for us and them, and would also contribute to making constructive peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis possible.

We repeatedly made clear to the Soviet leaders our desire to limit the arms race in the Middle East on a reciprocal basis:

— On February 4, 1970, I proposed to Chairman Kosygin that the United States and the Soviet Union discuss the question of limiting the arms which our two countries provide to the Middle East. The Soviets rejected this proposal as they had done similar proposals in the past.

— On March 23, Secretary Rogers announced that we would hold in abeyance a

decision on Israel's request for additional aircraft, pointing out that: "Restraint will be required on the part of other major suppliers to the Middle East. No nation can pursue a policy of seeking unilateral advantage in the area if peace is to be achieved."

The Soviet Union responded by stepping up the shipment of air-defense missiles and aircraft, manned by Soviet combat crews, to Egypt—the first time that Soviet combat crews have been moved to a nation outside the Communist orbit.

While indicating that the U.S. preferred restraint in the shipment of arms, I have also repeatedly stated that the military balance between the Arab states and Israel must be maintained:

— In my February 4 letter to Chairman Kosygin, I made clear that the United States would not hesitate to provide arms to Israel if they were required in order to maintain that balance.

— On July 31, I said publicly: "It is an integral part of our cease-fire proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire period to improve its military position in the area of the cease-fire lines. All would have to refrain from . . . undertaking a military buildup of any kind in such an area."

The Soviet Union's disregard for this essential foundation for peace talks raised serious doubts about its readiness to cooperate in the effort to achieve peace. Against this background, the United States had no choice but to take further steps to help maintain the military balance.

Throughout most of 1969 we had attempted to engage the Soviet Union in developing a basis for Arab-Israeli negotiations. Our talks with the Soviets focussed particularly on three points:

— The need for an Arab commitment to accept specific obligations in a peace agreement with Israel.

— The need for an Israeli commitment to withdraw from occupied territories as part of a binding peace which establishes recognized and secure boundaries.

— The need for both sides to enter a genuine negotiating process to work out the

detailed terms of a peace settlement between them.

The Soviets have persistently called for an Israeli commitment to total withdrawal from all occupied territories. The Soviets have also called for a refugee settlement which inadequately reflects the practical human and security problems involved on both sides. The United States has recognized that any changes in prewar borders should be insubstantial, but we insist that any agreement to fix final borders must be directly linked in a peace agreement to mutually agreed practical arrangements that would make these secure. These are matters for negotiation between the parties. The Soviets have insisted, however, that the major powers make these judgments and, in effect, impose them on the parties.

In June 1970, the USSR offered further formulations on some of the obligations that all parties would undertake for preventing hostile acts from their soil and on the precise time when peace would come into effect in relation to the withdrawal of troops to final borders. But these formulations, which were modifications of earlier Soviet proposals, came belatedly and still failed to take into account the need for a negotiating process engaging the parties themselves.

The U.S. continues to welcome Soviet suggestions for a settlement. But to be serious, they must meet the legitimate concerns of not one but both sides.

Apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a strong Arab nationalism has grown in reaction to an era of outside political control which has now ended. It is nurtured by a persistent yearning for unity among Arab nations. But traditional and ideological rivalries make it difficult for Arabs to agree on the form their unity should take. The attempts to fashion unity, therefore, sharpen tensions.

At the heart of these disputes is a fundamental ideological disagreement on how Arab society should respond to pressures for rapid modernization. As a consequence, some of the more militant forces exploit issues of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, even where these are not the real issues. For their own nationalist or ideological reasons, they seek to



reduce the U.S. position. The ironic result of their action—if they succeeded—would be to make the area once again more vulnerable to outside domination.

Thus some political currents in the area make it more difficult for the U.S. to maintain, as we would wish to do, productive relations with nations on both sides of inter-Arab disputes. We will continue to maintain friendly relations with all the countries of the area which welcome our friendship. We can make a significant contribution, as we have in the past, to the development of the Arab world in the fields of education and technical training, business management, and investment. The value of the contribution we can make, and wish to make, creates a common interest in the maintenance of decent relationships which may offset pressures to disrupt them.

The search for peace—especially an Arab-Israeli settlement—and the quest for a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship that will help preserve the independence and integrity of each nation in this area will remain our top priorities. Our aim is to see an epoch begin in which strong independent nations in this area—in association with each other as they choose—relate freely and constructively with the world outside. The U.S. is prepared to consider new and fresh ways to assist in the development of the region to the benefit of both Arabs and Israelis once a real peace agreement is achieved.

In pursuing those goals, the United States will face these principal issues in the months ahead:

First, if the United States is to play a major role—as we promised to do—in helping to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement and provide supplementary guarantees, what should be the nature and extent of our diplomatic involvement? As I pointed out at the United Nations last October, the primary responsibility for peace rests on the nations of the Middle East. What is the proper relation between the efforts of the international community to encourage a settlement and the responsibility of the negotiating parties themselves?

Second, our bilateral relations with Arab nations are in flux. With some, formal diplomatic relations have been suspended. In others, attitudes toward the U.S. and the West are undergoing reassessment. The changing relationships in the Persian Gulf necessarily raise new issues for American policy. How do we best encourage and assist the constructive forces in the area to build a regional system of stable relationships?

Finally, there is a range of broader worldwide issues that form the background to Middle East politics. Limiting the external supply of arms to the area is one such issue. The U.S.-Soviet military relationship in the Mediterranean area is another. Beyond this, what is our policy toward the broadening commercial association which the European Common Market is establishing with nations in the area? How can we help assure the access of Western Europe and Japan to the supply of oil, and also help assure that the producing states receive fair revenues for their oil?

On some of these issues, our work is already well advanced. With others we are coming to grips for the first time. Our purpose is to resolve them in a way that helps us and every nation involved in the Middle East, including above all the states of the area, to build and strengthen the relationships—at every level—that will hold together the structure of peace.

#### 41

### **Comments on the Soviet View of the Middle East Conflict and Its Implications for the Possibility of an East-West Détente, Made by U.S. Senior Statesman and Former Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Harriman After a Visit to Moscow<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1971

On my recent visit to Moscow with Senator Muskie, the Soviet leaders emphasized their

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from W. Averell Harriman, "The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.," *International Herald Tribune*, February 25, 1971, p. 4.

firm support for a real peace in the Middle East and their willingness to participate in effective four-power guarantees of that peace. They are, perhaps, motivated to end the conflict, which they have exploited to gain influence in the Arab world, by their desire to avoid direct confrontation with us. The Soviets evidently do not want another war between Israel and Egypt. Their prestige is committed too greatly for them to allow Egypt to suffer another humiliating defeat. They seem to fear that if Egypt is not strong enough they would have to intervene even more directly and that such intervention would involve a confrontation with us.

In addition the Soviets want to reduce the burden of supplying arms to the Arabs and are anxious to have the Suez Canal reopened to permit them to fill the vacuum left by British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

I gained the impression that the Soviets have used their influence to encourage the Egyptians to move toward a peaceful solution, accepting Israel's right to exist. The Soviets have never supported the Arab call to drive the Israelis to the sea. They now contend that the United States should join them in demanding Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory, conforming with their interpretation of the 1967 UN resolution. They disregard its ambiguity, designed to permit territorial rectification.

The Soviets now show greatest concern over the Middle East. In 1965 Kosygin told me it was North Vietnam. Soviet apprehension of direct conflict there was relieved by President Johnson's ending the bombing, though the war still causes tensions between us.

. . . . .

## 42

**Statement Including Israel's Conditions for a Middle East Settlement Issued by the Government of Israel in Reply to Peace Proposals Put Forward by U.N. Special Envoy Jarring<sup>1</sup>**

**February 26, 1971**

Pursuant to our meetings on February 8 and February 17, I am instructed to convey to you, and through you to the U.A.R., the following:

Israel views favourably the expression by the U.A.R. of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and the U.A.R. should—inter alia—include the provisions set out below.

A. Israel would give undertakings covering the following:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between Israel and the U.A.R. as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the U.A.R.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the U.A.R.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the U.A.R. to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

4. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-U.A.R. cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both parties in this connection, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Governments directly involved on:

<sup>1</sup> English text of Israeli reply, *Jerusalem Post*, March 8, 1971, p. 2.

- a) The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property.
- b) Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region.

Once the obligations of the parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue have been agreed neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

6. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the U.A.R.

7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the U.A.R.

8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against the U.A.R. and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the U.A.R.

B. The U.A.R. undertakings in the peace agreement with Israel would include:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between the U.A.R. and Israel as finally ended and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between the U.A.R. and Israel.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement.

4. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of the U.A.R. against the population, armed forces or property of Israel.

5. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel.

6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israeli ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal.

7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of

interference in the normal international relations of Israel.

8. Non-participation by the U.A.R. in hostile alliances against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against Israel.

The U.A.R. and Israel should enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent, and containing the above undertakings.

The Government of Israel believes that now that the U.A.R. has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

#### 43

### **Interview Given by Deputy Premier Allon of Israel Dealing with U.S. Policy in the Middle East, Rejecting the Rogers Plan and Advocating the Allon Plan<sup>1</sup>**

**February 27, 1971**

*Q. Mr. Allon, after President Nixon's statement, is there still doubt in the heart of the Israeli Government that the Rogers plan is the plan the United States is confronting us with?*

<sup>1</sup> Allon's interview broadcast without the final question and answer on Israel Home Service in Hebrew. The final question and answer were included in the Israel in English "This Week" interview; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3623/A/8-A/10; reprinted by permission.

In an interview on February 26, 1971, Israeli Foreign Minister Eban responded to many of the same questions and also gave his opinion on the Jarring mission, superpower rivalry in the Middle East and the Israeli policy of "quiet diplomacy" (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3622/A/1-A/3).

A. There has never been doubt in our heart that the plan of the US Secretary of State is the plan of the US Government and, therefore, his plan has particularly worried us since it was brought to the knowledge of the world and to our knowledge.

*Q. But it has never been made so clear by President Nixon.*

A. Nevertheless, I found [word indistinct] in the choice of expressions and words used by President Nixon and by Secretary of State Rogers. In our contacts with the US Government in general and with President Nixon in particular, however, we received clarifications and commitments which, in my opinion, give us enough guarantees to ensure there will not be an imposed peace from outside and, therefore, they will not impose insecure borders on us.

*Q. The question of guarantees was stressed this time. Is this a substitute for, or a hint about, an intention to substitute for [secure] borders and full and clear peace?*

A. I did not understand President Nixon's words this way. It is completely clear that we will not receive guarantees from the Powers as a substitute for a lasting peace treaty or defensible borders.

*Q. Mr. Allon, are we facing a confrontation with the Americans?*

A. I hope the friendship between Israel and the United States is not incidental, but I do not rule out the possibility of sharper confrontation the more we progress towards a political solution.

*Q. Does this mean US pressure?*

A. The circumstances this time are much better for us than in the past although, in my opinion in the past we also hurried to submit to a shadow of pressure before we even felt pressure.

*Q. When in the past?*

A. I mean in 1949 and in 1958. This time we should be prepared for difficulties if, God forbid, lack of understanding is discovered between us and the United States concerning a solution for the Israeli-Arab dispute.

*Q. The disagreement between us and the Americans which has been deeply hidden since the six-day war is now open and clear. Does this indicate a deterioration in the situation?*

A. In my opinion there is no deterioration in the situation. The problems which were dormant between us have now come to life following the progress in negotiations. I do not rule out the possibility that we can persuade the US Government to abandon the Rogers plan because it is unjust to Israel. Although the United States is a super-Power and we are a small State we hold a key area in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean and our strength and presence have specific weight which, in my opinion, the entire free peace-loving world is interested in.

*Q. Are the maps the Israeli Government began drawing for itself based on the principle of secure borders?*

A. Up to this very moment, the future map of the State of Israel has not been discussed by the Government.

*Q. But the fact that committees are discussing the matter has been confirmed.*

A. Discussions on the level of committees are necessary. The extraordinary thing is not the holding of discussions but the failure to hold discussions over a period that has not been short. You know Israel has refused to draw a map in the past, claiming there is no sense in doing so as long as there is no one to talk to.

*Q. It refused to admit that committees were working.*

A. The Government is not obliged to tell about all its methods of work. You may take it for granted that when the time comes to draw a map the Government will do so with courage and will bring it to the knowledge of the people. Speculation at this time is not beneficial. You know I have believed for three and a half years that it is necessary to draw a map. But if you ask me now, I will say that at this moment in particular it is worth while waiting until it becomes clear whether, in fact, there is hope of continuing negotiations with Egypt. The maps should take into account the security needs of Israel first, however.

*Q. This completely contradicts the Rogers plan.*

*A. Certainly. I opposed the Rogers plan the day it was made public. I am not isolated in this, if I am not mistaken, and I am not mistaken. The entire Government without distinction, doves, hawks, etc. is united in its opposition to the Rogers plan.*

*Q. When maps and plans are considered by the Government, will the Allon plan also be considered?*

*A. Every Minister is entitled to submit a plan of his own. I do not see any reason why the thoughts I raised then about the future map of Israel should not be considered by the Government as part of the general discussion.*

*Q. The Allon plan has always been linked with the West Bank. It is difficult to assume that the plan dealt only with the West Bank and not with the Golan Heights and Sinai.*

*A. You are right. The map attached to the plan I worked out runs from the Golan Heights to Sinai. It includes all the territories in which we are engaged now. Actually, although it recommends a great compromise, it nevertheless draws borders which in my opinion are defensible on all fronts without exception.*

*Q. In the West Bank the problem of the population was of main concern. The Golan Heights and Sinai are almost unpopulated. What is the guiding principle concerning the Golan Heights and Sinai?*

*A. In the Golan Heights and Sinai it is necessary to take into account two primary considerations. The first is the defence consideration. We need a defence line in the Golan Heights not only to give security to the border settlements but also to give a strong defence position to all of Galilee and to the sources of water for the State of Israel. In Sinai we should ensure that there is no possibility of an Egyptian blitzkrieg. We should remove from their heart any prospect of a victory in the future, and then it is almost certain there will be no danger of a new war. We have several important cracks in the southern and south-western fronts which we should topographically block with reasonable depth. Furthermore, there is the question of navigation in the Strait of Tiran so there*

is special importance attached to Sharm ash-Shaykh. We want to create a situation in which navigation in the Strait of Tiran, with the effects navigation there has on all the Red Sea and its southern approaches, will be secure in the future. International guarantees in the past were not effective. It is natural that we want to find a solution to this problem by securing permanent Israeli control in this vital area. It is completely clear, without trying to point to a map, that our control of Sharm ash-Shaykh requires a land link with the State of Israel proper. In my opinion, therefore, it is necessary to include Sharm ash-Shaykh with a territorial connection to the Negev in an acceptable way. I would say this should be done in a manner which will satisfy the security needs of Israel and at the same time be such that, in my opinion, Egypt can and should accept.

*Q. Mr. Allon, in view of recent developments, how much realism is there even in the Allon plan?*

*A. It will be very regrettable if the plan I am recommending turns out to be unrealistic because this plan from the beginning took into account not only the legitimate needs and rights of Israel but gave much consideration to the Arab aspirations. In other words, it has an element of compromise, and if such a compromise is rejected it is a sign that the Arab States do not want peace.*

*Q. And finally, Mr. Allon, while we are still here talking about peace and negotiations, the fact is that the cease-fire with Egypt has just one more week to run. What do you think will happen on 7th March?*

*A. It is very hard to predict because the Egyptians are unpredictable. But I may say that the Egyptian Government will commit a grave mistake and they will pay heavily if they start shooting. I do hope they will have second thoughts about it. If, God forbid, they force us to fight, we shall fight very strongly and we may use some new tactics as well. Let us hope that these preparations will never be put into practice.*

## 44

# Statement on the Middle East Situation Issued by the Government of the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, February 28, 1971

The liquidation of the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the attainment of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict continues to be one of the most important and urgent international problems, on which the general state of the international situation depends. New efforts were undertaken lately in the interests of reaching a political settlement in the Middle East. But now the situation is again aggravating and the entire political settlement may find itself pushed back. The ruling circles of Israel are obviously aiming at this.

On 21 February this year the Government of Israel published an official statement that it refuses to withdraw Israeli troops from the occupied territories of Arab States, in particular from the territory of the United Arab Republic, and that Israel "will not withdraw to the 4 June 1967 cease-fire line".

The Israeli extremists have never concealed their plans of conquest and intention to retain the Arab territories occupied as a result of the 1967 aggression. But the circumstances in which the Israeli Government made this statement lend special meaning and significance to it.

A more favourable situation than ever before has been taking shape in the past several weeks for reaching agreement on a political settlement on the basis of fulfilment in full volume of the known 22 November 1967 resolution of the Security Council by all the interested sides. The decisive role in the creation of this situation was played by the United Arab Republic's consistent line at a solution of the Middle East problem by political means.

As a result of efforts by the United Arab

Republic and a number of other Arab States, supported by the huge majority of States in the world, contacts by the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, with the sides in the conflict were resumed a month and a half ago. From the very outset these contacts, the first ever, acquired the nature of a discussion of concrete undertakings which are a part of the set of measures for political settlement. Wishing to create a favourable atmosphere in the interests of successful talks, the Arab countries expressed consent to continue the observance of the cease-fire despite the fact that a part of their territory is being occupied by Israel for the fourth year now. The United Arab Republic Government proposed a resumption of international shipping through the Suez Canal in the event of a commencement of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula.

All this facilitated the development of contacts. On 8 February, noting the shaping possibilities for progress in the cause of the political settlement, the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General approached both sides with a proposal to inform him of their readiness to assume concrete commitments on two key questions of the settlement—the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and the terms of the peace which is to be established in the Middle East.

The stand of the United Arab Republic on these questions is clear and positive. As it follows from statements by United Arab Republic representatives and, in particular, in connexion with the message by the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, the United Arab Republic is ready to conclude an agreement on peace with Israel, if Israel undertakes a commitment to withdraw its troops from all occupied territories and fulfils United Nations decisions on the Palestine refugees. The United Arab Republic is prepared for the agreement on peace to envisage commitments by the sides on ending the state of war, on respect of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, on recognition and respect of the right of each side to live in peace

<sup>1</sup> English text of statement as sent to the U.N. Secretary General by U.S.S.R. Representative Malik on February 28 and circulated as U.N. Documents A/8288 and S/10136.

within secure and recognized borders, on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Within the framework of the political settlement the United Arab Republic agrees to ensure the freedom of shipping through the Suez Canal in accordance with the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and freedom of shipping in the Strait of Tiran in accordance with principles of international law. The United Arab Republic also expressed agreement with the idea of creating demilitarized zones along both sides of the border and the stationing in some areas of a United Nations peace-keeping force.

The constructive position of the United Arab Republic Government was met with much satisfaction by all who sincerely strive for peace in the Middle East. Even those circles which far from sympathize with the national liberation struggle of the Arabs, the United Arab Republic and other Arab States that have embarked on the road of progressive development, could not but admit that the position of the United Arab Republic both as a whole and in details accords with the programme of political settlement drawn up by the Security Council. The United Arab Republic's bold and realistic position contributed to a strengthening of the international prestige of the United Arab Republic. It fully exposed the slanderous allegations by enemies of the Arab national liberation movement that the United Arab Republic is not prepared to accept terms of a peace in the Middle East that would be fair for all, including Israel.

It became obvious that the talks had approached the decisive stage. It was enough for the Israeli Government to announce its readiness to assume a part of the commitments concerning the political settlement, including the commitment to withdraw troops from all occupied territories, and a genuine turn to peace would have finally taken place in the Middle East.

But this did not happen. In its 21 February statement, replying to the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Israel actually gave a negative reply to the main question without which there can be no peace in the Middle East—the question of the

withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories. Israel thereby openly came out as an aggressor and again showed the whole world that it does not want to give up its plunderous habits and is not stopping short of challenging the United Nations Organization and the peoples of the whole world.

It is an open secret on what the Israeli Government counts when promoting a line at frustrating the political settlement and at further aggravating the situation in the Middle East. It counts on support by the United States of America, which invariably encourages Israel's aggressive policy against the Arab countries, gives the Israeli occupationists extensive patronage and supplies them with the latest types of weapons.

American representatives have announced more than once the interest of the United States Government in achieving a political settlement in the Middle East. But there is a big gap between words and deeds in American policy. The United States pays lip service to peace in the Middle East and to a settlement of the Middle East conflict by political means. But in deeds Israel has been and continues to be the shock tool of American imperialism in frustrating the political settlement, in creating new dangerous complications in the Middle East. In words, the United States Government recognizes the lawful interests of Arab States. In deeds, it supports Israel's aggressive course.

In view of all this, the United States shares with Israel the entire responsibility for the situation that is now shaping in the Middle East. It also shares responsibility for Israel's latest obstructionist step—its announced refusal to withdraw troops from Arab territories—and for all possible consequences of this.

The question arises—in what direction will events further develop in the Middle East. Every government, every responsible politician must realize that the alternative in the Middle East is such: political settlement or a military clash. That is why the Soviet Government believes that vigorous actions by all States interested in peace are now

especially necessary in a direction to prevent Israel and its patrons from frustrating the cause of political settlement. If the peace-loving States unite their efforts in the struggle for such a settlement in the Middle East, it will be possible to achieve this task.

If, however, the ruling circles of Israel think that by promoting a policy of sabotage they will be able to achieve their main aim for which the aggression against Arab countries in 1967 was unleashed—to break the Arab national liberation movement, to overthrow the progressive régimes that have asserted themselves in the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries, they should better remember that such plans are doomed to failure. The Soviet Union is a friend of the Arab peoples and gives them the necessary assistance, political and material, in the struggle for the liberation of lands captured by the Israeli aggressors. This aid will be given further.

The Soviet Government firmly comes out for a settlement of the Middle East conflict by political means. It will further do everything for the policy of peace to score victory in the struggle between forces of peace and forces of aggression in the Middle East.

## 45

**Letter to a Fateh Representative from Foreign Minister Almeyda-Medina of Chile, Expressing Support for the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Santiago, February, 1971**

On behalf of the President of the Republic To the Representative of the Palestine Resistance:

Honored Sir,

I have the pleasure to thank you on behalf of the President of the Republic for the appreciation expressed by your comrades in the Resistance of Dr. Salvador Allende's

understanding of that movement's struggle and, as Foreign Minister of the Government of Popular Unity, I have pleasure in declaring our support for and concern with the Palestine Resistance and its dimensions as a response to the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their usurped rights. Finally, I should like to express to you my thanks on this occasion for your good wishes to the Government of Popular Unity and my good wishes to the Palestine Resistance in its struggle to achieve its great aspirations.

Accept my greetings,  
Clodomiro Almeyda-Medina  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

## 46

**Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of Talks Between a Delegation Representing the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) and the Communist Party of Chile<sup>1</sup>**

**Santiago, February, 1971**

The Chilean Communist Party, on behalf of the Party's Political Committee, welcomed the representative of the movement of the Palestinian Arab people. In a discussion with the leaders Victor Diaz and Orlando Millas, the Fateh representative provided a picture of the Palestinian Arab people's long struggle against foreign colonialism in all its forms and told of how their homeland had been torn to pieces by imperialism, led by the United States of America and its tool Zionism. He also explained the similar problems which beset all groups of the Palestinian people before imperialist ambitions made their appearance in the area and took advantage of the Zionist problem for their own objectives. These may be summed up as the construction of a colonialist settler base to exploit the resources of the Arab world, and its strategic position against the states of the socialist camp, and to check

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Almeyda-Medina's letter, *Fateh* (Damascus), June 11, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *Fateh* (Damascus), June 11, 1971.



the advance of the peoples of the area towards peace and progress. He also outlined the tragedy of the Palestinian people's homelessness and their eviction in 1948 from the homeland in which they had lived for thousands of years; the tragedy of the refugees, and the repeated aggressions of the state of Israel against the Arab nation, the last of which was the aggression of 1967. He talked of the struggle of the Palestinian people who for eighteen years waited for the international organizations to deal fairly with them without any positive results; this led to their taking up arms to defend their legitimate right to their country. He also spoke of the goals of Fateh's struggle as embodied in the call to establish a democratic state in which members of the Palestinian people of all religions will coexist—Jews, Muslims and Christians—as they lived for thousands of years, in equality and justice. He reaffirmed Fateh's support for the peoples of the third world against imperialism and its tool Zionism, and stressed the unity of the struggle of the Palestinian and Chilean peoples against their common enemy.

Comrade Orlando Millas affirmed his Party's support for the heroic struggle of the Arabs against Zionism and imperialism and reaffirmed the Chilean Communists' support for and solidarity with Fateh in its defense of the legitimate rights and freedom of the Palestinian people. He thanked the representative of Fateh for visiting his country, Chile, and it was agreed to consolidate the solidarity and constant cooperation between Fateh and the Chilean Communist Party. He also affirmed that this mutual solidarity was of the greatest importance to the support of the liberation of peoples and their national struggle. The two parties sent their greetings to the revolutionaries of Latin America in their struggle for the liberation of their peoples. The representative of Fateh also reiterated Fateh's best wishes for the success of the Government of Popular Unity in achieving progress not only for the Chilean people but for all peoples struggling for freedom and progress.

47

**Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of Talks Between a Delegation Representing the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) and Representatives of the Socialist Party of Chile<sup>1</sup>**

**Santiago, February, 1971**

I. The Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh), which is struggling for the recovery of its rights which have been usurped by Zionism and world imperialism declares its full support for the Chilean Socialist Party and the Government of Popular Unity in their struggle against backwardness, exploitation and subjection, and against American imperialism, the enemy of the so-called developing peoples.

II. The Chilean Socialist Party reaffirms its full support for the Palestine revolution against Zionism and American imperialism which are the cause of the problems which are weakening the whole of humanity, and against its tool, the Israeli government.

III. The two parties agreed to reaffirm their support for and solidarity with the peoples of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Indochina that are struggling for self-determination against imperialism and its agents in all parts of the world.

IV. The two parties agreed that their problems are similar and that they face a common enemy—American imperialism and its tools, Zionism, feudalism and reaction, which constitute obstacles in the way of those peoples who are struggling for a decent life and to build a society which will permit men to live in freedom and full development.

V. The Palestine revolution, under the command of Fateh, wishes the Chilean Socialist Party and the Government of Popular Unity every success in its tasks of establishing social justice and building socialism in Chile.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *Fateh* (Damascus), June 11, 1971.

## 48

**Statement Issued by the Government of Iran Reiterating Its Support for a Peaceful Settlement in the Middle East, Hailing the Positive U.A.R. Response to Ambassador Jarring's Proposals and Urging Israel To Implement U.N. Resolutions and To Adopt a Positive Attitude Towards the Rogers Plan and the Jarring Proposals<sup>1</sup>**

**Teheran, Early March, 1971**

On 7 June 1967 His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr declared that "the days of occupation and retention of one country's territory by another are over". In accordance with this principle, the Imperial Government of Iran has always considered that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories is essential for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. The Government of Iran was among the Governments which endorsed the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. On every occasion since the adoption of that resolution by the Security Council, the Government of Iran has emphasized the need for implementation of its provisions; hence it supported and voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution of 4 November 1970 endorsing the provisions of the Security Council resolution. At the same time, the Government of Iran, in pursuance of its stated policy, was among the sponsors of the resolutions of the 1967 emergency special session of the General Assembly with regard to the inviolability of the legal status of Jerusalem.

The Government of Iran welcomed the announcement of the Rogers Plan for the restoration of peace in the Middle East and on 1 October 1970 declared its support of the Plan in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Rogers Plan sought to establish a cease-fire among the parties concerned,

thereby laying a foundation for peace discussions in order to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The Government of Iran believes that the recent proposals by Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, contain provisions based on the Security Council resolution and that they provide the basis on which a just and honourable peace could be established. Happily, the Government of the United Arab Republic has responded favourably to the Jarring proposals and has thereby opened the door for the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. For the first time, it has declared its willingness to reach a peace agreement provided that Israeli forces are withdrawn from occupied territories.

Now that as a result of the positive attitude of the Government of the United Arab Republic, favourable conditions for restoration of peace in the Middle East have been realized, the Government of Iran hopes that Israel will reciprocate by taking positive steps in the direction of peace and regional tranquillity so that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General may succeed in his efforts to enable the parties concerned to reach a just and honourable agreement.

In view of what has been said and considering that the Government of Iran regards the response of the President of the United Arab Republic as a favourable basis for a just and honourable peace, should the Government of Israel persist in its refusal to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolution and maintain its negative attitude towards the Rogers Plan and the Jarring proposals, the Government of Iran will see no alternative but to condemn the unconciliatory attitude of Israel.

<sup>1</sup> Text of Iran government statement as submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General on March 11, 1971 and circulated as U.N. Document A/8298 and S/10154.

# Statements Assuring Unflagging U.S. Government Support for Israel, Made in an Israeli Press Interview by U.S. Zionist Leader Wexler<sup>1</sup>

Early March, 1971

[Advising Israelis not to be anxious about U.S. Middle East policy]: My advice to Israelis is: "Please do not panic when some stories make headlines." People here should not be pessimistic. Why, I remember that a year ago I told them you will be getting the jets [Phantoms], and they thought me over-optimistic.

[Commenting on President Nixon's recent "State of the World" speech]: I have told everybody that I have confidence in Nixon. He is anxious for peace. I am certainly not depressed by the over-all tenor of his statement. He was very specific about preventing a Russian takeover in the Middle East ... Israelis should not worry. I cannot see the U.S. making any basic policy changes to Israel's disadvantage. After all, there is the overwhelming feeling of Congress in favour of Israel to take into account. Now that elections are coming up, I cannot visualise any kind of policy change in the cards.

[Recalling the meeting with President Nixon in the White House on Soviet Jewry]: As we were leaving he said, "Fellows, you have to have faith and confidence in me. Didn't we deliver \$500m. worth of arms?" People here should realize that no U.S. Government—and that includes the best—has provided what Nixon has for Israel.

[Noting that 95 per cent of U.S. Jewry (according to the Gallup Poll in *Newsweek*) and wide circles of U.S. society favored Israel's cause]: Above all, I thank the Almighty that six million American Jews who are very effective politically, will do what we have to do.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted text of interview with Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Dr. William Wexler, conducted by Mark Segal, as published in the *Jerusalem Post*, March 3, 1971, p. 4.

# Interview in U.S. Weekly Given by Premier Meir of Israel Replying to U.A.R. President Sadat's Settlement Proposals and Reiterating Israel's Insistence on "Secure and Recognized Borders"<sup>2</sup>

Early March, 1971

*Q. For the first time in a generation, Egypt has declared its willingness to conclude and sign a peace treaty recognizing Israel specifically as a sovereign state. In the past, you have always said that Egypt's refusal to do this was the main stumbling block on the road to peace. Has Mr. Sadat now removed this stumbling block?*

*A. We haven't lost sight of the fact that something important has happened. If both sides are prepared to go on from there, something of greater importance may take place. But there is one stumbling block left which we hope will also be removed—namely that Egypt is asking us to make prior commitments before any negotiations can take place on outstanding issues. If we are prepared to agree to their program, then, and only then, are they prepared to enter into a peace agreement. We don't set any preconditions and we ask them not to set any either. We cannot accept any preconditions.*

*Q. How have you responded to President Sadat's initiative, besides saying that it is encouraging?*

*A. We have said we are ready for meaningful negotiations on all subjects and that we are prepared to withdraw to borders that are secure, agreed and recognized.*

*Q. Sadat has made a solemn pledge on what he is willing to put in a peace treaty. In return, he says, he must have a solemn pledge from you on withdrawal from occupied territories. He does not, however, reject minor border changes in your favor. In the light of all this, hasn't the time come for you to tell the world what you have in mind—besides the oft-repeated phrase of "secure, recognized and agreed borders?"*

<sup>2</sup> Text of Meir's interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (Atlantic Edition), LXXVII, 10 (March 8, 1971), pp. 66-67, 70; © copyright Newsweek, Inc., 1971; reprinted by permission.

A. Sadat told you that border changes must be left up to the countries concerned. He's quite right. Jordan negotiates with us about the west bank and Syria about the Golan Heights. Sadat speaks for Egypt and insofar as Egypt is concerned he asks for complete withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Sadat also adds after stating his conditions that a just and lasting peace cannot be realized without withdrawal from all occupied territories. So where are the border changes?

*Q. Since the highly explosive Mideast situation can still trigger yet another war, in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might find themselves involved against their will, isn't the world entitled to know where you want your new borders to be?*

A. Your assessment on possible international complications seems farfetched. Supposing the world knows where we want the borders to be, how is that going to prevent a new war unless Egypt is willing to sit down and negotiate these new borders with us?

*Q. Aren't the Arabs entitled to know how much of their territory you wish to keep?*

A. Of course they are. But please understand that the question is not of keeping territories but of obtaining secure borders.

*Q. What if the Arabs ask, through Dr. Jarring, to see your peace map?*

A. Do you know of any case where people who want to make peace refuse to look at each other?

*Q. What about a divorced couple? Don't they negotiate through lawyers?*

A. Who's talking about divorce? We're talking about marriage.

*Q. Can I infer from what you say that when it comes to borders, you will only discuss this face-to-face in direct talks?*

A. I am saying this would be the best method. But if they at this stage want to negotiate through Dr. Jarring, we don't object. However, I cannot conceive how we can negotiate substantive problems without face-to-face meetings.

*Q. You say no return to the 1967 borders. But would you be willing to consider them as a basis for negotiation?*

A. We want to sit down and discuss borders that are secure and recognized. The borders we had between 1949 and 1967, according to the armistice agreements, were not recognized and final borders, though we were quite content to go on living in them. The Arabs said throughout these years that Israel had no borders. Now they say they want the borders they said we didn't have. So let's work out a definitive map.

*Q. You say that your new borders will not be the 1967 borders, nor the present cease-fire lines. This means somewhere in-between.*

A. Obviously.

*Q. But this conveys the impression that you have major changes in mind.*

A. When they see our map they will see whether they are minor or major. We could do what the Egyptians have done—draw a map and say this is it, take it or leave it. Many people would say this is an ultimatum. We haven't said that. We want to negotiate—and a negotiation means give and take. In some cases border changes will be minor and in others there may be need for major changes.

*Q. By declining to answer specific territorial questions, you create an impression that you have not agreed among yourselves on what the new map should be. Is that correct?*

A. Within 24 hours of border negotiations getting under way, our suggestions for a new map will be on the table.

*Q. Could you spell out what, for example, would meet your criterion of a secure and defensible border?*

A. Borders that are defensible if we are attacked again, borders that will deter attacks.

*Q. If you pull back to a line behind El Arish in the Sinai, Sadat told me, under his partial withdrawal proposal, he will undertake to restore the canal to navigation for all countries, including Israel, and guarantee freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran as well. Does this proposal of Sadat's interest you at all?*

A. Free passage certainly interests us. But in their reply to Dr. Jarring, they say in accordance with the Constantinople Conven-

tion of 1888. Well, in the past, they've invoked this same convention to deny free passage for Israeli ships. There seems to be a contradiction here that is clearly a subject for negotiation.

*Q. What about partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the canal?*

A. Sadat's partial withdrawal proposal was made before he said he was prepared to enter into a peace agreement with us. One seems to have superseded the other. Now we are talking about a real peace agreement, not partial withdrawal. Egypt itself says so.

*Q. Moshe Dayan said recently that he would prefer to keep Sharm el Sheikh without peace than to have peace without Sharm el Sheikh. Your own Labor Party platform, before the last elections, pledged a permanent Israeli presence at Sharm el Sheikh "linked to Elath by territorial continuity." Is this the position of the government today?*

A. The [Israeli] Government has not drawn final lines on any map. This will be done as soon as border negotiations get under way.

*Q. Would the Israeli Government consider restoring Sharm el Sheikh to Egyptian sovereignty if you could negotiate a lease on a base there?*

A. We will negotiate anything that the Egyptians put on the table. Any idea that they have we will consider.

*Q. Is a Security Council-guaranteed international force at Sharm el Sheikh an acceptable alternative to a permanent Israeli presence?*

A. Nothing in our opinion is an alternative to secure and recognized borders. There is no substitute for that. In 1957, it was unanimously agreed that a U.N. force should stay in Sharm el Sheikh until the situation became normal again. Well, surely there was nothing normal about the situation in 1967 when Nasser whistled and the U.N. force packed its bags.

*Q. But that was not a Security Council guarantee where each of the Big Four has a veto.*

A. After we've worked out a peace treaty and agreed on borders, then we will be prepared to discuss any additional guarantees that are offered. What they would be worth

is a moot point. They proved worthless in the past.

*Q. Cairo says you have rejected Dr. Farring's latest suggestions for withdrawal from Sinai in return for recognition. Is that correct?*

A. We haven't rejected anything. The only thing we reject is the ultimatum issued to us, namely the conditions put to us by Cairo in return for a peace agreement and for which we are expected to sign on the dotted line. That is not a negotiation.

*Q. Do you have any designs on Jordan's west bank?*

A. We have no designs on anything. The notion that one bright morning in June 1967 Israel decided she wanted more territory and went to war to get it is ridiculous.

*Q. If you have no designs on the west bank, why are you settling Jewish families in Hebron?*

A. I refuse to answer questions phrased that way.

*Q. Why, then, are you settling Jewish families in Hebron?*

A. Irrespective of whose jurisdiction Hebron will be in, why should any Jew agree that there's any place in the world where his presence is inadmissible. Let us assume that Hebron goes back to Jordan, aren't Jews allowed to live there the way 400,000 Arabs live in Israel? Hebron has an historical connection with the Jewish people. Until 1929, when they were attacked and massacred, Jews had lived there from time immemorial.

*Q. The Arabs point to new Israeli settlements in occupied territories as proof that you are expansionist and there to stay. Why are you settling land that does not belong to you?*

A. The Arabs say many things. They say, for instance, that Israel was taken from them. What do you mean we took land away from the Arabs? Don't forget that Jordan took East Jerusalem by force in 1948. The Jews that were left alive in the Old City were driven out. We cannot agree to the principle that there mustn't be a Jew on Jordanian territory.

*Q. Will you dismantle these settlements in occupied territories under a final peace treaty?*

A. You are assuming that no Jew can live on the other side of the border. I make no such assumption. And I am not prepared to say where the border with Jordan should be.

*Q. Israel has stated it will never relinquish the Golan Heights. Does that apply to the Syrian city of El Kuneitra and the Golan Plain that you now occupy?*

A. I'm not going to draw a map for you. When we negotiate with Syria we will negotiate borders.

*Q. You say you are not interested in territory, only in security. Assuming everything else has been settled, what areas do you feel should be permanently demilitarized?*

A. Whether we consent to demilitarized borders or not, this is something that must be negotiated. But Egypt demands of us that we withdraw from all of Sinai and the Gaza Strip and then, astride those old borders, they would be prepared to establish demilitarized zones in equal distances from both sides. Where would that leave us?

*Q. Is it true that the Egyptians, in their reply to Jarring, have indicated they would be willing to give up the economic boycott against Israel as part of the final peace arrangements?*

A. There's no mention of that. It's conspicuous by its absence. But it must be made very clear in a peace agreement.

*Q. What is your objection to the plan put forward by Secretary of State William Rogers?*

A. The Rogers plan draws a map and allows for predetermined minor border changes. We believe borders should be negotiated.

*Q. Since you're worried about the reliability of any contract with an Arab country, why wouldn't Big Four guarantees, linked to the Security Council, be an effective way of ensuring your safety during the transition period to peace?*

A. We do not ask to be in a privileged position. Every country has borders and is responsible for its own safety. We don't want anyone to watch over us and be responsible for our safety. We have said this to Dr. Jarring. But after we have negotiated final peace, we will look at any other suggestions for additional safeguards.

*Q. If the cease-fire is not extended and the Egyptians resume shelling across the canal, do you feel you now have the capability to take out Egypt's missile defenses in the canal zone?*

A. We're convinced we have the capability of handling the situation as we have in the past. We don't want war. It solves nothing. We sincerely and honestly believe the Egyptians should feel the same way because it would get them nowhere. I must say it's a rather peculiar way to negotiate peace under a war deadline.

*Q. Would your military riposte be limited to the zone of the canal?*

A. I refuse to draw borders so I'm not about to disclose military contingency plans either.

*Q. Is Egypt's recognition of Israel's territorial integrity and political independence (as mentioned by Sadat when I asked him what he would be willing to put in a peace treaty) sufficient, or are open borders and an exchange of ambassadors a sine qua non?*

A. The normal state of affairs is that when governments have reached a peace agreement, an exchange of diplomatic representatives takes place. But if everything is agreed and if Sadat then says "no normal diplomatic relations," I would be prepared to recommend to my government that we sign anyway.

*Q. Sadat now says he thinks a reasonable solution to the Palestinian problem would be compensation coupled with a referendum in Gaza and the west bank to determine whether the Palestinian people want a separate state, either federated or confederated with Jordan, or to remain an integral part of Jordan. The right to return to Israel has been dropped as an option. What is your objection to this solution?*

A. We say that whatever people live beyond the agreed borders can decide anything they want through any method they want. But we do not believe there is room for three states between the Mediterranean and the Iraqi border. Whether the second state calls itself Jordan or Palestine or Jordan-Palestine or Palestine-Jordan is none of our business.

But a third state is not possible if there is to be peace in the area—especially a state that could carry the seeds of yet another war.

*Q. But do you reject the idea of the sort of referendum I put to Sadat and which he called a reasonable solution?*

*A.* A few days after you saw Sadat and after [Yugoslavia's President] Tito had been through Cairo, there was a joint communiqué stressing the need for the Palestinians to determine their future and supporting their "just struggle to restore their rights in the fatherland."

*Q. This communiqué and what Sadat told me are not necessarily mutually exclusive.*

*A.* According to those who speak for the Palestinian people—Arafat, Habbash and company—Israel and "fatherland" are one and the same.

*Q. Do you believe that any government in Amman could sign a peace treaty which included a clause ceding East Jerusalem to Israel?*

*A.* I cannot speak for Amman. I only know one thing. East Jerusalem came under Jordan rule not by serenading its inhabitants but by driving out every single Jew that was left alive, people who had lived there for generations.

## 51

**Statement Issued by the Foreign Ministry of Bulgaria Criticizing Israel's Response to Proposals for a Middle East Settlement Made by U.N. Envoy Jarring and the U.A.R., and Supporting the U.S.S.R. Statement of February 28, 1971<sup>1</sup>**

**Sofia, Early March, 1971**

After the initiative of the cease-fire and the proposal to reopen the Suez Canal to navigation, the United Arab Republic stated, in reply to questions by the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Jarring, that it was ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. The proposal of the United Arab Republic requires the ending of the state of war and respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence by all the countries in the region, on condition that Israel withdraws its troops from the Sinai peninsula and from all the occupied territories, and implements the resolutions which have been adopted concerning the Palestine refugees. These constructive proposals by the United Arab Republic in fact represent the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and thus provide a basis for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis. They were welcomed by the peoples of the whole world, including the people of the United States, who sincerely wish for peace in the Middle East. They received the full support of the socialist countries. What was the response of Israel to this initiative? Persisting in its policy of aggression, Israel in

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the French text of a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement to the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, as forwarded to the U.N. Secretary-General by Bulgarian Ambassador to the U.N. Grozer in a letter dated March 4, 1971 and circulated as U.N. Document S/10144 and A/8294.

In late September a delegation representing the Bulgarian Communist Party visited Syria for talks with representatives of the Syrian Baath Party; the resulting joint communiqué, issued in Damascus on September 25, 1971 (see *al-Baath* (Damascus), September 26, 1971), included no points not contained in the above statement.

its statement of 21 February 1971 in fact rejected the proposals of the United Arab Republic aimed at a peaceful solution to the crisis. It gave a negative reply to the question without a solution to which there can be no peace in the Middle East, namely the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. Thus, Israel made Mr. Jarring's mission more difficult, demonstrated its scorn for all United Nations resolutions, and yet again afforded proof of its aggressive intentions.

Israel's reply may prevent the extension of the cease-fire along the Suez Canal and on other fronts, which expires on 7 March 1971.

At this crucial juncture, on 28 February 1971, the Soviet Government published a statement which unmasks the manoeuvres of the aggressors and their protectors, and shows the only path to follow and the only means to use if the Middle East crisis is to be settled. At the moment when the question of political settlement or military confrontation is being raised, the statement of the Soviet Government expresses the position of the whole of progressive mankind, that the only way to solve the conflict is by peaceful means. It is for this reason that the statement is a document of capital political importance, which will without doubt unite and mobilize the progressive forces of the world against the aggressive intentions of Israel. Now more than ever the parties concerned must support the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Government, and not allow Israel and its leaders to make a political settlement of the conflict unattainable.

The Bulgarian Government fully supports the timely statement of the Soviet Government, and is firmly convinced that it will contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The Bulgarian Government condemns the policy of Israel, which is leading to an aggravation of the situation in that part of the world. It believes that Israel could not persist in its policy of aggression without the unreserved support of the United States of America, which to all appearances wishes to crush the national liberation movement in the Arab countries and suppress the progressive régimes

which have been set up there. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the whole of the Bulgarian people declare their full support for the constructive proposals of the United Arab Republic for a settlement of the Middle East conflict. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has been, and will continue to be, a faithful friend to the Arab peoples in their just struggle. As in the past, Bulgaria will provide full moral and material support to the Arab peoples in their struggle to liquidate the aftermaths of aggression.

The Middle East crisis can and must be solved by peaceful means on the basis of full implementation of the Security Council resolutions, and on condition of withdrawal by the aggressor from the occupied Arab territories.

## 52

### **Speech Reviewing Anglo-Arab Relations and Commenting on Egypt's Readiness To Live in Peace, Made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**London, March 2, 1971**

For centuries Britain and Arabia have been attracted to each other. The romantic and the material have each played their part. We have always held in deep respect the Arab's love of his country and the value which he places on the dignity conferred by independence on man. Our contacts have been characterised throughout our association by respect and fair dealing, and I would like to say, and believe I can still say, trust.

Of course, over the centuries our countries have changed out of all knowledge from what they once were. Rural Britain was transformed by the Industrial Revolution; and the discovery of oil changed the face of much of Arabia. Oil opened the prospect of riches for those who owned it, and the opportunity for those who consume it to meet the endlessly

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the text of Douglas-Home's speech at the Anglo-Arab Association dinner provided, on request, by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.



greedy appetite of the industrial developed world. If partnership is to be fruitful and profit is to be mutual (and I hope that I can mention profit once again in polite society) then the greatest care must be taken to understand each other's needs, both as producers of oil and consumers of oil.

Lately the partnership has been prone to crisis. This is apt to be the case, of course, where one single commodity dominates the market. But in such a situation there is all the more need, if I may say so, for political wisdom. We must consider the legitimate needs of producers, but consideration must also be given by them to the needs of the consumer. An increasing number of countries in this world today, not only those in Europe, are deeply concerned about inflation; Britain is one of them. We are relieved that in the recent negotiations between the oil companies and the oil-producing States in Tehran rupture over oil prices was avoided. Nevertheless, the agreement raises wide economic implications for the future; and the concern is shared not only, let us remember, by Western Europe (the largest consumer of oil), but by countries in Africa and Asia who need increasing quantities. And when the price is pushed up so high there is only one response, however much consumers want to buy: it is to explore for further areas of supply and to develop apace other forms of power. I hope, speaking as a consumer and speaking to representatives of States who are producers, that this clear lesson of Tehran has been learned by all and learned in time; because our interests are mutual, and consumers and producers must respect each other's needs.

In Britain's relationship with Egypt we have in both countries been through much travail. We have been able to break away lately from the restraints which those difficulties put upon us. The Egyptian Ambassador is not here; but I would like to pay tribute to his single-mindedness in pursuit of better relations. And following the visit recently of Mr. Riad to London, all of us look forward to a fruitful period ahead in Anglo-Egyptian relations. In particular, Mr. Riad has left us in no doubt at all of the sincere desire of his Government for an

honourable peace in the Middle East. Since his visit, Dr. Jarring has taken a positive initiative to try and identify the essentials for a settlement between Israel and Egypt within the terms of the governing Resolution of the Security Council. These have been welcome developments as far as they have gone.

There are moments when politicians should say nothing—extremely difficult always for a politician! And so I don't mean to say anything tonight, because we have a meeting of the four Powers in New York, I think on Thursday. We have a report from the Secretary-General which could have an influence on the present situation. But I think I can say this. The Government of the United Arab Republic has felt able to give a clear, unequivocal and specific commitment on the nature of the peace which they would undertake to keep with Israel; and this is a most valuable contribution at a vital moment in these discussions and in these affairs. Dr. Jarring now seeks from Israel a matching commitment on withdrawal within the terms of Resolution 242. Everyone understands it would be useless to ignore the need for physical security for the State of Israel as great as that as she thinks she has from her own acts of conquest. It is now the task of statesmanship to find the answer which will give confidence both to Egypt and Israel that their security in future will be intact; and this opportunity must not be missed.

Egypt has risen to the occasion by a public and absolute commitment to live at peace following a negotiated settlement. Nothing is more difficult, particularly when one has made an advance of this kind, than patience, and patience after years when the emotions of years of tension run high. But it will be infinitely worth it to achieve a peace which is real; I don't know how far anybody outside can affect this issue; all I can say is that the British Government will continue to do all it possibly can, notably through the four-Power discussions going on in New York on the important subject of guarantees for peace; and it may be that this will be a vital element in the final conclusion of peace between Egypt and Israel, Jordan and Israel, and Syria and Israel. At any rate we are

waiting and watching for the opportunity to hasten, if we can, the day of settlement.

I said I would say nothing on this particular issue; and this audience will readily recognise that I have said very little. Nevertheless I can say that the British Government stands by at this critical moment to lend every possible assistance that we can in what we regard as one of the most important issues that have ever faced the peace-making nations. That is to achieve peace at last after all the years of tension in the Middle East. Let us then toast Anglo-Arab relations, reconciliation and peace.

### 53

#### **Statements on Spanish Support for the Arab States and Efforts Towards a Middle East Settlement, Made in a Speech Delivered by Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain at the Spanish Center of Higher Studies in National Defense<sup>1</sup>**

March 2, 1971

Our continuing policy of friendship with the Arab countries, a fruitful policy and one which has, by means of our diplomacy, become permanent, should not be understood only in sentimental, historical or cultural terms. It is a realistic policy, consistent with our past and has at times influenced problems arising from our geo-political position in relation to North Africa. It is a policy which embraces the entire spectrum of Arab diversity, with friendship for the progressives as well as for the conservatives, and is marked by our not taking part in their internal arguments. The Arabs have appreciated our conduct, and their fourteen votes at the United Nations are one of our staunchest sources of support on any question which does not involve any of them.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Spanish text of López Bravo's statements on Spanish policy towards the Arabs as transmitted, on request, by the Embassy of Spain in Beirut from the Diplomatic Information Office of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This Arab policy is parallel to our policy towards Israel, to our non-recognition of Israel as a state. It is parallel; it is not, however, the same policy. The non-recognition of Israel is principally due to the Israelis themselves, who did not wish to communicate to us their proclamation of statehood in 1948 and one of whose first acts in the United Nations was, on May 16, 1949, to attack us through the utterances of Abba Eban himself. Subsequently, at various times the Israelis opposed our entry into that international organization.

This position has changed, and now it is Israel who desires relations with us. The normalization of relations with Israel would bring us advantages, but by no means as many as one might hastily assume, and, of course, clearly outweighed by disadvantages. It is evident, without harboring any anti-Semitic sentiments, that under present circumstances we pay a high price both financially and in propaganda. Notwithstanding, recognition of Israel by Spain at this time, unless circumstances change, would, taken on the whole, have repercussions prejudicial to the cause of peace.

Our support for the Arabs is considerable—we have extorted resolutions from the Security Council for them at sword's point—and it is a progressive support, in that we sometimes go further than many Arab countries—the Palestine question is a good example. This support doesn't in itself, however, imply any enmity for the Jews or Israel. This last I had occasion to state in a press conference in Cairo itself. A proof of it is the very considerable though discreet work we did on behalf of the Jews held in the Arab countries at the time of the war with Israel, work possible thanks to our good relations with the Arabs.

If the Arabs—when I say the Arabs I am referring in particular to the parties to the conflict—seem little disposed to any intervention on our part vis-à-vis Israel, they do, on the other hand, frequently urge us to take action as regards the United States and to join France and Italy in a common front.

We have for some time been working for a better understanding between the United

States and the Arabs. As you know, our Ambassador in Cairo represents American interests there. The Egyptians, by reason of their combatant status and their greater manpower capacity, are our principal interlocutors in this work for peace.

In this connection can be seen Foreign Minister Riad's September visit to Madrid in relation to President Nixon's impending visit to Spain. During the Egyptian minister's stay we kept in constant touch with Washington, and Rogers and Riad exchanged their points of view through us. These were dramatic circumstances and I believe that if the Egyptians didn't, on that occasion, go off on their own account and agreed to place confidence in the West, it was in part thanks to our efforts.

I would like to remind you that no sooner had Minister Riad arrived in New York for the last U.N. General Assembly than he met with me in order to learn my analysis of the situation. During my prolonged stay in that city, I was able to work on this problem in depth and I believe that Spain has not a little to contribute, and that she will go on to the limits of her strength.

## 54

### **Press Conference Statement by U.S. President Nixon Denying Any American Intention To Impose a Settlement in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1971

*Q. Mr. President, if I may turn to the Middle East just for a minute, the Arabs have reportedly agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for certain withdrawals by Israel from territory occupied in 1967. Is it not now time for the Israelis to make some concessions of their own, and will you be asking them publicly or privately to do so?*

*The President:* Mr. Semple, as you well know because you are sophisticated in this

area, the question there is whether or not the United States will impose a settlement in the Mideast, and the answer is no. We will do everything that we can to urge the parties to talk. And, incidentally, when we talk about the problems in the Mideast, let it not go unnoted that we have made some progress. There was 4 years of fighting up until August of last year, and for 7 months no guns have fired in the Mideast. That is progress of a kind.

We hope that the cease-fire, either by agreement or de facto, will be extended. We hope that the Israelis and the Egyptians, and for that matter the Jordanians, will continue some kind of discussion. As far as imposing a settlement, however, we can only say that we can make suggestions, but we are going to have to depend upon the parties concerned to reach an agreement.

And we, of course, will be there to see that the balance of power is maintained in the Mideast, which we will continue to do. Because if that balance changes that could bring on war. And also we are prepared, as I have indicated, to join other major powers, including the Soviet Union, in guaranteeing any settlement that is made, which would give Israel the security of its borders that it might not get through geographical acquisition.

## 55

### **Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel Denying Israeli Intransigence in the Matter of a Middle East Settlement and Insisting on the Principle of a Directly Negotiated Settlement<sup>2</sup>**

March 7, 1971

The date is March 7, so I thought that I should come here to sum up our position; especially on two problems: the cease-fire

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the text of Eban's speech to the foreign press, *Jerusalem Post*, March 10, 1971, p. 3.

Many of the same points were discussed during Eban's interview on the CBS radio and television program "Face the Nation" in New York, March 21, 1971.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Nixon's press conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1657 (March 29, 1971), p. 438.

and the Jarring talks at their present stage.

On the cease-fire, Israel's position is that the Resolutions adopted in June, 1967 by the Security Council have binding and continuing force; and that no party has a right of unilateral cancellation or of fixing deadlines for them. Accordingly, we have proceeded on the basis of a cease-fire conditioned only by reciprocity.

That is our position.

For us the operative factor is whether or not fire is opened upon us, or whether fire is threatened. The Israel statement this morning continues to cover the situation, even after President Sadat's statement on the cease-fire.

[On the Jarring mission]:

We have never made a secret of our belief that a direct negotiation would be most effective and, in the long run, indispensable. But, in response to the American initiative, we accepted the idea of an indirect procedure in its first phase. Nevertheless, it was clear to us that what was involved was going to be a serious negotiating procedure; and many statements by the authors of that initiative stand on the record to show that that was meant.

In December, 1970, Israel decided to renew its participation in the Jarring talks, notwithstanding the violation by the United Arab Republic of the cease-fire-standstill agreement.

Therefore, to enter these talks, we overcame very serious obstacles, both on procedure and on substance. Early in January, 1971, we invited Ambassador Jarring to come to Jerusalem, where we opened the current talks by presenting principles of peace, by which we meant those obligations without which no peace agreement is really a peace agreement; the indispensable elements of any condition of peace.

We also decided then that we would make an effort, in the interests of efficacy and peace, to conduct these talks by "quiet diplomacy." In fact, this has probably been the noisiest diplomacy in the history of international relations. The U.A.R. has had the habit of making selective and prejudicial publication of our documents accompanied by strident

criticism at every stage in violation of the normal procedure of negotiation. On two occasions the U.A.R. has not wished to take Israeli documents into its hands until there was eliminated from them any hint that Israel was communicating its positions even indirectly with the U.A.R. In other words, they do not agree that we should communicate with them directly; they do not agree that we should communicate with them indirectly; there must not be a document that indicates that there is any kind of communication whatever between Israel and the U.A.R.

Recently there has been selective publication of Israel's positions as laid down in an *aide memoire* of February 26. Some comment and criticism have developed on the basis of what we are assumed to have said. Since no complete publication had yet been made, we have now decided—very much against our grain but as a result of these compulsions—to publish our document in full. It is now before you.

This is a reasoned reaction, both to Ambassador Jarring's *aide memoire* of February 8, and to the Egyptian *aide memoire* submitted to us on February 17. As you can see from the first paragraph, it is not true to say that Israel did not react to what was communicated to it by Ambassador Jarring on February 8.

What have we done in our document? Faced with the positions and "preconditions" formulated by the U.A.R., Israel formulated its basic positions. It did not ask the U.A.R. to accept them as preconditions. We have said, "These are Israel's positions, and we are now ready to enter into meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries." Having laid down what we thought should be the correct formulation of the principles of the peace agreement, and since some of these principles have to be spelt out and are not self-executing, we added, "Now that both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points

listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement." I draw attention to the words, "all the points" in the Egyptian and in the Israel documents. This means, amongst other things, that on February 26 we offered a discussion on withdrawal and on boundaries, if that was one of the matters that they wanted to be taken up early. So, if, since February 26 there has not been a concrete and detailed discussion on the issue of withdrawal and boundaries, this is in spite of and not because of the Israeli position.

Much has been written about the question of withdrawal. But there are other matters referred to in the documents about peace obligations, the prevention of terrorism, free navigation—on which formulations in the documents presented by Dr. Jarring and by the U.A.R. would, in our view, require modification in some cases and clarification in others. We would not be able to sign on the dotted line on all those formulations without a prior negotiation.

What is our central position without which the Israel policy cannot be understood? Our central position is that the peace settlement must be negotiated and agreed in all its parts by the two governments. It should neither be imposed on the parties from outside, nor dictated by one party to the other in advance of negotiations.

Where do we go from here? I hope that there may still be a cease-fire on the ground, although if anybody says to me that there has been a more "positive" response by President Sadat to the cease-fire than by Israel, I will assume that all sanity is gone. We accept the cease-fire positively, based on the Security Council Resolution, as a continuing commitment. The U.A.R. at best has said that it does not acknowledge the cease-fire; it will not recognize it or prolong it; but it might do the world the kindness of not shooting.

We believe that there should be a response to our expressed readiness for detailed and concrete negotiations on all the matters mentioned in the Secretary-General's report—our own document, Dr. Jarring's document, and the U.A.R. document.

That leaves open the discussion on all of the problems, including withdrawal to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries. I hope that a similar willingness will be forthcoming on the U.A.R. side, so that the peace-making effort can go forward without delay.

## 56

### **Libyan Press Interview with F.R.G. Chancellor Brandt Commenting on the West German Position on the Middle East Conflict and Relations with the Arab States<sup>1</sup>**

**Tripoli, March 8, 1971**

*Q. Could you explain the F.R.G.'s position on the tragic problem of the expelled Palestine people and present your government's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict?*

A. The problem of the Palestinian refugees is a particularly tragic aspect of the Middle East conflict. We understand the problems involved because we have lived through the fate of refugees after the Second World War. We have not failed in our readiness to give humanitarian assistance. In addition to emergency aid after the Middle East war, the F.R.G. has initiated an emergency program for Palestinian refugees concentrating on medical and educational projects. Since autumn 1968, we have contributed about 25 million DM through this aid program for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon.

We will continue our support in the coming years and are ready to participate in a comprehensive international plan if the conditions for such can be created.

On the position of the F.R.G. on the Middle East conflict, I would like to stress that we welcome all efforts aimed at an early, peaceful,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the German text of Brandt's interview published in *al-Thawra* (Tripoli, Libya), March 8, 1971; *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), No. 35 (March 10, 1971), pp. 357–358.

just and lasting settlement. In particular we welcome the U.N. Special Representative Ambassador Jarring's mission, based on the November 1967 Near East Resolution. As is well known, this resolution includes a demand for settlement of the refugee problem. I will expressly add that the F.R.G. does not supply arms to areas of tension.

*Q. Can Your Excellency give us an idea about future relations between the Arab world and the F.R.G.?*

*A.* I am convinced that feelings of friendship which were the hallmark of German-Arab relations in the past will be re-established with all Arab countries in the future. The good relations between the F.R.G. and Libya show that such a hope is well-founded.

## 57

### **Letter to the Editor of U.S. Weekly from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sisco Emphasizing U.S. Insistence on a Durable Middle Eastern Settlement with Only "Insubstantial" Alterations to pre-1967 Borders<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 8, 1971

While we have had honest differences at times over aspects of U.S. Middle East policy, I have always had the greatest respect for the integrity with which you have portrayed what that policy is. I think it important, therefore, that I correct the characterization of U.S. policy in the lead article of the March 3 issue of *Near East Report* ("The 1957 Script—Take Two"), which is seriously misleading in two respects.

The implication that the U.S. is seeking a 1957-type solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute could not be more wrong. The essence of that solution was that it largely re-estab-

lished the *status quo ante* the 1956 Sinai War—a return to basing relations between Israel and Egypt on the Armistice Agreement and a continuing state of belligerency—and created a United Nations Force whose effectiveness proved tragically fragile in the critical days of May 1967. It has been fundamental to our policy since June 1967, that there should be no return to the conditions of the past; that there must this time be a settlement which replaces armistice with peace based on direct and reciprocal commitments of the parties to each other, a settlement that recognizes Israel's borders and its sovereignty, that terminates all claims of belligerency and that includes security arrangements that are inherently durable.

Secondly, the article is misleading in its portrayal of the U.S. position on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. It has never been our interpretation that the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, requires total Israeli withdrawal in all cases to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. In our judgment, the Security Council Resolution neither endorsed nor barred the 1967 lines as the "secure and recognized" final borders called for in that resolution. We recognize that in some instances the possibility must be kept open for changes in the pre-June 1967 armistice lines, where a return to those lines would leave elements of the conflict unresolved. We have said, however, as your article subsequently notes, that such changes should be insubstantial, since in our judgment peace is not attainable on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the area as it existed before the June 1967 War.

I hope the foregoing will serve to clarify U.S. policy on these important points . . .

JOSEPH J. SISCO  
*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs*

<sup>1</sup> Sisco's letter to the editor, *Near East Report* (Washington), XV, 10 (March 10, 1971), p. 40.

58

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Mauritania of Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Nouakchott, March 9, 1971

At the invitation of His Excellency Hamdi Ould Mouknass, member of the National Political Bureau and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, His Excellency Muhammad Masmoudi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tunisian Republic, paid an official visit to Mauritania, accompanied by an important delegation, March 6-9, 1971.

The two sides dealt with international problems and expressed the two states' preoccupation with the increasingly grave situation in the Middle East, stressing the need for the early establishment of a just and permanent peace based, on the one hand, on the evacuation of all the occupied territories in accordance with the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967 and, on the other hand, on respect for the undeniable rights of the Palestinian people.

59

**Statements of the Official Israeli Position on U.N. Ambassador Jarring's Initiative and the U.A.R. Response and Reiterating Israel's Insistence on "Secure Borders," Contained in a Policy Paper Issued by the Embassy of Israel in the U.S.<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, March 10, 1971

Nowhere in Security Council Resolution 242, which is the basis of the Jarring talks, is it stated that the 5th of June, 1967, line is the "secure and recognized boundary" of which the resolution speaks. That boundary, according to the resolution, is to be delineated in negotiation between the parties.

As its sponsors have publicly affirmed, the resolution was deliberately phrased so as to permit a genuine border negotiation. Its author, the then British Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, said in the Security Council on November 22, 1967, when the resolution was presented, "that any action to be taken must be within the framework of permanent peace and withdrawal must be to *secure boundaries*." No less an eminent authority than Eugene Rostow, the then U.S. Under-Secretary of State, reaffirmed very recently the centrality of the territorial negotiation as conceived by the resolution. He wrote:

"...Paragraph 1 (1) of the resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 'from territories occupied in the recent conflict,' and not 'from *the* territories occupied in the recent conflict.' Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word '*the*' failed in the Security Council. It is therefore not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal

<sup>2</sup> Abridged text of the policy background paper issued by the Embassy of Israel in Washington as published in *Jewish Frontier*, XXXVIII, 4 (413) (April, 1971), pp. 39-42.

The text of the Israeli proposal of February 26, originally reproduced at the end of this document, has been omitted here; it is reprinted above (see Document No. 42).

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Amal* (Tunis), March 11, 1971.

from all the territories now occupied under the cease-fire resolution to the armistice demarcation lines.” (*American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 64, 1970, p. 69).

Israel accepted the resolution and agreed to co-operate with the Jarring mission precisely because it linked the establishment of a “just and lasting peace” with the establishment of “secure and recognized boundaries,” other than the June 5, 1967 lines.

Under no circumstances will Israel surrender its right to a free negotiation with Egypt of this most crucial of issues. It will resist all pressures, from whatever the source, be they military or political, that aim at resurrecting Israel’s past territorial vulnerability by precluding the negotiation of future secure boundaries. Israel permitted this to happen once before by acquiescing in the imposed solution in 1957. It will not squander its territorial security again. Israel is ready, in peace, to withdraw from the cease-fire lines. But this time the withdrawal will be to boundaries that are secure, and shall be rendered so by geography. As stated on March 7, 1971 by Prime Minister Golda Meir in an interview with the British Independent Television:

“We say that a new border, a negotiated border, will be somewhere between the cease-fire line and the June 4th line, 1967.”

This is the meaning of the provision contained in Paragraph 4 of Israel’s document to Ambassador Jarring of February 26, 1971. It reads: “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-UAR cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.”

When Israel speaks of secure boundaries it means, above all, the elimination once and for all of those territorial foci of past aggression; the removal of those geographic conditions that have in the past tempted attack on vulnerable frontiers and on exposed shipping lanes. Consider, as an example, the case of the Straits of Tiran. Twice in ten years the Straits were subjected to Egyptian blockade, so easily facilitated by control of

Sharm el-Sheikh. And twice did such Egyptian aggression trigger major confrontations between the two countries, in 1956 and 1967.

In 1957 Israel, faced by a joint Soviet-American front against it, yielded to pressure and withdrew from Sharm el-Sheikh and the rest of Sinai and the Gaza Strip, back to the old exposed armistice line and thus was deprived of the opportunity to conclude a secure peace with Egypt. Israel accepted under duress a mixed bag of international arrangements and assurances that were designed to buttress its fragile frontier with Egypt, but which were to collapse upon their very first testing in May-June, 1967.

Israel will have nothing to do with conceptions of this kind again. It will not withdraw from and surrender a location such as Sharm el-Sheikh to the protection of international arrangements and guarantees that, by their very substance, cannot but be tenuous. After two wars and intermittent tension between them, Israel has the right to maintain with its own forces the security of Sharm el-Sheikh, its only link with East Africa and Asia.

In its reply to Jarring of February 15, 1971, Egypt stated that it was prepared, under certain conditions, to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. As will be seen in the attached Israeli document to Ambassador Jarring of February 26, 1971, Israel welcomed this readiness on the part of Egypt to entertain, after twenty-two years of belligerency, the conclusion of a peace agreement between the two countries. Normal international procedure would suggest that, having presented their basic positions, Egypt and Israel should proceed now, under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices, towards a detailed and concrete negotiation on their respective terms with a view to reconciling their differences and drawing up their peace agreement.

The Egyptian conditions for a peace agreement with Israel are ultimative. Unlike the Israeli proposal, they make no allowance for a negotiation process to bridge the profound differences that inevitably exist after more than two decades of hostility. In the Egyptian document, Israel is required to carry



out a total withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip—indeed from all the territories on every front. It is, furthermore, expected to renounce its sovereign rights on the refugee issue and give entry to a mass Arab influx. (President Sadat in his address of March 7, 1971, when he announced the abrogation of the cease-fire, referred to the above two clauses when he said: “Egypt’s *sine qua non* conditions are: complete withdrawal from all territories occupied in June, 1967, and the observance of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.”) With respect to the obligations Egypt itself would be prepared to assume towards Israel, nowhere is there any direct commitment to Israel on the crucial question of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and through the Suez Canal. And, as the instrument of guarantee of the Egyptian version of a settlement, Egypt conceives of international security arrangements much in line with those of 1957.

But for the expression of willingness to enter into a peace agreement, the UAR response to Ambassador Jarring reveals that Egypt’s position has not changed one iota from its traditional posture. Its terms are a restatement, without deviation, of Egypt’s classical political doctrine. As they stand, they are devoid of practical expression of what normal peaceful relations between states are supposed to mean. Above all, they fail to address themselves to the elimination of the root cause of the past conflict which is the key to a future peace that will be secure. That root cause is the boundary issue. As its condition for peace, Egypt would have Israel restore its past territorial vulnerability. This Israel will never do. It will not do so because the political and military realities of the present and the political and military contingencies of the future are such that a settlement without reasonable geographic security would be a paper peace alone.

The Egyptian proposal is not an independently conceived document. Its conception, if not its language, was devised in close consultation with the Soviet Union in the furtherance of a common strategy. The extent of the intimacy of military and political co-ordination between Moscow and Cairo was alluded

to by the Egyptian President himself in his address of March 7, 1971. Divulging that on the eve of the Egyptian termination of the cease-fire he had made, at the invitation of the Soviet leaders, a secret trip to Moscow on March 1–2, 1971, Sadat declared:

“Everybody knows the role the Soviet Union has played until now. . . . I wish to express my absolute satisfaction with my discussions in Moscow which covered all subjects. The USSR will continue its full and positive support of the UAR.”

The primary Soviet goal in involving itself so decisively in every major Egyptian move is its quest to maintain and consolidate its power position in the Middle East, with Egypt as the base. To achieve this, it must maintain its credibility in Arab eyes by holding out to them the real hope that it can deliver the political victory they seek over Israel, i.e., total Israeli withdrawal. Without that, Soviet influence in Egypt and throughout the Middle East is ultimately threatened. Russia was ready, in the spring of 1969, to encourage Egypt to employ limited military action—war of attrition—in the attempt to put teeth into the effort to achieve the goal of total withdrawal. It gave Egypt every backing in the attrition campaign and when, in the winter of 1970, Nasser found himself on the verge of total collapse, the Soviet Union moved in and involved itself directly on a combatant basis with ground personnel, missiles, and pilots. The fighting escalated and so did the risks of a wider confrontation, while the results justified neither. The Soviet Union accordingly advised its client state to shift, for the time being, the emphasis from the military to the diplomatic.

This is the backdrop against which the Egyptian response to the American peace initiative and, later, the decision “to enter into a peace agreement” on the condition of a total Israeli withdrawal should be seen. The object remains as before: the eviction of Israel from all the occupied territories through the imposition of an Egyptian-Soviet style settlement. Having shelved for the time being the military option, the Soviets and the Egyptians have now set themselves the task of

winning American pressure on Israel so as to compel it to withdraw totally, thus recreating the international conditions that had made 1957 possible. This is the strategic goal in which President Sadat, in co-ordination with the Soviets, is currently engaged.

In a speech before the representatives of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Cairo on February 28, 1971, Sadat summed up in the following words the objectives of his strategy as:

"(a) The deepening of the commitment of our friend.

(b) The neutralization of the adversary.

(c) The isolation of the enemy."

(In the UAR political lexicon, the Soviet Union is "the friend," the U.S. is the "adversary," and Israel, "the enemy.")

Central to the implementation of this strategy is the driving of a wedge between the United States and Israel as occurred in 1957. Once done, Israel is rendered isolated both in the international councils, and perhaps, too, in the field. The conditions would then be set to enable Russia to activate the Security Council and/or the Four Power forum on behalf of an Arab interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242. Thus, the groundwork would be laid for an imposed international political arrangement and, failing that, the possible condonement of a Soviet-Egyptian military effort to impose the arrangement by force. That was the scenario of 1957.

The tactical ploy which Sadat has utilized in his attempt to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States is his acceptance of an invitation "to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." That offer is made subject to a central condition which Egypt and the Soviet Union know Israel will never accept and will be even prepared to fight over it if necessary: the issue of total withdrawal. Egypt and the Soviet Union understand that the only prospect of ever possibly winning a total withdrawal would be through imposition. For this to happen Israel has to be rendered internationally isolated, and for that to occur a U.S. movement away from Israel is required. Then the prospect would be opened for a

Four Power common front against Israel and the conditions created for an imposed political arrangement. It was to facilitate this prospect that Egypt and the USSR introduced a new element into the political discussion. It is a semantic one: the use of the term "peace agreement," presented as though it were an unprecedented concession. Having used the term, Egypt is now demanding of the U.S. that it deliver Israel on the territorial matter. "The U.S.," Sadat said in his speech of March 7, "will not be able to evade this obligation."

Unlike those of Egypt and the USSR, the policies of Israel and the U.S. are not identical. But, ever since 1967, they have met on the critical principle that this time there will be no imposition of a settlement, but a true peace, one that is freely negotiated between the parties. That principle has generated policies and actions on the part of Israel and the United States that have produced results which have advanced the peace process. Israel's tenacious stand in the field; the U.S. maintenance of the local military balance of power through the sale of weapons to Israel; the over-all U.S. political stance; and its deterrent actions that were applied during the second half of 1970—these together have been the policies that compelled Egypt and Russia to turn, for the time being at least, from the military option to the diplomatic one. Now an Arab leader has used the words, "peace agreement with Israel." Leaving aside for the moment the tactical motive which inspired the words, the fact is that for the first time in twenty-two years they have been uttered. (For twenty-two years it was widely suggested that were an Arab leader to even pronounce such words, his political and physical assassination would automatically follow.)

This is movement. It is progress of a kind that would have been thought inconceivable a year and more ago. Surely, if further movement is to be registered beyond the realm of semantics and into the arena of a genuine peace with security, it will be, in the first instance, by keeping to these proven policies. In 1969-70 Egypt and the Soviet Union

tried the option of war and failed. They turned to diplomacy. Now they are trying, through diplomacy, to achieve their goal of a total Israeli withdrawal by means of an imposed settlement. This, too, must be made to fail if they are to ever contemplate the option of a genuine peace with security, freely negotiated between the parties, that will eradicate the conflict once and for all. The United States can help bring this about by continuing to stand fast against any attempt to impose a settlement.

The essence of lasting peace is the creation of a new pattern of relations between Israel and its neighbors. This will never be achieved if Israel is to be made strategically vulnerable again. The only kind of peace which will prove credible and therefore lasting is the one that offers Israel territorial security, thereby removing the temptation of future aggression. Israel will not flinch in its insistence on the establishment of new and secure boundaries through a free exchange with Egypt. It will not withdraw as it did in 1957, unless it is to boundaries that have been freely negotiated and that replace the irrational and exposed demarcation lines which served in the past as the true invitation to attack. After three wars of survival fought alone and twenty-two years of insecure and unrecognized borders, Israel is resolved this time to settle for nothing less than a peace which also offers it a reasonable margin of territorial security. This is the essence of the Israeli peace proposal of February 26, 1971....

## 60

**U.K. Press Interview by Premier Meir of Israel Setting Forth Israel's Territorial and Security Conditions for a Settlement of the Middle East Conflict (Reported Text)<sup>1</sup>**

**Tel Aviv, March 12, 1971**

Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israel Prime Minister, said today that there must not be another war in the Middle East, and indicated the frontiers for Israel which she said could prevent it. It would be a painful solution for President Sadat, she said, but people had to pay for their deeds.

Israel must have Sharm el Sheikh, which dominates the Straits of Tiran, and have access to it. Sinai must be demilitarized. In an interview in her office here, the Prime Minister said that Egypt must never be allowed to deploy troops, tanks, artillery, and missiles in the peninsula.

She would propose a mixed force to guarantee demilitarization, which must include Israeli troops. Egyptians could also be included.

She was afraid of Russians and missiles being deployed along Israel's southern border.

The Russian in charge of Moscow's anti-missile defences was now in Egypt, she said. He was not there to teach them to grow cotton.

The border round Eilat must be negotiated and Egypt could not return to Gaza. Israel would take care of refugees, and Gaza could be a port for Jordan.

Israel would not come down from the Golan Heights, which dominate the Hulah valley. "We paid for it—that's something people don't always remember", she said.

Jerusalem would remain united and part of Israel. The West Bank border must be negotiated. Never again would Arab forces stand within a few miles of the sea.

<sup>1</sup> Meir's interview granted to *The Times* correspondent Louis Heren as reported by him and published under the title "Mrs. Meir Defines Peace Frontiers in an Interview: Israel Proposes Mixed Force To Ensure a Demilitarized Sinai," *The Times* (London), March 13, 1971, p. 1; reproduced by permission.

The Jordan river must not be open for Arab troops to cross. Israel must have something there, and perhaps on the heights behind.

I asked her if she would accept the plan which was devised by Mr. Allon, the Deputy Prime Minister. She said that there were several plans, not only Mr. Allon's.

The Gahal Party and the religious groups wanted Judea and Samaria, but she did not want another 600,000 Arabs. She was opposed to a bi-national state such as Lebanon. Israel must be a Jewish state while still having, of course, its Arab minority.

Mrs. Meir said that she was opposed to an independent Palestine on the West Bank. It would be too small to be viable, but big enough to wage war on Israel. Jordan was more than 50 per cent Palestinian. They had a state already.

The final borders between Israel and the West Bank must not divide but connect Israelis and Arabs. Each must have access to holy places in the other's territory.

Mrs. Meir saw a peaceful and prosperous future for Jordan and the West Bank. Israel compensation and international funds could finance its industrialization. Refugees could provide the manpower. She did not like corridors but King Husain could have access to the Gaza or Haifa ports.

Secure, negotiated and recognized frontiers were necessary to prevent another war, she said. International guarantees could not replace them. She helped to negotiate 1957 guarantees. She was not convinced that they could work, but American and Russian pressure gave her no choice.

She remembered sitting in the office of Mr. Dulles in Washington and going over every comma. But by the time she had got home, the Egyptians had reoccupied Gaza and the United Nations refused to do anything about it.

She was asked if Israel was prepared to fight for Gaza. Mrs. Meir said that she could not go through all that again, especially with the Russians in an international force.

Every member of the Cabinet felt a sense of personal responsibility for the lives of young Israelis. Three generations had had to fight: in the Haganah against the Arabs,

in the Second World War, "in that little trouble with the British" in 1956 and the Six-Day War of 1967.

"When I go to military cemeteries, as I did before independence day, I see fathers and mothers mourning their sons, and now young widows and orphans. I can't take it any more".

She was in London when Mr. Chamberlain came back from Munich. He sincerely believed he had saved the world from war. But little Czechoslovakia had to pay the price.

In 1968, everybody was sorry for the poor Czechs, but Russian tanks still rolled into Prague. That was not peace.

There were children in Israel who had always slept in bomb shelters. She knew of one little girl who visited Tel Aviv and became hysterical when told that she did not have to sleep in a shelter. Mrs. Meir said that she might be sentimental, but this sort of thing had to stop.

She was prepared to negotiate with the Arabs. She was ready to negotiate everything. But she would not be dictated to.

President Sadat was the first Egyptian leader to say that he was prepared to make peace. "At least, he said it. But does he mean it?"

He also told Al Fatah that they must support the legitimate rights of the Arab people. "Is it double talk, true or honest, or for internal propaganda? I don't know, but they must be prepared to accept us."

**Statement on Italy's Interests in a Peaceful Settlement in the Middle East, Made by Foreign Minister Moro of Italy in a Policy Speech to the Italian Senate<sup>1</sup>**

Rome, March 12, 1971

Our responsibilities are naturally more direct in the geographical area of which Italy is a part. We have vital interests in the Mediterranean which have been endangered by the present tensions. The increased Soviet presence also shows the possibility and risk of confrontation. The Middle East crisis provides opportunities for this reinforced military presence and builds up reasons for noticeable frictions in the area. If the principle of the indivisibility of peace and security is valid, the East-West *détente* would lack substance and stability if it were limited to Central Europe.

A political initiative is then required to solve the conflict. Furthermore, a comprehensive agreement is necessary in order to reestablish security and confidence in the Mediterranean and to allow contacts and trade among the various Mediterranean peoples, as have existed for centuries past, to be fully resumed. Our Mediterranean policy is directed towards this end.

However, without imposing prejudicial conditions, we should remember that the normalization of the situation in the Mediterranean area—where obviously we must maintain a responsible vigilance—constitutes an element in the East-West dialogue.

The Senate is aware of the discussions now for some time underway about the best ways to make decisive steps forward towards *détente* in Europe and cooperation among all European states.

In our opinion these discussions can and must explore all the means of deepening and consolidating the dialogue among various

countries, with the final aim of reaching a solid agreement for our continent, an agreement on guaranteed and confident co-existence.

There has been, and there still is, talk of a conference, or a series of conferences, on European security and cooperation. Italy's position, analogous to that of the other allied countries, is well-known; but it is worth repeating here. In our opinion it is necessary that such large-scale discussions, if they are to be as fruitful as we would like, should be based on secure premises.

Such a need is keenly felt, as is proved moreover by the continued existence of an acute conflict which, having several times covered with blood an area adjacent to Europe and very important to its welfare—the Middle East—still does not seem close to solution. The voice of Europe as a whole, which should be sufficient, is not heard in this conflict. Nevertheless, at present, it is contingent upon not only the two super-powers, but all the countries of Europe and first and foremost Italy which is nearest to the area of conflict, to do everything possible to settle the serious dispute between Israel and the Arab states.

For our part, in fact, we have done everything in our power to promote such a peaceful settlement, seeking to reconcile the viewpoints of the parties directly concerned.

It is in this spirit that the various meetings I have had in recent months with the leaders of various Arab countries, as well as with those of Israel, where I just made an official visit in return for Foreign Minister Abba Eban's visit to Italy last June, must be evaluated.

Among the many relations which we have constantly maintained with the Arab world, the recent trip of Undersecretary Salizzoni during which he was able to contact the leaders of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, was of undoubted interest.

All this activity is carried out in order to find, through objective evaluation, possible solutions to the crisis, either at present or in a future rapprochement. We have established

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Italian text of Moro's speech as published in *Relazioni Internazionali*, March 20, 1971, pp. 289-290, 290-291.

that our discreet action is positively valued by both parties, especially as Italy is perhaps the only country to maintain sincere and friendly relations with all the states of the area.

It has always been the opinion of the Italian government that the United Nations is the most suitable forum for discussion of a solution to the conflict. Therefore it is within that organization that the Middle East crisis should be solved. We think that a solution should be arrived at through application of the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967, which was accepted by Israel as well as by the majority of Arab countries. This is why we have from the beginning placed our confidence in the mission of the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring. He walks a path bristling with obstacles but, in spite of all the difficulties, there is no doubt that thanks to his constant and patient efforts the problems to be solved have been more clearly defined and a convergence of views has been obtained on the principles of ending the state of belligerency, of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the area, and of their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

The truce is now effectively observed and we hope that it may be maintained for as long as necessary, taking also into account that the Egyptian President in his latest speech specified that the non-renewal of the truce does not mean that the guns will again be heard or that negotiations should stop.

My recent visit to Israel offered me the opportunity of speaking with the leaders of this hard-working people, who in the space of one generation have done wonderful work in making use of local resources, assuring free and dignified living conditions to hundreds of thousands of people who fled the Nazi persecutions and to their children.

In my previous contacts with the Arab leaders, I had tried to collect all possible facts for a complete evaluation of the means by which they think the dispute may be settled. I was able to complete my information on this visit by going deeper into the Israeli viewpoint, especially in this new and delicate

phase of the negotiations. The points of difference are certainly significant.

The Senate will allow me to be properly cautious. It is not right for us who, although interested, are outside the conflict, to judge the basic positions of the parties. What we can say here is that a realistic long-term prospective can lead to solutions which will result from the meeting of minds, and will open up an era of fruitful and peaceful coexistence between these peoples. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations observed in his March 5 report to the Security Council, a report which reflects actions for which the Italian government expresses its appreciation, the situation presents on the one hand promising elements, but on the other reasons for increasing preoccupation. It is therefore the duty of all parties to do their best to allow the negotiations to continue under Jarring's aegis. The Israeli leaders told me in the last few days that they accept the Jarring mission and that they are ready to cooperate to reach a positive conclusion. President Sadat has confirmed that he is aiming at a political solution. If the parties agree, through Jarring's mediation, to present constructive proposals, which can satisfy their anxiety for justice and security without disturbing the balance which inspired the Security Council resolution, they can be assured of the appreciation and gratitude of world public opinion.

Italy, which is aware of the tricky and serious problems of the present time, will continue to play a role—not of mediation which is Jarring's function—but of clarification and friendly contacts with all parties. She will join any call which allows Ambassador Jarring to renew the thread of negotiations and carry them forward. In expressing this wish, Italy has no other interest than that of a rapid reestablishment of peace in the eastern Mediterranean: this is an indispensable basis for any action aimed at promoting the reconstruction of the territories damaged by the conflict, and increasing the welfare of the area's people, projects which will, when the time comes, receive the assistance of Italy and, we feel sure, of all of Europe.

## 62

**Statement by Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain Affirming Spanish Support for the Legitimate Rights of the Palestinian People and Objections to Israeli Construction Projects in Occupied Jerusalem, Included in a Speech Made During a Visit to Morocco<sup>1</sup>**

Fez, March 13, 1971

As a Mediterranean nation, Spain feels directly affected by the conflicts existing at the eastern shore of this sea, and this results too on another level from something no less real: its firm, unalterable and often demonstrated friendship for the Arab countries and its unflagging support for their legitimate causes. Total implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 could be the basis for a solution to the conflict, a solution which must finally recognize the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. Spanish opinion has felt injured in its moral sensibility and in its feeling of friendship for the Arab countries by the news of construction inside occupied Jerusalem, of blocks of houses destined for the Jewish population. This act seems to indicate a purpose of conditioning the future destiny of the Holy City and attests to an expansionist tendency.

## 63

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Senegal of Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Dakar, March 13, 1971

At the invitation of His Excellency Amadou Gueye, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Senegalese Republic, His Excellency Mr. Muhammad Masmoudi, Foreign Minister of the Tunisian Republic, paid an official visit to Senegal March 9–13, 1971.

The two Ministers reaffirmed the two countries' attachment to the United Nations Charter and to the principles and goals of the Organization for African Unity. In this connection they expressed their preoccupation with the critical situation in the Middle East, insisting on the necessity for a solution to establish a just and permanent peace based on the full implementation of the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967 on the basis of respect for the rights of the Palestinian people.

## 64

**Statement of Support for U.N. Resolution 242 As a Basis for a Middle East Settlement Included in a Foreign Policy Declaration by President Amin Dada of Uganda<sup>3</sup>**

Kampala, March 15, 1971

The government of the Republic of Uganda hopes that peace will be established in the area of conflict in the Middle East on the basis of the United Nations Security Council resolution. To achieve this, Uganda will

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Spanish text of López Bravo's speech made in Fez at a dinner given in his honor during an official visit to Morocco, *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), No. 114 (March-April, 1971), p. 223.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Amal* (Tunis), March 14, 1971.

<sup>3</sup> Middle East section of Amin's foreign policy statement, *Africa Diary*, XI, 14 (April 2–8, 1971), p. 5409.

continue to support the mission of Ambassador Jarring, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General.

## 65

**Interview with Transport and Communications Minister Peres of Israel on U.S.-Israeli Relations and Israel's Conditions for a Settlement to the Middle East Conflict<sup>1</sup>**

Mid-March, 1971

*Q. The Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, stated last Tuesday that if a settlement of the Near East conflict is not reached now, the seeds of a new war will be sown, a war that could lead to a world conflagration. What do you think?*

*A. Mr. Rogers' forecasts are disturbing, but let us remember that General de Gaulle, whose opinion was respected in Israel, also maintained on the eve of the Six Day War that it could lead to a new world war. I think that it was as well that we did not pay too much attention to him.*

Israel is capable of supporting differences with the United States. If there were nothing but the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, I should be afraid of the American press, but in the present state of affairs I am prepared to submit to American pressures, if this will eventually lead to the liberation of the Near East from the Soviets.

*Q. Is your attitude to the Rogers Plan still negative?*

*A. Even if Israel accepted the Rogers Plan today it would fail because of the five points it does not mention: Jerusalem, Gaza, Sharm el-Sheikh, the Golan Heights, and the*

problem of "insignificant" adjustments. I think that it will take a long time and much patience to have talks with the Arabs. It is no good seeking a hasty solution because the problems are difficult and complicated, and it is not possible to conduct talks with a stopwatch in your hand.

*Q. What is your attitude as regards the future of the Golan Heights?*

*A. Golan was the last area to be occupied during the Six Day War, and it can be kept for the end of the negotiations with the Arabs. Essentially the problem of Golan is a theoretical one. I do not believe for a moment that the Syrians are prepared to come and negotiate with us under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. In view of the present state of affairs, we are staying in Golan. Should a new situation arise, we shall reconsider the problem.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. And the West Bank and Gaza?*

*A. When two peoples live in the same country, it can either be partitioned into two independent states, or authority can be divided within a single state—a federation can be set up. I myself am in favor of the second solution—a federal state including Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In this federal state there would be a single authority for foreign affairs and security, but there would be autonomy in cultural, religious affairs, etc.*

*Q. Would that not be the pure and simple annexation of these territories by Israel?*

*A. Annexation is a unilateral act, while I am talking of an agreement between the two parties. I foresee a solution for the West Bank and Gaza like that of Quebec. The inhabitants will talk and write their own languages and have their own parliament. Moreover, there is the whole ocean between France and Quebec, whereas here the Arabs*

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of Peres' interview conducted by Ammon Kaplan in the *Nouvel Observateur*, No. 332 (March 22-28, 1971), p. 33; © *Le Nouvel Observateur*; reprinted by permission.

Peres reiterated his idea of a federation which would include the West Bank, Israel and Gaza in an interview on Radio Israel in English, March 23, 1971 (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts* ME/3643/A/4-A/5).

<sup>1</sup> It is to be recalled that the Premier, Mrs. Golda Meir, told the Knesset this week that "Israel will not come down from the Golan Heights which dominate the Huleh Valley." In political circles this statement is thought to mean that in the event of a peace settlement with Syria, Israel will keep the areas close to the old Israeli frontier. In most of these territories, population centers have been established since the war.



of Palestine will be separated from their brothers in Jordan and other Arab countries only by the narrow River Jordan.

*Q. And the problem of the "refugees"?*

*A.* I am in favor of the payment of compensation, the reunification of families and the establishment of the refugees in the area following an Arab-Israeli agreement. The refugees who are at present in the West Bank and Gaza will be established here once and for all thanks to intensive industrialization. The refugees who are outside Palestine will be established once and for all in the areas outside Palestine.

*Q. General Dayan has many times repeated that if it came to a choice between Sharm el-Sheikh and peace he would choose Sharm el-Sheikh. What do you say?*

*A.* In my view there is no contradiction between the two. Both are possible: peace and Sharm el-Sheikh. The Egyptians want peace as much as we do. President Sadat says he wants peace and is still very popular. This is what makes me optimistic. What is more, I do not believe that the Egyptians are sure of the superiority of their missiles, nor do I believe that the Russians will push them into war.

*Q. Then would it not be a good thing to encourage the moderates in Egypt by adopting less intransigent positions, on the occupied territories, for example?*

*A.* On the contrary. When you start to make concessions, you strengthen extremist elements. In this connection I should like to explain our attitude on international guarantees. This land is called "the promised land." Now the Israelis have always had more promises than lands. This was the case in 1967 when the international guarantees of General Eisenhower, of the maritime countries, of the United Nations, and even of Nasser did not prevent Egypt from closing the Gulf of Aqaba.

We are not opposed to international guarantees, but they cannot replace an Israeli presence on the spot.

*Q. Are you optimistic about the negotiations presently in progress?*

*A.* I am optimistic as regards direct talks and their results and I am in favor of a solution by stages.

*Q. What do you think the first stage should be?*

*A.* There have been exchanges of declarations on this subject between Mrs. Meir and President Sadat, and negotiations must be started. But it seems to me that that cannot be achieved through Dr. Jarring, for U Thant's representative received his mandate for a "package deal." The Security Council has not granted him sufficient authority to allow him to deal with the whole of this affair.

*Q. What concessions should Israel make following the step taken by the Egyptians? Israel is always reproached for having declared that she will never return to the June 4 frontiers.*

*A.* It is no catastrophe if each side clearly announces its positions of principle at the start. Besides, we too have made two concessions; we have accepted the principle of indirect talks and we are now using the term "evacuation." This is already quite a lot.

## 66

### **Statements to the Knesset Made by Premier Meir of Israel Opening the Debate on a No Confidence Motion Tabled Following Meir's Alleged Specification of Borders Acceptable to Israel in a U.K. Press Interview (Condensed)<sup>1</sup>**

**Jerusalem, March 16, 1971**

The Government's policy has been not to draw maps except in the course of negotiations over borders. This policy remains in force. When the time comes the Government will decide on its position and the matter will be submitted to the Knesset in accordance with the democratic procedures obtaining among us. That moment, I regret to say, has not yet come.

<sup>1</sup> Condensed English text of Meir's Knesset speech as published in *New Middle East*, No. 31 (April, 1971), p. 46.

Here I must recall that the Government of Israel has never operated according to the "not one inch" policy of Knesset Member Begin, even when he and his colleagues participated in the Government. We have never said that the cease-fire lines have to be the peace boundaries....

Our rich experience over the long period from the War of Independence to the days of June, 1967, has taught us the ineffectiveness and the danger inherent in reliance upon arrangements intended to serve as substitutes for defensible boundaries. U.N. observers and a U.N. force were placed on our borders, and all of us are aware of the outcome. It is our experience in defending ourselves that has brought us to recognise that no guarantees of any kind can be regarded as a substitute for defensible boundaries which we can defend by ourselves.

...I have no reason to retract anything that I said to Mr Heren. In view of the seriousness of the issues and the interpretations which have been put on them, I feel it my duty to clarify some of the points exactly, to avoid misunderstandings.

I did not engage in drawing maps, nor did I delineate borders. This applies equally to Israel's eastern border. I stressed that the border between us and Jordan must be a subject for negotiation between us.

In reply to a question on our settlements in the Jordan Valley I said that Israel must have a hold in that area.

I was asked whether the Government had adopted the plan known as the Allon Plan and I replied that when it came to negotiations on the border with Jordan, there are and would be other plans as well. I was asked whether there was a plan for our remaining on the Heights, and replied that this was also a possibility. I refrained from adopting a specific plan, on the assumption that when the time comes the Government will decide.

I mentioned that Gahal and the National Religious Party want all of Judea and Samaria. As for myself, I repeated my reservations, which I have already expressed on more than one occasion, at the addition of 600,000 Arabs to Israel, out of a desire to preserve the Jewish character of the State.

I rejected Egypt's return to Gaza. At the same time I made it clear that Israel would be prepared to allow King Hussein the use of port services in Gaza or Haifa, as has been proposed in the past, without corridors.

When talking about Sharm el-Sheikh, which commands the Straits of Tiran, I made it clear that it must remain in our hands with territorial continuity of access between Sharm el-Sheikh and Israel. I said that negotiations had to be conducted on the line of continuity to Sharm el-Sheikh, and that the region in Sinai west of the area of continuity must be demilitarised. Some confusion has obviously occurred in connection with the *Times* quotation referring to negotiations on the border around Eilat.

Certain commentators have attributed to me a proposal concerning the stationing of an international force in Sinai. I did not propose this, nor has such a proposal been published. I expressed my opinion concerning a mixed force to ensure the demilitarisation, which must include Israeli soldiers and in which, possibly, Egyptian soldiers could also be included. I touched on such a possibility, but I must stress that no view on this subject has yet been crystallised in the Cabinet.

I am convinced that the presence of Israeli soldiers guarding the demilitarisation is most essential to ensure it.

In addition to these clarifications, and in order to complete the picture, I will mention some of the things I said to the *Times* correspondent, which were also published in his report:

1. Jerusalem shall remain united and part of Israel.
2. Israel will not come down from the Golan Heights, which dominate the Hula Valley.
3. The Jordan River must not be open for Arab troops to cross.
4. I said I was opposed to an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank.
5. Secure and recognised frontiers, to be determined by negotiation, are necessary to prevent another war. International guarantees cannot replace such borders.
6. Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Arabs on all issues, but will not be dictated to.

### **Statements of the Belgian Attitude on the Middle East and the Mediterranean As Put Forward in a Speech by Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium<sup>1</sup>**

**Brussels, March 16, 1971**

#### **I. First, why the Mediterranean?**

To explain this it is surely sufficient to recall the words of Paul Valéry: "Wherever the names of Plato, Trajan and Saint Paul have both meaning and authority, there is Europe."

We cannot separate ourselves from the Mediterranean because for one thing, two member countries of the Community are situated on its shores, and also because it was from the Mediterranean that we derived the three components of our civilization.

In view of what President Nixon has said of the interests of the United States and the U.S.S.R., Europe should also declare that she has from time immemorial had "vital interests" in this sea and on its shores.

It is not by chance that the members of the Community have felt the need to conclude agreements, ranging from association to classical or preferential commercial treaties, calculated to promote Mediterranean prosperity, in the interests of each of the countries bordering this sea.

But this is also why our countries are anxious to see peace restored in the Middle East. Belgium has always, and especially since the new crisis of 1967, wanted to maintain equal relations with the parties to this conflict; she has believed that this was in the interests of peace; she is pleased that the six countries of the Community have drawn nearer to this attitude and has already sought to coordinate their thinking on this subject. Belgium is delighted with the initiative taken by Secretary of State Rogers, which has set in motion a process in the direction of the establishment of peace in this part of the world.

<sup>1</sup> Translation of French text of excerpt from Harmel's Senate speech as provided, on request, by the Embassy of Belgium in Beirut.

She is highly satisfied with the efforts made by the Big Four and with the essential role played by the mediator, Mr. Jarring. More recently we have observed with satisfaction the emergence of trends in Egypt which make it possible to view the future with greater confidence.

Belgium will also be happy if Israel too makes the gesture that the world is waiting for and which will brighten the horizon in this part of the world.

### **Statements on Possible U.S. Role in Guaranteeing a Middle East Settlement, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers at a News Conference<sup>2</sup>**

**Washington, March 16, 1971**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you assess for us where you think the United States and Israel and Egypt and the Soviet Union, the whole complex of powers involved in the Middle East peace search, stand at this point and particularly what contribution international guarantees involving the United States and the Soviet Union might make to a peace settlement?*

*A. Well, the United States is supporting the Jarring mission because we think that the best prospect for peace is to have the parties negotiate under procedures established by Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring].*

*At the moment, as you know, because you have read the answers that were given by Israel and Egypt to Ambassador Jarring, there is what seems to be an impasse. We are convinced that that impasse can be overcome. We are going to do what we can to see that it is overcome, and we strongly support the continuation of Ambassador Jarring's mission.*

*Now, we are going to work behind the scenes; we are going to have discussions with*

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers' news conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1658 (April 5, 1971), pp. 478-480, 481-482, 483-484.

all concerned about what we can do not only to get around this particular impasse but to make substantial progress in the talks.

As far as international guarantees are concerned, we have said that we are willing, as a nation, to play a responsible and appropriate role in a peacekeeping force. Now, we haven't attempted to dictate or lay down any particular ways that that might be done. Obviously a peacekeeping force would have to be supportive of an agreement, and that agreement has to be reached among the parties. On the other hand, the type of peacekeeping force that might be formulated would play an important part in the attitude of the parties when they look toward the final agreement. So, to that extent the two are parallel, and we would hope that the negotiations between the parties would continue under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, and at the same time in the four-power talks we will talk about the possibilities of guarantees.

Now, an international peacekeeping force would not necessarily be limited to the four powers. It could include forces from other countries, and that is another matter that we are considering at the present time. I am looking forward very much to the meeting that I will have with Foreign Minister Eban on Friday. We will have further opportunities at that time to talk about these negotiations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could talk a little bit in more detail about these international guarantees that you have talked about and specifically reports that the United States is interested in participating in a peacekeeping force with the Soviet Union and other Big Four powers?*

A. Well, as I have said, we are not fixed in our views about how a peacekeeping force would operate. That would have to depend to a large degree on what the parties wanted. But if an agreement is reached, and we hope one can be reached, then we think an international peacekeeping force, properly established—with provision that it would be of a continuing nature, that it could not be removed by any unilateral decision and would be located in areas that were critical—would provide, we believe, possibly the greatest possible security for the parties.

There is a thought that geography is the sole consideration when you are thinking about security. Now, we don't think that geography is solely responsible for security, or even to a large extent responsible for security. Certainly in modern-day world situations, geography is ordinarily not important. What is important is the political arrangement that is made: the agreement itself, whether the parties are belligerent and hostile, or whether they have made an agreement that is understood by the international community, and whether the powers of the world are willing to take part in guaranteeing that the agreement will be kept. And therefore we think that although geographical considerations are important, and certainly Israel is fully justified in considering them, we think an equally important consideration is the political consideration—what is the political climate.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what political arrangements is this Government prepared to make with Israel to assure it that it will not find itself in the same situation it did after 1957, when it also had letters from President Eisenhower to Ben-Gurion and assurances from John Foster Dulles to Abba Eban?*

A. Well, I think it is very incorrect to make an analogy between 1957 and the suggestions that we make today.

In 1957, as you recall, it was a continuation of the armistice. The parties still were in a state of belligerency. The U.N. Force that was established was a very fragile force that could be removed unilaterally.

Now, we are not talking about anything of that kind. We are talking about a contractual agreement entered into by the parties with reciprocally binding commitments, signed, sealed, and delivered; with full agreement of all concerned that belligerency will cease, that they will live in peace with each other, that they will not interfere with each other's internal affairs; with provisions made for security; and with an international force consisting of those nations that are willing to participate and who may participate because the parties are prepared to accept it; with an understanding that that will continue for a definite period of time, probably with

options to renew, so that it can't be removed unilaterally—which would mean if the United States participated that the United States would not move its forces except by the agreement.

So, as far as our Government is concerned, we think that that is the most adequate possible guarantee that you can conceive of in modern life. What else can you do?

*Q. Well, is there any bilateral thing—*

*A. Excuse me—go ahead.*

*Q. I had asked also what bilateral guarantees?*

*A. Well, we are not thinking of bilateral guarantees at the moment. Of course, we would continue to give support to Israel in terms of economic assistance and other assistance. In other words, that of course would be a very important factor in Israel's attitude toward its security. And we would be prepared to continue to play a supportive role to Israel. But what we are saying is this: that the climate has never been better for a settlement in the Middle East, and if we don't make a settlement now, we are going to plant seeds that will lead to future war.*

Now, everyone, it seems to me, is prepared for peace. The difficulties now involve, on the one hand, the question of acquisition of territory, which Egypt says is unacceptable, and which the Security Council resolution says is unacceptable, and security as far as Israel is concerned; and anything that does not provide security to Israel is unacceptable, and unacceptable to us and unacceptable as far as the Security Council resolution is concerned.

Now, we think there is a middle ground. We think those two positions can be negotiated if the parties want to. In other words, the security aspects of it do not necessarily require acquisition of territory. On the other hand, we recognize that Israel has to be satisfied that its security is guaranteed. And the United States is perfectly prepared to play a leading role in that guarantee.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how can assurances by our Government of safeguards to the Israelis be convincing to the Israelis when the majority leader of*

*our Senate doubts the wisdom of American troops to be stationed in the Middle East and our Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman says that his proposal for an American-Israeli security treaty is—actually, his intent was to limit and codify American support for Israel?*

*A. Well, first, I am not sure that when you quote Senator Fulbright that you are accurately quoting him. Let me say I did not detect, in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, any opposition to the idea of a peacekeeping force as a matter of principle.*

Now, as far as Senator Mansfield is concerned, I am not sure that he is inflexible. I noticed what he said the other day. I haven't had an opportunity to talk to him. But I am quite satisfied in my own mind that if we worked out an agreement that would be acceptable to the parties concerned, our Senate and our House of Representatives would support it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you interpret the redeployment of Russian troops in the Sinai as a response to the President's plea for restraint on both sides?*

*A. I think it is too early to judge that. I don't think you could come to that conclusion based on the fact that they have redeployed some of their Russian armed forces that were manning the SAM-3 sites near the Suez as necessarily a response to that. As Mr. Bray [Charles W. Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations] said yesterday, the deployment or redeployment is just that. We have no evidence that they have removed the troops from Egypt. So I think it is too early to judge.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could follow up Marilyn's [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post] question. One doesn't have to go back to 1957 to understand the Israeli doubts; one can just go back to August, when the Soviets either countenanced, if not took part, in violation of the standstill. On the basis of that—what we thought was a good understanding—how can we be assured that their participation is not going to be an opening for eventual sabotage of a peacekeeping arrangement?*

*A. Well, if there is any sabotaging, they can sabotage right now. They have got troops there, and we don't have troops there.*

Secondly, I think the fact that the missile controversy arose doesn't necessarily mean that some other agreement won't work.

As you know, that was an oral agreement, and we were concerned about what happened. But certainly that doesn't foreclose the possibility of an agreement that might be satisfactory.

What I want to emphasize is that we think that an agreement can be worked out that will be satisfactory. We recognize that it is not going to be easy. We recognize that there are types of agreements that can be worked out that would be very unsatisfactory. But if the parties are prepared to negotiate, I think it can be done.

*Q. May I ask you a clarifying question, Mr. Secretary?*

A. Sure.

*Q. Because I am not quite sure what you mean when you talk about international agreement. Are you talking essentially about a Middle East security treaty in which the big powers would participate? Are you talking about something as formal as a treaty?*

A. Well, I don't think it necessarily makes a great deal of difference, the form. We are talking about a written agreement, which would be signed and agreed to by all concerned. And all concerned, in this case, includes Egypt, Jordan, and Israel.

Now, we would anticipate that if this worked it would provide all the arrangements among the parties. And it would probably, either in that agreement or by reference, refer to a U.N. peacekeeping force. By that time a U.N. peacekeeping force would have been considered and worked out, and worked out in agreement among those taking part in the peacekeeping force and those signing the agreement. So the peacekeeping effort would be supportive of the agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a few moments ago you said that the security aspects in the Middle East don't necessarily require the acquisition of territory.*

A. That is right.

*Q. Do you mean that you feel that Israel could be secure if it returned to the pre-1967 borders?*

A. Well, let me make it clear, because when you discuss a subject of this kind and this complex, sometimes things can be taken out of context. Our position is very carefully set forth both in the President's state of the world message and in more detail in my December 9, 1969, statement.

We have never said that Israel had to withdraw from all territory. Our position has been that it should not acquire territory, except in substantial amounts for security purposes.

Now, insofar as the present situation, which primarily deals with Egypt and Israel, we have said that our policy is that the 1967 boundary should be the boundary between Israel and Egypt. Now, that excludes the Gaza Strip. So we are not talking about the Gaza Strip. We also say that that 1967 boundary should be the boundary provided that adequate, satisfactory arrangements are made for demilitarization of the Sinai—and we say that is a matter that should be negotiated between the parties—and that satisfactory arrangements are made concerning Sharm al-Shaykh. And we say that should be negotiated between the parties.

Now, what I was saying earlier is that it is not necessary to acquire territory to make adequate provisions for security. Acquiring territory is one thing; use of territory is something else again. And one of the uses that might be made of the territory that we are talking about, Sharm al-Shaykh, might be the introduction of a peacekeeping force which would include the permanent members of the Security Council and other nations. And we are not inflexible about it. We just say we think that is a very useful instrumentality for maintaining the peace. And when the United Nations was formed, that was one of the hopes that was then expressed for mankind, that something of this kind might be developed. And we think for that reason that it is a very good prospect if the parties are willing to accept it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Mansfield's objections the other day were specifically to the idea of introducing American troops in one of the world's*

*flashpoints, on the line where they could get us into a deeper commitment. Would you comment on that?*

A. Well, you know, that is a matter of judgment. There have been three wars there in the last 23 years, and we think this would prevent war, not cause war. We think that if a peaceful settlement is not worked out in the foreseeable future that there is a very dangerous situation that will develop and possibly lead to world war III. So we don't think it would be an added factor; we think it would be a factor leading to peace.

As far as the Russians are concerned, they are there now. People say, "Why would you agree to a peacekeeping force in which the Russians participate?" Well, they are there in large numbers now in the area.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it practical to think in terms of American and Soviet troops cooperating in a situation—in a shooting situation, for example? Would you expect Soviet troops to fire on Egyptian forces if that became necessary?*

A. Would you speak a little bit louder? Would I expect what?

*Q. Do you think it is practical to think in terms of Soviet troops and American troops cooperating if a shooting situation occurred?*

A. Well, I think this would prevent a shooting situation from occurring. We are not, of course, talking about a Soviet-United States peacekeeping force. We are talking about a U.N. peacekeeping force, including United States forces and British forces and French and Soviet and others. And our answer is, yes, we think it is possible that under those circumstances a U.N. peacekeeping force might cooperate.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Russians having pulled SAM-3's back from Suez.*

A. No. I said the Russians who were operating the SAM-3 sites, not the SAM-3 sites themselves.

*Q. Are they being operated by Egyptians now?*

A. Yes, the ones that I referred to are now being operated by Egyptians.

*Q. Would you regard this as a sign of Russian restraint in the situation?*

A. Well, as I said, I think it is a little early

to judge. It wasn't a very substantial number. But it gives reason for some encouragement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you get these talks through Ambassador Jarring going again? Would you support the Secretary General's report that Israel should answer and make a commitment on withdrawal?*

A. Well, I don't want to go into the details about how we hope to do that. We are going to have discussions about that with Mr. Eban and others. We are going to talk to Ambassador Jarring. We think this is the best hope for a solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israeli answer to Mr. Jarring's proposal said, if I am not mistaken, that they were willing to withdraw from occupied territory but not to the '67 line. And as far as I understand our position, we believe that it should be the '67 line but that that should be negotiated. With this in view, wherein lies the impasse exactly?*

A. Well, I am not sure that the differences are as great as they seem. But keep in mind, because each time I see this reported in the press—I shouldn't say each time, but several times I've seen it reported in the press—it is not accurately stated. We support the '67 boundary between Egypt and Israel—I am not talking about the Jordan problem or anything else; I am talking about that boundary—provided that demilitarization can be worked out satisfactorily to the parties and provided that a satisfactory arrangement is worked out between the parties on Sharm al-Shaykh, to provide security for Israel.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the Middle East, you appear to be talking about an American commitment over a considerable period of time and much firmer than anything the United States has ever given in this area before. You say '57 is not a case in point. Given the national commitments resolution passed by Congress and the history of congressional-executive argument over commitments, are you not required at a minimum to secure a joint resolution of Congress or perhaps, as some Senators say, a treaty?*

A. Well, it wouldn't be a treaty. But we would certainly get the consent of the Congress in one form or another. And as I said of my

testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, although it obviously had to be a tentative proposal, there seemed to be a general disposition to favor it.

We can't be sure what Congress would do. But I think it would be favorably disposed.

I mean we could establish, if the agreement were satisfactory—you always have to have the premise that the agreement is satisfactory—if it is a satisfactory agreement, then I don't believe we would have difficulty in getting Congress to authorize a peacekeeping force.

Until this administration took office, we had 64,000 men in South Korea in a U.N. peacekeeping force.

*Q. Well, are you prepared to say at this point not simply that you want concurrence of, say, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees but that you want a vote of Congress in some form, in a positive way, to approve an American participation more or less indefinitely in a military sense in the Middle East?*

*A. Well, I don't want to answer that question, because I am not sure it would be more or less indefinitely, and I am not sure what form it would take. But I can say, Mr. Roberts, that I would think—and I feel sure that this is the position of our Government—that in an undertaking of this magnitude, in which we took part with other nations, we would expect congressional approval.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could give us your assessment about the development of U.S.-Arab relations, especially your assessment on the possibility of a resumption of diplomatic relations.*

*A. Well, obviously our relations with the Arab nations are affected by the Middle East problem. And they are suspicious of the United States. They, at least to some degree, blame us for what they think is Israel's intransigence. They are not sure that we are doing all we can to help solve the problem. On the other hand, I think there has been some awareness that we are making an honest, genuine attempt to work out a peaceful settlement. I think our relations have improved slightly. On the question of diplomatic relations with Egypt, we would certainly be willing to have diplomatic relations with*

Egypt. We don't think at the moment it is practical. But we would hope that if some arrangements are worked out, that we could have diplomatic relations with Egypt. We have historically been very friendly to the Arab world.

. . . . .

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**Commentary on U.S. Obstruction of Jarring Initiative and of Four-Power Discussions on the Middle East Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Izvestia (Condensed)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, March 19, 1971**

...The heightened interest in the work of the "four" [powers holding consultations on the Near East] is quite understandable. The initiative taken on Feb. 8 by G. Jarring, the U.N. Secretary-General's special representative on the Near East, and the United Arab Republic's positive response (on Feb. 15) to that initiative opened up prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Near East problem. Israel's frankly negative and pugnacious position remains, as before, the stumbling block on this path. Backed into a corner by G. Jarring's proposals and the U.A.R.'s response, the Israeli aggressors were forced to drop their hypocritical pretense at being the peacemakers. Declaring their intention of retaining in perpetuity the fruits of their lawless seizure of Arab lands, they cynically rebuffed the peaceful initiative of the U.N. Secretary-General's special representative.

In the situation that has developed, the "four" have a duty and an obligation to aid

<sup>1</sup> Condensed and translated from the Russian commentary by M. Sturua (*Izvestia*, March 19, 1971, p. 4), *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 11 (April 13, 1971), pp. 21-22. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.



and support G. Jarring's initiative, and to do so above all with respect to its two key questions: 1) the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories to a position behind the line that existed prior to June 5, 1967, and 2) the conditions of the peace that must be established in the Near East. As your correspondent has learned from usually well-informed U.N. circles, the Soviet Union has persistently tried, at meetings of the "four," to secure the adoption of just such a declaration in support of G. Jarring's initiative on these key questions, as well as an endorsement of the U.A.R.'s positive response and an urgent appeal to Israel to give an equally positive response to G. Jarring's initiative, without delay.

Such an approach is undoubtedly constructive and positive in character. However, one has yet to see any progress in the matter: The "four" have thus far been unable to draw up and adopt any kind of statement in support of G. Jarring's mission. Why? In the view of U.N. circles, the sole reason for this inaction is the negative position taken by the United States. From the very beginning, the American side has done everything in its power to obstruct the adoption of a mutually acceptable communiqué. It blocked the convening of the "four" on an urgent basis in early March; when "four" finally did convene, the American side categorically opposed any mention in the communiqué of the key questions of G. Jarring's initiative. The American representative tried to reduce the whole matter to a question of extending the cease-fire deadline.

This last maneuver cannot but put one on his guard. At the beginning of March, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir officially announced that Israel expects only one thing from the four: an appeal for a cease-fire. And what about the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from Arab lands and a peaceful settlement? The fact that Washington and Tel Aviv hold "coinciding" views on the role of the "four" indicates that a definite understanding has been reached between the U.S. and Israel, whose purpose it is to perpetuate the Israeli aggressors' seizure of Arab territories.

That such an understanding exists is further evidenced by the following "terminological coincidence." Addressing a press conference on March 4, President Nixon mentioned the formula of "geographical acquisition" in connection with the problem of guaranteeing the security of Israel's frontiers. On March 10, the Israeli embassy in Washington published a memorandum stating that Israel would not quit the Arab lands that it had occupied, specifically Sharm el Sheikh, and would not accept the conditions offered by G. Jarring. The memorandum emphasized that Israel was prepared to withdraw only to frontiers whose security was "geographically guaranteed."

The meaning of these "coincidences" is not hard to decipher. The United States supports and encourages Israel's aspiration to perpetuate its usurpation of Arab lands. This also explains why the American side has consistently attempted to obstruct progress in the work of the "four." The attempt has been evident for some time now. Since November of last year, the Americans have been playing the same tune over and over, like a cracked phonograph record: Israel, they say, should not be "offended and angered"; "quiet diplomacy" is what is needed, they say; it is better to wait "until the dust settles," etc. But the dust raised by an aggressor's marching feet cannot, after all, settle until those feet have departed to the place from whence they came. Talk of so-called "geographical acquisitions" flagrantly contradicts Security Council Resolution 242 and the General Assembly's decisions on the Near East, which demand withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from the Arab territories that they have seized. The formula of "geographical acquisitions" is contrary to the principle that the acquisition of territories by means of war cannot be permitted—a principle enunciated in a whole series of declarations solemnly adopted at the anniversary session of the U.N. General Assembly, specifically the declaration on the Strengthening of International Security; the United States was one of the nations that voted for this declaration.

Lately there has been no dearth of state-

ments by the American side to the effect that the U.S. is "exerting influence" on Israel, trying to make the Israelis "see reason." Some people here were inclined to believe this for a time. But by now the number of willing believers has dropped to zero in the face of incontrovertible facts.

U.S. ruling circles, having obstructed the work of the "four," stifled the initiative taken by G. Jarring and encouraged the Israeli aggressors under the guise of "talking reason" to them, bear equal responsibility with Israel for the abnormal situation in the Near East. This situation is fraught with grave consequences.

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### **Interview Statements by Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin on the American Position Towards the Policy of Israel on Conditions for a Middle East Settlement<sup>1</sup>** **March 19, 1971**

*Q. Is it possible for the United States and Israel to agree on a joint compromise policy?*

*A.* At this time a common American-Israel position on the nature of peace is impossible. The main difference—and it has existed since the end of the Six Day War—is not the definition of peace, but its territorial component.

*Q. Is it possible for Israel to recognize Egypt's sovereignty over Sharem-e-Sheikh and use it as a base for an extended period? Will this formula be agreeable to the Americans? For example there has been talk of Israel Sharem-e-Sheikh.*

*A.* The Americans have attempted to ascertain whether Israel has territorial changes in mind or accepts the principle of Egyptian sovereignty. The Americans have advocated Egyptian sovereignty accompanied by security arrangements. This is a "negotiation technique." If Israel will say it does not insist on sovereignty the Americans will ask: in that

event, why don't you agree that American soldiers are as good security guarantee as Israeli soldiers? The United States does not agree to exclusive Israeli military presence at Sharem-e-Sheikh. The Americans will not at this time budge from this position.

*Q. But the Americans say they cannot make a firm decision on Israel's territorial plans because they have never received them.*

*A.* Israel has not officially transmitted its precise territorial plans to the United States. However, Israel's leaders have informally told the United States Government Israel's principles.

The problem that should concern Israel's public and Government is: Where are we headed? What are our intentions now that the Soviet Union and Egypt have accepted the Rogers plan?

In the present situation there are three possibilities: a) peace—on the basis of the American plan, which holds that border changes that Israel requests are impracticable, b) deadlock: if we succeed in preventing American pressure (and there are chances that we shall succeed) within six months after the Soviet Union and Egypt despair of American imposition of a solution on Israel, fighting may recommence.

*Q. And what is the third possibility?*

*A.* The third possibility is the transition from war to peace as a result of a long and gradual process rather than through diplomatic negotiations under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. I call this solution "easing into peace."

*Q. What do you mean by that expression?*

*A.* To achieve peace by a series of steps, each of which is not a declaration of peace but none of which involves giving up territory or the chance of finally achieving peace according to Israel's concepts.

*Q. What is an example of such step?*

*A.* The withdrawal of Israel's forces along the Suez Canal a few dozen kilometers, a distance from which they will be able to return in a matter of hours. The Egyptians could present such step as a partial withdrawal,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted English translation of the Hebrew text of Rabin's interview in *Ma'ariv*, March 19, 1971, *Tadmit Newsletter* I, 20 (April 1, 1971), pp. 3-5.

which will enable them to open the Suez and renew civilian life along the Canal. That solution would lessen the pressure on the Soviet Union since it would receive a limited advantage from this move. It would also decrease pressure on Western Europe which needs to renew the transport of oil via the Canal. That step would also diminish pressure on the United States since it would decrease the likelihood of a confrontation between the two super-powers. Clearly this would have to be a temporary one, and considered as only a stage on the road towards a complete solution. Israel would benefit from it since it would lessen the danger of the renewal of the fighting and would decrease the pressure for an immediate territorial solution based on United States documents from October, 1969.

*Q. Doesn't withdrawal from the Suez front constitute a military danger?*

A. Every solution involves dangers. But inactivity is also dangerous.

*Q. Doesn't the United States regard the opening of the Suez with disfavor?*

A. Perhaps some people in the United States are of this view. However, every political solution the United States does favor involves the re-opening of the Suez Canal. The United States regards the continuation of the present situation as a greater danger to itself than the opening of the Canal. It is to be assumed that the United States would encourage this step as a means of separating the belligerent forces in order to prevent a renewal of fighting that may lead to a confrontation between the two super-powers.

*Q. Have you been talking about a possibility or an actual plan?*

A. About a possibility that may be expected.

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## Vatican Editorial Commentary Expressing Concern at the Increasing Take-Over of Jerusalem by Israel<sup>1</sup>

Vatican City, March 22, 1971

The negotiations which began not so long ago through the mediation of Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring, between Israel and the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries, are now marking time. Let us hope that this will not be for long. While diplomatic activities are in progress to resume negotiations, the truce expired on 7 March. We all wish that the hopes which have materialised during these past few months may not be dispelled again by the violence of arms.

While each of the parties tries to place itself advantageously for negotiations within this framework, the question of Jerusalem's future remains a most delicate one for the achievement of a lasting peace and for the re-establishment of mutual understanding which is its base.

Any political agreement on other questions could find in this point an insuperable obstacle, a stumbling block, if the sense of justice of those responsible does not succeed in imposing respect for the rights of the minority communities, which today feel that their existence and development is threatened by a policy which seems to aim at slow suffocation, and if Jerusalem does not remain the city in which believers of the three great monotheistic religions—Jews, Christians and Muslims—can identify themselves.

This is why it is necessary at this moment to pay attention to a problem the consequences of which—if not controlled in time—could do irreparable damage to the cause of peace in the Middle East.

The unhappy divisions of the city following Britain's withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, and the failure to implement the United

<sup>1</sup> English translation of unsigned (and therefore "official") Italian language Vatican editorial in *L'Osservatore Romano*, 22-23 March 1971, *Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism*, No. 17 (April, 1971), pp. 9-10.

Nations resolutions on the establishment of Jerusalem and its surrounding areas as a separate entity, that is, as a city that should have belonged to all, reached an epilogue with the Israeli military occupation of the "Arab sector" of the city during the 1967 war. Almost immediately, this occupation was transformed by the Israeli Parliament practically into annexation under the formula of unification.

This determination to acquire the Arab sector as well for its own sovereignty has manifested itself ever since in measures of a legislative, fiscal and urban nature which are impressing on Jerusalem an ever more special character at the expense of the non-Jewish population—Muslims and Christians—who are compelled for reasons of urban expansion to live in ever increasingly restricted spaces and finally to look elsewhere for a future they feel they no longer can find in their homeland's environment.

As has already been the case over the project for the internationalisation of the city, so also the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly of the United Nations forbidding alteration of the "status" of Jerusalem and ordering the annulment of all measures taken against it, came to nothing. Nevertheless, they remain to testify that a very grave state of affairs is forming against the law and which has the logic of a *fait accompli*.

Reference to expropriation measures is sufficient to give an idea of the radical manner with which a physiognomy is impressed on the city that greatly differs from its historical and religious character and its universal vocation.

In January 1968, 660 acres of land were expropriated in the Mount Scopus region and most of it is already covered with Hebrew homes.

In August 1970, another 2,640 acres were expropriated in the Arab sector of Jerusalem and on the outskirts of the town for the carrying out of the "Greater Jerusalem" plan. There was another project in the air for the old part of Jerusalem. Here six thousand Arabs would have to leave and various buildings would be expropriated.

We are bound to feel deep apprehension at

changes of such gravity. In Israel itself these plans have met with justified criticism and not only from the exclusively urban point of view.

The Jerusalem press has actually traced a link between the Government's haste in preparing and implementing these plans and the peace undertaking promoted by American Secretary of State Rogers, without disguising the resulting intention of affirming in deeds Israel's sovereignty over the entire city. These intentions have been confirmed authoritatively by the Israeli Minister for Construction, who expressly stated that it was "a plan with Hebrew aims".

On 21 February, the Hebrew Municipal Council of Jerusalem approved, despite open opposition of technicians and architects, the plans prepared by the construction ministry for housing in the suburbs. This means that there will be a veritable belt of buildings on the hills around the Holy City, consisting of 20,000 homes destined to house 75,000 Jews.

Unfortunately, these are not peace projects and cannot leave indifferent those who really work for definitive peace in the Middle East. These together with other plans—to which the press is beginning to refer—confirm the necessity of an international petition in order to guarantee truly the peculiar character of the city and the rights of minority communities.

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**U.K. Parliamentary Discussion Including Replies by Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home Recognizing the U.A.R. Commitment To Withdrawal on the Basis of U.N. Resolutions 242, Noting Israel's Failure To Undertake Such a Commitment, and Stating Britain's Willingness To Participate in a Peace Keeping Force in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

London, March 22, 1971

*8 and 9. Mr. Dykes asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) whether*

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 814, March 22, 1971, cols. 17–20.

*Her Majesty's Government have made any new proposals in the context of the Four-Power talks on the Middle East since the last extension of the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire arrangements;*

(2) *whether he will make a statement on the latest progress in the United Nations Middle East peace talks under Dr. Jarring, as notified to Her Majesty's Government.*

19. *Mr. St. John-Stevas asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on the latest position in the Middle East.*

*The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home):* In his proposals to the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, Dr. Jarring sought conditional commitments from them on peace and withdrawal respectively. The United Arab Republic Government's reply gave the commitment for which Dr. Jarring had asked on the nature of peace. Dr. Jarring still seeks from Israel a commitment on withdrawal within the terms of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November, 1967. It is now more necessary than ever that these negotiations should be enabled to make progress and the Government will continue to play their full part in encouraging the parties to this end, both in bilateral discussions and through the Four-Power talks.

*Mr. Dykes:* I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply. One does not wish to make the negotiations more difficult, but bearing in mind two factors of immediate importance which are of crucial significance—the approach of the end of the so-called period of grace and the apparent and indeed disconcerting deterioration of relations between the United States and Israel—do not the Government feel that there might at last be a possibility of some unilateral British initiative *vis-à-vis* the four-Power talks and the Jarring talks to make sure that negotiations continue on a meaningful basis and eventually lead to direct negotiations between the parties concerned?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* Yes. That would be our intention. If there is the slightest opening for any initiative by the Government, we shall take it. I think that probably

public diplomacy at the present time is a mistake.

*Mr. St. John-Stevas:* Will my right hon. Friend continue to use his best endeavours to persuade the Government of Israel that their long-term security would be better served by recognition by the Arab States of international guarantees than by clinging to their present wartime frontiers?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* I share my hon. Friend's view. I think that there is an opportunity now of which Israel would do well to take advantage. But we equally understand Israel's desire for secure boundaries within which she may live.

*Mr. Hattersley:* I am sure that the entire House will be glad that the Foreign Secretary was able to make a statement marginally more hopeful than might have been expected when foreign affairs were debated before Christmas. Perhaps I may ask a question on one point concerning the guarantees that Great Britain might be able to give to the affected Powers. Taking into account the interest and enthusiasm which certainly Arab Governments have for Britain to underwrite some of the peace guarantees, would the Government, even allowing for the enormous pressures on British forces now, be prepared to consider participating in a force which would guarantee peace on the basis of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* It is not wise to speculate as to the specific nature of guarantees or the countries which might take part in a guaranteeing force, but in certain circumstances the British Government would participate in a guarantee.

*Mr. Goodhart:* Since the Soviet Union is the only one of the four Powers with troops on the ground in the Middle East, and as it has reinforced its forces in Egypt throughout the cease-fire period, have we suggested to the Soviet Government that it should withdraw some of its forces which are now in the Middle East?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* That is rather a wider question. What this question deals with is the nature of guarantees and the

possible composition of the guaranteeing force, mixed up, of course, with demilitarised zones and all that. The wider question of limiting armaments to the Middle East on all sides should be looked at, but not particularly in the context of this Question.

*Mr. Mayhew:* I welcome those replies, but will the right hon. Gentleman meanwhile consider raising at the Security Council the question of the construction of large blocks of suburban flats for Jewish residents in Arab Jerusalem, which is very provocative, is violating three separate unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, and is an act of vandalism condemned by architects and town planners all over the world?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* I do not think that that is a matter in which the British Government should take an initiative.

*Mr. Longden:* Irrespective of Jerusalem, which is in a case by itself, I think, does my right hon. Friend think it reasonable to expect the Israelis to withdraw to the pre-war boundaries, unless we are prepared to speculate about the form of guarantee which will be given to them—and not only to speculate but to make definite proposals?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* I think that the first thing which has to happen is that more definition must be given to the Israelis' requirements regarding a frontier. Then, of course, unless there is agreement between, let us say, Israel and Egypt, there is nothing to guarantee. So we want a good deal of information before we can be certain of the nature of the guarantees we offer, but there has been no doubt in the mind of the Israeli Government since the talks in New York that we are prepared to participate in guarantees, and that they could be provided to supplement an agreement.

*Mr. Clinton Davis:* Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise, when he speaks of withdrawal by Israel to the pre-1967 frontiers, that this has been interpreted by the Arab Governments as giving comfort to their proposals? Does he not realise that it is totally unacceptable to the Israeli Government to think in terms of withdrawing, for example, from Sharm-el-Sheikh and the

Golan Heights? Does he not also recognise that this is a matter of survival for them?

*Sir Alec Douglas-Home:* Yes, Sir. The hon. Gentleman will remember that Israel said that she would withdraw when she accepted Resolution 242. The question is what adjustments are needed to the 1967 frontiers in order to give Israel the security which she has a right to expect.

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### **Remarks Made in U.S. Senate Middle East Debate by Senator Fulbright Defending Administration Initiatives and Secretary Rogers and Affirming a Negotiated Settlement To Be in the Long-Term Interest of Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, March 23, 1971**

The Secretary of State came to the Foreign Relations Committee before he held his press conference. He went into great detail as to the purposes of the administration with regard to its proposal, which was to reach a negotiated settlement rather than to rely upon, as the Senator says, "geography" and the force of arms. He felt in the long run that a negotiated settlement was in the interest of Israel.

I personally feel the Secretary's opinion is exactly correct. I think the only hope for survival of Israel over a long period of time is a negotiated settlement. I also feel that the principal reason there has been no progress on negotiations for the settlement of this question is the belief on the part of Israel that the United States and the Senate will back it, no matter what position it takes.

I believe that attitude is most unfortunate, because I do not see any possibility of negotiation so long as Israel believes we are completely at its disposal.

I was not privileged to be at the meet-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Fulbright's remarks following Senate speeches by Jackson and Javits, *Congressional Record*, March 23, 1971, pp. 7357-7358.

ing when the Senator from New York had the Foreign Minister of Israel here in the Senate, with a great many Senators. Perhaps there was a different view which would be persuasive against the administration's position, but I see nothing that would so indicate.

I thought the inference of the Prime Minister of Israel in her statement that "even if the Secretary was sincere" was a most unusual statement to be made by any Prime Minister with regard to a Secretary of State. I have no doubt that the Secretary of State is sincere, and the President is, too.

I think it is in the interest of Israel that we have a negotiated settlement, and I very much regret that the Senator from New York seems to take the position that Israel is now giving notice that they do not intend to withdraw from the territories they took in the last war.

That was the essence of the 1967 agreement, regardless of the technical details. Certainly everyone understood the agreement to mean that the acquisition of territory by conquest is not acceptable to the great majority of the nations of the United Nations, including Israel. It is my understanding that Israel agreed to that general principle at the time of the 1967 cease-fire, and I believe the Secretary believes it as well.

I think we have here an honest difference of opinion as to what is in the interest of Israel's long-term survival. Is it force of arms, backed by the United States, or is it a negotiated diplomatic settlement?

I honestly believe the second is the only hope, over the long term, because I do not think Israel should take the United States so much for granted. At the moment, they do have the influence in Congress to support them, as evidenced by several actions within the last 2 or 3 years. But if they create the impression of being too determined not to negotiate, I think they run a great risk of losing the support that they have heretofore had in this whole affair.

I do ask the Senator from New York to give the administration and the Secretary greater credit for an honest desire to bring about a settlement that is in the interest of

Israel. The administration's policy is in the interest of the United States of course; but I believe it also to be in Israel's interest. I do not believe Israel can have security simply by the continued occupation of the Sinai. I do not think, with modern weapons, that territory constitutes the kind of security it did 200 or 300 years ago. I think this is the essence of the matter.

I think we ought to promote negotiated settlements in this area, just as I have thought all along that the only hope for peace in Indochina is a negotiated political settlement. I think that remains true. In these days of modern weapons, the idea that you can maintain security by occupying a certain piece of real estate is an illusion.

It is a matter of judgment: What is the best, over the long period, for the security of the State of Israel? I submit that the Secretary is not only in good faith, but he is also wise in his statement of his political judgment as to what is in the interest of Israel as well as those of the United State and, I might say, of peace in general.

Mr. President, if I understand correctly, it is not the position of the Secretary of State that before anything whatever is done, Israel must physically withdraw from every inch of territory. What he is proposing, as a preliminary to the intense, as the Senator says, negotiating of the details, such as whether Sharm el Sheikh is returned, or how much demilitarization is possible, is that Israel accept in principle withdrawal from the occupied territories, except for insubstantial changes on the borders.

But this is what, in my understanding, Israel adamantly refuses to do, leaving the impression that so long as we support her, she will not withdraw from anything, even an insubstantial withdrawal.

That is very vague, but it is a refusal to accept the principle, in its broad sense, as a condition for negotiation of the details.

We cannot know whether this opportunity if missed now, will ever return. I thought the Secretary's presentation was unanswer-

able, that this is the critical time to proceed to negotiations.

As to these absolute guarantees which the Senator mentions, obviously there is nothing absolutely certain in this world about anything, or any country. But when the Egyptians say in good faith they will do everything they possibly can to carry out these principles, which we ourselves requested and which Mr. Jarring has submitted, it strikes me as most unusual that the Israelis will not even accept the principle of the 1967 U.N. resolution, which they at that time, I understand, did accept.

There has been a very clear hardening of their position, which, while none of us can prove it absolutely, leaves the impression that the Israel Government at the moment has no intention of withdrawing even in an insubstantial way from the conquered territory.

I do not know how you can proceed to a negotiation unless you first agree to the preliminary proposition that you accept these principles. What would then become of the idea of the 1967 cease-fire? If these principles are accepted then you could get to details such as control of Sharm el Sheik and the other particular spots that will have to be negotiated.

I confess that I am very puzzled with the Senator from New York, other than that, simply, his judgment is that there is no substitute for geography, no substitute for geographical occupation. If that is true, I do not think there will be any negotiation. I do not believe that the Arabs, backed by the Russians, as they are, can be forced to accept that kind of complete abdication, complete surrender.

I submit that if this opportunity is lost, we will share the blame for not having brought about a negotiation, and I think that the great majority of the nations will feel that we are to a great extent responsible for the failure of a good faith negotiating effort proposed by this administration. I regret very much that the Senator is not able to support the administration in this instance.

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**Statements on Soviet Foreign Policy Included in the Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union As Delivered by Party Chairman Brezhnev to the Twenty-Fourth C.P.S.U. Congress<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, March 30, 1971**

Comrades, in the period under review the Central Committee and the Soviet Government did their utmost to ensure peaceful conditions for communist construction in the USSR, to expose and frustrate action by the aggressive imperialist forces, and to defend socialism, the freedom of peoples and peace.

Our policy has always combined firm rebuffs to aggression, and the constructive line of settling pressing international problems, and maintaining normal, and, wherever the situation allows, good, relations with states belonging to the other social system. As in the past, we have consistently stood up for the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states, regardless of their social system. This principle has now become a real force of international development.

Let me deal with the most important international problems which because of their acerbity or importance for the future have required our special attention.

... The Middle East is another "hot spot" in world politics. The crisis which has arisen as a result of Israel's attack on the UAR, Syria and Jordan has been one of the most intense in the development of international relations over the past period.

Together with the fraternal socialist countries we did everything necessary to stop and condemn the aggression. We raised this question in the UN Security Council in the most resolute terms. An extraordinary session of the General Assembly was called on our demand. The USSR and other fraternal

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text (TASS), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 14 (April 3, 1971), pp. 6, 7.



countries have broken off diplomatic relations with Israel, which has ignored the UN decision for a ceasefire. Our country has helped to restore the defence potential of the Arab states which were subjected to invasion, the UAR and Syria in the first place, with whom our co-operation has been growing stronger from year to year.

The United Arab Republic recently came out with important initiatives. It announced its acceptance of the proposal put forward by the UN special representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, and readiness to conclude a peace agreement with Israel once the Israeli troops are withdrawn from the occupied Arab territories. The UAR has also proposed steps to resume navigation along the Suez Canal in the very near future. Thus, the attitude of the Arab side provides a real basis for settling the crisis in the Middle East. The Israeli Government's rejection of all these proposals, and Tel Aviv's now openly brazen claims to Arab lands clearly show who is blocking the way to peace in the Middle East, and who is to blame for the dangerous hotbed of war being maintained in that area. At the same time, the unseemly role of those who are instigating the Israeli extremists, the role of US imperialism and of international Zionism as an instrument of the aggressive imperialist circles, is becoming ever more obvious.

However, Tel Aviv ought to take a sober view of things. Do Israel's ruling circles really expect to secure for themselves the lands of others they have occupied and to go scot-free? In the final count, the advantages obtained by the invaders as a result of their piratical attack are illusory. They will disappear as mirages pass from view in the sands of Sinai. And the longer the delay in reaching a political settlement in the Middle East, the stronger will be the indignation of world public opinion, and the Arab peoples' hatred of the aggressor and its patrons, and the greater the harm the Israeli rulers will inflict on their people and their country.

The Soviet Union will continue its firm support of its Arab friends. Our country is prepared to join other powers, who are permanent members of the Security Council,

in providing international guarantees for a political settlement in the Middle East.

Once this is reached, we feel that there could be a consideration of further steps designed for a military détente in the whole area, in particular, for converting the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly co-operation.

Now about the Soviet Union's relations with the United States of America. An improvement of Soviet-American relations would be in the interests of the Soviet and the American peoples, the interests of stronger peace. However, we cannot pass over the US aggressive actions in various parts of the world. In the recent period, the US Administration has taken a more rigid stance on a number of international issues, including some which have a bearing on the interests of the Soviet Union. The frequent zigzags in US foreign policy, which are apparently connected with some kind of domestic political moves from short-term considerations, have also made dealings with the United States much more difficult.

We proceed from the assumption that it is possible to improve relations between the USSR and the USA. Our principled line with respect to the capitalist countries, including the USA, is consistently and fully to practise the principles of peaceful coexistence, to develop mutually advantageous ties, and to co-operate, with states prepared to do so, in strengthening peace, making our relations with them as stable as possible. But we have to consider whether we are dealing with a real desire to settle issues at the negotiation table or an attempt to conduct a "positions of strength" policy.

Whenever the imperialists need to cover up their aggressive schemes, they try to revive the "Soviet menace" myth. They seek to find evidence of this threat in the depths of the Indian Ocean and on the peaks of the Cordilleras. And, of course, nothing but Soviet divisions prepared for a leap against the West are to be discovered on the plains of Europe if these are viewed through NATO field-glasses.

But the peoples will not be deceived by the attempts to ascribe to the Soviet Union intentions which are alien to it. We declare with a full sense of responsibility: we have no territorial claims on anyone whatsoever, we threaten no one, and have no intention to attack anyone, we stand for the free and independent development of all nations. But let no one, for his part, try to talk to us in terms of ultimatums and strength.

We have everything necessary—a genuine peace policy, military might and unity of the Soviet people—to ensure the inviolability of our borders against any encroachments, and to defend the gains of socialism.

Comrades, the period under review marked the end of the quarter-century since the rout of Hitler Germany and militarist Japan. The fruits of that great victory still live in international realities today. The Soviet people cherish everything that has been attained at such great cost.

For more than 25 years now, our people have lived in peace. We regard this as the greatest achievement of our Party's foreign policy. For a quarter-century now, mankind has been safeguarded from world war. That is another historic achievement of the peoples to which the Soviet Union and its foreign policy have made a considerable contribution. However, the forces of aggression and militarism may have been pushed back, but they have not been rendered harmless. In the post-war years, they have started more than 30 wars and armed conflicts of varying scale. Nor is it possible to consider the threat of another world war as being completely eliminated. It is the vital task of all the peaceable states, of all the peoples, to prevent this threat from becoming reality.

The Soviet Union has countered the aggressive policy of imperialism with its policy of active defence of peace and strengthening of international security. The main lines of this policy are well known. Our Party, our Soviet state, in co-operation with the fraternal countries of socialism and other peace-loving states, and with the wholehearted support of many millions of people throughout the world, have now for many years been waging

a struggle on these lines, taking a stand for the cause of peace and friendship among nations. The CPSU regards the following as the basic concrete tasks of this policy in the present situation.

#### *First*

— To eliminate the hotbeds of war in South-East Asia and in the Middle East and to promote a political settlement in these areas on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of states and peoples subjected to aggression.

— To give an immediate and firm rebuff to any acts of aggression and international arbitrariness. For this full use must also be made of the possibilities of the United Nations.

— Repudiation of the threat or use of force in settling outstanding issues must become a law of international life. For its part, the Soviet Union invites the countries which accept this approach to conclude appropriate bilateral or regional treaties.

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### **Statements on the Superpowers and the Middle East Conflict Included in the Statement Delivered by the Government of Sweden in the Riksdag Foreign Affairs Debate<sup>1</sup>**

**Stockholm, March 31, 1971**

The relations between the super-Powers still hold a central position in the international picture of conflicts and tensions. These relations are characterised by a reciprocal mistrust and uncertainty about each other's intentions. Each side seems increasingly to fear that the other is striving to alter global power relationships. At the same time both the United States and the Soviet Union appear

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Swedish text of the general political section of the government statement, *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1971*, New Series 1:C:21 (Stockholm: Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1972), p. 20.

to be anxious to prevent a direct military confrontation.

In the view of both Washington and Moscow the Middle East is the part of the world where there appears to be an especially grave risk of a clash between the super-Powers. Therefore the super-Powers are trying to influence the states in the area with which they have close relations, to show enough moderation to enable there to be found a solution of the issues that have been disputed for many years. Recent developments have led to some progress in this direction. A *de facto* cease-fire still reigns along the Suez Canal. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, is still playing a central part in the efforts to implement the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

The principal parties in the conflict have declared that they accept the resolution, but there are extremely divergent views on the way in which it should be implemented. The Arab countries require, in the first instance, a total withdrawal from occupied areas. In reply to an appeal from Mr. Jarring, the United Arab Republic has undertaken in principle to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Israel emphasises the necessity of a settlement which assures it secure and recognised frontiers. Among other difficulties there is the complicated and tragic problem of the Palestine refugees, which is hard to solve.

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### **Statement by Minister of Immigration and Integration Peled of Israel on Israel's Absorption of Immigrants<sup>1</sup>**

**Late March, 1971**

In 1948 Israel had only 650,000 inhabitants, and in two years it received 235,000 im-

migrants. It is as if the United States had received 70 million immigrants in the same period. And we did not have the means that the Americans have. At that time there was the case of a Communist country, Bulgaria, whose leader, Dimitrov, decided to give his Jewish compatriots a time limit of one year to leave; at the end of this time limit 45,000 out of 50,000 Bulgarian Jews had come to Israel. Today conditions are very different and our means are much greater . . .

[Responding to the remark that there is more space with the addition of the territories occupied in 1967. . .]: I assure you that we can perfectly well absorb all the immigrants that come, within the territorial limits of before the Six Day War. Do you realize that only six or seven percent of the active population of our country are engaged in agriculture although our performance in this field is very creditable. In 1970, 44 percent of the immigrants held university degrees and 1,200 of them are engineers.

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### **U.S. Television Interview Statements by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel Expressing His Opposition to Any Withdrawal of Israeli Troops from the Suez Canal or Elsewhere and His Opposition to Any Israeli Dependence on a U.S. Guarantee<sup>2</sup>**

**Early April, 1971**

[Asked under what conditions he would

<sup>2</sup> Dayan's statements made to Mike Wallace on the Columbia Broadcasting System's television program, "Sixty Minutes" III, 15, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, filmed in Israel and broadcast on April 13, 1971; transcript provided by CBS; reprinted by permission.

Much the same points were made in Dayan's April 5 speech to the Israeli Labor Party Conference in Jerusalem (see *Le Monde*, April 7, 1971, p. 3 for excerpted French translation of Dayan's remarks). Premier Meir was also interviewed on the same "Sixty Minutes" program from which Dayan's above remarks are taken, but her statements were reiterations of Israel's insistence on borders that will guarantee peace, and are not reproduced here.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of Peled's statements to *Le Monde's* correspondent in Israel, *Le Monde*, March 27, 1971, p. 6.

agree to pull back Israeli troops from the Canal]:

*Dayan:* We are ready to discuss interim arrangements, but with the idea that this is the end of the war. Otherwise, why should we withdraw from our best line? We just feel fine there, and we are ready to withdraw on the grounds of peace—peace, cease-fire, armistice agreement, but on the ground that the war is over. Once the war is over, then military line hasn't got the same value.

*Q. General Dayan, is there no way to get the Suez Canal open now, and to start an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Desert?*

*A.* There are two different moves. There is a way and no obstacle whatsoever, to have the Suez Canal operating right away now. The Egyptians can start cleaning the canal as far as we're concerned. If they want their personnel to cross the canal in order that—the technicians—in order to work it, welcome.

*Q. Civilians?*

*A.* Civilians, anybody who has got to do with the actual opening of the Suez Canal.

*Q. You'd let them come over to the Israeli side?*

*A.* Yes, welcome, and we shall be very hospitable. But, why should we withdraw? Why should we withdraw? It is not needed, it's not a part necessary for the operating of the Suez Canal.

*Q. Why should you not withdraw?*

*A.* Because this is our best line, military line, and we are at war.

*Q. The U.S. evidently wants you to undertake that withdrawal now, General Dayan.*

*A.* Why should we do it? Not why you ask us to, but why should we do it? Would you do it? Would you ask your troops to withdraw if you know that a war is not over yet and the other party will just cross the canal and come over and have everything that they wanted to for four years and couldn't do it, and you just give it to them as a present—not even for Christmas.

*Q. General Dayan, you have said in the past*

*that given the choice between peace and Sharm el Sheikh, you'll take Sharm el Sheikh.*

*A.* Well, I could have said it in a more intelligent way, to put it this way. And actually, that's what I said. If we had to choose between peace without Sharm el Sheikh, or Sheikh without an official peace, I would rather have Sharm el Sheikh without all the documents and signatures on official peace. But, practically, without Sharm el Sheikh, it cannot be peace. It is not this sand that we want; what we want is free shipping, free navigation. If you ask me, the only way to secure it is with Israeli forces.

*Q. What about the possibility of a mixed force here at Sharm el Sheikh with Israeli soldiers as a part of that force?*

*A.* It all depends what kind of mixture. I'm for a mixture of Israeli with Israeli troops. This is a very good mixture. But whom do you want us to be mixed with? If we are the bosses and others want to sit here with us, welcome. It's not so nice in the summer-time here. But for me, the point is, nobody will have the right to tell us, "Get out of here." Let me ask you, do you really feel like American troops sitting here?

*Q. You mean—*

*A.* This is the American mood now in the United States of America to have American units sitting here and taking care of a conflict in the Middle East? And supposing the Russians, or the Egyptians, one day say—come and say, "Get out of here or we'll have war." Will you go to war with the Egyptians about that, about Sharm el Sheikh, with your one hundred or so troops here? Will you do that? You won't. You won't. Believe me, one of the things that I really, really don't want is to have any American commitment that will make the American fighting for Israel.

*Q. Why?*

*A.* Because I want your friendship and I want—you will not be friendly for us if you will have to fight for us. I would like you to sell us arms, to help us in the political field. I don't want you to fight for us, because once you will be getting killed for us, you won't like us very much. You won't like us.

*Q. Our Secretary of State, William Rogers, says that international guarantees are more important than geography.*

*A. What exactly he means by that? If you have a chance, ask him.*

*Q. I suppose what he means, I understand it to mean, that the United States will guarantee the integrity, the security of Israel, if Israel goes back to the 1967 lines with minor rectifications.*

*A. We are discussing now Sharm el Sheikh.*

*Q. All right.*

*A. We had that once before, twice. Twice before. Once guaranteed by President Eisenhower. He said, "Get out of here, and we, the Americans, will take care of it and see that the navigation is not stopped here." Well, then when it happened, we had President Johnson at that time. What can you be—have more than the sincere will of the American President to help you and to avoid a war? So what did President Johnson do in order to allow us freedom of navigation here? Absolutely nothing.*

\* \* \*

*Q. General, I think there is a feeling developing in the United States right now that Egypt is showing reason about the matter of peace, the recognition of Israel, for the first time, and that Israel is being unreasonable, stiff-necked.*

*A. Yes, so I hear, so I hear.*

*Q. Are you worried about the fact that public opinion in the United States is changing against Israel to some extent?*

*A. Yes, yes, I'm worried and I don't like it. I'm worried and I don't—I wish we could explain our case better.*

*Q. What 1967 borders are you ready to go back to?*

*A. '67?*

*Q. Yes, what '67 borders are you ready to go back to?*

*A. Well, the Lebanese one, but—no, practically none. Practically none. It's not—and again, I want you to understand me, I am explaining or stating my position—*

*Q. Right.*

*A. —not what I am ready to, but what I would like to. I would like to have major changes on all of the boundaries. When you ask me what you want to, I do want major changes. When you ask me what I'm ready to, I am ready to discuss and to compromise.*

*Q. Well, then, simple common sense indicates that war is going to come in the Middle East because the Arabs obviously, the Russians obviously, are not going to accept that position.*

*A. The question is whether they can afford another war.*

*Q. Can they?*

*A. Can they?*

*Q. President Sadat says that April is the decisive month. That a real move toward peace must be made this month—*

*A. This month.*

*Q. —or the shooting will begin again.*

*A. Well, I heard that one before.*

*Q. You don't believe in that timetable?*

*A. No, not in a timetable, not in a timetable. And I don't believe that you can tell the other party, "Unless you make peace with us within thirty days, then we're going to kill you." Now, that won't work with us. I don't think that they really believe that the Egyptian soldier can push us out. And I don't think they really believe that the Russians might come in, in big force. But they do believe that the Americans hold the key, and perhaps if they open fire, then the American Administration will put more pressure on us. That is the main reason.*

*Q. You mean because the shooting begins again, the Americans feel, let's get the shooting stopped?*

*A. Something like that, because the Americans would say, "Well they might have the Russians more deeply involved and we'll have to get in and we don't want to get involved in that." The Egyptians now think that their best weapon are the American—the American Administration. And anything that they will do now, I think, will be aimed to make you putting pressure on us.*

*Q. Do you think that there is a chance of war here in the Middle East during this year, during 19—*

*A. Yes, I do. I do.*

## 78

### **Statement by F.R.G. Chancellor Brandt Supporting U.N. Resolution 242, Rejecting the Acquisition of Territory by Force, and Denying the Likelihood of Any Direct West German Role in Bringing About a Middle East Settlement<sup>1</sup>**

Early April, 1971

The German Federal Government believes, as it has emphasized on various occasions, that an early peace settlement in the Middle East is of great importance for the whole of Europe.

It considers the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967, as the suitable basis for such a settlement. The resolution is based on the assumption that a settlement has to take into account two principles, namely, the withdrawal of all armed forces from the occupied territories, and the right of all countries in that region to live in sovereignty, independence and security.

As the Chancellor has stated on a previous occasion, we are in favour of the application of these principles. Our foreign policy follows in general the line that, in our time, force can no longer be a means to achieve territorial changes.

The German Federal Government sees but limited possibilities for itself to contribute directly to a peace settlement in the Middle East. It supports, however, all efforts which are apt to reach peace in the area. Particularly, it supports the proposals made by the United Nations special envoy, Ambassador Jarring. The German Federal Government hopes that Ambassador Jarring's efforts will soon be successful.

<sup>1</sup> English text of Brandt's comments on an interview statement by U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad, as published in *The Bulletin* (Bonn), XIX, 12 (April 6, 1971), p. 85.

As regards the resumption of diplomatic relations, the German Federal Government considers that a return to normal relations with all Arab states would be in the interests of both sides.

It does not believe, however, in tying up that resumption with any preconditions.

Good relations are only possible on the basis of mutual confidence and understanding.

## 79

### **Statement Reiterating Canadian Support for the Jarring Mission and U.N. Resolution 242, Made by Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp Before the House of Commons of Canada<sup>2</sup>**

Ottawa, April 1, 1971

...The present stage of efforts to make progress toward a lasting Middle East peace settlement involves both continuing dangers and challenging opportunities. The absence since March 7 of formal and mutual agreements to maintain the cease-fire underlines the persisting risk that hostilities might at some point be renewed unless the momentum of the current peace initiative is maintained and reinforced. But there are encouraging possibilities for such progress toward peace which I hope will be taken up and exploited by the parties.

The Government of Canada has followed with close interest the latest sequence of exchanges under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring, the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative charged with promoting a peace settlement on the basis of Resolution 242, which... was drafted with the help of Canada, which was then on the Security Council. Although Canada is not directly involved in these efforts and we are, therefore, not informed of all aspects of the exchanges, certain observations can fairly be made on the basis of development known to us.

<sup>2</sup> Text of Sharp's statement as published in *External Affairs* (Canada), XXIII, 4 (April, 1971), pp. 145-146.

I should like first to reiterate the Canadian Government's full support of Ambassador Jarring's persistent and untiring efforts to assist the parties toward a settlement based on the Security Council resolution. The House is well aware of the formidable nature of the issues to be resolved. Any expectation of rapid advance toward agreement would be illusory. But some encouragement may be drawn from the Secretary-General's report of March 5 on the course of Ambassador Jarring's mission.

In drawing attention to the intensity of recent efforts to move toward a peaceful solution, the Secretary-General noted that general agreement had been found on some of the problems to be settled. He also cited with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic on specific questions raised by Ambassador Jarring. As the House is aware, the U.A.R. response included an explicit expression of readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, subject, of course, to mutually-acceptable terms of such agreement being worked out. At the same time, the Secretary-General has appealed to the Government of Israel to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. Ambassador Jarring will doubtless seek now to elaborate progressively the terms of a peace settlement. For this he will be dependent upon goodwill and restraint by the parties in asserting what they see as their respective vital interests.

In the Canadian Government's view, the essential basis for a just and lasting peace remains available to the parties in the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. The opportunity is theirs, with Ambassador Jarring's help, to resolve within that framework all their outstanding differences. In this respect, the response of the U.A.R. Government to the questions posed by Ambassador Jarring is encouraging. We earnestly hope that the ultimate effort will be made along these lines, as a matter of urgency, to convert the present absence of hostilities into an enduring peace.

The Canadian Government's concern to see the exchanges under Ambassador Jarring proceed successfully has been emphasized

to the parties in these terms in our regular diplomatic contacts.

## 80

### **Radio Interview by Minister Without Portfolio Galili of Israel Expressing the Impossibility of Israeli Acceptance of U.A.R. President Sadat's Proposals and Voicing Israeli Willingness To Discuss an Interim Suez Settlement<sup>1</sup>**

April 2, 1971

*Q. First I would like to hear your reaction [words indistinct] of President Sadat yesterday, about an interim solution for opening the Canal, as it was published.*

*A. I have not seen it myself. [Passage indistinct.] As far as I know no such proposal has reached us through official channels or has been presented to the Israeli Government. What I shall say is my personal opinion from reading newspaper reports. I believe the proposal is absurd from the point of view of it receiving Israeli agreement. [Passage indistinct.] Israel is willing to discuss the opening of the Canal with Egypt separately from other issues, but on the basis of agreement to certain conditions which would make it possible to open the Canal. This is on condition that shooting is not resumed. [Passage indistinct] on this basis, all sorts of arrangements can be made, which I am not willing to discuss publicly at present, just as I am unwilling to discuss in public the legal implications arising from this issue. What Sadat proposed is no basis for this.*

*Q. Is it feasible that in a certain context Israel would agree to the Egyptian Army crossing the Canal and have so-called control over both banks?*

*A. Of course, under conditions of a peace agreement when we withdraw to defensible, agreed and recognised boundaries, this area*

<sup>1</sup> Galili's interview, conducted by Yonadov Navon, on Israel Forces Radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3652/A/1-A/3; reprinted by permission.

would be handed over to Egyptian sovereignty. I hope the area would be demilitarised and would not be open to a concentration of Egyptian troops, but Egypt can control the Canal from both sides.

*Q. Will the Cabinet discuss Sadat's proposal at its next session on Sunday?*

*A.* There is no reason for the Israeli Cabinet to discuss a proposal it has not received, especially as what has been published in a newspaper is no basis for a discussion with Israel. The Premier's statement in the Knesset on 9th February on behalf of the Government is still valid. The statement declares that our position on the opening of the Canal has not changed, that is, we would view favourably the opening of the Suez Canal for free navigation, including navigation by Israeli ships. We are also willing to discuss favourably proposals designed to make possible normalisation of life in the area, reduction of the military deployment in the area on a reciprocal basis, but so far no contacts on the subject have been made between Egypt and ourselves. The Premier said in her Knesset speech of 9th February that she would prefer a discussion about the opening of the Canal to be held separately from other issues without intermediaries, but there has been no progress in this matter.

*Q. Sir, what is the Israeli Government's attitude towards the possibility of an interim solution as a whole?*

*A.* The Israeli Government is willing to have a special arrangement with the Egyptian Government, separate from the peace issue, and it is willing to negotiate on this because we are interested in life in the area returning to normal. And in any case, we want an end to the war, a permanent and unlimited cease-fire, but there is no question of the Israeli Government agreeing to a special arrangement with the Egyptian Government on the basis of a withdrawal which is a stage in a total withdrawal, as part of the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

*Q. Excuse me, can it be understood from what you say that you are speaking of a special or interim settlement as being one which is unconnected with*

*Security Council resolution 242 and Dr. Jarring's mission?*

*A.* Well, that's what I said. I would not call it an interim solution. I assume we should be ready for an agreement to a special arrangement for the opening of the Canal as a separate issue from the peace agreement, a settlement between Egypt and ourselves unconnected with Jarring or the Security Council resolution, although we would not want to perpetuate the situation created by the special agreement. We shall (?maintain) a desire to (?facilitate) the talks under Jarring's auspices which are designed to reach a peace agreement on all issues. But a special agreement to enable the Canal to open does not have to be linked to the Security Council resolution, and we certainly do not regard this as a preliminary stage agreed by us before further stages of withdrawal.

*Q. It is said there is a crisis in the Jarring talks, sir. First, is the definition "crisis" correct in your opinion, and if so where do we stand now in view of this crisis?*

*A.* One can say crisis, strait, standstill, stalemate. This has been caused by the fact that envoy Jarring and the Egyptian Government demanded prior undertakings from Israel on issues to be negotiated. They demanded prior undertakings on withdrawal to the international boundary, in Jarring's version, withdrawal from Sinai and from Gaza, in the Egyptian Government's version, while we went to the Jarring talks with the express declaration that we undertake to fulfill any prior conditions for our part, we do not demand any prior conditions on their part. As long as prior conditions are demanded the talks are consequently undermined. The talks can only continue as long as neither side gives any prior undertaking.

*Q. It has been said that Israel is always saying unconditional negotiations on one hand but on the other hand the Premier and other leaders say on various occasions that Israel for example will not abandon Sharm ash-Shaykh, will not evacuate the Golan Heights, and so on. Can you explain this paradox?*

*A.* I am familiar with such contentions,



and I can reply to them with absolute clarity. This contains a statement of Israel's position in the negotiations. We make no demand on Egypt's part to give a prior agreement, on the verge of entry into negotiations, to accept Israel's position. We say this and this will be our stand during the negotiations. We understand that Egypt's position in the negotiations will be a demand from Israel to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza. That is its right. The negotiations will open and we shall discuss these matters. But on no account can we give prior undertakings [word indistinct] and we do not demand undertakings from them. Giving a prior undertaking makes negotiations superfluous and ends negotiations, it does not open them.

A distinction must therefore be made between our stand in the negotiations and a prior undertaking before negotiations. The Israeli Government, with the Knesset's approval, will not make any prior undertakings on negotiable issues and will not demand that Egypt should make prior undertakings.

*Q. Egyptian leaders, including Foreign Minister Riyad, have made conflicting statements during the week, such as Egypt will not skirt shooting and there is no way of avoiding war with Israel. What is the situation, in your opinion? Do we face the possibility of a resumption of the war on the Egyptian initiative?*

*A.* What I have said about what you call the Sadat proposals is my personal opinion, and what I shall say in reply to your question is also my own opinion. I personally am convinced that Israel will take the possibility seriously of resuming the shooting, that is, a resumption of the war on the Egyptian initiative. This is the only way I can interpret the preparations being made on the other side of the Canal and the stream of arms which Egypt has been receiving during the past two weeks from the USSR. We would do well to take this preparation seriously and take no notice of propaganda and misleading statements by the other side.

*Q. With your permission I should like to pass on to another subject: Could you evaluate the Middle East passage in the speech of the First Secretary of the*

*Soviet Communist Party at the 24th Congress—Brezhnev's speech?*<sup>1</sup>

*A.* I believe the Middle East passage in Brezhnev's speech shows that the USSR continues to identify with Egypt and its policies and moves. This time the speech is distinguished by the sagacity of its definitions and proposals. For example he says, and I quote, our country has permitted a renewal of the defensive potential of the Arab countries who fell victim to the invasion, especially Egypt and Syria, with whom we have links of co-operation which become stronger every year. This is an attempt to portray Egypt as the victim of an invasion, as the victim of Israeli aggression, in such a way as to illustrate the Soviet effort as restoring the military potential of the victim of the invasion. This is a continuation of the identification with the militant trends in Egypt and, what is even more important, while making this speech, before it and after it, the shipment of modern equipment to Egypt continues.

I do not know what the USSR is whispering in the ears of the Egyptian rulers about present political moves, but there is no doubt that it is persuading the Egyptian leadership that the Egyptians can trust the Soviets. This is the thing that ought to put both us and all freedom-loving nations on the alert.

*Q. Finally, Sir, I would ask you, if you will, to give an estimate of what your expectations are concerning moves in the near future, in the next few weeks.*

*A.* In my opinion in the next few weeks attempts will be made to persuade Israel to contribute something without defining exactly what the contribution is to be. But this is the sort of contribution of obligations to withdraw or moves which will give strategic advantages to Egypt, and Israel must continue its struggle to persuade the political elements that we are willing to pay—seriously willing, willing to withdraw from the cease-fire line back to defensible boundaries which will be agreed and recognised, but these must be boundaries which can be defended with our own forces. We do not agree with the theory that under modern conditions of warfare

<sup>1</sup> See Document 74 above.

there is no value in territorial factors, and we are not willing, in the light of our 20 years' experience, to rely on guarantees or police forces. [Words indistinct] the dispute between the United States and ourselves concentrated on the fact that we must persuade it that peace entails a change in the international boundary, and the plans formulated by the US Secretary of State in October and September 1968 as a basis of peace cannot satisfy Israel.

## 81

**Comments on the Possibility of an Interim Suez Settlement, on Israel's Rejection of International Guarantees and on Israel's Determination To Retain Jerusalem, Made in a Speech to a Labor Party Congress by Premier Meir of Israel<sup>1</sup>**

Jerusalem, April 4, 1971

....We are in favor of the Suez Canal being opened to free navigation and we are ready to discuss it. But does President Sadat think that this can be done while Egypt is threatening a resumption of hostilities? The Egyptian plan must be regarded as a maneuver aimed at exerting pressure on Israel to make her accept the Egyptian and Soviet concept of a political settlement.

[On sure and defensible borders]: Our position is determined by our past experience. Moreover, international guarantees and the stationing of foreign forces between Israel and her neighbors would erect a wall between them. We do not want a peace resulting from new barriers—we want a peace by agreement. We want a real peace, which means close relations and cooperation between our neighbors and ourselves.

[Defending a clarified position]: It is not true that the world does not know how we envisage the essential requirements of Israel's security in the territorial field.

The capital of the state of Israel will remain united and will never again be divided. But suitable arrangements will be made to safeguard the religious and universal status of the Christian and Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and to allow free access by the faithful of all religions. We are ready to conclude agreements on this matter with the Islamic and Christian religious authorities.

[Expressing "surprise" at certain attitudes adopted by the Vatican]: For nineteen years the world kept silent while "East" Jerusalem was under Jordanian control, while the Jewish inhabitants were killed and Jews were refused access to their holy places. Why then is so much fuss being made today now that Jerusalem, under Israeli control, is open to all religions? Is it because Jerusalem is now in Jewish hands?

[Defining the Israeli position as regards her territorial claims]:

1. The Jordan is Israel's security frontier; that is to say, no Arab military forces will be allowed to cross it going toward the Mediterranean. Political frontiers between Israel and Jordan are subject to negotiation.

2. The Golan Heights and Gaza will remain under Israeli control.

3. The Sharm el-Sheikh area, which will remain under Israeli control, will be linked to the territory of Israel by a territorial strip whose width will depend on the requirements of its defense.

Palestine is a country that stretched from the Mediterranean to the borders of Iraq. In this country there were two peoples, Arabs and Jews. In 1948 these peoples became Jordanians and Israelis. There can never be any question of creating a third state between them. When we demarcate the frontier between us and Jordan, the inhabitants of that country will be free to call themselves Palestinians if they so wish.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the excerpted French translation of Meir's speech, *Le Monde*, April 6, 1971, p. 8.

**Statements on the Role of the United Nations in Reaching a Settlement in the Middle East and British Willingness To Participate in a U.N. Peace Keeping Force in the Area, Included in a Speech Given by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home<sup>1</sup>**

**Loughborough, April 4, 1971**

There is today one challenge, in particular, which contains a tantalising opportunity for the United Nations both in peacemaking and peacekeeping.

The United Nations has, from its foundation, been closely involved in the problem of the Arab-Israel conflict.

It is not simply the interests of the countries of the region which are at stake; the international community as a whole, and, in particular, the major powers are closely concerned. There is no doubt that after all the history of Middle East conflict and the absence of trust between Israel and the Arabs, that the United Nations and its charter provide the best available framework within which to seek a just and lasting settlement.

The main achievement of the United Nations since the fighting in 1967 has been the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 242.

This is still the only basis for a settlement which has been generally agreed by the parties themselves and by the vast majority of the membership. This was an example of the Security Council at its best. Britain played a leading part in negotiating that resolution.

Since its adoption we have fully supported the patient efforts of the Secretary-General's special representative, Dr. Jarring, to promote agreement between the parties in accordance with its provisions.

In the meetings of the four permanent members of the Security Council in New York, we have also been engaged in the search for means to reinforce Dr. Jarring's efforts.

In all this we have had very much in mind the contribution the United Nations could make towards under-pinning, in its initial period, any peace settlement reached between the parties.

It is fundamental that the parties must by one method or another agree between themselves on the issues in dispute. Only such an agreement can lay the foundations for true peace and stability in the region. For example, without agreement between the parties on frontiers, there is nothing tangible and stable for others to guarantee.

In the Middle East, given the mutual suspicion and hostility of the last twenty-five years, there are bound to be difficulties in the early years following a settlement.

It is here that the international community has a part to play in helping to create the conditions of confidence which are essential to a peace which will hold.

We believe that a United Nations peace-keeping force, rightly constituted, could provide that essential sense of security for both sides. Such a force could have several roles.

It should almost certainly be responsible for protecting the regime of the demilitarised zones which would be established by the settlement, and observing any attempts to violate that regime.

But a force could also provide a reliable deterrent to potential military action in specific areas which past experience has shown to be especially sensitive. We should profit from the mistakes of the past. A future peacekeeping force in the Middle East must not be withdrawn, except through a positive resolution of the Security Council. That would mean that each of the permanent members would have to agree.

Britain would be prepared to consider participating in a United Nations peace-keeping operation of this kind in the Middle East in whatever way seemed appropriate at the time.

The United States and French governments have also indicated their willingness

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted advance text of Douglas-Home's speech at a United Nations Association lunch, London Press Service, Verbatim Service 104/71, April 2, 1971; provided, on request, by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.

to contribute to such an operation. It is for the Russians to say what they would do. They must, of course, themselves decide what kind of guarantees they would require and support. It may be that, with the agreements they will reach among themselves, the need for external guarantees will be reduced to a minimum. But a force composed of powerful countries, willing to contribute to the security of all the countries in the area, could give the confidence which is so often absent from bilateral settlements—at least in the early stages.

It is by its handling of issues such as this that the United Nations will be judged. It is our hope that a success in the Middle East would in some measure dispel the disillusion that has become so noticeable in New York, and that it could stimulate the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to tackle other dangerous situations in a manner that would fulfil the hopes of San Francisco and the aspirations of the Charter.

It is the role of this association to foster public understanding of those aspirations. Every time the reality of what can be done in New York falls short of them, your task is made more difficult. And so it is for the sake of the United Nations Association's work that we must all hope this morning for a breakthrough. If it comes, and if the seed of a Middle Eastern peace can be made to germinate in New York, I know that you will not miss the opportunities which that will mean for you.

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**Statements by U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Fulbright Urging Positive U.N. Action, Including Sanctions If Necessary, To Bring About a Settlement in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**New Haven, Connecticut, April 4, 1971**

In the Middle East there is a chance—though probably only a small one—that Americans, Russians and others may actually come together to facilitate a settlement through the procedures of the United Nations. It need not be an 'imposed' settlement—although I myself am not as shocked by that term as are some of my Senate colleagues, inasmuch as the United Nations Charter, to which we are a party by act of the Senate in 1945, provides quite explicitly for certain kinds of 'imposed' settlements.

Be that as it may, Secretary Rogers, it seems to me, is pursuing an intelligent policy of encouraging a voluntary agreement between Arabs and Israelis, which he would then have enforced by a United Nations peace force in which both Russians and Americans might participate.

For reasons which may warrant our sympathy, but not our support, Israel pursues a policy of antiquated—and to a great degree delusional—self reliance. As Foreign Minister Eban expressed it, 'a nation must be capable of tenacious solitude'. In fact, neither Israel nor any other nation is capable of so profound an isolation in our time. Israel is heavily dependent on the United States for both arms and economic assistance. Only last December Congress appropriated a half billion dollars for military assistance to Israel. Since 1948 the United States Government has provided \$1.4 billion in direct economic assistance to Israel; this does not include military aid. Since 1948 private American citizens have provided another \$3 billion in tax-deductible

<sup>1</sup> Excerpt on the Middle East from Fulbright's address before the Political Union of Yale University, as published in *Middle East International*, I, 3 (June, 1971), pp. 7-9.

contributions and regularly purchase between \$3 and \$400 million a year in Israeli bonds. Included in the massive American military aid, which has increased greatly since the 1967 war, have been aircraft, missiles and electronic systems more advanced than those provided to the countries with whom we are allied in NATO or SEATO. I do not see how this can be reconciled with a policy on Israel's part of 'tenacious solitude'.

Even more important than Israel's dependency upon us is the fact that we ourselves have a crucial stake in the Middle East—the avoidance of conflict with the Soviet Union. It takes no great feat of imagination to conjure up some new Arab-Israeli crisis in which the two sides managed to draw their respective patrons into a head-on conflict. Premier Meir says that we ought not to press for Israeli withdrawal from the conquered Arab territories because, as she puts it, 'This is not the border of the USA. . . .' If indeed that were the whole of the matter, if Israel, as the Premier says, really were prepared to 'stand up for itself' without involving others, it might make sense to let the Arabs and Israelis work out their differences, or fight them out, and come to their own solution.

We all know, however, that that is not the case, that American interests of the most crucial nature are involved, that another war in the Middle East might well set us against the Russians, and that, therefore, we have not only the right, but a positive responsibility, to bring an influence to bear.

Israel has a different conception of American interests in the Middle East, an essentially cold war conception. Picturing herself as the bastion of democracy in the Middle East, Israel professes to be defending American interests by holding the line against a surging tide of communist imperialism. Indeed, I recall a television interview last fall in which Foreign Minister Eban professed to believe that the Russians were not interested in destroying Israel but were motivated by a desire to expel American power and influence from the Middle East.

Recent visitors to the Middle East assure me that the Israelis are quite sincere in their fear of being 'thrown into the sea' and in their

conception of the Soviet Union as an insatiable imperialist power, bent, presumably, upon the conquest and communization of the Middle East. Nonetheless, I perceive in this some of the same old communistbaiting humbuggery that certain other small countries have used to manipulate the United States for their own purposes.

When it comes to anti-communism, as we have noted in Vietnam and elsewhere, the United States is highly susceptible, rather like a drug addict, and the world is full of ideological 'pushers'. It is a fine thing to respect a small country's independence and to abstain from interference in its internal affairs. It is quite another matter when, in the name of these worthy principles—but really because of our continuing obsession with communism—we permit client states like Israel and South Vietnam to manipulate American policy toward purposes contrary to our interests, and probably to theirs as well.

This is not to suggest that the Russians are lacking in ambitions in the Middle East. There is no doubt that they desire to maximize their 'influence' in the Arab world and that they derive gratification from sailing their warships around the Mediterranean. This, however, is normal behaviour for a great power; it is quite similar to our own. We too keep a fleet in the Mediterranean, which is a good deal farther from our shores than it is from the Soviet Union; and our main objection to Soviet 'influence' in the Arab countries is that it detracts from our own.

Were it not for the fact that they are Communists—and therefore 'bad' people—while we are Americans—and therefore 'good' people—our policies would be nearly indistinguishable.

Despite the inflexibility of the Israelis and the great power rivalry of the Russians and Americans, it appears to me the situation in the Middle East provides as promising an opportunity as ever we have had to resolve a major international controversy through the procedures of the United Nations, and, in so doing, to create a valuable precedent for the future.

The primary, essential factor is the apparent recognition by both the Soviet Union and the

United States that they have a surpassing interest in the avoidance of a major confrontation with each other. The Russians, for their part, have consistently counselled their Arab associates against reckless action; they are reported, for instance, to have warned the Egyptians that they would not support a military operation across the Suez Canal. Nor have the Russians ever indicated any expectation of, or desire for, the destruction of Israel; they were indeed among the first to recognize the state of Israel when it came into existence in 1948.

The Soviet position now is that Israel should return to the borders of 1967; that is substantially our position as well, and it is consistent with the Security Council Resolution of November 1967, which calls among other things for the 'termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area'.

Another promising factor has been the remarkable evolution of Arab attitudes. The Jordanians have long been known to be willing to come to terms with Israel—to end the state of war and recognize Israel's existence as a state in return for the restoration of occupied territory. The United Arab Republic, in its reply of February 6, 1971, to questions put by Ambassador Jarring states unequivocally that, if Israel would withdraw from occupied Egyptian territory, Egypt would be prepared to end the state of belligerency, ensure freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, establish demilitarized zones, agree to the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force, and 'enter into a peace agreement with Israel....'

The Egyptian reply concedes to Israel all that she once desired, all that she claimed to be struggling for in three wars. None the less in its own reply to Ambassador Jarring of February 26, 1971, the Israeli Government stated bluntly that 'Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines'. Israel, Mrs Meir subsequently explained, insists upon the retention with her own forces of Sharm el

Sheikh; the Gaza strip; the Golan Heights—because, as the Premier explained, 'We paid for it'; Jerusalem of course; and certain undefined parts of the West Bank.

In addition, said the Premier, Sinai must be demilitarized, and the demilitarization must be guaranteed by a mixed force including Israelis. The Egyptians too might participate in this force on their own territory. All this, Mrs. Meir conceded, would be painful for President Sadat of Egypt, but people must pay for their deeds.

A different view is taken by Israel's wise elder statesman and first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. 'Peace', he said recently, 'real peace, is now the great necessity for us. It is worth almost any sacrifice. To get it, we must return to the borders before 1967'. 'As for security,' Mr Ben-Gurion continued, 'militarily defensible borders, cannot by themselves guarantee our future. Real peace with our Arab neighbours—mutual trust and friendship—that is the only true security.'

Mr Ben-Gurion's outlook is substantially that of Secretary Rogers, whose basic position, reiterated many times since, was expressed in a speech in December 1969 in which he stated, as to the Arab-Israeli borders in the wake of the 1967 war, that '...any changes in the pre-existing lines should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security.' Secretary Rogers has also been a consistent supporter of the Security Council Resolution of November 1967, which emphasizes 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war....' In recent weeks the Secretary has spelled out a position calling as well for American participation in a United Nations peacekeeping force, which could not be removed by anybody's unilateral decision.

The principles—and opportunities—involved in this Middle East situation go beyond the fears and ambitions of Israel and the Arab states and their great power mentors. I perceive here an opportunity to breathe life and force into the United Nations by putting it to effective use for the purpose for which it was founded. We have an opportunity to take a single substantive step in the direction of a new kind of politics in the

world, toward the purposes spelled out in the Charter itself, 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . .'

To accomplish this purpose, I would not shrink from applying certain sanctions as a last resort for the preservation of peace. The United Nations Charter, to which every nation involved in the Middle East has voluntarily subscribed, spells out a graduated series of sanctions, from economic to military, for the enforcement of peace. It makes no sense at all for us to shrink in horror at the very notion of an 'imposed' solution, not only because we are legally bound by the Charter to accept certain kinds of 'imposed' solutions, but because the absolute sovereignty of nations is an outmoded principle; it is indeed a principle of international anarchy. No community can function without some capacity for coercion; as President Wilson said of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 'Armed force is the background . . . if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall.' The crucial distinction is not between coercion and voluntarism, but between duly constituted force, applied through law and as a last resort, and the arbitrary coercion of the weak by the strong.

The Middle East may provide us with the best opportunity since World War II to make use of the peace-keeping procedures of the United Nations in approximately the manner envisaged by the framers and, in so doing, to create a valuable precedent for the future. I regret that no such prospect is in sight for Indochina, but I would not pass up the opportunity in the Middle East for the sake of a baneful consistency. Perhaps, if the war in Indochina ever does end, as presumably it will, we will have the wisdom in any future 'Vietnams' to make it clear at the outset that we will readily act in co-operation with other nations to implement decisions of the United Nations, but that we will not again attempt to substitute ourselves for it. Through positive acts of abstention we shall have to make it clear that we are not longer interested in the imperial dream of a Pax Americana, that indeed we are neither isolationists nor imperialists, but internationalists in the only

sense in which that term makes either moral or political sense

#### 84

### **Statement "For a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East" Issued by the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, April 8, 1971**

We who represent 14 million Soviet Communists, expressing the will of the peoples of the Soviet Union, strongly condemn Israel's imperialist aggression against the Arab states conducted with US imperialist support and declare our fraternal solidarity with the courageous struggle of the Arab peoples for the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression, for the triumph of the ideals of freedom, independence and social justice.

The struggle of the peace-loving forces against the Israeli aggression has now entered a phase in which the expansionist aspirations of Israel's ruling group and Zionist circles have been fully exposed. The international isolation of the Israeli aggressors and their patrons, the US imperialist circles hypocritically declaring their wish for peace but, in effect, encouraging the Israeli extremists, is becoming greater.

The constructive stand of the Arab countries, primarily that of the United Arab Republic, provides favourable conditions for the full implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

The persistent refusal of the Israeli rulers to withdraw their troops from captured Arab territories is an open challenge to world public opinion and the decisions of the United Nations.

Therefore, it is the duty of all peace-loving forces to concert efforts in bridling the Israeli

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, April 9, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 16 (April 17, 1971), p. 1.

aggressors, force them to respect the universally accepted standards of international life and the legitimate rights of the Arab states, and to withdraw their troops from captured Arab territories.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU expresses its firm conviction that the attempts of the imperialists and their henchmen to impose their diktat on the peoples of the Arab countries, subvert the progressive regimes in the Middle East and defeat the national-liberation movement in that part of the world, are doomed to failure. The legitimate rights and interests of all Arab peoples, including that of Palestine, will triumph. The Israeli aggressors will be compelled to get out of the Arab territories seized by them in 1967. The guarantee of this is in the unbending will of the Arab peoples, their striving for independence, freedom, peace and social progress, their close alliance with the peoples of the Soviet Union and those of the other socialist countries, with all anti-imperialist, peace-loving forces.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU declares that, acting undeviatingly on the Leninist policy of international peace and friendship, the Soviet Union will continue consistently to support the just cause of the Arab peoples who suffered from Israeli aggression, to support their efforts at regaining their violated rights, to secure a fair political settlement in the Middle East, and to protect the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

We call on all fraternal Parties, on all peaceloving peoples and states to redouble their solidarity with the peoples of the Arab countries and to render them active support in their struggle.

For united action by all forces opposing imperialist aggression, for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East!

Long live the inviolable Soviet-Arab friendship! May it go from strength to strength!

85

# **Statements Expressing Rumanian Attitudes Towards the Use of Force in International Relations and Supporting U.N. Resolution 242 As a Basis for a Middle East Settlement, Made by Foreign Minister Manescu of Rumania<sup>1</sup>**

Bucharest, April 8, 1971

The development of postwar inter-state relations provides cogent proof that every violation or transgression of the precepts of international law is inevitably followed by negative phenomena, creates new sources of tension and animosity, and endangers the peace and security of the peoples of the world. Similarly the elimination of the foci of tension, the reestablishment of peace and the normalization of relations among conflicting parties require the restoration of legality.

Particularly dangerous for humanity are acts of armed aggression, of the use of force aimed at destroying the right of peoples to follow the course of political and social development they have chosen, the oppression of peoples under colonial domination, and brutal interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Rumania constantly opposes all manifestations of the policy of force, of *diktat* or pressure, of the violation of the standards of international law. While supporting the just cause of the Vietnamese people and of the other peoples of Indochina, the Party and our government declare themselves in favor of ending the war in that part of the world and of the immediate withdrawal of all American troops and those of their allies, so that the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian peoples may decide their own future without any outside interference.

At the same time, our country gives its full

<sup>1</sup> Translated and excerpted from the French translation of Manescu's address before the opening session of the Association of International Law and International Relations as published in *Revue roumaine d'études internationales*, V, 2 (12) (Bucarest: Association de droit international et de relations internationales de la République Socialiste de Roumanie, 1971), p. 10.



support to national liberation movements, to the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, against the policy and practice of racial discrimination. It maintains and develops at many levels relations in collaboration with young states, regards with sympathy and supports their efforts to strengthen their independence, to realize democratic changes and to ensure their economic and social emancipation.

In conformity with its policy of promoting peace and of finding political solutions for differences and conflicts among states, Rumania declares itself in favor of the solution of the Middle East conflict in conformity with the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. This involves the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, respect for the territorial integrity and independence of all the states in this area, and the solution to the problem of the Palestinian population in accordance with their national aspirations.

## 86

### **Mandate for Continued Soviet Support for the Arabs in the Middle East Conflict, in the Resolution on the Report of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Adopted by the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the C.P.S.U.<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, April 9, 1971**

The Congress, approving the policy of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the Soviet government in the Near East, instructs them to continue to pursue a line aimed at all-round support of the Arab peoples who have been

subjected to Israeli aggression, which is encouraged by American imperialism, and at the development of close cooperation with the progressive Arab states. The Soviet Union will strive a just political settlement in this area, which presupposes the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the seized territories, the implementation of the right of every state to an independent existence, and the satisfaction of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

## 87

### **Statement by Pope Paul VI Assuring the Christians of Palestine of the Moral and Material Support of the Christian World<sup>2</sup>**

**Rome, April 9, 1971**

Today we must look with affection in our hearts to the Christian community of this Holy Land, already so sorely tried in the course of history, these our Brothers, who live where Jesus lived, and who, surrounded by the Holy Places, are the successors of that ancient and very first Church, from which all the other churches take their origin. We wish to salute them and assure them of our affection and of the sympathy of Christians throughout the world.

These our brothers continue to be in need, as never before, of our spiritual, moral and material support. The help which the Christian world has never left wanting to the brethren in Jerusalem and in Palestine, does not serve merely to maintain the actual buildings which record the great mysteries of the Redemption, but also the religious and social works necessary to maintain the life of the community.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Russian text (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, April 10, 1971) of the C.P.S.U. Resolution, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 17 (May 25, 1971), p. 23. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted English text of Pope Paul's Good Friday comments as published in *New Middle East*, No. 34 (July 1971), p. 19.

## 88

**Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of Meetings Held Between Representatives of the National Liberation Front of Algeria and a Delegation of the United Socialist Party of France (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Algiers, April 14, 1971

The two delegations, in agreement with the representatives of the Palestine Resistance, affirm their support for the struggle in which the Palestinian people are engaged to recover their independence, which support is based on the following objective principles:

The Palestine Resistance and the unified command it has formed are alone competent to determine the forms and methods of struggle. The desired goal is the liberation of the whole of Palestine, the destruction of all the racist structures of the Zionist state and the building of a democratic state for all the inhabitants of Palestine without discrimination as regards race or religion.

At a time when the imperialist and colonialist campaign is spreading on both shores of the Mediterranean, all the progressive and anti-colonialist forces in the Mediterranean without exception must reply to it. This reply must take the form of urgent common measures to ensure the Palestine Resistance the support of the popular masses on both the northern and the southern coasts of the Mediterranean. With this end in view, the representatives of the National Liberation Front and the United Socialist Party, with the approval of the representatives of the Palestine Resistance, propose that there should be held as soon as possible a second session of the Conference of the Progressive Parties of the Mediterranean Basin, as a continuation of the conference held in Rome in 1968.

The object of this session would be to study the situation in the Mediterranean, and in particular to consider means of providing real support to the struggle of the Palestinian people.

The two Parties and the representatives of the Palestine Resistance will contact all those who attended the first Conference of the Mediterranean Basin, with a view to considering the best way of convening this conference and the possibility of forming a preparatory committee as soon as possible. The two Parties consider that the desire to exert influence and pressure in the Mediterranean is clearly revealed by the presence of imperialist forces in the area, which presence is prejudicial to the higher interests of the peoples of the Mediterranean.

The two Parties undertake to redouble their efforts to make the Mediterranean a sea of peace, by contacting other progressive parties.

Within this framework the two Parties condemn the presence of fleets and military bases in the Mediterranean and regard the Atlantic Pact as a hostile alliance employed by imperialism to consolidate its influence and to continue its aggressions in this area.

The two Parties consider that the present situation makes it essential to assemble the world revolutionary forces so as to coordinate their activities and unify their strategy.

For this goal to be attained it is necessary to reject all attempts to impose a solution which does not take into account the basic rights of the Palestinian people, as was the case with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which was rejected by the National Liberation Front, and is also the case with the Rogers Plan and Jarring's attempts, and with all so-called peaceful and democratic attempts, whose sole object is to sacrifice the sacred rights of the Palestinian people and the revolution of the Arab people for the sake of peaceful coexistence between the great powers.

The aim of the imperialist campaign which is developing in the Middle East is to eliminate the armed revolutionary force constituted by the Palestine Resistance. It became clear that Israel was inadequate for the achievement of this end, so that it was found necessary to find those in the Arab regimes who would join them in annihilating the Palestinian people. Hussein agreed to play this role in Jordan, and the role he is playing must be

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué as published in *al-Mujahid* (Algiers), No. 556 (April 18, 1971), p. 4.

exposed to the whole world. In view of this situation some people are trying to revive worn-out frameworks like the World Peace Council or the Afro-Asian Conference which were indeed useful in the past but are now completely ineffective.

Thus a conference is to meet in Rome in the near future with the declared intention of achieving peace in the Middle East on the basis of the November 22 resolution and the Rogers Plan through negotiation with Israel, so that some parts of the Arab territory may be returned in return for recognition of the *fait accompli* imposed by the Zionist presence and the abandonment of the basic rights of the Palestinian people.

It is not strange that the organizers of such a meeting should completely ignore the views of those who do not accept the policy of surrender.

The National Liberation Front and the United Socialist Party declare that they will neither agree to the holding of nor attend such a meeting, which is doomed to failure.

## 89

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Numairi of the Sudan (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, April 16, 1971**

Major-General Gaffar Mohamed Nimeiri, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union from April 14 to April 16, 1971.

The Soviet Side, stressing that the Sudan adheres to realistic positions on the question of a Middle East settlement, supports the UAR

position in this matter, once again confirmed that the Soviet Union would continue to come out firmly and consistently for a political settlement and the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East on the basis of the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution which envisages the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories. The Soviet Union has rendered, and will continue to render, support and assistance to the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, in their just struggle for eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression and the restoration of their legitimate rights.

## 90

### **Statements on the Necessity for Israel To Retain Permanent Control of the Golan Heights, Sharm el-Sheikh, and the West Bank, Made by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel to the Tel Aviv Journalists' Association<sup>2</sup>**

**Tel Aviv, April 18, 1971**

*Dayan:* After the six-day war, I believed and I still believe that we must try—and we have a chance of success—to create a new map and other new relationships with our neighbours—I mean our neighbours the residents and our neighbours the Arab countries. A new map and new relationship.

Naturally, there are two partners in this—they and us—and we must effect those parts of the settlement which depend on us from the outset. I know that now there is much talk, and certainly I, if questioned, will have to touch upon the matter of the partial settlement. But, gentlemen, in all areas, if we want to make new arrangements, we must effect parts of these settlements,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, April 17, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 17 (April 24, 1971), pp. 2, 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> Dayan's statements broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3662/A/16-A/17; reprinted by permission.

daily and hourly. And in truth, some of these things are being done—although, as in every sphere, perhaps not at the desired speed, and not in full or with maximum energy.

Nevertheless, the list is not a disappointing one. We want the Golan to remain permanently ours. We must effect those parts we can of the settlement which pertain to the Golan on the basis of the Golan being part of the State of Israel. Firstly, agricultural settlement and development.

And in the West Bank we want—at least, I believe the majority of the Jewish population of Israel wants—Jews and Israelis to have the right to live there anywhere, visit anywhere, and not be strangers in the West Bank, and we want to ensure that the line—the defence line, the security line—is identical with the river Jordan, follows along the Jordan. And we are doing so. There are three central things from which we must compile those parts of the settlement which are in our hands. These are: settlement on the land, defence, and the network of relations between the Arabs and ourselves.

And in the Gaza Strip we have two parts: The refugee issue; and the Gaza Strip as a region which must be dealt with in agriculture, in services provided by the State, in security. But actually, the main question in the Gaza Strip is the refugee question, and we have only just begun to deal with this. But I believe that a way is coming to light, showing that we are capable of settling this problem.

Thank God, thank God and thank the Israeli Defence Forces, we have Sharm ash-Shaykh. Because in Sharm ash-Shaykh—in those parts of the settlement which we can effect by ourselves, we can ensure that there are civilian elements there, but mainly and primarily, we can exercise our control over these Straits, with all those elements which constitute military domination. Control is control.

*Q. Does the new federation constitute a brake on a partial settlement or a peace settlement with the Egyptians?*

*A.* The federation, or pre-federation, does have a significance. The formal basis for it had even been laid by Abd an-Nasir in his day. It is nothing new, but one should not

ignore the fact that this trio contains two very great extremists—Syria and Libya. Syria has been extremist in all its regimes, and Libya is extremist in its sole ruler, Qadhafi. He has now become in the Arab world even a fanatic—not even an extremist. And in fact, there were some very sharp exchanges between Abd an-Nasir and him about resuming fighting against Israel.

In any case, I do not suggest that their declaration of the establishment of this pre-federation is regarded as the expiry of the possibility of any kind of settlement, and a partial settlement in particular.

*[The Defence Minister was asked whether he rejected withdrawal in any circumstances from the Suez Canal, even if it was only withdrawal a few kilometres eastwards.]*

*A.* I made a distinction between the Jordan line and the Suez Canal because I do not see the Suez Canal as the permanent border of the State of Israel. In any case, I do not regard it as a permanent border. I do not believe this border demands the description “forbidden for withdrawal”, but I would not propose that Israel withdraw from it as long as the war exists, or as long as it is not promised that it will not be resumed.

## 91

### **Declaration Issued by a Preparatory Meeting of the International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East, Calling for a Conference To Discuss a Peaceful Settlement in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**Rome, April 20, 1971**

The situation in the Middle East continues to deteriorate. There is a real danger of a renewed outbreak of fighting, and one that would not be restricted to this area, but could spread into a yet graver, and even worldwide conflict.

The result of negotiations so far is virtual

<sup>1</sup> English text for sponsors of the declaration issued by the International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East, provided by the working committee.

deadlock. The peoples of the world cannot be expected indefinitely to accept that occupation of territories by force, as the territory of Arab States has been occupied by Israeli forces since 1967, should remain a "fait accompli" against every principle of international law.

It is for this reason that it is proposed to call an International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East in which participation will be invited from all those who are interested in discussing the possibilities of a settlement by peaceful means: notably, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories they have occupied since the 1967 war; the full implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967, and the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 4th, 1970, in all their terms as a first step towards the security and independence of all the states and the peoples of the region; the full implementation of the just rights of the Palestinian people; possible guarantees for a lasting settlement to ensure the benefit and existence of all.

Whether a settlement along those lines is or is not adequate to sustain peace in the long run is a matter subject to argument, but the immediate problem is to prevent further hostilities.

The views of many differ in respect to priorities on these questions. A discussion and confrontation of views can only strengthen pressures towards a just settlement in the Middle East.

## 92

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, April 21, 1971**

At the invitation of the Soviet Government, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the United Arab

Republic, visited Moscow April 15–20, 1971.

Alexei Kosygin, the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., welcomed Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and during their meeting they discussed a large number of questions of concern to the two countries: first and foremost the struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli-imperialist aggression.

Mr. Mahmoud Riad also had talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and with other Soviet officials.

During the talks, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, there was discussion of questions related to bilateral relations and of urgent international problems. The talks revealed complete identity of viewpoints on all the questions that were discussed: first and foremost of which was the problem of Israeli aggression against the Arab states.

It was reaffirmed that there can be no just and permanent peace in the Middle East except on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the resolutions of the Security Council adopted on November 22, 1967, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967 and the recovery by the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights.

Attention was drawn to the constructive policy pursued by the United Arab Republic as regards the question of a political settlement, which policy enjoys the support and recognition of all peace-loving states and of world public opinion, and creates circumstances favorable to the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East. It was also pointed out that the positive reply to the memorandum submitted by the United Nations special envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Jarring, on February 8, was an important reaffirmation of the realistic attitude of the United Arab Republic to a Middle East settlement and of its endeavors to speed up the restoration of the situation in the Middle East to normal.

In spite of this, however, the government of Israel, with the support of the United States of America, is obstinately persisting in its aggressive policy and refusing to with-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), April 22, 1971.

draw its forces from the Arab territories it occupied following June 5, 1967, as was again reflected in its negative attitude to Ambassador Jarring's latest proposals. The obstructive policy pursued by Israel constitutes a crude challenge to all peace-loving states and the whole of world public opinion, and a threat to international peace and security.

The two parties agreed on common future steps to restore the situation to normal and to consolidate peace and security in the Middle East.

The two parties again drew attention to the great importance of regular contacts and consultations between the Soviet government and the government of the United Arab Republic on questions that concern them and affirmed their readiness to carry out such contacts and consultations in the future.

The two parties believe that the exchange of views that took place in Moscow during Mr. Mahmoud Riad's visit constitutes an important contribution to the expansion and consolidation of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United Arab Republic and to their joint struggle to reach a political solution of the Middle East conflict as soon as possible and to establish a just and solid peace in the Middle East and to ensure peace throughout the world.

## 93

**Statements Calling for U.S. Abandonment of the Rogers Plan and of Proposals for an Interim Suez Settlement and Blaming the Soviet Union for the Middle East Conflict, Made in a Foreign Policy Speech by U.S. Senator Jackson<sup>1</sup>**

**Boston, April 22, 1971**

In April 1967, two months before the Six Day War in the Middle East, Leonid Brezhnev told an audience of European Communists that "there is no justification whatever for the constant presence of the U.S. fleet in waters washing the shores of Southern Europe. . . . The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean."

There is today little doubt that the continuing and accelerating Soviet penetration of the Middle East is an important expression of that demand. And those of us who are concerned about the security of Western Europe must, of necessity, concern ourselves with the clear threat to NATO that arises from the deepening involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Russian interest in the Middle East as a means of affecting her relations with Europe has a long history, dating back to Catherine the Great in 1788. The persistence of this interest was dramatically evident both before and during the Potsdam Conference when Stalin and Molotov attempted to secure Soviet

<sup>1</sup> Text of the Middle East section of Jackson's speech, "A Perspective on American Foreign Policy," made to the World Affairs Council of Boston, as inserted by U.S. Senator Magnuson into the *Congressional Record*, April 29, 1971, pp. 12766-12767.

Senator Jackson made other statements of his views on the Middle East situation on the floor of the Senate on March 23 (see *Congressional Record*, March 23, 1971, pp. 7353-7354), to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on March 5, 1971 (see *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1971, pp. 5348-5349), and on the Columbia Broadcasting System's television and radio interview program "Face the Nation" on March 7, 1971.

trusteeship over one of the former Italian colonies, preferably Libya. As reported in the official records, Secretary of State Byrnes felt that, "the Soviet foray into a region so close to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf shook up Churchill more than any other episode at the Conference."

Soviet hegemony in the Middle East would gravely imperil the vital flow of oil, essential for industry and defense, from the Middle East to Europe and Japan. Seventy percent of Europe's oil now comes from that region; for Japan the figure is 80 percent, and there are no near term prospects for the development of adequate and economic alternative sources of supply. The capacity of our NATO allies to resist Soviet pressure over a prolonged crisis would be drastically impaired if the petroleum pipeline could be shut down by Moscow.

The Middle East is today the "soft underbelly of Europe," not only because it possesses oil that Europe requires, but because of its strategic location. Our position in the Mediterranean, to say nothing of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, is severely prejudiced by Soviet encroachments in the countries lining its shores, including the massive Soviet military presence in Egypt.

Yet the Middle East policy of this Administration has been marked by a singular inability to distinguish our friends from our enemies and a persistent failure to recognize that Soviet ambition, and not the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, lies at the heart of the instability in the Middle East.

The simple truth is that the Soviets would be in the Middle East even if there were no Arab-Israeli conflict—even, indeed, if Israel did not exist. And far from urging the Arab states to negotiate a genuine and stable peace with Israel, the Soviets are intriguing to perpetuate the uneasy condition of "neither war nor peace" in order to keep tensions high and facilitate their own continuing penetration of the Arab world.

From this perspective, two aspects of the Administration's Middle East policy are particularly self-defeating:

*One:* Continued support for the "Rogers Formula"—which provides that any settlement should be based on Israeli withdrawal from virtually all occupied territory—has now become a major obstacle to progress in the efforts to negotiate a stable peace in the Middle East. Its principal effect has been to shake the confidence of our friends, deepen the intransigence of our enemies and discourage genuine negotiations.

It is clear that commitment by the United States to a view of the general nature of a settlement in advance of negotiations between the parties was unnecessary and unwise. Moreover, the public statement of this view, by weakening the Israeli position in advance, merely compounded the initial error of making gratuitous concessions.

So long as the policy of the United States is based on the "Rogers Formula," the Arab states will be unwilling to enter into serious negotiations with Israel. Why, for example, would Egypt negotiate defensible borders for Israel while the United States, Israel's only friend among the Big Four, maintains that Israel should agree in principle to withdraw completely from the Sinai? Only a failure to appreciate Israel's determination to negotiate secure and defensible borders can explain the Administration's persistence in this shortsighted plan. If we wish to promote serious negotiations in the Middle East, we must drop the "Rogers Formula."

*Two:* Our energetic diplomacy aimed at reopening the Suez Canal is extremely dangerous.

Once the Canal is reopened the effectiveness of the growing Soviet military and merchant fleets would be doubled and a single fleet would be enabled to move rapidly between the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans and thereby contribute to the ongoing Soviet penetration of Africa.

Moreover, if the Canal were back in operation, the United States could well find itself undertaking to prevent, by force if necessary, Soviet-Egyptian movement on the East Bank of the Canal. In the absence of some means of assuring that the East Bank would not be occupied by Soviet-Egyptian forces, it is un-

likely, and properly so, that Israel would withdraw from her present defensible positions on the Bar-Lev Line.

Clearly, the opening of the Suez Canal is a trump card in any forthcoming settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. With the Canal back in operation, one of the chief incentives the Soviets have to make concessions on the other outstanding issues will vanish. In my view, the reopening of the Suez Canal should only be negotiated as part of an overall settlement and not in order to obtain a fragile interim arrangement of doubtful value.

#### 94

### **News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers Announcing His Trip to the Middle East and Commenting on the Possibilities for an Interim Settlement and an International Peace Keeping Force<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, April 23, 1971**

Ladies and gentlemen: As you know, I plan to leave Monday for London, where I will head the United States delegation to the 16th annual ministerial meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization on April 27 and 28. This will also afford me an opportunity to meet with Foreign Secretary Sir [Alec] Douglas-Home and his colleagues for discussions on a number of matters of mutual interest.

I will leave London on Thursday, April 29, for Ankara, Turkey, to attend the 18th annual Council of Ministers meeting of the Central Treaty Organization on April 30 and May 1. On the way to Ankara I plan to stop in Paris on April 29 to consult with French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann.

From Ankara, I plan to go to four Arab countries—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, not necessarily in that order, that is alphabetically listed—and to Israel. On my return, I will make a stop in Italy for talks with officials of the Italian Government.

The last visit of an American Secretary of State to the Middle East—an area of such rich and abiding historical and cultural significance—was in 1953. As I embark on this trip, I am quite conscious of the ancient traditions that exist in the area and the profound spiritual and religious beliefs of the people who live there.

This is a visit I have long wanted to make, as you know. It underscores the importance we attach in the United States to our relations with the Middle East countries. I look forward to meeting with the leaders of the countries that I will visit and the opportunity to strengthen the ties between us.

I want to say at the outset that this trip should be viewed and understood in light of our expressed willingness to play a constructive and responsible role in continuing efforts to achieve peace in the area. I do not anticipate any dramatic results or breakthroughs from this visit. But I do trust that it will provide an opportunity to explore ways in the evolving situation to maintain and, hopefully, accelerate the momentum toward peace.

I intend to reiterate our strong dedication to the objective of reaching a contractually binding and lasting peace settlement in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and our full and constant support for Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] efforts to this end. We believe there is an exceptional opportunity—and an opportunity that must not be missed—to build on the progress that already has been made.

For almost 9 months the shooting has stopped. This has given people in the area some reason for hope where previously there was little or none. We believe that the negotiations which have been undertaken under Ambassador Jarring must succeed—the climate will never be better.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers' news conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1663 (May 10, 1971), pp. 593-595, 597, 598.



President Nixon believes that the United States should seek every opportunity, expend every effort, take every chance, in playing a constructive and energetic role in the search for peace in the area. It is for these reasons—or should I say, in that spirit—that President Nixon has asked me to take this trip.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some confusion in various reports about American arms shipments to Israel. The question is whether some of the recent arms shipments have been specifically in reply to the reported increase in arms shipped by the Soviet Union to the U.A.R. Would you address yourself to that, please?*

A. Yes, Mr. Hensley [Stewart Hensley, United Press International], I will be glad to. The answer to that, categorically, is no. We have not made any commitments in response to any recent action by the Soviet Union. As you know, we have had a relationship with Israel over the years. In a democracy we have to present all our requests to Congress, so it is understood that we have had this relationship. But I can say here today, so there can be no doubt about it, that we have made no new commitments this year for any shipments this year of equipment to Israel.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the conflicting statements from Israel and Egypt on reopening the Suez Canal, could you say what the United States regards as a reasonable basis for reopening the canal?*

A. No, I don't think that the United States would want to be in that position of saying what is a reasonable basis. We think it is up to the parties to decide that.

It is clear from the discussions that we have had that all concerned feel that under proper conditions opening the Suez Canal would be in the best interests of those in the area.

Now, we plan to discuss this matter with the leaders of the nations I visit in the hopes that eventually something can be worked out. But our purpose on this trip is not to focus just on that proposal. As I said in this statement, we have a much broader purpose.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you clarify for us how the Suez Canal diplomatic effort fits in with*

*the implementation of Resolution 242 and the Jarring mission?*

A. Yes. The Jarring mission is a mission undertaken pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 242 that I have referred to, and it seeks a final contractual peaceful settlement that is binding on all the nations in the area.

Now, that is a very complex subject. A good deal of progress has been made to date. As you know, there is an impasse at the moment—Ambassador Jarring is not in New York. But that seeks a final settlement based on the Security Council resolution.

Now, the Suez proposal—let me say, too, as I have indicated—we give full support to Ambassador Jarring's efforts—Our objective is to reach a final peaceful settlement based on a contract, including all issues involved, and nothing would occur until the contract is completed and signed, so no action would be taken until there was a final agreement. That is one objective. That is the principal objective.

Now, the Suez proposal is the proposal that has been mentioned by President Sadat, been referred to by Mrs. Meir and others in the Israeli Government as a possibility of an interim character that would provide a step in the direction toward a final peaceful settlement. And this consideration of the Suez at the moment is being undertaken by the parties concerned.

Now, we will be discussing that with Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, and others. But this, if it could be accomplished, would not be a substitute for the Jarring mission, but it would be supplementary to and, hopefully, helpful to that mission.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the evident Soviet displeasure at what is regarded as our middleman role in the Suez negotiations could impede a resolution of that problem and, indeed, of the overall settlement?*

A. No, I don't think so. And I don't like the word "middleman." We are not the "middleman." We are playing a role that the parties would like us to play. We hope it will be a constructive role, constructive diplomacy. And we plan to exchange ideas with the leaders of these countries, not proposals. In other words, we don't have any intention of just

exchanging papers. We want a full discussion of the problems, exchange of views on all ideas that have been put forward, with the hope that we can add to the understanding and, hopefully, get the parties closer together in a possible settlement.

. . . . .

*Q. Mr. Secretary, even allowing for the fact that the settlement on the Suez Canal has to be worked out between Israel and Egypt, it is fairly well known that part of the Israeli view is that there should be neutralization of the East Bank of the Suez Canal if they withdraw partially. Would you favor American participation in any kind of international force, either observer, police, military, to make sure that there was neutralization and that the Soviet-Egyptian forces did not cross the canal?*

A. I will try to state this again—I have stated it so many times I thought it was fairly clear. The United States has indicated, and will continue to indicate, a willingness to play a responsible role in a peacekeeping force or an observer force. We have not gone beyond that. Obviously any such role would require the approval of all the nations concerned. So that we have offered and continue to say that assuming an agreement can be reached, we are prepared to consider playing a role in an observer force or any other force. We don't demand it. We are not sure that is the best system. We are perfectly happy if the parties could agree on some other kind of a force. But we do not want to back away from what we consider responsibility to try to bring about a peaceful settlement in the area.

Miss Berger [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I had understood before that your willingness—the United States willingness—to participate in such a force was in an overall settlement. Does this mean that you are also willing to do this in an interim settlement and that you would agree to this idea to support a neutralization of that East Bank area that is vacated by the Israelis?*

A. Well, I don't want to get into the latter part of your question. As I said, we aren't trying to tell the parties what to neutralize or

whether it should be neutralized or whether it should be demilitarized or what. And when you say "this role," I want to make it clear that all I am saying is that we are prepared to assist in playing a responsible role if that will be helpful. Now, we can only do it if the parties are willing to have us. And we are only willing to do it if we think it would be helpful. And I have a little difficulty understanding why anybody could reject that idea, because we haven't insisted on it. All we say is that we are prepared, as a Government, to play a responsible role if that would be helpful in bringing about a peaceful settlement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your thinking based on the history of international peacekeeping as to what would be an effective international force?*

A. No, I think it depends a good deal on the agreement and what is involved. And I don't think it helps any to speculate, because it gets out of kilter when you start doing that. But it is clear that in some instances a peacekeeping force might succeed. Certainly an observer force might be helpful. The fact that one has failed in the past doesn't mean that another type of peacekeeping force under other circumstances would fail. If people were that pessimistic, we would never have had an airplane.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you having any direct discussions with the Russians about the reopening of the Suez Canal, and have you discussed your trip with them, or do you plan to discuss your trip with them either before you leave or at any stage during the trip?*

A. No, we have not. If Ambassador Dobrynin had been here, I might have mentioned it to him, but he hasn't been here, so we haven't.

. . . . .

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us some of the subjects you might discuss with Foreign Minister Schumann in Paris and particularly whether you can anticipate from recent events any change in the French attitude and posture toward the Middle East?*

A. Well, no—I think the principal subject I will discuss with Mr. Schumann will be the

Middle East, because they have taken a very active interest in it. As you know, they have been involved in the four-power discussions. So the principal subject for discussion with him will be the Middle East.

We will, of course, discuss other matters. We have several other bilateral matters that we will discuss. But that will be the principal subject for discussion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I just wondered whether or not you could say if the Israeli proposal has been considered a basis for further negotiation on the canal, why hasn't it yet been passed on to Egypt for such negotiations?*

*A. Well, descriptions like "basis for negotiation" are difficult phrases, because they sort of suggest that we approve—or if we say it is not a basis, we disapprove. So I have some hesitation in labeling it.*

We are continuing to discuss the matter with the Government of Israel, and we will discuss the matter with President Sadat and others when I get to Egypt. As I said earlier, I want to try, if possible, to get away from this idea of exchanging papers and have the negotiations all conducted in the newspapers, because people get frozen in their positions or governments frozen in their position. It becomes this country's proposal, and the other country says "We reject it." And obviously you reject it unless you accept it. But that doesn't mean that the parties may not have many areas of agreement, and there may be areas in the proposal that provide a basis for further negotiation.

So the answer to your question is we are not going to exchange papers, and that is why we are not submitting it as such. But we are going to discuss different ideas about how this might be done with all governments concerned.

. . . . .

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### **Commentary Hailing the Formation of the Federation of Arab Republics and Expressing Support for the Arabs, Published in the People's Daily of China<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, April 25, 1971**

The Heads of State of the United Arab Republic, Libya and Syria reached an agreement recently and declared that the three states would unite to form the Federation of Arab Republics. This is a great event in the Arab countries' cause of unity against imperialism.

The declaration on the setting up of the Federation of Arab Republics states solemnly "that there will be no negotiations and reconciliation with Israel; that not an inch of the Arab land is to be given up; that there will be no doing away with the Palestinian question or compromise over it." This solemn stand reflects the militant will of the Arab and Palestinian people to carry their struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors through to the end, as well as their determination to recover their territories and to return to their homeland.

Israeli Zionism is a tool of aggression fostered by U.S. imperialism and a dagger thrust into the heart of the Arab countries. For more than 20 years it has committed heinous crimes against the Arab people by launching three large-scale wars of aggression. With the instigation and support of U.S. imperialism, the Israeli aggressors are today still very arrogant and they constantly threaten the security of the Arab countries. In an effort to safeguard the independence of the Arab nation and to recover the occupied territories, the Arab people will never cease their struggle against the Israeli aggressors. The principled stand against negotiations and reconciliation with Israel as laid down in the declaration conforms with the common aspirations of the broad masses of the Arab people and it is a blow to the plot for a Middle

<sup>1</sup> English translation of commentary, *Peking Review*, XIV, 18 (April 30, 1971), p. 13.

East Munich being hatched by U.S. imperialism and its accomplices.

Over the past 20 years and more, the Israeli Zionists occupied large tracts of Arab territories through wars of aggression. The Arab people's demand for the recovery of their lost land is entirely just and nobody has the right to stand in their way and undermine their demand. U.S. imperialism, however, has always supported Israel's acts of aggression; it flagrantly announced not long ago that it has "never said that Israel had to withdraw from all territory." This is an outrageous infringement upon the sovereignty of the Arab countries and a rabid provocation to the Arab people. Every inch of the Arab territories the Israeli aggressors have occupied must be recovered. The plots which U.S. imperialism and its accomplices are playing with in this respect will never be tolerated by the broad masses of the Arab and Palestinian people.

Through their protracted and arduous struggle, the Palestinian guerrillas have grown into an important force of the Arab people for opposing the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. While repeatedly instigating the Jordanian reactionaries to suppress the Palestinian guerrillas, U.S. imperialism is resorting to such political schemes as that for a "Palestinian state." By employing such counter-revolutionary dual tactics, it is attempting to ultimately liquidate the Palestinian revolution. The Palestinian people have waged a tit-for-tat struggle against the U.S. imperialists' counter-revolutionary dual tactics. Their just struggle is winning increasingly great support from the people in Asia, Africa and the rest of the world. Victory certainly belongs to the Palestinian and other Arab people.

Our great leader Chairman Mao pointed out: "The Chinese people regard victory in the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America as their own victory and give warm sympathy and support to all their anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles."

The Chinese people resolutely support the people of Arab countries in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism, and support their desire to achieve unity and solidarity in a way of their own choice.

We are convinced that the Arab countries and people will continuously push forward their cause of unity against imperialism by overcoming all kinds of obstacles and difficulties on their way ahead.

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### **U. K. Television Interview Statements on the U.S. Position on Conditions for a Middle East Settlement, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

**London, April 28, 1971**

*Q. Now, of course, as we all know, you're about to go off to the Middle East to visit all the countries concerned in the crisis there, and you are, I think, the first Secretary of State to visit the Middle East for about 18 years. I understand that your first move—your first limited move—will be to try and get the Suez Canal opened, but aren't you thereby in fact helping the Russians strategically quite a bit? Because won't their forces be able to move out into the Indian Ocean, where we are a bit worried about them?*

A. Our first objective, Mr. Kee, is to do anything we can, to do all we can, to help bring about a peace agreement, a final peace agreement.

*Q. Between Israel and Egypt?*

A. Between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, pursuant to the Security Council resolution which was passed in 1967. Now, Ambassador Jarring has been attempting under the auspices of the United Nations to bring that about, and we've been giving him full support in that effort. At the moment there is an impasse in those negotiations—

*Q. And you're going out to try and break through it?*

A. Well, we've been working at this for

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers' interview conducted by Robert Kee for the Thames TV program "This Week," recorded April 28 for broadcast on April 29, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1666 (May 31, 1971), pp. 689-691.

some time—attempting to do something to break the impasse—and we have one goal, and that is to do everything we can to bring about a final peace agreement, because we think the climate has never been better. Now the Suez Canal proposal, which has been referred to by President Sadat, which was referred to by Prime Minister Meir and others, is a proposal of an interim nature, and if it could be accomplished it would provide additional time for Ambassador Jarring to try to work out the details of the final settlement. So we would favor the opening of the Suez. In answer to your question about would it be an advantage to the Soviet Union, well, my best judgment is, on balance, no. On balance, we think the opening of the Suez would benefit everyone. Certainly it would provide additional stability in the area for a period of time. It would prove, I think, to the parties that it was possible to live together in peace, and the climate for the negotiations with Ambassador Jarring would be helpful.

*Q. Can we now turn to some of the really hard difficulties that are in the way of bringing these negotiations for peace to a successful conclusion. You mentioned the United Nations resolution of November 1967. That resolution, of course, calls for two major things: one, the recognition of sovereignty by Egypt of Israel, a mutual recognition of sovereignty; and the other, if I may quote the words, "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." Can I ask you, how does the United States interpret that? Does that mean withdrawal from all the territories that Israel occupied?*

A. No. Mr. Kee, there's an additional provision here in the next paragraph which refers to "secure and recognized boundaries." So we interpret the Security Council resolution to mean that the withdrawal should be to secure and recognized boundaries. There's also a provision in this resolution which says that there should be the principle of nonacquisition of territories—

*Q. Exactly.*

A. —should be lived up to. So our view in the United States, as expressed by President Nixon in his recent "state of the world"

message, and as I've expressed it several times, is that there should be withdrawal to secure borders, that those borders should only be drawn in a way that will provide security, not in a way that would justify acquisition of territory in any substantial ways.

*Q. So that this does not mean, in fact, total Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied?*

A. Well, as I say, it means withdrawal to secure borders. Now, the secure borders, we think, should be negotiated between the parties.

*Q. Would you say that, for instance, Jerusalem was necessary to the security of Israel's borders?*

A. Well, I think Jerusalem presents a different problem and not a problem of security. It's a very complex problem that refers to—many religious factors—

*Q. Exactly. But you have a clash between the two there, haven't you? I mean the Israelis—*

A. At the moment, Mr. Kee, we're talking principally about the problems between Egypt and Israel—

*Q. But do you think*

A. Eventually we'll have to get to the problems between Jordan and Israel, the problems of Jerusalem, the problems of refugees, but at the moment the impasse has to do with Israel and Egypt, and we would hope that some method can be arrived at to break that impasse.

*Q. Surely Egypt could hardly stand aside and see Israel continue to occupy Jerusalem? I mean, the Arab consciousness is always going to be an obstacle to that, isn't it?*

A. Yes, we've made clear in our position that there has to be a solution to the problem of Jerusalem that takes into account these very deep religious convictions of the parties.

But as I say, I want—for the moment, because we're doing it step by step—in my discussions in the Middle East to deal principally with the immediate impasse, which is the problems between Israel and Egypt.

*Q. But someday, and perhaps quite soon, you'll have to get to these more difficult realities. And it*

*does seem to me to remain this permanent deadlock between Israel and Egypt, inasmuch as Egypt wants total withdrawal from all the territories occupied and Israel has made quite clear that she has no intention of withdrawing. Now, in the last resort—if the United States thought it correct, would it bring pressure on Israel, and could it bring pressure on Israel to withdraw?*

A. Well, there again I want to be sure that we don't misunderstand each other.

We think this: We think that if this process continues step by step that it's possible to work out a peaceful settlement. A year ago the parties did not think it was possible to have a cease-fire. There's been a cease-fire in effect now for 9 months. The parties didn't think that Egypt would ever agree that Israel had the right to be sovereign. There was considerable doubt that Egypt would ever agree to enter into a written agreement with Israel. There was doubt that Egypt would agree to free navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal, and they've indicated they'd be willing to do that. There was doubt that Israel would ever agree to withdraw at all—to suggest they were willing to withdraw—so we've made a good deal of progress. Of course there are a lot of hurdles ahead of us, but if we take them one at a time, as we're trying to do, I still think there is a hope for peace. As slight as it may be, I think there is a hope; and I think the more the people say to themselves, "Well, maybe it can work out; let's have a little optimism," then the better the prospects are.

*Q. But you do think, as one of the possibilities for the future, that Israel might eventually be brought to agree to withdrawal from almost all?*

A. Now I don't want to say anything about what I think Israel might do or what I think Egypt might do. That's for the parties to decide. I think there is a prospect of a peace agreement in the area. The climate has never been better. People now are accustomed to peace. Tourism is now booming in the area; there has been no fighting for about 9 months; King Hussein has Jordan under control; the *fedayeen* movement is now not as strong as it was—

*Q. The Palestinians are still there though, aren't they?*

A. Yes, but that's the reason why we're very anxious to keep the momentum going, because if it dies down then the *fedayeen* movement could revive. What we're trying to do is keep the momentum going—let's move ahead—and I think there's a possibility for this to happen. Now, it's not going to happen during my trip; it's going to take some time. The purpose of my trip is to see if we can't exchange ideas with the parties, see if we can't move them a little closer together—not in terms of pieces of paper and all of that—in terms of talking over the problems. And there is—for example, there is agreement now that the Suez Canal should now be opened, and we think it would be to everyone's advantage. So, Egypt would like to open it, Israel would like to have it open, the United States favors it, the Soviet Union does, and all the nations in the area.

*Q. May I ask you this general question then? Does the United States accept the full implications of the Zionist doctrine that all Jews in the world have a right to settle in that part of the Middle East?*

A. Well, we don't ask ourselves that question—

*Q. Well, might you not have to if the Jews came out of Russia?*

A. I don't think so. The—

*Q. It is of course the question, you see, that the Arabs are always asking themselves. That is why they are so worried at what they call Israeli expansion.*

A. Yes, but you see the Arabs have asked, and we understand, they have asked for guarantees of their borders, and Israel is very concerned about guarantees for its borders. Now, Egypt has accepted the proposition that if it gets the conditions—the conditions they have laid down are satisfied—it has agreed that Israel has a right of sovereignty, has a right to exist as a nation in the future, and is willing to make an agreement in writing to the effect it will not interfere with the internal affairs of Israel. Now, that is a big step forward.

*Q. But still if the large number of Jews who are at present in Russia and agitating to be let out, if they were let out, it would very severely aggravate the whole problem in the Middle East, wouldn't it?*

*A.* Well, I am not sure how many persons Israel could accommodate in the present territory, but they say they can accommodate a great deal more. I don't believe that is a problem for the immediate future.

*Q. You see that is exactly the Arab problem, because you said in their immediate territory, and the Arab fear seems to be that the Israelis might need more territory.*

*A.* Yes, but if the agreement provides guarantees against that from the Arab standpoint and if Israel is guaranteed satisfactorily that the present territory of Israel is not going to be invaded, then you would have stability in the area.

*Q. Can I ask you very briefly—you said that you think the third world war could be triggered off in the Middle East. Now if this present expedition of yours proves not to be successful, do you think it brings a third world war closer?*

*A.* No, I didn't say anything about a third world war in that context. I was saying that the seeds could be planted, but I was thinking many years ahead. I don't believe a third world war is something we should be talking about now. I don't myself believe that the Soviet Union wants to have a confrontation with the United States in that area of the world, and certainly the United States has no interest in having a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

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**Interview Statements on the Israel Labor Party's Position on Borders, the Difficulties Posed to Israel by a Large Arab Population in the Future and the Consequent Probability of an Eventual Bi-National State, Made by Finance and Commerce Minister Sapir of Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**April 29, 1971**

*Q. Mr. Sapir, in an interview about three weeks ago, you said the verbal doctrine [of the Labour Party's platform on borders] was not an ultimatum. Does this mean that you do not wholly subscribe to it?*

*A.* I voted for it, but I voted for it knowing and assuming that it is not an ultimatum. We usually say: We will only make conditions at the negotiating table. We say, without prior conditions. We say this to our rivals, to those who are hostile to us, to our neighbours, and we certainly say it to ourselves. We say that at the negotiating table we will have conditions. But I have insisted on what I said. It was my condition.

*Q. Your condition for voting on the verbal doctrine?*

*A.* My condition when I voted for the verbal doctrine was that it should be clear that this is not an ultimatum. It is not a question of die rather than give up what I feel, for example, about Jerusalem. I could not even always remember well the contents of the verbal doctrine. I had to recheck the letter I had received in my capacity as Party secretary.

*Q. Are there things about which you feel you would prefer death to doing something else?*

*A.* Yes.

*Q. What for example?*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Sapir's interview conducted by Dan Halperin, Nahman Shai, and Rafi Unger, broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3672/A/7-A/9; reprinted by permission.

A. For example, what I said a moment ago: A united Jerusalem. I can find other preferences....

*Q. Mr. Sapir, I understand that in the argument which is taking place now on the question of geography as against guarantees, you are in the camp of those who believe in guarantees rather than with those who believe in geography.*

A. In general, there are things in geography which I think would make things very difficult for us.

*Q. I understand it is demography and not geography.*

A. Demography is the result of geography, if you want to speak in hints.... Yesterday I looked at the total natural increase according to the maximalists, according to "not an inch of land." Already today it is almost not far behind the natural Jewish increase. I think this would make it difficult. I think in the end we will be a bi-national State.... I have not changed my opinion that if there is peace and we have a settlement, with another 1,000,000 Arabs plus those who left the West Bank—and then there will be refugees—there will be 1,250,000 plus 440,000—all together 1,700,000. Although I am one of those who believes that the Jewish population may double, nevertheless in 10 or 20 years it would be a Jewish State in name only, not in content. I have many reasons why such a large Arab population would make things difficult for us....

*Q. Mr. Sapir, you once said that what logic does not do, time does. I think you have hinted at the flexibility demonstrated by the Government recently, flexibility it did not display three years ago.*

A. Time does its work and I hope it will work still further. I have no better definition....

*Q. Do you have a plan, do you have a map?*

A. Me? Twice I told you yes.

*Q. Many security men say that if we return to previous borders, our defence expenditure will rise. Sinai, for example, offers very great security and it saves manpower, such as reservist manpower. What do you think?*

A. ...In the National Unity Government I have heard various talk, but I do not leak the protocols of the Government. I have heard other voices, and all those who say Sinai, say only part of it....

*Q. Since then [the six-day war] have we done everything to promote a settlement?*

A. I think we are in the course of a very difficult campaign and we have done a great deal. I do not know exactly if we have done everything, or if a percentage is missing. We have done and are doing everything in our power. One must know our neighbours exactly, their conduct, their appearance and what has happened during the past four years in giving ourselves credit.

*Q. The question of the moment is the partial settlement. Do you support it?*

A. I do not want to enter into details before anything has happened. Under certain conditions—and if you ask me, the particular condition there is one principal test—we must stand at a distance which will allow us to see everything being done there, and from where we can return to our positions if necessary. I am not just telling you this today, I said it at private talks, when they began to talk about it. The problem for me is the distance to which we must withdraw.

*Q. The problem is not that of the opening of the Canal being linked with an unlimited cease-fire?*

A. I know there are various theories on this issue, but for me the principal point—and this is what I told you—is the distance from the Canal.

*Q. Free Israeli navigation in the Canal?*

A. Yes, the six-day war was about it, 57 was about it. Freedom of navigation is an inviolable condition.

*Q. With Egyptian forces not crossing?*

A. If I want there to be control over the Canal, it is inconsistent with your question. My logic says there should be no crossing....



**Statement of Senegal's View of Israel As the Aggressor in the Middle East, Made by President Senghor of Senegal in a Press Interview<sup>1</sup>**

Early May, 1971

*Q. There is an Israeli ambassador in Dakar but at the U.N., Senegal regularly votes with the group hostile to that state. How do you explain this paradox and what is your point of view concerning relations with Israel and her government?*

A. Senegal has always been a tissue of paradoxes. But as regards Israel our policy is clear. We deplore the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Personally, I consider Jews, Arabs and Blacks to be bound by deep ties—Jews and Arabs. This is why we are co-authors because these constitute the trilogy of suffering races. I believe then in dialogue between Negroes and Semites.

This having been said, in the existing conflict Israel is the aggressor. This deduction doesn't prevent us from hoping for peaceful co-existence between [the two sides on the basis of] the resolution adopted at the U.N. on November 22, 1967. . . .

But, at the same time, I maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, against the wishes of the Arabs. . . .

I can also tell you that the one time I really risked my life was during the occupation of France and it was to hide a friend. She was Jewish, Russian, Communist and so she has remained.

**CENTO Council of Ministers Communiqué Announcement of Their Discussion of the Middle East Conflict<sup>2</sup>**

Ankara, May 1, 1971

The Council of Ministers of CENTO held their eighteenth session at the headquarters of the Organization in Ankara April 30 and May 1, 1971. The Heads of the Delegations were:

Ardeshir Zahedi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iran

Ifikhar Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan in Turkey

Osman Olcay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom.

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, United States

. . . . .

In their discussions, held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, the Council reviewed the international situation in the Middle East. The Council emphasized the urgent need for establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the principles and provisions of the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

. . . . .

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the text of the CENTO Ministerial Council communiqué, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1666 (May 31, 1971), p. 693.

CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) includes the following member states: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom. The U.S. Government participates without being a full member. The Council of Ministers is composed of permanent deputies of ambassadorial rank meeting annually.

<sup>1</sup> Question and answer on the Middle East excerpted and translated from Senghor's interview in *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), No. 539 (May 4, 1971), p. 17.

## 100

# **Editorial Commentary Expressing Support for the Palestinian Struggle and Opposition to the Proposal for a Palestinian State, Published in the People's Daily of China<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, May 3, 1971**

"Palestine International Week" activities will take place in Peking, China's capital, today as a resolute support to the Palestinian people in their just struggle for national rights. We hail the growing in strength of the Palestinian people's armed forces and congratulate the Palestinian people on the important victories they have won in their struggle; we give our militant salutation to the heroic Palestinian people and the people of various Arab countries who stand at the anti-imperialist front in the Middle East, and warmly welcome the Delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization that has come to our country to participate in the "International Week" on invitation.

The armed struggle waged by the Palestinian people is an important component part of the present struggle of the world people against U.S. imperialism and its running dogs. For several years now, the Palestinian guerrillas have fought thousands of battles against the Israeli aggressors, and thwarted the various schemes designed by U.S. imperialism and its collaborator to strangle the Palestinian revolution and inspired the fighting will of millions upon millions of Arab people in resisting the U.S. and Israeli aggressors. Today, the Palestinian guerrillas have become a staunch and active anti-imperialist revolutionary force in the Middle East.

The Palestinian guerrillas have created an excellent situation through their bitter, valiant and tenacious struggle. Since the founding of the Palestinian guerrilla units, U.S. imperialism has tried its utmost to break them up in a vain attempt to wipe them out in their very bases. Last September, U.S.

imperialism instigated the Jordanian reactionaries to dispatch tens of thousands of troops and large numbers of aircraft and tanks in a massive onslaught on the guerrillas. The Palestinian guerrillas valiantly rose up, launched counter-attacks in self-defence and stood up to this rigorous test by frustrating the enemy's vicious scheme. Through this event, the cadres and fighters of the guerrilla units once again came to see clearly the sinister and fiendish features of U.S. imperialism and its collaborator and running dog and became all the more determined to carry their armed struggle through to the end. Firmly grasp the gun and recover their lost homeland through armed struggle—this is the only road chosen by the Palestinian guerrillas and people.

The Palestinian guerrillas have further strengthened and developed their unity on the principle of persevering in armed struggle and carrying the Palestinian revolution through to the end. Last March, the Eighth Session of the Palestinian National Council, the participants of which had a wide representation, adopted a "political action programme" which embodies the strong will and undaunted fighting spirit of the broad sections of the Palestinian people who are united in struggling against imperialism. This constitutes a powerful blow to U.S. imperialism and its collaborator, which are plotting to disrupt the unity of the Palestinian people.

The Palestinian guerrillas have a profound mass basis among the Palestinian people and enjoy the extensive support of the people of the Arab countries. By acting arbitrarily and playing the jackal to the tiger, the Jordanian reactionaries have found themselves in an extremely isolated position among the Arab countries. The perverse action of the Jordanian reactionaries in suppressing the Palestinian guerrillas is countenanced neither by the Palestinian people nor by the people of Jordan and other Arab countries.

U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism collude and at the same time contend with each other in their activities in the Middle East. While intensifying the arming of Israel and engineering military suppression of the

<sup>1</sup> English translation of commentary, *Peking Review*, XIV, 19 (May 7, 1971), pp. 12-13.

Palestinian guerrillas, U.S. imperialism is actively pushing the plot for a so-called "Palestinian state." Flaunting the signboard: "For a just and lasting peace in the Middle East," social-imperialism is working in close co-ordination with it in many respects. Such underhanded activities of theirs boil down to one aim, i.e., to make the Palestinian people and the people of the Arab countries give up their struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors, submit to their will and fall victim to their activities of contending for and dividing spheres of influence in the Middle East. Such power politics pursued by the two superpowers has met with resolute opposition by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples.

The great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "A people's revolution can triumph and imperialism and its lackeys can be defeated."

The struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors is a just one. The Chinese people and the people of the whole world side with them and resolutely support their struggle. We are deeply convinced that, despite the comparatively difficult conditions in their present struggle, the Palestinian people can steadily develop and strengthen their force in struggle, overcome all difficulties on their way of advance and continuously achieve victories so long as they strengthen their unity and persevere in a protracted people's war.

U.S. imperialism and Zionism will certainly be defeated! The Palestinian people's just struggle for national rights is sure to win!

## 101

**Remarks Expressing Chinese Support for the Palestinians, Made by Vice-Chairman Kuo Mo-jo of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China at a Rally Marking International Palestine Week<sup>1</sup>**

Peking, May 3, 1971

U.S. imperialism and its collaborator have always regarded the struggle by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples as a big obstacle to their aggression against and control of the Arab countries. They are contending with each other in a desperate effort to expand their own spheres of influence; at the same time, they are colluding with each other in a plot to wipe out the Palestinian guerrillas and strangle the Arab people's cause of national liberation. However, today is no longer the time when imperialism could ride roughshod over others and rule the fate of other peoples at will. It is only the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and the people of other countries in the Middle East, and definitely not U.S. imperialism and its collaborator and lackeys, who will decide the fate of the people of the Middle East.

...The common struggle against imperialism has linked China and Palestine and other Arab countries together. ...Your struggle constitutes a positive contribution to the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the world's people and a great support and encouragement to the Chinese people who are engaged in socialist revolution and socialist construction. The Chinese people learn from you and salute you. We will, as always, firmly support your just struggle.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted English text of Kuo Mo-jo's speech as published in the *Peking Review*, XIV, 20 (May 14, 1971), p. 8.

## 102

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Saudi Arabia of Foreign Minister Yifru of Ethiopia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Riyadh, May 6, 1971

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Ketema Yifru, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 9-12 *Rabi<sup>c</sup> al-Thani*, 1391 A.H. [May 3-6, 1971 A.D.].

The two sides also condemned aggression and the acquisition of territories by force, and in this connection the two sides demanded the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories and reaffirmed the usurped rights of the people of Palestine.

## 103

**Statement Issued on the Occasion of the Meeting Between Secretaries Suslov and Ponomaryov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a Delegation from the Communist Party of Syria (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Moscow, May 7, 1971

On May 7, 1971, M.A. Suslov, member of the C.C. C.P.S.U. Political Bureau and

Secretary of the C.C. C.P.S.U., and B.N. Ponomaryov, Secretary of the C.C. C.P.S.U., met with a delegation of the Syrian Communist Party, which came to the U.S.S.R. at the invitation of the C.C. C.P.S.U. The delegation included Kh. Bakdash, General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, and Politbureau members and Central Committee Secretary Y. Faisal, D. Naame, Politbureau member R. Turk, C.C. Secretary M. Yusef and C.C. member B. Gazzi.

The two sides exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East in connection with the continued Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab countries. Both sides condemned the expansionist policy of the Zionist rulers of Israel and their stubborn refusal to abide by the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution. They confirmed the determination of the two Parties to achieve a political solution of the Middle East conflict, the withdrawal of aggressor troops from occupied Arab territory and restoration of the lawful rights of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinian Arabs.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), May 8, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, May 8, 1971), *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, IX, 10-11 (194-195) (June 25, 1971), pp. 79-80, 80.

A purported record of the comments on the Syrian Communist Party's Draft Program (criticizing the Party's acceptance of Baath policy on Palestine and of nationalist tendencies, and urging the necessity of a

political settlement in the Middle East, of seeing the Palestine problem as a part of a larger revolutionary struggle and of refraining from calling for the destruction of the State of Israel as opposed to the defeat of Zionism) made by C.P.S.U. experts, presumably including Suslov and Ponomaryov, was published in Arabic in *al-Raya* (Beirut), June 26, 1972 and translated into English in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, II, 1 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 188-202.

## 104

**Resolutions Adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) Accepting the Possibility of an Interim Suez Settlement and Demanding That the Israeli Government Put Forward a Peace Plan<sup>1</sup>**

**May 8, 1971**

1. The Central Committee of Maki is of the opinion that, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council is still an appropriate basis for the achievement of a just, lasting peace by the way of negotiations under the auspices of the U.N. Emissary, by the way of a mutual agreement between the countries concerned on each paragraph of the peace treaties.

2. The Maki Central Committee expresses its principled consent to a partial agreement on the opening of the Suez Canal if it constitutes a step that advances and brings nearer the full peace solution, i.e. if the following three conditions are observed:—a) the Canal to be opened to the shipping of all states including Israel; b) the partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Canal line to be accompanied by an Egyptian declaration on an unlimited extension of the cease fire; c) no military force must cross the Canal from the west bank to the east bank after it is evacuated by the Israel Defence Forces and no other military advantage will be derived from the withdrawal of the Israeli army.

3. The Maki Central Committee sees an urgent necessity in the renewal of the mission of U.N. Envoy Gunnar Jarring that was interrupted after the exchange of messages between him and the governments of Egypt and Israel in February 1971. The mediation by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers concerning a partial settlement for opening the Canal does not justify the delay in the mission of Ambassador Jarring to advance an agreement on a complete solution.

4. The Maki Central Committee condemns the repeated threats by the rulers of Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries to renew the war against Israel; the war threats contradict the positive significance of President Sadat's announcement of Egypt's readiness for a peace agreement with Israel. The Central Committee warns against the danger involved in these threats to peace in the Middle East and in the world and appeals to the elements of progress and peace throughout the world to enforce their influence in the Arab capitals to prevent any military initiatives and to encourage the readiness for an agreed solution of the complex of problems in dispute with Israel.

5. The Central Committee of Maki expresses its opinion that—while rejecting the attempt by the government of Egypt, in its letter to Jarring of February 15, 1971, to dictate Israel a withdrawal from all areas and an unagreed solution of the refugees issue—the government of Israel should have presented a political programme of its own for a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict. The announcement of cabinet ministers made unofficially and in the spirit of the "Oral Doctrine" of the Alignment programme, cannot serve as a basis for an Israeli political initiative, because they do not express the readiness of the people of Israel to make a supreme effort for a real peace. The Maki Central Committee vehemently criticizes this inactivity of the government and demands to publish an Israeli peace programme that must demonstrate Israel's supreme effort to prevent the renewal of the war and to promote an agreement between the peoples, and that should give preference to mutually agreed borders, security and good neighbourhood, rather than the annexation of territories and territorial expansion.

6. The Central Committee decides to start a discussion in the party press on the contents of the Maki initiative for an Israeli peace programme. The discussion will be opened with the publication of theses submitted in the lecture at this session. The discussion will be wound up by the Central Committee in its next session.

<sup>1</sup> English text of resolutions adopted by the 16th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of MAKI, *Information Bulletin (MAKI)*, 1971, No. 6 (June, 1971), pp. 8-9.

7. Until the discussion in the Central Committee on the peace programme is terminated, the members of Maki will not express—except in the framework of the internal party discussion—another position on the issue of the withdrawal but to secure, recognised and agreed borders.

## 105

### **Statement Issued by International Symposium Held on the Occasion of International Palestine Week<sup>1</sup>**

**Algiers, May 8, 1971**

On the occasion of the conference marking World Week for Solidarity with the Palestinian People, held in Algiers from May 3 to 8, 1971, under the slogan of "Freedom is the Basis of Peace," those invited to the meeting, including the representatives of world organizations and liberation movements, took this opportunity to reaffirm support for certain basic principles which the seminar participants regard as established and indisputable facts in regard to the Palestine problem and the just and legitimate armed struggle of its people against Zionism, world imperialism and the forces of reaction.

In the course of the comprehensive and positive discussion that took place on the two items on the agenda of the seminar, which were:

1. The truth about the world Zionist movement and the nature of its objectives and its organic relationship with world imperialism and the forces of reaction in various countries; and
2. The Palestine problem and the armed resistance in which the Palestinian people are engaged and the connection between this resistance and liberation movements throughout the world, those present came to the following conclusions:

I. That world Zionism is an aggressive political movement with a basic component of racist fanaticism and the exploitation of religion as a pretext for realizing its political and economic goals and ambitions and creating dual loyalty among Jews in all parts of the world—and this in an age in which the conscience of the world condemns all kinds of fanaticism, discrimination and despotism—and in this respect Zionism is just as ferocious and just as dangerous in its aims and methods as were the Nazi and Fascist regimes.

II. That Zionism is a movement that always has been since its establishment, is now, and will be in the future indissolubly linked to the forces of imperialism, reaction and all kinds of neo-colonialism—forces which are led and directed by the United States of America, while the victims of their stratagems and ravages are the peoples of the world—in Palestine, the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The organized and effective struggle of all free and noble men in the world against these forces is an effective answer to them, and also contributes greatly to the cause of justice, peace and freedom in the world.

III. Israel is a colonialist settler presence, which has involved the eviction of the original inhabitants from a land for many centuries an ancient Arab homeland; this presence, which is a flagrant challenge, was imposed by imperialist and reactionary forces in that part of the world in the form of an artificial entity still being supplied, instigated and protected in the military, financial and political fields by those forces, to ensure its survival and so that it may continue to be a base and a striking force for the achievement of control over the resources of the peoples of the area, the plundering of their wealth and the perpetuation of the fragmentation and backwardness of those peoples.

The plundering by these forces of the raw materials which belong to the peoples of the third world, the exploitation by these forces of the toil of these peoples are the very keystone of the objectives of Zionism and are intended to be a source of profit to the Zionist movement. In such circumstances, it is therefore

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the statement as published in *al-Shaab* (Algiers), May 10, 1971.

a duty to support a policy based on the recovery of natural resources and the exercise of all basic forms of activity on the part of certain governments and movements working for the liberation of the backward peoples, as a means of supporting the struggle for liberation of the Arab peoples in general and the Palestinian people in particular.

IV. The establishment of the spurious state of Israel through treachery and terrorism and through the expulsion of a whole people from their land is a flagrant violation of the principles of self-determination, international justice and human rights.

V. It is only natural that the Palestinian people, faced as they were with the international community's disregard of their national rights in their homeland, should resort to armed struggle as the only means of liberating and recovering their homeland.

VI. The Palestine revolution is a national liberation movement and an inseparable part of the Arab and world liberation movements.

VII. The Palestine revolution, which is a continuation of the Palestinian people's struggle over the last fifty years to obtain their freedom and independence, is the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people.

VIII. The Palestinian armed struggle is not a racist or sectarian struggle against the Jews or the Jewish religion, nor has it any religious character; rather it strives to liberate even the Jews themselves from the clutches of Zionism.

IX. The only sound way to escape all the dangers that threaten peace in the Middle East is to destroy the Zionist military establishment and set up the Palestinian democratic state which the Palestine revolution is striving to establish, and which will allow all its citizens of all religions equal rights without discrimination on grounds of religion, race or color.

Having reviewed all the above points those present declare the following:

I. Condemnation of the Zionist state, which is nothing more nor less than an artificial

entity implanted in the Arab territory of Palestine as a conspiracy aimed at consolidating the military, economic and political ambitions of imperialism in the Middle East.

II. Unreserved support and aid for the Palestinian armed resistance as being a just and legitimate movement, while all lovers of peace in the world and all liberation movements in the world should be called on to provide it with all kinds of support to enable it to achieve its goals.

III. Condemnation of all projects and attempts aimed at destroying the Palestine revolution, and in particular the massacres of the Palestinian people by the reactionary Jordanian authorities.

IV. Rejection and condemnation as totally unacceptable of all political schemes and projects which the forces of imperialism are endeavoring to implement on behalf of Zionism and against the Palestinian people, such as the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967 and the so-called Rogers Plan, and consideration of any solution which does not satisfy the Palestinian people and does not fully guarantee their rights.

## 106

### **Statement on Meeting Between Premier Chou En-lai and Vice-Chairman Kuo Mo-jo of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China and a Palestine Liberation Organization Delegation<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, May 9, 1971**

Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Kuo Mo-jo on May 9 met Abu Ammar Sa'ad, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization Delegation, and members of the dele-

<sup>1</sup> *Peking Review*, XIV, 20 (May 14, 1971), p. 9.

gation Abu Khaled, Abu Ali, Abu Feras, Abu Imad and Hamdi Mahmoud as well as the journalists from Palestine and other Arab countries visiting China and covering "Palestine International Week" activities in Peking.

Premier Chou En-lai and N.P.C. Vice-Chairman Kuo Mo-jo warmly welcomed the Palestinian and other Arab friends who came from the forefront of the struggle against U.S. imperialism and Zionism in the Middle East and had a photo taken with them.

Premier Chou En-lai and N.P.C. Vice-Chairman Kuo Mo-jo had a long, cordial and friendly conversation with all the members of the P.L.O. Delegation. Premier Chou also answered questions raised by the journalists.

Those present at the meeting included: Wang Hsin-ting, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army; Chi Peng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister; and Wu Teh, Vice-Chairman of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee.

## 107

### **Press Conference Statements by Premier Chou En-lai of China Reaffirming Chinese Support for and Aid to the Palestine Revolution, and Urging Continued Struggle and the Unification of the Resistance Movement<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, May 9, 1971**

*Q. What do you think of the attempt by American imperialism to impose a peaceful solution on the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab nation?*

*A. American imperialism will not be able*

to achieve this solution if it acts on its own. Look at the talks that have been going on between the United States and Vietnam since 1968. They have been going on for three years. At present the United States is being actively aggressive, but as long as the people of Vietnam and the three peoples of Indochina do not accept, the United States is powerless. We support the three peoples' demand that all hostile and subservient forces should withdraw from Indochina, and that the three peoples should settle their own affairs. If the Arab peoples stand up to the aggression of American imperialism and Zionist imperialism and unite without being taken in by the American distortion of facts, their strength will be greater than that of Indochina. The population of Indochina is over 50 million, while that of the Arab nation is over 100 million, and the population of Israel is three million. In the Middle East the only combatant directly involved in the field is Israel, whereas in Indochina America is directly involved with from half a million to six hundred thousand men, and with the subservient forces the total is more than a million. Beginning in a small way, the struggle of the Arab peoples has been going on for more than ten years. For the last six years and more, many countries have been supporting the struggle of the Arab peoples, just as they support that of the peoples of Indochina in their fight until victory in resisting American imperialism and in rescuing their homeland.

In Indochina today there are those who want to help the United States impose a peaceful solution without the total withdrawal of American forces, but these people will not succeed.

We hope that what is happening in Indochina will also hold good for Palestine and the Arab countries. As long as the Palestinian and Arab peoples persevere in their resolution and their views, they will win final victory and reach their goal; the American conspiracy will never succeed. And the key is unity: the Palestinian people and also all the Palestinian organizations and forces that have been carrying on a large-scale struggle

<sup>1</sup> Questions and answers relevant to the Middle East conflict excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Chou En-lai's press conference for Arab journalists as published in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 29, 1971.



against American imperialism since 1965 should unite.

In Indochina the American forces cannot be withdrawn and still implement the project of imperialism, because the subservient forces cannot be depended on. Therefore they have fostered and supported the subservient regime in Cambodia and the revolution broke out. Last year the subservient forces were not in a position that could be relied on either. This year they extended their war to Highway 9 in Laos. Most of the four divisions in Laos have been wiped out in the area near Highway 9.

The American forces provided air support behind the lines, and in this way the theaters of war in three Indochinese countries were linked together.

Two alternatives lie open to imperialism today: to recognize defeat or to withdraw all its armed forces and the subservient forces from Indochina so that the peoples may solve their own problems. This is what the three peoples, the peoples of the world and the American people are demanding. The other alternative is to extend the war to cover not only Indochina but South East Asia and China. From the first day we started supporting the three peoples of Indochina, we have been prepared and we have completed these preparations. We shall not engage in provocations, but if the war is extended into China, we shall have to fight the battle. Those who drew up the plan for Johnson and are doing so today for Nixon maintain that aerial bombing is not war, and that the bombing of North Vietnam is not war. But because China is so big and vast the United States would never get out again if it got entangled there. The American people do not want to fight in China. There are people who propose aerial bombing and a marine blockade of China, saying that this would not be war. The American Democratic Party asks: In what way is this not war? Did not the war in the Pacific start with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor?

Everything depends on the unity of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. In their struggle against American imperialism the Arab people of Palestine must be

given real support. The greater the fear of the great battle, the greater the danger.

*Q. Can the Palestinian revolution expect aid at the same level as that provided to the Indochinese revolution?*

A. For the sake of comparison, the aid we provide to the Palestinian people is not less than that which we provide to Indochina, but we are prepared to provide a great deal of aid. A moment ago I was talking to the Palestinian delegation about this subject. We hope that all the organizations that are really struggling against American imperialism and Israeli Zionism will really unite, and that the organization will become a command nucleus for the Arab people of Palestine, that the Executive Committee and the Central Committee will be more strongly united, that the command of armed struggle will in fact be granted to two organs, one political and the other military, and that our aid will be directed to their unified command. This is what we propose and what we hope. For our part we want to direct our aid to the unified command; for our part we want to make this clear.

All of you are responsible in the view of Arab public opinion, and we hope that you will work for unity in accordance with this call.

At the proposal of Sihanouk a summit conference of the Indochinese peoples was held last year, and it issued a communiqué on the unification of the combatants which soon played a role in unifying their ranks. We are sure that the Palestinian people will become more closely united every day as their struggle advances, and I call on you to promote this unity.

*Q. The Palestinian revolution is passing through a hard and difficult stage, in which it is beating a series of retreats. There have also been retreats in the case of the Chinese revolution. What are the fundamental laws of these retreats? What are their causes and symptoms, and in what ways can they be ended?*

A. The Palestinians must answer this question themselves. What I can say is that our experience shows that the Palestinian revolution has passed through twists and turns on its way. The course of revolution does not run smooth; it is crooked and tortuous. This means that it will take a long time and that the price will be heavy, but I do not understand the retreats. The struggle against the enemy means that there is no retreat, and if there is retreat it means that there is no struggle against the enemy. We do not permit retreat in the face of the enemy. We must maintain our struggle against the enemy. Retreat may take place but what do we do after defeat? We must determine the objective and subjective causes of the defeat. We are more concerned with subjective errors. On several occasions the Chinese revolution made mistakes, and the mistakes must be appraised. But no change can be made in the struggle against the enemy, because he wants to eliminate us. For this reason our course is tortuous—like that of a ship that has to avoid the concealed rock.

If we lose our strength we must wait until we can recover it. The motives for the Long March in which so many lives were lost were in fact the mistakes made by the Party. Chiang Kai-shek's hostile forces were greater than our forces, in spite of the fact that our forces had reached 300 thousand. Our forces were dispersed and scattered. We had a policy of confronting the enemy in his positions, but this policy could not divide his forces and the result was defeat. We had to depend on our fundamental principles, and we were forced to make the Long March.

The Palestinian case is not like ours. I was talking to the Palestinian delegation about this in detail a short time ago. But there are certain views which they could take as their point of reference. I do not want to declare these views, and will content myself with talking about the experience of our Party. Historical experience is the answer.

How many are you, the Palestinian people?

How courageous are you to fight the battle? There are three million [Israelis] fighting the battle against 100 million [Arabs]. The Palestinian revolution constitutes a point of weakness for American imperialism. The people want to resist imperialism. The way will be chosen by the people. We rely on the people. A new world will certainly appear.

## 108

### **Resolution Supporting the Rights of the Palestinian People and Their Recourse to Armed Struggle As a Means of Redressing the Infringement of Their Rights by Israel, Adopted by the Bureau of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers<sup>1</sup>**

**Budapest, May 9, 1971**

The I.A.D.L. Bureau met in Budapest from 7th to 9th May, 1971, and after consideration of the Palestine problem;

Declaring that the Palestinians expelled from their homes and prevented by force from returning there or subdued to Israeli repression to a discriminatory regime had, using their right of self-defence, to have recourse to armed resistance thus affirming the existence of a Palestinian people as an objective reality;

Considering that the Palestinian people has the right to national existence on its national soil and that, as all peoples, it has the right to self-determination;

Considering that nobody can dispose of its imprescriptible right on its territory and that no solution could be made of the Middle East conflict in contempt of its fundamental national rights and in the absence of its genuine representatives;

Considering that the struggle of the Palestinian people is inscribed in the national liberation movement waged by the oppressed

<sup>1</sup> English text of I.A.D.L. resolution as published in *Arab Palestinian Resistance*, III, 9 (September, 1971), pp. 77-80.

peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its ally, international Zionism;

Observing that the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance that could not be carried out by the Israeli troops is entrusted to Arab agents of American imperialism, and that the last bloody events of Jordan make clear that the "vietnamization" is used in the Middle East

The I.A.D.L. Invites all democratic lawyers and all peoples cherishing Justice, Peace and Freedom:

1. to support, in conformity with the principles of International Right derived from the United Nations Charter of the Statement of Human Rights, the right of the Palestinian people to the practice of its fundamental national rights and to its right of self-determination on its territory;

The negation of these rights by the Israelis and the continuation of Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people when preventing it from returning to its territory, constitute a slur on International Right, on Human Rights and on World Peace and justify the right of the Palestinian people to have recourse to armed fight;

2. to support the Palestinian Resistance which is the expression of the Right of the Palestinian people to the recovering of its national personality and its dignity;

3. to denounce the attempts made by the Arab reactionaries to liquidate the Palestinian Resistance;

4. to declare that real Peace could not be set up in the Middle East as long as the grave injustice of which the Palestinian people is victim will last and without the participation of its representatives.

## 109

### **Report of the Political Committee of the European Economic Community Setting Forth the Points of Near East Policy Agreed Upon by the Nations of the Common Market (Unofficial Text)<sup>1</sup>**

**Paris, May 13, 1971**

— II. The essential points of the accord may be stated as follows:

#### *The Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Akaba*

The delegations of the Six agree on these conclusions:

- The Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba must be regarded as international waterways to which the right of free passage applies.
- The peaceful settlement, based on Resolution 242, must guarantee this free passage.
- The guarantee of free passage must, for a period of time to be further defined, be assured by the presence of the United Nations. It is suggested that all states neighboring on the Gulf of Aqaba sign the agreement on free passage.

#### *The Suez Canal*

- Agreement on the following consequences:
- On the basis of Resolution 242, the principle of free passage for all states, including Israel, must be recognized.
- In order to lay down an unequivocal juridical procedure, it would be suitable to include in a peace settlement a reference to the 1888 Constantinople Convention, since according to international law this convention is the most important basis for the use of the canal. It would be appropriate to obtain an engagement by the U.A.R. to exclude any discriminatory

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German translation of the French text, excluding the Preamble and the Conclusion (I and IV), of the E.E.C. Near East Paper as prepared by experts of the several nations, submitted to the Political Committee, transmitted to the Council of Ministers and adopted by them at their Paris meeting with the stipulation that the text not be released, as published in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), July 14, 1971.

measure affecting the free passage of all ships or freight.

- Disputes about technical problems should be settled by arbitration. The Security Council will concern itself with differences of opinion regarding the principle of free navigation.

### *Demilitarized Zones*

Agreement on the time schedule concerning the Zones in the Near East, and on the consequences:

- Creation of demilitarized zones between Israel and its neighbors and of buffer zones in specified locations: in principle, these zones will be determined separately in individual cases taking into consideration the geographical conditions on either side of the border; these zones will form a security factor essential for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.
- Stationing of United Nations units: in the demilitarized zones: observer and control groups—unarmed; in the buffer zones: supervisory troops—armed;
- Observers and armed forces to be under the control of the Security Council. The Security Council will determine their composition and their stationing in the zone during an initial period which could extend at least five years; it will determine their financing and their status. The Security Council alone has the power, on periodic examination of the situation, to reduce, enlarge, or, by vote according to Chapter V, article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations, withdraw the forces;
- The groups and the armed forces will be placed under a multinational staff;
- The creation of demilitarized zones presupposes that the parties implement Resolution 242, particularly the two fundamental provisions on withdrawal and peace efforts: regard for the balance of the resolutions demands that these two problems be considered simultaneously.

Regarding relations between the demilitarized zones and the borders, the delegations of the Six are of the opinion that for the

reestablishment of peace in this area a general agreement is necessary, containing the following points:

1. The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war;
2. The withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the areas which were occupied during the last conflict, with the possibility of minor adjustments in borders and boundary lines existing before the last conflict, insofar as the parties agree on them;
3. The establishment of a collective system of guarantees.

### *Jerusalem*

The delegations of the Six approve of the plan calling for international administration of the old city and other sacred places; the states concerned should assent to this plan.

### *The Palestine Problem*

Concerning the Palestine Problem the delegations acknowledge that its solution depends on the freely expressed will of those concerned and on the agreement of the Arab States affected.

Regarding the refugee problem the delegations acknowledge that Resolution 194 of the United Nations General Assembly of December 11, 1948, must form the basis of a settlement. Measures, in particular the establishment of a commission, should be taken with the aim of:

- Guaranteeing to the refugees the free choice between gradual resettlement [in Israel] and settlement in other states, including compensation;
- Supervising, in the first case the circumstances of acceptance in Israel, in the second case the actual payment of the compensation awarded, and in both cases the reimbursement for damages incurred by the refugees.

In Munich, the ministers had envisaged possible steps by the European Community aimed at contributing to the solution of the Palestine Problem. The plan submitted by one delegation conforms to these intentions. The delegations ascribe fundamental im-

portance to this idea and agree with it in principle.

It is the basic idea of this plan that a contribution will be made on the part of Europe to the measures which are to be taken in the framework of a general and global plan regarding the settlement of the Palestine Problem.

This European contribution can be implemented only in the framework of a plan which is under the aegis of the United Nations, and in close cooperation with those states which have been directly affected by the refugee problem and with all those who can make a significant contribution to the financing of the endeavor.

The Six delegations propose that the member states of the community draft an aid program, as far as necessary in consultation with the organs of the community and with member states agreeing to examine the financial side of the problems.

III. The Political Committee suggests that the Ministers ratify the agreements concerning the Near East Problem made by the Six and that they recognize the following arrangements;

- A. Regarding further procedure, they decide:
  - a. to instruct their representatives at the United Nations to make the contents of the report of the Six the basis of their conversations with the Secretary-General, in order thereby to contribute to the progress of the Jarring Mission and to agreement among the Four, as well as, in a general sense, to support the peace efforts of the United Nations;
  - b. to send the text of the report to their representatives in the capitals of the Near East and in the other countries most concerned, in order that—provided the necessary discretion regarding the work of the Six is maintained—these representatives can coordinate their activities for peace;
  - c. to continue their consultations on the problems of the Near East;

- d. to charge the minister exercising the office of president with the task of informing the press in accordance with the guidelines which follow. Each individual minister will also consider himself directed by these guidelines.

## 110

### **Resolution on the Mediterranean and the Middle East Calling for Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Territories and the Full Participation of the Palestinians in a Middle East Settlement, Adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe<sup>1</sup>**

Strasbourg, May 14, 1971

The Assembly,

1. Recalling its Resolution 446 (1970) on the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East which still holds good;

2. Reaffirming that it is in the vital interests of the countries of Southern Europe and of Europe as a whole to pursue an active policy for peace in that area, particularly in order to reduce the dangers inherent in the Israeli-Arab conflict and the confrontation between the super-powers,

3. Considers that, on the basis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, peace talks should continue on all outstanding issues leading to an agreement negotiated between the parties involved, and in particular that they should recognise:

<sup>1</sup> English text of Resolution 490 (1971) (adopted by the Assembly at its Twenty-third Ordinary Session, 7th Sitting) as provided, on request, by the Council of Europe.

The Council of Europe is composed of the following member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.

(a) the need to establish a true armistice which must be binding on all parties until a negotiated peace agreement is reached;

(b) the State of Israel and its right to live in peace with its neighbours;

(c) the necessity for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 to secure and recognised frontiers as part of the application of a forthcoming peace treaty;

(d) the need to solve the political problems of the Palestinian population and to secure their full participation in a peaceful and democratic settlement in the entire area;

(e) the right of all countries to unrestricted freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba;

4. Reaffirms the important contribution that could be made by the member States of the Council of Europe towards the economic, social and political development of the Mediterranean and the Middle East as a zone of stability rather than a zone of outside influences by:

(a) working out a joint Mediterranean policy, for instance within the framework of the European Communities, with a view to harmonising as far as possible the association or trade agreements so far concluded, and extending their scope as a means of stimulating regional co-operation among the countries in that area;

(b) embarking on a plan of economic aid to the countries of the Middle East, in which priority should be given to alleviating the plight of the Palestinian refugees and which should contribute to raising the standard of living and of literacy, the development of agriculture and industrialisation, in short increasing economic productivity in the countries concerned.

## 111

**Message to the Assembly of the World Peace Council from Organization of African Unity Administrative Secretary-General Telli (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Budapest, Mid-May, 1971**

It is my very pleasant duty to convey to you on behalf of the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity a message of greeting and encouragement on the occasion of this session of the World Peace Council Assembly which has so fortunately initiated measures welcomed by us, since they deal especially with colonialism and racial discrimination, which are of major concern to the African peoples and governments. The presence of the representative of the General Secretariat at your session stresses the great interest attached by the Organization of African Unity to the seeking and preserving of peace.

More than any other continent Africa requires peace today, the young African States need peace and security in order to develop, but alas, throughout the world, peace is being threatened.

In the Middle East peace is still seriously threatened, and a permanent atmosphere of crisis reigns over this region. This condition is due to the attitude of Israel, whose negative role would be inconceivable without the important political, moral and material aid generously provided by its various allies. The Organization of African Unity has already studied the situation resulting from the non-application by Israel of the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November, 1967. In this connection it has appealed several times to Israel to accept this Resolution and apply it in full. At the same time it has expressed its solidarity with the United Arab Republic and its support for all the efforts that this country may employ in order to eradicate the consequences of the aggression

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the text of Telli's message to the 1971 Assembly of the World Peace Council, held in Budapest May 13-16, *Assembly of the World Peace Council: Documents* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1971), p. 17.

to which this O.A.U. member-state was subjected.

The Organization of African Unity supports a just and peaceful settlement of international disputes within the framework of the United Nations' Charter, but this support in no way jeopardises the assistance rendered by it to the people who are struggling to free themselves from the steel claws of imperialism, colonialism, racialism and the inhuman treatment meted out to their victims. Peace and colonialism cannot coexist. This is why the independent African States grouped within the Organization of African Unity have, since the very creation of that Organization, pledged themselves to do everything possible to liberate the parts of the continent as yet under colonial and racist domination. With this in view they have created a Committee for the Coordination of the Liberation of Africa intended to coordinate the assistance rendered to the independent African States and liberation movements recognized by the O.A.U. In addition no effort is spared within the United Nations' Organization and all the international agencies, as well as within the O.A.U., to find solutions to the distressing problems of colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa.

## 112

### **World Peace Council Resolution Criticizing Israeli Obstruction of a Peaceful Middle East Settlement, Praising U.A.R. Efforts Towards Peace, Upholding the Rights of the Palestinians and Supporting the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Budapest, May 16, 1971**

The serious events in the Middle East are

causing grave concern to the peoples of the world.

Today, wider and wider sections of public opinion are coming to realize that the conflict in the Middle East is a conflict between the Arab peoples, fighting for their national independence and social advance, and the forces of imperialism, in the first instance of U.S. imperialism, which works to tip the balance of forces in this area in its favour. It does not stop its endeavours to deal a blow to the Arab national liberation movement, to overthrow the progressive Arab régimes, to secure control over the wealth of that region, and to stabilize the South-East flank of the Atlantic Pact. Israel's expansionist policy and its growing dependency in all domains on the aid of the United States has turned it into an instrument for the application of U.S. policy.

The imperialists have not given up their efforts to thwart the Arab Liberation movement. They continue to encourage the Israeli aggressors. And at the same time, aware of the sharp drop in their prestige in the Arab world and the increasing drive for peace in the USA, they attempt to camouflage their political objections through intrigues and duplicity. This was evident in Rogers' recent tour, the aim of which was to guarantee and straighten out U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Without U.S. support, without the large U.S. supplies of modern weapons and unlimited financial assistance, it is obvious that Israel could not reject the UN resolutions for a just settlement of the conflict. The U.S. offers lavish encouragement to the intransigency and adventurism of the Israeli rulers. It torpedoes consultations between the Four Great Powers on the Middle East. It is evident that the U.S. has all the means to compel Israel to reason. The alleged differences between the U.S. and Israel are aimed mainly at camouflaging U.S. support for the policies of the Israeli Government.

On the key question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories, the ambiguities that the U.S. consciously maintains in its declarations are a cover for

<sup>1</sup> Text of resolution adopted by Commission II of the World Assembly for Peace, as published in *Assembly of the World Peace Council: Documents*, Budapest, May 13-16, 1971 (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1971), pp. 85-87.

its real support of the Israeli Government's expansionist policies. The United States is responsible for the mounting tension in the Middle East and for the continuing occupation of Arab lands by Israel.

Israel, for her part, pursues a systematic policy of obstruction in regard to all efforts for a just peace and refuses to implement the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November, 1967. It refuses to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, many times proclaimed in UN resolutions. It maintains links with the South African racialists.

In violation of the Security Council Resolution of November, 1967, Israel officially declares that it will not withdraw from the occupied Arab territories in their totality. There will be no peace in the Middle East while Israel persists in occupying Arab territories. The activities of the Israeli authorities directed at changing the character of Arab Jerusalem contradicts the Special UN Resolution on Jerusalem.

This sabotage of a political settlement by Israel is accompanied by the feverish measures to create a *fait accompli*, according to a pre-conceived plan, on a long-term basis for establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

Steps are made to accelerate the integration of the occupied territories by Israel. Their economies are transformed and turned into economic appendages of Israel. A genuine colonial policy is practiced. This colonial policy is pursued through brutal repressions which grow with the rise of the legitimate resistance of the Arab population and which provoke the condemnation of an increasing number of international organizations and movements. Forces in Israel itself, opposing war and occupation and struggling for a just peace on the basis of the full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution, are gaining in strength. We call upon world public opinion to condemn the repressive measures undertaken by the Israeli occupying forces against the Arab people in the occupied territories and to demand the release of all administratively imprisoned persons languish-

ing in Israeli prisons.

The UAR has exerted, and continues to exert, increasing efforts for a just political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. On numerous occasions it has given proof of being in favour of such a solution by adhering to the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

The positive replies given by the UAR to Ambassador Jarring's questions and the various proposals of the UAR for the implementation of UN resolutions, including the proposals for a resumption of navigation in the Suez Canal, have created favourable conditions for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. But despite the successive peace proposals of the UAR and other peace-loving states, Ambassador Jarring's mission is deadlocked. The responsibility for this lies squarely with the Israeli leaders and the United States.

The fundamental obstacle to a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East lies in the refusal of Israel to return the territories occupied in the 1967 war in their totality, as well as in the sizeable and growing support given to Israel by the United States and the Zionist movement.

It is the legitimate right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland. A lasting peace in the Middle East demands full respect for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including the right to self-determination, in accordance with the UN Charter.

The Palestinian Resistance Movement is part and parcel of the Arab liberation movement and the national liberation movement throughout the world. The Palestinian Resistance Movement enjoys, in its struggle against the occupation and for the just rights of the Palestinian Arab people, the sympathy and support of all the forces of freedom, justice, and national independence.

The World Peace Council takes a firm stand against all plots directed against the Palestinian Liberation Movement and condemns the continued attacks launched by the reactionary forces in Jordan which aim at the elimination of the Palestinian resistance as a step towards striking at the whole Arab Liberation Move-



ment in the interests of U.S. imperialism and the Zionist Israeli ruling circles.

The World Peace Council strongly reaffirms its full support for the struggle of the Arab peoples to liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression of 1967 and rebuff all imperialist intrigues and plots aimed at holding back the movement for peace, national independence and social progress in the Arab world.

The designs of the Israeli extremists and of the United States are destined to fail. Strengthened by the selfless aid of the USSR and other socialist countries, the growing isolation of Israel in the international community, and by the increasing support from the people of the entire world, the Arab peoples will defeat the aggression.

A just political settlement is possible in the interests of all peoples in the region. It constitutes the only alternative solution to the present situation, pregnant with great dangers for the peace of the world. The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, provides the basis for such a settlement. The forces of peace have the power to secure its implementation. The World Peace Council calls upon all national and international organizations and movements which stand for peace and justice to coordinate their efforts to this end, and to call upon the US Government to stop its support of the Israeli aggression.

### 113

#### **World Peace Council Appeal for Unconditional Application of U.N. Resolutions on the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**Budapest, May 16, 1971**

The situation in the Middle East remains a serious subject of concern to international

public opinion. At any moment, hostilities can be resumed and result in a conflict of world-wide proportions.

The occupation by Israeli armed forces of territories which are an integral part of the Arab States is the first obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in this region. The most recent declarations by Israeli leaders confirm their intention to annex territories acquired by force in violation of all principles of international law. The Arab people, together with all peoples who cherish peace and justice, will not tolerate for long this policy of *fait accompli* upheld by U.S. imperialism.

However, the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East presupposes:

The unconditional application of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November, 1967, and that of the UN General Assembly of 4 November, 1970; the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all territories occupied since the 1967 war; the recognition of all States in this region and of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine; the guarantee to all people concerned that they may live and develop in their own way. Thus, conditions would be created for a lasting peaceful settlement.

The Assembly of the World Peace Council, meeting in Budapest from the 13th to 16th May, 1971, solemnly appeals to all those who share its desire to contribute actively to the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East to acknowledge these proposals, discuss them and make them known throughout the world. The establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through their application.

The peoples and progressive movements of the world—including the anti-annexation forces in Israel—should develop their action on this realistic basis. This is today the only way of preventing the resumption of hostilities and the accumulation of the ruins and bereavements of war, and of reaffirming the legitimate rights of all peoples in this region including the Palestinian Arab people, to live free in their homeland.

<sup>1</sup> Text of appeal issued by Commission II of the World Assembly for Peace, as published in *Assembly of the World Peace Council: Documents*, Budapest, May 13-16, 1971 (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1971), p. 85.

## 114

**Television Interview Statements on the Prospects for a Middle East Settlement and the Possibilities of U.S. Guarantees to Israel, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

May 16, 1971

*Mr. Valeriani:* Mr. Secretary, you have just returned from a trip to the Middle East, and I'd like to ask you about that. Is the government crisis, the current government crisis, in Egypt going to set back the prospect for an interim peace settlement in the Middle East?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, we certainly hope not. There is no way of knowing for sure what the future developments in Egypt may be, but we are convinced, and I am convinced personally, based on the trip that I had and experiences I had there, there is a deep longing for peace among people all over the world, and it was particularly impressive in the Arab countries to me because no American had been in some of those countries for long—no American official had been there for a long time. I was the first Secretary of State to have been in Egypt since 1953, and I was tremendously impressed by the reception we got all over—street crowds, friendly people, people waving and cheering, and to me it was an indication of the success of President Nixon's foreign policy. We get very provincial in our attitudes about it. Everywhere I go, and every place I went on this trip, I was impressed with the fact that people throughout the world hail President Nixon as an outstanding world leader.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers' interview conducted by Joseph Kraft, Peter Lisagor, Henry Trehwitt, Richard Valeriani and Lawrence E. Spivak, on the National Broadcasting Company's television and radio program "Meet the Press," *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1667 (June 7, 1971), pp. 737-738, 738-739, 740.

The texts of Rogers' formal statements made in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (May 1 and May 2); Amman, Jordan (May 2); Beirut, Lebanon (May 3); Cairo, U.A.R. (May 4 and May 6); Tel Aviv, Israel (May 6 and May 8); Rome, Italy (May 8) at the end of the tour; and the text of his May 8 press conference in Rome, are all published in the *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1666 (May 31, 1971), pp. 694-702.

*Mr. Lisagor:* In concrete terms about the Middle East, Mr. Secretary, if an agreement on a pullback from the Suez Canal were reached, have the Israelis asked the United States for guarantees in the event that that agreement were violated?

*Secretary Rogers:* No, they have not.

*Mr. Lisagor:* Would this country be willing to give them guarantees on that?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I wouldn't want to answer hypothetically. It would depend on what type of guarantees they were talking about. I have said, and I repeat here today, that we think that the necessity for peace in the Middle East is so great that the United States is prepared to play any responsible role that we might be requested to play if that would insure a peace agreement.

*Mr. Trehwitt:* Mr. Secretary, I think those of us who were along on the tour of the Middle East would agree there were some signs of flexibility on the part of both the Egyptians and the Israelis while you were there. Has the upheaval in the Government of Egypt prevented any practical implementation or pursuit of that movement?

*Secretary Rogers:* I am glad you asked that question, Mr. Trehwitt. No, not at all. We have seen no sign that there will be any slowdown in the discussions that are underway, and I would hope that there will not be any. I have no—as I said earlier—any sure way of knowing what the future holds in Egypt, but to date we have had no indication that would suggest that the Government is not in complete control and that the conversations that we had there could still be very productive.

*Mr. Trehwitt:* Well, now you are going to New York tomorrow, I believe—

*Secretary Rogers:* That is correct.

*Mr. Trehwitt:*—to talk to the Secretary General and to Mr. Jarring. Should one view this as an undertaking on your part to transfer back to the United Nations forum the personal initiative you undertook in this trip to the Middle East?

*Secretary Rogers:* Not in the way you put it, because I have made it clear from the beginning that we based our hopes on Ambassador Jarring and his negotiations, and we think that the peace agreement that has to finally come about has to come about as a result of Security Council Resolution 242 and the negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

My trip there is to fill him in on what happened, to make it clear that we are not interfering with his negotiations. I am sure he knows that, because we talked to him before we left. We have been in touch with him since. But I do want to keep the focus of attention on Ambassador Jarring's negotiations.

*Mr. Spivak:* *Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back to the Middle East. Do you think an interim agreement is possible unless Israel is assured that her ships can go through the canal?*

*Secretary Rogers:* You are speaking about the Suez Canal?

*Mr. Spivak:* *Yes, the Suez Canal.*

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I think if an interim agreement is worked out that the Suez Canal should be opened to international traffic of all nations.

Now, this is one of the issues, of course, that is under consideration at the moment. I think there is a possibility of working out an interim agreement. If that could be done, I think it would contribute very much to the possibilities of a final peace agreement, and certainly the thing that impresses one when he travels in that area is the tremendous potential that exists if peace could be achieved and the terrible prospects that exist for everyone in the area if you can't achieve a peace agreement. So I am hopeful that common sense and good judgment and the hopes of the millions of people that live in that area will result in a peace agreement, and I think the fact that President Sadat has indicated a willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel is a very constructive step.

## 115

**Statement on the Canadian Position on the Right of Peoples to Independence by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada During a Visit to the U.S.S.R.<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, May 18, 1971**

The Soviet people, like the other peoples of the world, are profoundly disturbed and indignant at the continuation of the aggressive war in Indochina and the continued existence of a hotbed of war in the Near East. Wherever the freedom and independence of the peoples is being infringed, the position of the Soviet Union is perfectly clear: The aggressor must withdraw from other people's land, and it is necessary strictly to respect the right of the peoples to independent development and to the arrangement of their internal affairs in accordance with the will and aspirations of the peoples. Our country is invariably on the side of states and peoples that have been subjected to imperialist aggression and upholds their rightful cause.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of Trudeau's speech at a luncheon given in his honor by the Soviet Government, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 20 (June 15, 1971), p. 19. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

## 116

**Statements on U.S. Involvement in Efforts Towards a Middle East Settlement and on the Results of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers' Middle East Tour, Made by Assistant Secretary Sisco Before an American Congressional Committee<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1971

The part of the Near East and South Asia region which poses the greatest threat to peace and to our interests is the Middle East because, as the President has on more than one occasion remarked, the dispute between the Arabs and Israelis contains the potential for great power conflict. We are, therefore, investing great effort in trying to create a durable peace in place of enduring hostility and the fragile armistice arrangements of the past.

As indicated above, we have made some progress in that direction over the past year. The guns have been silent along the Suez Canal for 9½ months. A negotiating process began early this year under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, the special representative of the U.N. Secretary General, looking toward agreement between the parties on a final settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. Both of these developments are the direct result of the initiative we took with the parties in June 1970.

In February of this year, the United Arab Republic took an important and positive step when, in response to an initiative by Ambassador Jarring, it stated explicitly that it is prepared to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. It is precisely this commitment that Israel has sought for four years since the June war. It is therefore of interest and concern to the United States that Israel move to match this step on the part of Egypt. This is of particular significance since the climate

in the Middle East for making progress toward peace is propitious. In an area rich with a history of lost opportunities, it is essential that present favorable indicators be utilized for forward movement toward peace. It was to give added momentum to the peace efforts that Secretary Rogers recently visited four Arab countries and Israel—the first visit by an American Secretary of State since 1953. I want to take this occasion to describe my principal impressions.

We went without illusions about the obstacles to be overcome and about the risks of awakening undue expectations that such a trip would entail. But with so much at stake for the peoples of the area and for our own interests there, these were risks that had to be taken. There are risks in action; the risks of inaction are greater.

I would summarize the results of the trip briefly under three headings:

First, the Secretary's presence underlined the depth of our dedication to the search for peace, and made clear that the United States is and will remain engaged in the search for a peaceful settlement. As part of an arduous and intensive schedule, the Secretary saw for himself some of the key territorial points which are at the heart of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In his talks with the leaders of all the countries visited, and in letters which he carried from the President to each chief of state or head of government, he was able to explain our policies directly at the highest level, and to convey a message of friendship and hope from the United States. He was able not only to reinforce long-standing ties with the governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel, but also to contribute to an improvement of our relations with Egypt. The fact that, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, the Secretary went to Cairo and was cordially received, is a measure of the pragmatic and realistic approach of both our governments.

Second, the visit provided an opportunity to explore ways of renewing the momentum of the negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. This remains our primary objective. Particularly in Israel, to which Ambassador Jarring and indeed the

<sup>1</sup> Text of excerpts from the Middle East portion of Sisco's statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee as issued in "U.S. Policy Documents" (Beirut: USIS, May 19, 1971).

whole world look for a more positive response to his February initiative, we sought to explain elements of our policy about which certain differences have developed between us and to stress the need for flexibility in present favorable circumstances in the search for peace which alone can bring the long run security Israel seeks. At the same time, Israel has no reason to doubt the constancy of American support for its security and strength and for the acknowledgement by its neighbors of its right to a sovereign and secure existence.

Third, we explored with Israel and Egypt the question of an interim agreement for reopening the Suez Canal. Given the legacy of hostility and suspicion between Arab and Israeli, movement toward peace in the Middle East will be a step-by-step process of building confidence on the part of each side in the other's intention. An interim agreement for opening the Canal could be a first step in that process. Both Egypt and Israel put forward constructive ideas. Neither side wants to forsake clarity and understanding by undue haste. However, serious difficulties remain to be overcome, and will require time to resolve. I would not therefore want to leave the impression that such an interim agreement is imminent. As a result of the Secretary's trip, however, there is now more basis for hope that progress can be made on this question. The gap between the parties has been narrowed; there are areas of commonality or parallelism in their views.

We shall continue our efforts to play a useful diplomatic role on the Canal question, as both Egypt and Israel have asked us to do, because we believe it could provide the means both to preserve the cease-fire and to create conditions in which further movement will be possible toward a final overall settlement. We do not believe an interim settlement is a substitute, or that it would diminish the urgency of continuing the search for a final settlement. It would not touch such fundamental issues as Jerusalem and the refugee problem, which must be dealt with in an overall settlement. Nevertheless, the Secretary's recent trip has given fresh impetus to all of those who look ahead to a better future for the peoples of the Middle East.

It is fair to ask: why has the United States involved itself so directly and vigorously in the peace-making process? There are very good reasons.

First, we have important political, economic and strategic interests in the area. They are best protected by a policy of friendly relations with all countries in the area. This is a policy which also serves the interests of both Arabs and Israelis.

Second, peace and stability in the Middle East will create conditions in which these interests can prosper. Continued stalemate and turmoil can only serve interests inimical to ours.

Third, we have an interest in stabilizing the area because this diminishes the risk of war.

## 117

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Spain of Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Madrid, May 19, 1971**

Returning the visit which the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. López Bravo, made last February to Tunisia, Mr. Mohamed Masmoudi, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Tunisian Republic made an official visit to Spain from May 17-19, 1971, accompanied by his wife. This trip came within the framework of the regular contacts established between the two governments.

Examining the situation in the Mediterranean basin, the two ministers, conscious of the importance of this sea to their respective peoples, were firmly convinced of the urgent need for ending the dynamics of tension which exist in the region and for contributing to bringing about in it the dynamics of peace

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Spanish text of the communiqué, *Revista de Política Internacional* (Madrid), No. 115 (May-June, 1971), pp. 251-252.

and security, and expressed their hope that the Mediterranean will come to be a meeting place and a factor of rapprochement between Europe and Africa. Mr. López Bravo and Mr. Masmoudi resolved to work tirelessly in this direction to arouse a Mediterranean consciousness which could promote understanding and lasting solidarity among the coastal nations.

Both ministers affirmed that the security of the Mediterranean is indivisible and so must include that of the eastern part of that sea. In this respect they expressed their profound concern about the situation which still prevails in the Near East and welcomed with hope the recent initiatives undertaken to get a process of peace underway in the region. The two ministers reaffirmed their adherence to the United Nations resolutions on the Near East conflict and remain convinced that any solution to it, in order to be just and lasting, must take into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

## 118

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Taiwan of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Taipeh, May 20, 1971**

At the invitation of His Excellency President Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Chinese Republic, His Majesty Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, paid an official visit to the Republic of China 20–25 *Rabi' al-Awwal*, 1391 A.H. (May 17–20, 1971 A.D.).

His Majesty King Faisal made a general statement of the Arab point of view as regards the Palestine problem and the injustice inflicted on the Arab nation by the expansionist ambitions of Zionism, and the President

of the Chinese Republic expressed his belief that the Palestine problem must be solved on a basis of right and justice, and that the Palestinian people must recover their natural rights if peace and stability are to return to this sensitive area of the world.

## 119

### **Statement Made by U.N. Representative Kosciusko-Morizet of France After Informing U.N. Secretary-General U Thant of the European Economic Community Accord on the Middle East<sup>2</sup>**

**New York, May 21, 1971**

During their meeting in Paris on May 13 and 14, the Foreign Ministers of the six governments of the Common Market reached agreement on a preliminary report on the problems of the Middle East submitted to them by the political experts. On May 18 they informed the four candidate countries—Great Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland—of it. At the end of the meeting, Mr. Maurice Schumann made the statements that you have already heard.

My government, which is at present chairman of the Six, has directed me to inform the Secretary-General of the main outlines of this agreement. The important points are:

1. Absolute support for the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring;
2. An appeal to all parties concerned to ensure the success of Jarring's mission;
3. Reaffirmation of approval of Resolution 242 (adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967) as a basis for a peaceful settlement and the necessity for all its provisions to be implemented;
4. Europe's willingness to contribute, when the time comes, and to the extent of the means of the different countries, to the social and economic stabilization of the Middle East situation;

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), May 21, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the French text as published in *Le Monde*, May 23–24, 1971, p. 5.

5. The decision to complete and follow up these first efforts, bearing in mind the constant development of the Middle East situation.

This step is important both for Europe and for the United Nations, and I think that the Secretary-General was extremely pleased with it. It is the first time that Europe, as such, has approached the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is thus a manifestation of European will and an indication of the progress made in political cooperation. There are many reasons for this, the first and foremost being the very old and traditional links that the European countries have with the Middle East.

Another reason is the importance for Europe of a just and durable peace being established in the Middle East. The six European countries believe that in this their support for the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring is by no means negligible.

## 120

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Yugoslavia of Foreign Minister Nguyen Ti Binh of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Belgrade, May 22, 1971**

During extensive talks conducted between a Yugoslav delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Mirko Tepavac and a delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam led by Foreign Minister Nguyen Ti Binh, and on other occasions, a fruitful exchange of views was carried out on the main questions of international relations and especially on the development of the situation in Indochina and ways of further advancing cooperation between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

and the Republic of South Vietnam. The talks were conducted in an atmosphere of sincerity, friendship and understanding.

The two sides confirmed their solidarity with the struggle of peoples against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and foreign interference and for freedom and social progress. They confirmed their support for the struggle of the Arab peoples for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

## 121

### **Press Interview with F.R.G. Foreign Minister Scheel Commenting on the European Economic Community Position Paper on the Middle East<sup>2</sup>**

**Bonn, May 22, 1971**

*Q. The Israeli government has let it be known through the new German ambassador Jesco von Puttkamer that they feel uneasy about the latest Near East resolution of the European Common Market Council of Ministers, and in particular about [the role of] the German government. Tel Aviv suspects that it foreshadows a change in hitherto prevalent policies towards Israel. Is this correct?*

*A. There has not been a change in Germany's policy towards Israel. The European foreign ministers have developed, after careful deliberation, common guidelines for their position on the Middle East. They have neither passed a resolution nor offered a patent formula for a Middle East settlement. They have merely done their duty as Europeans: they have tried to speak with one voice on a subject which is of immediate interest to all Europeans.*

*They have stressed the necessity for a*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the excerpted English text of the communiqué as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 508 (June 5, 1971), p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the German text of Scheel's written answers to questions posed by the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* as published in that paper on May 23, 1971; text provided, on request, by the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn.

peaceful solution in the Middle East, declared their support for the current peace efforts, especially those of U.N. Mediator Jarring, and expressed their readiness to help in the economic and social reconstruction of the region after a peace settlement. All this is consistent with the generally recognized interest of all parties involved in the Middle East conflict.

*Q. How did agreement among the E.E.C. foreign ministers come about? Was there pressure from the French, and why has the report of the political advisors remained secret?*

A. The unity of the six European foreign ministers is the result of many months' deliberation by political advisors and Middle East experts of the foreign ministries. They presented a report to the ministers. The consultative machinery set up by the European states after the 1970 Munich conference has thus proved its value.

Everybody's opinion went into the report which became the basis for the foreign ministers' decision. Nobody pressured anybody: to have done so would have been contrary to the spirit of the consultations and all the activities which accompanied them. This imputation is particularly offensive to the partners who all took part in the consultations on an equal basis.

It is obvious why the report was not made public. The Europeans don't want to tell the world about their consultations; they just want to arrive at a common position. That's a delicate diplomatic process. It brooks no indiscretion, no outside intervention. Those who are always demanding European unity should, in this instance especially, be able to see that.

*Q. What are the effects of these European consultations? How binding are they on individual governments?*

A. We are on the way to working out common policies. We will continue to be concerned with the Near East and other important subjects which directly affect Europeans. We will show that Europeans are capable of developing common positions. The actual results of the consultations are

less important than putting into practice and improving Europe's political coordination. We must have the courage to make decisions. People must get used to the idea that Europeans speak with one voice on political questions which concern them even when they are controversial.

*Q. You announced a long time ago that you were planning to go to Israel. When do you think you will make the visit?*

A. It will probably take place in the first half of July. We will announce the final date shortly after consultation with the Israeli Foreign Minister.

## 122

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Japan of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Tokyo, May 25, 1971**

At the invitation of the Japanese government, His Majesty King Faisal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia paid an official visit to Japan from *Rabi<sup>c</sup> Awwal* 25-30, 1391 A.H. (May 20-25, 1971 A.D.).

In the international field the two sides declared that they opposed the use of force in the settlement of international disputes and that problems should be solved by peaceful methods based on right and justice. They affirm that the aggressor must not be allowed to reap any benefit from his aggressions and agreed that the two states shall continue to cooperate with each other in playing their part in establishing peace in the world and developing international cooperation based on respect for the principle of equality of rights for all peoples. His Majesty King Faisal explained the Arab point of view on the problem of Palestine and the injustice inflicted on its people by the expansionist ambitions of Zionism. His

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), May 26, 1971.



Excellency the Prime Minister of Japan expressed the hope that at an early date the Middle East would enjoy peace based on justice in conformity with the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967, and His Excellency believes that the Palestine problem should be solved on a basis of right and justice and that the people of Palestine must enjoy their natural rights if peace and stability are to return to this sensitive part of the world.

## 123

**Statement of Support for the Arab Cause and the Rights of the Palestinians Included in the Report Delivered by First Secretary Husak to the Fourteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, May 25, 1971

At the present time international attention is directed towards the Middle East where, as a result of the expansionist and aggressive policy of Israel, supported by American imperialism, a dangerous hotbed of war has been created. We take an unqualified and resolute stand on the side of the United Arab Republic and the other Arab states fighting to overcome the consequences of Israeli aggression, for the return of the occupied territory and for the assertion of the just claims of the Palestinian people. A realistic way for establishing peace in this area is fulfilment of all the provisions of the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization of November 1967.

In this connection we express our conviction that on the basis of common interests in the struggle against imperialism and for social

progress our relations with the United Arab Republic will continue to develop fruitfully.

## 124

**Statements on U.S. Support for Continued Israeli Occupation of Arab Territories, Made by U.S.S.R. President Podgorny During an Official Visit to the U.A.R.<sup>2</sup>**

Cairo, May 26, 1971

The Israeli aggression poisons the atmosphere not only in the Near East but also far beyond it. Israel's ruling circles and their American protectors are responsible for the fact that the consequences of the aggression have still not been eliminated, and the situation remains very tense. The aggressors are deliberately leading efforts toward a settlement into an impasse, sabotaging the fulfillment of the Security Council's November resolution and rejecting the U.A.R.'s constructive proposals for a settlement of the Near East conflict that would take into account the legitimate rights and interests of all states and peoples in this area, including the Arab people of Palestine.

In the four years that have gone by, representatives of the U.S.A. have made a good many mellifluous statements about their alleged desire to restore peace in the Near East. They really are not averse to facilitating the reaching of a "peace" settlement, but only the kind of settlement under which the U.S.A., using Israel as its tool, could dictate its will to the Arab states.

In other words, attempts are now being

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the translation of the Russian text (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, May 28, 1971), of Podgorny's speech at a dinner in his honor given by U.A.R. President Sadat, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 21 (June 22, 1971), pp. 5, 28. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Czechoslovak text (*Rude Pravo*, May 26, 1971) of Husak's report, *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, IX, 12-13 (196-197) (August 6, 1971), pp. 76-77.

made to achieve that which could not be achieved by military means.

Everyone now sees clearly who it is that has a direct interest in the continuation of the Israel occupation of Arab territory. Washington's surprisingly "delicate" treatment of its protégés—the Israeli rulers—can be explained in no other way. The Israel imperialists persist in their claims to age-old Arab lands, while they are receiving more and more new consignments of up-to-date weapons from overseas. The Israeli militarists are carrying out a policy of genocide in the occupied Arab lands, while the U.S.A. is presenting them with checks for hundreds of millions of dollars.

This position is not unexpected. It stems from the very nature of American imperialism.

Only specific actions that have the goal of curbing the Israeli aggressors are of real importance today. An ostentatious love of peace, no matter with what promises and measures designed for external effect it is accompanied, will mislead no one. When President Anwar Sadat declares that the U.A.R. will not cede "one inch of Arab territory or give away any rights of the Palestinians," this position is received with understanding by Soviet people and all honest people in the world and meets with their support.

The aggressor and its transoceanic protectors must realize—and the sooner they do the better it will be for them—that the peace-loving forces will never become reconciled to the policy of brigandage and annexations that some people would like to make a norm of present-day international relations. The Arab peoples are not alone in their just struggle against imperialist aggression. Their defense capability is increasing day by day. To counterbalance the arrogance and recklessness of the aggressive forces, the sacred hatred of the Arab peoples for their enemies is growing all the time, and their solidarity and militant unity in the struggle to safeguard their legitimate rights are intensifying.

There is no doubt that the rightful cause of the Arab peoples will triumph and that a

lasting and just peace will be established in the Near East. This will create favorable conditions for the further independent and free development of the states and peoples of this area.

Dear friends! The Soviet Union is always together with the people of the United Arab Republic, both in the construction of a new life and in the struggle against the intrigues of international imperialism and Zionism.

## 125

### **Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, May 27, 1971**

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic,

firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-round cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps strengthen world peace,

inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples,

determined persistently to struggle for stronger international peace and security in accordance with the invariable course of their peaceable foreign policy,

reaffirming their allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

motivated by a desire to consolidate and strengthen the traditional relations of sincere friendship between the two states and peoples by concluding a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and thus creating a basis for their further development,

agreed on the following.

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the Russian text of the treaty (*Pravda*, May 28, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 23 (June 5, 1971), pp. 2-3.

## ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-round cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific-technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.

## ARTICLE 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will cooperate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples.

## ARTICLE 3

Guided by a desire to contribute in every way toward maintaining international peace and the security of the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic will continue most resolutely to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the High Contracting Parties will come out for peace, relaxation of international tension, achievement of general and complete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

## ARTICLE 4

Guided by the ideas of freedom and equality of all peoples, the High Contracting Parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to come out against imperialism, for the full and final abolition of colonialism in pursuance of the UN Declaration on Granting Independence to All Colonial Countries and Peoples, and unswervingly struggle against racialism and apartheid.

## ARTICLE 5

The High Contracting Parties will continue to expand and deepen all-round cooperation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technological fields—in industry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, exploitation of natural resources, development of power engineering, training of national personnel and other fields of economy.

The two Sides will expand trade and sea shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most favoured nation treatment.

## ARTICLE 6

The High Contracting Parties will further promote cooperation between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

The two Sides will promote wider cooperation and direct ties between political and public organizations of the working people, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

## ARTICLE 7

Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples, and attaching great importance to coordinating their actions in the international arena in the struggle for peace, the High Contracting Parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states.

In the event of the development of situations creating, in the opinion of both Sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or re-establishing peace.

## ARTICLE 8

In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the United Arab Republic, the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere

on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in training UAR military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to resist aggression in general.

#### ARTICLE 9

Proceeding from the aims and principles of this Treaty,

each of the High Contracting Parties states that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or undertakings directed against the other High Contracting Party.

#### ARTICLE 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that its commitments under the existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty and it undertakes not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with it.

#### ARTICLE 11

The present Treaty will be operative within 15 years from the day it enters into force.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties declares a year before the expiry of this term its desire to terminate the Treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and so on until one of the High Contracting Parties makes a year before the expiry of the current five-year period a written warning of its intention to terminate it.

#### ARTICLE 12

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the near future.

The present Treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic.

Done in the City of Cairo on May 27, 1971,

which corresponds to 3 Rabiaa el-Thany 1391, Hejira.

For the Union  
of Soviet Socialist  
Republics  
N. PODGORNÝ

For the United  
Arab Republic  
ANWAR SADAT

#### 126

### **Statements on the U.S.S.R.-U.A.R. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Its Significance for Events in the Middle East Made by U.S.S.R. President Podgorný During an Official Visit to Egypt<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, May 27, 1971

The coordination and conduct of joint actions in the international arena, the implementation of joint economic projects, cooperation in increasing the defense capability of the U.A.R., the development of contacts between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Union of the U.A.R., the strengthening of ties between public organizations—all this is being done by the peoples and governments of our countries in the interests of their common anti-imperialist struggle and of growing Soviet-Arab friendship. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic will now rise to a higher level and enter a qualitatively new phase.

We have just signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic....

This treaty reinforces and cements that

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the condensed translation of the Russian text (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, May 29, 1971) of Podgorný's speech at a dinner he gave in honor of U.A.R. President Sadat during an official visit to Egypt, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 23 (July 6, 1971), p. 5. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

which ripened and took form in recent years during the joint struggle of our peoples against imperialism and neocolonialism and for national and social progress on the noble foundation of the great ideas of socialism.

We are confident that the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which creates a long-term basis for the development of relations between the peoples of our countries, will bear abundant fruit. It opens ever broader prospects for the comprehensive cooperation of our states and peoples, makes it possible to increase our joint efforts directed against the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists and their accomplices, and increases our contribution to the strengthening of international security and to the cause of peace and socialism.

At the same time, the treaty between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic signifies a new blow to the plans of international imperialism, which is trying in every possible way to drive a wedge into the relations between our countries, to undermine our friendship and to divide the progressive forces.

Dear friends! The situation in the Near East remains tense and dangerous.

Having failed to achieve their aims by organizing direct Israeli aggression, the imperialists of the U.S.A. and other countries are now trying to maneuver. They have donned the false toga of "peacemakers," arbitrarily appointing themselves arbiters in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, the rulers of Israel, continuing their provocationist expansionist course and refusing to bow to the will of the peace-loving peoples and the U.N. decisions, stubbornly insist that they will not yield the Arab lands seized by Israel and that this line remains the basis of Israel's policy. . . .

The time of colonialism has gone, never to return; no one will ever bring it back, and none of the schemes of the imperialists, no matter how subtle they may be, are destined to come true. They will suffer inevitable defeat.

It is this end that the joint efforts of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and the Arab national-liberation movement are directed. This development of events is facilitated by the intensified consolidation of

the Arab states and peoples on the firm basis of their common goals in the anti-imperialist struggle. This is also served by the unity of the progressive forces within each Arab country and throughout the Arab world.

## 127

### **Socialist International Resolution on the Middle East Rejecting an Imposed Solution and Appealing to the Arab States and Israel To Negotiate on the Basis of U.N. Resolution 242<sup>1</sup>**

**Helsinki, May 27, 1971**

a) The Socialist International recalls the resolution of its Congress at Eastbourne in June 1969 pledging its full support for Dr. Gunnar Jarring's mission as defined in the Security Council Resolution of November 1967.

b) The Socialist International welcomes the fact that the cease-fire which came into effect in August 1970 has been maintained and calls on the Arab states concerned and Israel scrupulously to observe the cease-fire, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of June 1967—which was accepted by all parties—until a peace treaty is concluded.

c) The Socialist International notes with concern the recent escalation of the arms race through the despatch of new advanced weapons to Egypt and Syria and urges that the balance of arms between Israel and its neighbours be maintained.

d) The Socialist International emphasises the importance of ensuring that a peace settlement be based on negotiation and agreement between the parties and not be imposed upon them from the outside. It appeals to the Arab states and Israel to co-

<sup>1</sup> Text of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Council Conference of the Socialist International provided, on request, by the Socialist International.

operate with Dr. Jarring by negotiating on the basis of United Nations Resolution No. 242 without prior conditions in order to conclude and sign a binding contractual peace agreement.

## 128

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.A.R. of President Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, May 28, 1971**

N.V. Podgorny, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, paid an unofficial visit to Cairo from May 25 to 28, 1971, at the invitation of Anwar Sadat, President of the United Arab Republic and Chairman of the Arab Socialist Union.

The greatest attention was paid in the negotiations and talks to the dangerous situation which continues to exist in the Middle East as a result of Israel's imperialist aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries. The two Sides stated that, relying upon the support of the United States, Israel acts as an aggressor. The essence of its position has an openly expansionist character. It tries to strengthen its hold in all sections of the Arab territories occupied in 1967. Rejecting all the proposals for a political settlement of the conflict and persisting in its unwillingness to withdraw its troops from the territories occupied in 1967, Israel thus demonstrates its desire to continue its expansion and places itself more and more in a position of increasing international isolation. Israel ignores the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. Its policy constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

The two Sides are unanimous in the fact

that the constructive policy of the United Arab Republic on the issue of a Middle East settlement by political means creates favourable possibilities for the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East. This policy of the UAR is meeting with support in all peace-loving countries and of world public opinion.

Both Sides reaffirmed that a lasting, durable and just peace could be established in the Middle East only on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967 and the implementation in full measure of the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The Soviet Side confirmed that the Soviet Union would continue lending the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries all-round assistance and support in their just struggle against Israeli aggression, for the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel, and for a fair settlement of the Middle East conflict.

UAR President A. Sadat expressed deep gratitude to the Soviet Union for the aid and support it is giving the UAR in its struggle against Israeli aggression and highly appraised the statement of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "For a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East!"

In the course of the talks and discussions, complete satisfaction was expressed with the development of the relations of friendship and all-round fruitful cooperation between the USSR and the UAR in the political, economic, military and other spheres, which are founded on the common aims of the anti-imperialist struggle and social progress. The two Sides confirmed their mutual desire to use every opportunity for the further development of these relations.

During the meetings, questions were discussed on the development of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Union of the United Arab Republic, and agreement was reached on concrete measures for implementing the plans of party contacts in 1971.

Prompted by the desire to consolidate the traditional relations of friendship between the two states and peoples and firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, May 28, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 23 (June 5, 1971), pp.4, 4-5.

all-round cooperation between the USSR and the UAR accords with the interests of both states and serves the cause of strengthening universal peace, the two Sides adopted a decision to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic.

This Treaty was signed in Cairo on May 27, 1971, by N.V. Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Anwar Sadat, President of the UAR, for the United Arab Republic. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the UAR is a historic document in the relations between the two countries. It is directed towards supporting the just national-liberation struggle of the people of the UAR for building up a better future.

The two Sides expressed their resolve to work for the earliest elimination of the aftermath of Israeli aggression and restore a just peace in the Middle East which would take into account the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The two Sides expressed confidence in the fact that the coming visit of President Anwar Sadat of the UAR to the USSR, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government, would be a further contribution to the development of fraternal relations between the two countries.

## 129

### **Statement of Concern with the Situation in the Mediterranean Issued by the NATO Defense Planning Committee<sup>1</sup>**

**Brussels, May 28, 1971**

7. Against the background of the continuing growth of the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, Ministers gave special consideration to a report on steps to improve the Alliance's defence posture in that area. They noted that a number of measures to this end had already been taken, particularly for surveillance, while others were in hand or under consideration; and that countries were working both on an individual and on co-operative basis as well as with the NATO Military Authorities to produce the most effective and co-ordinated results. Ministers asked for a further report on the progress made to be submitted to them at their next meeting. In the same context they noted that the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session had approved a political directive for unscheduled activities of the Naval On-Call Force for the Mediterranean, as an additional mode of activity to regular planned activities for that force, for which authority has existed for some time.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the final communiqué of the Defense Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in ministerial session at its regular Spring Meeting, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni* (Ankara), No. 80 (May, 1971), pp. 66-67.

The Defense Planning Committee is composed of representatives from all fifteen member states of NATO, as follows: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

## 130

**Interview Statements by Israel M.K. Avnery Advocating a "Palestine State" on the West Bank and Rejecting a Democratic State for Both Arabs and Jews in All Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

May, 1971

*Avnery:* In the Israeli context, there is an important difference between the two views: when one talks about a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, then something could be done about it immediately. If one insists it must include Transjordan, then there is a beautiful pretext for doing nothing. It means until Amman—the Amman of Hussein or the Amman of Arafat—wants to start negotiations, nothing can be done about it. It relieves the Israelis of doing anything.

*Q. Do you have any glimmer of hope that Palestinians will accept your proposal?*

*Avnery:* I am quite sure they will.

*Q. Why?*

*Avnery:* Because there are 1.5 million Palestinians in the occupied territories who would want to get rid of us and who know perfectly well that they will not make peace with us. I think there is a major difference between Palestinians outside of Palestine and Palestinians inside Palestine.

*Q. Are the leaders you see and their views representative of Palestinian opinion?*

*Avnery:* No one is representative of Palestinian opinion because there is no elected leadership. But you have the mood of the people which is obvious. What does an average Palestinian in Ramallah think? Do they like Israel? Do they think Zionism is a good thing? No, they do not think it is a good thing. Do they love the *fedayeen*? They love the *fedayeen*. They think the *fedayeen* are sacrificing themselves for the Palestinian people, they are the heroes of the Palestinian people. Do they think the *fedayeen*

can ever get Ramallah out of this situation? No, they know the *fedayeen* cannot do it.

Do they want to wait a 100 years for Arafat to liberate Palestine? No because they know in a 100 years not only will they be dead but in another five years there will be another 20 *kibbutzim* around Ramallah.

*Q. How popular are your views in Israel? How typical are they of other 'dovish' groups?*

*Avnery:* This depends on what kind of views. When we criticise Zionism I would say they are not very popular, because Zionism has become in Israel a kind of State religion, a dogma and a doctrine. But they are far more popular when we speak of peace, of recognition of the Palestinians, or a Palestinian state in Palestine.

*Q. Could you briefly elaborate your peace proposals?*

*Avnery:* This country is the homeland of two nations, the Israeli nation and the Palestinian nation. Each has a right to the land. Coexistence between the two peoples will be based on two or three national states. The state of Palestine should come about in the Arab part of Palestine, namely the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem, as a unified city, should be the capital of both Israel and Palestine. There should be an open frontier between the two states for free movement of people and goods. Security arrangements should be mutually agreed upon by the two states.

The people of Transjordan should be invited either to join the Palestinian state or become a third party to the arrangement. The refugees should be granted a free choice between repatriation and compensation. The resettlement of the refugees should be a joint effort of the two states. Both states should work for the integration of the whole country within a framework of a confederacy of [all states in] the Middle East. Both states should gradually and with common consent create common federal institutions to enable a gradual shift of jurisdiction and sovereignty from the two states to a unified structure for the whole country.

*Q. The practical interpretation of your proposal,*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Uri Avnery's interview with *Mid East* as published in *Middle East International*, I, 2 (May, 1971), pp. 23–24, 24.



*the November 1967 UN Resolution and what the Rogers 'peace initiative' implies appear similar, that is, a withdrawal to the 1967 lines. You do not seem to be offering anything more to the Palestinians.*

*Avnery:* I did support the UN Resolution and the Rogers initiative from the beginning, long before the Israeli government. But the basic difference is that the Rogers initiative and the UN Resolution would have again turned over the [occupied] territories of Palestine to Jordan and Egypt, thereby again denying the Palestinians the right to exercise self-determination and the setting up of their own sovereign state.

We, on the other hand, want the Palestinians to set up a state of their own. We want to create a new reality in Palestine by having an open frontier between the two states and at least the beginning of a framework for the reunification of the country, which the Palestinians want more than anyone else.

*Q. In a recent statement Dayan threw cold water on suggestions for a Palestine state in the occupied territories. He said that one state whose capital is Amman (Jordan) and one state whose capital is Jerusalem (Israel) are enough.*

*Avnery:* Dayan has become against a Palestinian state. Immediately after the war there was a feeling among some that Dayan was in favor of a Palestinian state. Some of his people definitely were and I suppose he was too.

\* \* \*

[On the possibility of a "democratic State for both Jews and Arabs"]:

*Avnery:* It is nonsense.

*Q. Why?*

*Avnery:* It is absolute nonsense.

*Q. You said earlier you were in favor of pluralism.*

*Avnery:* It is absolute nonsense from beginning to end. This program completely ignores the major fact of our life that we are an Israeli nation. When they talk about Palestinians and in purely religious terms—Jews, Christians and Moslems—but refuse to talk about Israelis and Palestinians, it means a complete negation of everything we are. They want

to turn us back to what we were 100 years ago. We shall not go back to what we were 100 years ago.

This is also qualified by the Palestinian Covenant. Not one single commando dreams of having a Palestinian state with the Israelis who are there today.

Let's make it quite clear. We are the majority in Palestine today. If all the Palestinians go back to Palestine we still will be the majority. Do the *fedayeen* really want a secular, nonsectarian state governed by the majority in which the majority will decide to call the state Israel? And to have a Law of Return? The Israelis are the majority. They are today the majority and when this comes about they will still be the majority.

*Q. So what are you scared about?*

*Avnery:* It is nonsense. I do not want a Palestinian state in which the Arabs dominate the Jews nor an Israeli state in which Israelis dominate the Arabs. I do not believe in it. It is bad. This is just opening the door for an endless struggle between the two people instead of getting some situation in which they can live. I never heard any Fatah person really spelling out what they have in mind because it is unrealistic. It won't work.

A Palestinian will not give up his Palestinian nationhood. Fatah is a nationalistic movement.

## 131

### **Statement Supporting the Arab Cause in the Middle East and Condemning Israeli Aggression, Issued by the Sixteenth Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Mongolia<sup>1</sup>**

**Ulan Bator, Early June, 1971**

On behalf of all members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and all working people of Mongolia, we representatives of

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the statement, *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, IX, 14–15 (198–199) (August 27, 1971), p. 36.

Mongolian Communists voice our emphatic support and militant solidarity with the Arab peoples, courageously defending their just cause in the struggle against the aggression and expansionist policy of the Israeli reactionary circles and their imperialist patrons.

Contrary to the just demands of the peoples of the Arab East and world public opinion and grossly violating the generally recognized norms of international law, the Israeli military are stubbornly resisting a political solution of the Middle East crisis, refusing to withdraw their troops from the occupied Arab territory and flagrantly ignoring the UN decisions.

In its expansionist policy towards the Arab countries the Israeli rulers are relying on direct support and protection from the imperialist circles of the United States who speak about a political solution of the Middle East conflict while fanning the hotbed of war in the Middle East in the attempt to prevent the free and progressive development of the Arab nations.

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and all Mongolian people, together with all revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces of the world, decisively condemn the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and demand that the Israeli government show respect for the rights and interests of all Arab peoples, including the Palestinian Arabs, and immediately withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territory in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

We sincerely hail the staunch and courageous Arab peoples who are resolutely resisting the Israeli aggressor, relying on the support and aid of the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and all the peace-loving progressive forces of the world.

The 16th Congress of the MPRP declares that the Mongolian People's Republic will continue consistently supporting the courageous struggle of the Arab peoples to liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression and to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Mongolian Communists and Mongolian people are certain that the just struggle of the Arab peoples for their freedom,

independence, territorial integrity and progressive development will be successful and that the Israeli aggressor, attempting to foist his will upon the Arab peoples, to undermine their unity in the struggle against imperialism and international Zionism and to weaken the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the Middle East will suffer a disgraceful defeat.

### 132

#### **Statements Emphasizing the Importance of Maintaining an Independent French Policy in the Middle East and Warning Against Superpower Intervention, Made by Foreign Minister Schumann of France During a Foreign Affairs Debate in the Senate<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, June 1, 1971

We defend Israel's right to existence and security: I have always said this and I gave expression to it on an occasion that you have recalled. But at the same time we make a point of cautioning Israel against a tendency which our experience has shown us is always dangerous—the temptation to annex.

Is it then surprising that we should disagree when—according to *Le Monde* on May 30—there were “insurmountable differences of opinion,” at the Conference of the Socialist International in Helsinki, at which Mrs. Meir was present. The Scandinavian socialists can hardly be suspected of ulterior motives vis-à-vis their sister party in Israel! In the same way, how can men like Mr. Ben-Gurion, the former Prime Minister of Israel, and

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the excerpted French text of Schumann's replies on Middle East policy as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1971), pp. 199–202.

Foreign Minister Schumann's speech and debate statements in the National Assembly on June 9 (*Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1971), pp. 228–229 and 234) contain essentially the same points.

Mr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress, who distrust the policy of annexation as strongly as we do, be suspected of unilateral distrust of Israel?

For my part I change neither my principles nor the words I use to express them, whether the visitor welcomed in Cairo is called William Rogers or Nicolas Podgorny. But I do claim that the chances of peace in the Middle East are not increased when one superpower takes action there alone, thereby drawing in the other superpower and arousing its rivalry. This is still true even if—as I too believe to be the case—both of them want to avoid the worst. I say this to help you to understand the spirit of our policy.

First of all there was a factual omission in the question: there was no mention of the talks held in Paris on May 13 and 14, and then on May 18 between the Foreign Ministers of the six countries of the European Community and later expanded to ten when the candidate countries were brought in. Thus we did not shirk the difficulties involved in making a start on that European political cooperation you wish for! The Middle East headed the agenda. I do not need to emphasize how important these talks were for Europe, taking place as they did at a time when she is passing through a stage at which, although her currencies are in danger, there is every hope that she will be enlarged—you will understand why I say no more. Thus Europe as a political entity has taken its first steps, without stumbling. In the words of the closing statement, “the Ministers placed on record their agreement.” You know—but perhaps you do not know that this was proposed by France—that it was agreed that the report should be kept secret. So I shall restrict myself to the essential point that comes in the third paragraph of the press release: “The Foreign Ministers reaffirm their approval of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 and stress the necessity for its being implemented *in toto*.”

Are the Common Market countries going to assume an active role in the Middle East crisis? No. It is not in our interest to offer ourselves as another mediator in the conflict, but to support the international community,

whose will is expressed at the United Nations through the General Assembly, which recently adopted a new resolution, and through the Security Council, whose four permanent members have always recognized that there is an interest higher than national interests and, finally, through the Secretary-General, U Thant, to whom we reaffirm our loyalty.

In fact it was their anxiety to help U Thant and his special representative, Mr. Jarring, that was the only reason—but it is a sufficient one—for the discretion observed by my colleagues, at the request of their President, in connection with the report I have just mentioned. We did not want the import of our communication to be weakened by propaganda or publicity considerations.

Another significant fact: the journey of the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, who stopped off in Paris to confer with the French Foreign Minister. I should like to play a tribute to the clear-sighted determination, the straightforwardness and good will of my friend and colleague. In answering the many questions he put to me, my only concern was to help him. And I know that, as far as he could, he took my answers into consideration.

What was his guiding idea? The same as had some time before been formulated by President Nixon after a statement which I will not call courageous—you would challenge me if I did—but unexpected, by the Egyptian government, which constituted a *de facto* recognition of the State of Israel. “Never have the chances of peace been greater,” said Mr. Nixon. It was these chances that William Rogers wanted to seize, and this does him credit. I remember his emotion when he said to me: “If, against all probability, we miss them, we should perhaps have occasion to regret it one day.”

How did he intend to seize these chances? Not by asking new concessions of the Egyptians, but by ensuring that the Israelis gave direct answers to Jarring’s memorandum, rather than to Egypt’s reply to it. Was this a piece of legal subtlety? Certainly not! To have replied to the Jarring memorandum would have been to take up a clear position, through an international undertaking, on

the problem of the evacuation—conditional evacuation—of the occupied territories. It would have been an explicit admission or repudiation of the temptation to annex.

Once William Rogers had failed on this crucial point, would he be able to secure the adoption of a settlement restricted to the reopening of the Suez Canal? It is not surprising that this question should have been asked with increasing anxiety and scepticism. The Security Council resolution is a whole; there is a link between the first phase of evacuation and the subsequent withdrawal of the occupation forces to the international frontier.

If the problem remains undivided, it is not improbable that the American government, to which the credit will be due for clearing the ground, will once again resort to the international organization and its good offices. I shall soon have the opportunity of seeing Mr. Rogers again in Lisbon, and later in Paris, and I shall report to your Foreign Affairs Committee the outcome of these talks. A third element has appeared to complicate the situation. I refer to the internal crisis in Egypt, mentioned with all due respect to a sovereign state. Six months after he came to power, Mr. Sadat has broken with the collegiate leadership established after Nasser's death, dismissing Ali Sabri from the vice-presidency and accepting the resignation of six ministers and three leaders of the Arab Socialist Union. He wished by this to affirm his authority and the legitimacy of his power. This is not our business. What is certain—even the Israeli leaders say so—is that the Egyptian people want peace. Their leaders have proved it by accepting the Jarring memorandum. There must be no turning aside from this course. There is nothing suggesting that Mr. Sadat has changed the orientation of his policy on this point.

What lessons can be learned from developments in Egypt? As far as I am concerned only one: France is not wrong to sum up her policy in the Middle East by saying that there, as elsewhere, she opposes and dreads the confrontation of blocs.

This brings me to the events alluded to

by M. Monteil in his question. To justify our independent position as regards groupings of powers, we must start from reality, that is to say, from the current situation in the Mediterranean. What is this situation? It more than ever resembles that which we have constantly described and made known. Two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are progressively increasing their presence and their influence. We may deplore this, but France does not have the power to change this situation. In any case, we must take precautions against these dangers. The greatest would be an armed confrontation. Fortunately this is not very probable, but it would be disastrous enough if there were to be permanent cold war in the Mediterranean basin. This is what would happen if the international community abandoned the only strength at its disposal—that of right. It has no intention of doing so—last November 4 the General Assembly adopted by a large majority a resolution calling for the implementation of the United Nations recommendations. The four permanent members of the Security Council, without ignoring the preoccupations of the parties immediately concerned, maintain that there are higher interests which they must safeguard. This is not much, but it is something, for those who do not dissociate politics from morality.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt the powers bordering the Mediterranean, and France as the largest among them, have a graver responsibility than do others. This was the theme of M. Taittinger's contribution to the debate, and I share his feelings.

Two camps are face to face, while the opposition between the powers that support and arm them is stronger than anywhere else in the world. France is not involved in this opposition, which leaves so little room for maneuver. She would no longer be independent if she changed her policy of an embargo on arms supplies to the countries on the field of battle or her principle of non-acquisition of territory by war. She would be regarded as having joined one of the camps.

If this had already happened, it would never have been possible for our European partners to state, in a joint communiqué,

their agreement with our Middle East policy. Not only should we have deprived ourselves of any chance of taking action in the settlement of the conflict, we should also have played our part in increasing division in the Mediterranean.

Without this presence of an impartial and neutral France, there would be a vacuum which the forces of both camps would not be long in filling—remember this when you raise the Libyan problem—and the risks of a general conflagration would be increased.

You have sometimes blamed General de Gaulle—and in this connection let me tell you that it does not embarrass me to be reminded of the weightiness of my past allegiances—you have blamed General de Gaulle's general policy for isolating France. But what about the effects that the policy you have just outlined would certainly have led to? No, there is today no change in our Middle East policy. It is only a matter of minor modifications.

There is no need for me to repeat to this tribunal what I said to the Foreign Affairs Committee on the conditions for the implementation of the contract concluded with the Libyan government. Only when you can demonstrate that the engagements entered into have not been fulfilled will you be able to claim that we are acting in contradiction to our policy.

You have spoken of diplomatic embargo. I have recently had very long talks with Mr. Abba Eban. Our ambassador in Israel sees Mrs. Meir regularly and I did not have to wait for your exposé to be aware of Israeli policy. Mr. Eban knows very well that he can see me whenever he wants. So it is a problem of substance, not of form.

Far from justifying any change in our Mediterranean policy, the development of Franco-Algerian trade relations, the disappointing results of the Jarring mission, the consolidation of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, are so many reasons for maintaining that policy in the interests of all the Mediterranean countries without exception.

At a time when certain Mediterranean countries might be tempted to adhere to

one or another of the blocs, when the solution of the conflict seems more difficult, when the Arab governments are providing themselves with the means to reinforce their action, it is particularly useful to affirm the independent and peaceful presence of those countries which believe that it is essential that all the Mediterranean states should cooperate. France has made a rendez-vous with the only future which is not disfigured by the horrors of war and the grimaces of hatred. She will keep it.

### 133

#### **News Conference Statement by U.S. President Nixon Commenting on the Possible Effects of the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Treaty on a Middle East Settlement<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, June 1, 1971**

*Q. Mr. President, what effect will the Soviet-Egyptian treaty have on your efforts to get a peaceful settlement in the Middle East?*

*The President:* Well, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty will have effect only in terms of how it might affect the arms balance. In the event that this will be followed by an introduction of more weapons into the Middle Eastern area, it can only mean a new arms race and could greatly jeopardize the chances for peace. We trust that that is not the case.

It is too early to appraise the treaty in terms of what it could mean in terms of introducing arms into the area.

As far as we are concerned, we continue to support the truce, which is now in its 10th month. We continue to work for an agreement—either an interim agreement if necessary; of course, a comprehensive one if possible.

And we are not going to allow this treaty to discourage us insofar as seeking that agreement is concerned. We seek normal relations

<sup>1</sup> Question and answer on the Soviet-Egyptian treaty excerpted from the excerpts of the transcript of Nixon's news conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1669 (June 21, 1971), p. 791.

with all of the countries in the area, including the U.A.R. And we believe that the chances for an agreement are still there. Whether the Soviet follows up with large-scale arms shipments into the area will determine whether or not it increases the chances for peace or sharply increases the chances for war.

## 134

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Iraq of a Party and Government Delegation from North Korea (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, June 2, 1971**

At the invitation of the National Command of the Baath Party and the Government of the Iraqi Republic, a Party and Government delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, headed by Mr. Pak Song-chol, Member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Korean Socialist Workers' Party and second Deputy Premier, paid a friendly visit to the Iraqi Republic May 24-31, 1971.

The two sides, Korean and Iraqi, declare their full support for the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their usurped rights and to liberate their land, Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), June 3, 1971. An Iraqi Party and Government delegation had visited Korea at the end of April and the resulting communiqué, issued in Pyongyang on April 30, 1971 (see *al-Jumhuriya*, May 3, 1971), had also affirmed Korean-Iraqi support for the Palestine Resistance. Prior to the Korean delegation's visit to Iraq, the delegation had gone to Syria (May 19-24); the resulting joint communiqué issued in Damascus on May 26, 1971 (see *al-Baath* (Damascus), May 27, 1971) condemned Zionism and imperialism and demanded Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. In August, Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika visited North Korea; the resulting joint communiqué, issued in Pyongyang on August 13 (see *al-Shaab* (Algiers), August 18, 1971), made much the same points as the above Korean-Iraqi one.

The two sides affirm their determination to provide all aid and support to the Palestine Resistance which has proved its ability to continue and develop under any circumstances, and proved how deeply it is rooted in the hearts of the Palestinian people. In the view of the Korean and Iraqi peoples, it is the sole legal representative of the aspirations of the Palestinian people. In this connection the two sides strongly condemn the conspiracies of American imperialism and Zionism and their agents, aimed at achieving the total liquidation of the Palestinian cause and the intrepid Palestine Resistance. They also condemn American schemes against the Palestinian people in particular and the Arab people in general.

The two sides expressed their belief and confidence that the Palestinian people will achieve final victory in their struggle against American imperialism and Zionism, with the full assistance of the revolutionary peoples of the world.

## 135

**Position Paper Stating Israeli Reaction to the Conclusion of the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Friendship Treaty and Urging an Offsetting of New Soviet Military Aid to Egypt, Issued by the Embassy of Israel in the U.S.A.<sup>2</sup>**

**Washington, June 3, 1971**

The Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and co-operation, signed in Cairo on May 27, 1971, is the first pact of its kind that Moscow has entered into with a country that is both non-Communist and that lies far from the Soviet border. In substance and scope it is radically different from the Moscow agreements with such non-Communist states as Finland, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey whose territories are contiguous with the

<sup>2</sup> Abridged text of the policy background paper issued by the Embassy of Israel in Washington, as published in *Jewish Frontier*, XXXVIII, 7 (416) (July-August, 1971), pp. 7-8.

Soviet frontiers. These treaties are essentially limited to the demands of Russian national security and are construed to ensure that the neighbor territories shall not be used as bases for attack against the Soviet Union proper. What makes the treaty with Egypt so unprecedented and far-reaching is its resemblance to the treaties governing the relationships between Russia and the Warsaw Pact states. A comparison of the language and pattern of the Egyptian treaty with, for example, the treaty between U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia of May, 1970, shows a sufficiently striking similarity to infer that the document signed in Cairo was at least drafted in Moscow by Soviet-policy planners. There are, to be sure, differences between the Warsaw pact treaties and the Egyptian accord. But, on the purely political level, they share a common quality and philosophy of a long-term relationship with the Soviet Union—in the case of Egypt fifteen years—that embraces virtually every facet of national life: economic, military, diplomatic, social, cultural and ideological.

For the Soviet Union the treaty with Egypt represents an important landmark. Its terms do not merely formalize an existing *status quo* of Russian assistance and co-operation; they grant Moscow the legality of presence and a say in the affairs of Egypt for the next fifteen years (Article 11). Of particular significance is Article 7, the "consulting" clause. By it Egypt undertakes "to concert" its international policies with the Soviet Union and "to regularly consult...at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states." This goes further even than the wording of the Soviet treaty with Czechoslovakia which is less specific and which avoids the use of the term "concert" and the principle of "regular" consultations. Article 7 is perhaps the most indicative clause of the whole treaty with respect to the degree of the commitment Egypt has made to the Soviet Union on the political level.

On the military level, Article 8 spells out the Soviet long-term commitment to "*continue to develop co-operation in the military field...with a view to strengthening [Egypt's] capacity to eliminate the consequences of the aggression as*

*well as its ability to stand up to aggression in general*" (meaning military aid in the event of any future hostilities with another party, not necessarily related to the Israel-Egyptian conflict).

Article 7 (regular consultation), Article 8 (military aid unrelated to the conflict with Israel) and Article 11 (fifteen years duration), all indicate that the pact is not merely an instrument dictated by the needs of Egypt's conflict with Israel and the Soviet involvement in it. Egypt and the Soviet Union have agreed, as a matter of principle, to regular their future relations and to concert their future policies under all circumstances, no matter how the Israel-Arab dispute may develop. It is in this respect that the treaty is a milestone for Soviet policy in the Middle East. It gives Moscow what it has long sought, namely, the political consolidation of its presence in the Middle East by winning a long-term legal title to intervene in the affairs of the region's dominant Arab state, Egypt, irrespective of who controls the reins of government in Cairo and in a manner that transcends the Israel-Arab conflict.

The duration and substance of the treaty are themselves evidence, if such were needed, that the continued Soviet presence in Egypt is not simply a function of the tensions generated by the Israel-Arab conflict nor is it predicated upon the conflict. Hence, the absurdity of the suggestion that were Israel but to risk making unilateral concessions this would inevitably bring about a slackening of the Soviet grip over Egypt and an Egyptian movement away from the U.S.S.R. towards the West. The facts of politics and power in the Middle East since 1967 are themselves a refutation of this dangerous simplification.

The Soviet Union's massive investment in Egypt and the political course it has pursued transcend the conflict with Israel and have throughout been predicated, in the first instance, upon its own power interests. Egypt is of crucial importance to the U.S.S.R. strategy in the Middle East because it is the advance base for the initiation of future power moves as the opportunities arise.

Israel's caution in insisting upon testing the

intentions of the other side—among other things through a detailed negotiation—has throughout been influenced by this recognition of Soviet strategy and by the decisive role the Soviet Union is seeking to play in dictating that kind of a political solution which would serve Russia's own policies and interests. What it seeks through its own involvement in the political-military process is the maintenance of conditions for its own prestige and power by supporting Egypt and the other Arab countries in their effort to achieve a settlement on their terms: total Israeli withdrawal; mass Arab influx into Israel; sealed borders; an international force; international guarantees.

Any progress towards an interim or total settlement between Israel and Egypt is wholly conditional upon the continued maintenance of the cease-fire situation. This, in turn, is dependent upon the maintenance of the balance of power on two levels:

(a) The preservation of Israel's defensive credibility in face of the commitment, undertaken by the Soviet Union in the treaty, to extend the supply of weapons to Egypt for an indefinite period. This aspect of the treaty was particularly hailed by Sadat in his address to the Egyptian People's Assembly on June 2, a few days after the accord was signed. He described the Soviet arms-undertaking as a "new element." "We wanted this treaty," he said, "because it added new guarantees to our struggle [against Israel] that previously were unstipulated." It would be disastrous to minimize the implications of this Soviet guarantee in terms of the local arms-balance, and the consequences that would result from a shift in it.

Of equal importance to the maintenance of the arms-balance as a factor in preventing the renewal of hostilities is the necessity to ensure a political-deterrent posture of such credibility that would prevent any miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Union, leading it to believe that it might enjoy a greater freedom of military action than it has had until now.

136

**Press Release on the Proposal That International Law Should Apply to Guerilla Warfare Made by Delegate Blix of Sweden to the Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 4, 1971

Mr. Blix said that the present rules of International Law, which were too rigid in their application, had not been developed with a view to covering guerilla war. They ought therefore to be brought up to date, otherwise there was a risk that support for the rules of International Law from the expanding world community would be undermined. He went on to point out that another immediate danger was that war would become more brutal. If a guerilla fighter was in practice never protected by the rules of warfare, he would have practically no inducement to observe the rules of warfare himself. If, on the other hand, he knew that he would have prisoner-of-war status when he was captured, he would himself have every reason to keep within the bounds of these laws and to exercise restraint in his type of fighting.

Mr. Blix declared that the rules requiring a combatant to wear a distinctive sign and to carry his weapons openly should be eased. However, in his opinion, it was hard to say how far the present rules should be eased, for far-reaching revision might expose the civilian population to greater dangers. If almost every belligerent act by persons in civilian clothes carrying concealed weapons was to be protected, the result might only be that military forces would see an enemy in almost every civilian and act accordingly. Mr. Blix suggested two steps that could be taken to offer better protection to guerilla fighters without endangering civilians. If states were to refrain from making use of the

<sup>1</sup> English text of press release as published in *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1971*. New Series: 1: C: 21 (Stockholm: Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1972), p. 130.



death penalty and to make a determined effort to stamp out the use of torture, this would help significantly to lower the level of brutality. Torture and other cruel and degrading treatment of captured persons were prohibited unconditionally by International Law. Similar methods were used, especially against guerilla fighters, to extract information from them about their organisation. It was desirable that the Governments should make explicit commitments that they would stamp out all use of torture and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment.

## 137

**Statement Expressing Concern at the Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean Issued by the North Atlantic Council at the Close of a Ministerial Session<sup>1</sup>**

**Lisbon, June 4, 1971**

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Lisbon on 3rd and 4th June, 1971.

12. Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Council in Permanent Session. While welcoming the efforts currently undertaken to re-establish peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, they observed that developments in the area as a whole continue to give cause for concern. In the light of the conclusions of this report, they instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue consultations on this situation and to report thereon at their next meeting.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the text of the North Atlantic Council communiqué, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1670 (June 28, 1971), pp. 819, 820.

The North Atlantic Council meets semiannually and is composed of the permanent ministerial representatives of the fifteen member nations of NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

## 138

**Soviet Analysis of U.S. Middle East Policy Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda (Condensed)<sup>2</sup>**

**Moscow, June 5, 1971**

During recent months, much has been written in the United States and Western Europe concerning Washington's aspiration to "play an active role" in the Near East. A number of bourgeois newspapers have been viewing prospects for solving the present Near East crisis in light of this activeness. How much stock can be placed in these arguments, and what motives are behind them?...

To explain the U.S. "initiative," one must examine the events preceding the announcement of the "Rogers Plan." After receiving American Phantom fighter-bombers at the beginning of 1970, Israel launched air raids against military and non-military targets deep inside the United Arab Republic. The raids, which received frank coverage even in the Western press, were undertaken in pursuit of largely political ends, namely, development in the U.A.R. of an atmosphere of resentment toward the country's leadership and the fomenting of demonstrations against the Egyptian government, which was said to be incapable of providing a reliable national defense. To further exacerbate the situation, Israeli propaganda raised a great to-do about "open skies over Egypt."

Those skies were quickly closed to Israeli airplanes, however, as a result of measures that the U.A.R. undertook, with the Soviet Union's assistance, to strengthen its anti-aircraft defenses. Threatened with substantial

<sup>2</sup> Condensed and translated from the Russian commentary "U.S. Maneuvers in the Middle East," by Ye. Primakov, Assistant Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute on World Economics and International Relations (*Pravda*, June 5, 1971, p. 4), *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 23 (July 6, 1971), pp. 17-18. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

losses, Israel halted its lawless encroachments on the U.A.R.'s interior regions in mid-April.

It was at this precise moment that the "Rogers Plan" was unveiled. The immediate goal of this plan was to preempt the center of the stage for the U.S. in the settlement of the Near East conflict. It was a step calculated by Washington to weaken the Arab countries' ties with their friends and provide America with a stronger foothold in the Arab world, while at the same time preserving the U.S. strategic policy of full support for the Israeli expansionists.

In developing the Rogers Plan, the Secretary of State undertook a visit to the Arab countries and Israel at the beginning of May, 1971. . . .

America's self-styled "mediation" maneuver was nevertheless undertaken mainly as an attempt to restore U.S. positions in the Arab countries—positions that had markedly weakened as a result of the anti-American orientation of the Arab national-liberation movement and the all-out support the U.S. government had been giving to the Israeli expansionists.

The U.S.A.'s major interests in the Arab world are largely related to petroleum. Western experts, manipulating such purely formal indices as the fact that oil imported from the Arab countries supplies only 3% of U.S. domestic petroleum requirements, have been propagating the notion that "the U.S.A. is not at all dependent on Arab oil." On the other hand, from 60% to 90% of the fuel and power requirements of the U.S.A.'s principal allies—Britain, Japan and all the rest—are provided by oil supplied by the Arab countries. Arab oil is supplied to all U.S. overseas military bases, including those in Europe and the Mediterranean and those connected with NATO, CENTO and SEATO. It is shipped to the American and Saigon puppet armies that are waging the dirty war in Indochina. The importation of Arab oil will become ever more significant for the U.S. in conditions of the progressive depletion of that country's oil resources.

Nevertheless, the principal U.S. concern

is with the profits being obtained by American oil monopolies operating in Arab countries. According to press data, these monopolies transfer at least \$1,500,000,000 annually to their American bank accounts. These enormous sums substantially reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. Now that the leading country of the capitalist world is in the throes of a currency crisis, one can readily imagine the fate of the dollar if the flow of profits accruing to American monopolies from the exploitation of the Arab countries' national riches and the Arab peoples' labor were suddenly to cease. . . .

Inasmuch as the "blitzkrieg" action aimed at overthrowing the progressive Arab regimes has taken on a long-drawn-out character and unilateral support of Israel has begun to threaten America's positions in the Arab world, however, that segment of American monopoly capital which is connected with petroleum extraction in the Arab countries has, as a rule, called for "maneuvering." Pressure exerted by this segment of the U.S. oil business was not the least of the factors impelling Rogers to undertake this trip.

That trip was made largely for the purpose of revitalizing pro-American sentiment, which is still rather rife in a number of Arab countries. Certain Arab journalists were characteristically alleging, on the eve of Rogers' visit, that the United States held the "key" to the solution of the Near East problem. This "thesis" aroused widespread indignation in the U.A.R., whose people know from personal experience that the U.S. holds a key of quite another sort—the key that has opened the floodgates to a heavy flow of arms to Israel. This "thesis" was subsequently replaced by a more "flexible" one: Every possible step, it was said, must be taken to "neutralize" the U.S.A., as though an imperialist power whose aspirations are wholly bound up with those of the Israeli ruling elite could be "removed from the game" or won over to the side of the progressive Arab regimes. Could American imperialism possibly be expected to abandon its alliance with international Zionism or ignore the special place that the Israeli lobby occupies in the U.S. military-industrial com-

plex and the American propaganda apparatus?

The American maneuver that was designed to drive a wedge between the U.A.R. and the Soviet Union has reached its climax since the completion of Rogers' visit. One reflection of it has been the provocative campaign of misinformation that the imperialist press has launched in response to recent internal events in the U.A.R. As is known, a group of ministers and heads of the Arab Socialist Union were removed from power in the United Arab Republic. The purposeful representation of these events—which were purely domestic in character and had no connection with the problem of any particular “orientation” of the U.A.R.—as a “clash between pro-Soviet and pro-Western forces in Egypt” has begun in the West. This provocative interpretation of events is intended by American politicians to promote the “estrangement” of the United Arab Republic from the Soviet Union. But such plans do not rest on solid ground. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. that N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, and Anwar Sadat, President of the U.A.R., signed in Cairo has dealt a crushing blow to those plans. The significance of this treaty lies not only in the fact that it consolidates results of diversified and friendly cooperation between the two countries *that have already been achieved*, but also in the fact that it opens up *new* horizons for such cooperation in all areas: economic, political and military. And this, as the Cairo press has emphasized, has created a key condition for strengthening the U.A.R. as a bastion of progressive forces in the Arab world and establishing a just peace in the Near East—a peace in the interest of all peoples.

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**Radio Interview Statements by Military Administrator of the Israeli Occupied Territories Gazit Commenting on the Attitudes Towards Israel of the Arab Populations of Gaza and the West Bank<sup>1</sup>**

June 5, 1971

*Gazit:* I do not think that after four years of Israeli administration in the territories there is any more readiness today to accept the Israeli administration as a fait accompli or as a permanent solution of their fate in the territories whether in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. On the other hand, I certainly believe that there is today a greater atmosphere of moderation and de facto coexistence between the residents and the Israeli administration in the territories and between the residents and Israeli society and the Israeli economy. This applies to both regions, but naturally more to the West Bank than the Gaza Strip.

*Q. What is the situation with regard to the young intelligentsia, what is called here the young generation, the generation which will lead the Arabs in the territories after five or 10 years? Have they become more moderate or more extremist?*

*A.* I would say that generally the same description which I gave also applies to them, particularly in the West Bank—in Judaea and Samaria....

*Q. For more than a year we have been enjoying relative peace in Judaea and Samaria as compared with increasing subversive activity in the Gaza Strip. Can you explain the significance of this?*

*A.* First of all, I somewhat disagree with the facts you cite. The relative peace in Judaea and Samaria is more peace in the sphere of civil rebellion which bothered us during a certain period in Judaea and Samaria. This included strikes, demonstra-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from interview with Gazit conducted by Yehuda Litani, broadcast on the Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3703/A/11–A/12; reprinted by permission.

tions, hunger strikes, sit-down strikes and so forth. This has disappeared completely, and this is what is more conspicuous in the field of calmness. The terrorist activity in Judaea and Samaria is not emphasised. There is probably a little less activity in one season or another, and this is naturally the result of measures which stopped infiltration from outside and the achievements of all the security services in foiling and capturing the terrorists. However, I do not think that this is what is characteristic. Actually, almost without exception, all the levels of the population in the West Bank benefit in some way from the existing nature and system of the Israeli administration in the region—something which does not exist in the Gaza Strip because of objective reasons of the situation which exists there. There is no leadership in the Gaza Strip. There are no people who have authority, beyond the very limited family authority, over what is taking place in the Gaza Strip. Despite all these factors, there has been an actual move, particularly in the past two years, in the field of economic development and moving from an unemployed population to one enjoying more or less full employment, employment which brings in more and more money, and employment which is more and more dependent on and linked with Israel. This is a process which the terrorist organisations view, in my opinion, with fear . . . .

*Q. What about the Golan Heights? How do you sum up the activity of the Israeli administration there, particularly in recent years?*

*A. In general, we have no problems in the Golan Heights. . . .*

*Q. How do you sum up the past year in all the areas under military government?*

*A. I think the past year was very important. I think that year was, I may say, almost the year of the break-through in the sphere of relations between us and the population, again mainly in the West Bank and less in the Gaza Strip. The time which passed, the economic prosperity and full employment, the mutual relations with Israel, and mainly the events in the Arab world beginning with*

*the cease-fire, then the death of Abd an-Nasir, the civil war in the East Bank of Jordan, and the decline in the prestige of the terrorist organisations, which before were at the height of political-psychological success—all this has completely changed the mood in the territories, the attitude towards Israel, the feeling of relative independence of the residents from the point of view of adopting decisions regarding their own future rather than allowing Arab elements from outside to do that. I think that last year was very important from the standpoint of our future relations.*

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### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the Soviet Union of President Makarios of Cyprus (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, June 9, 1971**

President Makarios of the Republic of Cyprus was on an official visit in the USSR from June 2 to June 9, 1971, at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government.

During the talks, which passed in a friendly atmosphere, questions of bilateral relations, the Cyprus question, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and other topical international problems were examined.

President Makarios informed the Soviet leaders about the situation in the Republic of Cyprus, its foreign policy and government measures to settle internal political problems.

On the Soviet Side an understanding was expressed of the course pursued by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus towards non-alignment with political and military blocs,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, June 10, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 25 (June 19, 1971), pp. 15, 16.

and towards strengthening the independent and sovereign Cypriot state, which corresponds to the tasks of strengthening peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and throughout the world.

Both Sides outlined their positions on the situation in the Middle East. The Soviet Side stated that the USSR continues to support the just struggle of the Arab peoples for liberating the Arab territories occupied as a result of the Israeli aggression of 1967, for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and for the implementation of all the clauses of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to participate together with other powers—permanent members of the Security Council—in creating a system of international guarantees of a political settlement in the Middle East. The USSR was also prepared to examine further steps aimed at a military relaxation in the Mediterranean area, and at turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and friendly cooperation.

The Cypriot Side stated its support for the efforts aimed at the speediest translation into practice of the well-known Security Council resolution on the Middle East problem. The Government of Cyprus deems the capture of alien territories by war inadmissible, and comes out for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

The Soviet Side informed President Makarios about the contents and significance of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the UAR, concluded on May 27 this year.

President Makarios voiced the opinion that all efforts must be bent towards a peaceful and just solution of the Middle East crisis, according to the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The two Sides support the constructive efforts of the United Arab Republic aimed at seeking ways for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict and establishing a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

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**Policy Statement Made to the Knesset by Premier Meir of Israel, Rejecting U.A.R. President Sadat's Conditions for Israeli Withdrawal from the Suez Canal and Commenting on U.S. and Soviet Policies in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

Jerusalem, June 9, 1971

Since my policy statement in the Knesset on February 9, and my address from this rostrum on March 16, events of considerable importance, which are likely to have a far-reaching influence on our military and political position and on the efforts to achieve peace, have taken place in our region. I refer to the visit to the area by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, and Assistant Secretary Sisco, to internal developments in Egypt, and, most recently—to the new, unprecedented agreement between Egypt and the Soviet Union of May 27.

The Government of Israel was glad of the opportunity to exchange views with the U.S. Secretary of State, who was paying his first visit to our country. Mr. Rogers is the Secretary of State of a friendly country, the government of which manifests a profound interest in and a special responsibility for the fate of the Middle East, and which has made and is making many efforts to achieve peace in this troubled region. That government has clung to two fundamental principles with regard to the Middle East: the preservation of the balance of forces and the principle of no withdrawal without a contractual and binding peace.

The United States of America, its people and government, have followed the establishment and development of Israel with feelings of friendship and assisted in her consolidation, her struggle for her rights, and the strengthening of her defensive capacity.

It is only natural that Secretary of State Rogers and his entourage should have been welcomed in Israel with genuine feelings of

<sup>1</sup> Partial text of Meir's Knesset speech as published in the *Jerusalem Post*, June 10, 1971, pp. 3-4.

friendship. Their visit provided an appropriate opportunity for us, the Government of Israel, to discuss all the subjects common to our governments, with a view to consolidating what we have in common, clarifying whatever needs clarification, and bridging differences of opinion as far as possible.

The principal subjects were discussed in the course of the talks. One was the joint aspiration of both our governments to achieve a comprehensive contractual and binding peace agreement between Israel and her neighbours. The second was clarification of proposals for a special agreement between Israel and Egypt on the opening of the Suez Canal.

In so far as the subject of a comprehensive peace is concerned, the Secretary of State stressed his government's interest in the prevention of a new outbreak of fire, and the renewal of the Jarring talks in order to promote peace.

We, for our part, made it clear once more to the United States representatives that Israel did not interrupt the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring and we have not gone back on our readiness to hold such talks in all seriousness and with the utmost effort to achieve the declared aim of these discussions. At the same time, we made it clear that we are convinced that these talks will fail in their objective to the extent that we are called upon by any factor whatsoever to give prior commitments on the subjects to be clarified. We stressed repeatedly that Israel has declared her readiness to discuss all subjects relating to peace, including the territorial issue, without prior conditions.

Had the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring continued and been conducted without conditions and without any demand for prior commitments, then Israel would also have submitted her detailed proposals on the subject of peace boundaries and would have presented her detailed demands for defensible borders and the changes required in the lines of June 4, in order to safeguard the existence and security of Israel within the framework of a lasting peace.

I have not the slightest doubt about the

constructive intentions of the Government of the United States. However, regrettably, its representatives did not put forward proposals that could, in our opinion, bring nearer the aspired peace. We then went on to discuss the special agreement on the opening of the Suez Canal.

Members of the Knesset, it is worth while to recall once more some of the stages in the evolution of this subject:

On February 4 President Sadat raised his proposal on clearing the Canal and opening it to international shipping. On February 9 I said in the Knesset (and I quote):

"Our position on the opening of the Canal has not changed. We are in favour of the opening of the Suez Canal to free navigation and would even willingly discuss proposals aimed at leading to normalization of civilian life in that area, and mutual de-escalation of the military confrontation. But does the President of Egypt believe that it is possible to carry out the work of clearing the Canal while the threat to renew the war is still in force? At any rate, Israel is ready today, as in the past, to hold discussions with Egypt on arrangements for opening the Canal, even as a separate issue from other provisions."

This reaction of ours was transmitted to the Government of Egypt through the American Government. President Sadat did not show any readiness for a direct discussion with us on this subject.

On April 19 we submitted to the United States Government, in response to its request, in orderly and lucid form, a series of principles and considerations on the subject of the special arrangement.

In its reaction, the United States Government explained to us that since its purpose was to offer its good offices with the aim of reaching agreement, it intended to refrain from assuming a position of identification with the proposals of one side or the other. At the same time, the State Department spokesman said: "We believe they (Israel's conditions) offer a basis for further negotiations on the interim arrangements to reopen the Canal."

In our talks with Mr. Rogers during his visit to Israel, we held a practical and detailed clarification of each clause in the principles we had submitted. The Secretary of State and his Assistant wanted to promote agreement between the parties by narrowing the gap between their positions as far as possible.

In the course of these discussions, I repeatedly emphasized that we were in the stage of clarification with the United States Government on an agreement between ourselves and the Government of Egypt on the opening of the Suez Canal, pursuant to the initiative of the Egyptian President of February 4, and my own statement, approved by the Knesset, of February 9. If indeed it becomes evident that conditions have been created for such a special arrangement, which can be recommended by the Cabinet, the issue will be submitted for debate and approval by the Knesset. The Government of Israel will accept no commitment, nor will it create any facts, prior to debate and decision by the legislature.

The principles that we enunciated in our discussions with the United States Government are the fruit of our conviction and our policy that we must work untiringly for an end to the fighting and a permanent cease-fire on the way to a lasting peace within defensible borders.

Members of the Knesset, at the conclusion of our discussions with the Secretary of State on an arrangement for the opening of the Canal, I summed up our position in its principal outlines, following on the principles which we submitted to the American Administration, in my meetings with Ambassador Barbour in Israel and through Ambassador Rabin in the United States: the arrangement for the reopening of the Canal that would be agreed upon by Israel and Egypt would be a special and separate agreement not linked to the course of the Jarring talks, or to the Security Council, or to the four-power talks. As part of this special agreement Israel would be prepared to consider some pullback of her forces from the water line, in accordance with the following principles:

The fighting would not be renewed. Egypt

would clear and operate the Suez Canal. No Egyptian and/or other armed forces would cross to the eastern side of the Canal. There would be free passage for shipping in the Canal, including Israeli ships and cargoes. Effective and agreed supervision procedures would be established. Means of deterrence against the danger of violation of the agreement would be assured. Removal of I.D.F. forces from the water-line would not be a stage leading to a further withdrawal before peace. Maintenance of the arrangement would not be dependent upon the Jarring talks, but it would also not be incompatible with the holding, furtherance and aim of these talks. The new line to be held by the I.D.F. forces will not be considered the permanent boundary. The permanent boundary between Israel and Egypt would be determined in the peace treaty to be concluded between us and Egypt, and Israel would withdraw to it.

We did not authorize the representatives of the United States Government to convey a document to the Egyptian Government, but at the end of the discussions the U.S. representatives were able to acquaint the Egyptian Government with our views, and they did so.

It should be made clear for the information of the House, that our position, including the clauses that I have not mentioned here, and our requests to the United States in that context, were determined by the Israel Government at the end of March 1971, that is before the Soviet-Egyptian agreement was concluded. The government did not see fit to decide at this stage on the distance to which our forces would pull back from the waterline on the conclusion of an agreement, since the conditions that we had defined for ourselves as justifying a decision on this subject had not yet been created.

To prevent incorrect reports, I must make it clear that the Minister of Defence, in his conversation with the Assistant Secretary of State, did not mention a distance of 35 kms., or any other distance, as the extent of the I.D.F.'s withdrawal. These reports have already been denied by my office and by the Minister of Defence, and I feel it advisable to repeat and emphasize the validity of this

denial. To conclude what I have to say on this subject, I hereby repeat and emphasize: no undertaking on a change in the deployment of forces on the cease-fire lines has been given or will be given until the Cabinet has recommended it and received the approval of the Knesset.

I am happy to note that the talks were intensive and frank, as is appropriate between friendly states. The two sides tried to achieve the utmost clarity on the subjects discussed. The Secretary of State also held a frank talk with the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee.

Upon his departure from Israel, Mr. Rogers said that there had been "a very busy two days" and that the visit had been "most worth while." He said he thought there had been "some narrowing of the gap" between the positions of Israel and Egypt, but, he went on to say, "there are considerable areas of difference that remain." In view of the talks in Israel, he had asked Mr. Sisco to return to Cairo "to provide the Egyptian officials with certain clarifications we have been able to find here." The Secretary of State explained that his Assistant's trip to Cairo had been arranged in advance with the Egyptian President.

Mr. Sisco left for Cairo on May 9 and met with President Sadat and other officials. As far as we have been able to gather from these talks—from Sadat's speeches and from other diplomatic statements made thereafter up to this date—it transpires that Egypt's position concerning the arrangement on the Canal has become more intransigent.

In his address on May 1, the Egyptian President had detailed his conditions for opening the Canal. Among them he stated that a partial withdrawal by Israel from the Suez Canal must be the first stage in a total withdrawal from all the Arab lands. Egypt would agree to extend the cease-fire for a determined period, during which Ambassador Jarring would set a timetable for the implementation of the Security Council resolution, in which the first clause would be total withdrawal by Israel from all Arab lands in Syria, Jordan, Gaza and Sinai.

Egyptian armed forces would cross the Canal eastwards. Should there be no tangible progress by the termination of the cease-fire period, the Egyptian armed forces would reserve the right to take military action to totally liberate all occupied Arab lands.

Throughout this period, both President Sadat and Foreign Minister Riad made public speeches and statements of a provocative and negative nature. On May 20, after the visit of Mr. Rogers, and after Mr. Sisco's second trip to Cairo, President Sadat repeated the above conditions for the opening of the Canal. In all public statements, Sadat presented conditions which were in the nature of dictation, and not a basis for agreement.

It is obvious that these public statements are harmful to the possibility of arriving at an agreement on the Canal, if they do in fact express Egypt's official position on this issue. It cannot be seriously expected that Israel will be prepared to withdraw from the water-line in order to grant her enemies decisive strategic advantages for the renewal of the fighting, to enable the Egyptian and perhaps the Soviet army to cross the Canal, and all this as the first stage in a total withdrawal from all the territories.

The Government of Israel is still hopeful that the Egyptian Government's last word on this matter has not yet been heard.

The Egyptian Government will undertake a heavy responsibility to its people and to the interest of peace if it closes the door on the chance of arriving at a special agreement on the opening of the Canal.

Members of the Knesset, while Israel was still waiting for progress in the discussions on an arrangement for the opening of the Canal, President Sadat informed his people on May 14 of the discovery of a plot against him that had been fomented by various circles in the Egyptian leadership with the purpose of undermining his rule and regime. All the signs indicate that the arrests, imprisonments and purges which followed this affair were intended first and foremost to consolidate Sadat's position and to remove the factors that had endangered his rule.

These developments—including attacks on leaders belonging to the pro-Soviet wing of



the Egyptian hierarchy—aroused hope among various circles in the West that Sadat wished or was able to free himself from Soviet influence. Sadat himself did not hesitate to encourage a whispering campaign for Western ears that Western, particularly American, pressure on Israel to accept Egyptian terms for a comprehensive or special settlement would bring about the freeing of Egypt from Soviet influence.

To our regret, certain circles showed a tendency to interpret developments in Egypt in accordance with wishes that had no basis in reality. Insufficient attention was paid to the factor of the personal struggle between the ousted group and Sadat. They ignored the dependency which binds Egypt to the Soviet Union—a dependency which has constantly increased since 1955, when the first agreement to supply Egypt with arms was drawn up, until it reached the proportions of a new form of colonial servitude.

It would appear that the Russians were extremely worried by the internal developments in Egypt and by the uncertainty as to the stability of the Cairo regime. Egypt's gestures towards America also increased Soviet fears that the undermining of the Soviet position in Egypt might have begun.

A high-ranking Soviet delegation, headed by Soviet President Podgorny, rushed to Egypt to save the situation. The delegation included the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Soviet Foreign Minister, the Deputy Defence Minister and Commander of the Soviet Union's Ground Forces, and the Chairman of the inter-ministerial committee for foreign economic relations, as well as many aides and advisers. The dispatch of a delegation on this level, only 10 days following the purges, reflected Russia's determination to ensure the stability of the status of the Soviet Union in Egypt both from the standpoint of her strategic presence and from that of Egypt's international orientation. On 27 May, after only two days' stay by the Soviet delegation, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty was concluded—to the surprise of Western political circles.

Members of the Knesset, the conclusion of this treaty between the Soviet Union and

Egypt is an unprecedented step in the relations of the Soviet Union with any country outside the Communist camp and far from her borders. This pact was defined by the Russians (and I quote) as an historic document which raises the relations between the two countries to a higher plane and to a new qualitative stage.

And indeed, the Soviet-Egyptian pact may be regarded as a contractual framework that creates a new dimension in the process of Soviet entrenchment in the Middle East. The articles of the treaty recall the bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the nations of the Communist bloc. The articles of the treaty express both local and international commitments and are calculated to bind Egypt to the Soviet doctrine.

The treaty covers every vital sphere of political and social life: the infrastructure of the economy, social, political and cultural life, relations between the Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Union, foreign and defence policy, and cooperation and military aid. The treaty also contains operative clauses which bind the two countries by unprecedented mutual commitments.

As to the Security implications, attention should be paid to article 7. In addition to the stress placed on the importance of "concertedness of action in the international arena," it is stated that (and I quote):

"The high contracting parties will, for this purpose regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states. In the event of development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace."

I shall read article eight in full: "In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. military personnel, in mastering the arma-

ments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general."

There is no doubt that behind these contractual definitions there stands an Egyptian commitment to the strategic presence of the Soviet Union on Egyptian territory and a Soviet military commitment towards Egypt, which was not publicly spelled out for obvious reasons. Of far-reaching importance is the fact that the Soviet commitments have been given for a long term (15 years) with a possibility of extension in the future.

Under article 3, the Soviet Union undertakes to help the Egyptian army to achieve offensive power by training the armed forces and preparing them to wield the weapons supplied them. This means that over and above the terms of the treaty, the Russians agreed to accelerate the rearmament of Egypt, and possibly even to supply modern and sophisticated weapons.

Under article 8, Soviet military aid to Egypt is promised not only in connection with the conflict with Israel, but to improve the capacity of the Egyptian army to face aggression in general, and Soviet flexibility on the interpretation of the term "aggression" is well known. This special treaty will certainly encourage the Egyptian rulers in their conviction that the military connection with the Soviet Union will still continue after what they call "the liquidation of the aggression of '67."

The Soviet military commitment in this article of the treaty was defined by President Sadat to the People's Council as a new and fundamental matter which induced him to sign the pact.

In his address of June 2 to the National Council, Sadat said that the treaty "adds to our struggle new guarantees hitherto unfixed." Later he explained that there was a new and fundamental element in this treaty, which induced them to sign it without hesitation, and he is convinced that this element was expressed in article 8.

The President of Egypt suggested that every word and point in this article should be studied

and he read it out, in full, word for word. After reading the article he repeated: "This is the new element and this is what we want and cling to in the faith that the battle will be forced upon us, that the last word in the struggle will be said on the battlefield."

The Soviet-Egyptian treaty possesses a significance extending beyond the sphere of Israel-Egyptian relations. Egypt has undertaken to coordinate with the Soviet Union her moves and positions in the world political arena. The Soviet Union has gained control of Egypt's policy. The treaty is a framework permitting intervention in the life and actions of Egypt to the extent that this is necessary to the great-power interests of the Soviets. It is impossible not to perceive the global political significance of this alliance, the gravity of which cannot be ignored by any nation that believes in independence, particularly the peoples of Europe and Africa, in so far as they are alert to the fate of the peace and independence of nations.

Members of the Knesset, the signing of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty is not the outcome of the Arab-Israel conflict, but the result of the consistent Soviet policy of turning Egypt into a principal base in the Mediterranean and North Africa, with the aim of expanding Soviet penetration west of these shores and south to Africa and the Indian Ocean, as well as of creating a threat to the southern flank of Europe. At the same time, there can be no doubt that Egypt will try to use this new treaty as a lever to threaten Israel and as a means of exerting political pressure on the West, first and foremost on the United States, to extort concessions from Israel.

In the meantime, the Egyptian propaganda organs have for camouflage purposes opened a tranquillizing campaign aimed at minimizing the importance of the treaty in the eyes of the West, and President Sadat himself has taken up this task. There was a time when Egypt took pains to proclaim and to emphasize that she was a "neutralist" and "non-aligned" state. President Nasser was active in organizing the neutralist bloc and the "Third World." We ourselves never took seriously the neutralist mask that the Egyptian propagandists were wont to assume in their

appearances in the new African states and at the United Nations. I believe that Egypt can now no longer present herself as "non-aligned," as she has declined to the status of a long-term satellite for the sake of short-term benefits. Regrettably, this situation in Egypt will hamper her healthy, free and sovereign development.

Members of the Knesset, in February of this year Sadat expressed himself as to Egypt's readiness, under certain conditions, to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. We were not unaware of these conditions, which were enough to put to nought the readiness he proclaimed, but we took a favourable view of the very fact that he expressed readiness to enter into a peace agreement with us, since such readiness, provided it is sincere, is a primary condition for the achievement of peace.

Since then one disappointing move has followed another, paralleling the internal upsets and the adoption of the alliance between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Once again allegiance has been sworn in Egypt to the doctrine of stages, which aims at pushing Israel back to the June 4 lines as a first step and, as the second stage, at the complete liquidation of the Jewish State.

In the agreement on the federation between Egypt, Syria and Libya of April 17, this year, it is stated that: "It has been decided to adopt these principles: no peace, no negotiations with Israel, no yielding of a single inch of conquered Arab territory, and no concessions and no bargaining on the Palestine problem."

In a speech to the Palestinian National Council on February 28, 1971 Sadat said: "We oppose the narrow view, that wishes to see the Palestinian revolution as a reaction to the year 1967. We insist on the rights of the Palestinian people as accepted in resolutions of the U.N. in 1947 and up to the present."

The Arabs have always made it clear that when they speak about the rights of the Palestinian people, they in fact mean destruction of Israel.

Recently, in his speech to the National Council on June 2, 1971, Sadat said, *inter alia*: "The Zionist occupation which besets us will

not be solved by the restoration of the occupied territories: this is a new crusade, which will continue in our generation and in generations to come."

Members of the Knesset, there are some who, yearning for peace, obscure the cruel reality. I have mentioned these negative pronouncements that no one may ignore the reality in which we are placed, but not in order to despair of peace or to give up our efforts to attain peace.

To my sorrow I am aware that these statements by the Egyptian rulers are not abstract phrases, but expressions of practical policy. Nevertheless, this will not lead us to abandon our desire for peace. Our policy will continue to be persistent preparedness for self-defence and a persistent policy of peace.

\* \* \*

Members of the Knesset, continual effort for the arming of the Israel Defence Forces and the building up of their strength continue to be the first of the government's priorities. The preservation of Israel's defensive and deterrent strength is the most important factor in preventing a renewal of fire and it alone facilitates the continuation of political efforts for the advancement of peace without military or political coercive conditions. This effort is vital tenfold in the light of the fact that the Egyptian rulers, actively helped by the Soviet Union, are continually striving to undermine the arms balance in order that Israel may be exposed to military threats and political blackmail.

Egypt's central political objective is the blocking of Israel's sources of armaments. President Nasser said on May 1, 1970: "We demand one thing that the United States can do: to refrain from further aid to Israel, so long as she is in occupation of Arab lands. The United States must refrain from all aid—political, military or economic."

And President Sadat, speaking to the National Council on May 20, 1971, addressed the United States as follows: "I do not agree that you say, 'We are persuading Israel': I do not even agree that you apply pressure to Israel.... I officially call on President

Nixon to squeeze Israel hard, if it is peace that we are talking about.”

I note with appreciation the fact that during the past year the United States has expressed in deeds its understanding of the need to maintain the military balance between Israel and the Arab States. President Nixon made this quite clear in his report to Congress on February 25, 1971, and in other statements. Members of the Knesset, the problem of preserving the military balance is not static, especially when Soviet arms shipments to Egypt are on the increase, and so is the involvement of the Soviet Union. We look forward, therefore, to the meeting of Israel's demands for the rectification of the balance that has been upset.

Even before the Soviet-Egyptian treaty was signed, Russia provided Egypt by airlift with modern and sophisticated types of missiles, aircraft and other weapons. After the agreement was signed, the violation of the balance was aggravated even more, both by the creation of new and binding contractual frameworks and by Soviet military commitments which Sadat described as “a new element” in the Egyptian struggle against Israel.

The quantities and types of Soviet arms supplied to Egypt so far and the supply envisaged in the clauses of the new agreement—these already constitute an even graver violation of the military balance. Israel looks forward to continued understanding of her vital claims to arms supplies from the United States Government required for her defence, particularly in the air, and hopes that her requests will be met without delay. Any failure to recognize the deep significance of the violation of the arms balance in the region, as a result of the supply of Soviet weapons to Egypt and the intensification of Soviet involvement, may be a temptation to aggression and a great danger to peace.

\* \* \*

Members of the Knesset, a week ago I returned from a tour of some of the Scandinavian countries and participation in the conference of the Socialist International in Helsinki.

The resolution adopted in Helsinki, which was supported by all the members of the International, with only Finland voting against part of its provisions and Sweden abstaining, constitutes an important recognition and support of Israel's principal contentions, namely:

The cease-fire must be unlimited, as decided by the Security Council in June 1967.

Anxiety with regard to the arms shipments to Egypt and Syria and a call to preserve the balance of armaments between Israel and her neighbours.

Peace must be based on negotiation and agreement between the parties without being imposed from the outside.

Negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring should be conducted without prior conditions, in order to sign a contractual and binding peace agreement.

I was also glad to have the opportunity of meeting a number of Heads of Government and leaders attending the conference in order to hold conversations on subjects of central interest. I should like, from this platform, to thank the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Sweden and Norway for the hospitality accorded to me in their capitals, and for the opportunity afforded me, in lengthy and thorough conversations, to clarify our approach and exchange views on the principal topics under discussion.

The meetings I held were also attended by other ministers and I had the opportunity to meet members of parliament and socialist party and trades union leaders. In every country I visited, without exception, I was greeted by waves of sympathy and understanding for Israel on the part of the public as a whole and the communications media. I regret that due to my tight schedule I was unable to accept the invitation of the Prime Minister of Iceland to visit his country, and I thank him for his invitation.

I drew great encouragement and inspiration from my meetings with the Jewish communities in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. From my visit to the Jewish school in Helsinki, which is the northernmost Jewish school in the world, to my moving meeting with Jewish youth and the assembly at the

Great Synagogue in Stockholm, I was inspired anew with faith in the unity and destiny of the Jewish people and its firm ties with Israel. These Jews look to us as the source of the inspiration which gives meaning to their lives, and we see in them a source of strength and encouragement in our joint struggle for peace and security.

\* \* \*

Members of the Knesset: four years have passed since the Six Day War. Now, as we cross the threshold of the fifth year, we remember not only the victory, but also the days of May and early June—the tension, the danger, the encirclement and isolation, the military might that was arrayed to attack us, the roars for battle, the boasting, the sabre-rattling visit of Nasser and Amer to Bir Gafgafa, the impotence of the United Nations, the blockade against shipping and the promises that were not kept.

We remember the armistice lines of those days, which were a constant temptation to the aggressor, and our memories of all these strengthen our determination not to return to the circumstances and the situation of those days, but to stand firm on the cease-fire lines until the achievement of peace within defensible borders. Victory has not diminished in the slightest our conviction of the vital importance of peace. In our conviction, it is time that the experience of the developments in the Middle East since the founding of the State of Israel should convince the Arab states that in war against Israel they will achieve nothing. War multiplies death and destruction, squanders resources, delays social development and causes dependence on foreign powers which endangers independence.

The one way to peace is to abandon the aspiration to destroy Israel and to enter into talks without prior conditions.

We are prepared and our heart is open for a change in the relations between the peoples and countries in the region, for the opening of a new page, but as long as this way is blocked because of hostility and false hopes, we have no alternative but to be constantly prepared to defend ourselves with all our strength, to unite in every effort to ensure that

if the Arab rulers do, in fact, decide that the Six Day War was not the last war, then their military defeat in that war will not be their last defeat.

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### **Statement Made by U.S. State Department Spokesman Bray Criticizing Israeli Population Transfer in Occupied Arab Territories<sup>1</sup>**

June 9, 1971

[Declaring that United States economic aid to Israel is in no way allocated to projects in the occupied territories (including a factory proposed for the Golan Heights) and particularly not for the construction of new housing in Jerusalem]: Full respect for the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 forbids an occupying power from transferring the population of occupied territories. It also prohibits construction of permanent housing with the aim of facilitating the transfer of the Israeli population into the occupied territories. We continue to be opposed to the activities of the Israeli government in the occupied territories, which threaten to make a peaceful settlement more difficult.

<sup>1</sup> Translation of excerpted French translation of Bray's statement as published in *Le Monde*, June 11, 1971, p. 3.

## 143

**Press Interview Statements by Secretary-General Wischnewski of the F.R.G. Social Democratic Party Commenting on His Recent Visit to the United Arab Republic<sup>1</sup>**

June 11, 1971

*Q. Did you make this trip with the knowledge and encouragement of the Federal government, specifically of the Chancellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?*

*A.* Of course. The Secretary-General of a governing party can't allow himself any private extravagances. This visit, like previous talks with Middle East political leaders, took place after informing the appropriate government departments and keeping in touch with them.

*Q. A few weeks ago you were in Israel. Is there any connection between the two visits?*

*A.* It was certainly useful to have been in Israel beforehand with the S.P.D. delegation. It was my first visit. People there were not uncritical of me. But we were able to clear up many misunderstandings. . . . [Denying that the Israelis wanted to see him act as mediator]: We are no world power and especially as regards this conflict we are not united enough to be active as mediators. The job would be too big for us. Nobody expects it of us; nobody asks it of us.

[On Bonn's maintenance of diplomatic relations with Israel and expected resumption of relations with the Arab states]:

The Arabs cannot determine our relations with Israel nor Israel our relations with the Arabs.

*Q. Israel seems not only to tolerate such relations but to want them, whereas the Arabs seem to cling to an Oriental version of the Hallstein Doctrine.*

*A.* Such may have once been the case. But now the U.A.R. president has told

me, "After all that's happened in the past, let's turn over a new leaf." He has also let it be known that the Arabs would very much like us on their side. Because they realize that is unrealistic, they expect neutrality from us. They see us, however, as being almost as biased in favor of Israel as is the United States.

*Q. The U.S. Secretary of State visited Cairo before you, Mr. Wischnewski, and the Soviet President came after you. Did your talks help you to evaluate the visits of these statesmen from East and West?*

*A.* People spoke sympathetically of U.S. Secretary Rogers—of him personally and of his plan—but less so of U.S. policy as a whole. The Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty is not so sensational as it is thought to be in other quarters. This treaty only puts on paper what already exists. Besides, those who know the country and the people all agree that a demonstrative gesture towards Moscow was inevitable after the pro-Soviet politicians had been ousted from power. Sadat assured me he is working towards non-aligned policies within the Third World, but that at the moment he has to stick to realities.

*Q. For the people you were talking to, is Israel a part of these realities?*

*A.* I believe that responsible and intelligent politicians are adjusting themselves to this reality. On both sides you continually hear the key word "peace." Of course this fundamental word is modified differently: in Israel people speak of a "secure" peace; in Egypt of a "just" peace. The Israelis want to live within secure borders; the Egyptians would like to get their lost territories back.

*Q. Do you see in the near future the possibility of bridging the gap between the demand for a secure peace and the demand for a just peace?*

*A.* Whatever the case, it is my impression that no responsible person in Cairo wants to break the cease-fire and go to war again. They accept the U.N. Resolution, the Rogers Plan and the Jarring mission. Nevertheless, if by the end of the year no reasonable and lasting arrangement has come about, then a situation could arise with dangers which it

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the German report of Werner Hofer's interview with Wischnewski on his visit to the U.A.R., *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), June 11, 1971.

would be fatal to underestimate. Nonetheless I hope—no, I believe—that the chance for an agreement is greater than before.

*Q. In your opinion in the next months will there also be a change in the relations between Bonn and the Arab world?*

*A.* [In answering this question Wischniewski showed the relationship between the problem of Algeria and the “Berlin Complex.”] With Boumedienne everything has gone so far towards being cleared up that diplomatic relations could be resumed at any time. Nevertheless we have to ask the Algerians for understanding and patience for first of all progress has to be reached on an acceptable solution to the Berlin problem. This is where the subtleties of the post-Hallstein era come in, in the sense that it would be difficult at the present time to send an ambassador to a state like Algeria where Germany is represented at the moment only by a diplomat from the G.D.R. So when progress is made on Berlin, then we’ll have freedom of movement vis-à-vis Algeria, and after that we could also resume official contact with Cairo. This would have economic advantages for both sides, like an easing of Egypt’s debt to the F.R.G. in return for the expansion of German industrial activities there. For a start they would be happy in Cairo if the F.R.G. were to make something on the order of 40 million dollars available through Hermes Krediss for building a pipeline from Suez to Alexandria. When this pipeline is finished in about two years’ time the Suez canal will have lost a lot of its importance, even though the fact that it’s blocked—which technically can be tackled at any time—has cost the west millions and will cost them more.

*Q. When and how will this international scandal come to an end?*

*A.* In my opinion the Egyptians will only allow the Suez Canal to be opened as a partial or “pre-solution” to a total solution which they think they are able to agree to. Here too in the handling of these problems we can put some hope in the sense of reality of Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat.

## 144

**Comments on the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Treaty and the Possibility of an Interim Settlement in the Middle East, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers at a News Conference<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1971

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we can go to the Middle East. There seems to be some feeling that the expectations that attended your return from your trip have kind of petered out following the attempted coup and the Soviet treaty. Can you analyze the treaty’s implications, both in larger terms and in terms of an interim settlement?*

*A.* I think that, as President Nixon said in his press conference, it is a little early to form a conclusive judgment on the treaty. It depends on what happens. We would hope very much that the Soviet Union does not escalate the arms race. This would be most unfortunate.

On the other hand, we do not think that the treaty makes it impossible that an interim settlement might be reached. We are still in communication with both Israel and with Egypt. Mr. Bergus [Donald C. Bergus, Minister in Charge of U.S. Interests Section, Embassy of Spain, Cairo] is here now, and we are going to have additional discussions with him before he returns to Cairo.

We think that there still is the possibility that an interim settlement could be worked out. We think that the way to do that is to engage in quiet diplomacy. There are a number of areas of agreement, and there are some areas of disagreement. Those areas will require some accommodation on the part of both Israel and Egypt. But I think it is encouraging to notice that these strictly fundamental facts are still agreed to:

First, everyone—and when I say “everyone,” I am speaking about Egypt and Israel and the Soviet Union, the United States and others, England and France—would like to have the Suez Canal open.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers’ news conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXV, 1671 (July 5, 1971), pp. 6-7, 9.

Secondly, there is agreement that if it is open, it has to be operated by the Egyptians.

Three, we all agree that it would only be a step toward full implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242. In other words, the objective is a final peace agreement, and this would not be an end in itself.

Four, that during  $x$  number of months or years the cease-fire would have to continue, because it would make no sense to have an interim agreement if the fighting should start.

Five, there is agreement that if there has to be withdrawal on the part of Israel from the canal, and there would have to be an agreement, that the evacuated territory probably would involve some kind of an observer force or international force—someone to separate, in other words, to move into the evacuated territory.

Now, there are large areas of disagreement. What kind of evacuation? To where? Who would cross the canal? What kind of an observer force would be involved? These questions are complex. But we would hope very much that based on these common factors—common in the sense that all parties want them—something could be worked out certainly this year, and we would hope considerable progress could be made before the meeting of the General Assembly this fall.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union has been critical of our role in the Middle East recently in public statements. Can you give us your interpretation of the meaning behind that criticism? And, secondly, can you tell us whether you envisage the Soviet Union being brought into the negotiations on the interim settlement at any point?*

A. I can't, Mr. Smith [Terence Smith, New York Times], answer the first part of your question. I don't know what it is that irritates them. We obviously welcome anybody's assistance. Just the fact that we are taking these initiatives doesn't mean that it is exclusive. A lot of other nations are discussing it, working on the same subject.

In answer to the second part of your question, we would expect that if an interim agreement is reached, the Soviet Union would have to be involved in it, of course. So, we

would have some discussions with them at the right time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may return to the Middle East, in the aftermath of the attack on the ship headed for Israel, Mrs. Meir called on international maritime powers to also say something about freedom of the seas. Now, in answer to an earlier question, you spoke about an international force along the Suez Canal, and Israel has expressed grave reservations about such forces. And then the international maritime powers have not said very much following that. Can you say anything about it now?*

A. Yes. Miss Berger [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post], we haven't gotten all the facts on this. You know, this occurred just in the entrance to the Red Sea, and we don't know all the facts, but we know that an attack was made on the *Coral Sea*—which is, I believe, a tanker under Israeli charter.

We consider the attack a very serious matter. We think that any interference of this kind with maritime traffic deserves the condemnation of all responsible nations, and we very much deplore this act.

## 145

### **Declaration Calling for a Just and Lasting Peace Settlement in the Middle East Issued by the Eighth Congress of the G.D.R. Socialist Unity Party of Germany<sup>1</sup>**

**Berlin, Mid-June 1971**

In the name of the people of the German Democratic Republic, we, the delegates of the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, decisively condemn the aggression of Israel against the Arab states which is supported by US and West German imperialism and other imperialist states. We manifest our fraternal solidarity with the struggle of the Arab peoples for the removal of the consequences of the Israeli aggression,

<sup>1</sup> English text of the declaration as published in *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (Berlin), XI, 18 (July 2, 1971), p. 137.



for the victory of freedom, independence and social progress.

The expansionist policy of Israel's ruling circles has completely abandoned the pretence. The international isolation of the Israeli aggressors and their imperialist protectors, the USA and other imperialist states, who in practice encourage Israeli reaction to ever new adventures while hypocritically speaking of peace, is becoming increasingly obvious.

The constructive attitude of the UAR and other Arab countries is in contrast to this policy. Their policy creates favourable conditions for the all-sided implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967.

Israeli reaction stubbornly refuses to withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories. Thus, it openly challenges the world public and the UN.

All peace-loving forces in the world therefore consider it to be their duty, by united efforts to force the aggressors to respect the generally accepted norms of international relations and the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples and to withdraw their troops from the forcefully occupied Arab territories.

The Eighth Congress of the SED is firmly convinced that all attempts whatsoever of the imperialist powers and their lackeys to enforce their rule on the Arab peoples, to undermine the progressive regimes in the Arab area and to inflict a defeat on the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in the Middle East are inevitably condemned to failure.

Victorious will be the legitimate rights and fundamental interests of the Arab peoples, among them also the Arab people of Palestine. The aggressor Israel will have to clear out of the occupied Arab territories. The guarantee of this is the decisive struggle of the Arab peoples for national independence, freedom, peace and social progress as well as their firm alliance with the main force of the anti-imperialist struggle, the Soviet Union, and with the other socialist states, with all peace-loving forces in the world. The closer this alliance, the sooner will it be possible to achieve a lasting and just peace correspond-

ing to the interests of the peoples.

The conclusion of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the UAR dealt a heavy blow against imperialist schemes.

This treaty not only anchored the results of the manifold and longstanding friendly cooperation already previously existing between the Soviet Union and the UAR. New ways and means for this cooperation are opened up in all spheres. The conclusion of the treaty fills the people of the German Democratic Republic with great satisfaction. It contributes towards the all-sided strengthening of the UAR as a bulwark of the progressive forces in the Arab area, for the association of the Arab states and the unification of the anti-imperialist forces.

The Eighth Congress of the SED declares: The German Democratic Republic will in future, too, consistently support, jointly with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community of states, the just struggle of the Arab peoples for the reestablishment of their legitimate rights, for the bringing about of a just political solution in the Middle East and for the defence of the interests of the Arab peoples of Palestine.

As a reliable friend of the Arab peoples we shall consolidate the solidarity with their struggle, the anti-imperialist alliance in the struggle against the imperialist aggression and for the implementation of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Long live and strengthen the unbreakable friendship between the people of the GDR and the Arab peoples!

## 146

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Algeria of Foreign Minister Moro of Italy (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>****Algiers, June 18, 1971**

At the invitation of Mr. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, the Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mr. Aldo Moro, the Foreign Minister of the Italian Republic, paid an official visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria June 15-18, 1971.

The two ministers then proceeded to discuss the present political situation in the [Mediterranean] basin and expressed their concern at the present acute crisis in the Middle East and at the threat this crisis poses to all the countries of the Mediterranean basin and to world security.

In this connection they reaffirmed their governments' opposition to the acquisition of territory through war. They also once more expressed their determination to support all genuine efforts to secure a just and permanent peace in the area.

The two parties believe that the only policy that can guarantee peace, security and close relations among the peoples of the Mediterranean is that which concentrates on eliminating all the strongholds of war and tension and is based on the equality and real independence of peoples and on economic and cultural cooperation among them.

## 147

**Statements Calling for Israeli Withdrawal from All Occupied Arab Territories and for the Restoration of the Legitimate Rights of the Palestinian People, Included in the Communiqué Issued by the Islamic Solidarity Conference<sup>2</sup>****Jedda, June 23, 1971**

In their general speeches to the conference, the delegations attending expressed their strongest condemnation of the continuation of iniquitous Israeli aggression and the continued occupation of Arab territories by force of arms. They also expressed their absolute conviction that the only way to restore peace and security to the Middle East is through the liberation of Jerusalem, total withdrawal from the occupied territories and the restoration to the people of Palestine of their legitimate rights, which have been usurped.

The conference observed the importance of the role that is being played by certain Christian bodies in defending the sanctity of the holy places and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, welcomed cooperation between Muslims and Christians and expressed its appreciation of the role played by Lebanon in promoting such cooperation.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué as published in *al-Shaab* (Algiers), June 19, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué as published in *al-Bilad* (Jedda), June 24, 1971.

This conference was held in accordance with a resolution adopted by the second Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Karachi December 26-28, 1970. This conference was held in Jedda June 21-23, 1971 and was attended by representatives of the following countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and the Yemeni Arab Republic.

## 148

**Resolution on the Continued Aggression Against the United Arab Republic, Adopted at the Eighth Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity<sup>1</sup>**

**Addis Ababa, June 23, 1971**

*Having heard* the declaration of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions AHG/Res.53 (V) of September 1968, AHG/Res.57 (VI) of September 1969 and AHG/Res.62 (VII) of September 1970, concerning the situation prevailing in the Middle East in general, and in the United Arab Republic in particular, calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and appealing to all Member States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of that resolution and support the present efforts of the United Nations Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General,

*Mindful* of the constructive efforts of the United Arab Republic aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, especially the positive position recently taken in response to Ambassador Jarring's peace initiative of 8 February 1971,

*Seriously concerned* that the present grave situation resulting from the continued Israeli

occupation of the territories of three Arab States, one of them a Member in this Organization, constitutes a serious threat to the regional peace of Africa and to international peace and security.

*Determined* that the territory of a State should not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another State resulting from threat or use of force, which is a basic principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reiterated in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), as well as the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2734 (XXV) of 16 December 1970,

1. *Takes note* of the declaration of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic;

2. *Reaffirms* emphatically the contents of its resolutions AHG/Res.53 (V) of September 1968, AHG/Res.57 (VI) of September 1969 and AHG/Res.62 (VII) of September 1970, and calls for immediate withdrawal of Israel armed forces from all Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967 in implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967;

3. *Expresses its full support* to the efforts of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and to his initiative for peace of 8 February 1971, in particular;

4. *Reaffirms* its solidarity with the United Arab Republic and appreciates the positive attitude reflected in its reply on 15 February 1971 to the Special Representative's initiative for peace as a practical step for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

5. *Deplores* Israel's defiance to that initiative and calls upon it to make a similar positive reply to the Special Representative's initiative for peace of 8 February 1971;

6. *Requests* the current Chairman of the OAU to consult with the Heads of State and Government so that they use their influence to ensure the full implementation of this resolution.

<sup>1</sup> English text of the O.A.U. resolution (AHG/Res. 66 (VIII)) as transmitted to the U.N. Security Council by O.A.U. Ambassador to the U.N. Thiam on July 13, and circulated as U.N. Document S/10272.

The O.A.U. is composed of the following member states: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Peoples' Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire (former Congo-Kinshasa) and Zambia.

## 149

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Iraq of a U.S.S.R. Government and Party Delegation (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Baghdad June 24, 1971

A Soviet Party and Government delegation, headed by V.N. Novikov, Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stayed in the Iraqi Republic on an official friendly visit from June 16 to 24, 1971, at the invitation of the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baath) Party and the Iraqi Government.

An exchange of opinions took place on the situation in the Middle East, which continues to spell danger to universal peace, as a result of the Israeli imperialist aggression, backed by American imperialism, against the Arab peoples. The two Sides denounced the intrigues and manoeuvres of the US imperialist circles in that area aimed at restoring their influence, protecting their monopolies, and strengthening the positions of American imperialism in the Arab world. The two Sides declared that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East without the liberation of all the Arab territories seized as a result of the Israeli aggression, and without ensuring the legal rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They regard the Palestinian resistance movement as an inalienable part of the Arab national-liberation movement.

The Iraqi Side highly assessed the all-round assistance being rendered to the Arab peoples by the Soviet Union and its constant efforts to

support their struggle for peace, progress and liberation.

## 150

**Provisions of a Resolution Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, Condemning Israel and Zionism, Supporting the Rights of the Palestinians and the Palestine Resistance, and Calling for the Expulsion of Israel from the United Nations<sup>2</sup>**

Damascus, June 24, 1971

The Executive Committee of the Organization for the Solidarity of Afro-Asian Peoples meeting in its tenth session June 22-24, 1971,

*Having carefully* and comprehensively studied the Palestine problem in all its ramifications and the struggle of the Arab people for unity and liberation and their steadfastness in the face of the Zionist-colonialist conspiracies which reached their climax in the June 1967 aggression;

*Whereas* world public opinion has been provided with conclusive proof of Israel's aggressive character and her continued disregard of the right of the Arab people to Palestine, and of her expansion, ever since the state was established, at the expense of the Arab people and their land in implementation of a Western colonialist conspiracy that has been directed against all the Arabs for more than half a century;

*Whereas* it has been established, on the basis of the evidence published in reports

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, June 26, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 28 (July 10, 1971), pp. 4, 5-6.

Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko made an official visit to Iraq in December; the resulting joint communiqué, issued in Baghdad on December 17 (see *al-Jumhuriya*, December 18, 1971) contained no new points.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the A.A.P.S.O. resolution as published in *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 25, 1971.

Seventy-five countries are affiliated with the A.A.P.S.O. The Permanent Secretariat is composed of representatives of Algeria, Angola, China, Guinea, Ghana, India, Iraq, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, South Vietnam, Tanzania and U.A.R.

of international bodies and commissions that Israel employs the most odious and barbarous methods in her treatment of the Arab inhabitants, forces them to leave their country and changes the character of the occupied territories, establishes settlements in them and destroys villages and houses in defiance of all international law and in violation of human rights and the Geneva conventions for the protection of these rights;

*Whereas* it has been established that the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East as a result of Israel's tyranny is a threat to the security of the whole area and, consequently, to world peace and security;

*Whereas* it has become evident that Israel, which is the offspring of world Zionism, is a no less ferociously racist entity than Nazism, and that in her tyranny she enjoys American support, which enables her to continue her occupation of Arab territory and to expel the original Arab population and disregard their rights, just as she previously trampled underfoot the rights of the Palestinian Arab people;

*In view of* the organic links between Israel and Zionism on the one hand and world imperialism represented by the United States of America and its allies such as West Germany, on the other, inasmuch as since her creation Israel has been an extension of world capitalism and a prolongation of colonialism in its old and new forms and a settler racist state, no different from Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, and a military base like South Vietnam, designed to protect colonialist presence through force and violence and to strike at the popular revolutionary liberation movements in Asia and Africa;

*And recalling* that since June 6, 1967 Israel has violated forty-two resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its various agencies, in particular the General Assembly and the Security Council, in addition to her violation before that date of no less than sixty resolutions, all of them on the established rights of the Arab people;

In the light of the above the Executive Committee:

*Affirms* that the Palestine problem is not and never has been a problem of refugees

but is basically the problem of a people forcibly deprived of its basic rights by a colonialist settler minority. The Committee therefore affirms these rights, which no people can possibly relinquish, the first of which is the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in and on its own territory, and the international community is deceiving itself if it thinks that security can be established in the Middle East area until this people recovers its rights. The General Assembly affirmed these facts and these rights in resolutions it has adopted by a two-thirds majority since 1969—Resolution 2535 of December 10, 1969 and Resolution 2672 of December 8, 1970.

*Condemns* the Israeli aggression against the Arab nation in June 1967 and demands total withdrawal from all the occupied territories and the elimination of all consequences of that aggression, and condemns the annexation of territories by force.

*Condemns* both Israel and South Africa in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 2649 of November 30, 1970, which condemned governments that deny the rights of peoples to self-determination, especially the Arab people of Palestine and the people of South Africa.

*Recognizes* the legality and legitimacy of the Palestine Resistance, particularly as the General Assembly has affirmed the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination and condemned Israel's violation of these rights, and regards the Palestine Resistance as a vanguard movement for liberation from the most odious form of settler colonialism, which is entitled to employ armed struggle and other means in its struggle against Zionism and Israel. In this connection it draws attention to the United Nations Resolution 1415, adopted in 1960, on the termination of the colonization of peoples, and condemns all attempts to liquidate commando action and the Palestine Resistance. It also condemns in the strongest terms the savage colonialist campaign which the reactionary Jordanian regime has been engaged in since September 1970 with the aim of destroying the forces of the Palestine Revolution and preventing the Palestinian people from ex-

ercising their right to struggle for the liberation of their homeland, and salutes the valor of the Palestine Resistance and affirms its right to carry on armed struggle and mobilize the Palestinian people to struggle for their rights.

*Condemns* in particular the American government and West Germany for their aid and support of Israel with money and arms to enable her to expand at the expense of the Arab people who have been forcibly expelled from their land. In financial terms this support is greater than that given to any regime in the world and has enabled the Zionist state to mobilize more than a quarter of a million men equipped with the most deadly kinds of fighter bombers, electronic weapon systems and other instruments of destruction, all of which have been used in the occupied territories to kill innocent Arab civilians—old people, women, children, students and workers—with the greatest savagery and brutality.

*Calls on* the Security Council and the General Assembly to insist on the implementation of their resolutions on the delegation of a representative of the Secretary-General and an international committee to investigate Israel's treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, inquire into the conditions of the thousands of Arab prisoners, and publish reports on their findings.

*Calls for* the return of the refugees and the persons newly displaced from the occupied territories in implementation of the humane resolution unanimously adopted by the Security Council, Resolution 237 of June 14, 1967, and General Assembly Resolutions 2252 of July 4, 1967, 2452 of December 19, 1968, 2535 of December 10, 1969 and 2672 of December 8, 1970, all of which were adopted by an overwhelming majority.

*Draws*, at the present juncture, the particular attention of the international community to the tragedies that are being enacted in Gaza and to the detention camps established by the occupation authorities in Sinai, their separation of members of the same family and the infliction of the most abominable kinds of torture on prisoners in the occupied areas. This indisputably constitutes the crime

of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Committee calls for their investigation by neutral international bodies.

*Affirms* the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on Jerusalem which call on Israel to rescind the appropriation and annexation measures she has taken in Jerusalem and which have led to its character being changed and to the expulsion of thousands of Arabs and the seizure of their properties and to Zionists being settled in their place.

*Calls for*, in the light of the above, enforcement against Israel of Article Six of the [UN] Charter which states that if any member of the United Nations persistently violates the principles of the Charter, the General Assembly may expel it from the organization on the recommendation of the Security Council.

*Praises* the efforts of the Arab states which stand up to Israeli aggression and provide aid and support to the armed struggle, according particular praise to the efforts that the United Arab Republic, situated on the front line against Israeli-imperialist aggression, is making to increase its combat capacity and strengthen its popular forces, and to the extensive activity it is undertaking to win over world public opinion and explain the facts of the Arab struggle, and to isolate Israel internationally and demonstrate her expansionist intentions and her fascist racist character; regards the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United Arab Republic as a historic step in support of the Arab struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

*Warns* the struggling peoples of Africa and Asia and their liberation movements, and in particular their workers' movements and organizations, against American and neo-colonialist penetration through Israel under a false guise and couched behind a poisonous allure.

*Demands* the abolition of American bases in Africa and Asia which, as has been proved, are being used by America to maintain its colonization and to prolong its strategic domination and its exploitation of the resources of their peoples, and regards Israel

as being one of these bases and as being founded on aggression and expansion.

## 151

### **Statements by Pope Paul VI Expressing Concern for the Holy Places and for the Christian, As Well As Non-Christian, Peoples of the Holy Land and Calling for an International Status for Jerusalem, Included in an Address to the College of Cardinals<sup>1</sup>**

Vatican City, June 24, 1971

Then there is the Middle East, where the Holy Land is in the center of the conflict. We cannot but look to that Holy Land with intense interest and—with a sort of prophetic instinct—to wish it peace, true peace. It is clear to all that this peace cannot be the fruit of a military victory; it is also clear that no simple formula can be found for attaining it. The complexity of the situation renders it extremely delicate and difficult.

In any case, We repeat that only an interest in peace and an intention to work for it guide Our actions in this complex question. They guide Us also in the exercise of Our right and duty to concern Ourselves with the protection of the Holy Places, knowing full well that not only Catholics but all Christendom shares Our feeling in regarding this as absolutely necessary. In addition, there is the matter of protecting the Christian population, and also the interest of the non-Christian Arab and Jewish population of the region, so that they may be enabled—despite a composite character—to live there freely and normally.

Then there is the question of Jerusalem. It seems to Us, We repeat, that it is the interest

of all—and hence it is the duty of all—that this city, enjoying as it does a unique and mysterious destiny, should be protected by a special statute, guaranteed by an international legal safeguard, and that it should thus be better enabled to become no longer an object of implacable controversy and endless dispute, but a meeting place of concord, peace and faith. To this end We are seeking to carry out a work of persuasion, in a spirit of respect and friendship.

## 152

### **Statement Explaining Belgian Adherence to the European Economic Community Report on a Common Middle East Policy, Made by Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium in Response to a Parliamentary Question<sup>2</sup>**

Brussels, June 30, 1971

During the ministerial session in Munich on November 19, 1970, it was decided that the six governments should try to reconcile their views on the Middle East. It was agreed that the study would cover the following four points:

1. Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal;
2. The establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. The status of Jerusalem;
4. The problem of the Palestinians.

The policy advisors of the six countries were instructed to draw up a report on these points.

On May 13 the ministers, meeting in Paris, gave their approval to the document that had been prepared for them. They decided that

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the adapted English translation of the Italian original (*L'Osservatore Romano*, June 25, 1971), *The Pope Speaks*, XVI, 2 (Summer, 1971), p. 95; translation by *The Pope Speaks Magazine*, Washington, D.C.

<sup>2</sup> Translation of the French text of Harmel's reply to M. Simonet's question, as provided, on request, by the Embassy of Belgium in Beirut.

the public announcement of their efforts should be restricted to a joint declaration, which was read to the press by Mr. Schumann. I should like to read to you the essential passages:

It is the view of the Ministers that the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East is of great importance for Europe. They also support all efforts leading to a peaceful solution of the conflict, in particular the negotiations presided over by Mr. Jarring. They urgently call on all the interested parties to ensure the success of this mission.

They reaffirm their approval of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which constitutes the basis for a settlement, and they stress the necessity for it to be implemented *in toto*.

The six governments declare that they are ready when the time comes to contribute, to the extent of their means, to the social and economic stabilization of the Middle East.

The Ministers recalled their decision to exchange views with the candidate countries on May 18.

They instructed the Political Committee to complete and follow up its work, bearing in mind the constant development of the situation in the Middle East.

\* \* \*

In the part it has played in these various activities, the Belgian government has respected the following principles, which it regards as essential:

1. It is no longer acceptable that Western Europe should play no part in the quest for a solution of the Middle East conflict. It is, indeed, regrettable that it did not find a way to intervene effectively to prevent the events of 1967. It would be equally regrettable if it did not participate in the efforts for peace now in progress. It is in conformity with the interests of Europe and the interests of the states of this area that the European countries should participate at the diplomatic level in the quest for peace. Impressions I brought back with me from my recent journey confirm this view.

2. The only basis for peace lies in the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. This resolution makes provision for a set of measures which are complementary and inseparable. This resolution also provides a method for seeking a solution with the interested parties: recourse to the good offices of the Secretary-General's special representative Mr. Jarring.

It seems to us both futile and dangerous to initiate public discussion of how the different passages of this resolution should be interpreted. But it does seem to us essential to embark, energetically but with discretion, on clearly defined diplomatic activity with a view to ensuring the implementation of the terms of this resolution. It was with a view to making this diplomatic action as effective as possible that the European States—six of them at first and then ten—concerted their positions.

3. Obviously this diplomatic action has but one basic goal: to secure the establishment of peace in this area. It is thus not a question of maintaining a truce or of simply declaring that the state of war has come to an end. On the contrary, the signature of the peace treaty must transform the relations among the states of this area and permit all of them to live in peace. As it is not possible to change overnight a political situation which is so notoriously complex and which has given rise to so many bloody confrontations in the past, it is necessary to understand all the difficulties that impede the passage from a state of war to a state of peace.

It is precisely to promote this change and to dissipate mistrust, that international action is essential. This is why Resolution 242 provides for a system of international guarantees, including the creation of demilitarized zones. It is in this context that answers will have to be found to the territorial problems which are outstanding, particularly at Sharm el-Sheikh, in Sinai, in Golan and in the West Bank of Jordan.

I had occasion to explain to the Senate on March 23, 1971 why it was easier to solve the problem of the withdrawal of forces and that of the frontiers when the latter was set



in the general context of international guarantees.

\* \* \*

It will then be observed how completely the public statement made in the name of the Six, which I read at the start, is in conformity with the principles I have just mentioned.

It has been all the easier for me to give my agreement to this common position since it corresponds with attitudes adopted by the Belgian government which I have had occasion to state to the Belgian Parliament and to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

\* \* \*

What is important now is not to seek the detailed interpretation of this or that statement, but rather to embark on clearly defined diplomatic activity with a view to promoting peace. It is to such unremitting activity that Belgium gives priority. It assumes that, so that it may be effective, it will be possible for this activity to be carried on discreetly enough for it to be agreed upon by all the states concerned.

## 153

### **Report Submitted by Jewish Agency Treasurer Dulzin to the Assembly of the Reconstituted Agency, Presenting Budget and Finance Plans To Provide for the Absorption of a Million New Jewish Immigrants to Israel (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Jerusalem, Late June, 1971**

The Budget and Finance Committee of this enlarged Jewish Agency met here in Jerusalem on January 25th and 26th, 1971, together with the Planning Committee. We discussed the proposed budget of the Jewish Agency for the current fiscal year which begins April 1, 1971 and ends on March 31, 1972.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from A.L. Dulzin, "A Million New Immigrants and the Financial Means To Absorb Them," Report to the Assembly of the Reconstituted Jewish Agency, *Economic Review* (Jerusalem: Aliya and Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency), XXIV, 5-6 (May-June, 1971), pp. 9-10, 11-12, 12-13, 14-15.

At those meetings in January we presented and approved a Budget of Needs in the amount of \$572,130,000, the highest budget ever presented by the Jewish Agency. This Budget of Needs is based primarily on (1) the immigration and absorption of 50,000 new immigrants, and (2) the needs of some 500,000 people here in Israel who have not yet been fully absorbed and continue to need our help, immigrants who came here many years ago, and the children of these immigrants. These 500,000 include: 250,000 people still living below the poverty line; 45,000 students in our institutions of higher learning; 100,000 youth requiring high school scholarships; 45,000 children in prekindergartens. Of those 500,000 I would say that 65% are children and teenagers.

Since the Six-Day War we have taken over from the government part of the services which the government supplied to the needy of previous immigrations. We were able to do this because in 1967, in this year of the Six-Day War, our first emergency campaign brought us in the sum of \$346 millions in cash. Yes, this was in time of war, in a time of the gravest concern about the fate of Israel. And the response of world Jewry was to jump from \$60 millions in 1966 to this amount of \$346 millions in 1967. That is why the Jewish Agency could take over those services to the needy of previous immigrations, and these services are and will continue to be our responsibility.

Our income in 1968 went down to \$178 millions, and then increased in 1969 to \$210 millions, and to \$285 millions in 1970. This year, in 1971, we had hoped to be able to double our income, and our goal was set for \$600 millions. This goal was based on the most realistic appraisal of Israel's needs. But it was also based on something else, on the fact that over 90% of the government's total revenue from direct and indirect taxation goes for defense purposes, which means that very little is left over for even the most minimum services which our people in Israel require, to enjoy even the minimum standard of living as it was in previous years.

In effect, in voting such a budget, world Jewry was saying to the government of Israel: "*You take care of the Israel of today—the defense*

*burdens, the day-to-day concerns. And we'll assume responsibility for the Israel of tomorrow. We'll care for the newcomers, the immigrants, the needy. We'll help to build the Israel of the future."*

Reflecting this determination, we included in this Budget of Needs, in our responsibility, 68% of the social welfare services of Israel; 59% of health services; 25% of education; 98% of the operating deficits of the institutions of higher learning—practically the entire amount; 84% of immigrants housing; and, of course, youth care and training, including Youth Aliyah which is and has always been our own responsibility.

These were the responsibilities we took over, in addition to those of immigration of newcomers, the absorption of new immigrants, and the continuing work of our Agricultural Settlement Department. These were together the items that made up our Budget of Needs in the overall amount of \$600 millions. These were the building blocks of the Israel we were and are resolved to help build.

We did not arrive at our goal without full regard for the possibilities of raising it. In an unprecedented step in the history of worldwide campaigning for Israel, we went out and consulted with every country that ran a campaign. We visited and consulted with the largest communities in these countries.

Beginning last September, we visited 63 communities in the United States, communities which represent almost 90% of the United Jewish Appeal Campaign. We met with the top leaders of each community, and with the larger contributors. Everywhere there was unanimous approval of the goal set for each community. The vote to accept this goal came after long and difficult debate. But when the vote was taken, the goal was accepted unanimously.

And we made similar visits in Europe, in England, in Canada, Australia, South Africa, South America. Everywhere we met with top leaders and givers, everywhere we engaged in soul-searching consultation and debate. And everywhere the decision was unanimous: to accept the goals set for the respective countries and communities.

\$600 millions: for the United States \$400 millions, for the rest of the world \$200 millions. An enormous effort, a tremendous target. More than double the previous year.

Let me mention another matter: the assets and liabilities of the Jewish Agency. A special committee has been set up to deal with the assets and liabilities involved in the various companies of the Jewish Agency, its accumulated operating deficit, its borrowings. Yesterday that committee had its first meeting.

At this Assembly, when we begin a new chapter in our work and in our relationships—Israel and world Jewry, it is proper to look at our assets and liabilities of the Jewish Agency in the broader perspective of the role of the Jewish Agency in the history and development of Israel. Since the creation of the State, the Jewish Agency has invested over \$3 billions in Israel. Because we undertook on behalf of world Jewry the responsibility for the ingathering of the exiles, for the immigration and absorption of the Jews for whom Israel, and Israel alone, could be haven and home, the Jewish Agency brought in and carried out the absorption of 1,450,000 olim. In these 23 years of Statehood we established hundreds of new settlements. More than 100,000 youngsters were helped to a new life through Youth Aliyah. Schools were built through the Israel Education Fund. Hundreds of thousands of immigrant families were housed. Hundreds of thousands of children received educational aid.

I think we realize now—we realized it then, in fact—that what we did was not enough, and much of those tasks of earlier years remain now for us to complete. But it should be a source of infinite joy and pride to every one of you, as it is to me, to realize that what we see here in Israel today could not have happened without the Jewish Agency, without the Jewish people for whom the Jewish Agency is the instrument for building this land.

Perhaps it is a strange thing for a Treasurer to say, but the fact is that I am not worried about our financial liabilities. I ask you to remember that these liabilities represent barely ten percent of the total investment we

have made in Israel during these past 23 years.

. . . . .

Yes, we are still confronted with the deprivation and poverty of 250,000—perhaps 300,000—of those whom we brought to Israel and for whom we assumed responsibility. This problem is the concern of every person in Israel, of every responsible political party. Nor is it an issue of which any party makes political capital, as happens in other countries. I repeat: it is the concern of every Israeli, as it is the concern of all of us here in this Assembly, of every Jew in the free world. We shall not be content until every one of these Jews who are deprived will enjoy the same privileges and conditions as every other Jew in Israel. This is our goal. This is our task.

That is why this question of budget cuts is so terribly important. Because it affects these people for the most part. I want to drive home this point. We are not dealing with a country in depression, with vast numbers of unemployed. On the contrary. There is full employment in Israel, and acute manpower shortages in many sectors of the economy. Everybody in Israel who is able to work can find work. That is why immigration is especially crucial, aside from the all-important considerations of rescue. We need immigration, because we need manpower.

But if we cut the housing budget by \$110 millions, we will still have to find housing for the new immigrants. As our Chairman said yesterday, immigration is second in importance only to defense. This is the Agency's top priority, for Israel cannot exist and has no future without continuous immigration. So we will provide housing for the new immigrants—we have no choice.

. . . . .

It is clear, then, that we will have to go out next year for no less than \$600 millions—again. We are far from peace, and if peace will come, in whatever form, we will continue nonetheless to campaign on an emergency basis for many years to come. We will probably hear something about this from the Minister of Finance, but I doubt very much that the defense budget of the Israel govern-

ment will be less next year and two and three years from now. Israel will have to be on the constant alert, with its defense constantly on the ready, with the people of Israel constantly mobilized.

And there is another factor. We expect to receive here in Israel in the next decade at least a million Jews. They will come from the East, they will come from the West. I do not wish to be specific at this moment, but we believe it. And this means that we must keep Israel running in such a way as to be able to absorb these new immigrants in the most constructive manner. We will need a dynamic economy in which there will be work for every one, and every one will be able to derive satisfaction from his work.

During the past four years we were able to absorb 150,000 new immigrants with relatively little difficulty because we have an economy which requires more and more manpower. But jobs are only part of what is needed. To absorb all those who will come will require more housing and more schools and more hospitals. This is our great worry.

In this next ten years we will probably have to raise from the Jewish people throughout the world at least \$6 billions. This is an effort unparalleled in human history. We have never before set such a goal for ourselves. The great drama of our people is that we can envisage such possibilities. One million new immigrants here in Israel, the financial means to absorb them—this is the goal of this enlarged Jewish Agency, this is *our* goal.

I know that the Jewish world will respond.

I know that there will come a day when we shall have peace here in Israel, and that the Jewish people will show even greater understanding and make an even greater effort in time of peace than in time of war. For we shall be witnessing and experiencing a great joy: hundreds of thousands of Jews coming here from the Soviet Union, the remnants of the Jewish communities in the Moslem countries brought here to rescue and hope.

The sense of mutual responsibility is creating that mood within the Jewish people as we contemplate that happy day. In the meantime, however, we are confronted with immediate and urgent tasks. We must find

solutions for immediate and urgent problems.

The Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization have always operated on the principle, from their earliest beginnings, that never will a Jew remain where he lives if he wants to come here. Whether or not the funds were available did not count—we brought him regardless. *This* priority, certainly, I can state as we consider what must be done now, and in the future.

My dear friends, I hope that from this Assembly will go forth a call to the Jewish people for a greater effort than ever before, for greater achievements in our campaigns, for greater achievements in the fulfillment of our common responsibilities.

## 154

### **Magazine Interview Statements Made by the Shah of Iran Asserting Iran's Intention To Process More of Her Petroleum, Her Determination To Keep the Persian Gulf Open and Free of Any Foreign Presence, Her Views on the Necessity for Muslim Access to the Holy Places, and Her Support for U.N. Resolution 242 on the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**Teheran, Early July, 1971**

*Q. The Kuwaiti Minister of Finance and Petroleum recently declared: "If the [French] companies continue their campaign to boycott Algerian oil, we will be obliged to act so as to fulfill the duty of solidarity uniting all members of O.P.E.C." If such an act of solidarity should become necessary, would Iran take part?*

*A.* We haven't been following the conflict closely. The responsibility of O.P.E.C. members would come into the matter only on the basis of decisions taken in common. Despite all the sympathy we have for Algeria, we cannot show solidarity in the case of a conflict

which we have not approved of in common agreement with the O.P.E.C. countries.

*Q. ARAMCO [the Arabian-American Oil Company] has recently let it be known that it wants to triple its production of Saudi Arabian oil in three years, to become the prime exporter of crude in the world. Should one see in this anything other than an economic measure just at the moment when the producer countries have formed a united front?*

*A.* The goal, no doubt, is economic. The United States would have had us believe at the Teheran talks that their Alaska reserves would soon be enough for them. However, we know that in a few years the U.S.A. will have to import more than 50% of their crude. Their reserves amount to 40 billion barrels and at the present rate of extraction (9 billion barrels per year), they won't last long. Saudi Arabia—like Iran by the way—has extraordinary reserves. It is not surprising then if ARAMCO wants to triple its production, but I don't think that it can do so immediately. In Iran, in any case, we will not permit such an increase in exports of crude. During the Teheran talks, we made it clear that our intention was to make use of the oil at home and to transform it into petrochemical products and thus to create new jobs. I would like each liter of oil to bring us 100% more profit by being processed here instead of being exported. Our exports would no doubt increase at first, and then stabilize once we ourselves could process a greater part of the oil; our exports would then decrease.

*Q. Many observers have noted that Iran's influence in the Persian Gulf is becoming more pronounced. Some don't hesitate to talk about imperialism, basing their assessment on the fact that Iran has just provided itself with a significant quantity of modern arms. Do you think that the Emirates of the Persian Gulf have anything to fear from Iran's influence?*

*A.* That question would have to be put to the Emirates. If sending doctors and experts is considered an act of imperialism, Iran is ready, for the good of the region, to be considered an imperialistic nation.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Shah's interview, conducted by A. Abbas, *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), No. 548 (July 6, 1971), pp. 54–55, 56.

Thank God our country is large enough and rich enough in natural resources not to have to adopt an expansionist policy which would create problems and occasion useless expenditure. It is normal that we provide ourselves with modern weapons for we must be able, alone, to assure the complete integrity and stability of the Persian Gulf if the policy of defense cooperation we at present pursue with the coastal states should change. This waterway is vital for us and it must remain open. We would if necessary double or even triple our armament. We don't want another nation to replace Britain which is now obliged to withdraw from the area.

*Q. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Zāhedi, recently raised the problem of the conservation of the holy places of Palestine with Pope Paul VI and with Italian and Senegalese leaders. What should be thought of this initiative on the part of Iranian diplomacy?*

*A. It is a basic question of principle. If access to the holy places is a passionate and spiritual problem for three million Israelis, so is it just as much for a billion Christians and for the 600 million Muslims of the world. Its status cannot be altered unilaterally.*

*Q. In the case of a repeated refusal by Israel to enter into peace negotiations, will Iran undertake sanctions by, for example, ordering the petroleum consortium to export no more Iranian black gold to Israel?*

*A. We firmly support the November 22 U.N. resolution, and the points presented by President Sadat seem reasonable to us. Still, any initiative to impose sanctions on Israel depends on the United Nations and Iran will apply to the letter any sanction determined by that organization. Once the tankers are filled, we do not know where our oil goes. Who told you, by the way, that Arab oil isn't exported to Israel? It's enough to have it transited via a second port in order to hide its origin.*

## 155

**Statements Affirming U.S.S.R. Support for Israel's Existence, Renouncing Any Attempt To Force Israel To Withdraw from the Occupied Territories and Expressing Soviet Willingness To Consider a Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Israel, Made by Members of the Soviet U.N. Delegation in an Israeli Press Interview<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, Early July, 1971**

We [the U.S.S.R.] will not constrain Israel by force to withdraw from the occupied territories. We will do it by political means. We will isolate her totally by creating a climate of world public opinion so much against her that she will be obliged to return what she took by force.

The U.S.S.R., which has never guaranteed the security of any nation whatsoever, today offers such a guarantee to Israel, which refuses it.

It has cost us an enormous effort to convince the Arabs to stop talking about exterminating Israel and pushing the Jews into the sea. This was not easy, but we were able to do it. Now it is time to convince Israel that her security and her future do not depend on her occupation of Arab territories.

The U.S.S.R. is ready to study the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Israel, once your government declares its willingness to return these territories. It would not be right for us to resume these relations before this condition be met.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French excerpts of the interview with First Secretary Loguinov and Second Secretary Kotomine of the Soviet U.N. delegation given to *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), as published in *Le Monde*, July 4-5, 1971, p. 3.

## 156

**Radio Interview Statements with Israeli Premier Meir's Political Advisor Dinitz Commenting on U.S.-Israel Relations in the Light of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director Helms's Visit to Israel and of the Bergus Memorandum<sup>1</sup>**

July 2, 1971

*Q. There is an opinion, Mr. Dinitz, that following the Soviet infiltration into the Southern Mediterranean the Americans consider Israel practically part of NATO. Can Helms's visit be considered within this context?*

*A.* First I think I should point out that Helms's visit did not come in the wake of any specific event but as part of a visit to a number of countries. It was a visit by a man who has considerable weight in the US Administration to obtain information from the leaders of states. I would not attribute it to any specific development and I would say that the press comments on the visit are far from accurate regarding the subject that was actually discussed during the visit.

Concerning the wider part of the question, I do not think we can say for sure that the USA has reached some conclusion or other regarding linking Israel with the Western defence system. It can be definitely said that no negotiations are being held on this subject; no talks are being held within such a framework....

*Q. How does the question of American aid stand today—military aid, credit and so on?*

*A.* In many spheres the aid continues. Regarding a certain sphere, aviation, it is no secret that negotiations are still going on intensively. I cannot tell you that there have been positive results at this moment, but the dialogue is continuing until the problem is solved.

*Q. To what extent does the Bergus document*

*reveal trends in American policy towards Israel? Can it be said there is official American pressure or a trend regarding the extent of a withdrawal?*

*A.* I think the phenomenon of the Bergus document—and this is an understatement—is a strange phenomenon. I think the official American statement on this matter shows that they too do not think this is an acceptable thing.... I should point out here that up to today the Israeli Government has not received official, authoritative information as to what the Bergus Note contained....

*Q. Where do we stand today regarding the partial settlement and political activity on this subject?*

*A.* As everybody knows, we submitted the main points of Israel's position in a Note to the US Government on 19th April.... They agreed to communicate the main points to the other side. The US Secretary of State and Sisco visited Israel in early May. Comprehensive talks were held then with the participation of the Premier.... I must say our document did not contain a single clause which the Americans considered bad or unreasonable. Since then, since 5th May, the Israeli Government has not received any authoritative Egyptian reply regarding their position on the various clauses to be included in a partial settlement....

*Q. Another subject—do you think the chances of resuming our relations with the Soviet Union are better today than they were a few months ago?*

*A.* It is difficult to say or even to assume whether a decision has been adopted in the Soviet Union to renew relations with Israel.... I want to point out here with regard to the visit of Viktor Louis that he himself declared that he did not come on an official mission, he did not come as an official representative.... It is important to emphasise that the Israeli Government's position is that it is prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union just as it has with other states.... No one among us thinks that if and when relations with the Soviet Union are resumed this would automatically eliminate all the differences between us and them.... However, up to this moment no such negotiations have been held anywhere.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Dinitz's interview broadcast on Israeli Forces Radio in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3726/A/5-A/6; reprinted by permission.

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**Radio Interview with Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin Stating His Acceptance of the U.S. Government Claim That the Bergus Memorandum Was a "Personal Initiative," and Noting that U.S. Support Neutralizes International Hostility Towards Israel<sup>1</sup>**

July 2, 1971

*Q. Mr. Rabin, in Israel this week there have been many conflicting evaluations of the US Middle East policy. One opinion is that the United States now considers Israel to be part of the Western defence deployment with all this implies. On the other hand, there is another opinion that the United States want to obtain a partial agreement between Israel and Egypt as soon as possible and at any price. Which evaluation do you agree with?*

A. I estimate that the United States recognises the fact that a country called Israel, a strong democratic state, is capable of defending itself with its own forces in a localised dispute if it receives the necessary monetary, military and political aid. Second, the United States, people and Government, regards Israel as far closer to the US spirit and understanding of how a country should be run than probably any other country in the Middle East. Third, I am convinced that in the present situation in the Middle East, especially since the end of the six-day war, the United States wants to settle the dispute in the Middle East even if by stages. But it first and foremost wants to ensure US interests, and US interests are mainly linked with the whole Middle East area, most of which consists of the Arab world. The United States does not want to reach a situation in which all that remains for it in the Middle East is Israel's friendship. For this reason, the United States is striving for an agreement which will be a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbours at the expense of most if not all

the territories conquered in the six-day war. This has been US policy since the end of the six-day war, a policy laid down by President Johnson's Administration and slightly improved by President Nixon's Administration. Therefore an attempt to define what the United States wants in an oversimplified way, as you tried to ask me to do, cannot be done.

I just want to recall one thing: the United States has no formal obligation to come to Israel's assistance with troops, whether in the case of an internal dispute—which certainly at present no one sees as necessary here or in Israel—or against Soviet troops, although I think it is hard to envisage the US people or Government watching and allowing Soviet forces to harm Israel. This is, of course, on condition that Israel has proved it is doing all in its power to promote and advance peace.

*Q. Do you estimate, on the basis of the principles you have just spoken of, that the United States is devising any concrete plan of action for the near future in an attempt to attain some sort of Middle East settlement?*

A. From what I know of the US character, and without knowing any details at present, I believe the United States does not accept the theory that sometimes the best answer to a certain situation is to sit back and wait and do nothing. I believe the United States does not want to face the dilemma—if and when the battle resumes along the Suez Canal—of a situation being created whereby the extent of Soviet intervention might be increased, thus posing the problem: What shall we do? They have no desire to become involved with the USSR and even less so over the problem of Sinai. They do not link Sinai with the existence of the state of Israel. On the other hand, the United States cannot calmly observe a Soviet attempt to interfere crudely and with force against Israeli forces. US policy is searching for any way to avoid a development which would place the US Government in such a dilemma because it would be intolerable for the United States.

*Q. Some people say the Bergus document was not merely a private document, and it is feared that the State Department will come round to the line*

<sup>1</sup> Text of Rabin's interview, conducted by Daniel Bloch, broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew (on July 3, 1971); English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3727/A/4-A/6; reprinted by permission.

*presented in this document to Egypt, if not now, at least eventually. What do you think?*

A. You ask me in such a way that my answer must be given publicly. The United States has explained that what was done was done on Bergus's own initiative without prior permission or knowledge. It was subsequently explained to the Egyptians that this did not represent the US view. I am not in a position to express doubt over what the US Government tells me.

However, unrelated to the Bergus affair, I believe that in the end the United States is not blind to reality. Along with its evaluation of the dangers inherent in lack of progress towards a solution or even the absence of action which would appear as progress towards a solution, the United States wants to avoid a stalemate over the issue on which progress has been demonstrated—in other words its activities to obtain a partial settlement centred on the opening of the Suez Canal. I am thus not convinced that in the near future the United States will produce a paper expressing its attitude, because it has learnt by the experience of Jarring's memorandum in February that the moment a mediator adopts a position of his own, he loses freedom of action and his ability to continue as a mediator.

*Q. Mr. Rabin, do you expect pressure on Israel, both through delaying a response to our requests for more arms and, in the political sphere, perhaps our complete isolation at the United Nations?*

A. Let us distinguish between Israel's relations with the United States and its relations with the whole world, especially the United Nations. I assume that what will happen at the next General Assembly will be the usual operetta which takes place in this tower of babel called the United Nations. In my opinion, everything that takes place there is meaningless, and it is time the state of Israel looked upon this institution as an institution of demagoguery. As long as the United States does not support resolutions of the type passed at the 25th UN Assembly, these resolutions have no significance. The only real way to deal effectively with the complete hostility of the whole world, as

expressed in the United Nations, is to start telling the United Nations, the world, and the public in the countries friendly to us, about the negative role played by the United Nations—in a word, everything connected with Israel for the past 15 years. What is more important is what concerns the United States, because we have not received a single dollar, a single bullet, a single aircraft, and no economic assistance from the United Nations. The problem is thus the United States, because it is our prop which makes the hostility of the world as manifested at the United Nations useless and meaningless.

I do not expect pressure. However, I assume that the differences in opinion—opinions as to the nature of things, on moves to be made, on Israel's needs—between the United States and ourselves will continue. That is the nature of relations between Israel and the United States, despite the wide and firm basis of friendship which exists between us.

*Q. What about continued supply of arms?*

A. I do not want to go into detail; there are issues on which we have difficulty, there are issues on which we have no difficulties. However, I believe we have never been in such a good situation.

*Q. How are the rumours about Soviet feelers for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel being received in Washington?*

A. I shall say this. The US Government has received the rumours favourably. First, this enables the United States to find justification for all sorts of moves it might make in the near future. It will be recalled, for example, that Israel was not enthusiastic about the two-power talks. If Israel can talk to the USSR, is it forbidden for the United States to do so?—we hear this here already. I do not believe the United States would decide upon resumption or non-resumption of the talks with the USSR merely in the light of whether Israel is trying to resume its contacts with the USSR or not. But there is no doubt that this makes things easier for it. Second, it makes matters easier for the United States in that it creates a more amenable atmosphere because there is no serious danger: the



Russians are talking to Israel, and since the only danger to Israel is from the USSR, so long as expectations for an Israeli-Russian rapprochement increase the main danger feared by the United States becomes more remote. And that's good. On the other hand, Kremlinology experts believe the Russians are merely paying lip service in a public relations exercise, which is unusual for them, for there is no doubt they have improved their image here among the US public through the rumours and stories of an improvement in relations with Israel.

## 158

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of Foreign Minister Riad of the U.A.R.<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, July 4, 1971**

Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UAR Mahmoud Riad paid a visit to the Soviet Union from June 29 to July 4, 1971, as a guest of the Soviet Government.

On July 1, 1971, Mahmoud Riad and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko exchanged the instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that had been signed between the USSR and UAR in Cairo on May 27, 1971. The said Treaty thus entered into force from the moment the instruments of ratification were exchanged.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev received Mahmoud Riad and had a friendly conversation with him about Soviet-Egyptian relations, the Middle East situation and also on certain topical international issues.

M. Riad also had meetings and conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko.

Various aspects of bilateral relations be-

tween the two countries were discussed during the meetings and conversations. The confidence was voiced that the Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic that had now entered into force would make for still more active relations between the two countries in the political, economic, cultural and other fields. The two Sides made a particular point of noting that the Treaty struck a fresh blow at the designs of international imperialism, which was striving might and main to upset the relations of friendship and cooperation that had been established between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, and also their movement for peace and social progress which proceeded from common aims.

The Treaty is an important contribution to the efforts to eliminate the consequences of imperialist Israeli aggression, to normalize the Middle East situation, and to strengthen peace and security.

The two Sides also exchanged views on certain aspects of the world situation today, concentrating on the Middle East situation and the steps which the Soviet Union and the UAR were making in their effort to overcome the aftermath of Israeli aggression.

The two Sides stressed that Israel's aggressive expansionist course is the basic cause of tension and the absence of peace in the Middle East. It is their conviction that without the political, economic and military assistance and support of the USA, the Israeli government would be unable to pursue its policy of aggression, and to sabotage all the efforts being made by the peace-loving forces to secure a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict through the observance of all the provisions stipulated in the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. The two Sides reaffirmed that a Middle East settlement should incorporate every aspect in their mutual relations, chief among which is to have Israeli troops withdrawn from all Arab territories that were occupied in 1967, to establish peace in the Middle East, and also to ensure the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

At the same time it was noted that the

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the Russian text of the communiqué (*Pravda*, July 5, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 28 (July 10, 1971), pp. 7-8.

matter of opening the Suez Canal to international shipping could not be decided in isolation from other aspects of the settlement, and had necessarily to be tied up with an agreement to have all Israeli troops withdrawn behind the line existing prior to June 5, 1967, coupled with a firm deadline for this withdrawal.

The two Sides reaffirmed their support for the Middle East mission of the UN Secretary-General's special representative, Ambassador Jarring.

In conformity with the Treaty, opinions were exchanged as to the further moves that the two Sides would take as regards some aspects of a Middle East settlement so as to normalize the situation and establish a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East. The two Sides have reaffirmed that a policy of securing a Middle East settlement by political means through the observance of all the provisions of Security Council Resolution No. 242, remained the principle line of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.

Matters germane to the problems of universal and complete disarmament, and of the consolidation of international security, including prohibition of the devising, manufacture, and stockpiling of bacteriological and chemical weapons were likewise discussed during the exchange of views. The Egyptian Side highly assessed the latest Soviet proposals for disarmament and the lessening of international tensions.

Noting the major importance of regular contacts and consultations between the Soviet Government and the UAR Government, as provided for in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the two Sides called for the further extension of all contacts and consultations on questions of Soviet-Egyptian relations, the present international situation, and the struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression.

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**Message of Congratulations from Premier Chou En-lai of China to Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) on the Convening of the Palestine National Council<sup>1</sup>**

**July 7, 1971**

On the occasion of the convening of the Conference of the Palestine National Council, I, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, express warm congratulations to the heroic Palestinian people and wish the conference every success.

In the past few years, the Palestinian people and their revolutionary armed forces, holding high the banner of armed struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression, have surmounted numerous difficulties, advanced wave upon wave in their valiant fight and continuously frustrated the military attacks and schemes of political deception by imperialism and its lackeys. Today, the Palestinian people's revolutionary armed forces are growing ever stronger through the fight and are daily becoming a shock force of the Arab National Liberation Movement. Your just struggle has won mounting sympathy and support from the broad masses of the people in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world. The Chinese people admire the revolutionary fighting spirit of the Palestinian people and the broad masses of the guerrilla fighters and extend revolutionary militant salute to them!

The Chinese Government and people will unswervingly support your just struggle. We will always stand together with you in our common cause of opposing imperialism. We firmly believe that the Palestinian people and their revolutionary armed forces will further strengthen their militant unity, overcome the temporary difficulties and continuously carry forward their just struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression to win still greater victories in their national liberation struggle.

<sup>1</sup> English text of the message, *Peking Review*, XIV, 29 (July 16, 1971), p. 27.

## 160

**Press Conference Statements by F.R.G. Foreign Minister Scheel on West Germany's Desire for Balanced Relations with the Nations of the Middle East, Israel's Right to Secure Borders and the Desirability of Concluding an Interim Suez Settlement<sup>1</sup>**

Jerusalem, July 9, 1971

We have just now ended our talks, which were conducted in a very open and friendly manner. These talks confirm that our relations, formalized in 1965, have since that time steadily developed and that this steady development continues. We agree that working for a relaxation of tension is the right way to achieve an improvement in the situations in our respective regions. We have explained to our partners in these talks why political consultations among the six members of the E.E.C. and the ten Western Europeans could contribute to a stabilization of the Near East situation once a peace agreement has been reached. I explained to the other party in our talks that the Federal Republic is attempting to reach a balanced relationship with the countries of the Near East. We have in our talks exchanged information on general and bilateral questions. By this visit we have gained a better knowledge of, first and foremost, the conditions in the country but also of Israel's special situation. The question of peace in this region concerns all of us Europeans; we agree that the peace settlement must be reached through free negotiations. I should like to add that the Federal Republic gives unchanging support to Ambassador Jarring's mission, in the service of a negotiated solution.

\* \* \*

*Q. Would it be correct to assume that a basic aim of the Federal Republic's foreign policy is reconcilia-*

*tion with France and another basic aim is reconciliation with the Jewish people? Is this not a time when the two aims of this reconciliation are at loggerheads? And how do you envisage the solution of these difficulties which arise out of this inner organic contradiction? Which is the preference, when it comes to a real showdown?*

A. There is no inherent contradiction in the German Federal Republic's policy of developing good, friendly relations—constantly improving relations with Israel, and at the same time achieving a reconciliation with France. We have seen in the past that there is no contradiction between these two aims, that on the contrary there is a deep inner connection. It is not possible that difficulties should arise from it. It is possible that differences of opinion concerning specific questions may arise among the partners of the Federal Republic, which would then have to be discussed and which, if possible, could be bridged insofar as the Federal Republic is able to exert any influence in the matter.

*Q. You mentioned that the Federal Government desires a balanced relationship with the countries of the Near East. What does such a phrase mean in reference to the special relations between Bonn and Jerusalem?*

A. A balanced relationship in our Near East policy means on the one hand that we want to maintain and furthermore to develop good, friendly relations with Israel, relations which, because of the past, have and will continue to have a special character; and, on the other hand it means that we want to undertake the attempt to resume relations, in the foreseeable future, with the Arab states with whom we have not had diplomatic relations for some years. The Israeli government understands very well that the interest of the Federal Republic demands a balanced relationship with all the countries of the region. But the Israeli government knows that the resumption of diplomatic relations with Arab countries, if it were to take place, would not prejudice the character of our relations with Israel; and the Arab countries with whom we shall resume diplomatic relations know it too.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the text of Scheel's press statement and selected questions and answers which followed as published in German (except for questions 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 originally asked in English) in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), No. 107 (July 13, 1971), pp. 1177–1180.

*Q. Mr. Minister, do you find that the principle which has just been confirmed, the principle of striving for a freely negotiated peace in this region, is more important than the other stated principle—that of your support for the Jarring mission? What would be the attitude of the Federal Republic if these two principles were not fully reconcilable?*

*A.* I do not see any disparity of objectives between what I have just said and what Jarring is working for. The objective is a peace settlement agreed by the parties.

*Q. Mr. Foreign Minister, can you, on the basis of your impressions here, specify your stand concerning the problem of Jerusalem?*

*A.* Public discussion of details by a representative of a country such as the Federal Republic appears to me not to be conducive to a solution of the problem of Jerusalem. We cannot believe that we should be “referees” in deciding on solutions which must be found here, *in situ*, if a peace settlement is to be accepted by all parties.

*Q. What is your government's position towards the American conception that peace in the Middle East requires Israel's readiness to evacuate all territories, except for minor changes? In view of your support for the Jarring mission, does it mean that your government will welcome a favorable reply of Israel to this mission?*

*A.* Regarding the first question, I might repeat what I have said about the problem of Jerusalem: I consider public discussion on these particular questions by others than those directly involved to be inappropriate. It is for this reason that the six ministers of the E.E.C., and the ten ministers of the enlarged E.E.C. as well, have not made any public pronouncement on these particular questions. We support the Jarring mission and we hope its success will be facilitated.

*Q. Mr. Minister, can you, despite the pressure of time, give us a few comments on the results of your bilateral negotiations this morning?*

*A.* I can list for you the subjects we talked about. They were economic questions. There was the question as to how private capital can be encouraged to invest in Israel. We heard a very interesting report by Dr. Dinstein on Israel's economic development, especially

the development of its foreign trade, with impressive figures achieved in a few years. We talked about trade between our countries, about economic loans which we had agreed on in past years and which we want to agree on in the future, with the understanding that the details must be renegotiated every year.

Of course we also spoke about Israel's relationship with the E.E.C. in the areas of trade and of economic cooperation. In this connection Israel wishes—a wish which has always been supported by the Federal Republic—to develop further the present treaty agreement with the E.E.C., that is to progress by stages from the preferential treatment agreement previously concluded with the E.E.C. to associate status. The questions connected with this have been discussed; there is considerable agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic on this.

May I add that both parties have noted with great satisfaction and pleasure the good development of cultural exchanges, and that we are also agreed that in future we shall give even more attention than we have so far to the youth-exchange program and that, in particular, we shall attempt to reach a certain balance in youth-exchange in the future.

*Q. Mr. Minister, assuming that you succeed in improving relations with the Arab states—possibly even in establishing normal diplomatic relations—could you then imagine that in such a changed climate between Germany and the Arab states, the Federal Republic could in some way help the taking of steps which might lead to peace talks between Israel and the Arabs?*

*A.* The Federal Republic has only very limited possibilities of contributing to the achieving of a lasting peace. We are not a great power. We are not a member of the United Nations. There are the interests of the United Nations. There is the Representative of the United Nations who has been charged with working towards the establishment of peace. There are further groups within the United Nations working on these questions. I do not think that any new active mediation is in the best interest of this affair. The Federal Republic will use all its diplo-

matic channels, the possibilities it now has and those it may have in the future in the service of the attainment of a lasting peace. We do not wish to hinder the efforts now underway; we wish to support them whenever we can. The possibilities for support would certainly broaden when we have reestablished diplomatic relations with the Arab states.

*Q. Mr. Minister, you said at the beginning that clarification had been achieved. In view of the numerous problems which exist between the Federal Republic and Israel, were you and those with whom you talked able to envisage a plan for regular consultations, following for example the model of German-French consultations on different levels and different subjects?*

A. We agreed this time that meetings between the two Foreign Ministers shall take place more regularly in future. I have already asked Mr. Abba Eban to consider the next date, which should not be too far in the future.

*Q. Since the Arab-Israeli problem has become a matter of international concern and since the Federal Government's representative has consulted in the framework of the Common Market action, it must be assumed that Germany has a position on the issue of total withdrawal and also with regard to the Rogers plan. May we know what Germany's position on these two subjects is?*

A. The Federal Government is of the opinion that the conflict should be resolved on the basis of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and that the elements contained in this resolution form a whole, that is that they must be implemented all together. The Federal Government has always stressed that a peace treaty in the Near East must affirm the right of the Israeli people to live within secure boundaries on the territory of their state, which shall be inviolable. This aim can be reached through negotiations. The efforts now underway are efforts first of all to get such negotiations started. We consider that Secretary of State Rogers' initiative holds a promise of success, namely the first step on the road to a final peace treaty, even though only in stages, for example the initiative to take a first step by reopening the Suez Canal,

so that hostilities, which on the canal have stopped for almost a year now, will not resume.

*Q. You said earlier that your policy of détente in Europe will facilitate peace efforts in the Middle East. Do you think that the Soviet military involvement, the one-sided backing of the Arabs, does not endanger or contribute an obstacle to détente in Europe? And how are you trying to influence the Soviets not to conduct a one-sided policy in the Middle East?*

A. There is certainly a connection between the centers of conflict and potential centers of conflict in the world. There is a connection between the policy of détente in Europe, the center of conflict in the Near East, and the center of conflict in South East Asia. The policy of the big nuclear powers at this time appears to be directed towards containing conflict through joint efforts. The SALT talks are a sign of this. Another sign is the readiness of the Soviet Union to enter into negotiations about mutual and balanced troop and arms reductions as suggested by NATO, and also the initiative subsequently taken by the United States in this affair. All these separate areas of conflict are connected. But the Federal Republic is not itself in a position to exert any influence on this global development. This is restricted to the big powers, who engage in global, political and also military strategy. We can only play our own role in this development, namely the role of working for a relaxation of tension wherever we have influence. We are doing this, particularly in Europe, and this is the motive for our attempt to bring about increased cooperation between East- and West-European countries and to remove causes of tension.

*Q. May I know the attitude of your government regarding the Brussels negotiations for the admission as associated countries of the Lebanon and Egypt to the Common Market, especially as concerns Articles 7 and 8 of the Common Market Treaty by which, by exemption, Lebanon and Egypt would be able to continue boycott practices against Israel, which is also an associate in the E.E.C.?*

A. The E.E.C. Council of Ministers has decided to conduct negotiations with Lebanon and the United Arab Republic in order to

negotiate a trade agreement; that is a development similar to the one we have concluded in the preferential treatment agreement with Israel. The texts so far produced exclude the possibility of boycott provisions entering into these trade agreements. Not only the Federal Republic, but all the members of the E.E.C. reject boycott as a trade policy.

*Q. During your talks with the Israeli Government, did you propose an extension of Germany's aid projects and programs, and what was the response?*

*A.* I have just pointed out that we discussed existing economic relations, which are negotiated from year to year. At this time I can only say that we shall continue these economic exchanges concerning the negotiation of economic loans. I cannot say anything now concerning the amounts. I will only just mention that the Federal Republic is in a very difficult fiscal position. For this reason our possibilities are very limited. We have not yet begun the negotiations for the period currently under consideration. I assume that we shall begin in the foreseeable future. I cannot say anything about the amounts, especially since these negotiations are conducted by my colleague, the Minister of Finance.

*Q. Could you explain to us, if possible, why there are still so many high-ranking Nazis in the Federal Republic, and [why] there are so many awaiting trial, without the trial actually taking place? Israeli public opinion is very much concerned with this matter.*

*A.* During the last years there have constantly been trials of criminals whom the existing authorities in Germany have been able to discover and to prosecute. But the conducting of these trials is less satisfactory every time. The reason is simply the passage of time which creates extremely difficult conditions for the holding of such trials. Such difficulties must be reckoned with and we must simply resign ourselves to them. We cannot overcome them.

*Q. Are you under the impression that the best solution could be an opening of the Suez Canal in order to avoid new hostilities between Israel and the Arabs, especially along the Suez Canal?*

*A.* I believe that it is desirable if, as a first stage of a peace settlement, the partial solution of the opening of the Suez Canal is concluded as soon as possible. We have seen that for a long time there have been no hostilities there. The opening of the Suez Canal would certainly preclude hostilities for a long time, hopefully until the conclusion of a final peace treaty.

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### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Algeria of Foreign Minister Roa Garcia of Cuba (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Algiers, July 13, 1971**

In response to an invitation from Mr. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, the [Algerian] Foreign Minister, within the framework of strengthening the close relations that exist between Algeria and Cuba, Dr. Raul Roa Garcia, the Cuban Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to Algeria at the head of an important delegation, July 8-14, 1971.

The two sides examined with special attention the development of the situation in the Middle East and, in expression of their profound alarm at the increasing danger which threatens peace and security in this area, condemn the Israeli policy of aggression and expansion. They also condemn the political, military and financial support provided to Israel by the imperialist countries, and in particular the United States of America. They condemn the maneuvers of imperialism aimed at imposing a so-called peaceful solution at the expense of the imperishable rights of the Palestinian people, who have been evicted from their homeland by the Zionist invader. In their belief that violent

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), July 14, 1971.

struggle alone is capable of ending the repeated aggressions and imperialistic goals of Zionism, the two parties reaffirm their absolute support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples to recover their occupied territories.

. . . . .

## 162

### **Commentary on the Aims of Recent U.S. Diplomatic Activity in the Middle East Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Izvestia (Condensed)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, July 14, 1971**

Takhsin Bashir, an official representative of the United Arab Republic government, has stated that the two American diplomats now in Cairo—M. Sterner, the head of the U.S. State Department's Egyptian desk, and D. Bergus, chief U.S. representative in the U.A.R.—“had nothing new to contribute to the problem of resolving the Near East crisis.”

These two American diplomats arrived in the U.A.R. to the accompaniment of a great stir in the American press, which claimed their visit was almost a “new act” in the U.S.A.’s Near East policy. But this latest propaganda balloon has been punctured. . . .

The results of the visit by U.S. Vice President S. Agnew, who has just completed a sojourn in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, also show that America’s Near East policy entails nothing positive either for the Arab countries or for the cause of a Near East settlement. Essentially, Agnew’s statements in those coun-

tries indicate once again, upon analysis, that the thesis of alleged “U.S. pressure on Israel” was and still is nothing more than a propaganda maneuver. The Cairo newspaper *Al Misaa*, by way of calling attention to the “U.S.A.’s two-faced position,” has emphasized that Washington talks about its desire to promote a Near East settlement while at the same time negotiating with Tel Aviv in regard to new deliveries of American weapons.

Moreover, local political observers have emphasized that the U.S.A. “is now preparing the soil” for the establishment of “closer ties” with Israel in all spheres: military, intelligence, political and economic. Pentagon representatives, who have been in Israel constantly, are busy drawing up precisely such plans. C.I.A. Director [Richard] Helms’ visit served identical purposes. J. Sisco, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, is also expected to arrive here within the next few days on a mission of further diplomatic support for Israel. As local observers have stressed, these men, operating “in accordance with their departments’ positions,” are pursuing one and the same goal: the strengthening of Israel’s military potential. . . .

As for Israel itself, the reaction in that country to Washington’s latest “acts of encouragement” has been swift . . . . Significant in this regard is the latest statement by Moshe Dayan, who has officially offered NATO leaders the use of military airfields in the Sinai Peninsula, which is under Israeli occupation. Thus the Tel Aviv general brazenly disposes of Arab territories that Israel has seized and which that country has to surrender under the written provisions of the Security Council’s November [1967] resolution, the fulfillment of which is demanded by all who hold dear the cause of peace in the Near East.

While discussing the mutual desires of Tel Aviv and the Atlantic alliance for rapprochement, Cairo political circles have voiced the opinion that Washington also would not be averse to using its “active ties” with NATO as a screen for American military assistance to Israel, and that the U.S. might continue to maintain the pretense of a so-called “balanced” Near East policy for this purpose. No such game, however, can con-

<sup>1</sup> Condensed and translated from the Russian commentary by L. Koryavin (*Izvestia*, July 14, 1971, p. 2), *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 28 (August 10, 1971), pp. 16-17. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

vince the Arab countries that America's Near East policy is an "unbiased" one, since that policy is directed against the interests of the Arab peoples. . . .

### 163

#### **Statement by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies Supporting an Administration Request for Funds for Military and Development Assistance to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, July 14, 1971**

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today in support of the President's request for funds to carry out development and military assistance programs during fiscal year 1972.

For this coming year, we are requesting \$407,335,000 in development aid and \$617,250,000 for security assistance for various countries in the Near East and South Asia. We believe these monies are essential if we are to carry out our policies successfully in this critical part of the world.

The past year has seen many important changes and events in the Near East and South Asia. The continuing drama in the Middle East and our intense concern with it were recently underscored by Secretary Rogers' unprecedented trip to certain Arab states and to Israel in support of Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] mission to bring a permanent peace settlement into being. In his report to this Congress of February 25, 1971, President Nixon, you will recall, characterized the situation in the Middle East as the most dangerous we face and noted its potential "for drawing Soviet policy and our own into a collision that could prove uncontrollable."

Despite the gravity of these circumstances, we can look back over the past months to some tangible progress. The cease-fire has been maintained. Neither side has closed the door to hearing the views of the other or to demonstrating some measure of flexibility.

Soviet shipments of significant quantities of modern weaponry into the United Arab Republic have not helped to stabilize the situation and have caused us to react accordingly in order to maintain the balance of arms in the Middle East.

Also, a few weeks ago, the U.A.R. and Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Although we do not know now what the ultimate significance of the treaty is, it is obviously a serious and potentially complicating development. On the other hand, we do not believe it need be a bar to making progress toward a peace settlement or an interim Suez Canal agreement. We are therefore continuing our discussions with the parties through diplomatic channels.

Indigenous economic problems, other rivalries, deep uncertainty over the course of the future—all have added to the political fragility of the area. The solution of these other problems could be accelerated by the confidence which would ensue from a belief that peace was permanent.

Until there is stabilization, the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean will remain of deep concern to us.

We are providing security assistance to various countries in this area in an effort to build positions of strength. We are asking you to consider requests for military sales credit for Israel and other assistance for Jordan, Greece, and Turkey.

Elsewhere in this region, the crisis which *fedayeen* activity precipitated in Jordan last September has almost completely subsided due to the firm position assumed by the Jordanian Government authorities. The crisis, however, has left Jordan with new financial problems, and we consider it essential to help her meet some of these costs.

A new regime in Syria shows promise of being more pragmatic than its predecessor, and we would hope that some more active

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Davies' statement on Development Aid and Security Assistance in the Near East and South Asia made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXV, 1678 (August 23, 1971), pp. 204, 205, 207, 207-208.



dialogue could be undertaken with that government so as to move toward more normal and friendlier relations.

### *Development Assistance*

For Jordan in FY 1972, we are asking \$750,000 for technical cooperation. The largest slice of this will go into education and manpower training, specifically for strengthening administrative skills.

### *Security Assistance*

For the Near East and South Asia, the total security assistance request for FY 1972 is \$617,250,000—\$167 million for military assistance (MAP), \$420 million for military credit sales, and \$30,250,000 for supporting economic aid.

Elsewhere in the Near East, both Jordan and Israel have security problems of serious dimensions.

Jordan with strong moderate leadership has overcome a major internal crisis provoked by radical *fedayeen* activity, which last year threatened its survival. Through decisive efforts of its own, supported in part with U.S. assistance, the regime of King Hussein has brought order and stability from near chaos. His forces have proved themselves capable and in the absence of external aggression or subversion and with our help should be able to maintain internal security.

Our concern with Israel's security continues to reflect our policy of insuring that a military balance is maintained. As you know, we have desired and have proposed to the Soviet Union an arms limitation agreement covering the area. We have been unsuccessful in inviting the Soviets to such discussions. Without such an agreement and without a peace settlement between the Arab states and Israel, our policy must remain unchanged. We are therefore including Israel in our request for funds for military credit sales for the next fiscal year.

Other countries in the Near East to which

we wish to extend such credit are Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon still has a serious internal security problem with the radical *fedayeen*. We are therefore planning to continue a modest security assistance program for Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia, an Arab state with which the United States has long enjoyed friendly relations and where this country has important economic and political interests, is committed to a long-range program to modernize its modest armed forces. Saudi Arabia has long felt threatened by hostile states on its peripheries and in 1969 was the victim of an unprovoked attack across its southern border. The difficulties of its terrain and the length of its borders have made such modernization essential to its defense. We also look to Saudi Arabia to play a positive role in cooperation with other littoral states in maintenance of stability in the Persian Gulf region following withdrawal of the operational British military presence there this year. After delays because of budgetary stringency, the Saudi Government is publicly committed to move ahead with expensive but necessary economic development projects. To maximize spending on economic development, the Saudis need deferred payment arrangements for several major projects in their coordinated military development program. We are therefore requesting funds for military sales credit for Saudi Arabia in this bill.

## 164

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Yugoslavia of Foreign Minister Riad of the U.A.R. (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Belgrade, July 16, 1971**

On the invitation of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mirko Tepavac, the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 510-511 (July 5-20, 1971), pp. 15, 16.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, Mahmoud Riad, accompanied by Mme M. Riad, and his party, paid an official visit to Yugoslavia from 12 to 16 July 1971, and on that occasion had talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mirko Tepavac.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Riad was received in Brioni by the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. On this occasion the Deputy Prime Minister Riad conveyed to President Tito a message from H.E. Anwar El Sadat, President of the UAR.

During the talks between the two delegations, which were held in an atmosphere of friendship and frankness, a broad exchange of views took place on the situation in the Middle East and on other international issues as well as on bilateral relations. Proceeding from their adherence to the policy of nonalignment and their will to continue to work towards the implementation of the decisions adopted in Lusaka, the two sides noted an identity of views on key international issues and the order of priority in solving them.

The Secretary of State Mirko Tepavac and the Deputy Prime Minister Mahmoud Riad examined in detail the latest development of the Middle East situation which continues to cause serious concern of all peace-loving nations. In spite of the efforts of the international community and numerous initiatives for the achievement of a peaceful solution, no progress has been made so far nor are there any prospects for an early solution of the crisis. Although the Government of the United Arab Republic has showed maximum patience, flexibility and realism in the desire to find a just solution and restore honourable peace, these efforts have produced no results, for Israel, bent on territorial expansion, has blocked all avenues towards a peaceful solution.

The two sides noted that a peaceful solution of the crisis and the restoration of a durable peace in the Middle East can only be achieved

if Israeli forces withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories and if the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine are restored. Proceeding from the fact that Israel, even after four years, continues to occupy Arab territories and persistently refuses to implement the decisions of the United Nations and that the explosive situation in the Middle East may threaten security of the Mediterranean, European and other countries, the two sides consider it essential that the international community, all peace-minded countries, and the world public opinion, intensify their efforts and use their influence for the implementation of the 1967 Security Council resolution and that Israel withdraws from all the occupied Arab territories.

The Yugoslav side noted that Yugoslavia will continue to work actively towards a just solution of the Middle East crisis and to support resolutely efforts by the United Arab Republic as well as the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine.

Emphasizing the role and importance of the United Nations, the two sides pointed to the responsibility of the world Organization in preventing aggression, defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member States and in preserving peace. They also pointed out the need for respect for and the strict implementation of the decisions of the United Nations and of the principles of its Charter.

The two sides reviewed the activity of non-aligned countries in the past towards the implementation of the decisions of the Third Non-Aligned Conference in Lusaka. In this connection, they emphasized the need for the continual activity of non-aligned countries through bilateral and multilateral consultations in order to accord their positions, in particular with regard to questions on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly session which are of special concern to non-aligned countries. The two Ministers expect that non-aligned countries, guided by the decisions of the Lusaka Conference, will

continue to support the just Arab cause and the efforts towards achieving a peaceful solution and restoration of durable peace in the Middle East.

## 165

### **Resolution Adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel (MAKI) Criticizing the Government of Israel for Having Failed To Put Forward a Middle East Peace Plan<sup>1</sup>**

**July 17, 1971**

The C.P.I. (Maki) Central Committee most sharply criticizes the government, because it has so far not presented an Israeli peace programme that is needed for the campaign against hostile political initiatives and schemes and against the threat of a renewed war on the part of the Arab states.

The Central Committee demands that the government rectify the above failure as soon as possible and take towards the forthcoming United Nations Assembly an Israeli initiative for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in accordance with the following principles:

<sup>1</sup> English text of resolution adopted at the 17th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of MAKI, *Information Bulletin (MAKI)*, 1971, No. 8 (August, 1971), pp. 3-5. The voting on the resolutions was as follows:

- Paragraph a) was adopted unanimously
- " b) adopted by a majority of 17 against 5
- " c) unanimously adopted
- " d) unanimously adopted
- " e) unanimously adopted
- " f) adopted by a majority of 17 against 2, 4 abstained
- " g) unanimously
- " h) nobody voted against, 17 for this paragraph, 6 abstained
- " i) by a majority of 17 against 2, 2 abstained
- " i) unanimously

18 members voted for the entire resolution including all its paragraphs, none against, 3 abstained (*Information Bulletin (MAKI)* (August 1971), p. 5).

a) The peace treaties between the Arab states and Israel will be written and signed on the basis of mutual recognition of the legitimate national rights of all people concerned, on the basis of liquidating the conflict and establishing good neighbourly relations. The negotiations are to be held on the basis of Security Council Resolution No. 242, including all its provisions, under the auspices of the U.N.O. Emissary who will direct his efforts to promote an agreement between the parties.

b) The safe, recognized borders between the State of Israel and the Arab states will be determined by the way of a mutual agreement as the result of free negotiations without any preliminary conditions. No prescription of borders must be presented in the negotiations as a preliminary condition—neither the armistice lines of 1949, nor the pre-1948 mandatory borders, nor the cease-fire lines of 1967, nor the map of the Alignment's "oral doctrine" of 1969, nor any other map. The Israel government should declare from the outset and should prove in practice, that while rejecting the dictate of a return to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines, and everything it implies, it does not seek territorial expansion, but borders of mutual consent, of security, of a just, stable peace.

c) The State of Israel will recognize the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination, and will regard favourably the participation of a democratic, peace-seeking representative body of its own in the peace negotiations and will make possible the establishment of such a body as far as this depends on Israel. In accordance with the principle of self-determination, the State of Israel does not interfere in the shaping of relations between the Palestinian people and the Jordan people—whether they shall live in one joint state or in two separate states.

d) In accordance with the signed and reaffirmed peace treaties, Israel shall withdraw from the cease-fire lines to borders agreed upon between the parties concerned.

e) The territories Israel will evacuate in accordance with the peace treaties, shall be

demilitarized—as it will be agreed—and an efficient control shall guarantee the demilitarization as agreed.

f) For a just solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees, it is necessary to determine by mutual consent the areas for their resettlement and the numerical allocation of the refugees according to the places of their absorption. A regional development project must be planned and regional as well as international financial sources must be procured for development and reconstruction. Israel shall make its contributions to an agreed constructive solution of the refugees problem, allowing their return within the framework of reuniting families, and paying compensation. The reciprocal connection existing between the solution of the Palestinian refugees problem, the implementation of the self-determination of the Palestinian people and the establishment of peace, implies that the refugees be settled and re-established mainly in the national-territorial framework of the Palestinian Arab people.

g) Israel shall propose to the neighbouring countries a regional development programme not only for the re-settlement of the refugees, but also for raising the living standard of the whole population in order to change the relations between the peoples from suspicion and war into friendship and constructive cooperation. The development programme shall include the joint exploitation of the river waters to irrigate barren areas and to produce hydro-electrical energy, joint exploitation of the natural resources and the operation of international lines of communication.

h) International freedom of navigation, including Israel, shall be guaranteed in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Free land-routes shall be opened from Egypt to Lebanon and Syria; from Egypt to Jordan; from Jordan (and/or Palestine) to Ghaza; from Eilat to Sharm e-Sheikh. The borders of peace shall also be open to the transition of passengers and goods in both directions.

i) Israel will be ready to discuss the establishment of federative relations between

the sovereign states on both sides of the Jordan.

j) Israel shall welcome appropriate international guarantees to the agreements to be achieved between the Arab states and Israel, as well as international aid to finance the regional development programme for a resettlement of the Palestinian refugees. Israel shall support every initiative of the big powers on the cessation of the armaments race between them in the Middle East, on the nuclear demilitarization of the region and on the exclusion of the region from the sphere of the struggle between the powers and blocks. Israel will make its full contribution to the peaceful coexistence between all the Middle East states and between them and the big powers, as a cornerstone for the building of peaceful co-existence on a universal scale.

## 166

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the G.D.R. of Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Berlin, July 18, 1971**

At the invitation of Otto Winzer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Abdel Halim Khaddam, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, paid an official visit to the German Democratic Republic from 15 to 18 July 1971.

The two sides discussed the present situation in the Middle East, especially after the imperialist Israeli aggression of 1967. They agreed that a continued aggression will endanger world peace. They strongly condemned the aggressive expansionist plans

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (Berlin), XI, 21 (August 4, 1971), p. 162.

of Israel which prove its racist, imperialist, and aggressive character, its function as a spearhead of world imperialism and of Zionism in the Arab world, and its role in endangering international security and world peace.

Both sides emphasized the necessity to end the imperialist Israeli aggression against the Arab people as well as the necessity of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all occupied territories. At the same time they firmly condemned the material, political, and military support given to Israel by American and West German imperialism. They consider the continuation of this support as an encouragement to the aggression against the Arab nation and as a threat to international security and world peace.

The representatives of the German Democratic Republic voiced their support for the just struggle of the Arab people, and corroborated the recognition of all rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their legitimate right to self-determination and resistance against the imperialist Zionist occupation.

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### **West German Government Statement on the Occasion of the Visit to the F.R.G. of Deputy Prime Minister Jalloud of Libya (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Bonn, July 20, 1971**

On July 19 and 20 [1971], Libyan Deputy Prime Minister and Member of the Revolutionary Council Abdul Salam Jalloud met Federal Chancellor Brandt, Foreign Minister Scheel, Minister for Economic Cooperation Eppler, Parliamentary Secretary at the Foreign Office Moersch, and Secretary of State at the Ministry of Economics and

Finances Emde. The meetings took place during the course of an unofficial visit and were held in the presence of the newly appointed Libyan ambassador to Bonn, Jalal Daghely.

On July 20, 1971 the Federal Chancellor received the Deputy Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Libya, Abdul Salam Jalloud on a courtesy visit. They exchanged opinions on F.R.G.-A.R.L. relations. On the situation in the Middle East the Chancellor stressed that in his opinion a just peace could be reached only by recognizing the right of all peoples to existence and security and that there must be a just solution to the problem of the refugees.

On the same day, July 20, 1971, there were talks with the Parliamentary Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Moersch. In addition to bilateral questions, Germany's policies towards the Middle East and also the problem of the conflict in the Middle East were discussed. Parliamentary Secretary of State Moersch declared that the F.R.G. was interested in the restoration of peace in the Middle East and would support all efforts to bring about such a peace, in particular U.N. Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 and the mission of Special Representative Jarring.

On the problem of refugees the Parliamentary Secretary of State Moersch expressed the government's hope that this problem too could be solved justly and peacefully. Such a solution is essential to a lasting peace. He referred in this connection to the humanitarian help the F.R.G. gives to the Palestinian refugees.

On the Middle East consultations of the six members of the E.E.C., the Parliamentary Secretary of State explained that the document did not reflect merely the position of one of the partners but was the common opinion of all those governments which took part in the consultations.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the German text of the statement as published in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), No. 114 (July 24, 1971), pp. 1255-1256.

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**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Poland of Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Warsaw, July 21, 1971

In response to the invitation of Mr. Stefan Jedrychowski, the Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to Poland from July 18-20, 1971.

As regards the situation in the Middle East, the two sides strongly condemned the aggressive imperialist measures and schemes directed against the Arab nation, and demanded the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories. They also declared their support for the just and heroic struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to recover all their legitimate national rights. They strongly condemned the repressive actions that are being taken against the Palestinian people, and the attempts by imperialism to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab states. The two sides stressed the necessity to reinforce and unify action in the Arab states, to strengthen the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Arab states and the socialist states, and to mobilize all progressive and anti-imperialist forces in the world for the struggle for the national independence of the Arab peoples.

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**Statements on the Situation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and on Italy's Friendly Relations with the Arab Countries, Anxiety To See Peace in the Middle East and Concern for the Welfare of the Palestinians, Made by Foreign Minister Moro of Italy to the Chamber of Deputies<sup>2</sup>**

Rome, July 23, 1971

Generally speaking, in Europe as well as in Asia, our hopes for peace and cooperation do not seem to have been totally illusory. Considering the problems of the Mediterranean area, so near to us and therefore so vital, we should fervently wish that our minds may be opened to similar perspectives of prudent optimism. But the situation presents some obscurities and, in an area such as the Middle East, there are elements of tension and serious preoccupation. In fact, the situation continues to be strongly influenced by the prolongation of the Arab-Israeli conflict which, in spite of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations and by countries motivated by good will, does not yet seem to be proceeding to a negotiated solution. A note of hope is given by the fact that in spite of the present apparent stalemate in the negotiations conducted by the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative, Ambassador Jarring, the dialogue cannot be considered as broken off and the ceasefire has not been violated since last August. There is no doubt that, in Cairo as well as in Jerusalem, there remains definite interest in reaching a final settlement of the conflict by way of partial solutions. Among these solutions is one which concerns the possible reopening of the Suez Canal accompanied by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from part of Sinai. This first approach towards a definitive settlement, which naturally should be related to the intentions of the countries

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Baath* (Damascus), July 22, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Italian text of Moro's speech as published in *Relazioni Internazionali*, No. 31 (July 31, 1971), p. 802.

concerned, has some possibilities of success; provided of course, that there is a realistic evaluation of the local and international situations on both sides, reflecting the spirit of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. -

Another point on which attention was recently focused is the question of Jerusalem, containing as it does the principal holy places of the three great monotheistic religions, which give to the city its special and spiritual character. We hope that, until a solution for its final and definitive destiny is decided on, according to the United Nations resolution, any action will be avoided which might alter the character of the Holy City where three great communities of believers in the same God should be able to worship Him freely and in their own way.

Another factor which cannot be ignored in a general settlement of the Middle East region is that of the Palestinian refugees, some forced to live in a West Bank occupied by Israel and others in camps established in the neighboring countries. Several times world attention has been drawn to the tragic plight of the refugees, who for years have been hoping to obtain conditions more compatible with the rights and dignity of man. Even lately some appeals have reached us, pointing out the urgent need to find a solution to this problem which endangers the economic stability of many countries in the Middle East, and to solve which violence would seem unnecessary. Our very hope is that with the good will of all those responsible, a consensus will be reached. I can assure you that, for our part, we are aware of the urgent need of these unfortunate people, and that from now on, we are ready to coordinate all our efforts and best means with other industrialized countries in order to provide at the proper time a just solution to the social, as well as political, problems which are painfully obvious in that region of the world.

In this troubled area of the Middle East, we are happy to see the presence of a country like Lebanon, which has overcome the problem of coexistence among peoples of different religions, and has been able to build up a

state in which these peoples live in a harmonious balance and in mutual respect for each other's liberty. Lebanon constitutes an element of stability which should be safeguarded in the general interest. We spoke to this effect during the recent visit to Italy of the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom we examined the various problems of the Middle East in a sincere and friendly atmosphere.

With Syria, too, our relations have undergone considerable improvement. While we have made some profitable contacts in Iraq during a visit of Undersecretary Salizzoni, our relations are also excellent with Saudi Arabia, with Kuwait and with Iran. I have recently had occasion to have interesting and serious conversations with Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi during his official visit to Rome. The situation in the Persian Gulf is such that it raises some problems. We wish to express here our hope that these problems will be solved with the agreement of all parties and without endangering the stability of the whole region.

Finally we have seen with pleasure the Yemen again making its way towards social progress and civil independence, to which Italy traditionally gives its support. Thus our support and advice reach even the shores of the Red Sea. In fact we very willingly act in order to help strengthen and improve relations between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic which are both friendly to Italy. The many visits to Africa made by myself and by Undersecretaries Salizzoni and Pedini prove our constant interest in the African countries, and our policy in favor of the independence of their peoples and against racial segregation. I should not forget to stress the special ties which for various reasons link us to the friendly countries of Latin America.

Speaking of the Mediterranean, I would like to point out that our political involvement in an area essential to us does not in the least conflict with our European involvement; on the contrary, both involvements are harmoniously complementary. Our effort with our European friends, and especially with the present and future members of the

[European] Community, is a constant illustration of the need for progress of the North African peoples. We are happy to see the interest in such progress not only on the part of a Mediterranean country like France or on that of those with a longstanding Mediterranean tradition like Great Britain, but also on the part of the governments of West Germany and the Benelux countries. And we are ready to deal with the subject of security in Europe and partial reduction of forces in Central Europe; we must not forget that security is indivisible and that peace and stability cannot be obtained in Europe if we do not also guarantee them in the Mediterranean.

We are therefore convinced that mutual confidence and fruitful cooperation should prevail among all the peoples who live on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

This includes all the Maghreb countries, beginning with Algeria, which I have recently visited and with which our relations can be expected to become much closer; Morocco, which we hope to see proceeding quickly towards an appropriate political and social development, and Tunisia, a country to which we feel especially close, not only geographically, even if for the moment some pending problems are waiting to be solved in the common interest. Finally, this also concerns Libya, with which our relations have improved, but with which we have still to make some further steps in order that they may be confident and sure, as is fitting between two countries which nothing divides and which everything—including the Mediterranean Sea—unites.

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**Statement on U.S. National Security and the Indian Ocean Area Made by U.S. Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director Spiers Before an American Congressional Subcommittee (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, July 28, 1971**

An identification of our interests in the Indian Ocean is necessarily complex. It is not in any sense a political unit. In brief our interests are these:

— The oil of the Persian Gulf is vital to our allies and of considerable direct interest to us.

— About 30 of the 127 members of the U.N. belong to the Indian Ocean region, and one-third of the world's population is there. Several of the states—India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, the U.A.R., and, in certain respects, South Africa—play a significant international role. Further, our interests in assisting in the development of these countries have been and continue to be a matter of concern to the United States. We see forward movement in economic development and toward political stability as the best means to promote an environment conducive to our own interests.

— Conversely, the instability and intra-regional antagonisms that characterize much of the Indian Ocean area could serve to promote Soviet interests at the expense of ours. We are concerned over the volatile political situation with the attendant growth of Soviet influence in Yemen and Southern Yemen at the mouth of the Red Sea. The Israelis, incidentally, share our unease on this point. We are particularly disquieted by the potential for instability in the Persian Gulf and what this might mean to our and allied oil interests in the event the British are unable to effect some form of federation among the gulf shaikhdoms.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Spiers' statement before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXV, 1678 (August 23, 1971), pp. 200–201, 201, 202, 203.



— It is to our interest that countries of the area not pass under the control of forces hostile to us. Specifically, we would be concerned if Chinese or Soviet influence in the area extended to control of the water areas or significant parts of the littoral. We do not envisage an immediate threat of this nature, however.

We are quite conscious of the Soviet Union's aspirations to project its power into distant areas. Politically, the Soviets probably view the Indian Ocean as an area where their influence can grow at the expense of Western and, to a lesser degree, Chinese influence by exploiting targets of opportunity among the revolutionary and nationalistic forces in the region.

U.S. strategic interests in the Indian Ocean include oil requirements. About 60 percent of the oil required by our Western European allies and 90 percent of the oil used by Japan comes from the Middle East. This assumes even greater pertinency when viewed in the light of known oil reserves.

With the U.S.S.R. naval presence in the Indian Ocean now an established fact, we face the prospect of enhanced Soviet politico-military power flanking Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Australia. This calls attention to the growing Soviet naval capability in reference to the so-called choke points which control ingress and egress to and from the basin. These include Bab el Mandab at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz at the narrow of the Persian Gulf, and the politically less vulnerable Straits of Malacca and Sunda.

The practical effect of the Soviet presence athwart lines of communication would, of course, be acutely felt in the case of all-out hostilities. A Soviet attempt to block maritime routes in peacetime could, of course, lead to a major world crisis. Nonetheless, with appropriate basing and/or establishment of political preeminence in these funnel areas, Soviet domination of the most critical of these

choke points falls within the realm of possibility. The knowledge that in the event of war or great tension the Soviets or their associated states might control traffic in and out of the Indian Ocean at one or more of these points could not but exert some influence in the political orientation of those nations who would be most affected should this contingency come to pass.

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was inaugurated in the spring of 1967 with the deployment of ships with military and civilian crews for oceanographic and space-event support operations. Soviet combatant deployments in the Indian Ocean were initiated in March 1968. Since that date the Soviets have maintained an essentially continuous presence in the Indian Ocean and have increased threefold the number of ship-days in that ocean. This includes naval combatants, naval auxiliaries, and oceanographic ships.

To enhance their staying power, the Soviets are soliciting access to existing support facilities in various locations in the Indian Ocean and on its littoral, which, if their efforts meet with success, could permit them to develop a position of strength in such areas as the Gulf of Aden, the southern gateway to the Red Sea.

The complexities of maintaining the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron would be considerably ameliorated were the Suez Canal to be reopened. Supply lines would be drastically reduced, transit times foreshortened, rotation of units expedited. Similarly, with the canal opened to traffic, the number of Soviet naval deployments into the Indian Ocean could take a quantum jump inasmuch as the assets of their powerful Black Sea Fleet would become available for rapid deployments south and east of Suez. The time required to deploy U.S. naval units to the Indian Ocean would be reduced, but to a lesser extent. The 6th Fleet could be employed on short notice. Access to Persian Gulf oil by our Western allies is of considerable strategic and economic interest to the United States and would be positively affected by the reopening of the Suez Canal. Arrangements associated with

the canal's reopening could also act to defuse the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Although the threat to any of our interests in the Indian Ocean is of relatively low order, it nevertheless is an area that merits close and continuing attention, particularly in view of the apparent Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Chinese Communist objective to enlarge their influence and presence in the region. Accordingly, as we look at the region over the period of the next few years, we are faced with three policy dilemmas:

First, how can we best respond to the increased soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean area and the extension of Soviet influence? How can we maintain our own ability to exert military influence in that area in case of need without acting in a way that would stimulate a competitive buildup of forces?

Second, how can we encourage economic development, international political responsibilities, and domestic political stability in the countries around the Indian Ocean and have good relations with them as a way of limiting the development of Communist influence hostile to the United States in those countries?

Third, how can we insure maintenance of free transit through the key access points to the Indian Ocean?

We will have to find answers to these questions within the constraints provided by our desire to avoid a great-power competitive buildup in the Indian Ocean. There are factors which favor our objectives. Among them are the efforts of some Indian Ocean countries to restrain Soviet military activity. Nonetheless, the United States must ultimately decide whether or not it will maintain the option to counter an enlarged Soviet military buildup.

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### **Commentary on the U.S. Role in the Suppression of the Palestine Commandos in Jordan, Published in the China Weekly Peking Review<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, July 30, 1971**

On July 13, the Jordanian authorities sent one army division, two armoured brigades, one infantry brigade and three regiments of shock troops supported by artillery and tanks to attack Palestinian guerrilla bases and refugee camps in the Jarash-Ajlun area. Since then, the Jordanian troops have ceaselessly launched feverish attacks, including air strikes, against the guerrillas. This new crime of the Jordanian reactionaries has aroused high indignation among the Palestinian guerrillas and people who valiantly counter-attacked to defend their bases and refugee camps.

The Palestinian radio Voice of al Assifa pointed out in a commentary that these attacks on the Palestinian guerrillas were a U.S. and Zionist plot carried out with U.S. weapons and economic aid by U.S. and Zionist tools in Amman to liquidate the Palestinian revolution. It also revealed that the hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles attacking guerrilla positions were U.S.-made Patton tanks and that the guns shelling the guerrillas were U.S.-made howitzers.

Numerous facts have proved that U.S. imperialism is the chief criminal in suppressing the Palestinian guerrillas.

Since instigating the Jordanian reactionaries to mount large-scale attacks on the guerrillas in September last year, U.S. imperialism has spared no effort in fostering these reactionaries militarily, politically and economically so as to prepare for further suppression of the Palestinian revolution. Last November, the U.S. Government decided to give Jordan 30 million U.S. dollars. It promised last January to supply Jordan again with a large amount of military aid when Jordanian King Hussein visited the United States. On July 14, the day after the Jordanian reactionaries

<sup>1</sup> *Peking Review*, XIV, 31 (July 30, 1971), p.8.

started their attacks on the Palestinian guerrillas, a spokesman of the Jordanian authorities disclosed that the U.S. Government would supply Jordan with 15 million U.S. dollars in aid. Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft, tanks, artillery and ammunition poured into Jordan non-stop. Many U.S. advisers were also there to train Jordanian troops and work out criminal plots with the Jordanian reactionaries to liquidate the guerrillas.

On the eve of the recent attacks on the guerrillas, Richard Helms, Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, slipped into Israel to arrange measures for suppressing them and instigate the Israeli Zionists to coordinate in the suppression. It was reported that simultaneously with the Jordanian reactionaries' frenzied attacks, Israel sent aircraft to bomb Palestinian guerrilla bases.

In line with the U.S. imperialist schemes to suppress the Palestinian guerrillas, the Jordanian reactionaries have always used the counter-revolutionary dual tactics of alternating military attacks with ceasefires in a vain effort to wipe out the guerrillas piecemeal. Consolidating themselves at every step, cutting up the guerrilla units and then encircling and gradually closing in upon them, the Jordanian reactionaries have tried to drive the guerrillas to sparsely settled mountain areas cut off from the masses and then liquidate them as they please.

The U.S.-backed Jordanian reactionaries are swollen with arrogance. King Hussein clamoured on July 17 that this time the guerrillas would be eliminated once and for all. "There is no problem now with the comandos and there will be none in the future. This time it is final," he declared. A Jordanian government spokesman said the following day that the Cairo and Amman Agreements with the Palestinian guerrillas were no longer valid.

The guerrillas are now bravely fighting in self-defence. When the Jordanian reactionaries began to encroach upon the guerrilla bases, the guerrilla leaders, who were then attending the 9th Conference of the Palestinian National Council in Cairo, immediately held a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. They

studied the situation in Jordan and adopted measures to deal with the Jordanian reactionaries. The P.L.O. Executive Committee said in a statement that the Palestinian revolution "will continue to defend its goal, persist in its principles and carry on its armed struggle with even stronger determination till the complete liberation of the occupied land." Chairman of the P.L.O. Executive Committee Yasser Arafat pointed out that the Palestinian guerrillas are fighting not only to defend themselves but also to defend the Arab nation.

The U.S. imperialists and their agents will never succeed in their schemes to stamp out the Palestinian revolution. They will surely be reduced to ashes in the raging flames of the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national-liberation movement.

## 172

### **Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of Talks Between a Delegation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Representatives of the Arab Socialist Union of the U.A.R. (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, July 30, 1971**

At the invitation of the Provisional Secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union to attend the Second General National Conference, a delegation representing the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., headed by Mr. Boris Ponomarev, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, visited the United Arab Republic July 20-30, 1971.

The two delegations exchanged views on urgent international questions, in particular the situation in the Middle East. The representatives of the Soviet Communist Party stated that the U.S.S.R. and its Communist Party strongly support the struggle of the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 31, 1971.

Egyptian people and the other Arab peoples to eliminate the traces of Israeli colonialist aggression, and above all to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, and to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The two parties also stressed the important role played by Egypt in developing and strengthening the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples. They expressed the belief that hostility to communism is injurious to the liberationist aspirations and national interests of the peoples of the world, and that such hostility must not be tolerated.

Hostility to communism is of service only to world imperialist and reactionary forces, its object being to arouse strife in the ranks of the Arab revolutionary fighters who are engaged in a struggle against imperialism and Israeli aggression to ensure the right of the Arab peoples to develop a free future.

### 173

#### **Statements on the Role of the Big Powers in the Middle East, Made by Foreign Minister Schumann of France in a Television Interview<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, July 31, 1971

*Q. Mr. Minister, there is another subject which you have mentioned yourself, activity in the Middle East... and if you like we can also go on to deal with what is happening in the Arab world, which has experienced various crises, as can still be seen at this moment in Tripoli.*

*A. Certainly... The more crises there are the more desirable it is to avoid the risk of the fire spreading—and you know how rapidly the flames flare up in that part of the world—*

by reaching an agreement on the basis of Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 which, it can never be sufficiently emphasized, not only calls for the evacuation by Israel of the territories she occupies but also requires that there should be strict parallelism between evacuation and positive guarantees of peace. In other words, there is peace and there is evacuation, and the two cannot be dissociated. As you know, the Americans are making efforts to negotiate an interim settlement; everything that brings us nearer to peace is good and, far from impeding the negotiation of an interim settlement, we have when necessary taken pains to encourage it. But it is clear that as regards both an interim settlement and a general settlement, the matter cannot be left to one of the great powers, no matter which one. The mission which Mr. Rogers took upon himself, and which has had fortunate consequences, was immediately followed by the journey of Mr. Podgorny, and, as you know, by the conclusion of a treaty between the U.A.R. and Moscow—one great power attracts another. Do we think that the confrontation of the two superpowers is sufficient for the establishment of durable peace? Of course not. And this is why we proposed talks by the Four and why it will be necessary for talks by the Four on the implementation of Resolution 242 to be resumed if a durable and final peace settlement is to be established.

*Q. But Mr. Minister, I now come to another subject, which worries many Frenchmen. What are our relations with Israel at present? There is much talk about this subject, and I think there will be even more in the future.*

*A. They are not as good as we could wish. The day before yesterday I had a talk with the Israeli ambassador; naturally, in accordance with usual custom, I shall say nothing at all about this talk which lasted for an hour and a half, which in itself is not without significance, between the French Foreign Minister and a head of mission accredited to Paris....*

*Q. There is talk, Mr. Minister, of your having set conditions for the improvement of our relations with Israel.*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of Schumann's O.R.T.F. interview in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1972), pp. 71–72.

A. It is precisely because I know what is being said about what went on during that talk that, in accordance with custom, I have taken the precaution of disclosing nothing. I can, on the other hand, reveal the aim of the talk: the aim was to restore Franco-Israeli relations to the state they should be in—the state of normal, and therefore friendly, relations. For this to be achieved, I personally am convinced that it is enough that our actions and intentions should not be misrepresented; it is evident to me that Israel's overriding interest in her integrity and sovereignty for which we are as anxious as anyone, will not be best served by her persevering in what looks like a desire for territorial aggrandizement, but that on the contrary, the security of Israel, for which, I repeat, we are as anxious as anyone, requires that Israel should resist what one of her best French friends, the President of France-Israel, M. Monteil, Senator for Finistère and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has called the "annexationist temptation." Yes, we believe that to resist the annexationist temptation is the first of duties but, on the other hand, we have always said—and I see no harm in repeating it today on behalf of France—that counterpart and consequence, nay the condition for evacuation, must be a real peace settlement. That is to say, not a return to the pre-1967 situation which was an extremely precarious situation with which I, for one, never agreed (at that time I did not have the same responsibilities as I do now, but I never agreed with it). I have always considered that the possibility of the Egyptian government getting rid of the Blue Berets at a moment's notice meant that there were no real guarantees of security. But, if there is evacuation, and if, for the sake of argument, the evacuated zones were to be occupied by United Nations forces which, for a fairly long period of time could only be withdrawn by an unanimous vote of the Security Council—doesn't Israel think that this would be a better guarantee of security than the prolongation of a situation which, I repeat, may well lead to the line of demarcation between the two superpowers along the Suez Canal or perhaps, in the future, on the River Jordan?

This means that when, as is the case today, thank God, the two superpowers wish to agree, there are grounds for hoping that the worst will not happen—but if by some misfortune it did come about, this part of the world would become a pawn in the game of their rivalry.

## 174

### **Vatican Commentary on Renewed Conflicts Between Palestinians and Government Forces in Jordan, Urging Respect for Humanitarian Principles<sup>1</sup>**

**Vatican City, Late July, 1971**

Palestinian families have spent anxious hours because of the clashes in Jordan which, according to the press, could have had a tragic outcome.

A people, of whom a large percentage has always lived in the depressing conditions peculiar to refugees, can feel even more deeply than others the pain of seeing fighting between brothers mow down young lives and plough another furrow of dissent in a part of the world already divided by misunderstanding and bitterness.

We are certain that all differences, even internal ones, can and should be resolved by the only method appropriate to man and his rationality: discussion, dialogue, negotiation. But even when, unfortunately, the language of arms begins, respect for human principles, for compassion towards those who fall or surrender should never be wanting.

The Christian religion has as its great commandment love and sacrifice for our brothers and, as a result, all expressions of violence and armed struggle of man against man are against its nature. But when, alas, such struggle does occur, the Church can only involve itself in helping those who fall,

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of unsigned *L'Osservatore Romano* editorial entitled "A People Who Suffer," originally published in the Italian edition, and republished in the French weekly edition of *L'Osservatore Romano*, No. 31 (1128) (July 30, 1971), p. 1.

especially when both parties believe their causes are just, even if those causes could be defended other than by force of arms, which smothers friendship and the spirit.

We prefer to believe that the news from Jordan is not entirely accurate, especially the reports on the numbers of dead and wounded. Nevertheless, certain events give food for serious thought. That is why those who see things without prejudice, having in mind only the justice and freedom of individuals and of humanity, still look with compassion today on people already so afflicted by adversity. In the name of the higher good which is peace, they appeal to all authorities and express their steadfast confidence that, whatever the circumstances, human principles and human solidarity will never be violated.

## 175

### **Comments Emphasizing the Soviet View of the Necessity for a Political Settlement in the Middle East Included in a U.S.S.R. Press Commentary<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, July, 1971**

Is Middle East peace feasible? Can the Arab-Israeli conflict be settled?

These questions are not mere rhetorics. Some maintain that peace is impossible because the rift between the Israelis and Arabs is much too deep and irreconcilable. That is the concept of people who interpret the Middle East conflict as a racial or religious clash. The same is sometimes said by those who think the peace-loving forces are not strong enough to bridle aggression and imperialism. Now and then voices resound advocating purely military means of restoring lawful Arab rights.

The Arab-Israeli conflict can be settled. This must be done, no matter what difficulties

stand in the way. And it is up to the peace-loving states, up to all progressives, to accomplish this job. The Arab countries must get back the land torn away from them in 1967, and the legitimate rights of the Palestine people must be taken into consideration. This will be so. That is the writing on the wall. The progressive growth of the Arab states will continue. The support they get from their friends will multiply. Their lag behind Israel in some areas is being eliminated or successfully overcome. The friendship between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations will grow stronger. It is historically inevitable that justice will be restored. It is vital that everyone should appreciate this. One may try to delay the objectively inevitable. One may try to go against the tide. But, ultimately, the consequences are gravest for those who think they can block a historical inevitability.

It is high time for the Israeli rulers to stop gambling with the future of their people. They and their Washington patrons should awaken to the fact that the changes in the Arab world are irreversible. Gone are the days when the Arab peoples were compelled to bow to imperialist pressure. It is sheer folly to expect them to surrender now. That is out of the question. There is a chance, perhaps a singular one, to avert military disaster in the Middle East. Washington and Tel Aviv endeavours to assure Israel's superiority over the Arab states, particularly in the military field, are futile. More, they are completely unrealistic.

Tel Aviv should abandon its vision of a "Greater" Israel. It is out of date. It should realize that its main concern is to establish normal relations with the Arab countries. One does not choose one's neighbours. One just has them. Yet normal relations are inconceivable without elementary regard for the neighbours' rights. Also, it should give thought to the true aims of the United States. Essentially, the U.S. is eager to restore and strengthen American imperialism in the oil-rich and strategically important Middle East. It could not care less about the future of the Israeli people. Meanwhile, Israel will have to live among and with the Arab states.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from V. Lykov, "The Middle East Outlook," *New Times*, No. 30 (July 1971), p. 6.

As a step in the right direction, the Israeli government could begin fulfilling the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and respond to special U.N. envoy Jarring's appeal, as the U.A.R. has already done. Acceptance of the Egyptian initiative for re-opening the Suez Canal, which envisages a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops, could contribute significantly to a Middle East settlement and relieve some of the tensions. In sum, the choice of peace moves is great.

If the available opportunities for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis are allowed to fall by the wayside, the responsibility will fall squarely on the ruling element of the United States and Israel.

## 176

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to China of Foreign Minister Bouteflika of Algeria (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, August 1, 1971**

At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Government Delegation of Algeria led by His Excellency Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Member of the Council of Revolution and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria, paid an official friendly visit to the People's Republic of China from July 20 to August 1, 1971.

Both sides hold that the development of the present international situation is increasingly favourable to the revolutionary cause of the people of various countries and unfavourable to imperialism, colonialism and all reactionaries. Revolution is the main trend in the world today. The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles in the world are growing stronger daily.

The two sides reaffirmed their support to the resolute struggle waged by the Palestinian people for the restoration of their national rights. The two sides hold that this struggle is a component part of the anti-imperialist struggles of the world. Zionism is an imperialist tool in the Middle East. The two sides strongly condemn and oppose the criminal manoeuvres of U.S. imperialism and its traitorous agents in this region aimed at liquidating the Palestinian revolution and at checking and sabotaging the Arab people's movement for liberation and progress. The two sides give firm support to the Arab people for the recovery of their occupied territory. The two sides express the conviction that the Palestinian people, with the solidarity and support of the masses of the Arab people and the progressive forces of the world and thanks to the unity of their resistance movement and their vigilance, will certainly carry their liberation struggle to victory.

The two sides emphasize the danger to the peoples' freedom and international security emanating from the policy of hegemony and the division of spheres of influence in the world. In this connection, the two sides resolutely oppose the maintenance of foreign military bases and the presence of foreign armed forces, which constitute a direct menace to the freedom of the Afro-Asian peoples and security of the people of all countries.

## 177

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to North Vietnam by Foreign Minister Bouteflika of Algeria (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

**Hanoi, August 6, 1971**

In response to an invitation from the government of the Democratic Republic of

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué, *Peking Review*, XIV, 32 (August 6, 1971), pp. 24, 25.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), August 10, 1971.

Vietnam, a government delegation representing the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, headed by Mr. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, member of the Revolutionary Council and Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam August 1-6, 1971.

The Vietnamese side also supports the struggle of the Palestinian people for their legitimate national rights and the struggle of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression.

The Algerian People's Democratic Republic is daily playing an effective role in Africa and Asia.

The Algerian and Vietnamese peoples, in the third world and on the international scene, standing as they do side by side in a single front against imperialism, strongly support the struggle of the Arab peoples, and in particular that of the Palestinian people, against American imperialism and its agents, for the independence, sovereignty and territorial unity of the Arab states and the legitimate national right of the Palestinian people. They also support the heroic struggle of the Palestinian people against the maneuvers of the American imperialists and their agents aimed at liquidating the Palestine Resistance.

## 178

### **Radio Interview Statements by Minister Without Portfolio Galili of Israel Setting Forth Israel's Position on a Possible Interim Suez Settlement, Demanding a Resumption of U.S. Supply of Aircraft, Rejecting Any U.S. Pressure on Israel, and Hailing the Possibility of a Normalization of Israeli-Soviet Relations<sup>1</sup>**

August 7, 1971

*Q. Mr. Galili, it is exactly one year since the*

*thunder of artillery ceased at the Suez Canal. How long will this calm last, if at all?*

*A. I cannot guarantee how long it will last. President Sadat said that this year, 1971, would be a decisive one. We must be prepared as if the cease-fire was about to end any month, and perhaps even any week. We can trust in the Israel Defence Forces not to put their faith in the dates set by President Sadat, especially if he is postponing—if these are postponed dates. I think the Egyptians have good reason not to resume fighting, but in the complex of internal relations in Egypt and in the Egyptian President's state of dependence on the Army it is not impossible that they will think fit to resume fighting, and therefore I cannot say we are convinced that the cease-fire will continue for long.*

*Q. . . . How have we made use of the period of calm?*

*A. I believe that in general we have made correct use of this year, especially in everything concerned with building up the strength of our forces again following the war of attrition, which was tiring although it exhausted the Egyptians even more . . . .*

*Q. Have the politicians, Mr. Minister, tried to find contact or a way to the hearts of those sitting on the other side of the Canal; to break through the wall of misunderstanding?*

*A. I do not view lightly the conversations between Israeli and Egyptian soldiers with the Canal between them . . . . This period during which firing has been quelled has shown not only us but even the Egyptians that it is good, it is possible to exist without firing; it is possible to live without sacrificing human lives, without destruction and bloodshed. I am sure this will be valuable, and I am sure that it is harder for both sides now to think of resuming fighting. This ought to be reflected in the political considerations of the Egyptian leadership . . . . Although nothing has been achieved as regards the partial settlement, I am convinced that this matter has not been dropped from the agenda, the lid has not been put on it, and despite extreme Egyptian intransigence I am convinced that*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Galili's interview broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World*



the subject will be raised again in the future, sooner or later, although we shall continue to be remote from a comprehensive settlement.

From this viewpoint, I think the Israeli Government, with the approval of the Knesset, did well to state in public its willingness to sign a partial settlement with the Egyptians. In the absence of a peace settlement, this settlement would definitely aid and hasten progress towards peace—this settlement for opening the Canal—and it contains Israeli willingness for a certain Israeli withdrawal from the Canal. The settlement contains certain very important advantages for the Egyptian side, and I am certain that sooner or later the Egyptians will be persuaded that it is not worth their while to miss and renounce the advantages they could reap from the partial settlement.

*Q. ...How successful has Sisco been during his latest mission?*

*A.* If we can judge from what he announced before his departure for the United States, he could be regarded as a scout who came here to find a way of bridging the gap between the Israeli and Egyptian attitudes, and his attempt was unsuccessful. I say this on the basis of what he said publicly.

*Q. Do you agree with him?*

*A.* We heard an authorised and full report at the Sunday Cabinet meeting. During the week the Premier met Ministers and gave them an interim report on the talks. I have the impression that Sisco did state his opinion. There would be no reason for him to conceal his success had he actually succeeded.

*Q. ...What political advantages do you think the Israeli Government should obtain in exchange before renouncing the advantages of sitting at the Suez Canal?*

*A.* First, when we speak of the advantage of our sitting on the banks of the Canal, we must add "without peace, before peace, and until peace". None of the public bodies forming the Israeli Government hold the view that we must hold on forever to the advantage of sitting at the Canal. We are ready to withdraw to a permanent boundary which would be open and recognised and

defended by a peace agreement. The Cabinet has decided that even in the absence of peace it would be willing for its forces to withdraw a certain distance—which would not be dramatic—from the Suez Canal, in exchange for certain political and security advantages to be given with Egypt's agreement. The first principle, which is the point of departure for our whole attitude to the partial settlement and our very willingness to think of a certain Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal, is security and a cessation of hostilities.

*Q. For ever?*

*A.* The security that war will not be resumed; that the cease-fire will continue for an unlimited period, that the cease-fire will be permanent. In order not to give the impression that we intend to perpetuate the line to which we would withdraw from the Canal as part of a partial settlement, we have said and continue to say openly, seriously and explicitly that we do not intend to perpetuate this line. Also, along with the signing of a partial settlement the dialogue between Egypt and ourselves regarding a comprehensive settlement could continue, and when peace was signed and the permanent borders were fixed, we would make a further and final withdrawal from the line—some distance from the Canal—on which we had put our forces to the peace border. The first condition is not to give the Egyptians a strategic advantage which they could obtain by sending their forces across to this side of the Canal, to the area to be evacuated by our forces, while we were giving up the water obstacles. Here, then, I have mentioned the second principle, that Egyptian forces should not cross to this side of the Canal.

*Q. Even a symbolic crossing?*

*A.* I do not know what symbolic means. I am talking about the non-crossing of military forces to this side of the Canal. When you say symbolic, you do not explain what that means as regards the strength of the forces and the types of weapons and so on. The symbol can teach one about the body, it begins with a symbol and ends with a body, and we shall find ourselves with military forces holding the east bank of the Canal and

enjoying the big advantage of our renunciation of the water barrier, and enjoying the use of the eastern flank of the Canal as a spring-board for another attack to push us out of Sinai.

*Q. Did our representatives say this to Mr. Sisco during the recent talks?*

*A.* I assume that if the opening of the Canal was talked about during the recent talks as well Israel's attitude and its conditions for opening the Canal, the condition of non-resumption of hostilities and the condition of non-crossing of forces were certainly mentioned. Nor have I yet told you of one very important additional principle. Here is the big difference, the gap between the Egyptian and the Israeli approach. I think I can say, according to the interim report we heard from the Premier, that we are not wrong in our assessment of the Egyptian attitude. The Egyptian position is quite clear to us. If I can define it with my own free definition, which is precise as regards content, I would say the following: Actually, there is a willingness on our part for an agreement with Egypt before there is peace, willingness to open the Canal, willingness to allow a rebuilding of the towns on the other side of the Canal and to allow the Canal to operate, on the assumption that this will create a new atmosphere which will also permit the way to be opened towards a permanent peace settlement. However, the Egyptians are interested not so much in opening the Canal but in receiving an Israeli undertaking to withdraw to the international boundary and they are interested in a certain Israeli withdrawal from the Canal eastwards, which they see as the first stage in the implementation of an undertaking for a complete withdrawal to the previous international boundary. This means that the basic difference at present is that we see the partial settlement as being for the opening of the Canal and the creation of an atmosphere favourable to peace while giving the Egyptians the advantages of an open Canal, rebuilt towns, oil revenues, and a certain Israeli withdrawal; whereas the Egyptians see all this merely as a stage in an Israeli undertaking to withdraw totally. What is important

here is not how they see these things, but that they demand that Israel should make a prior undertaking to withdraw to the international boundary and that the partial settlement should be defined as the first stage in the implementation of this undertaking.

*Q. ...Have you changed your mind about the chances of an interim settlement at the Suez Canal following Sisco's visit?*

*A.* Since I have not heard that new Egyptian proposals have been made to us—newer than those we know of already, newer than those publicly stated by President Sadat—and since the Egyptians have maintained the intransigent attitude I have already explained and are not willing to agree to non-resumption of warfare, are not willing to refrain from crossing the Canal with military forces, and continue to demand a binding link between the partial settlement and an Israel undertaking to withdraw to the international boundary, the partial settlement is no longer valid. Nevertheless, I repeat what I said before: if the Egyptians do not want to resume fighting—and they have good reason not to want a resumption of fighting—a settlement which the politicians have rejected might still be a cornerstone in the political negotiations and I propose that we do not put the lid on this chance nor take any step which would make us responsible for removing this opportunity. I think the Israeli attitude, as expressed in our proposals we made to the US Government, is a reasonable stand; it contains a permissible amount of flexibility, a permissible amount of risk, without renouncing the most basic conditions in case fighting should be resumed.

[Passage omitted, including question about Israeli insistence on talks with the United States on the danger of Soviet involvement in the Middle East]

*A.* For example, I am convinced that the birth of the so-called Rogers's plan is an encouragement for both Egyptian and Soviet intransigence. As long as this plan exists—and it still exists as the United States will not abandon it—both the Egyptians and the Russians hope that this programme could be common ground for the Egyptians,

Russians and the United States to put pressure on Israel. I am convinced that both the Egyptians and the Russians hope there is a chance for their demand for a withdrawal to the international boundary, the 4th June boundary, as long as the Rogers's plan still stands. This motive appears in the Jarring note, in the Egyptian demand concerning the comprehensive settlement, and in the Egyptian demand for a binding link between the partial and comprehensive settlements. I am thus convinced that our representatives endlessly repeat and explain to the United States that the Rogers's plan encourages both the Egyptians and Russians. The Egyptians demand two things of the United States. They demand that the United States put pressure on us to put the Rogers's plan into effect and that it put pressure on us by refusing us arms.

*Q. And is the United States putting pressure on us in that way?*

*A.* It has been said by authorised persons in the defence network that relations between the United States and ourselves regarding the purchase of various arms continue and are satisfactory. However, there is a delay in the supply of aircraft, and we must demand that this delay be corrected, to fulfil the US President's promises made on several occasions, and especially so that the delay, which I hope is temporary, should not be interpreted by the Egyptians and Russians as US response to their demand for pressure on Israel.

*Q. Are there signs from the United States?*

*A.* I do not consider it appropriate to go into detail about this, but our discussions with the United States have been reported in the press, discussion continues, and I believe the US Government will keep its promise to the Israeli Government because in the meantime since last August the Soviet-Egyptian treaty has been signed. I do not know if there are secret military codicils to the official treaty; it is reasonable to suppose that such clauses exist. The stream of Soviet arms to Egypt is constant. I do not know if this stream is part of previous agreements or part of agreements inherent in the treaty.

In any case, Soviet involvement in Egypt has increased, and it will be very difficult for the Russians to let the Egyptians be inferior in strength to Israel. The number and quality of Soviet units in Egypt has increased. All these must be reasons for reinforcing our demand for the elimination of any delay in the supply of defence weapons.

*Q. President Nixon has hinted at the possibility of convening a Soviet-US summit conference on the Middle East. Do you think this would be a solution?*

*A.* I have not yet read the President's statement on this. My impression is that he spoke about the US-Soviet dialogue on various topics such as Vietnam, the SALT talks and the Middle East, and our own reporters hastened to link the Middle East topic to the Sisco talks in Israel.

Talks generally advance matters. If, for example, the US Government made it clear to the USSR that it was determined not to allow Soviet operational intervention on Egypt's side during an Egyptian offensive against Israel, this would undoubtedly have a deterrent effect. . . .

*Q. What is Sadat's Egypt like?*

*A.* Sadat's Egypt, as far as I know, is more subject to internal change, is not led by a charismatic leader, will be more influenced by internal disruption, and its Government is more dependent on success in internal policy than on development of pan-Arab dreams and the magic of influencing the outside world. It is on this evaluation that I base the possibility that a day will come, perhaps not far away, when the Egyptians will realise that they should realistically examine Israel's willingness for a partial settlement, especially if they are convinced, as they should be, that resuming the hostilities will not be to their advantage.

*Q. Do you expect Israel to be isolated at the United Nations?*

*A.* I expect Israel to have a political struggle, and I believe Israel ought to fight for its rights even if it is isolated there. . . . I do not believe that, because of the political risk and the bitter struggle we can expect in the United Nations, we would be justified in changing our

basic attitude, because all in all the influence of the United Nations and its institutions is only limited. . . .

*Q. How will the latest development in US-Chinese relations affect our area?*

A. In the long run, if this development progresses on the lines predicted by the optimists and brings us to the era when the wolf lies down with the lamb, it will have a favourable effect on the whole world, but in the short run we must be ready for dangerous possibilities resulting from competition for China's friendship. The admission of China to the UN would not be the entry of just another country but an entry which would inevitably bring about a series of changes in the Assembly. I believe China's admission will mean that important political elements will have to revise the pattern of relations in the UN. Although we are pleased with any unfreezing in global relations, we ought not to blind ourselves to the dangers in the short run. . . . The Israeli Government must make an effort not to drive the Chinese further away from understanding the conditions needed to promote peace in the Middle East, but it must not ignore the links between the Arab countries and the People's Republic of China, and we must be ready for additional dangers.

*Q. Mr. Galili, recently there have been rumours of contact between Chinese and Israelis. Do you know about this?*

A. I know of no contacts at all between official Chinese and official Israeli elements.

*Q. Might it not be worthwhile now to make a move towards Moscow?*

A. In everything concerning willingness for talks, our gates have long been open to Moscow. However, at present this is merely a matter of smoke without fire. There could be nothing easier than talks between Moscow and ourselves, as long as Moscow is willing.

*Q. Do you not think that now the Russians would be more willing for a Soviet-Israeli dialogue?*

A. Perhaps. I should welcome this, and not only I; the Israeli Government would welcome it. We have recently declared more

than once and have shown publicly and in private that Israel is willing for normalisation of relations between the USSR and ourselves and the resumption of diplomatic relations between our countries, but there has been no response from the Soviet side. There could be nothing easier than opening a dialogue between the Russians and ourselves. They only have to want it, and they can begin it in any capital at a suitable level.

*Q. . . . Is a dialogue between the Palestinians and ourselves possible?*

A. A dialogue between the Palestinians and ourselves takes place every day in the areas held by the Israeli forces, at the bridges open for visits by Palestinians in various Arab countries. I greatly value this dialogue. Recently there was a unique dialogue—or a meeting—which was rare in that the terrorist organisation members gave themselves up to the Israeli forces when they were exposed to the deadly fire of the Jordanian administration.

*Q. Some people said it would have been worthwhile to exploit this opportunity to draw closer to the Palestinians.*

A. I do not know which Palestinians you are talking about. In any case, were there a representative body of the Arabs of Palestine we should certainly talk to it, if it were willing. I also believe we ought to encourage the integration of Arabs in the territories in social activities, in the administration of services, and in talks with us. But here the distance between conjecture and reality is very great. . . .

*Q. When you sum up this year of cease-fire, would you say we had progressed, even by a single step, towards peace?*

A. Without being able to indicate tangible signs, I believe we have progressed. The mere fact that a cease-fire between Egypt and ourselves could exist following the US initiative, the mere advantages the Egyptians gained from this cease-fire year—these contain a promise of strengthening the roots of peace and the opportunities for peace. . . .

## 179

# Interview Statements by President Tito of Yugoslavia Commenting on the U.S.S.R. Naval Presence in the Mediterranean and on the Middle East Conflict<sup>1</sup>

August 9, 1971

*Q. Do you think that the presence of the U.S.S.R. as a naval force in the Mediterranean will create a new balance of power? And what bearing will it have on the relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.?*

*A.* For the moment, as far as one can tell, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has no bearing. The Soviet fleet seems to be intended, above all, to give the Arabs moral support in their defense against Israeli aggression. It seems to me that the American fleet and bases are much more dangerous for the U.S.S.R. In the long run the presence of both American and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean might even lead to a conflict. As the proverb says: "If you rattle your saber, you end by making war." This is why it is so urgent to find a solution to the Middle East conflict as soon as possible, so that both fleets, that of the United States and that of the U.S.S.R., may go home and leave the Mediterranean to the coastal countries, the only ones it belongs to: Yugoslavia, France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, the Arab countries etc.

*Q. What do you think of the Middle East problem? Of the reopening of the Suez Canal? Of the question of the Palestinian people?*

*A.* The solution of the Middle East problem is difficult because the situation, which is already confused, is made more so by the international expansion of the conflict and by the fact that there is no agreement among the Palestinians themselves. In any case, any solution implies the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied in the Six

Day War. I know that certain groups of Palestinian leaders want nothing more or less than the return of their people to their land of origin, but I fear that this is an illusion, inasmuch as the Israelis have profoundly changed these territories.

Certainly the possibility of reestablishing a Palestinian entity in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza could be studied, but this eventuality has been rejected by the Israelis. Three years ago in Algiers I talked to the Palestinian representatives about their problems. They stressed the fact that Arabs and Jews lived together in peace for centuries before the Zionists arrived. According to the Palestinians, a new secular and democratic state should be created in which Arabs and Jews could live together without friction. Of course, it remains to be seen how far this project corresponds to the general wishes of the Palestinians and the Arabs. I still believe that some of them want purely and simply to liquidate Israel, which I regard as inadmissible. And I have said so, whenever I have thought it necessary, to Arab politicians and leaders.

For the moment, in any case, things are going from bad to worse. In Jordan King Hussein's Bedouin are firing on the poor Palestinian refugees, instead of taking up arms to liberate the occupied territories. This irrational conduct is to be explained by the fear of socialism felt by certain Arab countries. This fear is also at the root of more than one disagreement among Arab countries. For all these reasons I do not think that the federation plan proposed by the Palestinians can be seriously discussed, for the present at any rate. Above all it arouses the hostility of the United States, whose interest it is to prevent the spread of socialism in the Middle East. To tell the truth, at the start the Israelis showed a leaning towards socialism, but it would seem that for several years they have been turning away from it.

As for the Suez Canal, I think that its reopening would be of great benefit to the Mediterranean countries, and therefore to us too. But we are not prepared to accept its reopening at any price. We think that the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from Tito's interview conducted by Alberto Moravia, *Nouvel Observateur*, No. 352 (August 9-15, 1971), p. 23; © *Le Nouvel Observateur*; reprinted by permission.

Canal should only be reopened after the withdrawal of the Israelis from its east bank. Naturally the United States is opposed to its being reopened because they are afraid of U.S.S.R. expansion in the Indian Ocean. This fear is shared by the British. In fact it is in the interest of the United States and Great Britain that the U.S.S.R. should not contest their supremacy in the southern part of the African continent. South Africa and the American fleet threaten anti-colonialist countries like Tanzania and Zambia. The Soviet fleet acts as a brake on the influence of the United States on these countries.

## 180

**Interview in U.S. Weekly with Premier Meir of Israel Stating Israel's Refusal To Withdraw from the East Bank of the Suez Canal and Reiterating Israel's Demand for "Secure Borders"**<sup>1</sup>

Mid-August, 1971

*Q. Mrs. Meir, at this point in time, a year after the cease-fire went into effect, how do you assess the outlook for war or for peace?*

A. The cease-fire in itself is something that we welcome. Anything that will do away with the shooting. But we hope that the other side will also come to appreciate the fact that it is better to continue the cease-fire than to reintroduce it after shooting begins again.

*Q. Is the interim solution involving the reopening of the Suez Canal still alive, or are we flogging a dead horse?*

A. As far as we are concerned it is alive.

We, at any rate, are anxious for the negotiations to succeed.

*Q. What would be the elements in such an arrangement?*

A. The fundamental desire to have peace between Egypt and Israel is the main thing. The forces are there, and they are separated by a body of water, a very important separating element. Now, as for the idea that this exercise involves our moving from the canal, it doesn't make any difference how far (and it won't be too far). No sooner will we move than Egypt's armed forces will come over. It is so ridiculous—illogical. Instead of having a further separation of forces, they would be closer.

*Q. This is a main sticking point, the number and character of the Egyptians on the east bank of the canal?*

A. Not the numbers, the very crossing of the canal by armed forces.

*Q. What about civilians?*

A. Of course we agree that those who are necessary to clear the canal and operate it can be there. No more shooting, though. That element is vital. There must be no military forces crossing the canal.

*Q. Is that the major sticking point?*

A. It is one. Another major one is no more shooting anywhere. Both of us have to declare that there will be no more shooting.

*Q. But there hasn't been any shooting for the past year.*

A. That is true, but we don't want to be served a new date every so often. What did [Egypt's President Anwar] Sadat do? He destroyed every constructive element in this proposition. First, he proposed that the Egyptian armed forces cross the canal immediately. Secondly, he gave us a cease-fire for six months. And during these six months he will clear the canal. During the six months, according to his recipe, [United Nations Mediator Gunnar] Jarring has to work out a timetable for our moving back up to the international border. And if that isn't done, they begin shooting. Where do

<sup>1</sup> Meir's interview conducted by Marsh Clark, *Time* (Atlantic Edition), XCVIII, 9 (August 30, 1971), p. 29. This interview preceded Defense Minister Dayan's controversial statements on annexation of the occupied Arab territories made during his speech at the Army Command and Staff College, August 19, 1971 (see next document).

they begin shooting? Not when they are on one side of the canal and we are on the other, but when we are both on the same side. Or maybe Sadat will say the canal is not important, that what he wants is to get Israel back to the 1967 border. This is exactly the crux of the matter. If Israel decides to withdraw to the 1967 international border, we don't need to do it in stages. If we were to come to a decision we would pack and move to the international border. And he can have the canal cleared or not. We are not responsible for that. The question of where the border should be, the final border, is a question to be decided by negotiation between the parties. We have always said an "agreed border."

*Q. You have just given a very pessimistic assessment. Do you think there is any expectation that something can be negotiated, interim or otherwise?*

*A.* We don't want any more than this. We demand for ourselves boundaries that we believe are safe for us and that we believe can deter a next war. What we want are two things. If and when we are attacked, the borders should be such that we will have fewer casualties. Even more important, the borders should be such that every Arab leader who takes it into his mind to attack us will look at them and say, "Ah, that is difficult, maybe we won't do that." That is all.

*Q. Somehow to the public eye, at least in the U.S., the impression is that Israel is intransigent.*

*A.* Sure we are intransigent when we face a situation in which Sadat says "peace," but the condition for peace is no negotiations, and we go right back where we came from. There is something else that is absolutely immoral, because it never happened before in human history—the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. How many around the table of the Security Council can really stand up and swear they have never done it, never without provocation of war, never held any other territory?

*Q. In your view, do the turbulence in the Arab world and the apparent inconstancy of the Arab*

*leadership constitute a barrier, mental or otherwise, to negotiations?*

*A.* No. But I think they strengthen our conviction that we are obligated to do everything we can from a security point of view because we never know what is going to happen on the other side. I think the crux of the difficulties of peace in the Middle East is the introduction of an imperialistic power in this area. That is the Soviet Union. I honestly believe the '67 war would not have taken place had it not been for the Russians.

*Q. Assistant Secretary of State Joe Sisco was here and presumably had thorough discussions with the government. Do you feel that the prospects for meaningful negotiations were enhanced by your discussions with him?*

*A.* There is always something positive in discussions among friends. Even when there is disagreement. And from that point of view, we welcomed the discussions with Mr. Sisco, as we did those in May with Secretary Rogers, and we are anxious for these discussions to go on.

*Q. You seem to grow stronger and thrive on responsibility. Will you stand for re-election?*

*A.* If I stand for election again in 1973, I'll be 75 years old. A career doesn't begin at 75. I have had quite enough. My children have been here from Tel Aviv for three weeks in my house, and I haven't had one day with them. It is almost barbaric. I always say that anyone who wants to be Prime Minister in Israel deserves it.

## 181

**Address by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel Urging that Israel Regard Herself As the Established Government of the Occupied Arab Territories and Take Unilateral Measures To Implement This Policy<sup>1</sup>**

**August 19, 1971**

Our conflict with the Arabs focuses our thinking on two questions: how to fight: and how to achieve peace.

But there is a third question which we have hardly deemed worthy of serious study, namely, what can we do to further our aims without either war or a peace agreement. We tend to see the present situation of no peace and no war in passive terms, as though we were running in neutral gear.

It is natural that the matters in dispute should be settled jointly by our neighbours and ourselves: and indeed, both peace and war would seem to be cooperative enterprises.

I say "would seem" because it is not really so. There is no general rule here that applies either to nations or to actions. One nation (ourselves) does not want war, while another nation (the Arab) does not want peace. But when the Arabs wish to make war, it is of no avail for us to refuse: We have to "co-operate" with them. And when they refuse to make peace, again our own wishes are of no avail, and we have to "cooperate" in their refusal. Both peace and war are made together, except that one side can force war upon the other, but not peace.

There is thus no justification for our continuing to spend 99 per cent of our energy, resources, thought and attention only within the green line (the 1949 armistice lines). The fact is that this line determines the area of our activities only because we have laid this down for ourselves. But in confining our-

selves in this way, we are evading reality rather than adjusting to it. We should regard our role also in the administered territories as that of the established government—to plan and implement whatever can be done without leaving "options open" for the day of peace—which may be distant.

In other words, the emphasis should be put on our taking unilateral and immediate measures, without relying on cooperation from our neighbours or waiting until they are ready for it.

We must naturally hope that the situation will change in the course of time: But meanwhile we should see the realities for what they are. From the beginning, our national movement has made numerous attempts to talk to the Arabs, to gain their understanding, to reach arrangements and agreements. But all that has been gained from them during this time has been some acceptance—after the event—of facts created by us against their will. And even such "acceptance" has been given in half-hearted tones, without conviction, with built-in reservations, and with the right of repudiation whenever they think fit. This was the case during the Mandatory period, and this was the case after the establishment of the State, from the 1949 Armistice Agreement up to the Khartoum resolutions. So it was in Nasser's time and so it is with Sadat's peace proposals and suggestions for a partial agreement.

In this context, there was in fact a worsening rather than an improvement in the Arab approach at the end of the Six Day War, compared with that at the end of the 1948/49 War of Independence. Although the 1949 agreements were only for an armistice, the Arab states which signed them recognized that they had to acquiesce in the existence of the State of Israel. The demarcation lines were determined more or less in accordance with the results of the war and there was no Arab demand and no Israel undertaking to enable the Arab refugees to return to Israel.

Now when the Arab states announce their readiness to make peace with Israel, they see it as a tactical step to secure the removal of Israel from the areas she occupied. Sadat's peace proposal is not a move towards rap-

<sup>1</sup> English translation of Dayan's speech in Hebrew at the Army Command and Staff College, *Jerusalem Post*, August 20, 1971, p. 11.

On August 26, 1971 Dayan expanded on these remarks in an interview on Israeli Defense Forces Radio (see *Jerusalem Post*, August 27, 1971, pp. 4, 6).



prochement with us, but a lever to get rid of us. The basic Arab feeling towards us is expressed in the Khartoum "noes"—no negotiation, no recognition, no peace—and the restoration of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians.

When I speak of unilateral measures, I do not mean taking a onesided view. Even if we create facts without making our actions contingent on the consent of the other side, we must take their point of view into account. We must devise a pattern of living and of situations which can be tolerated by the Arabs. By this I do not mean arrangements which are to their liking, but those they can live with, if they so wish.

On this matter of Arab acquiescence, we should distinguish between three criteria: The needs of Arabs, as individuals, who want what everyone wants—an untroubled life; the current policy of their governments; and their national aspirations.

We are able to satisfy the daily needs of the Arabs who come under our administration. This is borne out by the Palestinians who emigrated before the Six Day War to Kuwait, Amman, Saudi Arabia and Libya, found work and took up permanent residence there. Now, after visits to the West Bank, they wish to come back and live here. They would not want to return if conditions were still the same as those they left—even though there was then an Arab regime and so-called political rights, while today the West Bank is under Israel administration.

Behind the public declarations there are certain realities, and it seems that life at present in Nablus, Jenin, Hebron and Jerusalem is felt by them to be better than it was during the Jordanian administration, and even preferable to life in the Arab countries to which they had emigrated. I do not think that the present political status of the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip can continue permanently, but neither do I see it as intolerable for a transitional period, even a long one.

In spite of their national aims, it may be that some or all of the Arab governments will not find it possible to renew the war against us. However, this does not mean that they

accept the present situation. I do not expect that Syria, Jordan and Egypt will be reconciled in the current period to our maintenance of armed forces in the Golan Heights, on the Jordan and in Sinai. If the Arab States do not renew the war, it is because they know what to expect. Their leaders are aware that Israel has the military means to strike across the frontiers, and that any attempt to assault Israel is likely to bring disaster upon them.

In fortifying our lines, therefore, we should not assume that this will bring about Arab reconciliation. The real choice is between abandoning frontiers which we consider to be essential, and between holding on to them despite Arab opposition.

To complete the picture, let me add that, even in one sector where we have an agreed frontier—with Lebanon—matters do not always run smoothly. The Israel-Lebanese border is an agreed border; there is no state of war between the two countries; and we certainly want to maintain scrupulous respect for Lebanese sovereignty and not enter its territory. But when the Lebanese authorities allow the terrorists to operate against us from their soil, we have no alternative but to cross the frontier. It appears that just as the absence of agreement over a common frontier does not automatically spell war, so the existence of such an agreement does not automatically guarantee peace.

It has not been my intention in this talk to set out in detail what we should do on every specific matter. I have sought only to express my view on the broad considerations which should govern our actions today, four years after the Six Day War, with the Arabs still refusing to make peace with us.

I am afraid we must recognize the fact that, in the short run, the frontiers which seem to us to be vital will not be agreed, and without agreed frontiers we will not gain peace agreements. A peace agreement is of supreme importance to us. But if the Arabs refuse to make peace, we cannot stand still. If we are denied their cooperation, let us act on our own.

## 182

**Commentary in China Weekly Peking Review Denying Reports That Israel-China Contacts Had Occurred and Attacking the Soviet Union for Spreading the Rumor<sup>1</sup>**

**Peking, August 20, 1971**

Of late, certain Israeli and Western newspapers repeatedly spread the rumour that "contacts" were under way between Israel and the People's Republic of China on the "establishment of diplomatic relations." Obviously, such lies were deliberately fabricated by persons with ulterior motives to confuse and hoodwink public opinion.

However, the efforts of these rumour-mongers are futile. It is known to all that the Chinese Government and people have always been resolutely supporting the just struggle of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples against the U.S. and Israeli aggressors. We have been and will always be consistent in upholding this principled stand.

However, the Soviet news agency TASS which has set itself the task of making anti-China propaganda regarded such fabrications as heaven-sent and scraped them up with exhilaration. It published a special commentary on August 3, alleging that the matter could "only confirm the old saying: There is no smoke without a fire."

This is no surprise as TASS has long become a rumour-mongering and rumour-processing factory. That the propaganda machine of social-imperialism has to keep itself going with fabrications only shows how low it has sunk. The fact is simply that TASS is all eagerness to fan up an anti-China wave with the help of the vicious fabrications.

It was with sinister aims that TASS spread the lies. In the present contention and collusion between the two superpowers in the Middle East, social-imperialism, flaunting the signboard "for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East," is doing everything in its

power to make the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples give up their struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and submit themselves to its interests in seizing and expanding spheres of influence in the Middle East. It stops at nothing in pursuing its ends. In brazenly spreading rumours to sow discord between the Chinese people and the people of Palestine and other Arab countries, TASS is manoeuvring to cover up and divert attention from the sinister activities which social-imperialism itself is engaged in, including its collusion with Israel. Here a widely-known saying may well be applied to the TASS commentary—it is a sheer case of "a thief crying 'stop thief'!"

This recalls what Lenin, the great teacher of revolution, said when denouncing the shameless slanderers in his time: "Things must be pretty bad for you, gentlemen, if you are compelled to resort to such shameless and despicable methods."

## 183

**Statement by U.S. State Department Spokesman McCloskey Criticizing Statement Made by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on the Necessity for Israel's Establishing a Permanent Government in the Occupied Territories<sup>2</sup>**

**Washington, August 20, 1971**

[If General Dayan's declaration] represents the view of the Government of Israel, it would be completely inconsistent with Israel's acceptance of the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

We shall continue our persistent and discreet diplomatic efforts with a view to facilitating the conclusion of an interim agreement on the Suez Canal. This agreement would constitute a practical test of peace, a test which could, in time, lead to a com-

<sup>1</sup> *Peking Review*, XIV, 34 (August 20, 1971), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the excerpted French translation of McCloskey's statement as published in *Le Monde*, August 22-23, 1971, p. 3.

prehensive settlement in accordance with the U.N. resolution.

## 184

# **Comments on the Possibility of Direct U.S. Military Intervention in the Middle East Published in U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, August 22, 1971

A report by Pentagon expert J. Anderson appeared in a recent issue of *The Washington Post*. The report says that U.S. marines apparently are training for combat in jungle conditions and also for combat in desert conditions.... Obviously the Israel lobby in Washington has somewhat reoriented U.S. military policy—from assisting Tel Aviv with arms, planes and loans to the beginning of preparations (if necessary) for direct military intervention in Near Eastern affairs, and from basic “commitments” in Southeast Asia alone to the sharing of these “commitments” with the Near East.

Could this be the reason why the Tel Aviv hawks have again raised their heads, warning of the resumption of military activity and a new attack on the Arab countries? Is this why the Israeli authorities are carrying out “scorched-earth” tactics on such a wide scale in the occupied territories and, in the process, destroying refugee settlements and imprisoning those who refuse to surrender?

The political situation in the Near East has become exacerbated. This exacerbation is facilitated not only by the intrigues of the imperialist forces and by the policy of the occupiers, but by the operations carried out recently in Jordan against the Palestinian guerrillas. These operations have led Damas-

cus and Amman into conflict and have caused the two countries to sever diplomatic relations. Taking advantage of the discord within the Arab camp, the U.S.A. has stepped up its deliveries of the latest weapons and military equipment to Israel, further complicating the Near East crisis. In such conditions, great significance attaches to the meeting in Damascus of the leaders of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Libya. The leaders of those countries examined the present situation in the Near East and the draft constitution for a Federation of Arab Republics that will be submitted to a general referendum Sept. 1.

The tension in the Near East has attracted the attention of the press to developments on Malta, the so-called key to the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, and to NATO's plans to transfer its forces from bases on Malta to Italy, Cyprus and Gibraltar, and its plans to set up a so-called Mediterranean association. According to the Cairo magazine *Rose el Youssef*, Israel will be the foundation of this new military bloc.

As for the U.S.S.R., it approaches in the spirit of goodwill the question of assisting Malta in solving a number of its economic problems. The Soviet government is favorably disposed toward the efforts of the government of Malta aimed at finally eliminating the consequences of colonial dominion and at freeing Malta from commitments imposed on it from outside.

Obviously, NATO's leading militaristic circles will scarcely accept the fact that Malta is slipping away from their control, the more so since the system of NATO bases in the North Atlantic may also be broken up: The new Icelandic government has announced that it is demanding the closing down of the military base in Keflavik. As reported in the press, the intrigues against La Valetta are continuing, despite the decision to remove the headquarters of NATO Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe from Malta. Although expelled from that island, Admiral Gino Birindelli, commander of that headquarters, still has not abandoned the idea of sailing into Valetta on a “white cutter.”

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from a Russian survey article by V. Yermakov (*Pravda*, August 22, 1971, pp. 1, 4), *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 34 (September 21, 1971), p. 17. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

## 185

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Algeria of President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Algiers, September 10, 1971

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Houari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, His Excellency al-Hajj Ahmadou Ahidjo, the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon at the head of an important delegation paid an official visit to Algeria September 8-10, 1971.

The two parties conducted a profound study of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East and agreed to take action towards finding a solution based on justice and freedom. In this connection they declared their support for the resolution of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Lusaka and for all the objective resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity.

## 186

**Radio Interview Statements by Chief of Staff Bar Lev of Israel, Assessing the Country's Military Preparedness and the Military Balance of Power in the Middle East<sup>2</sup>**

September 11, 1971

*Q. If a war breaks out, in what way will it be different from those of the past?*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), September 11, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the transcript of Bar Lev's interview broadcast in Hebrew

A. I assume that if the fighting resumes, it will include the element of fire, i.e. shelling, bombardment and the like, and the element of operations—or the attempt to operate—behind the lines, in the air, at sea and on land. But it should be remembered that war has a momentum of its own and there can be various developments, even beyond what we have seen and experienced in the past. Of course, the various possible developments are being taken into account, and I believe the Israel Defence Forces are prepared for them.

*Q. Will there be any change in the principle of carrying the war into enemy territory now that we have territory in depth behind the lines?*

A. In the past we had no alternative. Today we have. Nevertheless, I would not say that in the course of battle situations might not arise in which the correct move, the correct solution, would be to carry the war across the present cease-fire lines. It is important, however, in my opinion, to emphasize that in the past, before the Six Day War, Israel had no alternative but to carry the war across the armistice lines in the very first moment. Today, thanks to the achievements of the Six Day War, we are not compelled to do this. We can do it and there may be situations in which it is right to do it, but we do not have to do it.

*Q. Is there any likelihood of the renewal of the war in the foreseeable future?*

A. It is very difficult to give a categorical answer. In my view there is a possibility that Egypt will renew the fighting. I see no point in speculating on the subject of how great are the possibilities or the likelihood. Such a possibility definitely exists. The I.D.F. and the country must take it into account and prepare for it.

*Q. Are we absolutely secure against a sudden attack by Egypt—in the air or by a crossing of the Canal?*

A. I believe we are adequately assured and

on Israel Forces Radio, as published in the *Jerusalem Post*, September 13, 1971, pp. 4-5, 5.

that we shall not be confronted by surprises of this kind.

*Q. Foreign commentators say that if the war is renewed we shall find it difficult to destroy the Egyptian and Soviet missile system without heavy losses. What do you think?*

A. I don't believe anyone thinks the destruction of such a missile system is a trivial task. Obviously it is a difficult operation, involving losses. But although it is neither simple or easy I definitely do not believe it is impossible.

*Q. It has been said that we take too much account of the Soviet factor in the area and that exaggerated fear of the Soviets deprived us of victory in the war of attrition.*

A. In my opinion, we definitely cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet factor exists in the Middle East, in Egypt. But at the same time I do not believe we exaggerate its importance and draw incorrect conclusions from it. That was so in the past, in my opinion, and it is still true today. As for the second part of your question, I have no great desire to go into the subject, because I think that very few people ask themselves this question. It seems to me that today the answer is obvious. When we are entering the 14th month of the cease-fire and we see what is happening inside Egypt, I do not think there is any need or reason today to explain at length that in the war of attrition, as the Egyptians called it—which we turned into a war of attrition against the Egyptians—we achieved our goal. Our aim was that the Egyptians should stop shooting and that the cease-fire should enter into force again. We have achieved this aim and for a fairly long period. We are now in [the second year of] the cease-fire and I think these facts in themselves show clearly that the Egyptian aim, when they started this war, has not been achieved, while our stated aim, which was to obtain a cease-fire, has been fully achieved.

*Q. How would you define a balanced approach on our part to the presence of the Soviets in the area?*

A. In my opinion, in future as in the past, we must first define for ourselves the steps vital

for our security, and if anyone tries to prevent our achieving these defined aims, we must fight him. That is what we said in the past, that is what we did in the past, and that is what I believe we shall do in the future as well. That is one element.

The second point, in my view, is connected rather with the options open to us in taking the initiative. Here we definitely have to know that there are operations we can carry out without their having undesirable consequences on the Soviet plane, but on the other hand there may be other operations which, if we carry them out, may oblige the Soviets, or the Russian troops in Egypt, to take steps undesirable to us.

We should therefore, in my opinion, be guided by these two things: first of all, insisting on our own position in all vital spheres, even when that might lead to a clash with Russian soldiers in Egypt, but on the other hand not taking the initiative in ways that will lead the Soviets in Egypt, or the Soviet Union, to decide on moves undesirable to us.

*Q. Do you think the new Arab federation is a more serious affair than similar developments were in the past?*

A. For the time being it is premature to draw any conclusions based on experience. It may be said today, however, that this federation has no real military significance. Egypt and Syria were there on our borders before the federation, and they were hostile to us, and the military reinforcement from Libya is not a substantial addition. Politically, the membership of Libya in the federation has effect in the direction of extremism. We have seen, for instance, that at the meeting of the three presidents in Damascus the principles of Khartoum were mentioned again, something we had not heard in very many months. It is true that the Khartoum principles were not repeated in full, for it was not said that there would be no recognition of Israel, but it was said again, that there will be no peace and no negotiations with Israel.

*Q. Is it not possible that Libyan money and extremism may lead to extremism in operations?*

A. There could be some influence, but I do

not think that Egypt, for instance, will start a war or renew the fighting, or refrain from renewing the fighting, because of Libyan pressure.

*Q. Could you review the situation on the cease-fire lines today?*

Let us start with the West. Along the Suez, as we know, it is quiet. During all this period, from the 7th of August 1970, throughout the whole year, nothing has happened in the way of shooting, except for some isolated firing, mostly random and undirected shots.

As for attempts at infiltration, there were times when the Egyptians infiltrated groups of intelligence personnel across the Canal. A very large part of these were captured, and in recent months, I think for several months, we have not come across this kind of thing. There have been overflights by Egyptian aircraft. Incidentally, in every such case we report to the [U.N.] Observer Staff.

Along the Jordanian border, it has been quiet since last autumn. There were a few attempts at infiltration and shelling, but all in all the Jordanian border is quiet. On the Syrian border, since the activity of our armour in July 1970, military activity of the regular Syrian army has ceased altogether. They have not fired as much as a single shot. On the other hand, from time to time, they facilitate activity by the Palestine terrorist organisations. In most cases we get them. In the last year we have suffered little damage and very few casualties on the Syrian border, so that, all in all, the Syrian border is fairly quiet, even though from time to time there are attempts at infiltration by terrorists.

On the Lebanese border we have also, in recent months, been very successful in stemming terrorist activity. The Hermon region, which was a fairly critical area a year and a half ago, and where quite a number of our fighters fell, has, thanks to our activity and organisation of the region, become a region entirely under our control. Further west, too, along the Lebanese border up to the seashore, terrorist activity is restricted and in most cases there are no casualties on our side, but rather amongst the terrorists themselves.

As for the administered areas, I assume you will want to ask a separate question on Gaza, and I will give you the opportunity to do so. In Judea and Samaria, we are, all in all, in control of the situation. There are occasional attempts at terrorist activity, but here, too, this has been on a small scale, and with little success.

*Q. You have said that the terrorists' strength has diminished. Could you say that they no longer exist as a tangible factor, a military factor, in the war against us?*

A. I would not say that the terrorists can be discounted altogether. They are at present in a very low state. It is quite possible that the present state of affairs will continue and they will not manage to recover, but will remain at this level. But there might also be two other things. One is in fact happening: that is, they are directing their activity at other Israeli vulnerable points. Attempts at sabotaging El Al planes are an example of this. But it is quite possible that, lacking the ability to operate against the I.D.F. along the borders, they will try to direct their efforts at other vulnerable targets. And the second thing, which may certainly happen, is that here and there they will somehow manage to get on their feet again. By and large, I am of the opinion that after this year there is no reason why the State of Israel should acquiesce in restoration of the situation on any spot along our border to what it was previously—I refer to the period when the terrorists operated from Jordan undisturbed, with the consent of the government. I do not feel that there is any reason why we should acquiesce in such a deterioration along our borders.

*Q. Is it your estimate that there is a danger of such a deterioration under certain circumstances? For example, in the event that the King of Jordan gives in to pressure.*

A. I do not believe that Hussein at this time will give in to such pressure. But the Arab world is rather fluid, and if in fact the quiet along the borders should change for the worse then I think we have the ways and means to restore the situation prevailing today.

*Q. Have you heard the joke that Hussein informed the Government of Israel that he will hold them responsible for infiltration of terrorists into Jordan from our territory?*

A. That's a good joke.

*Q. Are the operations carried out so far in the Gaza Strip adequate to solve the security problems in the camps and in the town of Gaza, and what, in your estimate, may be expected in this respect within the near future?*

A. In the near future a continuation of the things we have been doing for almost half a year may be expected. This activity consists of several elements: the first is the sealing of the Strip, both from the sea and from land, with a view to preventing any possibility of the terrorists receiving equipment and reinforcements.

The second thing we are doing is very intensive patrolling—both in the refugee camps and in the built-up areas, as well as in the so-called open spaces, mostly orchards—in order to ferret out terrorists, strike at them and prevent any possibility of their organising, training, building bunkers, and so on.

Thirdly, we are organising the region in such a way as to facilitate its military control. This is done by opening roads and pathways in the large, congested refugee camps and through orchards and other areas. In these three spheres we have, in my opinion, already made good progress and if we persevere in them, without being deterred, I believe that the terrorists in the Strip will eventually have to abandon their activities and from the point of view of development, relations and control in the Strip we shall arrive at a situation similar to that existing at present on the West Bank.

*Q. From the lessons learned from the behaviour of a unit of soldiers in the Shati camp, can you say that the soldiers of the I.D.F. can today stand the test of behaviour towards the local population in the administered areas?*

A. Definitely yes. Of course, I cannot guarantee that there might not be an irregularity now and then, by someone or other. But I believe that we have taken all steps to

ensure that there will be no irregularity by any unit or group.

*Q. What are our chances today of receiving the planes we asked from the Americans? And what is the situation regarding our orders in other spheres?*

A. A number of Government Ministers have recently asked and answered questions regarding the planes from America and I do not think that I have much to add on this subject. It is clear that we want them: It is also clear that we believe that it would be a good thing not only for Israel if we receive them—and it is also clear that so far we have not received them. When the consignments will continue to come—that is another question. As for other fighting equipment—I cannot say that we have any particular difficulty at present in any other spheres.

## 187

### **Speech Reviewing Anglo-Egyptian Relations, Welcoming Egypt's Steps Towards Peace and Expressing Britain's Willingness To Participate in a U.N. Peace-keeping Force, Made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home on an Official Visit to Egypt<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, September 13, 1971**

Egypt has a long and famous history and we of the twentieth century, with all its technology, marvel at the skills and techniques of your peoples and the beauty of the records which have contributed so much to civilisation. These are the heritage of the past.

The business of the contemporary statesman is to build a nation in which an identity, a character and a sense of achievement, all of

<sup>1</sup> London Press Service, Verbatim Service 267/71, September 15, 1971; text provided, on request, by the Embassy of Great Britain, Beirut.

them a source of pride for its people, go hand in hand with prosperity and a rising standard of living. I felt this in the crowd when a year ago I was present at the funeral of President Nasser.

As you carry on the work of building the modern Egypt, you have the goodwill and good wishes of the British people in your ambition. Above all we have admired the steadiness of the leadership which has guided Egypt through a year of stress and danger.

This year has also seen the forging of new links between Egypt and her Arab neighbours. Britain has only one reason to regret this new association. The change of name has moved you to the other end of our alphabet, and so we shall no longer have your delegation sitting beside us at meetings of the United Nations General Assembly.

For Britain the greatest significance of this last year for our relations with you is that we have been able to carry through our intention of putting those relations on a fresh footing. I believe that it has been your object also: it was in this spirit that I was happy to welcome you, sir, last January on your visit to London.

We welcome this development and the understanding which your Government has shown to help co-operation grow and mature. I hope that Britain's interests and ambitions are widely understood among our Arab friends today. Our interest in the Middle East is not one of power politics. We seek no military bases; we have no wish to try and interfere in the management of any independent country's affairs. Our concern is in friendship with all, as trading partners in a framework of political stability in which standards of living and economic prospects may be raised. The keynote of that friendship was picked out by a distinguished editor of yours four years ago in an article in the *London Sunday Times*. He wrote of, and I quote — "the equality of a mature relationship. Britain and Egypt can never be indifferent to one another because so much has passed between us, but today our friendship is securely based on mutual interests."

The SUMED pipeline project, in particular,

is a sign of the times that has a double significance. We welcome it not only as an important opportunity to contribute to the building of Egypt, but also as a practical example of the new promise of European co-operation in the development field. This is a pattern which I am certain must be followed increasingly if the world's needs are to be met.

Our trade is increasing once again in both directions. We have at last dealt with the tiresome question of nationalised properties. Above all, the possibilities for technical co-operation are opening up. I was glad to be able to tell you, sir, today that my Government is now able to offer what I hope will be a useful financial contribution to your development.

A shadow, however, still hangs over the future of Egypt. That is the threat of war. It is not just a question of the destruction that threatens all that has been built up with so much toil. It is not just a question of the resources wasted on armaments rather than invested in the region's future. Those can be replaced. But what can never be replaced are the lives of those who fall and the wasted years which the survivors spend under arms. The most urgent need must be the peace which will return them to their families and to the task of building an Egypt with an economic base which is firm and stable enough to resist whatever winds may blow on it. We want peace with you. We in Britain want peace for you, not only as a trading nation, but because the question of peace or war in the Middle East now involves the security of the whole international community. That peace must be real, based on a comprehensive political settlement under Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967.

Last October I took the opportunity at Harrogate to set out the elements of such a settlement which, in our view, would be fair. The most important of these elements was that Israeli armed forces should withdraw from territories occupied during the conflict of 1967, in the certainty of the knowledge that all states and claims of belligerency between countries engaged in that conflict would be brought to an end. We see no



substitute for an agreement which will embody these basic elements.

In your Government's response to Dr. Jarring's memorandum last February, as I understand it, there was an unequivocal and specific commitment to sign a peace agreement with Israel if Israel were willing to give the commitment about withdrawal for which the resolution had asked. We would have applauded such a commitment from Israel, but she proved at that time unable to give it.

Dr. Jarring then withdrew and the Americans took up the running, basing their new approaches on President Sadat's initiative of 4 February when he called for an interim arrangement which would allow the reopening of the Suez Canal in return for a measure of withdrawal by Israeli forces from Sinai, as a step leading to a final settlement.

At Ankara in April, I welcomed this proposal and the efforts being made to give it effect. I said that I thought such an agreement could help to reduce tension and go some way towards breaking the present deadlock.

We were glad to see your Government spokesman's reaffirmation on 24 August that Egypt adheres to President Sadat's initiative. I hope that it will be fruitful and that an arrangement can be negotiated soon. Real benefits would flow to the people of the Suez area and it would serve to build confidence for what in our view must be the next step—a comprehensive settlement. To that, Security Council Resolution Number 242 remains the key.

There will be opportunities for bilateral discussions shortly in New York where most of the Foreign Ministers concerned will be present. Thereafter I shall be in a better position to judge whether any further initiative would be useful.

In searching for ways to go forward, none of us should exclude any path that offers hope of progress just because in the past we have thought it right to reject it. The experience of history is that apparently insoluble difficulties can be resolved by diplomatic initiative, started by the parties to a dispute, assisted by friends who have a joint interest in peace.

In Europe, where for years we have lived with the threat of conflict between East and West that finds its focus in Berlin, that pattern seemed immutable until the Federal Republic took the initiative and the Four Powers recognised a common interest in lowering tension. The same Four Powers, incidentally, who in New York have been trying to find ways to help the parties to a peace agreement on the basis of Resolution 242. And now in Berlin we have a definite prospect of an agreement which will make life very much better for the people of Berlin and which will, I hope, serve to reduce tension in Europe generally.

In all these discussions, whether it be in Europe, in New York, or in the Middle East, the security of the parties is the dominating factor—security which by removing fear of aggression, removes the causes of aggression.

In the context of guarantees, Britain would consider participating in whatever way seemed appropriate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation to help to secure mutually agreed boundaries in the Middle East, and freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, determined in accordance with the principles of Resolution 242.

In this context, I should make clear that as far as Egypt and Israel are concerned that frontier should in our view be the old international frontier subject to whatever arrangements may be agreed for Gaza.

All this amounts, perhaps, to saying one simple thing: that my Government has been, and remains, ready to do everything in its power to help bring about the political settlement, and the state of peace, which is so much in the interests of all concerned.

It is our hope that the re-establishment of trust and friendship between Britain and Egypt will enable us to join in making a constructive contribution towards that over-riding purpose.

## 188

**Statements of Afghan Support for the Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes, for the Elimination of Racism and Colonialism and for the Arab Struggle for the Restoration of the Legitimate Rights of the Palestinians, Made in a Speech by King Mohammed Zahir Shah of Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, September 14, 1971**

Afghanistan, which pursues a policy of positive and active neutrality, nonalignment and nonparticipation in military and political blocs, firm support for the struggle of people and nations against colonialism, a policy of struggle for the strengthening of world peace, sincerely wishes to develop good relations with all friendly countries. There is no doubt that observance of the principle of the equality of states, mutual respect and noninterference in one another's internal affairs has played the principal role in strengthening friendship and ensuring tranquillity throughout the world. General and complete disarmament is a necessary condition for the maintenance of durable international security. The efforts that have been made along these lines by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states deserve approval, and we hope that in the not very distant future these efforts will be crowned with success. International security also is acutely in need of a peaceful resolution of disputed questions that are fraught with danger to peace. In our opinion, the use of military pressure for resolving these disputes leads to dangerous consequences. It is necessary to seek the

elimination of all disagreements along lines of political solutions, with respect for the inalienable rights of peoples and nations, the liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism and the abolition of all forms and types of racial discrimination. . . .

The people of Afghanistan, who support the struggle of the fraternal Arab people for a just solution of the Near East problem and the restoration of the legitimate rights of their Palestinian brothers, demand an end to the Israeli occupation and the aggressive actions that Israel has launched with a view to eliminating the Arab character of the old part of Jerusalem and other Arab lands under its occupation. The people of Afghanistan highly appreciate the support of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries for the rights of our Arab brothers.

## 189

**Press Conference Statements on the British Position on the Middle East Conflict and on the Balance of Power in the Mediterranean, Made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home During a Visit to Morocco<sup>2</sup>**

**Rabat, September 18, 1971**

[Asked about similarity in outlook between Morocco and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Middle East conflict]: There is a resemblance in the viewpoints of these two countries. I think as far as we are concerned, we should always treat the problem as a whole, as we see it. We believe that Security Council Resolution No. 242, which was, after all, adopted, should be the basis of any settlement. There is no chance of another resolution being adopted by the United Nations, so we

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the condensed translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, September 15, 1971) of King Mohammed's speech made at a dinner given in his honor by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government during his visit to the Soviet Union, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 38 (October 19, 1971), p. 6. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of Douglas-Home's press conference at the close of his official visit to Morocco, *La Dépêche* (Casablanca), September 19, 1971.

had better restrict ourselves to Resolution 242 and its contents.

We certainly respect the points of view of such other countries as may raise other aspects of the problem, and in particular the Palestinian problem. But we always maintain that Resolution 242 alone constitutes the soundest basis for an agreement between Egypt and Israel.

[Whether Egypt would continue to station her troops on the other bank of the Suez Canal within the framework of a partial settlement] is one of the questions which will have to be negotiated once the principle of evacuation is established. I do not think that we should speculate on what Egypt may do because that depends on a comprehensive agreement between Egypt and Israel.

... There will certainly be exchanges of views between the Foreign Ministers [at the U.N.], but the essential thing is not to depart from the United Nations resolution.

[Asked if he was optimistic as to the possibility of a solution being negotiated by the Big Four, as was the case with the Berlin problem]:

Judging by past experience, which does not inspire much optimism, it is a question of reviving the Jarring mission, if that is still possible. There is no magic solution to the crisis.

One thing is obviously clear [from my meetings on peace in the Mediterranean]: the balance of forces in the Mediterranean East has changed considerably as a result of the physical presence of Soviet aircraft which are using bases in Egypt and providing cover for the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. This is self-evident.

There has already been a reaction from NATO, whose member countries have decided to increase their forces. I think that if in the future there were negotiations on the Mediterranean, they would be within the framework of comprehensive negotiations on disarmament, if and when such negotiations ever take place.

## 190

# **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Morocco of U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Rabat, September 18, 1971**

At the invitation of the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [of the United Kingdom], paid an official visit to Morocco September 15–18, 1971.

Sir Alec expressed satisfaction at the close relations which have developed between the two countries since the independence of Morocco and expressed the hope that his visit will serve to strengthen these relations.

The political talks that H.E. Sir Alec Douglas-Home had with H.E. Dr. Abdellatif Filali covered the international situation, and in particular the problems of the Middle East, the Maghreb and the Mediterranean, as well as Moroccan-British bilateral relations.

In the course of their talks the two parties recorded similar viewpoints on the general problems of world peace, in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

In this spirit the two parties paid particular attention to the Middle East crisis, and recognized the urgent necessity for a peaceful solution to the present conflict.

The Moroccan party was of the opinion that such a settlement could only be reached by the evacuation of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and by the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

For its part the British party, while admitting the importance of these principles, insisted that the way to a just and permanent peace lay in the implementation of Resolution 242 *in toto*.

As regards the Mediterranean, the two

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of the communiqué as published in *L'Opinion* (Rabat), September 19, 1971.

parties expressed the hope that this sea was not destined to become an area of conflict but would remain an example of stability and fruitful cooperation among the coastal states.

## 191

**Radio Interview Statements by F.R.G. Foreign Minister Scheel Commenting on West German Relations with the Arab States and Israel<sup>1</sup>**

September 19, 1971

*Q. Foreign Minister, you mentioned the difficulties throughout this period of transition [towards political community] faced at the European consultations. One such difficulty is that of arriving at a Middle East policy. Shortly you will be going to New York for the U.N. General Assembly. It is said that you will be having contacts with Arab states with a view to normalizing bilateral relations. In your opinion, what chances are there for such a normalization? And what effects would it have on our relations with Israel?*

A. We said in a government announcement that we want to develop balanced relations with the Middle East. By that I mean that we have and want to maintain good relations with Israel, and that we will try to resume lapsed diplomatic relations with a large part of the Arab world. We have been working on this for the past year and a half and in my opinion we have come a long way. During this time the Arabs too have come round to feeling that the resumption of relations with us would be of mutual benefit.

They know too that a normalization of their relations with the F.R.G. would not be allowed to influence our relations with Israel. The Israelis know that our good relations

with Israel must not be a barrier to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Arabs. I have talked about these questions with both sides in the past. I think that positive results are possible if we continue in the next weeks and months as cautiously as before.

I will be meeting the Secretary-General of the Arab League in New York, and possibly other political leaders from these countries. I will also be meeting the Israeli Foreign Minister. All this is part of that balance we must find which is not only in our interest but also in that of the countries of the Middle East.

## 192

**Statement of Support for the Palestine Cause Made by Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army of China Wang Hsin-ting at a Banquet Honoring a Visiting Fateh Delegation<sup>2</sup>**

Peking, September 20, 1971

The Palestinian people have a glorious revolutionary tradition of fighting imperialism and the Chinese people admire them for their revolutionary spirit of daring to struggle in defiance of brute force....

The international situation is developing in a direction increasingly favourable to the revolutionary struggle against imperialism by the people of various countries and unfavourable to imperialism, revisionism and reaction. In the Middle East, although U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism are contending and colluding with each other and engaged in all sorts of conspiracies to stamp out the anti-imperialist revolutionary flames of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, the people's anti-imperialist struggle is deepening; the general trend of the development of history is irresistible.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the excerpted German transcript of Scheel's interview on Southwest German Radio as published in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), No. 136 (September 21, 1971), pp. 1475-1476.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpts from Hsin-ting's speech at a banquet honoring the Fateh delegation led by Abu Jihad. *Peking Review* XIV, 41 (October 8, 1971), pp. 5, 20.

... The Chinese people and the Palestinian and other Arab peoples have long been encouraging and supporting each other in the common cause of opposing imperialism. The Chinese people will always stand by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and the people of the world, together we unite, together we fight and together we will win victory.

### 193

#### **Communique Issued by the Consultative Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, September 30, 1971**

#### I

The third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September, 1970 reaffirmed the objectives and principles of Non-Alignment and set long-term goals and elaborated programmes of international co-operation with a view to promoting world peace and security, accelerating economic development and democratizing international relations and, in this context, strengthening the role and efficacy of the United Nations.

2. In conformity with these objectives and programmes, and bearing in mind the conclusion reached at Lusaka concerning the holding of periodic consultations, the representatives of Non-Aligned Countries met at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 16, 17, 18, 20, and 30 September, 1971 in order to hold consultations on developments in the world situation and important problems requiring urgent consideration at the 26th Session of General Assembly of the United Nations and the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 in Lima.

3. In pursuing the aims of non-alignment, the unity of action of Non-Aligned Countries manifested itself in particular during the 25th Session of the General Assembly. At that session, the General Assembly adopted important resolutions which constitute a comprehensive programme of action in respect of economic development, international security, principles concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States, decolonization, disarmament, the sea-bed and ocean floor as well as the role of the United Nations. These resolutions are an expression of the aspirations of the over-whelming majority of mankind for the constant strengthening of the contribution of the United Nations towards the improvement of the international situation. The implementation of these resolutions would strengthen the world organization and improve its efficacy.

#### II

4. World peace based on justice, equality and cooperation among all countries and of general progress of mankind has not been realized. Big Power tendency to monopolize decision-making on vital world issues and the persistent defiance of U.N. resolutions, still continue to prevail in international relations. The practice of interfering in the internal affairs of other states, and the recourse to political and economic pressure, threats of force and subversion are acquiring alarming proportions and dangerous frequency and thus endangering the security, independence and territorial integrity of many countries and the stability of various regions.

5. Wars, foreign occupation and hotbeds of crises in the world, particularly in the Middle East, South-East Asia and Southern Africa, are constantly threatening international peace and security. The lack of any substantial progress in solving long-term problems such as those of economic development, colonialism and neo-colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination and disarmament, which burden the international community and are a constant source of unequal relations, encourages the policy of power politics, foreign domination, and subjugation of peoples.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the text of the communiqué as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 516 (October 5, 1971), pp. 15, 16.

The meeting was attended by delegates from 53 full member countries and five observers.

## III

14. The participants in the Consultative Meeting devoted special attention to the problems of peace and security. International developments during the past year have confirmed the timeliness of the views expressed and decisions taken at the Lusaka Conference, and argue for the permanent preoccupation of the international community in matters relating to universal security. In this context it is imperative to develop and improve the system of security under the U.N. Charter, so that the world organization may carry out its responsibilities more effectively. At the same time, the participants in the Consultative Meeting reaffirmed the need to achieve full solidarity and co-operation among the Non-Aligned Countries with a view to strengthening their own security and taking concrete measures in the event of any threat to their independence and territorial integrity and sovereignty.

15. Deeply concerned over the lack of progress in solving the Middle East crisis, the participants reaffirmed the principles of resolution 8 on the Middle East adopted by the Lusaka Conference and all relevant U.N. resolutions on the matter. They emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force; the withdrawal of foreign troops from Arab territories occupied since 5th June, 1967, and full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They welcomed with deep appreciation the recent positive initiative of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa to resolve this grave crisis, and expressed the hope that its mission will be crowned with success. They further reiterated their support for the untiring efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, to implement Security Council Resolution 242 of 22nd November, 1967.

## 194

**Statement by a Bonn Foreign Office Spokesman on the Talks Between F.R.G. Foreign Minister Scheel and Arab League Secretary General Hassouna on the Possibilities for the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations Between West Germany and the Arab States<sup>1</sup>**

**October 4, 1971**

For the first time since relations were broken off [by various Arab states with the Federal Republic of Germany], pursuant to the resolution of 1965, a dialogue has been started again.

We assume that Mr. Hassouna will report to the Arab League about this talk.

According to what we have been told, another meeting of the Arab League will be held following the U.N. General Assembly.

The talk was very useful; it clarified matters. The standpoints on both sides were amplified on.

The Foreign Minister again pointed out that our Middle East policy is balanced and that we consider a resumption of relations to be in the interests of all states in the Middle East.

But the decision whether to resume diplomatic relations is a decision to be made by the various Governments. We assume that after the Arab League has received Mr. Hassouna's report, the individual countries may talk about this within the League and then make their decision.

<sup>1</sup> English text of Bonn Foreign Office statement on the Scheel-Hassouna talks held in New York on October 2, *The Bulletin (Bonn)* XIX, 35 (October 12, 1971), p. 267.

## 195

**Statements Reiterating Soviet Support for the Arab Cause, Urging Unity Among the Arab States and Denying Any Expansionist Aims on the Part of the U.S.S.R., Made by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin During an Official Visit to Algeria<sup>1</sup>**

Algiers, October 5, 1971

In the Near East, the brunt of the struggle against Israeli aggression is borne by the Arab Republic of Egypt. The Soviet Union in recent years has done everything possible to help the A.R.E. to strengthen its armed forces and to turn them into a formidable weapon in the struggle against aggression. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the A.R.E., signed in May, 1971, has become an expression of growing Soviet-Egyptian solidarity. . . .

The liberation epic of the Algerian people had great revolutionary importance for the entire African continent.

Every success of the people of any one Arab country in the anti-imperialist struggle is at the same time a success for all the Arab peoples. It could not be otherwise, since all of them are confronted by the same principal opponent—imperialism. This is a fact, and it cannot be changed by the existing differences in governmental structure and social system among the individual Arab countries nor by the differences in the concrete tasks they are accomplishing at this stage of their development. Imperialism has been and remains the plunderer and exploiter in the Arab countries, and this is the main threat to their independence and progress. For this

reason, all friends of the Arabs in the world warmly welcome every step they take leading toward the solidarity of the Arab countries in the struggle against imperialism; in the present situation, this means primarily the struggle against Israeli aggression as a manifestation of imperialist policy in the Near East. On the other hand, disagreements among the Arab countries that weaken their capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression and restore the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, give rise to profound regret. The cohesion of the Arab countries in the struggle against Israeli aggression will also strengthen the international solidarity of all the world's progressive forces with the Arabs.

The enemies of the Arab peoples fear most of all their unity and their friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. The imperialists and their agents in Israel are doing everything they can to divide the Arab countries and their peoples and to undermine their friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries. When they achieve this aim at least temporarily in one sector or another, they feel they have won a great victory. These efforts are kindling anticommunism, which has always and everywhere weakened the movement for independence, democracy and social progress.

Acting according to the principle that imperialist goals justify the use of the dirtiest means, the enemies of Soviet-Arab friendship are trying in every way to sow distrust of Soviet foreign policy in the Arab countries and to disseminate fables about some sort of "Soviet expansionism." The hopes here are evidently built on the fact that the colonial past has engendered in the Arabs a deep distrust of the states that at one time dominated this area. Now our foes are trying to transfer this distrust to the Soviet Union, slanderously attributing utterly alien aims to its foreign policy in the Near East. The foreign policy of the Soviet state, like that of any other state, is a continuation of its domestic policy. The class essence and goals of foreign and domestic policy cannot be at variance with one another. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the condensed translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, October 7, 1971) of Kosygin's speech at a dinner in his honor given by President Boumedienne and the Council of Ministers of Algeria, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* XXIII, 41 (November 9, 1971), p. 10. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

The Arab peoples have learned to distinguish their friends from their foes. They have learned to recognize the provocations of those who wish to hold back progressive development in the Arab East.

## 196

### **Resolution Adopted by the Constituent Assembly of the Muslim World League Calling on All Muslim States and Peoples To Take Religious, Military and Financial Action To Bring About the Withdrawal of Israel from Occupied Arab Territory<sup>1</sup>**

**Mecca, October 7, 1971**

1. The Constituent Assembly of the Muslim World League affirms that *Jihad* (the general muster of all able-bodied Muslims) has now become a material duty, either through personal participation or financial contributions, and that those who fail to bear their burdens are not following the course of the faithful.

Inasmuch as Palestine, Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque belong to all Muslims, Muslims everywhere must hasten to perform their duties of *Jihad*, preparing fighters and sending them to the field of battle.

In order that the Islamic countries may train, arm, organize and command the fighters, the Assembly recommends the formation of organizations for the three commands: religious, military and financial, in every Islamic country.

Each of these three commands should be composed of a local command in every Islamic state, commands in the towns linked to the local command, and branch commands linked to the town commands.

The local commands of the Islamic states

should be directly linked with the high command of the fighters, which in turn should be linked to the local political commands. (See the three attached appendices on the three commands: religious, military and financial.)<sup>1</sup>

2. The Assembly calls on the Islamic countries to send volunteer pilots and technicians to the fields of battle to assist their brethren stationed on the front lines.

3. The Assembly calls on the Islamic nation to establish a *Jihad* fund in every Islamic country to finance the struggle of the Palestinians and to provide for fighters and the families of martyrs. It suggests that governments allocate part of their budgets to this fund and that the peoples should contribute to it part of the income of each individual to the extent of his capability, his faith and his dignity.

4. The Assembly recommends that Islamic peoples and societies provide material and moral support to the Palestinian freedom fighters, that nothing be done to impede the implementation of their plans and that nothing of any kind should be done to injure them. It also recommends that the arms of Muslims be used against their enemies, not against each other, and that the Palestinian freedom fighters and the governments should cooperate to recover the rights of the Arabs and Muslims that have been usurped by Israel.

The Assembly also recommends that the confrontation states should allow the freedom fighters to make their territory a base from which they can set out on and to which they can return from commando operations, and for the protection of their lines of withdrawal.

5. The Assembly resolves that Israel's burning of the Blessed Aqsa Mosque was the supreme crime against the houses of God and the ultimate affront to the sentiments of Muslims, wherever they may be; that the only way to ensure that the holy places are protected and that the minds of Muslims may be at peace as regards them is the complete evacuation of Jerusalem and all the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Resolution I, "On the Palestine Problem," adopted at the Thirteenth Session of the League's Constituent Assembly meeting in Mecca, September 21-October 7, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), October 15, 1971.

<sup>1</sup> Appendices not reproduced here.



occupied territories by the Zionist enemy, and that any thinking about the Palestine problem which does not involve the restoration of the sovereignty and administration of both parts of Jerusalem to the hands of its people, the Palestinian Arabs, along with the protection of the Aqsa Mosque and all the holy places from foreign aggression, must be absolutely rejected, and that any suggestion for the internationalization of Jerusalem must be rejected as absolutely as must its Judaization.

The Assembly reminds the Islamic Nation of its duty to engage in *Jihad* to save and liberate Jerusalem and the occupied territory and the Islamic peoples of their duty to cooperate closely to achieve this vital objective.

6. The Assembly calls on the Arab and Islamic states not to be deceived by Israel's pretense of desiring peace, because though she pretends to want peace she really wants war.

It also calls on them not to be deceived by the Rogers Plan, because its aim is to anesthetize the Arabs as a prelude to establishing Israel more firmly in the occupied Arab territories, causing divisions among the Arab states and spreading suspicion in the Islamic states that the Arab states do not want to save Jerusalem and the occupied territory through war and sacrifice.

The Assembly also requests the Arab and Islamic states to prepare all the force they can for the recovery of their rights in the Holy Land and all the occupied territories, and to employ the greatest possible caution and vigilance.

There is no doubt that war between the Muslims and the Jewish state is coming, so that all the Muslims' material and moral resources must be mobilized in preparation for war.

7. Israel will only withdraw from the occupied Holy Land if she is forced to do so. Force is the only language Israel understands, and any claim to the contrary is idle— we only have to recall that she has scorned, and in no way complied with, all the resolutions adopted by international bodies.

Ever since 1949 the Arabs have been on the

defensive in the war with Israel. As is well known, he who is on the defensive can never be victorious, so that an offensive line must be followed in order to frustrate Israel's plans for expansion and settlement in the Arab countries.

8. The Assembly calls on those who are responsible for the armed forces and the commandos to make every effort to strengthen the Islamic spirit in their hearts and in the hearts of their men and to mobilize them spiritually so that their feelings may be bound to the True Faith, for fighters without high morale are of no military value, and nothing does more than religion to raise morale.

9. The Assembly supports the *fatwa* issued by the Muslims' *ulema*, muftis and qadis in the West Bank of Jordan on *Jumada al-Ula* 1387 A.H. (August 22, 1967 A.D.) to the effect that, according to Islamic concepts and definitions, the Aqsa Mosque includes the Aqsa Mosque of today, the Dome of the Rock and the surrounding courtyards, and the walls and gates, so that aggression against any part of this is a violation and desecration of the Blessed Aqsa Mosque, and that the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron is a holy Islamic mosque, and that any aggression against any part of it is a violation and desecration of it.

The Assembly recommends that the Secretariat General of the Muslim World League should send a detailed memorandum to the United Nations and to all the Islamic states and Islamic organizations in the world describing the excavations being carried out by the Zionists with the object of causing the Aqsa Mosque to collapse [and their actions designed to] Judaize the city of Jerusalem, change its character, and evict its people, and calling on them to make every effort to put a stop to this flagrant aggression against the holy places of the Muslims, their rights and their sentiments. The Assembly likewise recommends that this memorandum be sent to the Secretariat General of the Islamic States, of the Arab League and of the Organization of African Unity, calling on all of them to contact the Security Council and all other international institutions to

request them to take action to secure the implementation of the resolutions on the city of Jerusalem adopted by the Security Council and [other organs of] the United Nations.

The Assembly likewise recommends that all information media be used to acquaint the Islamic world and the world in general with what the Zionists are doing in Palestine in general and the Aqsa Mosque in particular.

10. The Assembly recommends that the Islamic countries and the Islamic peoples mobilize their information efforts to remind Muslims of the crime of the burning of the Blessed Aqsa Mosque, with the object of arousing Islamic and world public opinion on this subject, so that Muslims and others may not forget this abominable crime and may exert every material and moral effort to ensure the recovery of the Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem and the occupied territory.

11. The Assembly warns Arabs and Muslims in the Arab Islamic territory occupied in the June 1967 War against co-operating with Israel in any way or submitting to its desire to form a puppet government of Arabs and Muslims to cooperate with the Israeli enemy, because the formation of such a government would lend the Israeli occupation an air of legality which the Zionists would exploit with a view to establishing themselves more firmly in the occupied Arab territories.

The Assembly likewise regards all co-operation with the Zionist enemy as high treason and apostasy. "You do not find a people who believe in God and the last day, loving those who shun God and His Apostle. . . ."

The Assembly also calls on the population of the occupied territory not to leave their countries but to stand firm and be patient, cautious and vigilant.

12. The Assembly calls on the Jordanian government and the commandos to clear up their differences and to put an end to the fighting between the two sides, which benefits only Israel and the enemies of the Arabs and the Muslims.

The Assembly likewise calls for a return to the Agreement concluded at the Summit Conference held in Cairo on September 26, 1970 A.D. to put an end to the ordeal which befell the Arab and Islamic nation as a result of the incidents in Jordan and which did so much harm to both the commandos and to Jordan.

The Assembly also hopes that the two sides will cooperate against Israel and work together to rescue the occupied territory and recover the usurped land.

13. The Assembly recommends that the Arab and Islamic states should turn their attention to the question of Israeli penetration in Africa and the extension of her influence in the African countries, from which she has obtained bases, such as the base on the island of Halib obtained from Ethiopia, the object being to encircle Arab and Islamic countries and to obtain control of the Red Sea. It also recommends that the appropriate attitude be adopted to every country that allows its territory to be used by Israel for taking hostile action against the Muslims.

14. The Assembly calls on the Islamic states which have direct or indirect economic or political relations with Israel to impose an economic and political boycott on her; it also calls on all Islamic governments and peoples to impose a strict boycott on the economy of the Jewish State.

## 197

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Algeria of Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Algiers, October 8, 1971**

On the invitation of Houari Boumediene, President of the Revolutionary Council, Chair-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text of the communiqué (*Pravda*, October 9, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 42 (October 16, 1971), pp. 12, 12-13, 14.

man of the Council of Ministers of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was on an official friendly visit in Algeria from October 4 to 8, 1971.

The Soviet Side noted the great historical significance of the revolutionary gains of the heroic Algerian people and the important role it plays in the current struggle of the African and Arab nations against the forces of imperialism, neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid, for true political, economic and social liberation, for strengthening national independence and state sovereignty. It declared its respect for the policy of national independence and non-alignment conducted by Algeria, and views it as an active policy opposing the forces creating a threat to peace and international security, as a policy of resolute support for the just cause and the progressive forces in their historic struggle against imperialism and all forms of exploitation and foreign rule. It believes that this policy represents a major contribution to the cause of the preservation and strengthening of peace all over the world.

Having made an objective analysis of the present situation in the Middle East and strongly condemning Israeli aggression, the two Sides believe that the continuing Israeli occupation of Arab territories vastly aggravates world tensions.

Confirming their full solidarity with the Arab countries—victims of Israeli aggression—the two Sides agreed to press for the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of the occupation forces from all occupied Arab territories. Both Sides, in particular, confirm their effective support of the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their lawful and inalienable rights. The two Sides believe that a firm and just settlement of the Middle East problem, as well as the liquidation of military bases

in the Mediterranean will facilitate a removal of sources of tension in that area.

## 198

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of Premier Muhammad of South Yemen (Aden) (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, October 9, 1971**

A Government delegation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen headed by Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ali Nasser Mohammed stayed in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit from September 30 to October 9, 1971, at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

During the examination of international issues the two Sides devoted special attention to the problems of the Middle East. They denounced Israel's expansionist aggression, as well as the military and financial support rendered it by international imperialism headed by the USA, which constitutes an encouragement of aggression and a crying violation of the UN Charter and standards of international law. The two Sides also reaffirmed their immutable support for the Arab people of Palestine, struggling for the restoration of their legitimate rights. Both Sides noted that the success of the struggle for counteracting the Israeli aggression depends, to a large extent, on the unity of the Arab peoples, based on the struggle against imperialism and reaction.

The PDRY Government expressed its gratitude to the Soviet Union for its consistent support for the Arab people's just struggle

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text of the communiqué (*Pravda*, October 11, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 43 (October 23, 1971), pp. 9, 10.

against the imperialist Israeli aggression, for extensive political and economic aid to Arab countries and assistance in strengthening their armed forces. In its turn, the Soviet Side highly appraised the anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary foreign-policy course of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which is of vast importance for the common cause of the national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples.

## 199

**Statement on the Middle East in the Program for a Popular Unity Democratic Government in France, Adopted by the Central Committee of the French Communist Party<sup>1</sup>**

October 9, 1971

In the Middle East France would favor a political solution of the conflict, which presupposes application of the U.N. resolutions, in particular evacuation of occupied Arab territory, recognition of the national rights of all the peoples of that region, including the Arab Palestinian population, and the right to existence of the state of Israel.

## 200

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Morocco of Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Rabat, October 10, 1971

A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the French text (*L'Humanité*, October 12, 1971), *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, IX, 21-22 (205-206) (December 30, 1971), pp. 38-39.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text of the communiqué (*Pravda*, October 11, 1971),

Council of Ministers, was on an official visit in Morocco on October 8-10, 1971, at the invitation of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco.

The two Sides confirmed their resolute denunciation of Israeli aggression. They believe that the continued occupation of Arab lands by Israel presents a serious danger for peace and international security. They declare their complete solidarity with those Arab countries that were subjected to Israeli aggression and express their determination to press for an immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupation troops from all occupied Arab lands. The two Sides specifically confirm their support for the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their legitimate and inalienable rights. Both Sides expressed themselves for the intensification of efforts of all the peace-loving forces for the speediest peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis and agreed that a peaceful settlement of this conflict would promote stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole and help to turn the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation.

## 201

**Television Interview Statements on the Possibility of a Middle East Settlement, Possible U.S. Guarantees to Israel and the Soviet Role in the Middle East, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, October 10, 1971

*Mr. Herman: Secretary Rogers, Egyptian Pres-*

*Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 43 (October 23, 1971), pp. 7, 7-8.

<sup>3</sup> Questions and answers on the Middle East from the transcript of Rogers' interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System's television and radio program "Face the Nation," *Department of State Bulletin*, LXV, 1688 (November 1, 1971), pp. 479-481.

*ident Sadat, before leaving for Moscow this morning, proposed a new Suez Canal settlement which would have Egyptian troops crossing the canal immediately, a concept previously rejected by Israel. Does this run counter to indications you've been getting from Arab leaders that a settlement is now possible and could be worked out?*

*Secretary Rogers:* No, Mr. Herman, it does not run counter to those suggestions, because President Sadat has proposed this before. This is one of the things that he thinks is very important from his point of view. As you know, Israel at the moment rejects that rejects the concept of Egyptian troops crossing the canal—and this is one of the things that would have to be worked out before an interim agreement could be achieved.

*Mr. Herman:* Mr. Secretary, your Department has given some indications of being more encouraged recently about the possibility of an Arab-Israeli settlement, and yet this seems like the two sides are as nose to nose as ever before, no sign of give. What is encouraging?

*Secretary Rogers:* I think you have to recognize, Mr. Herman, that in all negotiations, when they seem to be stalled, each side states its maximum position and publicly it doesn't concede anything until there is a settlement. Now, in this case the United States at the request of both Israel and Egypt has played a role of mediator, if you will, at least a good-offices role, attempting to find out the positions of each side, to determine the parameters, and to see if we could play a useful role in reaching an agreement. Now, as a result of the discussions that we've had with both Israel and Egypt, we believe that the parameters are fairly clearly set forth. We believe it is possible to work out a settlement. I am convinced myself that both sides want a settlement, and furthermore it's the only viable alternative. Everyone at the United Nations that I've talked to—and I've talked to 70 foreign ministers during the last 10 days on an individual private basis—acknowledges that the United States initiative, under the leadership of President Nixon, is the only viable alternative at the moment, so we are going to do everything we can to play a

useful role to bring about an interim agreement. And I am cautiously optimistic that that is possible.

*Mr. Sherman:* But, Mr. Secretary, in practical terms Israel has had a very hostile reaction to your putting forward the six-point approach to the interim agreement. They suggest, in fact, that your doing that had undermined your role as the middleman in reaching this. Can you tell us what you hope to achieve from putting forward those six points?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, Mr. Sherman, you'll understand that the six points that we put forth are really the parameters of an agreement, they are not proposals by the United States. It is true that Israel has reacted, I noticed publicly, adversely in some instances, but there has been no criticism of my speech as such; and I talked to Mr. Eban [Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban] after I had made my speech, and he didn't make any mention of any criticism or object to any particular portion of my speech. And I think the position of the United States in the United Nations, as a result of this statement, which is President Nixon's position, has been very favorably received. Now, obviously if either side agrees publicly with what we have stated, it might appear that they are making concessions, but I think that both Egypt and Israel have responded in a fairly positive way.

*Mr. Kalb:* Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians and the Russians have a formal relationship with one another, the 15-year treaty of friendship. Do you feel that one way of breaking out of the impasse on the Suez effort is to have a longterm formal association with Israel that could perhaps take the form of a congressional resolution?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, we are open to any possible suggestion that would lead to peace in the area, and we have indicated that we support Israel, we support its sovereignty, we support its right to exist as a nation, and we have, as you know, have been very helpful to Israel, and the Prime Minister of Israel has said that President Nixon has done more for Israel in these last 2 years, in 2½ years, than any other President has done. I don't think it's necessary to have that kind of an arrangement in order to work out a peaceful settlement, but we would not preclude it.

*Mr. Sherman:* Well, would you be in favor of an exchange of letters, perhaps, or some sort of written document stating American security guarantees for Israel if they make concessions on this withdrawal?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I don't, Mr. Sherman, want to be involved in hypothetical discussions of what we might do.

*Mr. Sherman:* Have you discussed this with Israel?

*Secretary Rogers:* No, we have not in the terms that you've mentioned.

*Mr. Herman:* The other big power in this situation is the Soviet Union, and Mr. Sadat is now on his way to Moscow. Do you have any indications as to what the Soviet Union might urge toward a settlement in the Middle East?

*Secretary Rogers:* No, I do not. I had a long discussion with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] on this subject. I am convinced that they do not want an outbreak of war in the area because they've realized that it might result in a confrontation with the United States, so to that extent I think they would like to have the cease-fire continue. What their ultimate objective is, I'm not sure.

*Mr. Sherman:* Mr. Secretary, in your speech, one of your points, you said it's possible for a compromise on this issue of the Egyptian troops crossing the canal. The Israelis say flatly they will not compromise on this. Can you give us some indication of where you see the compromise developing?

*Secretary Rogers:* No, I can't, Mr. Sherman, for the reasons that I've mentioned. Obviously both sides say they are not going to compromise. If they say they are going to compromise, that would undercut their position. So in any negotiation, whether it's this or the Berlin talks, or even a labor negotiation, both sides say, "We won't make any further concessions." All I'm saying is that based on our discussions, we think, given the good will and good intentions of both nations, that an interim agreement is possible.

*Mr. Kalb:* Mr. Secretary, getting back to these security guarantees for Israel, the topic anyway,

there was a story that was published earlier last week, and it was not only not denied by U.S. officials, but it was basically confirmed, that there have been discussions of security arrangements with Israel that—I believe Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs], when he was in Israel during the summer, discussed some of these arrangements. What form would they take, if it would not take the form of some kind of congressional resolution or something more formal than the ad hoc arrangement that now exists?

*Secretary Rogers:* Mr. Kalb, one of the reasons that it's necessary to have quiet diplomacy is because every answer that you make to one question relates to another question. Now, what the form of guarantee would take would depend upon what kind of arrangement was made. Obviously if Israel makes an interim agreement, to some extent its military position is changed. Now, if it has changed as a result of that interim agreement to its detriment, then some provision would have to be made to reassure Israel that its security was not impaired as a result of that agreement, and we are prepared to consider that, but we are absolutely convinced that it is vital to the peace in the area and to peace in the world, for that matter, to work out this problem, and we don't think the time has ever been more favorable than now. Everyone accepts the idea that the cease-fire has been very fortunate, everyone accepts the idea that there should be an interim agreement—this was President Sadat's idea—now it's a matter of working out the terms and conditions so that it's clear to Egypt that this is not a final step, that this is merely a step toward an overall settlement under the Security Council resolution, and to satisfy Israel that its security is not in peril.

*Mr. Herman:* Do you take President Sadat's deadline at the end of this year seriously? Do you think that's hard and fast?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I take what President Sadat says seriously. I think he very much wants to do the things that he can do to bring about an interim settlement. I think he wants to create a sense of urgency, and that's understandable. I naturally dislike any threats

about renewed hostilities. I think it's of great importance that all parties, as much as possible, desist from statements that make the situation even more tense.

## 202

### **Statements of Soviet Support for the Arab Cause and for a Political Settlement in the Middle East Based on Implementation of U.N. Resolution 242, Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Arab Territories and Respect for the Rights of the Palestinians, Made by U.S.S.R. President Podgorny at a Luncheon in Honor of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, October 12, 1971**

... The current visit to the Soviet Union by President Anwar Sadat, who is known in our country as a close comrade-in-arms and follower of that outstanding son of the Arab people, Gamal Abdel Nasser, can be regarded with good reason as a continuation of this fine tradition and as an important new step in the further development of relations between our countries.

The visit that began yesterday is a new manifestation of the strengthening mutual trust and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt in the common struggle against imperialism, in support of the peoples that are acting for the implementation of their right to independent development and advancement along the lines of social progress and in the struggle for the consolidation of peace and international security. . . .

Having suffered a defeat in the implementation of their plans for the military destruction of the progressive regimes in the Near East, Israel and the U.S.A., which backs it, are exerting efforts aimed at taking advantage of the factor of Israel's occupation of substantial Arab territories to exert influence on the domestic political situation in the Arab countries.

With the aim of exerting undisguised pressure on the foreign and domestic policy of the leading Arab states, every means is being used—the expansionist policy of Israel, its endeavor to frustrate a just political settlement in this region, the actions of domestic reaction, and the intrigues of pro-imperialist circles aimed at undermining the unity of the ranks of the Arab peoples in the struggle against the common enemy. The anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign that is being whipped up by the imperialists and their agents also pursues these aims, which are alien to the Arab peoples. The organizers of this campaign would like to split the ranks of the revolutionary Arab fighter-patriots and incite quarrels between the Arab countries and their most loyal friends and allies in the struggle for freedom and social progress and against international imperialism and Zionism—the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist commonwealth.

However, the Arab peoples, made wise by the experience of the national-liberation struggle, know very well who is their ally in this struggle and who is their enemy, and they will not let themselves be fooled. Evidence of this is provided by the mounting rebuff to the subversive, hostile actions of reaction and the intensified desire of the Arab peoples for the cohesion and unification of their ranks. Waging an intense struggle against the aggressive aspirations of Israel, which enjoys comprehensive support and assistance from the United States of America, the Egyptian people, as the leaders of the A.R.E. have declared repeatedly, are upholding above all their fundamental interests, the honor and dignity of their country and the possibility of advancing along the path of the implementation of major social and economic transformations. Consistently pur-

<sup>1</sup> Condensed and translated from the Russian text (*Pravda*, October 13, 1971) of Podgorny's speech, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 41 (November 9, 1971), pp. 5-6. Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

suings a course, outlined under G.A. Nasser, aimed at transforming Egypt into a developed modern state and at the reconstruction of the life of Egyptian society along socialist lines, the people of the Arab Republic of Egypt are striving for the buildup of the country's economic potential and the strengthening of its defense capability.

It is this time-tested course that creates reliable preconditions for the victory of the Egyptian people and facilitates the strengthening of Egypt's leading position in the Arab world. The success of the struggle depends to a decisive degree on the cohesion, perseverance, persistence, courage and steadfastness of the entire Egyptian people.

I want to express the profound conviction that the A.R.E.'s people will successfully accomplish the important tasks confronting them. The sympathy and support of Soviet people are wholly on the side of our Arab friends.

The constructive initiative-taking position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, a position aimed at the earliest possible achievement of a political settlement of the Near East conflict, is also very important in the implementation of these tasks. This position is highly appreciated by the peace-loving states and by all peoples and has their approval and support. Their demand that an end be put to the aggressive policy of Israel and the American imperialist circles backing Israel, a policy that is dragging out the settlement of the Near East crisis, is being heard more loudly and more insistently.

In greeting our Arab friends today, we reaffirm the Soviet Union's principled standpoint on a Near East settlement. We Soviet people steadfastly believe that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories they occupied in 1967, the complete fulfillment of the well-known Security Council resolution and respect for the legitimate rights of all the peoples of the Near East, including the Arab people of Palestine, is the only possible realistic program for the establishment of a lasting and just peace in this area.

We state most definitely that the Soviet Union will continue consistently and firmly

to support the rightful cause of the Arab peoples and will continue to promote, both within the framework of the United Nations and outside it, the cause of a just political settlement in the Near East. As long as the Israeli aggression against the Arab states does not cease and its consequences are not eliminated, we shall continue to combine active efforts aimed at a political settlement of the conflict with the adoption of energetic measures to give assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt and other friendly Arab countries in the further strengthening of their defense capability. This is the immutable position of our Communist Party, the Soviet state and the entire Soviet people.

Dear friends! Actively and persistently pursuing the Leninist foreign-policy course, which received further development at the 24th Congress of our Leninist party, we attach extremely great importance to the cohesion of all anti-imperialist forces. There is no doubt that the unity of action of all fighters against imperialism will help in the swifter eradication from international relations of such phenomena as colonialism, racism, aggression and war.

In this connection, we note with great satisfaction that relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt are becoming increasingly deeper and richer in content. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between our countries is striking evidence of this—this fact is recognized by the entire progressive world public. . . .

The talks that began today between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt will no doubt strengthen still more our comprehensive cooperation, which is conditioned by the identity of our goals and interests in the anti-imperialist struggle, and will consolidate the indestructible friendship of the Soviet and Egyptian peoples.

. . . . .



## 203

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of President Sadat of Egypt (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>****Moscow, October 13, 1971**

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, Mohammed Anwar Sadat, stayed in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit from October 11 to 13, 1971, at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government. He was given a hospitable and cordial reception by the leaders and people of the Soviet Union.

The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the successful development of relations of friendship and close cooperation between the two countries in all fields and also stated their determination to further strengthen and broaden them, which is facilitated by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab republic of Egypt of May 27, 1971, that laid a sound foundation for the future strengthening of these relations.

During the negotiations the two Sides reaffirmed a coincidence of their viewpoints in appraising the present tense situation in the Middle East. They again stressed that the main factor behind the continued dangerous situation in the area is the expansionist policy of Israel which has the all-round support of the United States.

The two Sides stated that by pointedly ignoring the UN Charter, the decisions of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, and the generally recognized standards of international law, Israel challenges

world public opinion, creates a danger to world peace, continues its delay tactics, raises obstacles to a peaceful settlement, and is thus clearly trying to drag out the Middle East crisis. In doing so the Government of Israel relies on extensive financial and military aid from the United States.

The Soviet Side has noted with satisfaction that the constructive position of Egypt with regard to a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis and its clearly expressed desire to reach, through the mediation of the special representative of the UN Secretary General Gunnar Jarring, an agreement on a fair settlement, on the basis of the fulfilment of all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and a pull-back by Israel to the lines of June 4, 1967, have the support of all peace-loving states and peoples.

The two Sides have noted that Egypt's firm position with regard to the provocations of imperialism and Zionism and its determination to get Israel to pull out from all Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967, are a good barrier to the implementation of plans directed against the legitimate interests of the Arabs.

On behalf of the Government and the people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President A. Sadat expressed sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for its great assistance and constant support of Egypt, support on which it can rely in its struggle against Israel and the imperialist forces backing it.

The Soviet Side reaffirmed that the Soviet Union would continue to give Egypt and other Arab countries all-round assistance and support in their just struggle against imperialist Israeli aggression.

The two Sides expressed deep conviction that a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East can be established only on the basis of the fulfilment of all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, in accordance with the principle of illegality of the seizure of territories through war, and ensurance of the legitimate rights and interests of all countries of this area, including the Arab people of Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text of the communiqué (*Pravda*, October 14, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 43 (October 23, 1971), pp. 4, 4-5, 5-6, 6.

Taking into consideration the dangerous situation that has been created in the Middle East as a result of the aggressive policy of Israel, the two Sides exchanged views on further joint steps in the struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israel's aggression and ensure a fair peace and security in this area. They agreed specifically on measures aimed at further strengthening the military might of Egypt.

President Anwar Sadat highly appraised the great assistance given to the Arab peoples and states by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He expressed the hope that the foundations of friendship and co-operation between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union would grow stronger in the name of the fulfilment of the aspirations of the Arab peoples for liberation, in the name of their national interests and the strengthening of their anti-imperialist position.

In this connection it was stressed that the attempts to spread anti-communism and anti-Sovietism are designed exclusively to split the ranks of the Arab revolutionary fighters. These attempts are also aimed at disrupting the solidarity and cooperation between the Arab peoples and their true friends, the countries of the socialist community. Therefore, the two Sides strongly condemn anti-communism and anti-Sovietism as detrimental to the peoples' urge for liberation and their national interests, and as serving only the interests of the international imperialist forces.

President A. Sadat informed the Soviet leaders of the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, stressing that its main aim is to pool the efforts of states, members of the Federation, in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism, against imperialist presence in the area and for overcoming political, economic and social backwardness.

The leaders of the Soviet Union stressed the need for strengthening the unity of the Arabs in the struggle against the common enemy—imperialism and Zionism—and expressed the hope that the Federation will fulfil the aspirations of the Arab peoples and become

the bulwark of unity of all the truly progressive forces of the Arab world, and facilitate the rallying of Arab ranks and their cohesion in the anti-imperialist struggle.

The two Sides have stressed the importance of regular contacts and consultations between the leaders of the Soviet Union and Egypt in accordance with the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and regard these contacts and consultations as an important factor in further strengthening their bilateral relations and in establishing a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East.

## 204

### **Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of Talks Held by Delegations Representing the Communist Party of Italy and the National Liberation Front of Algeria (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Rome, October 14, 1971**

Important talks were held in Rome October 12–14, 1971 between the Algerian National Front Party and the Italian Communist Party.

In the Middle East in particular, constant aggression by imperialism and its advance base "Israel," against the Arab countries

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), October 20, 1971. A joint communiqué, issued in Algiers on May 18, 1971 and published in *al-Shaab*, May 19, 1971, on the occasion of a visit to Algeria of an Italian Communist Party delegation, made many of the same points. In early December a delegation from the Baath Party of Syria held talks with Italian Communist Party representatives in Rome; the resulting communiqué, issued on December 6 (see *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 9, 1971) contains no points not included in the above text.

and, in particular, against the Palestinian people, has recently given rise to developments which give grounds for alarm, as regards both their character and their orientation, while the bloody efforts to crush the Palestine Resistance and the anti-progressive attitudes that have made their appearance in various Arab countries provide evidence of a policy that is a danger to the interests of the Arab peoples and the unity of forces which are really anti-imperialist.

Moreover, the unity, resolution and struggle of the anti-imperialist forces are today indispensable conditions for the support and promotion of national liberation movements, and the Liberation Front Party and the Italian Communist Party announce their support for the Palestinian people in their efforts to achieve their full national rights. They affirm that the Palestinian people alone have the right to choose the goals, the forms and the methods of their struggle, and they undertake to strengthen their solidarity, and to expand their aid to the Palestinian people and the members of the Palestine Resistance and to all the Arab peoples who are struggling to put an end to Israeli aggression and to secure the immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of the aggressor forces from the occupied Arab territories.

The two Parties also affirm that the achievement of these goals, and in particular the recovery by the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights within the framework of the idea of establishing a democratic state open to all the inhabitants of Palestine without racial or religious discrimination, and the liberation of all the occupied territories, can alone ensure peace and strengthen the progressive forces in this area.

## 205

### **Draft Resolution Introduced Before the U.S. Senate Calling for Renewed American Shipments of Phantom Aircraft to Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, October 15, 1971**

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 177

Calling for the shipment of Phantom F-4 aircraft to Israel in order to maintain the arms balance in the Middle East.

Whereas the Soviet Union is continuing to supply additional sophisticated weapons including advanced jet aircraft, and has deployed combat pilots, and other military personnel in Egypt, and other Arab States; and

Whereas these actions have seriously affected the military balance in the Middle East and increase the danger of war; and

Whereas the aforementioned developments have encouraged certain Arab States to resist peace negotiations and to threaten the resumption of war; and

Whereas this constitutes a grave threat to peace in the Middle East, prejudicial to the vital interests of the United States; and

Whereas the policy of the United States as expressed by the President and the Congress of the United States is to maintain the arms balance in this region: Therefore be it

*Resolved, That—*

(1) The United States without further delay should take affirmative action on Israel's pending request for F-4 Phantom aircraft, and provide such supporting equipment and assistance as are essential to maintain Israel's deterrent capability;

(2) The United States Government should oppose any attempts at the United Nations to alter the meaning and effect of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and should reaffirm the importance of secure and defensible borders as a vital

<sup>1</sup> Text of proposed Senate Resolution 177, *Congressional Record*, October 15, 1971, p. 36369; see also *Congressional Record*, November 23, 1971, p. 42881.

element in a peace settlement to be negotiated by the parties themselves.

## 206

**Interview Statements by Foreign Minister López Bravo of Spain, Expressing Spain's Belief in the Necessity for a Mediterranean Area Freed from Foreign Presences and Reiterating Spanish Support for U.N. Resolution 242 As a Basis for a Settlement in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

October 18, 1971

*Q. The always complex problem of the Mediterranean has become even more complicated with the entry on the scene of two factors as extraneous to the Mediterranean as the fleets of the United States and the Soviet Union, and with the persistence of a conflict as threatening as that in the Middle East. Much has been said about the possibility of a Mediterranean pact, with aims not specifically military, which would strengthen and develop the bonds linking the coastal nations, affording them an acknowledged—and today all but nonexistent—participation in the resolution of their own affairs. What is the way to attain this cooperation? Does Your Excellency believe the realization of the aforementioned pact to be timely and feasible?*

*A.* In effect, it is objectively an anomalous state of affairs that the coastal nations of the Mediterranean are all but excluded from the politico-military decisions which affect them. The anomaly is even greater when one appreciates the situation created by the convergence of elements foreign to the majority of the countries in the area, like the presence of the fleets which you mentioned and the conflict in the Middle East.

The phases of a possible solution would be, roughly: a prior alignment of points of view, an increase in regional cooperation in all

possible fields, and a stabilization of the present arms situation tending to a subsequent reduction in favor of the Mediterranean states. The benefits of this can be reaped only with the active participation of the coastal nations in the decisions which affect this region.

*Q. It is possible that the Arab-Israeli conflict would never have become established in its present gravity if the successive resolutions of the United Nations had been complied with at the time. Now, it hangs on the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. Does Your Excellency see any prospect—and by means of what formula—to resolve a conflict like this one which so acutely threatens the general peace?*

*A.* In effect, if the U.N. resolutions were strictly complied with, situations of international conflict would have diminished, deflected into channels which are more peaceful and with better prospects of solution. In the specific instance of the Near East problem, Spain has always insisted on the basic necessity for compliance with Security Council Resolution 242 as a point of departure for a final settlement. The present situation is delicate and complicated; however, we have hopes that the cease-fire and a calmer view of the eventual consequences of a resumption of the conflict will contribute positively to bringing about negotiations which will comprehensively resolve the problem.

## 207

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Egypt of President Tito of Yugoslavia<sup>2</sup>**

Cairo, October 21, 1971

In response to an invitation from President Anwar el Sadat, the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, with his wife and the delegation accompanying him, paid a visit to the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Spanish text of López Bravo's replies to questions put to him by Pèdro Gomez Aparicio, as transmitted, on request, by the Embassy of Spain in Beirut from the Diplomatic Information Office of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> English text of the communiqué, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 518 (November 5, 1971), p. 17.

Arab Republic of Egypt on October 20 and 21, 1971, during his return trip from Iran and India.

On this occasion, Presidents Tito and Sadat held talks that were imbued with the usual atmosphere of cordial friendship and full understanding. They discussed developments in the Middle East and the significance of the policies and role of non-aligned countries in the world and also gave consideration to current international problems of interest to both sides.

The Presidents acquainted each other with the talks they had conducted recently with various world leaders.

During the exchange of views, the two Presidents attached great significance to the struggle of the non-aligned to preserve peace, to achieve equality, international cooperation, and economic development and to oppose imperialist occupation, racism and all forms of domination.

It was with satisfaction that the two Presidents observed the results that had been achieved at the meeting of the non-aligned held in New York in October 1971. They voiced their complete faith in the importance of the non-aligned concentrating all efforts on realization of the lofty goals which these countries have set themselves.

President Sadat informed President Tito of the situation in the Middle East and the attitude of the Arab Republic of Egypt toward the crisis.

President Tito fully upholds the efforts being invested by the Arab Republic of Egypt in achieving a just and lasting solution to the Middle East crisis in line with Security Council Resolution No. 242. The achievement of such a just and lasting solution would require the removal of all the consequences of Israeli aggression and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied after June 4, 1967, and the restoration of their rights to the Palestinian people.

President Anwar el Sadat, speaking in the name of the people and Government of Egypt, expressed his profound respect for the unwavering support extended by President Tito to the stance of Egypt in its struggle against Israeli aggression.

The two presidents noted with satisfaction the fruitful development of firm, friendly and cordial relations and comprehensive cooperation between their two countries and energetically expressed the wish for even greater efforts to be invested in consolidating these ties.

President Josip Broz Tito extended an invitation to visit Yugoslavia to Anwar el Sadat. The invitation was accepted and the date of the visit will be established later.

## 208

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Saudi Arabia of President Ould Daddah of Mauritania (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Riyadh, October 23, 1971**

His Excellency President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, President of the Mauritanian Islamic Republic, paid a visit to Saudi Arabia in response to the invitation of his brother, His Majesty King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, from *Sha'ban* 27 to *Ramadan* 2, 1391 A.H. (October 17–21, 1971 A.D.).

The two sides expressed their zeal for action to liberate Arab territory from the clutches of Zionism, to recover the holy places and to stand by the Palestinian people until they recover their usurped rights.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), October 24, 1971.

## 209

**Statements by President Pompidou of France Calling for the Reactivation of the Big Four Meetings on the Middle East Conflict, Expressing Reservations on an Interim Settlement, and Calling for a Solution Based on Secure and Recognized Borders Not Based on Annexation of Territory<sup>1</sup>**

Versailles, October 25, 1971

... There is another conflict which has lasted more than four years and which, if it should go on, will end by posing evident dangers to world peace; I mean the conflict in the Middle East. France has clearly expressed her position and remains firmly attached to the provisions—to all the provisions—of Security Council Resolution 242.

In the quest for a solution, we have, both of us, within the framework of the consultations among the four permanent members of the Security Council, established that our concepts are close and, on important points, identical. But, to my sorrow, I see that the activity of the Four has noticeably slowed down and that Ambassador Jarring's mission is deadlocked.

If the effort carried out alone by the United States government, an effort which we are not trying to oppose and which it seems to us you are not opposing either, should allow what is referred to as an "interim settlement" to be accepted by the parties concerned, we should be delighted. But we persist in thinking that such a settlement will ultimately only lead to a new conflict if it is not clearly seen to be the beginning of a comprehensive settlement conforming to the Security Council resolution and permitting all the nations of the region to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, excluding all territorial annexation; this is why we are convinced that

the time will come for the Four to reactivate their consultations in order to facilitate and guarantee a just and final solution.

## 210

**Statements Made to the Knesset by Premier Meir of Israel Criticizing the U.S. Proposals for an Interim Suez Settlement and Asking for Additional Aircraft from the U.S.<sup>2</sup>**

Jerusalem, October 26, 1971

Knesset members, unfortunately I must point out that since March worrying changes have taken place in the US approach to several of the clauses in the Canal settlement, and there is a danger that Egypt may see this as encouragement for its intransigent attitude. This in turn might make the very agreement itself fail to materialise.

From the first discussion on the settlement to open the Canal, in which we took into account a certain withdrawal of our forces from the waterline, we made it clear that we were willing to consider a move by the Israel Defence Forces on condition that this was made dependent on an Egyptian agreement to refrain from resuming hostilities—in other words, that the cease-fire was unlimited. I am sorry to say that US representatives have recently been publicly saying things which the Egyptians could interpret as a move towards their attitude on this vital point. In all our contacts with the State Department, we have stressed that the United States must refrain from making its own proposals, lest its role in offering its good offices is adversely affected. Any deviation from the offer of good offices, even deliberately, might bring about a crisis and harm the chances of negotiation.

<sup>1</sup> Statements on the Middle East excerpted and translated from the French text of Pompidou's remarks at a dinner given in honor of visiting Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Brezhnev, *Le Monde*, October 27, 1971, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpts from Meir's Knesset speech broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3824/A/1 and A/2; reprinted by permission.

## 211

I can say quite confidently that anyone who wants the Suez Canal open to navigation, anyone who wants any de-escalation which would prevent a resumption of firing, anyone who wants the creation of an atmosphere enabling a resumption of negotiations for peace, anyone wanting progress towards an overall settlement, must admit that our proposal of 19th April contains the conditions to achieve these objectives. But anyone hoping to achieve objectives not directly connected with the settlement to open the Canal, objectives aiming at endangering Israel's security, hopes in vain.

The stoppage of the supply of aircraft to Israel undermines the arms balance in the area and there is no doubt that it encourages the Egyptian leaders to violate the cease-fire and embark on a military offensive against Israel, if Israel does not agree to accept their dictates. But we cannot ignore the political significance of the supplying of aircraft. Egypt is liable to interpret this as a response to its demand. Israel vehemently rejects an attitude which makes the supply of vital defence needs conditional on any other matter, whether the conditions are made directly or indirectly. Israel's right to have its defence needs met cannot be made conditional on other matters which are part of the discussions between the United States and Israel or between the United States and Egypt. The Israeli Government appeals to the US Government to allow it to acquire the aircraft which are vital to its security.

## **U.S. House of Representatives Proposed Resolution Calling for the Resumption of Shipments of U.S. Phantom Aircraft to Israel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1971

H. RES. 666

Calling for the shipment of Phantom F-4 aircraft to Israel in order to maintain the arms balance in the Middle East

Whereas, the Soviet Union is continuing to supply additional sophisticated weapons including advanced jet aircraft, and has deployed combat pilots, and other military personnel in Egypt, and other Arab states;

Whereas, these actions have seriously affected the military balance in the Middle East and increase the danger of war; and

Whereas, the aforementioned developments have encouraged certain Arab states to resist peace negotiations and to threaten the resumption of war;

Whereas, this constitutes a grave threat to peace in the Middle East, prejudicial to the vital interests of the United States;

Whereas, the policy of the United States as expressed by the President and the Congress of the U.S. is to maintain the arms balance in this region;

Resolved by the House, that

(1) The United States without further delay should take affirmative action on Israel's pending request for F-4 Phantom aircraft, and provide such supporting equipment and assistance as are essential to maintain Israel's deterrent capability;

(2) The United States Government should oppose any attempts at the United Nations to alter the meaning and effect of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and should reaffirm the importance of secure and defensible borders as a vital element in a peace settlement to be negotiated by the parties themselves.

<sup>1</sup> A series of resolutions providing for military aircraft for Israel were introduced in the House on October 27 and November 1, 1971; see *Congressional Record* (1971), pp. 37856-37857, 38568.

## 212

# Statement by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel Commenting on the Price and the Objectives of Israel's War with the Arabs<sup>1</sup>

October 29, 1971

The objective of the war, in my evaluation, is rooted deep in the hearts of thousands of Jews. The prospect that the United States and the USSR will reach a joint formula does not frighten me. I do not fear pressures which could be exerted on us, but I fear a collapse in the will of the Jews in Israel to withstand the price of war and faith in the objective of the war. I fully believe that we can and are ready to pay the price of the war with money and otherwise. We are able to pay the price.

The objective of this war is to give us three things: a new map, new relations with the Arabs, and a new position in the region and in the world.

The danger is first of all that if the Arabs and the Russians succeed and break us, subdue us and defeat us, we shall lose our position, lose our right, and disappear from the map.

The problem will not end even if we go back to the green line. There is the Palestine problem, as it is called.

But I am not thinking at all in terms of losses, of what would happen if we had to withdraw and the losses involved. I believe, I assume and I am confident that we can achieve these things despite clamour and pressure.

## 213

# Statement on the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of a Palestine Liberation Organization Delegation (Condensed)<sup>2</sup>

Moscow, October 30, 1971

At the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation headed by Yassir Arafat, Chairman of the organization's Executive Committee, was in the Soviet Union from Oct. 20 to 29, 1971 . . . .

In Moscow there were talks between the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation and the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The P.L.O. delegation spoke of the courageous resistance of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and of the Palestinian patriots' firm resolve to counter the intrigues of imperialist circles and their accomplices aimed at liquidating the Palestinian people's struggle.

On behalf of the struggling people of Palestine, the delegation expressed its gratitude to the C.P.S.U., to the Soviet government and to the entire Soviet people for their support of the Arab peoples' national-liberation movement and their struggle for freedom, independence and progress.

On behalf of the Soviet public, representatives of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee resolutely condemned Israel's continuing imperialist aggression against the Arab peoples, and declared their solidarity with the courageous struggle of the Arab people of Palestine against the Israeli invaders who are trying to paralyze the Palestinian people's struggle for their just and legitimate rights.

It was emphasized that Soviet public opinion resolutely supports the Palestinian

<sup>2</sup> Condensed and translated from the Russian text (*Pravda*, October 30, 1971, p. 5 and *Izvestia*, October 30, 1971 (evening edition), p. 3), *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 44 (November 30, 1971), p. 18; Translation copyright 1971 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from excerpts of Dayan's speech to Israeli Armoured Corps officers broadcast on Israel Forces Radio in Hebrew; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3827/A/4; reprinted by permission.



resistance movement, which is a component part of the Arab peoples' national-liberation movement.

The Palestinian and Soviet sides noted the importance of the unity of all progressive forces of the Arab world and the necessity of further strengthening their alliance with the true friends of the Arab peoples—the countries of the socialist commonwealth. In this connection, emphasis was laid on the danger of the attempts to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship, to split the ranks of the Arab anti-imperialist movement, and to tear it from the common anti-imperialist front. These attempts inflict damage on the Arab peoples' liberation aspirations and national interests and serve only the interests of international imperialist and Zionist circles.

The talks proceeded in a friendly atmosphere.

## 214

### **Radio Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel Criticizing U.S. Secretary of State Rogers' Proposals for an Interim Suez Settlement and Commenting on Other Aspects of U.S.-Israel Relations<sup>1</sup>**

October 30, 1971

*Q. Mr. Foreign Minister, do you feel that there is a crisis in Israeli-US relations?*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Eban's interview conducted by Gideon Levarie, broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation of condensed text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3828/A/5-A/8; reprinted by permission.

Eban gave a second interview on the same topic to Radio Israel in English on the same date (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3828/A/10-A/12) in which no additional points were made. Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin also discussed the subject of U.S.-Israel relations in a radio interview on Israel Home Service in Hebrew on October 9, 1971 (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3810/A/4-A/6 for English text).

A. No, I should not use this term for a simple reason: the United States is the best friend Israel has ever had. It is the country which is helping us to ensure our defence capability, maintain our economic position and the basic principle of our policy of no withdrawal without peace and no peace except through agreement. As long as these moves continue, there can be an argument—and sometimes a strong argument—with the United States but this would not include such words as “confrontation”, “crisis” or “rift” regarding such relations. . . .

*Q. Is the suspension of the supply of Phantoms the main part of the US pressure on us?*

A. I cannot say what is the motive that kept the US Government from renewing the supply, but I have ceased to believe that the reason is that the Americans have not been convinced that the balance of arms justifies the shipment of arms. In other words, if it can be assumed—and I have the right to assume it in the light of what I have seen and heard—that this situation of non-resumption is linked with political moves, then definitely one can say that this is political pressure. After the lapse of some time this tone of “the matter is under consideration” ceases to be convincing. I was compelled to tell my interlocutors that for a certain time this tone was fair and reasonable but that after weeks and months it became clear that the reason for the lack of reply was not lack of information about the balance of arms, and consequently there was no doubt that this matter was linked with all kinds of considerations.

On the other hand, the United States contends that it does not link the balancing of arms with any political problem. This is the complication, and precisely because of this complication and ambiguity it was justifiable for us to say that if we are to go into a new and important round of political clarifications we ought to know where we stand.

*Q. Mr. Foreign Minister, do you know of a decision by the State Department or any other branch of the American Administration to lift the ban on the supply of the Phantoms?*

A. No. What has happened is that, following my last talk with Mr. Rogers, the Secretary of State said that a new study would take place, and since the situation then was one of complete deadlock we could not but welcome this announcement with reservation. In other words, if the intention is to take this issue out of the deadlock then it is welcome . . . . However, this announcement becomes fraud if some time passes without anything being done in its wake.

*Q. In that case would you assume that it was perhaps said to gain time?*

A. I assume that one of the motives which prompted the Secretary of State was the great public interest in both Israel and the United States. Public opinion in the free world is interested in this subject, including public opinion in the United States. Hence it was natural for the US Government to consider itself bound to say something . . . . However, I do not know what the United States wants to clarify. All the information is known to those concerned. As regards new information obtained during the last month, I know of only one thing: the announcement in Moscow of the decision to enhance Egypt's military strength. In this connection the Russians and the Egyptians did not use the term of "Egypt's defence ability" or "to defend Egypt" against so-called aggression in order to enhance Egypt's military strength . . . .

*Q. Mr. Eban, do you think that Rogers's six points express the present American policy?*

A. It is not I but rather Mr. Rogers who is authorised to define the American policy. The US Government claims that its policy is to explore the possibility of achieving a settlement, and in order to explore this possibility the US Government defines certain problems and suggests directions in certain lines . . . . I am very sorry that these points have seen the light. In my opinion these points attained excessive weight by their publication.

*Q. Weight out of all proportion?*

A. Beyond what is wise for a government which offers its good offices and which must be

free to raise or drop an idea, but not to espouse any idea. In order to carry out this role the side offering its good offices is permitted to move in the space between the position of Israel and that of Egypt but not to establish a third position . . . .

*Q. When we say that Egyptian troops should not cross the Canal, the Egyptians say that the Egyptian Army with an unlimited number will cross the Canal, and then on the other hand the Americans say it is possible to reach a compromise, then such a compromise will definitely be at our expense. Is it not so?*

A. Yes. Definitely. We oppose the crossing in principle. By using the word compromise the United States is turning the problem from one of principle and quality into one of quantity. Israel is opposed in principle to the very establishment of any Egyptian position on the eastern side of the Canal within a partial settlement.

*Q. And we cannot agree to that?*

A. We cannot agree to that. This is one of the mainstays of our position. I think that here we have great support and understanding in the world and it is difficult for the United States to turn this into a serious (? claim) against us when we are now saying what the United States actually said a few months ago.

*Q. Mr. Eban, are there minimum conditions without prior agreement on which we shall not go to talks under Sisoo's mediation?*

A. We have not decided not to go. We have not decided to send delegates. Our position in principle is that negotiations were held on 19th April; there was a statement and this statement has not been cancelled. The statement says that we definitely want to examine this matter, but I have every right and even a duty to use my own words which are: Before embarking on an important political move we should examine patiently and thoroughly the circumstances accompanying such a move to ensure that the move has a chance of success.

*Q. What process is US foreign policy undergoing at present with regard to the Middle East?*

A. In my contacts of few weeks ago, I discerned a change. There is a vigorous transformation from the concept of a total peace settlement. The impression now is that it is impossible to achieve peace in one surge and that one should be content with one stage which will be followed by other stages. Hence, the United States is not making any effort to renew the Jarring mission and I have the impression that the United States feels that if it is impossible to reach such a defined and limited settlement on the Suez, then there is less chance of achieving a total settlement in which all these (? problems) are settled. On the other hand if it is possible to achieve a partial settlement, this would then advance and enhance the progress towards other settlements. This is one change.

I discern also in the world a sign of another change. There is more understanding of our position regarding the negative effect of lack of contact. They do not tell us any more that this is a question of procedure . . . . It has been proved in the past year that there is a close connection between establishing contact and progress towards peace. In this year when the US President is visiting the Chinese capital and when Mr. Brandt received the Nobel Prize for initiating dialogue with Eastern Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, and in any other conflict where the adversaries come into contact there is understanding, our contention is that the Arab refusal to establish contact with us is among the fundamental causes of the deadlock . . . .

*Q. Mr. Foreign Minister, if we say to the Americans that we are not interested in their mediation, in your opinion, would they abandon their efforts?*

A. Yes, definitely. They have been telling us continually that they are using their good offices not because this is necessary for the security and the existence of the United States, but because they feel that they were invited to do so by the two sides. I was told in the most [word indistinct] manner: If you say, or if the Egyptians say, "We do not want the United States to deal with the matter" then the United States will cease to deal immediately. In my last talk with

Secretary of State Rogers he said to me: I have heard of all these reservations. Do you want us to continue at all or are you against the continuation of the good offices? I only had to draw his attention to the Government decision in Jerusalem stating that we wanted to continue to explore this matter.

*Q. At this stage the Egyptians also have not given their agreement to talks under Sisco's auspices.*

A. This is an important point, because there is absolutely no analogy between the situation today and that which we knew a year ago. Then they came to us and said: What are you waiting for? Abd an-Nasir has accepted the US peace initiative and the cease-fire. We said: With all respect to Abd an-Nasir, even in this situation we want to clarify a number of problems. Today they are not coming to us and saying: We have an Egyptian agreement. They are telling us: The Egyptian position is not negative, and we, the Americans, believe it may be possible to influence them.

*Q. Could we not be flung into a situation in which the Arabs and the Russians together with France and the European countries would stand against us—and if you add to that the United States, which is drawing closer to the circle of the friends of Egypt—and then find ourselves facing a broad front whose objective is clear? What would we have to do in such a case?*

A. We should have to do what we have done for four and a half years. This danger is the danger against which we have struggled. This is the significance of the struggle which we began in June 1967. There were moments at that time when the United States and the USSR were much closer to agreement than they are now or have been since then. However, we have always succeeded in (? mobilising) a bloc of countries which, without identifying themselves with us, at least objected to a number of definitions and concepts. They opposed the concept of withdrawal without peace, the concept that it is possible to achieve peace without negotiations, and the concept of armistice lines. They raised the concept of secure and recognised borders. There is no alternative for us but to carry on this struggle. This was the task I engaged

in during the first month of the UN General Assembly session, not only in the general debate, but also in contacts with about 70 Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations. What do we demand of them? Our demand is not that other states identify themselves with a certain Israeli proposal regarding borders. Our demand is humble. We say to them: Recognise our right to discuss the question of borders in negotiations. This is all we want of you....

*Q. Is there, in your opinion, room at the highest level to turn directly now to President Nixon?*

*A.* The decision on which level to work at is a decision which must be discussed through diplomatic contacts rather than over the radio. However, it is known that we occasionally turn to that level.

*Q. And now?*

*A.* Recently there were approaches to that level.

*Q. And in the near future?*

*A.* I imagine that the meetings between our Premier and the US President have always been useful, sometimes from a practical point of view and sometimes from the point of view of bringing the positions of the two sides closer. I therefore do not think that such meetings will not take place in the future. However, from an executive point of view I must say that no agreement or arrangements have yet been made.

## 215

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Cuba of Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Havana, October 30, 1971**

At the invitation of the central committee

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué as published in *Soviet News*, No. 5612 (November 2, 1971), pp. 357, 358.

of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba, Alexei Kosygin, member of the political bureau of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, paid a friendly visit to Cuba from October 26 to 30, 1971. He was given a fraternal and cordial reception by the leaders and people of the Republic of Cuba.

The Soviet and Cuban sides expressed resolute support for the struggle of the Arab peoples for the elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression, for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in June 1967, for the recognition of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the people of Palestine and for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The two sides share the view that achievement of a political settlement of the conflict in the area would help to ease international tension.

## 216

### **Reports by Three U.K. Members of Parliament on Conditions in the Israel-Occupied Gaza Strip<sup>2</sup>**

**London, October, 1971**

CAROL JOHNSON: You will all be aware of the general background in Gaza, against which our visit was seen. First of all there was the appalling indictment of the Israeli authorities which was so well documented

<sup>2</sup> Edited transcripts of reports by Bob Edwards (Labour), Carol Johnson (Labour) and Jock Bruce-Gardyne (Conservative) made, after an investigatory visit to Gaza, to a meeting of the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding held at the House of Commons, as published in *Free Palestine* (London), IV, 12 and V, 1 (December, 1971-January, 1972), pp. 4-5.

in a bulletin which was prepared by the Arab Women's Information Committee and published in April last. And this contained irrefutable facts. Facts about the harassment of the population, about the interminable curfews, about the closing of schools, and generally the creation of such intolerable conditions in Gaza itself, that even some of the Israelis serving there reacted against it, and the policy there had to be modified. But that covered a period of no less than 12 months, and what brought our visit as an important one, was what appeared to be the new hard line policy, being followed by the authorities in regard to the larger camps. As you will be aware, the Gaza Strip contains no less than nine refugee camps.

The Israeli authorities, in order to cope with the elements in the resistance movement, which was still strong and operating in the Gaza Strip, decided to increase their security arrangements, by a drastic reduction in the number of those camps, and this they achieved by the simple method of bulldozing down the length of the camp two rows of houses, and displacing a large number of people, mostly women and children. We did have figures given to us while we were there, but since our return some more up-to-date figures have been supplied through UNRWA and therefore, I think, cannot be challenged. And the position is that no less than 4,000 rooms built by the agency or with its assistance have been demolished, and in addition it is estimated that another 2,000 privately built rooms have been demolished. In all, about 15,000 persons have been displaced. And this was despite the very urgent request by the agency itself that this destruction should be stopped, and the removal of refugees beyond the agency's area of operation discontinued. And it is rather interesting indeed that so ruthless were the Israeli authorities that they even demolished no less than 70 dwellings belonging to staff employed by the agency. Now this, of course, is in complete breach of international conventions, not only specific resolutions at the General Assembly but also of the Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians.

We could get no concrete information at

all as to where those new built homes will be built, as to who will be responsible for them, where the money will come from and when they will be available.

It's not surprising that we were given certain assurances about the very humane way in which this operation was being carried out. We were told that the refugees were given as long a notice as possible from 24 to 36 hours, that they were given an option as to where they went if they were displaced, they could go to the West Bank, they could find accommodation with relatives or friends in the Gaza Strip, or they could go down to El Arish to find shelter and friends there. And that they would be paid compensation for the improvements they had effected to their dwellings. But of course when we went to El Arish, when we discussed matters with the refugees who had been affected, we got a very different story. In some cases notice of removal had been given at 9 o'clock in the evening and the transfer had been effected at dawn next day, that they had been given no option as to where they could go, their belongings had been put on lorries, they had been driven off they knew not where, and eventually they were taken to El Arish.

Now, this is an important point to appreciation that El Arish is still technically in Egyptian territory. But not only were UNRWA homes being destroyed, but there is the fact that refugees, the responsibility of UNRWA, were being taken out of the area of responsibility for UNRWA and it was doubtful indeed whether in fact UNRWA can continue not merely the provision of food, but also education and medical service and the like on which the refugees had been relying for so long.

And as for compensation, it is true that compensation had been paid in some cases, but this was of very small sums, in our money roughly £25 to £30, and the supplies of UNRWA no longer being available the refugees were using up this compensation and their own savings just to live. And although we had been told at an earlier stage that there was work available for them at El Arish, only one of the refugees we met

there had been able to find work, and that was manual work of a character which was quite unsuitable for many of the other refugees who had been taken there. And this seems to be a serious situation. It has been reported, of course, by the UNRWA Commissioner, but this is really a matter which ought to attract a good deal of public attention so that it cannot be allowed to continue.

Now, there are one or two special matters which I would also like to comment upon. We have tended to think of and considered the Gaza Strip merely in relation to the refugees, because out of a population of nearly 400,000, some 300,000 of them are of course refugees, but there is a large and substantial what I might call resident population and they too have been equally affected by the activities of the military, particularly in regard to the curfews. But not only that, rather wider ranging and deeper effects have been caused to them.

First of all, of course, their economic lives have been disrupted. A great deal of their wealth derives from the citrus crop which I am told is excellent in this part of the area, but they have been forced to sell their product through the Israeli Council at much reduced prices. Then again they have little or no say in the government of the country. There was in the old days a very responsible and very respectable town council.

Then another matter which concerned me while I was there was the treatment of offenders taken in by the army authorities. It's happening all the time. It's very worrying, I think, to us in this country to be told that no prisoner is allowed access to a lawyer or relative or a friend until at least a month has elapsed from the time he was taken in. That one lawyer who acted in many cases assured me that he had not seen any prisoner who still retained some marks of physical assault and that with almost sickening regularity there was always a confession available at the trial. And I would like some of our lawyer groups in this country who are very concerned about justice operating throughout the world to interest themselves in what is happening in the Gaza Strip.

Now, despite all these conditions, what

impressed me more than anything else was the calm and measured and reasonable way in which the Arabs there discuss their problem with you. One would have thought that their grievances would be so great that they would find it impossible to discuss the matter in other than extreme terms. But this was not the situation at all.

JOCK BRUCE-GARDYNE: In the first place I approached the Gaza Strip recognising that this was a military occupation area and I suppose one should start by recognising that conditions in a military occupation area are not likely to be, cannot be expected to be similar to the conditions that one would expect to find in an area under a normal system of civilian government.

The second thing I think that should be said by way of introduction is that while we were certainly lead to understand before we arrived in the Gaza Strip, from the Israeli authorities, that visits by us to the refugee camps would not only be welcome, but that we should visit at our own risk and that the risk was likely to be considerable. But having said that, when in fact, thanks to the good offices of UNRWA, we were able to visit the camps, and visit them of course in total security, subsequently I think it is only fair to say that we did have fairly lengthy and considerate explanations of their point of view from the Israeli officials whom we saw.

To my mind the question that I wanted to try and find an answer for was really simply this. What were the motives behind the decision of the Israelis to demolish a number of the dwellings. We had two somewhat conflicting explanations from the Israelis. One explanation being that this was essentially a matter of security, and the other being that it was a matter of re-settlement of the refugees into smaller units which no longer smacked of a condition of permanent, almost internment, camps.

And from the Palestinians whom we spoke to I think it would be fair to say that we also had two explanations, although these were by no means necessarily contradictory to each other. Those explanations being one that the demolitions were all part of a cam-

paign of harassment to try and in effect bully the Palestinians to disperse from the camps, and the other that it was part of a concerted move to disembarass the Israelis and the whole problem by shifting the refugees, or as many as possible, gradually out of the Gaza Strip into Israeli occupied Sinai with a view to the hope that if eventually Sinai were returned to the Egyptians, then the Palestinian refugees would go with it. So those as it seemed to me were the four alternatives, four explanations—security, re-settlement, harassment or disembarassment.

It did seem to me that the scale of the demolitions was hardly to be reconciled exclusively with the demands of security. As to re-settlement, again it seemed to me that there is a certain amount in the Israeli argument that after almost a whole generation in the camps it really would be desirable that the refugees should be encouraged to live in different surroundings where they were not settled into large camps and largely dependent on UNRWA for their survival, but if re-settlement was the objective I must say I find it a little hard to understand why it is that the demolitions took place quite evidently without any prior provision of the housing which would be required to re-house those whose existing accommodation had been demolished.

As to the alternatives to harassment and disembarassment, I think the Palestinians' anxieties seemed to me very understandable in this respect, particularly when one considers what appears to have been happening on the West Bank. We visited El Arish, where as many of these families who had had their homes in the camps demolished as could be persuaded in one way or another to go, were moved.

Now El Arish is a semi-deserted former Egyptian holiday resort and the families we saw there might just as well really have been dumped down in a ghost town of the American middle west, because El Arish is to a substantial extent a ghost town. And then I think one comes to what to my mind is perhaps the most important question of all. We were assured that this movement of the refugees to El Arish was temporary and

that they would be returned to the Strip as soon as accommodation was available for them.

But what I could not help noticing myself when we were at El Arish was [that] there were several hundred more empty houses standing vacant at El Arish, and one could not help wondering whether those were not to receive their quota of refugees from the Gaza Strip in due course as well. And this is something, it seems to me, that should concern the international community, because one can see the convenience from the point of view of the Israelis of gradually moving the Palestinian refugees in perhaps more and more substantial numbers out of the Strip and into a territory which at some stage perhaps is likely to revert to be part of Egypt.

I really don't see that the international community, given its responsibilities for the Gaza Strip, can turn its back on any such strategy if that is what the Israelis have in their minds. And I would like to feel myself that there was more perhaps continuing interest and information about what precisely is happening since we departed. Sometimes it is said that no news is good news. I wish I could feel more sure than I do that in this case that applies.

BOB EDWARDS: I arrived in Tel Aviv rather late in the evening, and after a long argument with a taxi driver, I persuaded him to take me to Gaza, although he said they won't let you in. I arrived at the Gaza frontier in the dark and I was informed by the military that nobody goes in. There is a curfew after six o'clock.

I said, 'Well, I have two colleagues staying in a hotel not far from here, I'd like to phone them'. I was informed there was no telephone service at all, and that I would have to go to Tel Aviv for the night or to Jerusalem. Well, I'm afraid I'm rather an awkward person and I refused to go. I spent the whole night on the frontier of Gaza with the military. They provided me with a camp bed and they provided me with a meal in the evening, and I spent very many hours until three o'clock in the morning discussing the problems of Gaza and the Middle East with the military commander, his second-in-command and oc-

asionally other young Israeli soldiers who came in to listen to the argument that was going on between us.

And I got a pretty clear idea of the thinking of the military, as far as Gaza and the Middle East situation was concerned, and I must say it was a very mixed viewpoint. The Commander seemed to me a most reasonable man. He thought, like I think and I am sure my two colleagues think also, that the problem of Gaza, although it may seem a small one, will determine ultimately the whole solution of the Middle Eastern problems, and if it was handled sympathetically and humanely by Israel it may very well help them to make their peace with the Arab world. And this was the viewpoint of the Commander.

His second-in-command had no doubts at all. He said, 'We are going to get 50,000 people out of the Gaza Strip as soon as we can'. And another of the soldiers said, 'We are going to develop the shores of Gaza into a great holiday establishment'. And, of course, Gaza, although it is a dreadful place to go to just now, is a very beautiful part of the world. There are miles of golden sands on the Mediterranean coastland which is, I suppose, one of the few parts of the Mediterranean which is unpolluted. So that was the view of another Israeli, a very intelligent young man.

None of them had any idea that they would ever leave the Gaza Strip. As far as they were concerned that territory belonged to Israel, and no force in the world, they insisted, would force them out.

I point this out to you to show you that you can have a good dialogue with the Israelis, an intelligent dialogue, but there are some extreme points of view that really appalled me. There was one young soldier who told me, 'We need a hinterland'. He knew no language but Israeli. It had to be translated to me very carefully, and he said, 'We want a hinterland to Damascus and to Cairo and even further afield to the Persian Gulf'. And I said, 'Well, you know Hitler wanted a hinterland and he thought it would last a thousand years and he slaughtered 6,000,000 Jews and he's been forgotten in the dust of history, and I hope you are not encouraging that kind of fate for your country,

because it's a country of social democracy which I have some considerable sympathy for'.

I spent seven days in the country altogether, doing nothing but visiting refugee camps and hospitals and clinics and colleges and schools and talking a continuous discussion with Israeli people, with Arabs and Palestinians.

I'm appalled, I really am. I have been to many countries in the world that have been in the throes of revolution and war, but I have not seen so much mass misery for many, many years, and really something has to be done to relieve this massive injustice that is being perpetrated against these Arab people and particularly against the people of Palestine.

Before the six day war there were three hundred thousand Arabs living in Israel, in 100 villages. They tilled their farms, they worked on the building sites, the children went to school. From the schools some of them went to universities. They have a great yearning for further education. They lived in peace with the Israeli people; during the six day war they were not involved in any acts of sabotage. They just lived in peace. They wanted to be left alone to live their own lives in their own way. And I am appalled that this factor is not considered as it should be by the Israeli authorities.

Before the six day war, when I talked with members of the Israeli Government, including the Prime Minister, they told me, 'All we want is the recognition of Israel, nothing more'. But that's not true today.

The six day war has created among far too many people in Israel an arrogance that is almost unbelievable. They just say they will not give up any of the occupied territories at all. Well, there is no basis for a solution to the Middle Eastern problem if this view is going to be firmly held for many years to come, because here in the Middle East lands the two great super powers of the world are involved. One in every five Jewish people lives in the Soviet Union and two in every five Jewish people in the world live in the United States of America. And nearly half a million Jewish people live in our country,



and so we are involved in the solution of these problems in Israel and in the Middle Eastern lands. And I am positive if we are going to have peace in the Middle East, if we are going to avoid a tremendous conflict between the two super powers which will automatically involve us, then new ethical human standards have got to be applied to the refugee people in Israel. And only the Israeli Government can do this. But if they are not willing to do it themselves, then some forces ought to be arranged so that the two great powers can help them to make this decision.

I talked with Arabs on the West Bank who tilled the land of Palestine, whose ancestors had tilled land for very many hundreds of years. They were living in appalling conditions, they were offered no compensation whatever, there was no guarantee. The people with whom I discussed these problems can be duplicated a thousand times over, and therefore I repeat what I said before, a massive injustice is being done to literally hundreds of thousands of people who have never been involved in the politics of the Middle East at all. And until these injustices are wiped out I cannot see any peaceful solution of the Middle East, and I think the wiping out of these grave injustices rest only with the Israeli Government.

100,000 people have always lived there, some have lived there for a 1,000 years. Their people have tilled the soil in the Gaza Strip for 1,000 years and some of these people have lost their lands. I live in hope that human and ethical standards will be applied to solve these appalling problems and to help us and to help the world to lay the foundations of some decent lasting solution of the problems of the Middle East.

## 217

### **Statement on Numbers of Palestinian Commandos Imprisoned in Israel, Made to the Knesset by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Jerusalem, November 2, 1971**

From July until October 1971, 37 terrorists

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French translation of Dayan's

were killed and 361 arrested in the territory of Gaza. The others ignored the tracts we distributed demanding that they give themselves up. On the cease-fire lines with Lebanon and with Syria, 37 terrorists were killed between April and the end of October. There are at present 3,687 terrorists detained in Israeli prisons.

## 218

### **Statement Made by President Senghor of Senegal on Behalf of the Organization of African Unity Peace Mission on Its Arrival in Israel<sup>2</sup>**

**Lydda, November 2, 1971**

[Designating the O.A.U. mission as that of a "unanimous Africa" to help restore peace in the Middle East]: We should be modest. We have no ambition to replace the superpowers, nor the big powers. Indeed, we do not have the means to do it. Neither do we intend to substitute ourselves for Dr. Jarring, who has been charged with the mission of peace by the Security Council.

On the contrary, all we want is to help; through a dialogue with both parties to help people of goodwill to find peace. To be precise, the issue is how to apply the resolution of the 22nd of November 1967 in all its parts—without exception.

If we have some advantage, it may be because we share a common destiny with the Jewish and the Arab peoples. For we form, all of us together, a trilogy of suffering peoples. And, because we are suffering nations, we have a message of humanity to transmit to the world. That is why a war among ourselves is inevitably a fratricidal war.

We are sure, Mr. President, that we shall find in you and in your government the confidence and the help which we need to accomplish our mission.

statement as published in *Le Monde*, November 4, 1971, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted English text of Senghor's airport statement as published in the *Jerusalem Post*, November 3, 1971, p. 1.

## 219

**Statement on French Mediterranean and Middle East Policy Made by Foreign Minister Schumann of France in a Speech to the National Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, November 3, 1971

This same wish for a presence without a wish for power also applies to what is called "France's Mediterranean policy." The expression is certainly apt, inasmuch as it reminds us that we are a major Mediterranean power and that this creates responsibility for us. It would be equivocal if our Mediterranean policy were to be interpreted as different from the general principles of our diplomacy, for the opposite is the case. When we say that we want to make the Mediterranean a "lake of peace" again and try—certainly not to exclude the Americans and the Soviets (which would be both absurd and futile)—to arouse in the coastal countries a consciousness of common interests (which is the only way to be sure that our fate is not taken into others' hands) we are simply being faithful to our own established principles and, as you have just said, to the words we use to express them. Last year a distinguished polemicist said to me, in another assembly: "In the Middle East you will never succeed in setting yourselves up as arbitrators or mediators." But we have never dreamed of doing such a thing: the object of our initiatives has always been to support the international community, whose will is expressed in the Security Council resolution which will be four years old in less than three weeks. Will the efforts made by the United States alone make it possible for the conflicting parties to accept an interim agreement? We hope wholeheartedly that they will, just as we hoped for the ceasefire, if only from our abhorrence of bloodshed. But—like Africa, who is sending four Heads of State, with our best wishes, for contacts with the countries concerned—we are afraid that there may be a tendency to accept the *status quo*, which could result in a painful awakening.

## 220

**Statements Supporting Third Party Mediation As a Means for Achieving a Middle East Settlement and Commenting on the Possibility of an Interim Reopening of the Suez Canal, Made in the British Parliament by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home<sup>2</sup>**

London, November 4, 1971

I turn to another region of the world, the Middle East, where confrontation should be replaced by dialogue. The achievement of stability there has so far remained a mirage. We continue to believe, because no one since has suggested anything better, that United Nations Resolution 242 constitutes the best basis for a settlement. It would be a great mistake to tamper with it, for no other resolution would gain comparable support in the United Nations.

When I visited Cairo in September it was my strong impression that Egypt now genuinely desires a permanent peace with Israel, but not at the price of ceding territory. Israel for her part also desires peace, but not at the cost of compromising her security. It is in the reconciliation of this dilemma that the heart of the problem lies. The most promising avenue of progress towards a comprehensive settlement still lies in the efforts to promote an interim arrangement under which the Suez Canal would be reopened in return for Israeli withdrawal to some line in Sinai to be agreed. Both Israel and Egypt are undoubtedly interested in such an arrangement, with the strong proviso made by the Egyptians that the first stage of withdrawal must not be an end in itself; it must lead to a comprehensive and final settlement.

There are limits to what any third Power can do. We will help if and where we can, especially in relation to guarantees by the leading Powers to give confidence in a lasting

*Textes et documents*, 2nd Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1972), p. 188.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of Schumann's speech, *Politique étrangère de la France*:

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted from the Parliamentary debate on the Queen's Address from the Throne, *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 825, November 4, 1971, cols. 348–350, 351.

peace. But one thing was crystal clear to me when I was in Cairo and later talked to Mr. Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel. No progress will be made in solving the problem unless the momentum and intensity of an exchange of views is accelerated. Where distrust is so deep it cannot be removed by leisurely correspondence through a third Power at intervals of months or weeks.

No one can dictate a peace, but the only answer to the present deadlock is, in my view, a third party which can accurately and quickly transmit and interpret ideas between those who confront each other; otherwise there will be no solution. There are signs that this is now recognised to be right and that it is necessary to set up this kind of machinery if there is to be progress and time is not to be wasted, which might make war more likely.

*Mr. Clinton Davis* (Hackney, Central): Do the Government support the idea which has always been postulated by the Israeli Government, that if the Suez Canal is to be reopened it must be made accessible to Israeli shipping as well as other shipping?

*Sir A. Douglas-Home*: That would be one of the conditions which we hope would apply when the canal was open. It would be our feeling that all shipping should be free to use the canal. Confidential contacts are more likely to show results than public postures, but I must emphasise that time slips by and action is urgent if the ceasefire is not to be broken.

*Mr. John Gorst* (Hendon, North): Before my right hon. Friend leaves the Middle East, he has been talking about a third party being able to make a contribution, perhaps as an honest broker, between the Israelis and their Arab neighbours. Will he make it clear whether he sees this country being available for that purpose?

*Sir A. Douglas-Home*: We shall help in every way we can. At the moment, the Americans are in touch with both the Israelis and the Egyptians. The best person to fulfil this rôle, once it was established that there could be an interim settlement, would still be Dr. Jarring,

who is ready to do so. But certainly we shall help if we can. I would not put forward this country as a third party at the moment, but we shall help so far as we are able to.

. . . . .

## 221

### **Radio Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel Commenting on Israeli Policy in Africa and on the Visit to Israel of the Organization of African Unity Peace Mission<sup>1</sup>**

**November 6, 1971**

*Q. Mr. Eban, it seems to me that the atmosphere in Israel on the arrival of the four Presidents was one of much goodwill on our part, suspicion of prejudice because of Egyptian influence, and not much hope that they would indeed get things moving. What is the position on their departure?*

*A. I have never defined my attitude according to the atmosphere you describe. I think that on the departure of the four Presidents a question mark continues to hover over the fate of the mission. As President Senghor has said in his own name and on behalf of his colleagues, this is only a first stage. He and some of his colleagues will return to Israel in the next few days. He heard a very detailed and comprehensive explanation of the Israeli position. He expressed his appreciation of the quality, level and frankness with which our position was defined, but, as I said, the aim of this mission, as explained by President Senghor, is to find out whether there is a possibility of advancing negotiations, and here I quote his words at Lod airport: In the final analysis, he said, what will be the*

<sup>1</sup> Text of first five questions and answers broadcast in an interview with Eban on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3834/A/4 and A/5; reprinted by permission.

Final statement broadcast (on the same day) on Israel in English, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3834/A/5; reprinted by permission.

decisive factor is not the dialogue between the Africans and the sides but rather the negotiations which have to take place between the sides themselves under international auspices. Hence, it is preferable to wait until the second stage ends in order to know the fate of the mission. Israel's position with regard to negotiations has never been complex. The question is to what extent a readiness for dialogue will be manifested in the second stage of the Presidents' mission.

*Q. What are your impressions from the few pronouncements made by the Presidents?*

A. In my opinion it was natural for them to express themselves as they did, because when talking about a serious effort to advance peace it is commended that those who use their good offices should take as few positions as possible. Accordingly I regard their restraint in making announcements as a certificate of respect and seriousness for them.

*Q. In your opinion, has this first visit any significance in the context of relations between Israel and the Organisation of African Unity?*

A. Actually Israel has no links with this organisation but we have links with Africa. We have links with these four states, and with nine of the 10 states whose heads will meet in Dakar.

*Q. But as an organisation it has been very deaf to Israel's case?*

A. We have no special links with this organisation. The organisation has no special standing in the international arena with regard to the Middle East. However, in addition to our relations with the Arab countries [*sic*] there is also specific importance for our relations with all African states separately.

Undoubtedly, Israel's policy in Africa has achieved a number of unexpected results. It was reasonable to assume—and this was the Arab assumption—that Israel would have no place on a continent in which the Arabs and Islam have such weight. Contrary to this expectation Israel's presence in Africa is reflected in 28 diplomatic representations, and this is a sign that the demand that Israel should not be recognised has failed. Also

commerce is expanding in economic and development links, in addition to personnel exchanges. This has an independent value not connected with the disappointments suffered in voting places in which, because of the nature of things, the numerical majority of the Arabs is decisive. Those who contend that because the results of voting are not good we must liquidate the rest are like he who says that since we have a cold we can expose ourselves to tuberculosis and pneumonia. The practical, moral and political links with Africa have a special weight. This consideration made it incumbent upon us to receive the Presidents with all respect and frankness in the dialogue with them. This is in addition to the hope that they may advance negotiations.

*Q. Is it possible that this delegation might replace Sisco's mediation or Jarring's mission?*

A. President Senghor said on behalf of the delegation on his arrival in Israel that the delegation did not intend to serve as a substitute for the great powers or for Dr. Jarring.

[Evaluating the talks with the O.A.U. delegation]: Well, in all his statements President Senghor, on behalf of himself and his colleagues, took a very moderate appraisal of what the mission was trying to do. It is not trying to mediate, according to him; it is not trying to substitute itself for other international peace efforts. It is trying to see whether Africa, by reason of its influence in the Arab world and in Israel, can contribute something to the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations. That is the key word that he used in his parting address at Lydda airport.

I think it is much too early to say what success the mission will have. At any rate the four Presidents and their ministers are equipped with a very detailed knowledge of Israel's attitude on peace and security. They cannot be under any doubt that the major objective of our policy is peace. There's nothing intransigent or inflexible about Israel's basic policies, but, as you know, the difficulty about negotiation has always been

an Arab psychological or political difficulty, not an Israeli one. Therefore I think it would be much too early to say what contribution this mission will be able to make to the cause which it is designed to serve, but all of us were (? certainly impressed) by the seriousness, the gravity and the sincerity with which the four Heads of State are approaching their task. . . .

## 222

**Israeli Press Interview with World Jewish Congress President Goldmann Expressing Optimism As to the Chances for a Middle East Settlement in 1972 or 1973 and Predicting U.S. Pressure on Israel<sup>1</sup>**

November 7, 1971

*Q. Very significant developments have occurred since your last visit. How do you see Israel's present political situation?*

*Goldmann:* A year ago I wrote the last of a series of articles in which I hoped that my gloomy prognosis would not materialize. To my regret my predictions are coming true. An Israeli leader who does not agree with my views told me that my fears were being realized but that my time table was mistaken. I agreed that it was unwise on my part to fix a specific time. For some time now I have been of the opinion that diplomacy should be redefined; it is the art of postponing inevitable decisions as long as possible. That is what the United States did in regards to China and what it is doing in respect to Vietnam. In the relations between Israel and the United States there is a tendency to postpone inevitable decisions as long as possible.

*Q. Does that rule apply to moves designed to promote a Near East settlement?*

*A.* I always thought that the settlement would be the result of an agreement between the Super Powers and the influence of both

sides, but I would be pleased if an agreement were reached by means of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. I always doubted that Sadat was more inclined to agree to a partial settlement than to a comprehensive one and now I am more sceptical of that than ever. I agree with Moshe Dayan that the hour of political or military decision is at hand, but in my opinion there is no danger of full-scale war in the near future. The Russians do not want a new war. I always said that and Israeli leaders who dissented are ready to agree with me now. The Egyptians know that they cannot win without Russian aid.

*Q. What, therefore, is the nature of the expected decision in the near future?*

*A.* In my opinion it will be necessary to have political decisions in the near future. The two Super Powers have decided to try to ease the tension between them. The Russians proved that by forcing East Germany to agree to a settlement with Bonn, even at the price of getting rid of Walter Ulbricht. Moscow agreed to American participation to the forthcoming conference on European security, a concession which Washington values highly. I am convinced that the Russians are interested in divesting themselves of the burden involved in helping the Arabs. The Americans also aspire to "detente" and Nixon wants to appear as the angel of peace in the next U.S. presidential elections.

*Q. What are the ramifications of these developments in the Near East?*

*A.* Any global understanding between Washington and Moscow must include an understanding about the Near East. Inclusion of the Near East in the agreement is an imperative Russian condition, which Nixon knows. Conceivably, the United States and the Soviet Union are already engaged in drawing up an agreement on the Near East in connection with the President's visit to Moscow in May, 1972. One reason the Americans have not acceded to Israel's request for more Phantoms is their desire to promote such agreement. On the other hand, the Americans believe the Russians are withholding aggressive arms from the Arab states,

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the Hebrew text of Goldmann's interview with *Davar*, November 7, 1971, *Tadmit Newsletter* II, 11 (35) (November 15, 1971), pp. 1-2.

and the Phantom is regarded as an aggressive instrument of war. It seems to me that so long as officials in Washington hope to achieve a partial settlement they will be averse to sending Phantoms to Israel. Israel must understand that it is difficult for the United States to commit itself in advance to supply Phantoms uninterruptedly for a long time since holding up such shipments is Washington's only means of exerting pressure. On the other hand, I think the Americans were obligated to continue the supply of Phantoms even in the absence of a long term contract; that would make talks with Israel easier.

*Q. What political and military developments do you foresee?*

*A.* I am optimistic about the chances of reaching a comprehensive Near East agreement in 1972 or in 1973 at the latest. The disagreements between Israel and the United States must be seen against the background of this effort to achieve a settlement and I fear that those arguments will intensify. Israel must prepare itself for the strongest disagreements with Washington. I am convinced that Jewry in the United States and the rest of the world will support Israel in this fight, but I am not certain that all the Jewish leaders in the United States will give Israel their unqualified support.

*Q. Can the Jews in the United States significantly influence the White House?*

*A.* We should not exaggerate Jewish strength in the United States. White House circles are convinced that most Jews will vote in favor of the Democrat Party's candidate for the Presidency anyhow, although the percentage of Jews who will vote for the Republican candidate may be higher than usual this time. Nixon's re-election will depend first and foremost on the economic situation. The South will be the decisive area and George Wallace will pose the greatest danger to Nixon. The Jews are not a significant political factor in the South. Even America's big cities that were former Jewish sources of strength are changing demographically: blacks are becoming the majorities in the populations of many large American cities.

Moreover, there are four times as many blacks as Jews in the United States and they certainly are not a pro-Israeli factor.

*Q. What will be the essence of a possible agreement between the two Super Powers?*

*A.* I do not know. However, I do know that in the past there wasn't an enormous difference between William Rogers' and Ambassador Dobrinin's suggested solutions. An agreement between the Super Powers would involve a guarantee on their part of the agreed new frontiers in the Near East. There is reason for a little more optimism concerning the Arabs. Sadat does not want to be the leader of the Arab world as much as Nasser did. Arabs and non-Arab observers have told me that the Egyptian people are eager to conclude the war with Israel—but not at any price. Peace with Egypt hinges on returning the Sinai; I do not believe that the Egyptians will fight for the return of the West Bank to Hussein or of the Golan Heights to Syria.

*Q. All in all, are you optimistic or pessimistic?*

*A.* The answer depends on intentions and aspirations. Were I to think like Ezer Weizmann or Menachem Begin, I would be pessimistic. As Nahum Goldmann, I am quite optimistic. I believe that there is no danger of all-out war in the Near East before May, 1972, and I regard the chances of a final peace settlement as reasonably good. When I say "final peace settlement" I am talking about a tolerable settlement as I see it. Israel must be both strong and flexible but at present I have no intention of offering advice. There is no point in making suggestions to people who are not ready to listen.

## 223

**Statements on Anglo-French Attitudes  
on the Bases for a Middle East Settlement  
Made by Foreign Minister Schumann  
of France at a News Conference During  
His Visit to Britain<sup>1</sup>**

London, November 12, 1971

*Q. You said there is a complete identity of views on the world financial crisis and the Middle East.*

*A. I did not say complete identity of views but a close identity of views.*

*I may say that now there is no longer, if there ever was, any disagreement [on the Middle East].*

*Q. May I follow up your last answer on the Middle East and enquire if the complete agreement you have found here in London on the Middle East is more or less on the lines of what was reported as the French plan, which was introduced recently into the discussions of the Western European Union?*

*A. There is no French plan. There was an agreement of the Six on a certain approach. Incidentally, Mr. Scheel confirmed, when we met in Italy last week, that this was still, in the German view, the Six's scheme, that it could still be described as the European view or the Six powers' view of the problem. Especially since Sir Alec's visit to the Near East, I cannot find the slightest difference between his approach and that common approach on this vital point. Of course, since then, a new problem has been raised, that of the so-called interim solution. On that special point, I feel we agree entirely. In the*

first place, we believe that nothing whatever should be done to jeopardise or undermine American endeavours to get a general agreement of the parties concerned on the interim arrangement. This is our view and this is certainly Britain's view. At the same time, we agree that such an interim agreement, if it has been worked out, will not be enough to restore peace or establish a permanent peace unless it is considered as a first step towards a general settlement based upon Resolution 242 of the Security Council. Frankly, on the Middle East there is no divergence at all (between Great Britain and ourselves).

*Q. You mentioned Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East question. Do you take the French or the English text of this resolution as the basis for your considerations, because there is a fundamental difference between the two texts, but the text was drafted in English.*

*A. I shall answer you by saying that I do not claim to know English very well, but for me the only valid translation of the English text is the French text.*

*Q. After your conversation about the Middle East and your talks with Mr. Brezhnev and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, is it your impression that the views of France, Russia and Great Britain on that problem are now identical?*

*A. They are certainly not far apart. Certainly not. And I must say that within the framework of the Four-Power conversations in New York, the three countries that you mentioned: England, Russia and France, did not use the same language but very often held similar views.*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the text of Schumann's press conference in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1972), pp. 205, 206, 208, 209. (The third question printed here was translated from the French; the other questions and answers were originally in English and the English text of them appeared in *Politique étrangère*.)

## 224

**Statement Supporting a Political Settlement in the Middle East Made by Foreign Minister Manescu of Rumania<sup>1</sup>**

November 14, 1971

Our country believes in the need for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict in conformity with the spirit of the Security Council resolution of November 1967. This requires the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the ensuring of the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area and the solution of the problem of the Palestinian people in conformity with their national interests.

The solution of these problems, as of others preoccupying humanity, demands strict respect for the principles of international justice and ethics, for the sacred right of every people to develop freely, according to its interests and aspirations, secure from all acts of force or threats to use force. This requires a constructive approach, based on principle, to the problems under discussion, along with a sincere desire to find just and durable solutions.

## 225

**Memorandum, Including Recommendations for Effecting a Middle East Settlement, Submitted to President Sadat of Egypt and Premier Meir of Israel by the Committee of Ten of the Organization of African Unity<sup>2</sup>**

Mid-November, 1971

To Mr. Anwar Sadat, President of the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of a speech made by Manescu during a visit to Turkey, *Dişisleri Bakanliği Belletini* (Ankara), No. 86 (November, 1971), p. 44.

Unofficial text of proposals communicated on behalf

Egyptian Arab Republic, and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

Your Excellencies,

1. The profoundest aspiration of the peoples of Africa, the great majority of whom have just acceded to independence and international sovereignty, is for peace, which is the first condition for their development.

2. This is why the African states have always felt more directly concerned than others with the grievous Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. There are too many similarities between the Middle East states and the young African states for the continuing Arab-Israeli tension not to remind them, by its possible consequences, of the threats to which these young states could be exposed tomorrow.

4. In addition to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, their constant concern is that there should be peace all over the earth, so that Africa may be better able to ensure its own development and make its

of the O.A.U. by Presidents Senghor of Senegal and Gowon of Nigeria to Sadat on November 21 and to Meir on November 23, as published in French in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, No. 375 (January 17-23, 1972), p. 53 and translated into English in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, I, 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 159-161.

Summaries of the positions of the parties (Paragraph 12) were omitted in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (and so in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* translation). The alleged English text of this section included here is as published in *New Middle East*, 41 (February, 1972), p. 38, in which the purported "full text" of the memorandum did not include the O.A.U. suggestions (Paragraph 13 in the *Nouvel Observateur* text).

The O.A.U. is composed of the following member states: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Peoples' Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaïre (former Congo-Kinshasa) and Zambia.



contribution to the development of a new humanism throughout the world.

5. Their major concern today is to support the efforts of the United Nations to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967, which contains, among others, the following provisions:

— “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”;

— “the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security”;

— “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied<sup>1</sup> in the recent conflict”;

— “termination of all assertions of belligerency or of all states of belligerency”;

— “respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area”;

— respect also “for their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force”;

— guarantees of the “territorial inviolability” and of the “political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones”;

— “freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area”;

— “a just settlement of the refugee problem.”

6. The hopes for peace which the African states share with the international community are founded, quite specifically, on acceptance by Egypt and Israel of Resolution 242.

<sup>1</sup> A direct translation from the French “*des territoires occupés*” [Translator’s note in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*].

7. This is why they welcomed the initiative taken by Dr. Jarring on February 8, 1971 to remove the differences of opinion as regards the priorities to be accorded to the various commitments to be entered into by the two parties for the implementation of Resolution 242.

8. Dr. Jarring’s proposals are a positive contribution to the implementation of the provisions of the said resolution, the acceptance of which has been reaffirmed by the two parties to the sub-committee of four.

9. Within the framework of total support for Dr. Jarring’s efforts to implement resolution 242, the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity, in its June 1971 session, appointed a committee of ten Heads of State to help to seek a solution.

10. The mission with which Africa unanimously entrusted the committee of ten, which appointed the sub-committee of four, was a mission of peace. For these messengers of Africa it is a question not of replacing Dr. Jarring in his role of mediator, and even less of replacing the Security Council, but of helping him to ensure the implementation of Resolution 242.

11. The exploratory talks which the sub-committee of four had, respectively, with the Israeli authorities on November 3 and 4, 1971 and with the Egyptian authorities on November 6 and 7, 1971, were essentially guided by the search for a possible ground of agreement which would permit the parties to surmount the obstacles in the way of the conclusion of a peace agreement.

12. The respective positions of the two parties, as they appeared to the sub-committee of four, may be summed up as follows:

#### [Israeli Position]

a. Israel affirms that, while preferring direct negotiations, she is prepared to enter into indirect negotiations, without preconditions, under the auspices of Dr. Jarring.

b. Israel declares that she has no desire to annex territory, and that for her it is only a question of 'secure and recognised borders'.

c. Israel is prepared to redeploy her troops on the frontiers which will have been defined in the peace treaty.

d. Israel reaffirms her adherence to the principle of an interim accord for the reopening of the Suez Canal, on the clear understanding that such a special arrangement is not linked to Resolution 242.

### *Egyptian Position*

a. Egypt agrees to the resumption of negotiations under the auspices of Dr. Jarring, within the framework of Resolution 242; she is equally prepared to accept negotiation through the mediation of the four great powers, or of the Security Council, within the framework of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

b. Egypt confirms the terms of her reply of 15 February 1971 to Dr. Jarring's memorandum, on condition that Israel makes an affirmative response.

c. Egypt is prepared to implement the provisions of Resolution 242 relating to 'secure and recognised borders'.

d. Egypt still adheres to her proposal for an interim agreement on the reopening of the Suez Canal, and agrees to the presence on the east bank of troops of the United Nations or the Great Powers, between the Egyptian and Israeli lines, to enable the mediator, Dr. Jarring, to establish a timetable for the implementation of the resolution.]

13. In the light of the report of the sub-committee of four on the respective positions of the parties, the OAU's committee of ten submits the following suggestions for their examination:

a) That both parties should agree to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Dr. Jarring within the terms of Security Council Resolution 242, to reach a peace agreement.

b) That both parties should agree to reach an interim agreement for the opening of the Canal and the stationing of UN forces on the east bank of the Canal between the Egyptian and Israeli lines.

c) That both parties should agree that "secure and recognized boundaries" should be determined in the peace agreement.

d) That both parties should agree that the solution to the security problems that arise should be found in:

- UN guarantees;
- the establishment of demilitarized areas;
- the presence of international forces at certain strategic points.

e) That both parties should agree that the means of evacuating the occupied territories should be defined in the peace agreement.

f) That both parties should agree that in order to guarantee freedom of navigation for all ships in the Straits of Tiran, international forces should be stationed at Sharm al-Sheikh.

14. The Heads of State who are members of the OAU committee think that these suggestions reconcile the essential points in the respective positions of the parties in confrontation.

15. They count on their being accepted by the Israeli authorities and the Egyptian authorities, whose desire for peace was, in both cases, made quite clear to them.

16. They make an urgent appeal to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel to receive these suggestions in a manner that will permit the resumption of the Jarring negotiations and the attainment in the area of a just peace, which they hope will be lasting because it is fraternal.

The Heads of State who are members of the OAU committee take the opportunity offered them of expressing to Their Excellencies Mr. Anwar Sadat, President of the

Arab Republic of Egypt, and Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, assurances of their highest consideration.

[Signed:]

M. Moktar Ould Daddah, President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Acting President of the OAU; His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia; M. Leopold Sédar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal; M. El Hadj Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic of Cameroun; Lieutenant-General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, President of the Republic of Zaïre; General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Mr. William Tolbert, President of the Republic of Liberia; Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya, represented by Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, Vice-President of the Republic of Kenya; Felix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, represented by M. Arsène Usher Assouan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ivory Coast; Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanzania, absent and excused.

## 226

### **Interview Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on U.S. Support of Jordan and Israel and the U.S. View That the Military Balance of Power in the Middle East Has Not Shifted Against Israel<sup>1</sup>**

Mid-November, 1971

*Q. Are there other areas [besides Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos] involved [where a defeat of the U.S. foreign aid program would have very serious consequences]?*

A. Yes. I've been talking about military assistance and supporting assistance. I haven't

mentioned Indonesia. We have improved our relations with Indonesia very much in the last 2½ years.

A few years back, many in this country agonized over Indonesia. People forget that there's been a turnaround there. Indonesia is now friendly with the West, our relations with them are good. And don't forget we aren't alone in helping Indonesia. We give one third, the Japanese give one third, and the Europeans give one third.

In the case of Jordan, for example, I think the assistance that we've been giving Jordan is essential to the stability of the Middle East. The fact that the King has been able to survive and manage to handle his intense problems as he has, has been a very important factor in stability in the Middle East.

*Q. What kind of assistance have we been giving Jordan?*

A. We've been giving them military assistance, supporting assistance and technical assistance.

Now, of course, we've been giving military assistance to Turkey, which is very important to our whole NATO position in that part of the world. We've been giving economic assistance to Latin-American countries, which is very important to our future relations with the Hemisphere. And let me add one point: People say this is giving money to others. Well, that just isn't true. Most of our development aid today is in the form of loans. We have 14 billion dollars outstanding and less than one quarter of 1 per cent is in default. Those loans are being repaid. And, over 90 per cent of the money we lend gets spent for U.S. goods and services right in this country.

*Q. When you were ticking off the danger areas, did you mean to mention the Middle East?*

A. Certainly it is equally dangerous, or a very close second. Much depends on how the situation develops.

We do not have a treaty commitment with Israel. On the other hand, we have, over the years, supported Israel's sovereignty and supported its right to exist without interference from outside. We have been a good

<sup>1</sup> Questions and answers relating to the Middle East taken from the copyright interview with Rogers on U.S. foreign policy, "U.S. Sets a New Course," *U.S. News & World Report*, LXXI, 21 (November 22, 1971), pp. 31, 33-34.

friend of Israel. But we also have friendly relations with many of the Arab countries.

We hope that no trouble erupts in the area.

*Q. But if it does, aren't we involved?*

A. We became active in the Middle East in the cause of peace because it seemed that the situation was escalating to the point where something had to be done.

So we felt that we had a reasonable chance there to bring about a successful result, and we took the initiative which resulted in a cease-fire. And since that time, we've been seeking to bring the parties together in a negotiating stance. By that I mean more active negotiations, not necessarily face-to-face negotiations.

At the present time, the United States is discussing problems with both Israel and Egypt in the hopes that we can bring about what we refer to as an interim agreement for opening the Suez Canal.

*Q. Why is it important to reopen the Suez Canal?*

A. We don't think that it's just the reopening of the Suez Canal that's important. We think it's important to have an interim agreement which will hold out clear hope for the prospects of a final agreement.

*Q. Is the Canal important to the United States?*

A. Well, the Canal is important to the United States in some respects. It, of course, would open up the Indian Ocean—

*Q. To whom?*

A. The argument is that it would be beneficial to the Soviet Union. In that sense, I think that it would be of some advantage to them. On the other hand, there are several offsetting advantages, as far as we are concerned. For example, just the fact that we have an interim agreement in the area would be of great importance in reinforcing the cease-fire.

Our relations with the Arab world have suffered in the last 10 or 15 years. And if we could work out an agreement that would meet the legitimate interests and concerns of both sides and provide for permanent peace

in the area, the cost would be well worth the effort.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you are trying to get the Israelis and Egyptians to intensify their efforts to achieve an interim agreement. What are the most serious differences between the two?*

A. I outlined in my [United Nations] General Assembly speech a few weeks ago the six areas where there are differences. I want to make clear we have made no proposals of our own and we have not adopted any substantive position on any of these six parameters that I outlined. We have no blueprint of our own that we have put forward.

Both sides have put forward some positive ideas; both sides adhere to certain points strongly, and both sides will have to make adjustments in their positions if an interim agreement is to be achieved.

There are a number of difficulties, but I would single out one in particular: the nature of any Egyptian presence east of the Canal. On this key point, I also want to make clear that both sides hold strong views, one insisting that military forces cross and the other taking an opposite view. While I expressed in my general-debate speech the hope that this and other points might prove reconcilable, I want to make clear that we have taken no substantive position. The fact that I hope the reconciliation is possible should not be understood to mean that we have made a judgment or expressed a substantive view on how it should be resolved. That is a matter for the parties.

*Q. What is the military situation in the Middle East?*

A. Up to now, the military balance has not shifted. And a review is in train in light of the recent Soviet-Egyptian communiqué. President Nixon has made it quite clear that he's going to be sure that the military balance is continued. And I think Israeli spokesmen have indicated in the last three or four months that they do recognize that the U.S. has done a great deal for them over the months and years.

Now, the Soviet Union in the last four or five

months has operated with some restraint as far as shipments are concerned.

*Q. Have the Russians cut down on shipments?*

*A.* In the last four months, as I said, their shipments have been very moderate. We will continue to watch the situation closely.

## 227

### **Radio Interview Statements by Police Minister Hillel of Israel on Increasing Sabotage Activity on the Part of Israeli Arabs<sup>1</sup>**

November 19, 1971

*Q. Recently, particularly in the last month or two, we have noticed an increase in hostile sabotage activity among the Israeli Arabs. What significance do you believe should be attached to this phenomenon?*

*A.* Firstly, I believe that this is also a sign of the Arabs' failure in carrying out acts of sabotage from the occupied territories or from beyond . . . . We should see the problem in its correct perspective. There are some 350,000–400,000—if we include all the minorities—in Israel. Of these, there are, let us say, about 250 in Israeli prisons . . . . In actual fact, this is a very small minority of the total Arab population. It would be well to remember this. I believe one of the aims of Arab terrorism is to drive a wedge between the Jews and Arabs living in the State of Israel. They have failed to do this . . . .

We are now, relatively speaking, in quite good shape. I believe we have overcome a very large part of the terrorist activity, both within Israeli territory—within the green line—and in the occupied territories, but the danger is not yet over and we estimate

that there will be renewed attempts to carry out acts of terror, both in the occupied territories and in the territory of Israel itself. Actually, we should be reminding the public that public awareness and alertness can help save many lives.

*Q. Let us return for a moment to the question of proportions. Without losing a sense of proportion, it is a fact that only lately has there been an increase in terrorist activity on the part of Israeli Arabs. Doesn't this indicate a trend that this phenomenon will increase and become more serious and that we can expect much more activity of this kind?*

*A.* I do not believe that we need to expect much more within the Israeli Arabs' territory. We have recently conducted a number of fruitful searches, but, if you look closely, you will notice that some of those caught were involved in acts carried out in the past. My feeling is that the Arab public will now also display greater alertness to prevent the danger of such elements operating in or from its midst . . . .

## 228

### **Comments by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on U.S. Secretary of State Rogers' Assessment of the Middle East Balance of Power and on His Six Point Plan for an Interim Suez Settlement, and on President Sadat's Statement That 1971 Is the Year of Decision<sup>2</sup>**

November 20, 1971

[Commenting on Rogers' assessment of the Middle East balance of power<sup>3</sup>]: This is just not true. I think that the balance of power has changed. I don't want to comment on Secretary Rogers, whether he knows that

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from Hillel's interview, conducted by Zvi Lidor, broadcast on Israeli Forces Radio; English translation of excerpts in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3845/A/5–A/6; reprinted by permission.

<sup>2</sup> Text of Dayan's conversation with a United Israel Appeal delegation as broadcast on Israel in English, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3846/A/6–A/7; reprinted by permission.

<sup>3</sup> Rogers' interview on U.S. foreign policy, *U.S. News & World Report*, LXXI, 21 (November 22, 1971), p. 34; see Document No. 226 above.

it has changed and just doesn't want to recognize it or he doesn't know, but I can say that I know about it, that such a statement that the balance of power has not changed is simply not true. Because the Egyptians are getting supplies—and a running supply—of all kinds of weapon including airplanes all the time. And we do not.

[Answering a question as to what guarantees Israel might be willing to accept]: To guarantee? I can tell you who I expect to be dependable, that is ourselves. And, not only that I don't expect anybody else to guarantee, but I don't want anybody to guarantee our border. I do hope that in the future, like in the past, we shall be able to defend our borders ourselves, and I would hate to see the day when American boys will have to fight for us. For the time being we shall be very, very pleased if we can buy and get military supplies and equipment and that's all. We would like to see political aid, economic support, military aid, by the way of selling us equipment, airplanes and others, but no foreign soldiers, friendly as they might be. We don't want to see any foreign soldiers except of our own soldiers defending our borders.

[On President Sadat's ultimatum that 1971 is the year of decision]: I do think that—I really believe that Sadat means business, that he is not only threatening but he is really ready and getting himself ready to open fire. And I think that he will find himself—he will find he has made a mistake after he opens fire. This will be the only similarity between what Nasir did and Sadat is that both of them will—but not—I'm sure Nasir ultimately regretted what he did at the beginning. I'm sure of that, that later on he thought that it was a mistake for him to announce the blockade on the Straits of Elat, of Aqabah. So I feel that the only similar point will be that by Nasir closing the waterway for navigation and by Sadat opening fire, both of them will find out that it was a mistake.

[Answering a question as to Israel's view on Rogers's six-point plan for a Canal settlement]: The Egyptians say that they should cross the Canal with their forces

when we withdraw. Now, when Secretary Rogers said that there are two views about that, two positions, but some compromise must be achieved, then the only meaning is that some troops should cross, because what we say is no troops, no crossing whatsoever, and if he says a compromise, a compromise means some troops should cross. And the question is not how many of them will cross, but whether they should cross at all. So by such a definition, when you say a compromise should be achieved, practically, our position is dead now, as far as the American or the [words indistinct] because we cannot insist on no crossing when the impartial party, Secretary Rogers, says that a compromise must be achieved and a compromise means that some troops will cross. So this is just one point. On the whole, I think that the six points made by Secretary Rogers were not helpful in order to advance the agreement about the Suez Canal.

## 229

### **Resolution on Jerusalem Adopted by the Executive Council of the United Towns Organization<sup>1</sup>**

**Florence, November 21, 1971**

The United Towns Organization is deeply concerned by everything likely to compromise peace and cooperation among men.

Conscious of the discretion it should maintain in regard to national and international politics, nevertheless it must remember that

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of the resolution on Jerusalem adopted at the nineteenth annual session of the Executive Council of the United Towns Organization (Fédération Mondiale des Villes Jumelées—Cités Unies) as provided, on request, by the United Towns Organization press service (release 1170). The conference was held in Florence, Italy from 19–22 November. Participating in the discussion which preceded the adoption of the motion on Jerusalem was a delegation from the Organization of Arab Cities, which included Ruhi al-Khatib, the exiled Arab mayor of Jerusalem, who addressed the assembly.

its concerns accord with the resolutions taken by the U.N. General Assembly on 4 and 14 July 1967 and the U.N. Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and subsequent Council resolutions 252 and 267 of 1968 and 1969.

For all people the world over whatever their political, cultural or religious beliefs, and especially for those whose homeland it has been for many years, Jerusalem is a unique city in which all have the right to live together in equality and peace.

Like UNESCO, in particular in its resolutions of 10 October 1969 and of 21 October 1971, the United Towns Organization considers that world peace, cooperation among peoples and the freedom of man depend on peaceful coexistence, the development of civic life and the preservation of a historic and cultural heritage belonging to all mankind.

The Executive Council urges all national and international authorities to do everything to ensure that all the sites, buildings or other cultural assets comprising the special heritage of Jerusalem are scrupulously preserved, that the human character and special nature of Jerusalem are completely and definitively respected, and that all the inhabitants of Jerusalem may be called upon to live within a community open to all and where human rights and civil liberties are implemented fully and for all.

The Council hopes that the conciliation mission entrusted by the Organization of African Unity to a Committee of Ten presided over by Leopold Sedar Senghor, Honorary President of the United Towns Organization, may, thanks to the support of all those concerned, be fully enabled to work in the spirit of the above observations expressed in this resolution.

The Council decides to transmit this resolution to President Senghor, to the U.N. Secretary-General and to the Director-General of UNESCO.

## 230

**Knesset Statement by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel Responding to Egyptian President Sadat's Speeches of November 20 and 21, and Reasserting Israel's Insistence on Her Security and an Agreed Peace (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Jerusalem, November 23, 1971**

The last ten days of the feast of Ramadhan are imbued with a special holiness for the Moslem faithful, and civilized people everywhere, therefore, regard them with high honour and respect. This period is described in the Koran as "the tidings of dawn." The central theme stressed by commentators is introspection, repentance, and learning from experience. It is written: "If to peace they turn, thou shalt turn to him and place thy trust in the Lord, for it is He who hears and knows."

What message did Egypt's President Anwar Sadat bring upon the dawning of the third day of the feast? Here are his words:

"I am come to bring you the feast's greetings and to tell that the campaign is at hand. No longer is there any hope for peaceful or other solutions. It may be the wish of the Lord, who has vouchsafed me the opportunity of meeting with you now in order to tell you that our decision is war. During the past eight months we have made the greatest possible efforts for the sake of one per cent of hope that our armed forces should cross."

The following day Sadat made bitter mockery of the U.S. proposal to hold discussions on an agreement for opening the Canal. The impression emerges that Egypt never regarded this proposal seriously. The Egyptian President further revealed that he had told the U.S. representative that Israel must agree to total withdrawal:

"Afterwards it will be possible to resume the dialogue on the basis of the crossing of our forces and a cease-fire for six months, so that

<sup>1</sup> English excerpted text of Eban's address as published in the *Jerusalem Post*, November 24, 1971, p. 11.

Eban's reaction to Sadat's remarks was also released as a press statement (see *Jerusalem Post*, November 22, 1971, p. 1).

if Israel does not withdraw within this period the armed forces will carry out their duty by expelling the enemy."

An original and instructive definition of the aim of the settlement in the Egyptian President's consciousness.

At the conclusion of his statement, Sadat told his troops:

"Israel is fearful of the confrontation with you. The path of crossing is a one-way path. Next time we shall meet you in Sinai, if God wills."

These and similar boasts are now the subject for deep and extensive consideration by governments and nations. Is it not clear that he who voices them is ignoring the aspiration for peace of all nations, including his own? Is there not here a stupefying ability to forget the lessons of experience and to disregard the outcomes which befell Egypt from similar things and frames of mind in the past?

Each time that Mr. Sadat mentions the Suez Canal it is only in connection with its crossing by Egyptian troops. This emphasis is most instructive. In May of 1967 the number of Egyptian troops in Sinai was greater than the number of inhabitants. This is the situation to which the Egyptian President suggests we return.

We see the opening of the Canal as a portent and signal for peace. Sadat sees the crossing of the Canal as a portent and signal for war. It is not surprising that such opposing approaches have not led to a means of negotiation, let alone an agreement.

The world may rightfully ask what purpose the President of Egypt hopes to achieve by war, at a time when the fruits of peace are within his grasp—if he only saw fit to enter into negotiations. He can clear the Suez Canal—without war. He can open the Suez Canal—without war. He can restore the cities on the Canal and bring back to them a million refugees—without war. He can negotiate with Israel on a peace which will contain agreement on the withdrawal of military forces to secure and recognized borders—without war. The debate, therefore, is between the desire for peace of Israel and the majority of nations, and the remnants of the

devotion of the Egyptian policy—despite their bitter experience—to empty dreams of war and victory.

Is this not an indication that the Egyptian Government's declared policy is not peace but a striving for resumption of aggression under conditions more suitable for its implementation?

The significance of these speeches and the conclusions they entail we shall shortly unveil before governments, international institutions and nations with whom we shall be engaged in clarifications on the promotion of peace. A clear and frank analysis of these warlike tendencies from the appropriate international rostrums is also called for. But the Government of Israel feels it its duty already now, further to the statements already made by its representatives and spokesman, to acquaint the nation and the world of the fundamentals of its response....

Two things Israel will not give up: its security, and its right to negotiations over an agreed peace. At the same time, it will keep open the gate of peace which the President of Egypt has in his recent speeches been working so hard to shut tight. We shall meet every eventuality firmly and coolly: for we stand strong....

If the Knesset will agree to the request of the Government that this matter be transferred for further clarification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, we shall be able to inform that committee, as always, of our appraisals and our preparedness in the area of defence.

Anyone who takes the trouble to imagine how it would be for us to face these threats were we standing along the vulnerable armistice lines will be able to understand how strong and well-founded is our position on the maintenance of the cease-fire lines until peace—and on the determination of secure and agreed boundaries as a condition for the establishment of peace....

Over and over again, in the remarks of the Egyptian President, we find continual references to the matter of honour. The understanding would seem to be that the source of honour is war rather than peace. Israel's approach, on the other hand, is that the



honour of states and of statesmen can have no greater or deeper satisfaction than that which comes from a thorough and detailed exploration of the ways to peace, with all the humane values embodied in this. Mr. Sadat's pronouncements of his readiness to sacrifice three million souls grates on the ears and shocks the hearts of all peace-loving men. The destruction of millions of human beings is in his eyes the lesser evil when weighed against the awful alternative—conducting negotiations with Israel.

Millions of Egyptians must die in order that Mr. Sadat will not have to conduct negotiations with the State of Israel which aspires to nothing except peace and security within agreed upon and defensible borders. . . .

As a result of events which were discussed and determined without any particular connection to the subject of our deliberations today—the Government of Israel stands today before a period of intensive and congested political activity. Within the coming fortnight exchanges will take place, according to the time schedule I will denote, on the policy of Africa on the question of peace, the stand of Europe in its new communal format, the U.N. General Assembly and—last but not least—the stand of the United States both in connection to its relations with Israel and the remaining nations of the Middle East, and from the standpoint of the chances of the dialogue between the powers in which its influence will be great in either direction, according to the degree of understanding and firmness which it will reveal.

For there are two lessons which have become very clear to us of late: there is no foundation to the delusion that the Soviet Union has adopted a policy of restraint regarding the arming of Egypt, and the withholding of planes from Israel has not helped in the least extent to prepare Mr. Sadat for serious negotiations—for all of his speeches are nothing but a complete rejection of any possible form of negotiations.

It is difficult to remember when we had such a multiplicity of political events in such a short period of time as that which is now before us. From the deliberations of the Knesset today the policy of Israel is clear. Israel will

be firm and alert in the preparation of her security, strong and unafraid in its political performance, consistent, clear headed and unswerving in its striving for peace.

I am sure that this is the desire of the Knesset—and it shall be so.

## 231

### **Senate Speech by U.S. Senator Jackson in Support of His Proposed Amendment to the Pending Appropriations Bill Intended To Make Immediately Available \$500 Million in U.S. Military Credits to Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, November 23, 1971**

Mr. President, I shall be calling up my amendment No. 750 shortly.

The purpose of the amendment is clear and simple. It calls for an appropriation, pursuant to the authority voted by the Senate last year, to enable the President to make available to Israel on credit terms vital aircraft and other defense equipment essential to maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East.

I know that many Senators share my concern that doubts about the stability of the balance in that troubled part of the world could give rise to a renewal of the conflict between the Soviet-supported Arab States and Israel. In recent days there have been ominous threats by President Sadat of Egypt of an attack against Israeli territory. These threats, however flamboyant and irresponsible, carry with them the danger that loose talk of invasions and war can set in

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record*, November 23, 1971, pp. 42878–42879.

Jackson's amendment No. 750 was introduced on the Senate floor September 23, 1971, and specifies an amount of military aid to be offered to Israel (as was already authorized by Jackson's Amendment to the Defense Procurement Act signed into law October 7, 1970). For another Jackson Senate speech supporting this amendment, see *Congressional Record*, September 23, 1971, pp. 33006–33007.

motion—a train of events only partially controlled, with consequences that are tragic in the extreme. Looking back, it is difficult to understand how Egypt could have chosen to mobilize for war in June of 1967. Thus, we should take little comfort from the optimistic view that because a renewal of war in the Middle East looks foolish to us, it must necessarily look foolish to those who would initiate it. I, for one, view the prospect of an outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East with the most activated concern.

There is a consensus among experts in these matters that a repetition of the 1967 war would not end, as it did then, in a matter of days—perhaps not even in a matter of weeks. In discussions here and during my visit to Israel I was made painfully aware that the next war, unlike the last, could become a war of attrition in which thousands of innocents could lose their lives, and in which the danger to world peace would increase beyond anything we have known in recent years. No one can take lightly such grim prospects. And no one can responsibly dismiss lightly the rhetoric that brings conflict closer.

I am convinced that at this moment the single most important step this country can take to help bring a measure of stability to the troubled Middle East is to make plain our determination that we will not prejudice Israel's ability to deter by further denying her the aircraft she needs to prevent an invasion across the Suez Canal or a renewal of the war of attrition against her defensive positions in the Sinai.

Mr. President, the principal element of this administration's policy in the Middle East has been a pledge to maintain the military balance in a condition of rough parity. Measuring such a balance is extremely difficult—especially, as in the present case, when superior equipment on the Arab—and Soviet—side is said to be offset by superior training and skill on the part of the Israeli defense forces. How does one compare an Israeli air force, highly skilled, with too few first-line planes with an Egyptian air force that has too many first-line planes and too few skilled pilots? And how, in such an

uncertain calculation, should one weigh the massive deployment of Soviet-supplied SAM missiles throughout Egypt, any one of which is capable of destroying an Israeli plane? Finally, how does one estimate the role of the Soviet Union in the event hostilities break out? Can anyone say with certainty that the Soviets will not be drawn into a conflict—that, no matter what happens in the Middle East, they will keep their combat aircraft and their pilots grounded and their fleet at a distance from the conflict?

I emphasize these uncertainties, Mr. President, because they suggest how fragile is a military balance with so many elements—and I have mentioned only three—about which it is impossible to be precise. Moreover, the balance in the Middle East is “subject to rapid change” to use the words of Secretary of Defense Laird. The conditions prevailing today can be dramatically different tomorrow. And in all of this the crucial and decisive factor is the balance in the air; and that balance depends, in large measure, on the available supply of first-line aircraft.

Mr. President, our most urgent immediate task in the Middle East is to acknowledge that the unrestrained flow of sophisticated weapons to Egypt from the Soviet Union has jeopardized the balance of power in a most dangerous way. We can preserve the peace in the Middle East but only if we recognize that it is today threatened by the narrow margin of Israel's air defense capability. With so few planes at her disposal we invite a miscalculation on the part of the Egyptian and Soviet forces leading them to believe that they could eliminate the Israeli air force as a factor in Israel's defense and thereby reverse the events of June, 1967.

It is against this background, Mr. President that I wish to introduce my amendment to the pending appropriations bill. It is a simple amendment that merely gives effect to a policy clearly laid down by an overwhelming majority of the Senate in upholding, by a vote of 87 to 7, the necessary authority under which this appropriation is here offered.

Mr. President, last September, we voted to provide the authority to enable the President to supply credits to Israel in such amounts

as may be necessary to provide aircraft and other equipment essential to maintain the balance in the Middle East.

Just a few days ago 78 Senators joined in cosponsoring Senate Resolution 177 calling upon the President to make Phantom aircraft available to Israel.

The President has the authority he needs. He has a mandate from the Senate to exercise that authority by making them available now. All that is required is an appropriation, and my amendment today is nothing more than the necessary appropriation. It would make available \$500 million in military credits, half of which—or more—could be used to provide the planes that 87 Senators authorized and that 78 Senators urged be made available at once.

Mr. President, I wish to point out that the Senate version of the Foreign Assistance Act contains the authority for an appropriation of \$300 million for military credits for Israel. In my view that authority is superfluous since the authority contained in section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act of 1970 is all that is required. Section 501, by agreement in a House-Senate conference, is still in force and remains in force until September 1972.

But more important is the fact that we do not as yet have a foreign assistance program. We may not get one for weeks or even months. It is subject to uncertainties and delays. None of its several provisions is securely a part of the public law.

Section 501, on the other hand, is the law of the land. I am merely proposing that we make the necessary appropriation to give effect to the policy we have legislated and so recently reaffirmed. Even if the \$300 million authorization contained in the Senate version of the Foreign Assistance Act emerges from conference and is enacted into law, we will have nothing that we do not already have in section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act. The difference is that the \$500 million I am now proposing can be made available immediately. And in view of the rapid deterioration of the military balance in the Middle East, especially in the last few days, it is urgent that we act at once.

Moreover, Mr. President, the \$300 million in requested authority is inadequate for both Phantom aircraft and other essential equipment. The aircraft alone will cost at least \$250 million, perhaps more, and considerably more than \$50 million has already been committed to supporting equipment. Thus we would face an eventual deficiency appropriation if we were to wait and appropriate funds to carry out the Senate's policy in a piecemeal fashion. If the \$500 million requested in my amendment is appropriated here today I would expect the administration to adjust its \$300 million request accordingly. And I need not point out that the administration has hardly been overeager to make available the planes it is my intention to fund with this amendment.

I will not go into detail about the state of the Israeli economy and Israel's obvious inability to provide for an adequate defense without credit assistance. Suffice it to say that fully 30 percent of Israel's gross national product goes to defense. And let me add that the annual cost of servicing the foreign debt incurred by Israel, largely as a result of necessary defense outlays, is alone \$500 million.

Mr. President, I have long believed that we have failed in our Middle East policy to pay sufficient attention to the cynical role of the Soviet Union in exploiting the tragic conflict between Arabs and Jews. The policy of purposeful instability that the Soviets practice is a menace to international order. And it imposes extraordinary burdens on the innocent victims who must work doubly hard to achieve even minimal security for their precious freedom and independence.

All that I am proposing is that we extend the credits necessary to permit a brave ally to purchase the means with which to defend itself while we look to a better day in a more peaceful world where weapons and credits are no longer needed.

I want to state that I shall call up my amendment now; but, in accordance with the understanding that I have with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, there will not be a vote on this matter until the two of us work out a mutually satisfactory time.

## AMENDMENT NO. 750

*Mr. Jackson.* Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 750 and ask that it be read.

*The Presiding Officer.* The clerk will state the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read the amendment (No. 750) as follows:

On page 49, between lines 21 and 22, insert a new title as follows:

TITLE IX—AIRCRAFT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT  
FOR ISRAEL AS AUTHORIZED BY PUBLIC  
LAW 91-441

SEC. 901. For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary to enable the President to finance sales, credit sales, and guarantees of defense articles and defense services to Israel, as authorized by section 501 of Public Law 91-441 (84 Stat. 909), \$500,000,000, including \$250,000,000 for sales, credit sales, and guarantees of F-4 Phantom aircraft to Israel.

## 232

**Senate Speech by Chairman Fulbright  
of the Foreign Relations Committee  
of the U.S. Senate, Opposing Senator  
Jackson's Proposed Amendment to the  
Appropriations Bill Authorizing \$500  
Million in Additional Military Credits  
to Israel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 23, 1971

Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, has stated quite accurately the origin of this matter and the alleged authority. I have recently read the law. It does not authorize an appropriation. It simply authorizes the President to transfer aircraft and materials by various means.

I may correct one small detail. I raised the question of procedural propriety last year, because the proposal was brought in without any hearings or proper legislative

basis. The Senate, however, in its wisdom, over my objection, did pass the item. But it is not authority; at least, it is not authority to appropriate. It is the type of authority the Senator just mentioned.

So the Senator has correctly stated the situation.

The military credit sales authority in S. 2819 is, as he has said, a credit ceiling of \$550 million of which \$300 million is earmarked for Israel. The bill also contains an authorization of \$85 million of supporting assistance for Israel. The \$85 million is a grant which the administration did not request. It was put in the bill in the committee without its being requested by the administration. The administration indicated they tentatively planned to make \$300 million in credit sales to Israel.

Actually, there is nothing to prevent the administration, from using all of the \$550 million ceiling for Israel if he wants to, but \$300 million is earmarked specifically for Israel.

I must say also that Congress passed a provision in the Foreign Military Sales Act which states that no appropriation shall be made except pursuant to an authorization, as the Senator well knows. This seems to be directly contrary to that.

Let me say further on the matter of policy, the administration, under the leadership of the Secretary of State, has been making a strong effort to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Middle East. I believe, and I think the President believes, that this is the only way to bring about peace there. I think what the Senate did last September, and what it is being asked to do today, is creating one of the principal obstacles to bringing about a settlement of the war between Israel and the Arab nations.

I have supported the President's policy. I have made speeches here in the Senate and in other places supporting the President's efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement based upon the United Nations resolution of 1967.

Everyone knows the critical question now is whether Israel is to retain the territory which she conquered in that war. Apparently

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record*, November 23, 1971, p. 42884.

Israel has made up her mind it is going to retain it, which automatically, I think, prevents the possibility of a negotiated settlement. That is a very controversial matter. It is controversial in Israel. Mr. Ben Gurion, one of Israel's greatest statesmen, is in accord with my view. I quoted a speech he made in this country in which he stated he believed the long term good of Israel depended on settlement, not in a long perpetuation of the war, and not upon military acquisition of territory.

I think Congress is interfering with the efforts of the administration to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Middle East.

I believe it is a great mistake to do so. I realize the emotional appeal of Israel. It is a valiant country. Certainly I do not wish to do anything to undermine its security.

This is a question of judgment as to what is in the interests of this country as well as of Israel. It is my opinion that it is in the interests of this country and of Israel to support the President's efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement. He has judged, and the administration has, that there is a military balance in the Middle East. On that basis, he has up to now declined to provide further Phantom jets, as would be provided by this amendment.

The amendment is designed to force the hand of the President, to bring pressure to bear upon the President to do what evidently is against his better judgment as to the proper way to bring about a settlement in the Middle East. I think that is what it is obviously intended to do.

I have no objection to the Senate taking issue with any President, if they feel that they know enough about the subject matter, and that it is in the interests of this country to do so. In this case, all I am saying is that I agree with the judgment of the President on all counts that the effort to bring about a negotiated settlement is in the interests of the United States as well as those of Israel and people everywhere.

This Government does not want to precipitate or to develop a confrontation with Russia. And there is a very dangerous situation in the Middle East. The President

correctly said, not too long ago, that he thought the Russians were being rational in the armament they were providing the Egyptians. That is our information. I know of nothing to contradict that.

So now, while of course the Senate has a right to do what it likes with the public's money, I agree with the President's policy and with what the Senator from Louisiana has said.

In addition to that, I think, as an orderly procedure, if we are ever to be a responsible body, we have to follow the usual, established procedure in this body for the appropriation of large sums of money, which is authorization after hearings, and then an appropriation, also after hearings and deliberations, by the appropriate committees. I think it is a very questionable procedure to bring in amendments to appropriate vast amounts of money without any hearings whatever.

The Foreign Relations Committee does not specifically say to the President, "You have got to give them \$250 million in Phantom F-4's." It simply gave him authority to extend military credit sales of \$300 million. It seems to me that is ample, under the circumstances, and that it would be unreasonable to go beyond that. As the Senator says, this would be a total of \$1.3 billion for military aid to Israel within the space of a little over a year. And in addition there is the \$85 million in grants for supporting assistance, which as a practical matter, can be considered an additional amount for the purchase of arms for their own forces.

Lastly, I want to say that I think that those who go too far, who go as far as I think this amendment would do, in support of Israel, run a grave risk—

*The Presiding Officer.* The Senator's time has expired.

*Mr. Fulbright.* I ask for 1 more minute.

*Mr. Ellender.* I yield the Senator 1 minute.

*Mr. Fulbright.* Run a grave risk of creating an attitude which would be counterproductive, if I may use that terrible word.

In other words, it will be against Israel's interest in the long run. If we do become involved as a result of failure to bring about a settlement in the Middle East, and there

would be demands for us to become involved, in view of our stringent circumstances, there is a great danger that there would develop in this country a reaction against Israel, which I would regret. The wisest policy, I think, as I have stated, is that of the President, who is trying to be as even-handed in this area as we can. That was the language, I believe, that the Secretary of State used, to try to be just and equitable to both sides, and above all, for the purpose of bringing about a negotiated settlement in one of the most explosive areas in the world, the area where the United States and Russia are, I would say, closer to a confrontation than in any other area—the area which might lead to a very serious conflict between these two super-powers, neither of which wants it.

So I regret very much that this amendment is offered, and I think the Senator from Louisiana is quite correct.

## 233

### **Letter from Premier Meir of Israel to Chairman Senghor of the Organization of African Unity Subcommittee on the Middle East, in Response to That Committee's Settlement Proposals<sup>1</sup>**

**Jerusalem, November 28, 1971**

Allow me to express to you, as well as to your eminent colleagues on the Committee of Ten African Heads of State, and more especially to the Subcommittee of Four, presided over by yourself, my deepest appreciation for the sincere and devoted efforts you have made towards bringing about peace in the Middle East by means of a resumption of negotiations.

In reply to your request, and following the clarifications of the Israeli position which I transmitted orally to you, as they appear

in the official report, I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the views of the Israeli government on the suggestions contained in the Committee of Ten's memorandum which you, Mr. President, delivered to me on November 24, 1971.

These views are as follows:

A. Israel accepts the resumption, without preconditions, of negotiations under Dr. Jarring's auspices and on the terms of Resolution 242, with a view to reaching a peace agreement. This was made clear to Dr. Jarring in August 1970.

B. Israel accepts that a Suez Canal agreement should be worked out, whose details should be negotiated and accepted by common agreement. Israel will be prepared, in the framework of negotiations for such a settlement, to discuss measures aimed at ensuring control of and respect for the Suez Canal settlement.

C. Israel accepts that secure and recognized boundaries should be determined by negotiations between the parties and should be incorporated into the peace agreement.

D. Israel accepts that, besides determining secure and recognized boundaries based on a common agreement, other arrangements for ensuring security could be negotiated.

E. Israel accepts that conditions of withdrawal to boundaries negotiated and established by mutual agreement should be incorporated in the peace treaty.

F. The question of Sharm el-Sheikh will be included in the peace negotiations, as specified in Paragraph C above. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 242, freedom of navigation through all international waterways, such as the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, will be provided for in the peace agreement for all ships and all cargo, including those of Israel.

Allow me, Mr. President, to reiterate how happy we were to welcome you and your eminent colleagues to Jerusalem and to have had frank and explicit discussions with you in a spirit of friendship and in a common search for peace.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept my warmest best wishes and sincere esteem,  
Golda Meir

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of Meir's letter as published in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, No. 375 (January 17–23, 1972), p. 54; © *Le Nouvel Observateur*; reprinted by permission.

## 234

# **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Iraq of President Barreh of Somalia (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, November 30, 1971**

At the official invitation of Mr. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Iraqi Republic, Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh, President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, paid a friendly visit to the Iraqi Republic November 22–24, 1971, accompanied by a number of Somali ministers and senior officials.

In the course of a review of the grave situation in the Arab area resulting from continued Israeli imperialist aggression against the Palestinian people and the sister Arab countries, the two sides affirmed their support for Arab armed struggle to liquidate the aggression. They also declare their full support for the Palestine revolution, as represented by the resistance organizations, in its just struggle to liberate the territory of Palestine and to safeguard all the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost of which is their natural right to self-determination in their land of Palestine, and to resist all imperialist and reactionary schemes aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem.

The two sides hold the United States of America responsible for continued Zionist

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), December 1, 1971.

Immediately after his visit to Iraq, President Barreh visited Syria (November 24–26); the resulting joint communiqué, issued in Damascus on November 30 (see *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 1, 1971) expresses Syrian-Somali agreement on Israel's colonialist character and the necessity to battle against it. Somali Foreign Minister Omar Ghalib had visited Syria August 28–31, 1971; the resulting communiqué issued in Damascus August 31 (see *al-Baath*, September 1, 1971) also affirmed Somali support in the Arab struggle against Zionism.

aggression, because of the constant comprehensive military and economic aid it supplies to the Zionist entity.

## 235

# **Statements by President Losonczi of Hungary Calling for Full Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Arab Territory and for the Restoration of the Legitimate Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>2</sup>**

**Algiers, November 30, 1971**

The Hungarian government and the Hungarian people, in spite of their limited resources, think it important to participate in solving complicated international problems and in relieving the tensions that threaten world peace, and from the start we have unequivocally and unanimously criticized Israeli aggression. We have severed our diplomatic relations with Israel and have always utterly rejected all attempts calculated to make the occupation and the consequences of the aggression a *fait accompli*. We affirm that the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories is essential and demand the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

As you know, in our view there is still a possibility of a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis, and we regard it our duty to compell the aggressor and those who support him to implement the Security Council resolution [of November 22, 1967] fully and unconditionally. This can be achieved by the unification of the forces of the socialist countries and the progressive Arab countries and by the decisive rejection of the maneuvers of the imperialists and their allies, the Israelis,

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Losonczi's speech at a reception given in his honour during an official visit to Algeria, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), December 1, 1971. The joint communiqué marking Losonczi's visit was issued in Algiers on December 3 (see *al-Shaab*, December 4, 1971).

who constantly postpone the solution of the problem. Our enemies are well aware of the importance of the unity between the socialist countries and the progressive Arab countries, and are therefore misrepresenting our cooperation and sowing suspicions in the Arab countries as regards the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries.

Mr. President:

We are aware of and highly appreciate your decisive opposition to the ideas of the Israeli aggressor and his allies and we have great respect for your attitude which, based on principle, is opposed to all the maneuvers of imperialism aimed at misrepresenting the cooperation between the socialist countries and the progressive Arab countries.

## 236

### **Speech by U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home Reviewing Anglo-Israel Relations and Setting Forth British Views on the Requirements for a Middle East Peace Which Would Assure Israeli Security<sup>1</sup>**

London, November 30, 1971

Your Excellencies, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject in our minds tonight is the cause of Anglo-Israel friendship, the cause to which your association is dedicated, a cause which your guest of honour epitomises in himself and for which he works so hard. This is the first time any British Government has been the host to a Foreign Minister of Israel. But Mr. Eban is no stranger. He has family ties with this country, he has many friends here, he had a most distinguished career as an undergraduate and research fellow at Cambridge (of course the wrong university), and he has often visited London

during his travels. We are very happy that this time he has brought with him his charming wife.

You, Minister, are visiting us at a time when both our countries are thinking very much about patterns of life for our countries for the future. We in Britain are about to embark on an entirely new phase in our national history, a phase when, as a member of the EEC, we shall be in and of Europe in quite a new sense. You in Israel are looking for the avenue which will lead to your goals of peace and security. This latter problem has of course bulked largest in our talks together and I will return to it in a minute.

Happily in our bilateral relations there is not a great need for discussion, for relations between our two countries are good. Politically, we see eye to eye on many of the problems which beset the world. Culturally, the bonds which link us are as strong as ever. Many thousands of Israelis visit this country every year, and as many, if not more, people from this country visit Israel. Our trade flourishes, in both directions. Although our entry into the EEC may bring changes, the markets both in this country, and in other advanced industrial countries, are expanding, and I believe you will prove more than capable of holding your own. It is very much our wish that you should do so. This will be prominent in our minds when we discuss these matters within the community.

So to the subject which, I am certain, preoccupies us all the most: peace in the Middle East.

Let me start by repeating what I said recently in Cairo: that we want peace in the Middle East. There are many reasons why we do so. We want peace because we believe that there must be peace if Israel and the other countries of the region are to win the prosperity and social cohesion which they deserve, for which they have the potential. We want peace because we hate the waste—of resources, but above all of lives—which war brings. We want peace because we know that peace brings trade, and trade profits us all. Finally, we want peace because the question of peace or war in the Middle East

<sup>1</sup> Advance text of Douglas-Home's speech at a dinner given by the Anglo-Israel Association in honor of visiting Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, London Press Service, Verbatim Service 363/71, November 30, 1971; provided, on request, by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.



bears on the security of the whole international community.

But how is peace to be achieved? It cannot be imposed. It is for the parties to agree on the terms. Their friends can only help by offering honest advice, and it is the part of a true friend to do this.

Let me start by saying that we stand with Israel when she claims the right to security. Rights, however, both for the individual in society and for nations internationally, must be protected, by the law or by some other effective mechanism, if they are to be enjoyed. How is Israel's right to security to be protected? In our view, there are three ways in which this should be done.

The first is through the conclusion of peace agreements—not just armistice agreements, or anything provisional of that nature—between Israel and each of her four neighbours. These peace agreements would be permanent, formal and binding. Those who entered into them would be engaging themselves and their reputations to carry them out and to defend them. But governments and statesmen, you may say—and experience sadly bears it out—are not permanencies in office. Something more is needed—an incentive in self-interest to observe the obligations entered into.

This leads me to the second point: the definition in these peace agreements of permanent frontiers, agreed between Israel and each of her four neighbours. This act of definition would create the "recognised boundaries" called for in the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

Would they also be secure? That would depend on two things: first, on the attitudes which would develop as a result of the conclusion of peace agreements, and secondly, on the sum of satisfaction of the parties in the boundaries, on their self-interest in observing the agreed frontiers. I say "sum" because the boundaries would not be secure if the total satisfaction of one party were to be balanced—perhaps I should say neutralised—by the total dissatisfaction of one or more of the others.

The third way is through physical arrangements designed to reduce the risks of

violation, to remove particular points of fear and to build up confidence; in particular there should be commitments and arrangements to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israeli ships through the waterways of the region. I do not want to speculate about the possible nature of these arrangements. But they would certainly have to be reliable in a way which the arrangements which existed before 1967 were not.

Those, then, are the three principal ways in which we believe that Israel's security ought to be assured. My list is not exhaustive, but I hope that you will think it covers the essentials. And out of the confidence established by these political acts and arrangements, changed attitudes could develop, so that true peace, rooted in the heart, could grow.

I now return to the question I asked at the outset: how is that peace to be achieved? It may have to be achieved step by step. Indeed, this is an approach which has recently seemed to offer the best prospect of making progress. But, whatever the approach, I believe that three conditions have to be fulfilled if peace arrangements are to be concluded and if a state of peace is to come into being.

The first condition is, to quote a phrase I used in speaking to the General Assembly, that dialogue must supplant confrontation. In private life, people cannot agree, let alone resolve disputes, unless they communicate. And letters written by solicitors are not expensive but tend to lead to confrontation in court. The same applies to states in international relations.

The second condition is that proposals must be made. No dispute, or conflict, is ever settled if the parties wait for one another. If the parties to the conflict in the Middle East want a settlement, if they want peace—which I believe that they do—then proposals must be made. Offers must replace questions. The affirmative must replace the interrogative.

The third condition is that the existing framework for a settlement—the Security Council resolution of November 1967—must be respected and made use of. The resolution may not be perfect. But to discard the

resolution, or to tamper with it, would, in my view, be a retrograde step. We should stick to the resolution and, in sticking to it, we should seek the practical measures to apply it.

The situation in the Middle East is tense. A debate on this situation is about to begin in the General Assembly. We hope that the debate will help to relieve the situation and to improve the climate for progress towards peace. We, for our part, will do all in our power to work for a positive and constructive outcome. And, looking rather further ahead, may I assure you that you will always find us ranged with those who are working for peace.

## 237

### **Statements on French Middle East Policy by Foreign Minister Schumann of France in Reply to Questions Put to Him by Members of the Senate<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, December 1, 1971

In the event of a resumption of armed conflict in the Middle East, all we shall be able to do is to join our efforts to those of the other powers in an attempt to stop it as quickly as possible; but what can we hope to achieve against an Israel armed—what shall I say?—over-armed, by the United States, and maintaining its superiority of armaments, and an Egypt equally over-armed by the U.S.S.R.?

In the meantime we must make every effort to secure the implementation not only of the resolution adopted last year by a two-thirds majority of the United Nations General Assembly, but also of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on November

22, 1967. This resolution can be interpreted in various ways. Some claim that Israel must evacuate all the territories it has conquered by force, others contend that it must evacuate only part of them. But in the case of Egypt there is no doubt: The United States, like France, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., consider that all its territory must be evacuated. No doubt the responsibility for the failure of efforts to enforce Resolution 242 is shared. We have done everything to support the United States in the quest for an interim solution. Unfortunately, this quest has not succeeded, although no great power—I am thinking of course of the U.S.S.R.—has impeded it. The United Nations debate remains, but we do not think that, even enlightened by the advice of the four African wise men, the debate can move the conflict to any considerable degree towards its solution.

The solution is the resumption of the Jarring mission, based on Resolution 242 and this object will certainly be furthered by the talks of the Four. Indeed, this has always been the sole object of these talks. According to the latest news, disturbed as he is by President Sadat's latest speech and by the failure of the search for an interim solution, Mr. Jarring intends to make new proposals. We shall do everything in our power to help.

France has always intended to refund the price of the Mirages; it has never felt that it could refuse to deliver them and yet hold on to the price paid for them. When the President of the Republic paid an official visit to the United States, he made a speech on television, a very brilliant one too, in which he specifically stated: "I am ready to start repayment tomorrow morning." The new fact is that Israel has agreed to negotiate this repayment—after all, the negotiations have only just started. In passing I should mention that the Mirages will be taken back by the French Army, so that there is no chance of their appearing on the field of battle, in either of the two camps.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the excerpts in French of Schumann's replies to senators' questions in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd Semester 1971 (Paris: Documentation française, 1972), pp. 241, 244, 246.

... It is also to be hoped that the United

Nations' efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East will lead to the success of the Jarring mission. We have maintained our policy of friendship with the Arab world and, without in any way repudiating our principles we are, in the general interest, examining ways and means of normalizing our relations with Israel.

## 238

**Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Denmark of U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Copenhagen, December 5, 1971**

Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, paid an official visit to Denmark from December 2 to 5, 1971, at the invitation of the Danish government.

The two sides expressed their concern over the continued tension in the Middle East. All countries should exert efforts for the speediest possible settlement of this conflict. The sides stressed that the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, continued to form the basis for a firm and lasting peace in the Middle East and, with due consideration for this, supported the mission of the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring.

## 239

**U.S. Television Interview with Premier Meir of Israel Expressing Her Country's Rejection of Any Commitment To Evacuate Occupied Territories, Her Need for U.S. Aircraft, and Her Refusal To Withdraw from the Suez Canal Before the Elimination of Any Possibility of Renewed Hostilities<sup>2</sup>**

**Washington, December 5, 1971**

*Mr. Valeriani: Madam Prime Minister, in your talks with President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers, did you get a hard commitment for the additional Phantom jets that Israel wants?*

*Mrs. Meir: It has always been our policy never to discuss the question of delivery of Phantoms, planes or any other war material in public. It becomes a public issue when the delivery is stopped. I have taken up this problem naturally with the Secretary and with the President. I don't think I can say or should say exactly what they said.*

*Mr. Valeriani: The delivery was stopped and had become a public issue?*

*Mrs. Meir: That is right.*

*Mr. Valeriani: Will the delivery start again?*

*Mrs. Meir: I hope.*

*Mr. Valeriani: Do you have assurances on that?*

*Mrs. Meir: That I can't say.*

*Mr. Valeriani: Do you believe that the balance of power can be maintained in the Middle East without additional Phantoms being delivered to Israel?*

*Mrs. Meir: No, it cannot. When the people speak about the balance of power, I don't know whether they are always conscious of what the balance of power really is. We don't have a situation where Egypt has "x" planes—I am not even speaking about all the Arab countries, who when there is war, they join in—but let*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué as published in *Soviet News*, No. 5617 (December 7, 1971), pp. 395, 395-396.

<sup>2</sup> Transcript of Meir's interview on the National Broadcasting Company's program "Meet the Press" as published by Merkle Press, Inc.; text provided, on request, by Merkle Press for NBC.

us take Egypt alone, when Egypt has "x" planes, Israel has "x" planes: if Egypt gets one more plane, then the balance of power is upset and Israel should get one plane. Of course, all that is nonsense. It is never matched. We never asked for that. There is a certain limit where if that is upset, with the much smaller number of planes and tanks and guns and manpower that we have, if that is upset, then it becomes dangerous, and we feel that since Egypt is being supplied constantly with arms, more and better, and having the delivery of planes stopped to us, well then it becomes a dangerous situation.

*Mr. Valeriani:* But is it a dangerous situation, now; has that limit been reached?

*Mrs. Meir:* We believe it has. Dangerous in what way? If, for instance, Sadat should do what he has said he will and begin shooting, there is no doubt in our minds that we can take care of that too, but if we are short of planes, as we think we are, this will mean many more casualties than we would have if we had enough air material.

*Mr. Trewitt:* *Mrs. Meir, given your unreadiness to discuss in detail the military nature of your discussions here, we on the outside are left with the feeling that not very much has happened while you have been in Washington, yet I am sure that is not the case. What do you think has been accomplished by your trip this time?*

*Mrs. Meir:* I hope it is not the case. There were two things that I wanted to clear up. Maybe it should be under one heading, really. What we are asking, since we want to negotiate peace, is that when we go into negotiations we should have a fair chance, both politically and on the military side. What does it mean? It means that nobody—I am speaking about our friends, we have no case with those who are opposed to us—that our friends should not take a public position as to what the result of these negotiations should be. On borders, for instance, we should be allowed to negotiate freely with our neighbors and through negotiations and an agreement reach a point where we have the borders that we and our neighbors can agree upon. If our friends take a public position and the Arab states know that Soviet Russia

is with them 100 percent—China now, yes—and the United States, too, on what the borders should be, why should they negotiate with us at all? And if at the same time our neighbors know that we are becoming weaker as far as military capacity is concerned, there is an additional reason that they should not negotiate with us. So all we are asking is for a fair chance of free negotiation.

*Mr. Trewitt:* *In that context, Mrs. Meir, I wonder if just for the sake of discussion, of obtaining an interim solution to the Suez Canal, for example, if Israel would be prepared to, say, withdraw to the Mitla Pass area in the Sinai Peninsula, and perhaps negotiate with the Egyptians through an intermediary, what we have come to call the proximity sessions, that is a third party moving back and forth between the two principal parties in hotels somewhere.*

*Mrs. Meir:* In one hotel.

*Mr. Trewitt:* In one hotel.

*Mrs. Meir:* Actually this is not the only question that is outstanding on the question of the Suez Canal arrangement. There is the question, when we step back from the best line that we can ever have as long as there is no peace, from our fortifications on the Suez Canal, fortifications that held up under the war of attrition for over a year, and if we say voluntarily, we will step back and there is still no peace, in order to try and see whether a better atmosphere can be created for negotiations, that is a question—if we step back, do we comply with the wish and condition of President Sadat that we step back from our fortifications and the Egyptian army crosses the canal.

The exercise is to have the armies farther apart if possible. We are now there. We are on one side of the canal, the Egyptian army is on the other side of the canal. What kind of arrangement is this that we step back from our fortifications and they immediately come over? Never mind we will sit in proximity in a hotel; no war will happen out of that. But if the Egyptian army comes, instead of being on the other side of the canal, there is too much proximity over there.

Then there is a question, do they go on threatening us with: If you don't do this

we will begin shooting again. Or is there a stopping of shooting and we just sit down in negotiations? One of the elements is how far we should withdraw from the Suez canal area when there is still no peace.

*Mr. Evans: Madam Prime Minister, your Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, used to say after the Six Day War, before negotiations started and before there was a cease-fire, if only the Egyptians would state their willingness to make peace with Israel, many things could happen. President Sadat said on February 16 of this year, Mrs. Meir: "The UAR—" that is Egypt—"will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" if Israel withdraws from the captured territories of Egypt, that is to say, the Sinai Peninsula.*

*Do you think he meant that?*

*Mrs. Meir: He probably did. Why shouldn't he? If he did, if we withdraw to the international borders he doesn't have to negotiate with us. He put a condition on entering into negotiations for a peace agreement, and we say, no condition. If his position is that we should go back to the pre-Fifth of June borders, that is perfectly all right, but let's negotiate.*

*Mr. Evans: To what stage of withdrawal would Israel be willing to commit itself if not to the old boundary?*

*Mrs. Meir: We do not commit ourselves to anything without negotiations. We are prepared to sit down as we were before, to go back to Dr. Jarring's negotiations, today, within an hour, on one condition, that there are no pre-conditions, not from us to them nor from them to us.*

*Mr. Evans: But, Madam Prime Minister, if Egypt now occupied a small portion of Israel, would you consider an agreement to demilitarize that portion of Israel on the basis of Egypt's withdrawal? Because that is the condition that you put to the Egyptians.*

*Mrs. Meir: We put no condition whatsoever to the Egyptians. We have never put a condition to them, and we are not putting a condition to them. In our answer to Dr. Jarring's proposition, a letter that we sent on the 26th of February that I have here with me, it says definitely we are prepared, we are*

*anxious and asking Dr. Jarring to go on with his activities, with no pre-conditions from any side. We never made a pre-condition.*

*Mr. Evans: Would you allow Egyptian forces then to cross the canal if there were a settlement of the Sinai?*

*Mrs. Meir: When we come to a settlement?*

*Mr. Evans: Yes.*

*Mrs. Meir: We never said that our line, our cease-fire line is to be considered a final border, never.*

*Mr. Evans: You would allow Egyptian forces if there were a settlement, to take positions in the Sinai.*

*Mrs. Meir: When we make a settlement we decide where our line is and we move towards that line.*

*Mr. Smith: Mrs. Meir, we have heard a great deal over the past months about 1971, particularly from President Sadat, as being a year of decision, a year when the negotiating track must be played out and must succeed or fail. I wonder if you would give us your personal assessment of the probability of fighting, even limited fighting, limited military activity breaking out in the Suez Canal shortly after the turn of the year?*

*Mrs. Meir: This morning I don't know whom to believe, President Sadat or Foreign Minister Riad. I watched him on the program this morning, and he wasn't prepared to say that what President Sadat said is exactly what he meant to say. I don't know.*

*We have often had experience with our neighbors to our sorrow—I think also to their sorrow—that they become eventually slaves of their own words. They have said something and repeated it. President Sadat went to his various groups in the army, he met his air force, and he said the decision has been taken: we will meet in the Sinai.*

*Well, it is better than what the late President Nasser said in '67: we will meet in Tel Aviv. Now he says we will meet in the Sinai. Whether he means it or not or whether he—I believe that he knows as well as we do, he cannot win. No military activities from our neighbors can solve any problem.*

But we are not anxious to win again. We hope that President Sadat will think once more and will be prepared to come to the negotiating table direct or indirect with no pre-conditions, and in that way the problems can be solved.

*Mr. Smith: I wonder if perhaps, as even a way of preventing fighting from breaking out, if it isn't in Israel's interests to extend herself a bit to at least enter into negotiations, let's say interim negotiations. You were talking before about pre-conditions and problems they pose, and yet doesn't Israel always have the option if the negotiations are unsatisfactory to withdraw short of an agreement? Isn't that always open?*

*Mrs. Meir:* But, Mr. Smith, when have we refused to go to negotiations? Never. Except when Mr. Sadat says, "Now before we negotiate, sign on the dotted line."

We have never asked him to sign on the dotted line.

*Mr. Smith: Why is it not possible for Israel simply to say, "We reject any and all pre-conditions, we will go into negotiations making it clear that we do not accept any pre-conditions set by anyone," and begin to discuss the matter, and if it is not resolved through an equitable reasonable solution, then step back from those negotiations and say, "No, we cannot agree."*

*Mrs. Meir:* Wonderful. This is exactly what we say. In our letter of the 26th of February to Dr. Jarring, we ended the letter saying, "The government of Israel believes that now that the UAR has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions, so as to cover all the points listed in the respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement."

*Mr. Smith: What I am merely suggesting is perhaps Israel could disclaim those pre-conditions that you find unacceptable and go into negotiations despite them, having said to the world that you will not accept them.*

*Mrs. Meir:* That is exactly what this says. We have been asking Dr. Jarring—now look

what happened: Sadat wrote a letter and said—by the way, he didn't accept one single point in Dr. Jarring's letter, except this question of withdrawal—and he says he is prepared to enter into a peace agreement with Israel on condition if Israel commits itself beforehand to withdraw to the Fourth of June line.

We said all right. This is what we say. We asked Dr. Jarring: Don't accept his condition. See that as the Egyptian position. And we have put before you our position, not a condition; now let us negotiate. That is exactly that what we said, exactly what you are suggesting.

*Mr. Valeriani: But, Mrs. Meir, in that same letter you say Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 line. That is a flat statement. Isn't that obviously a pre-condition? You are saying flatly you will not do that?*

*Mrs. Meir:* No, we did not say that unless President Sadat accepts this, that we do not withdraw to the '67 line, we won't negotiate. That is exactly what we said. We have put our position. We say we will not withdraw to the '67 line. President Sadat says we should. Exactly. This is the point to be negotiated.

*Mr. Valeriani: Is it conceivable that during a negotiation then you would agree to withdraw to the pre-June 5th lines?*

*Mrs. Meir:* If I tell you now whether we will or not, this means that we have, before negotiations, decided something.

Mr. Valeriani, after what happened in '67, and despite what we heard this morning from the Foreign Minister of Egypt, saying that we made war, of course, on the 26th of May, before the Trade Union Congress in Cairo, the late President Nasser said, "The object of the war will be the destruction of Israel."

Now, thank God he didn't succeed.

After all this that has happened and we remained alive and the State of Israel is intact, haven't we a right to a position to think that those borders were not good enough? We didn't break them. But supposing people think we are wrong. Supposing Sadat says that he cannot accept it. Well, let's negotiate.

*Mr. Valeriani: But is it conceivable that you*

*will negotiate that too without saying that you will do it?*

*Mrs. Meir:* Everything is negotiable.

*Mr. Valeriani:* Including the 1967 line?

*Mrs. Meir:* We are not promising anything beforehand. Everything is negotiable. This is our position.

*Mr. Trehwitt:* *Mrs. Meir, because of this overwhelming emphasis on negotiations, could I come back to the specific of one of our previous questions here? Would Israel be willing to start this process through this so-called proximity process with a third party marching back and forth between hotel rooms or whatever—in other words, indirect negotiations but on the same side?*

*Mrs. Meir:* We really do not believe that the major problem is whether we are in one hotel or, God forbid, in two hotels across the road or a block away. The question is what are we going to negotiate there.

Look, when we say that we make no pre-conditions, ask for no pre-conditions or pre-commitments when we negotiate a final peace solution, why do we do that and why should we do it; why should the other side do it? Nothing happens on the ground. Right? We stay where we are; the Egyptians stand where they are. We negotiate and as long as we negotiate nobody moves.

On this principle that an Israeli soldier—Israeli forces—do not move away from the ceasefire lines before there is a peace treaty, we have the support of your government and of many governments in the world.

When we say that in order to go through this—implement this project of opening the Suez Canal—actually the Suez Canal can be opened even if we are on the line. We never closed it. But we said, all right, that we can understand; for Sadat it is facesaving, prestige, call it whatever you want. If we move away, it will be easier for him. Fine. But if he says he is going to cross, then it isn't a question of negotiating how many soldiers will cross. Then why should we move away? When we move away, his soldiers will cross and occupy our fortifications, those that we have built with effort and with so much money? What sense does that make?

Therefore, we say we are prepared to

move away from our lines, but no crossing, no threatening that if he doesn't like it after three months he begins shooting again. As long as there is a danger of shooting, this is the best line that we can possibly have. It is not because we are afraid of losing a war. We don't want any of our boys to die. We have no joy, believe me, in shooting Egyptian boys.

*Mr. Monroe:* *We have about three minutes left.*

*Mr. Evans:* *Prime Minister, back on the question of Phantoms, you realize, I'm sure, that American interests and Israeli interests cannot be totally coinciding in the Middle East. We have our deep interest with the Arab states and with Israel, of course, but don't you think that if President Nixon should suddenly open up the Phantom pipeline while you occupy one-twelfth of Egypt's territory, it would appear we were underwriting your security in occupied territories?*

*Mrs. Meir:* Mr. Evans, maybe you should ask your President that. Your President has over and over again said that he is going to see to it that the balance of power between Israel and Egypt should not be upset. Evidently he does not think that when he doesn't weaken Israel he is doing something which is against American interests.

*Mr. Evans:* *What I meant I guess, Mrs. Meir, was this: that the talk about Israel's security, while she is in possession of such large amounts of territory belonging to other states is difficult to understand, because your Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Allon, said in September, "Israel will again be victorious," as you have just said here, "if a new war breaks out in the Middle East."*

*Mrs. Meir:* If a new war breaks out how?

*Mr. Evans:* *He didn't say.*

*Mrs. Meir:* But I will say it, and you know that he meant that, too: if we are attacked again.

*Mr. Evans:* *When did Egypt last attack Israel?*

*Mrs. Meir:* In '67.

*Mr. Evans:* *Did she invade?*

*Mrs. Meir:* And in '69, in the war of attrition, in violation of the cease fire agree-

ment resolution of the Security Council agreed to by the members.

*Mr. Smith: Mrs. Meir, it seems—I think one can sense it in your answers today—that there is obviously a rather basic philosophical and even practical difference between your view and that of the Nixon Administration in how to approach negotiations, in what contributes to security, an evaluation of Israel's security or the state of it at this moment.*

*I wonder whether you got at any of those differences in your talks with President Nixon and whether or not they were resolved in any way?*

*Mr. Monroe: We have time for a brief answer.*

*Mrs. Meir: I would not accept that there is a difference, philosophical or practical, between Mr. Nixon and ourselves on these basic questions.*

## 240

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Norway of Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Oslo, December 7, 1971**

Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, visited Norway from December 5 to December 7, 1971, at the invitation of the Norwegian government.

. . . . .

Both sides expressed anxiety over the still unresolved conflict in the Middle East. They stressed the need for constructive measures on the part of all states with the aim of reaching a just and lasting political settlement. They reaffirmed their support for the United Nations Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and for Ambassador Jarring's mission as special envoy of the United Nations secretary-general.

. . . . .

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of the communiqué as published in *Soviet News*, No. 5618 (December 14, 1971), p. 409.

## 241

### **G.D.R. Government Cable Statement on the Middle East Urging a Peaceful Settlement and Condemning Israel for Her Refusal To Withdraw from Occupied Arab Territory<sup>2</sup>**

**Berlin, December 7, 1971**

The Government of the German Democratic Republic takes occasion of the consideration of the situation in the Middle East by the Twenty-sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly to confirm its view that the Middle East conflict which has been in existence since Israel, on 5 June 1967, started its aggression against the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, gravely endangers world peace and obstructs international détente.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has followed with great attention the efforts made by the United Nations Organization to help bring about a lasting and just peace settlement in the Middle East.

Responsibility for the failure to this date of these efforts lies with the government of Israel and the imperialist circles backing it. Israel refuses to withdraw its troops from the Arab territories it has occupied since the aggression. This is incompatible with the generally recognized principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations which prohibit occupation and acquisition of foreign territories by means of force.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic advocates a political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. It considers that the complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, recognition of and respect for, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Arab states and for the legitimate rights of their respective peoples, including the Arab

<sup>2</sup> Text of G.D.R. cable to U.N. General Assembly on the occasion of the Assembly debate on the Middle East; circulated as U.N. Document A/8586.



people of Palestine, are preconditions for the creation of a stable and just peace order in the Middle East.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic would welcome it if the United Nations General Assembly would take effective decisions to get the aggressor, Israel, to implement Security Council Resolution 242. The Government of the GDR will support as much as it can any decision of the United Nations General Assembly which would serve to safeguard the sovereign rights of the Arab states and to restore peace in the Middle East.

I request Your Excellency to bring this statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the notice of the United Nations Member-States as an official document of the General Assembly.

## 242

### **Commentary in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda on U.S. Agreement To Resume Aircraft Deliveries to Israel and Other Consequences of the U.S. Visit of Premier Meir of Israel (Condensed)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, December 9, 1971**

The Washington Post, citing authoritative sources, reports that the United States has agreed to resume deliveries to Israel of Skyhawk combat aircraft. This report was issued after the conclusion of negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and officials in the U.S. administration.

Judging by Israeli press comments, the upshot of these negotiations is not restricted to an accord on the delivery of aircraft. It is a matter of agreement on a broad range of

problems, agreement which, observers believe, confirms the identity of aims of American and Israeli policies in the Near East. "Meir apparently got as much as one could expect," the Tel Aviv newspaper Davar stated. "One can draw the conclusion that Israel has been assured of continued American aid, but it can also be understood that Washington is not interested in widely publicizing that fact."

The latter remark is significant. The fact is that in recent months American diplomacy has been trying to look as if it has a "balanced policy" vis-à-vis Israel and the Arab countries. To give these assurances verisimilitude, the American press emphasizes differences that have allegedly complicated Washington's relations with Tel Aviv and, at the same time, advertises in every way steps purportedly taken by the State Department to solve the Near East crisis . . .

The Arab capitals, as one can judge by press statements, are aware that the activity of American diplomacy is not aimed at a search for a path to peace but is merely a smokescreen for the Israeli ally's aggressive intentions. Indeed, American aid by itself enables Israel to refuse to comply with the well-known Security Council resolution, which Israeli Foreign Minister Eban questioned at the present General Assembly session. Yet, if this resolution were implemented, it would be immediately possible to restore peace and justice in the Near East and to remove the danger of a new outburst.

<sup>1</sup> Condensed and translated from the Russian commentary by P. Demchenko (*Pravda*, December 9, 1971, p. 5), *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, 49 (January 4, 1972), p. 33. Translation copyright 1972 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

## 243

**Statements Expressing the View That Israel Must Withdraw from Occupied Arab Territories and Supporting the Endeavors of Egypt To Achieve Peace, Made by President Tito to a Joint Session of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia<sup>1</sup>**

Belgrade, December 16, 1971

The talks I had with President Sadat on my return trip from Iran and India have shown that the situation in the Middle East can again become extremely dangerous. Israel vigorously rejects even a gradual settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis. On this occasion, as well as during my visit in February this year, I gained direct assurance of the readiness and determination of the Arab Republic of Egypt to achieve peace in this region. The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has devoted much effort to this end and given several initiatives. It was willing, for example, to conclude an agreement on the opening up of the Suez Canal and agree to a six month cease fire, provided that the first stage in the withdrawal of Israeli troops to about 60 kilometers from the Canal be carried out simultaneously. And this would, as the beginning of a global solution, enable freedom of passage and contribute to the undertaking of new measures aimed at a final settlement.

I extended support to President Sadat in his endeavours, and in his staunch resolve to persevere in the demand for the withdrawal of Israel to its frontiers, because the aggressor must not be rewarded by the annexation of alien territories.

The Resolution just adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which unequivocally demands the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories expresses the demand of the international community that urgent, decisive steps be taken in the settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis. This Resolution likewise testifies to the isolation

of Israel in its opposition to the peaceful endeavours and to the quest of a political solution.

## 244

**Statement Issued by the Archbishop of Canterbury Calling for a Halt to Israel's Building Program in Jerusalem and Reasserting That the City Belongs to Christians and Muslims As Well As to Jews<sup>2</sup>**

December 16, 1971

I write some days before Christmas, at a time when we long that the Light of Bethlehem will scatter the darkness of fear, selfishness, division and war in the world into which Christ came. If men and women will receive it, the Light of Bethlehem can shew them the immensity of God's self-giving love, and can lead them into a new self-giving towards Him and towards one another which might transform the human scene.

Lately the tragedy of India and Pakistan, and the tragedy of Northern Ireland have in their different ways occupied the minds of all of us. I mention now another tragedy: Jerusalem.

It is not my purpose to suggest the lines on which peace in the Middle East might be secured. Nor shall I attempt to evaluate past injustices, in which Christians as well as Jews and Moslems have through the centuries had their share. There can be none of us who has not been moved by the sufferings of the Jews in Europe in the past, or by the more recent sufferings of Arabs who have lived for years as homeless refugees. The way to peace is not to dwell upon the past, but to act as justly as possible for the future and to avoid actions which are bound to contain the seed of future conflict.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text of Tito's report on Yugoslav foreign policy, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXII, 521 (December 20, 1971), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Text of press statement issued by Archbishop Ramsay as published in *Middle East International*, No. 10 (January, 1972), pp. 36-37.

The old city of Jerusalem is sacred to Jews, to Christians and to Moslems. Each of these religions respects the devotion to Jerusalem felt by the others. It is a city which belongs to all three; and the practical recognition of this by whoever at any time rules or controls the city is essential for peace. It is good that at this time all three religions are given access to their holy places.

We know that the Israeli government is striving to provide good housing for the people. It is, however, distressing indeed that the building programme of the present authorities is disfiguring the city and its surroundings in ways which wound the feelings of those who care for its historic beauty and suggest an insensitive attempt to proclaim as an Israeli city one which can never be other than the city of three great religions and their peoples. Christians must be concerned that the city should retain, and be seen to the eye to retain, that character. Unless it does, the prospects for peace are severely damaged.

I hope that by calling a halt to the building programme, there may be one welcome step towards the peace of Jerusalem.

We pray for the peace of Jerusalem, and for the peace of all the nations.

MICHAEL CANTUAR

## 245

### **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.S.S.R. of President al-Ariani of North Yemen (Sanaa) (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, December 18, 1971**

Abdurrahman Al-Ariani, President of the Republican Council of the Yemeni Arab Republic, was on an official friendly visit in the Soviet Union between December 7 and 18, 1971, at the invitation of the Presid-

ium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government.

Special attention was given to consideration of the Middle East situation which remains complex and tense.

The Sides emphatically condemned the aggressive expansionist policy of Israel which relies on the active support of international imperialism and Zionism, first of all American imperialism. Sabotaging United Nations resolutions and flouting universally accepted norms of international law, Israel seeks to retain the captured Arab territories, thereby creating a dangerous hotbed of tension in the Middle East and aggravating the international situation.

The Sides expressed firm conviction that the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of Arab countries would facilitate the speediest overcoming of the aftermath of the Israeli aggression.

The Soviet Union and the Yemeni Arab Republic believe that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be ensured provided Israel withdraws all its troops from all Arab territories it occupied in 1967.

It was also noted that the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs for the restoration of their lawful rights enjoys the invariable support of the Soviet Union and the Yemeni Arab Republic.

The Sides back the constructive stand of the Arab Republic of Egypt and its initiatives for the settlement of the Middle East crisis that provide a favourable basis for eliminating the seat of tension and for establishing a firm and just peace in the Middle East.

The President of the Republican Council of the Yemeni Arab Republic Abdurrahman Al-Ariani expressed feelings of cordial gratitude to the Soviet Union for its active and consistent support of the just struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialist Israeli aggression.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English translation of the Russian text of the communiqué (*Pravda*, December 20, 1971), *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 52 (December 25, 1971), pp. 3, 4.

## 246

**Report of the Near East Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Including Recommendations for U.S. Policy Regarding Approaches to Peace, the Palestinians, Jerusalem, Commitment to Israel, Arms Limitations, the Suez Canal, NATO in the East Mediterranean, and the Gulf After British Withdrawal<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 21, 1971

*I. THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE*

In examining the current stalemate situation, the subcommittee concentrated on the military relationships in the area and the diplomatic efforts to reach an interim settlement.

A. THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

It was the intent of members of the subcommittee to find out the precise nature of and trends in the military balance between Israel and Egypt in particular, the extent of Soviet military involvement in the area, the differences in defensive and offensive capacities and capabilities of the armed forces of countries in the region and the necessity of U.S. military aid and sales to countries in the area.

1. Since the 1967 war, the power relationship in the Middle East has shifted slightly. Even though total Arab forces vastly outnumber Israeli forces, Israel is generally regarded as having qualitative ground force superiority over the combined ground forces of all her Arab neighbors. But the massive inflow of sophisticated Soviet aircraft and air-defense systems with missiles to Arab States, especially Egypt, since the 1967 war and, more particularly, since 1970, has tended to neutralize the overwhelming air offensive superiority that Israel had in the 1967 war.

2. Israel today maintains air capabilities sufficient to thwart an Arab air offensive.

3. Because of its technology and highly skilled manpower, Israel, at present, also maintains a qualitative superiority over the Arab States. While the Arabs have a greater number of planes, the Israelis presently have a far greater number of qualified pilots and a greater capacity to maintain and service highly sophisticated aircraft. The Israelis have, for example, three qualified pilots for each supersonic plane while the Egyptians have less than one, a ratio that is not likely to last as more Egyptian pilots are trained. Because of Israel's ability to produce many weapons, including her own missiles and aircraft, the technological gap between Israelis and Arabs may be increasing rather than decreasing.

4. Points 2 and 3 need three important qualifications. First, there comes a point where the sheer quantities of planes and tanks can outweigh all qualitative factors. Second, this whole analysis is predicated on the assumption that the Soviet Union will not play a greater role in possible future conflicts. The capacity of the Soviet Union to play some role in helping Arab States mobilize and the shortness of distances in the Middle East make this a potential danger. The Soviet Union now flies planes, mans missiles and trains Egyptian personnel. Third, it appears that Egypt has materiel equivalent to its capacity to use it effectively. The continuation of this situation, as more men are trained, can also alter the present military relationship.

5. It seems the outcome of another war in the Middle East would be similar to previous wars provided the Soviets did not enter the war.

6. Compared to the huge deliveries of 1970, there is no evidence of large-scale Soviet arms deliveries during middle and late 1971. While there were massive armaments sent to Egypt following President Nasser's trip to Moscow in January 1970, it has been suggested that there were only modest and routine arms deliveries, including several

<sup>1</sup> *The Middle East in Crisis: Problems and Prospects*, Report of the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

Badgers, following the signing of the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in May 1971 and President Sadat's trip to Moscow in October 1971. Despite the statement after Sadat's visit saying that the Soviets and Egyptians "agreed, specifically, on measures aimed at further strengthening the military might of Egypt," the Department of State maintains the U.S.S.R. has shown some restraint.

*Recommendation.—The inflow of arms to the conflict area, in general, and Egypt, in particular, must be monitored closely. In monitoring arms supplies, we must consider the offensive and defensive nature and capabilities of specific types of arms and aircraft and not solely the quantity.*

*The subcommittee is disturbed by the necessity to maintain a constant vigil over the question of whether Israel needs more Phantoms or other specific types of weaponry, a question which, in part, can only be answered by experts with access to classified information. Israel's deterrent capabilities and the present balance of power should be maintained. At the same time, we should try to avoid an escalation of the arms race in the region. The subcommittee also feels that ways and means should be found to supply Israel with adequate and necessary arms in a routine way. This supply should be constant and long range, not fitful and erratic, and the discussion on types and quantity of aid should be low key and discreet.*

#### B. POST-1967 DIPLOMACY AND THE U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE

Since the 1967 war, the United States has pursued its goal of promoting a Middle East peace in many ways. Following intense negotiations with our allies, with the Soviet Union and with the parties directly involved, the United Nations Security Council adopted U.N. Resolution 242 in November 1967. The main provisions of this resolution recommended: "withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;" "termination of all claims or states of belligerency;" "freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;" "a just settlement of the refugee problem;" and "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area."

To a degree, this resolution contained deliberate ambiguities and it has indeed been subjected to many varying interpretations. While the Soviet Union has stressed total withdrawal from all occupied territories as a precondition for implementation of the resolution, many Americans, including some of those who worked on the drafting of the resolution, consider the absence of words like "all" or "the" in the phrase "withdrawal from territories occupied" as intending that there will be certain rectifications to insure secure and recognized boundaries. This controversy and that concerning the relationship of the resolution to direct talks between parties are the two most significant. These and other differing interpretations of, and controversies over, the resolution have not facilitated movement toward a just and lasting peace.

Initially after 1967, the U.S. supported Israeli demands for direct talks between the parties, but when this proved fruitless the United States tried to promote understanding and create better conditions for a peace in various other ways, that is, through bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, "Big-Four" talks involving Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and support of Dr. Gunnar Jarring's peace mission as Secretary-General U Thant's special Middle East Envoy. Other missions, including a recent mission of African leaders, have also tried to promote a peace agreement.

Dr. Jarring, who received his mandate in U.N. Resolution 242, established contact with the parties and his mediating efforts proceeded intermittently until the spring of 1971, when Israel did not accept the suggestions contained in Dr. Jarring's aide memoire of February 8, 1971, to Israel and Egypt. Egypt accepted Dr. Jarring's suggestions but Israel felt that the aide memoire put forward what Israel considered to be specific proposals and preconditions of a peace agreement, an agreement which Israel felt could only be the subject of direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Israel felt Dr. Jarring had exceeded his authority, but seems willing to resume indirect talks without any prior conditions.

It was against this background of lack of

movement of the Jarring mission and other approaches to peace that the United States undertook its peace initiative and sought, first, a stable ceasefire to end the war of attrition along the Suez Canal and, later (after intense debates over supposed ceasefire violations), an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, which would include a partial Israeli withdrawal across Sinai and the opening of the Suez Canal. Until now, the Nixon administration has believed that such an interim agreement is a viable approach to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. As Secretary Rogers said in his October 4, 1971, speech before the United Nations General Assembly:

...we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them [the Egyptians and Israelis] in arriving at an interim agreement. This effort, we believe, is imperative. This is important to keep in mind, because there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue.

In 1971, this initiative was buttressed by several trips by American diplomats to the Middle East and, at times, strenuous talks concerning an interim settlement involving the opening of the Suez Canal:

1. The trips of Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco to the Middle East and their conversations in New York during the 26th General Assembly session have apparently produced some narrowing of differences but no tangible results on an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel to open the Suez Canal.

2. While there have been no positive developments from these talks, they have continued and the parties, while groping for other useful approaches to peace, continue to urge the United States to work for such an interim settlement. Furthermore, the ceasefire has continued without serious interruption.

3. An interim peace agreement between Egypt and Israel has advantages for both sides. The agreement which would involve the opening of the Suez Canal and a partial Israeli withdrawal from the east bank of

the canal to some point in Sinai could be an important first step on the road to complete peace in the Middle East. For the Israelis and Egyptians, it would offer an excellent opportunity to disengage, avoid another war along the canal and take some pressure off the Egyptian Government. For the Egyptians, it would also permit a resumption of civilian life in the many large towns along the canal. Both sides could benefit from a reduction in tensions which would come from an open canal, although the main economic benefit would accrue to Egypt.

4. Although the differences between Israel and Egypt on the particulars of an interim settlement have not been resolved, they can be defined. There seem to be six:

(a) *Length of ceasefire.*—Israel wants an indefinite ceasefire and Egypt wants one of a short duration, perhaps 6 months to a year.

(b) *Distance of Israeli withdrawal from canal.*—From public statements, Israel would seem to be willing to agree to a limited withdrawal while Egyptians want the initial withdrawal to around al-'Arish in central Sinai.

(c) *Egyptians allowed in pullback zone.*—Israel refuses to allow any Egyptian military personnel into this zone while Egypt insists that the stationing of some Egyptian military personnel on the east bank of the canal is essential.

(d) *Security disposition in pullback zone.*—Israel wants Israeli participation in any peacekeeping force and Egypt wants a buffer zone with a U.N. force of observers. These positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive: a peacekeeping force could have both Israeli and Egyptian participation.

(e) *Israeli right of passage through the Suez Canal.*—Israel wants that right immediately and Egypt wants it deferred until after a final peace is signed and the Palestine refugee problem is solved.

(f) *Relationship between interim and final settlement.*—Israel insists an interim settlement be a separate agreement which would state that it does not preclude further steps toward complete peace within the context of U.N.

Resolution 242 and direct negotiations and that the new lines were neither final nor representing a new status quo. Egypt insists on an explicit statement that this interim agreement is an integral part of a full settlement and the first step in a timetable to the total withdrawal of Israeli troops to the international border existing between Israel and Egypt before the 1967 war.

5. The subcommittee notes with particular interest the views of several public witnesses that the United States should consider a time-related, phased-withdrawal peace plan between Israel and Egypt. In such a time-related peace, Israel would concede the return of all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty the moment Egypt signs a formal peace with it. Israel would then proceed to withdraw by stages that would go hand in hand with a defined progression from formal peace to normal neighborly relations and be contingent upon such a progression. These witnesses have argued that Israel wants security, not territory, in Sinai and that a time-related peace plan would meet both Israel's and Egypt's needs in a settlement. While it would be difficult to determine when one phase was completed and another should start, such plans could help build peace, step by step, might be self-enforcing and do not demand single steps greater than the present capacity of States in the region to undertake at any given time.

*Recommendation.*—*Some of our allies—France and, to a lesser degree, Britain—question whether the United States peace initiative will ever succeed, and if the Soviet Union wants peace, it clearly prefers a partial settlement which gives the United States little or no credit. Nevertheless, the United States should continue to use its good offices as long as the parties want us to help them. Although the subcommittee does not share the administration's optimism as to the possibility of an interim settlement, both Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Sisco are to be commended for their efforts to help the parties reach an interim agreement.*

*At the same time, the United States ought not to pursue this initiative to the exclusion of other approaches. In addition to giving serious consideration to types of time-related, phased-with-*

*drawal mentioned in point (5) above, the United States should try to revive other approaches, including negotiations under Dr. Gunnar Jarring's auspices and bilateral talks with the Soviet Union designed to facilitate a peace agreement by the parties.*

## II. SOME FACTORS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In addition to its examination of the immediate pressing issues of war and peace, the subcommittee made preliminary investigations into several difficult and fundamental issues related to the conflict, many of which may require Congress' attention in the coming years. Any one of them could be examined further in greater detail. They are:

### A. INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE CONFLICT AREA

The internal politics of the various countries in the region, particularly those directly involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, were an important subject of inquiry. In sessions with both representatives of the U.S. Department of State and academicians, the subcommittee sought to understand more fully the nature of political instability in the area and those internal factors affecting the way countries approach peace.

1. *Middle East.*—The hearings suggested that the chances of continued peace in the Middle East seem better today than they were in 1970 because several of the governments advocating peace are politically stronger.

2. *Egypt.*—President Sadat is in much greater control of the Egyptian Government today than he was in late 1970, even though his future position depends on some progress toward a settlement in the near future. If Sadat does not make some progress on a settlement, he will have to contend with increasing opposition and perhaps military action by some army officers. Until now, Sadat has dealt skillfully with his opposition and diplomatic alternatives, but most witnesses before the subcommittee indicated that, in order to continue his present peace policy, he must produce some results within a time period ranging from 6 months to 2 years. The length of time available to him

depends on his political skill in balancing and placating many political forces. It should be noted that the army is only one of the pressure groups in Egypt waiting for Sadat's policies to bear results. Witnesses also stated that Egyptian society appears more open and free under Sadat's leadership than it did during Nasser's last years.

3. *Israel*.—Despite many domestic cultural tensions, Israel's economic situation is potentially more dangerous for the immediate future. Israel's most serious economic problems are: (1) a foreign debt representing the equivalent of \$1,000 for each citizen and a debt whose annual servicing takes \$500 million or 10 percent of the budget, and (2) an inflation spiral abetted by the August 1971 devaluation of the Israeli pound. Both problems are a result of a policy need to maintain both a high state of military preparedness and a high rate of economic growth. Israel's foreign debt is about \$3.4 billion, three times what it was in 1968.

The subcommittee takes note of the hopeful attitude developing in Israel, in particular, the conciliatory and frank attitudes of the young generation and the efforts to integrate non-European Jewish and Israeli-Arab citizens into Israeli political life. Another hopeful sign has been the increasing realization by many Israelis that the Palestinians should have more opportunities and a greater voice in the determination of their lives.

4. *Jordan*.—While King Hussein's Kingdom has been left badly divided by the recent civil war between Palestinians and Jordanians, his position is much stronger today than at any time since the intensification of activities by Palestinian guerrillas in 1967. It is true that the civil war, which started in September 1970 and ended in July 1971, culminated in the military defeat of the guerrillas, but the bitterness and resentment of many Palestinians in Jordan, exemplified by the recent assassination of the Jordanian prime minister, leaves reconciliation with the King a very remote possibility.

5. *Syria and Iraq*.—These two countries remain unstable and prone to violent up-

heaval. It should be noted that the present Syrian Government is making approaches to some United States companies in pursuit of certain economic contracts. At present the only interchange between Iraq and the United States consists of the higher education of Iraqis in the United States. Because of the great instability in these countries, it appears that there is not much the United States can do.

6. *Lebanon*.—Lebanon maintains close cultural, political and economic ties with the West, in particular, France. Lebanon also has significant ties with the United States. Although its new President, Sulayman Franjiyyah, has been an effective leader his first year in office, the potential disruptive capabilities of Palestinian guerrillas could be great in this country. While disturbing, the recent small Soviet-Lebanese military sales agreement will not, in itself, affect the basic patterns of Lebanon's international ties.

#### B. PALESTINIANISM AND THE REFUGEES

1. The subcommittee expresses concern for the dreadful human plight of the Palestinian refugees and the need to give them more hope, more economic opportunities and a greater voice in their own affairs.

2. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), with a staff of 14,000, is the main international agency caring for the relief and educational needs of Palestinian refugees. Despite the many difficulties in obtaining accurate lists of refugees, it is apparent that, today, about 40 percent of the refugees live in camps, and, of the 1.5 million refugees registered, about 60 percent receive rations. The 40 percent who do not receive rations are in one of two categories: (a) many children do not receive rations because of U.N. imposed ceilings on the numbers receiving rations in one particular area; or (b) the refugees do not need aid either because of the size of their income or the fact they are not living near the camps. The United States contributes about 54 percent of UNRWA's nearly \$50 million annual budget and education is the largest



budgetary item. Unfortunately, some 25,000 out of 30,000 students who complete their basic education each year cannot attend vocational schools or college. It is among this large unskilled and unemployed group that most guerrilla recruiting has been done.

3. Although some estimates indicated there are between 12,000 and 15,000 guerrillas, it is more probable that there are between 5,000 and 7,000 dedicated guerrillas in roughly 14 organizations. Support in the region for the Palestinian guerrilla varies. Contrary to Jordan's policy, Syria uses the guerrilla movement for its own internal, political purposes while Lebanon has little choice but to follow a live-and-let-live policy toward the guerrillas.

Witnesses stated that the Soviet Union is pragmatic in its dealings with the guerrillas and prefers to support Arab Governments but that the Chinese are training a few guerrillas and offering limited financial support.

4. Witnesses seemed to agree that the guerrillas have not been able to mobilize the majority of the Palestinians, and it appears that the political and military future of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFPL) and the radical wing of the guerrilla movement is in doubt. They do not enjoy the support, financial or otherwise, of Palestinians generally or the trust and respect of Arab Governments that Fatah, the largest organization, currently has. Despite this inability to mobilize the Palestinians, witnesses suggested the guerrillas do maintain some credibility in many sections of the Palestinian community, particularly those outside the occupied territories.

5. Opinion in the occupied territories, according to observers, appears more mixed and although many Arabs are unwilling to express their preferences openly, one can see differences in opinion between Gaza and sections of the West Bank. Many in the occupied territories do not want to return to King Hussein and some openly favor reconciliation with the Israelis.

6. The year 1971 saw a further splintering of the Palestinian guerrilla movement and a strengthening of King Hussein's control over their activities in Jordan. It should be noted that, while the guerrilla offensive military capabilities in Israel and the occupied territories remains low, their political disruptive capabilities through demonstrations and possibly assassinations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Cairo, remain potentially high. Although the guerrilla movement can have an adverse effect on the struggle for peace in the Middle East, the capabilities of the guerrilla movement remain low and the movement itself is fragmented.

7. The subcommittee did not explore ways for Palestinians to be able to have a greater voice in their own affairs, but the subcommittee notes the diverse opinions among segments of the Palestinian community, including a public opinion among some Palestinians on the West Bank which seeks some accommodation with Israel.

*Recommendation.—The United States should take note of a new, emerging political consciousness of Palestinians which has not yet jelled. While there is some sympathy for the guerrillas among Palestinians everywhere, there are many Palestinians who are committed to a peaceful, rather than military, settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue. The United States should watch closely Palestinian developments, be prepared to deal with them and support peaceful and viable ways to encourage expression of the Palestinians' right to have a greater voice in their own political future within the context of a peace settlement. While many jobs have been made available to Palestinian refugees in Israel, surrounding Arab countries, the occupied territories and the Persian Gulf, and while there are several good vocational schools supported and administered by UNRWA, Israel, certain Arab and European states in the occupied territories and elsewhere, more needs to be done to make a greater number of meaningful job opportunities available to Palestinian refugees so that their lives will have more dignity and hope and less apathy, bitterness and despair.*

### C. THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIALS OF THE CONFLICT AREA AFTER A PEACE AGREEMENT

1. The subcommittee takes note that the Middle East conflict area has vast economic potentials in a postwar period. Increased agriculture through greater water supply, open waterways, free flows of man-power, tourism and free trade can benefit all peoples.

2. European employment for Arabs is another employment source that has not yet been fully tapped.

3. Before the 1967 war, Jordan and Israel were developing at a faster rate than the rest of the Middle East. According to one witness, the resumption of that trend would be very beneficial for the area and would be the optimum economic solution from the Jordanian viewpoint.

4. The subcommittee is aware of the several pilot studies for desalination plants and other schemes designed to develop the Gaza, North Sinai and Jordan Valley areas. One witness suggested that the potentials for agriculture intensification and extension in these areas remain extremely high but methods must be found to improve techniques and cost-benefit ratios of desalination projects, most of which are currently economically infeasible for agriculture.

5. Gaza needs special attention as some 375,000 people are crowded into an area 30 miles long and at most 10 miles wide. One witness stated that, in 10 years, some 500,000 people will live there and the labor force would be about 130,000 strong. Even with the present economy expanded, he indicated only 50,000 could be employed. Israel now employs almost 20,000 Gazans in Israel in contrast to the very small number of Gazans employed in Egypt before 1967, but more and better opportunities must be found for these people seeking an end to their refugee status. The North Sinai area would be a useful site for a desalting project that could, perhaps, intensify agriculture, help the Gaza area develop and provide some employment. If Arab oil states could supply oil in modest

amounts at a low price, the steam energy costs of proposed desalting schemes would be low enough to make the operations economically viable.

6. It was noted that, although there are many areas where economic integration and specialization are feasible, most Middle East countries' products are competitive with, and not complementary to, those of their neighbors.

7. A Palestinian entity on the West Bank without access to the Mediterranean Sea cannot be economically viable, but such access would be easy in the context of a settlement. Similarly, Jordan cannot really become economically self-sufficient as presently constituted, despite impressive irrigation, dam and agricultural projects, in particular the East Ghor project.

### D. JERUSALEM'S FUTURE AS HOLY CITY FOR THREE RELIGIONS

1. The subcommittee examined the present status of Jerusalem and Israel's determination not to give up this city which it united under Israeli rule in 1967. While the subcommittee is aware of improvements that have occurred in the city since 1967, in particular the greater rights of access to holy places that prevail now, it is also aware that almost all Muslims and some Christians object to some of the changes in the city, in particular, the new housing projects.

2. About the only points on which the three faiths can now agree is that the city should not be divided and that all groups should have access to their shrines.

3. The subcommittee takes note of the following positions:

(a) Most Jews feel that the issue of Jerusalem has been effectively solved since the Israelis took over the city in 1967, gained access to the holy places denied to them for 19 years, and united the city. The Israelis feel they can continue to guarantee free access to all peoples.

(b) The Muslims are unwilling to accept

Israeli control of a city which they feel they took good care of over several centuries.

(c) All Christians want access to the city and its holy places. Some Christians, however, are skeptical of both Muslim and Jewish rule, preferring some international guarantee or international nationalization of the city.

*Recommendation.*—*A solution for Jerusalem might well be the last issue involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to be discussed and, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve.*

*Americans should examine this issue carefully and, if possible, aid the parties to the dispute in working out an equitable agreement for the city. We should note the futility of all historical arguments regarding both rights to and in the city and past attempts at internationalization, and we should recognize the uniqueness of Jerusalem and the need to preserve its special significance for several faiths. It would appear at present that the parties can fruitfully explore types of extraterritorial status for holy places as the most promising avenue for accommodation on this issue given the present political situation.*

*While the specifics of the future of Jerusalem must be negotiated by the Arabs and Israelis, parameters of the final settlement should reflect the following considerations: First, Jerusalem is a unique city and because of its great importance to Jews, Muslims, and Christians, any solution must maintain its special character.*

*Second, the right of access should be guaranteed to all the holy places, and a free flow of goods and people within the city maintained.*

*Third, insistence on the sovereignty and administration of all holy places by one nation should be avoided if an agreement is to be reached.*

*Fourth, Jerusalem, as a city, should not be divided and should, in an administrative and municipal sense, be unified. This need not preclude agreement between the parties for appropriate representation in the administration.*

*Fifth, religious communities must accommodate each other's interest and cannot prevent any group from access to or worship in the city.*

#### E. POSSIBLE OPTIONS WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO INSURE A MULTI-LATERAL SETTLEMENT

1. The subcommittee feels that it is very important for Congress, within a general examination of our interests in the Middle East, to consider this issue, the options available, the precedents, obligations and rights under each possible alternative.

2. The most talked about options are as follows:

(a) Continuation of the present informal United States-Israeli relationship without any contracted obligation or treaty. This informal relationship has been supported by successive Presidents since the late 1940's.

(b) Big powers guarantee with or without a big power presence which would insure a settlement agreed to by the parties and would preserve the territorial integrity of all states.

(c) A U.S. security guarantee which would involve a unilateral American commitment to Israel in a guardian-ward relationship.

(d) A United States-Israeli mutual defense pact in a relationship of partnership and cooperation.

(e) A United States-Israeli treaty of friendship and cooperation, which would give Israel a reasonable mix of control over its own security policy and support and cooperation from the United States in case of a threat to its security.

(f) Israeli membership in NATO, which has the deterrent value vis-à-vis the Soviet Union of making Israel part of the Western defense system.

3. From the Israeli viewpoint, the type of relationship it prefers depends on the kind of settlement and its built-in guarantees.

4. One important variable to determine is the precise role of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, in a settlement and the guaranteeing of it. Because of the general makeup of the U.N. General Assembly and events of May 1967 in which the UNEF

forces in Sinai, welcomed by Egypt in 1957, were withdrawn upon Egypt's request, the Israeli Government is chary of any international guarantee involving the United Nations. U.N. guarantees are, to Israelis, no substitute for a binding peace between the parties. However, other viewpoints see an important role for the United Nations in providing the framework for a peace settlement and helping keep the peace. Israeli and Egyptian participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force could overcome some of these problems.

*Recommendations.*—*While the mood of a vast majority of American people is against any further political or military commitments overseas, some more formal relationship with Israel is worthy of consideration if it would encourage and accompany a peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and would be designed to insure it. If such a bilateral or multilateral relationship was undertaken to help bring peace, it should try to meet the following criteria:*

(1) *It should seek to give Israel reliable assurance of physical security in an Israeli territory defined by borders accepted on all sides of the dispute and by the big powers;*

(2) *It should be entered into only alongside a general settlement of the whole conflict; and*

(3) *It should seek to avoid further perpetuating and institutionalizing the present polarity of American and Soviet roles in the Middle East.*

### III. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Both substantively and procedurally, the examination of this subject by the subcommittee proved stimulating and productive. This important subject was discussed in a series of joint hearings with the subcommittee on Europe. An increasing number of inter-related topics of relevance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs cannot be thoroughly examined under the jurisdiction of one subcommittee, so joint hearings should continue to provide a new and enriching method of inquiry.

#### A. MIDDLE EAST POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

##### 1. Witnesses before the subcommittee em-

phasized that the Soviet Union in the Middle East today apparently prefers a stage of controlled tension to a situation of war or peace. A final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would, in Soviet eyes, remove the major factors that now draw Arab States to the Soviet Union—namely, the Arab quest for military supplies and for political support in the Arab-Israeli conflict. War likewise presents an unsatisfactory alternative from the Soviet Union's point of view: war is likely to be costly in terms of new demands for aid; another Arab defeat would be embarrassing; and war would present a danger of an undesirable confrontation with the United States. The Soviet Union sees a degree of tension as a safeguard to its own influence. It would seem that while Marxists claim capitalism needs war to prosper, Soviet Middle East influence needs tension to survive.

2. Despite the success of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, its policy is fraught with problems: military and economic aid is expensive; the volatility of Arab politics means regimes can fall quickly, as was the case in the Sudan; the Soviets are not politically well liked by some in Arab countries although their aid is appreciated; Communist parties are an anathema to all Arab socialist regimes; and there is a basic Arab nationalist opposition to communism. Moreover, the Soviets know they cannot respond in a crisis as the Arabs would like them to without risking the dangers of a confrontation with the United States and this situation may well cause the Soviet Union to lose the approval of the Arab States.

2. It is significant that the Soviet Union is aware of Israel's military superiority and seems to be counseling restraint in the Middle East, advising the Egyptians and its other clients not to go to war with Israel.

4. The Soviet Union does support U.N. Resolution 242, but will reject any settlement Egypt does not find acceptable.

5. The Soviet Union has no timetable or blueprint in the Middle East but it has momentum. Its success is due, in large part, to its ability to take advantage of situations,

in particular, political instability and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet policy, then, has been generally reactive and opportunistic. Its long-range intentions in the Middle East beyond the maintenance of its current presence remain obscure.

6. But future domestic and international requirements could lead to changes in Soviet goals and interests in the area.

For instance, while the Soviet Union is now importing Middle East oil, it is not dependent on it. But this situation could change in the coming decades; and if the Soviet Union controlled access to this oil, Western Europe and Japan could be paralyzed in a future crisis. The United States also could suffer.

7. In addition, the heavy amounts of military aid given the Arab States, some \$2 billion between 1967 and 1971, and the presence of over 10,000 to 15,000 Soviet military technicians who train and supervise Arab Armies and care for Soviet equipment, do raise justifiable questions concerning the ultimate political and strategic objectives of the Soviet Union.

8. Soviet economic interests and presence in the Middle East, while less significant than its military presence, are nonetheless formidable. Over \$2 billion worth of economic credit, half of which have been drawn down, numerous large construction projects, and extensive barter trading have led to a strong economic tie between some Arab countries and the Soviet Union. The terms of this credit are very favorable loans, usually being repayable in 50 years at 2 percent.

9. The Soviet Union approaches Arab politics pragmatically and relies less on local Marxists and weak guerrilla movements and more directly on those with political power running the State. In a sense, as one witness stated, client States are easier to handle than socialist friends: pressure can be applied with greater effect and less embarrassment.

10. There are several interest groups in the Soviet Union which have a stake in present Middle East policy. In particular, the military

seems to have increasing veto power over the actions of the Soviet collective leadership. One witness said there are also nationality and minority groups—in particular, Jews, Armenians, and Muslims—who can, and sometimes do, exert pressures on the Soviet foreign policymakers.

11. The institutionalization of Soviet policy in the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular has meant that there are military and economic bureaucracies in the Soviet Union with a vested interest in some specific Middle East policy and presence. In Egypt, this institutionalization took the form of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in May 1971. As yet, this treaty has led to no apparent change in Soviet policy.

12. On the whole, however, witnesses agreed that Middle East policy is not a top priority item in Soviet foreign policy, although the most impressive gains of the Soviet Union in the post-World War II period, outside of Eastern Europe, have been in the Arab world. Issues involving China, Europe, and the United States are more important. Soviet goals in the Middle East are related to other objectives, particularly the Soviet Union's desire for a strong Mediterranean presence and for the neutralization, or at least the vulnerability, of NATO. Precisely because of Soviet success in the Middle East, China or other powers challenging the Soviet world role, may choose to confront the Soviets there.

#### B. SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. During the hearings, witnesses suggested that the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East are both similar and dissimilar. The Soviet Union's interests are considered to be much more strategic and military—containing NATO and Cento, a presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and greater access to the Turkish Straits—and less economic and cultural. The Soviet Union is most concerned about its strategic and political

position in the Middle East in peacetime and wants some state of affairs other than peace or full-scale war, either of which might threaten its substantial investment in the area.

2. At the same time, it was argued by some that the U.S. interests are more economic and cultural and less strictly military. War in the Middle East threatens U.S. interests in Israel's security and oil.

3. Both the Soviet Union and the United States, however, have highly political interests when the Middle East is seen in terms of global strategic interests and communications.

4. The symbols of influence and prestige in the area are many for both powers, although the Soviet emphasis on brick and mortar might be contrasted with the U.S. concern with people. That is, while the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Tabqa Dam under construction in Syria have, in addition to military aid, won the Soviet Union many plaudits, the positive role of the American University of Beirut and several U.S.-supported educational and vocational institutions in Israel, Egypt, and elsewhere in educating present and future generations cannot be underestimated.

*Recommendation.—The United States should work more vigorously for an understanding with the Soviet Union to control arms flows to the Middle East and, generally, reduce tensions. It is important that, at present, neither side wants to be dragged into a Middle East war. Each power must recognize the other's legitimate interests in the area.*

*This need to resume serious talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East is made all the more urgent because of the lack of progress on an interim settlement. The need for such talks is also important because the United States appears, over time, to have lost much standing with some Arab States. Such leverage as the United States might have over Israel is less than may appear to be the case or than is commonly believed by Arab leaders.*

*The United States is unlikely to be able to get a compromise settlement in the Middle East without reaching certain understandings with the Soviet Union.*

### C. THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL

1. There are some who argue against opening the canal on the ground that an open canal will offer the Soviet Union greater accessibility to the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, three areas where Soviet naval presence is today relatively small. Sailing time for the Russians from the Black Sea area to the Indian Ocean would be reduced from 40 days to 5 days, with the canal open. However, it is not known whether, if the Suez Canal were opened, the Soviet presence would automatically increase and would provide support for liberation movements like those in Eritrea and Dhofar.

The Soviet Union has long had an interest east of Suez. During most of the 1960's, the Russians maintained a presence of five to 20 naval vessels in the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean area in addition to acquiring port facility agreements in Yemen, Somalia, India, Mauritius, and the island of Socotra.

2. There are also strong economic reasons in the West for opening the canal. According to one witness, the economic loss because of the canal's closure is about \$4 billion a year, \$2.5 billion of which is lost directly by Western Europe and another \$1 billion by the United States, mainly because of increased oil and freight transport costs.

If the Suez Canal were reopened, this witness argued, there would be a surplus of oil tankers and much oil traffic would return to the canal. It seems, he concluded, that the supertankers (200,000-ton capacity, compared with 60,000-ton tankers) have not made the canal obsolete, because there are presently not enough of these tankers nor enough ports that can accommodate them. However, this situation could change if the canal remained closed for any extended period. Europe also has reasons, unrelated to oil, for wanting the canal open. Before 1967, 76 percent of the freight going through the canal was destined for Italy, France, the United States and five other Western European countries; only 4

percent of total cargoes were going to the Soviet Union.

3. Despite these circumstances, the pressures to open the canal are not great and no nation considers its opening essential. It should be noted that the subsidies Egypt has received from other Arab States since 1967 because of the canal's closure outweigh the loss of canal revenues. As several witnesses stated, it is significant that, although many argue that the Soviet Union stands to gain from an open canal, the Soviet Union is not actively pressing for it.

4. The subcommittee, however, looks favorably upon the amendment in the House-passed Foreign Assistance bill of 1971 to provide funds for fiscal year 1972 which makes U.S.-owned foreign currencies in Egypt available to finance some of the costs of opening of the canal in the context of an interim agreement worked out between Egypt and Israel and involving the opening of the canal and a partial withdrawal. Such an agreement should allow all nations, including Israel, to use the canal.

*Recommendation.*—*The United States should support the opening of the Suez Canal as part of a settlement because such a settlement could be an essential and critical step on the road toward full peace. An open canal would be of great economic advantage to Western Europe. While it would give the Soviet Union increased mobility and flexibility in the area south and east of Suez, this advantage does not offset the arguments for opening the canal.*

*The United States should be careful that while it seeks to ameliorate one important problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict, it does not create many others in the area east of Suez.*

#### D. SOVIET PRESENCE AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

1. Although Western Europe and Japan have vital Middle East oil interests and are likely to need to get between 75 and 90 percent of their domestic fuel needs from the Middle East for the foreseeable future, our allies do not perceive, at present, any great Soviet threat to their access to that oil. And while

perhaps concerned about the Soviet Union's presence in this area and the potential threat to their oil supply in a crisis situation, they appear unwilling to do much about it. Their reluctance to deal with what the United States considers the dangers of Soviet involvement in the Middle East stems, according to witnesses, in part from the fact that they feel they can accommodate most Soviet goals in the area and also that they are not strong nuclear powers and could not, in any case, deter Soviet maneuvering in the Eastern Mediterranean. Europe relies on the umbrella of the Western or NATO defense system with a large American presence.

2. Because of their long history of involvement in the Arab world and their economic interests today, both France and Britain understand and are prone to support many Arab regimes on political issues. This legacy is stronger in France, despite French-Israeli friendship from 1950 to 1958, and might be latent in Germany although Germany is following a balanced policy in the area. France's legacy, one witness noted, is strongest in North Africa.

*Recommendation.*—*Despite the hesitation on the part of many of our European allies, the United States should seek our allies' and NATO's economic and political help in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East. A European presence—military, economic, cultural and political—could help to reduce the rigidity of the direct Soviet-American competition that exists in the area and perhaps help to extend the détente atmosphere to the area. The United States should seek, with the help of our allies, to convince the Soviet Union of the potential dangers of its policy of controlled tension.*

#### IV. THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

(a) At the end of 1971, the British Government plans to end its 100-year commitment to the defense of this area although the British will maintain a small presence in Oman. The United States will have to deal increasingly with the economic and political implications of the changing political situation in the Persian Gulf.

(b) Witnesses agreed that the dependence of the world, in general, and Western Europe,

in particular, on Middle East oil, is almost certain to increase in the coming decades, given the Middle East's possession of three-fourths of the world's proven oil reserves and increasing world consumption patterns. Today the United States is consuming 5 percent more oil each year and West Europe about 10 percent more.

The non-Communist world currently consumes about 40 million barrels of oil a day; the United States consumes about 18 million barrels of that. In 1980, it is estimated that the non-Communist world will consume between 80 and 100 million barrels and the United States 24 of that figure. At the present rate, the United States can get only 12 million barrels from domestic sources, including Alaska. Of the remaining 12 million barrels needed, about nine will have to come from the Middle East, and that figure will then represent between 35 and 40 percent of total United States consumption needs.

Middle East oil has several advantages, two of which are: (1) it is cheap—costs about 10 cents a barrel to produce compared with about \$1.50 for United States oil, \$1 in the Soviet Union and 60 cents in Venezuela; and (2) some of it is sulfur-free, and thus would aid the antipollution efforts.

(c) Although the United States consumes little Middle East oil today, less than 5 percent of total consumption, the United States oil industry now remits about \$1.6 billion per year to the United States, thus greatly helping our balance of payments at a time when the over-all balance is unfavorable.

(d) Several related points concerning oil were made during the subcommittee's hearings. Some were as follows:

1. The international oil market is moving from a buyer's to seller's market. The strong bargaining position of oil exporting countries has led them to press for higher revenues. The recent Tehran agreement means that Western consumers must pay \$15 billion more over the next 5 years for their oil. It should be noted that the new prices are not out of line although they represent big

increases—30 cents a barrel in the Gulf and 60 cents in Libya.

2. There is no evidence of substantial oil deposits off Vietnam at this time, and North Sea fields will hardly take care of increased consumption in Europe.

3. Israel is currently obtaining its oil from occupied Sinai and Iran.

4. There is disagreement among oil experts on Soviet interest in Middle East oil. While it seems the Soviets do not need it now for internal consumption, they may want it to sell to East Europe or West Europe. Many East European countries are now seeking their own oil deals in the Middle East.

5. Oil pipelines are still important despite their vulnerability. For every tanker destined for Europe and getting its oil from a pipeline in the Mediterranean Sea, one needs six tankers in the Persian Gulf.

6. The subcommittee notes the shortages of natural gas in the United States and the tremendous potential for exploiting gas reserves in the Middle East. Because of transportation and liquefaction problems and costs, the Middle East gas is, for the most part, burnt off and wasted.

(e) The Persian Gulf is an area of potential violent political upheaval and instability, and rivalries in the Gulf cut across many lines. The three most important ones with a potential of causing violence and instability are: Religious tensions—Sunni Muslim (mostly Arab) versus Shi'i Muslim (largely Iranian); national loyalties—Persian or Iranian versus Arab; and intertribal enmities. There are many factors involved in the current political configuration of the Arabian Peninsula. Witnesses emphasized the following:

1. The hastily constructed Union of Arab Emirates is not likely to stay cohesive or to be able to resist external pressure. At present, the Union is dominated by Abu Dhabi and Dubai which forced Ra's al-Khayma not to enter the Union at its inception.



2. Bahrain, Qatar and Oman are also new and small, independent, oil-based States which will face all the political and social dilemmas now confronting the Arab world. At present, the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman against the ruling Sultan and the volatility of the labor movement in Bahrain are the greatest dangers to the existing regimes.

3. Of all the States in the Arabian Peninsula, the revolutionary potential appears to be greatest in Saudi Arabia. According to one witness, the royal family has consistently neglected the rising political and social expectations of an increasing number of Saudis.

4. On the other side of the Gulf, the Shah of Iran is providing strong leadership in trying to deal with his country's social ills. Despite his success, his opposition, mostly outside Iran, is advocating violent revolution. The Shah considers his Government the most stable in the Persian Gulf area, and he is trying to assume leadership in the area as the British leave. At present, the Arab side of the Gulf does not appear to have the muscle to challenge the Shah although Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in particular, are concerned about what they consider to be the Shah's ambitions for domination of the Gulf.

5. In the southwest corner of Arabia, there are the Yemeni Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The present regime in the Yemeni Arab Republic appears more genuinely interested in ties with the United States than does South Yemen and our policies here should reflect this difference. Southern Yemen is supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) which seeks to overthrow the existing regimes in Oman and the Union of Arab Emirates. At present, its capabilities remain low.

6. The most immediate source of potential trouble in the Arabian Peninsula is Iran's claim to and occupation of the small Tumb Islands and Abu Musa (part of two former Trucial States, Sharja and Ra's al-Khayma) in the Persian Gulf. Most Arabs want to resist this occupation with force, and they do

not want Iran to control their access to the Gulf. Iran, at present, has the military power to resist all the Arab forces in the Gulf. The Tumb Islands and Abu Musa are 30 to 50 miles off the Arab side of the Gulf, and the Shah fears they would get into the hands of revolutionaries if he did not occupy them.

7. At the moment the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf consists of the Middle East Force at Bahrain which comprises only three small ships—two destroyers and one converted seaplane tender. Because it takes 40 days from the U.S. east coast to the Persian Gulf area, three ships need to be available to deploy one on post. (If there are two destroyers in the Gulf, there are two being repaired on the east coast and two en route). Several witnesses considered this Force of little military value and great political liability because it is small and vulnerable to demonstrations and harassments in an unstable area and in a shallow sea which offers little maneuverability. Besides the port calls these ships make, the U.S. military policy vis-à-vis the countries of Arabia involves training army and navy officers.

8. At the moment, the U.S. diplomatic presence in the Arabian Peninsula is very small. In addition to Embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and a small interests section in the Italian Embassy in the Yemeni Arab Republic with whom we have no diplomatic relations, the United States contemplates small missions in Bahrain, Oman, and the Union of Arab Emirates.

*Recommendation.*—The United States needs to give much more attention to this area and should seriously examine its future military and diplomatic policies. Although the present Middle East force may offer symbolic political reassurance of an American interest in and concern for this region as the British leave, the United States should explore all its military options, particularly whether the Middle East Force should be strengthened or removed in the next few years. If removed, other fleets could make occasional port calls to the Gulf. A prudent, low profile policy involving, perhaps, the insulation of the Gulf from great power rivalry

*might be the best approach at present. The United States might also seek an agreement with the Soviet Union to neutralize the Indian Ocean area. In addition, we might put more pressure on our Western European and Pacific allies, the countries who now get their oil from the Middle East, to use their influence, resources, and prestige to give this area of potential instability more time to develop in evolutionary, rather than revolutionary way. This help could involve training, aid, and cultural exchanges.*

## 247

### **Communique Issued on the Occasion of a Visit to the U.S.S.R. of a Delegation of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH), Headed by Central Committee General Secretary Vilner<sup>1</sup>**

**Moscow, December 22, 1971**

A delegation of the Communist Party of Israel, consisting of the General Secretary of the CC CP Israel, Meir Vilner, and CC Secretary Zahi Karkabi, was in the USSR from 13 to 22 December, 1971 at the invitation of the CC CPSU. The delegation had talks in the International and Propaganda Departments of the CPSU Central Committee, the Union of Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and other public organizations.

On December 17, the delegation met with P.N. Demichev, CC CPSU Politbureau alternate member and CC CPSU Secretary. The meeting was also attended by V.V. Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and Deputy Chief of the International Department, CC CPSU.

During the talks, which were held in the spirit of fraternal friendship, the two sides exchanged views on pressing international issues, particularly on the situation in the Middle East and other problems of mutual interest. The representatives of the CPSU

and CPI confirmed complete identity of views on all problems under discussion.

The CPSU and the CPI representatives expressed their concern over the continuing Middle East crisis which represents a danger to peace and security. They stated that the main barrier to a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict is the obstructionist policy of the Israeli rulers striving for territorial expansion and relying on the military, economic and political support of the United States and other imperialist powers and on the aid of international Zionist organizations. This policy is basically contrary to the national interests of the people of Israel. The representatives of the CPSU and the CPI reaffirmed the determination of their parties to work energetically for a political settlement in the Middle East and the establishment of a just and stable peace through full implementation of the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, including the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied during the 1967 aggression, and on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of all states and peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Arabs and the people of Israel.

The CPI delegation attached great significance to the Soviet Union's foreign policy, in particular to the recent moves by the CPSU and Soviet government for consolidation of peace and security, in support of the forces struggling against imperialism, for national independence, democracy and social progress. The CPI delegation described their Party's efforts in defense of the vital interests of the Israeli working people—Jews and Arabs—for consolidation of all forces in the country opposing the government's anti-national policy, for a peaceful solution in the Middle East and friendship among peoples, against the anti-Soviet slander campaign launched by the Israeli reactionaries and Zionist groups, which is aimed at distracting world attention away from Israel's aggressive colonialist policy. They also gave an account of preparations for the coming 17th CPI Congress.

On behalf of Soviet Communists, the CPSU representatives expressed solidarity with the struggle of the Communist Party of Israel, its

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the Russian text (*Pravda*, December 22, 1971), *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, X, 1-2 (209-210 (February 21, 1972), pp. 90-91.

internationalist stand on key problems in the world and the Communist movement. The Soviet delegation told about the labor enthusiasm of the Soviet Communists and all the people in realizing the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress.

The participants expressed a desire for the further development of friendly relations between the CPSU and CPI, for consolidation of militant solidarity of all anti-imperialist and progressive forces in the struggle against intrigues by imperialism and reaction in line with the ideas formulated by the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.

## 248

### **Statements by Pope Paul VI Expressing Concern As to the Rights of All Peoples Party to the Middle East Conflict, Made in an Address to the College of Cardinals<sup>1</sup>**

**Vatican City, December 23, 1971**

In this context We have not forgotten the Middle East, especially the land we Christians like to call the Holy Land and which is brought to our minds in so many ways of late: the country of Jesus.

Although there is reason for satisfaction that there has been almost no clash of weapons in that area of the world for a year and a half, there are grounds for fearing with justified trepidation that the uncertain cease-fire may suddenly come to an end without having produced the result for which it was chiefly proposed and accepted: the willing search for a peace agreement—or at least for the firm beginning of an understanding—through sincere talks which would take due account of the rights and legitimate

interests of all parties, including, in their rightful place, the people who have been forced by events of recent decades to abandon their lands.

For Our part, We have not failed, in Our meetings with authorities of the nations concerned, to give insistent encouragement to every noble endeavor toward an extension of the truce and toward a just and honorable understanding. We are convinced of the urgent necessity for a peaceful and wisely balanced solution of the Middle East problem—a solution which certainly cannot be imposed by recourse to further wars or by means of military victories.

With regard to Jerusalem in particular, We do not now intend to add further considerations to those We have repeatedly set forth in the past, confirming the need for a special statute, guaranteed internationally, which would do justice to the pluralistic and altogether special character of the Holy City and to the rights of the various communities which are situated there, or which look to it and come to it as to their spiritual center.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the adapted English translation of the Italian original (*L'Osservatore Romano*, December 24, 1971), *The Pope Speaks*, XVI, 4 (Winter, 1972), p. 330; translation by *The Pope Speaks Magazine*, Washington, D.C.

## 249

**Press Conference Statements on Possibilities of a Middle East Peace, U.S. Willingness To Play a Role in Negotiations and the Role of the U.N. and of Ambassador Jarring, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 23, 1971

*Q. Mr. Secretary, globally speaking, what do you regard during the past year as the main gains and setbacks in foreign affairs?*

A. Well, I have, in anticipation of that question, a checklist which I would like to refer to, because I think it is important to look back over the year to see what has been accomplished and where there are disappointments.

Second, in the Middle East the cease-fire has held. Difficult but constructive dialogue has been undertaken, and we will continue our efforts to maintain this cease-fire and, hopefully, to bring about a successful conclusion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, talking about the Middle East, you said you will continue your efforts. We are also told that you phoned to Mr. Eban [Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban], and to Mr. Riad [Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad], in effect offering your services or to continue your efforts. Can you tell us something about your blueprint, how you want to proceed?*

A. Well, I think Mr. McCloskey [Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations] did point out to you that

I had had discussions, telephonic discussions, with Mr. Eban and Mr. Riad, and that was for the purpose of telling them that we were prepared as a nation to continue to play a role in the negotiating process, particularly in connection with an interim agreement on the Suez, if they were interested in that possibility.

We are willing to play that role, and we talk about it as a role which we say is close proximity. By that we mean that we think the parties should get together and actively exchange ideas, and there has to be someone who helps in that process. We are prepared to do that if the parties want us to. We are not sure yet how they will react. Israel has indicated a willingness to do that. We are not sure yet how Egypt feels about it. There have been some indications that they did not favor this approach. On the other hand, there have been some suggestions that they might be prepared to continue. We don't know yet. But we are going to try to do that if it is possible.

Secondly, of course, we encouraged the parties to negotiate under Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices, because the two are different in scope. Whereas the interim agreement relates to only a portion of the dispute and by and large the Suez Canal itself, Ambassador Jarring's efforts are directed toward a total settlement under the principles announced and promulgated in Security Council Resolution 242.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the inability of the United Nations to act more forcefully on the Indian subcontinent tends to give some support to Israeli fears in that regard in terms of assurances or guarantees?*

A. Well, I don't think that the two are necessarily related. On the first part of your question, the inability of the United Nations to take action to prevent this war from starting and to stop it at the early stages was a disappointment. And it is a disappointment when 104 nations support that idea and it is vetoed by the Soviet Union. So it means in a sense, at least in this in-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the transcript of Rogers' press conference, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVI, 1699 (January 17, 1972), pp. 49, 50, 53, 56-57.

Rogers also discussed the U.S. role in possible Middle East negotiations during a question and answer session following his address before the 50th anniversary dinner of the Overseas Writers in Washington, December 1, 1971 (see *Department of State Bulletin*, LXV, 1695 (December 20, 1971), pp. 698-699).

stance, that the opinion of the world community carried very little weight. And I think that is a disappointment.

I don't think we can lose faith in the United Nations completely as an institution, because I think it does serve a useful purpose.

As far as the second part of your question is concerned, if an agreement was worked out and signed by the parties, concluded, and the mechanics for giving assurances were fully worked out so that Israel understood and could rely on those assurances, the United Nations might play a useful role.

Now, if you say to yourself, as some people do, it didn't work in 1967 and therefore it won't work now, it seems to me that the conclusion is quite invalid. It didn't work in 1967 because it wasn't a very good agreement. But there is no reason why, given the right kind of agreement with the proper safeguards, that the United Nations could not play a useful role. The United Nations has played a useful role in some areas—in Cyprus, some areas in Kashmir, and so forth. So the fact that it failed in 1967 or was ineffective in the recent difficulty in the sub-continent does not necessarily mean that it won't work in the future.

But I can see why Israel does have concerns, and I can see why Israel says to itself, "We want to be absolutely sure before we enter into any agreement that it is going to work." And they are entitled to believe that.

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# **Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Visit to Syria of Deputy Prime Minister Feher of Hungary (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, December 24, 1971**

At the invitation of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Lajos Feher, Deputy Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, paid an official visit to Syria December 21–24, 1971.

The two sides consider that the situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly dangerous as a result of continued Israeli occupation and Israel's persistent violation of Arab human rights and implementation of a policy of annexing the occupied Arab territories in Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank, the occupied Syrian heights and Sinai, disregarding repeated condemnations of these actions by the United Nations and its principal agencies and by world opinion.

The two sides strongly condemn Israeli aggression and the United States policy of support for Israel's objectives and her expansionist policy, and demand the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories.

The Hungarian government and people will continue their firm support, as in the past, of the just struggle of the Palestinian people for recovery and recognition of their legitimate rights, including the right to self-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the communiqué, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 25, 1971.

Expressing basically the same Hungarian Middle East policy were previous joint communiqués issued on the occasions of the visit of Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Puja to Syria (see *al-Baath*, February 5, 1971); the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Shaikhli to Hungary (see *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), August 23, 1971); the visit of Hungarian President Losonczi to Algeria (see *al-Shaab* (Algiers), December 4, 1971); and the visit of Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Feher to Iraq (see *al-Jumhuriya*, December 21, 1971).

determination. They also strongly support the just struggle of all the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression.

The two parties condemn all colonialist and reactionary conspiracies directed against the just struggle of the Arab people with the aim of preventing the Palestinian people from recovering all their established legitimate rights, including the right to self-determination.

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### **Report on International Committee of the Red Cross Operations Relating to the Conflict Between Israel and the Arab Countries<sup>1</sup>**

1971

#### PRISONERS OF WAR

The ICRC rendered assistance to prisoners of war held in Israel, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

(a) *Israel*: At the end of 1970, the Arab prisoners of war in Israel numbered 122, namely 72 Egyptians, 39 Syrians, 10 Lebanese and one Jordanian.

The ICRC delegates visited the Arab prisoners of war in the Sarafand military prison about every three weeks. They also visited the Safad Hospital, where three Syrian prisoners of war wounded at the time of capture, were receiving treatment for a number of weeks. In the course of those visits, the ICRC delegates gave the prisoners of war books, writing materials, records, games, food and cigarettes. They enquired whether they had any special wishes and

attended to the forwarding of family mail, as did their colleagues in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, for the Israeli prisoners.

Following the release of an Israeli civilian by the Palestinian organizations at the end of February 1971, the Israeli Government released ten Lebanese prisoners of war on 23 March. The repatriation operation took place at Roshanikra (Raz Nakoura), on the Israeli-Lebanese border, in the presence of ICRC delegates.

In the course of several operations, the Government of Israel also released 14 Egyptian prisoners of war. One of them, who was wounded, was repatriated on 28 March, at the same time as a wounded Israeli prisoner of war. Three Egyptian servicemen were repatriated on 16 September, while the remaining ten were repatriated at the same time as a second wounded Israeli prisoner of war, on 15 December. All these operations were organized by the ICRC and carried out on the Suez Canal, either at Ismailia or El Qantara.

Lastly, the Israeli Government decided to release a disabled Syrian prisoner of war, in accordance with the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, and ICRC delegates arranged for his repatriation at Ahmedia on 9 December.

Following these liberations and further captures in the course of the year, the number of Arab prisoners of war in Israeli hands at the end of 1971 amounted to 105, comprising 62 Egyptians, 42 Syrians and one Jordanian.

(b) *Arab Republic of Egypt*: ICRC delegates visited the twelve Israeli prisoners of war in the Arab Republic of Egypt on average every two or three weeks. Ten were interned in the Abbassieh military prison, while the other two, who were wounded, received medical treatment at the Maadi Hospital near Cairo. One of them, whose condition had improved, was transferred to the Abbassieh military prison at the end of July.

The ICRC was particularly concerned about the wounded prisoners of war and made a great many approaches regarding them in Cairo, through its delegation, and

<sup>1</sup> "Conflict Between Israel and the Arab Countries," from the Middle East section of "Chapter I: Operations" of the International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1971* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1972), pp. 40-51.

to the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Geneva. Among other things, it requested the unilateral repatriation of the more seriously wounded prisoners of war, in accordance with Articles 109 and 110 of the Third Convention. In exchange for a wounded Egyptian prisoner of war, the Egyptian Government agreed to repatriate a disabled Israeli prisoner of war on 28 March. Following the visit to Cairo, in December, of Mr. Petitpierre, a member of the ICRC, it also decided to release the Israeli prisoner of war who had been undergoing treatment in the Maadi Hospital. As already mentioned, the repatriation took place on the Suez Canal, not far from Ismailia. ICRC delegates proceeded to the simultaneous repatriation of ten Egyptian prisoners of war held by the Israelis.

(c) *Syria*: ICRC delegates paid monthly visits to the three Israeli prisoners of war held by the Syrians. Contrary to the provisions of Article 126 of the Third Convention, however, the visits were never held at the actual place of detention. The ICRC frequently made representations to the Syrian authorities with a view to gaining access to the place of detention.

(d) *Jordan*: The Jordanian Government awarded prisoner-of-war status to an Israeli civilian guard of Druse origin captured by Palestinian commandos in August 1969 and who in January 1971 had come under Jordanian military control. ICRC delegates visited the prisoner, who was interned in the Zerka military camp, every month or two. On 10 September, the Jordanian authorities captured a second Israeli national who had slipped across the border. He, too, was awarded prisoner-of-war status and interned in the Zerka military camp.

#### APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION

While the Israeli Government did not agree with the formal opinion expressed by the ICRC on several occasions, that the Fourth Geneva Convention should be made applicable to the population in the occupied territories, it nevertheless continued

to afford the ICRC and its delegates all the facilities necessary to the successful achievement of their mission for the population. The ICRC delegation therefore applied a pragmatic approach to its efforts to ensure as complete an implementation of the provisions of the Fourth Convention as possible. In many spheres, the co-operation thus set up between the Israeli authorities and the delegation allowed the very appreciable alleviation of the sufferings and difficulties arising from the conflict.

#### CIVILIAN DETAINEES AND INTERNEES

##### (a) **Arab Civilian Detainees in Israel and the Occupied Territories**

*Visits*: ICRC delegates continued their visits to people from the occupied territories and nationals of various Arab countries held in Israel or in prisons situated in the occupied territories. They carried out six series of visits to fourteen places of detention, namely the prisons of Ashkelon, Beer-Sheba, Chattah, Damoun, Kfar-Yona, Neve Tirza, Ramleh and Yagour Jalame, in Israel; the prisons of Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Tulkarem, on the West Bank, and the Gaza prison.

On two occasions they visited the Nahel internment camp, in Central Sinai. The camp was opened in January, following a number of arrests in the Gaza Strip. Early in May, the internees were released and the camp was closed down.

Some thirty Gaza families, who at the beginning of the year had been deported to Abu Zenima, on the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, were visited five times. They were mainly women, children and old people who had been deported because some member of the family was wanted by the police. When the deportees were sent back to Gaza at the end of November, the delegation, in co-operation with the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare, provided emergency relief for those whose homes had been destroyed by the army and who were destitute.

All visits were covered by reports which the ICRC sent to the Detaining Power and to the detainees' own government.

By the end of the year, about 3,200 Arab civilian detainees had been visited by ICRC delegates in Israel and the occupied territories. As a rule, delegates were able to see both the prisoners described as security risks (sentenced, accused or under preventive detention) and criminal law prisoners (sentenced or accused) within a month of their arrest, and talk to them without witnesses.

The ICRC approached the Israeli authorities regarding some overcrowded prisons. They also recommended that prisoners should be given more opportunities for work in places of detention. It provided the Prison Service with some ten sewing machines, as a result of which it was possible to equip two places of detention with an additional workshop.

The ICRC continued its monthly distribution of parcels to detainees who received no family visits. In 1971, there were 7,183 such parcels, containing 5 kg of fruit, biscuits, cigarettes and soap. In view of the approaching winter, the ICRC also succeeded in ensuring that detainees who had relatives living in one of the adjacent Arab countries should be allowed to receive a parcel of clothing from them. The operation, which was the first of its kind, was carried out in December, and 701 parcels were sent from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt. In addition, 300 parcels were provided by the Jerusalem Committee of the Jordan Red Crescent.

Detainees' families who could not afford to go and see their relatives in prison were able to take advantage of aid provided by the ICRC, which organized and paid for some 800 trips by coach. Over 51,000 relatives of detainees were thus transported free of charge to the prisons.

Lastly, the ICRC delegates instituted a procedure for speeding up the exchange of news between detainees and their families. The Israeli authorities agreed that detainees who for several months had received no word from their relatives should be allowed to send a special card bearing the words "Anxious for news" and that those cards should be given priority by the censors.

The ICRC also asked the Israeli authorities

to notify it of the identity of prisoners. On the occasion of Mr. Umbricht's visit to Israel in December, the Israeli authorities agreed to consider with the ICRC delegation in Tel Aviv ways and means for ensuring that notification.

*Repatriation of civilian prisoners:* On 15 February, the ICRC delegates arranged for two disabled civilian detainees to be repatriated to Jordan across the Allenby Bridge. At Roshanikra, on 26 February, a young Lebanese captured by the Israeli authorities the year before was repatriated. These various cases of repatriation came after the ICRC had made various approaches and ascertained that the persons concerned were in fact anxious to go home.

ICRC delegates also made representations on behalf of one of the last Palestinian combatants captured at Karameh (Transjordan) on 21 March 1968 and still held in Israel. The Israeli authorities agreed to release the man, and on 29 October the repatriation operation was carried out across the Allenby Bridge, under ICRC auspices.

Lastly, the ICRC delegates organized the repatriation of an Arab civilian detainee of Syrian origin captured in 1967 and who had served his sentence.

*Palestinian combatants:* The ICRC was also concerned about 90-odd Palestinian combatants who had surrendered to the Israeli authorities following the July armed insurrection in Jordan. ICRC delegates visited them in the Nablus prison, where they were being detained, and proposed that the men be allowed to settle on the West Bank. By the end of the year, 54 had in fact been released in occupied territory.

*Military courts:* ICRC delegates were present at several hearings of Arabs from occupied territories who were accused of acts prejudicial to the security of the State.

#### **(b) Civilian Infiltrators in Israel, Lebanon and Jordan**

*Israel:* In 1971, ICRC delegates organized the repatriation of about twenty Lebanese civilian infiltrators who had inadvertently



crossed the frontier between Lebanon and Israel. A Lebanese fisherman, wounded when captured by the Israeli authorities in April, was twice visited by ICRC delegates in the Haifa Hospital before being released in June.

The ICRC delegation in Tel Aviv also intervened on behalf of seven Egyptian fishermen whose boats had been stopped by Israeli coastguards. On 12 July, the fishermen were repatriated under ICRC auspices; the operation was carried out at El Qantara, on the Suez Canal.

*Lebanon:* ICRC delegates organized the repatriation of six Israeli civilian infiltrators in Lebanon. Three of them were interned in the Tyr prison for some weeks and were visited several times before being repatriated.

*Jordan:* Lastly, ICRC delegates arranged for the repatriation of an Israeli civilian who had inadvertently crossed the cease-fire line between Israel and Jordan.

### **(c) Israeli civilian in the hands of the Palestinian organizations**

The ICRC continued to concern itself with the case of an Israeli civil guard kidnapped on 1 January 1970 by Palestinian commandos operating from Lebanese territory. In 1970, ICRC delegates visited the internee six times, first in Jordan and later in Syria. In 1971, two further visits were made in Syria.

As a result of ICRC approaches, the Palestinian organizations agreed to release the detainee. The repatriation operation was carried out at Roshanikra, on the Israel-Lebanese border, on 28 February. The Israeli authorities simultaneously released a Palestinian civilian detainee, and on 23 March they released the ten Lebanese prisoners of war (see above).

#### **REUNITING OF FAMILIES**

*Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza-Sinai:* In 1971, five family reuniting operations, organized under the auspices of the ICRC, took place between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the occupied territories of Gaza and Sinai. They enabled 702 persons from Egypt or Gaza to join their relatives in the Valley

of the Nile or in the Gaza Strip. This brought the total number of those repatriated on either side, since the action started in 1967, to approximately 7,000.

In addition, the ICRC organized the transfer to the Arab Republic of Egypt of more than a thousand Palestinian students from Gaza who, having passed their baccalaureate examination in occupied territory and wishing to continue their studies in Egyptian universities, had secured the necessary permits from the Egyptian and Israeli authorities. Nearly 700 students, who were allowed to join their families in the occupied territory of Gaza for holidays or at the end of their studies, also crossed the Canal under ICRC auspices, in the course of seven operations at El Qantara between 9 August and 6 October.

*Syria and the Golan Heights:* Fifty persons displaced by the June 1967 conflict were able to join their families on the occupied Golan Heights, in five operations organized by the ICRC at El Quneitra. By the end of 1971, the approximate number of persons repatriated since the action started in March 1969 was 650.

*Israel and Lebanon:* At Roshanikra, ICRC delegates arranged for seven persons to join their relatives in the Lebanon.

*Jordan and West Bank:* As in previous years, ICRC action was confined to lending support to requests to the Israeli authorities which were of special humanitarian interest and which had not proved successful under the normal procedure. During 1971, 64 persons benefited under the hardship procedure.

*Central Tracing Agency activities:* In 1971, the ICRC forwarded 93,243 family messages between the Arab countries on the one hand and Israel and the occupied territories on the other. By the end of the year, the total number of messages exchanged since June 1967 exceeded 1.6 million.

During the year, the number of enquiries concerning soldiers and civilians missing since the hostilities was much lower than in previous years. Out of 87 enquiries in 1971, it was possible, in co-operation with the Israeli

military authorities and Magen David Adom, to locate nine persons who were being sought by their relatives.

#### STUDY OF HEALTH SITUATION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, IN GAZA AND SINAI

In March 1971, an ICRC doctor-delegate made a survey of the medical situation on the Golan Heights. In August, two similar surveys were conducted in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai, where all government and private hospitals and dispensaries were visited. Comprehensive reports were sent to the governments concerned.

In the course of an operation carried out under ICRC auspices at El Qantara, on 17 November, eleven doctors, who had originally come from Gaza and were living in Cairo, crossed the Suez Canal from west to east to resume work in the Gaza Strip, where a serious dearth of medical personnel was still prevailing.

#### ACTION FOR THE DISABLED

With the financial aid provided by the German Red Cross in the Federal Republic of Germany and the medical and technical co-operation of the Magen David Adom, the ICRC delegation in Gaza was able to continue registering war disabled who required an artificial limb and transporting them to Tel Aviv for treatment.

In 1971, eighteen disabled persons were fitted. The number of cases treated since the beginning of the action thus rose to 62, and the number of artificial appliances 56. At the end of the year, 38 new applications were still to be dealt with.

#### RELIEF

From January to April 1971, the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare, co-operating with the ICRC delegation, continued to distribute to some 50,000 Bedouin of Northern and Central Sinai the 300 tons of flour, donated by the Swiss Confederation and unloaded at the port of Ashdod in November 1970.

An additional 3,600 tons of flour donated by the European Economic Community arrived at Ashdod in July. Under a programme worked out with the ICRC, the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare distributed 2,800

tons of flour to 60,000 Bedouin by the end of December, at a monthly rate of 5 kg per person. Six hundred tons earmarked for the Gaza orphanage was supplied at a rate of 60 tons a month.

In August and again in October, the ICRC transmitted to the poverty-stricken inhabitants of Sinai and Gaza two further gifts, totalling 570 tons of food, blankets and textiles. This relief was distributed at the same time as that supplied by the European Economic Community.

In October the ICRC sent the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare ten tons of powdered milk for needy persons on the West Bank.

#### ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL RED CRESCENT COMMITTEES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

In September 1970, the ICRC made available a provision of 100,000 Swiss francs for the implementation of a programme of material and technical assistance to the ten Jordanian and Egyptian Red Crescent branches in the occupied territories. Of this sum, about 45,000 Swiss francs was used in 1971 to subsidize specific projects such as the purchase of materials for dispensaries, work-rooms, nurseries, and so forth. In August, 28 kg of medical supplies were sent to the ICRC delegates on the West Bank, who handed them over to the local Red Crescent.

#### EXPULSIONS

The ICRC continued to receive from the Red Crescent Societies of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt many complaints that Arab residents of the occupied territories, suspected of having taken part in activities endangering the security of the State, were being expelled and sent to Jordan.

In February 1971, the Jordanian authorities established near the Allenby Bridge, the crossing point over the cease-fire line, a transit camp where persons expelled could be received, and their identity checked, pending transfer to Amman. On two occasions, ICRC delegates went to the camp, which was closed down early in summer for climatic reasons. They also made ten visits to the Karak police station and to the Maan and Mahatta prisons in Amman, where a number

of persons recently driven out of the occupied territories were being provisionally interned.

The ICRC approached the Israeli authorities several times with a view to stopping expulsions which it regarded as being contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention. In a communication addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel at the end of February, the President of the ICRC expressed the ICRC's concern regarding the dire consequences for the persons stricken by such measures, against which appeal was not possible and which provided for no time-limit. The Prime Minister replied that the expulsion orders had been dictated by security considerations and that they were to be preferred to detention over an indefinite period. As the explanations given failed to allay ICRC apprehension, Mr. Umbricht, a member of the ICRC who went to Israel towards the end of 1971, confirmed that the ICRC wanted the expulsion of Arabs from the occupied territories to cease. The Israeli authorities agreed to consider individual applications from persons who had been driven out and who wanted to return.

#### DESTRUCTION OF HOUSES

In view of the continued destruction of houses in the occupied territories, the President of the ICRC made a renewed appeal to the Israeli Prime Minister at the end of April that her Government should abandon a method to counter subversive activities which the ICRC regarded as being contrary to the provisions of Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In her reply in August, the Prime Minister stated that the Government of Israel could not renounce measures which it deemed essential for the maintenance of security in the occupied territories.

ICRC delegates in the field therefore concentrated on rendering material aid to those whose homes had been destroyed. They provided the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare with 199 tents and 1,675 blankets for the homeless.

#### EXPROPRIATIONS

The ICRC continued to follow with close attention the question of expropriations in

the occupied territories. However, as the Israeli Government declared at the end of 1970 that it did not want to enter into any discussion on the subject, ICRC delegates confined themselves to submitting strictly humanitarian problems to the authorities as and when they arose.

#### DISTURBANCES AND POPULATION TRANSFERS IN THE GAZA STRIP

In view of the deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip and the outrages which caused victims mainly among the civilian population, Israeli security forces, in January 1971, took certain steps in refugee camps and more particularly in the Beach Camp. The ICRC delegation received a number of complaints about brutal treatment, forced transfers, the destruction of houses, and so forth. It made various approaches to the Israeli authorities and asked that such excesses should cease. Simultaneously, the President of the ICRC approached the Permanent Representative of Israel in Geneva. In accordance with the requests made, the Israeli Government strengthened its control over the security forces and inflicted penalties in certain cases of abuse.

On 21 July, the ICRC delegation in Gaza was informed by refugees that the Israeli army the day before had started to transfer refugee families to El Arish or to unoccupied camps on the West Bank of the Jordan. At the same time, in the Jabalia, Shatti and Rafah camps, work had started on the destruction of some of the shelters and on the laying of new avenues in order to reduce the camp population and facilitate supervision.

The occupation authorities, whom the ICRC delegates immediately contacted, ascribed the measures adopted to overriding security needs. They explained, however, that arrangements had been made to rehouse and compensate the persons displaced.

By the end of August, more than 14,700 persons had been affected by those measures. Most refugees were dissatisfied with their new housing and before long returned to Gaza. Relatives or friends provided shelter, usually in the camps. By the end of the year, some 200 families were staying on at El Arish and around fifty on the West Bank.

The ICRC made various approaches of a general nature to the Israeli authorities. It expressed concern about the forced transfers and urged that rehousing and compensation should be accelerated and intensified.

In addition, ICRC delegates contacted a number of families whose houses had been destroyed; on two occasions they went to El Arish to see in what conditions the displaced persons were living. They also conveyed to the authorities the complaints they had received about the matter of compensation.

The Israeli Government subsequently informed the ICRC that the operations, which had considerably reduced the number of outrages, were to cease for the time being. It assured the ICRC that, should any further transfers be contemplated, new housing would first be provided near the areas to be evacuated, to ensure that the persons displaced would be promptly rehoused.

#### UPROOTING OF PEOPLE

In December, the ICRC delegation intervened on behalf of a Bedouin tribe of about 260 persons whom the Israeli authorities had compelled to leave their lands near the Dead Sea and to settle in the Bethlehem district. As a result of the transfer, those people were deprived of their lands and their livelihood. The place where they found themselves did not belong to them, and their flocks could not graze there.

The ICRC delegates approached the Israeli authorities with a view to the Bedouins' return to their former site. They supplied the Ministry of Social Welfare with 20 tents, 100 blankets, 200 kg of sugar, 200 kg of rice and 50 kg of wheat, for the displaced Bedouins.

# Arab World



## 252

**Statement Rejecting the Idea of a Palestine State Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Beirut, Early January, 1971

The Arab world is at present facing a new link in the chain of imperialist-reactionary plots against our revolution and our people, for which rapid action is being taken at both Arab and international levels, as part of the series of conspiracies aimed at liquidation and peaceful solutions. This conspiracy is in a new form which has found expression in the so-called "Palestine entity" or the "Palestine state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."

From the start we have rejected all projects for liquidation. We rejected the Security Council resolution and the Rogers Plan; we resisted and are continuing to resist the alleged Palestinian entity, and we are firmly resolved to resist every proposal that is incompatible with the aims that the revolution came into existence to achieve. We believe that our basic task at present is to resist this proposal within the framework of our resistance to all proposals made by the subservient authorities in Jordan.

It is now the duty—a duty that cannot be postponed—of the Resistance to confront this imperialist proposal and disclose its essential significance. The Resistance must launch a propaganda campaign among the Palestinian-Jordanian masses to expose and lay bare the aims of the proposal; it must uncover all hidden quarters which advocate, or have been induced to advocate, approval of this despicable entity.

By adopting the formula of a national front comprising all sections of the armed movement, and by relying on the Arab revolutionary masses, the Resistance can resist attempts to encircle and blockade the revolu-

tion and to render it ineffective; it can also, through real and close cooperation in the confrontation of the subservient authorities in Jordan, foil all projects involving humiliation and surrender.

Strengthening and promoting the national unity of all sections of the revolution, so that it may be adapted to the character of the new stage and the dangers that threaten the revolution, will continue to be one of our first tasks; this is one of the fundamental directions of our policy.

So let us strengthen the cohesion of all sections of the Resistance.

And let our slogan be that we shall oppose this liquidation proposal as strongly as we have opposed other similar defeatist proposals.

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**Declarations of Jordanian Government Dedication to Islamic Solidarity, Arab Unity and the Palestinian Cause and Determination To Consolidate Law and Order in the Country, Included in a Policy Statement by Premier al-Tall of Jordan<sup>2</sup>**

Amman, January 2, 1971

By God's grace and bounty we have succeeded in ending bloodshed and fighting between brothers and in eliminating the causes of dissension. What is more, we have succeeded in returning the Jordanian advance to the right course, in restoring its principles and firm basic convictions, and in clearly and precisely plotting its course and objectives. The Cairo Agreement, which was signed by the Arab leaders on September 27, 1970, and the Amman Agreement, signed on October 12, 1970, and their annexes, protocols and decisions—all these documents are turning points which have corrected the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. statement, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 82 (January 9, 1971), pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall's statement, *al-Dustur* (Amman), January 3, 1971.

errors, straightened what was crooked and eliminated deviation; they constitute the vital parting of the ways from which we must set off on our dedicated and unified advance towards our sacred common aims. We wish it to be clear from now on, both to our country's citizens and to the people of the world, to those who have faith and confidence and to those self-seekers who have doubts, to brother Arabs and to foreigners, to our good and faithful friends and to our malevolent and deadly enemies, that the government is resolved not only to respect these agreements and all their ramifications, but also to implement them both in letter and in spirit and to regard all that has been achieved so far as being the start, the basis, for the establishment of greater national unity, whose crowning glory lies in unity of arms, struggle and aims in Jordan, and greater Arab cooperation and solidarity whose crowning glory lies in our willingness to sacrifice everything for the battle and for victory.

Mr. President, Honorable Members:

The most vital weapon in the sacred battle which our nation is fighting is the establishment of absolute national unity devoid of all regional, class and confessional deviations and the building of a cohesive internal front.

. . . . .

Therefore one of the first responsibilities of this government is to make every effort to consolidate the foundations of order, to embody the sovereignty of law in our everyday life and to ensure security in every part of the homeland. Power is not the only instrument used by government to achieve this end; our real instrument is the awareness and understanding of the citizen, his faith in himself, his country and his cause. . . .

All the foundations and principles of government are linked to the battle of destiny by the closest possible ties. The Arab cause has always been, and will always be, Jordan's concern and preoccupation, just as the Palestinian cause has always been Jordan's concern and will continue to be its preoccupation until it is victorious. Not that the tragedy of the Palestinian people for us here in Jordan

is the tragedy of another Arab people; it is exclusively the tragedy of Jordan itself and its people; yet once again we reaffirm the government's insistence on the sanctity of the right of the Palestinian people to their territory and their homeland and their right to self-determination. Acceptance of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, or of the initiative of the United States Secretary of State, does not and must not involve any prejudice to the sacred fundamental rights of the Palestinian people. In this connection, the government regards the project for a Palestinian statelet, which is being whispered and talked about, as a blow to that sacred feeling for unity which every Arab fosters in his heart and a step on the road towards the liquidation of the Palestinian cause. The government is therefore not content merely to reject and condemn this proposal; it is doing everything in its power to frustrate this project, which is really a conspiracy, by all the ways and means at its disposal.

The government will also cooperate closely with our Arab brothers so that we may frustrate the enemy's stratagems, his sinister plans and his destructive conspiracies.

Arab cooperation, Arab solidarity and joint Arab action are part of an inescapable duty imposed by the battle, and it is impossible for us in this country to doubt, ignore or neglect this fact.

Our belief that this is essential is based on the principles and fundamental convictions which form the whole fabric and groundwork of Jordanian existence. The government is therefore resolved to proceed to the utmost limits with Arab cooperation with all brother Arabs, with solidarity between all brother Arabs and with joint Arab action.

The government's policy as regards other Arab countries is based on confidence, respect and true brotherhood. In this field the government will proceed in accordance with the Charter of the Arab League, and with the decisions of its Council and its conferences. Moreover, the government believes, as does every member of this people, that Jordan is an inseparable part of the Arab nation and that



one of its fundamental duties is to advance towards the achievement of Arab unity, because this is the path of invincibility, strength and prosperity for us and for all Arabs. It is also the only way to confront the terrible dangers that face us, to enforce Arab rights and to raise our prestige among the nations. The government is optimistic in its support for the quadripartite union that has been announced between the four Arab countries—the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Libya and Syria—and we wish this project every success so that it may become the nucleus of comprehensive Arab unity, just as the unity of the two Banks of Jordan provides a model for all Arab steps towards unity.

The government will also devote particular attention to the brotherly relations that link Jordan with the Islamic countries and will strive to strengthen its relations with these countries so as to obtain more support for our cause, the cause of Palestine, and for our battle with Zionism and colonialism. In particular it will try to strengthen relations with the Islamic countries in Africa and Asia, thereby making it impossible for Israel to upset these relations and turning to the best possible account the resources of the Islamic nation on behalf of our causes, first and foremost of which is the cause of Palestine.

In this connection the government recalls with gratitude the many occasions on which Pakistan has stood by it at both local and international levels.

Our relations with other countries are based on those countries' attitudes to our struggle with our enemies and on their objective view of the Arab right to Palestine.

We are the friends of those who befriend us, our nation and our sacred cause, and the enemies of those who are inimical to us, to our nation and our sacred cause.

. . . . .

## 254

### **Statement Insisting That Arab Nations Respond to the Libyan Call To Make the Battle Against Israel a Pan-Arab One, Issued by the Official Spokesman for the Revolutionary Command Council of Libya<sup>1</sup>**

**Tripoli, January 2, 1971**

The whole Arab nation knows that the Libyan Arab Republic has submitted a proposal for making the battle with the Israeli enemy a pan-Arab one. This was after the United Arab Republic had called on the Arab countries, including the Libyan Arab Republic, to take action with all the means at their disposal to confront the dangerous and flagrant American challenge to the Arab nation, which takes the form of supplying the enemy with all he asks for to enable him to expand, occupy and impose his will on the Arabs by American force.

Because the Libyan Arab Republic believes that the right answer is for the whole of the Arab nation to enter the battle against all its enemies, the Revolutionary Command Council sent a deputation of officials, three of them members of the Council and one a minister, and informed all the Arab countries of this project. Their replies expressed support for this proposal and readiness to accept the call to the day of decision for usurped Palestine, most of them saying that it was the duty of the countries concerned to appraise the situation and the obligations it involved, and we are ready to do so.

In fact the countries concerned did meet in Tripoli, agreed on a new strategy and entrusted their Ministers of Defense with the task of conducting a military appraisal of the situation. The Ministers of Defense then met, also in Tripoli, appraised the situation and assigned specific obligations as regards time and place, and the Libyan Arab Republic, as the country which had initiated the process, informed the other countries of their obligations. But the Arab countries

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Libyan statement, *al-Haqiqa* (Benghazi), January 3, 1971.

did not respond to this national call or perform their duties to the battle. The Libyan Arab Republic then repeated the call, but the Arab countries took so long to reply that the Libyan Arab Republic grew weary of these governments' evasion of their national duty and of their having no intention of standing by what they had said in their replies to the proposal. The Libyan Arab Republic therefore decided to adopt a specific attitude to this situation, and just at that moment Kuwait sent the following reply:

To His Excellency Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi

Greetings etc.

In reply to your letter on the Libyan proposal that the battle should be made a pan-Arab one, I take pleasure in informing you of the following:

First: Kuwait's belief that the battle must be placed on an all-Arab basis is boundless, and its policy and attitudes are based on this belief.

Second: Kuwait always stands in the front rank as regards causes involving the national destiny of the Arabs. It has taken part in all the Summit Conferences and adhered to all their resolutions.

Third: Kuwait believes that exchanges of views between Arab officials must continue, and we should have liked to join with all the other Arab countries in the Conference of Confrontation States held in Tripoli, to give our views on the subjects that were discussed, so that the resolutions of the Conference might be binding on everyone.

Fourth: In view of the fact that Kuwait was not invited to take part in this conference, there are many points which require clarification.

Fifth: Kuwait hopes that there will be a meeting of all the Arab countries at a level to be agreed on, to discuss this subject so that a common Arab attitude may be adopted.

Kuwait, *Shawwal* 17, 1390  
(December 15, 1970)

The Libyan Arab Republic therefore places the matter before the Arab people from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Arabian] Gulf so that they may take action either through their governments or otherwise with a view to

reaching a definite solution on the basis of Kuwait's proposals. This is particularly important at this critical stage in the struggle.

Henceforward failure to respond and refusal to answer either Yes or No will certainly be high treason and extreme cowardice.

The Libyan Arab Republic hopes that Kuwait's proposal will provide the Arab governments with a way of taking action towards participation in the battle of destiny.

## 255

### **U.S. Television Interview by U.A.R. President Sadat Stating Extension of the Ceasefire To Be Conditional on Israeli Agreement To Withdraw from All Territory Occupied in 1967, Expressing Willingness To Conclude a Peace Agreement on the Basis of the 1967 Borders and Accepting the Principle of a Middle East Peace Keeping Force<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, January 6, 1971

*Q. If a solution is reached with Israel through the auspices of the United States or however, what would be the ultimate relationship between Israel and Egypt? Would it be recognition with an exchange of ambassadors and normalization of relationships? Do you see that in the future?*

*A. May I ask a question myself? How many years had the United States refused to recognize China? How many years?*

[Announcers' remarks omitted.]

<sup>1</sup> Transcript of Sadat's interview broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System television and radio program "Face the Nation"; "Face the Nation" is the property of CBS News, and is a publication of Holt Information Systems, A Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

Cronkite's interview with Sadat was filmed in Cairo on January 6; excerpts from it were shown on the "CBS Evening News" broadcasts of January 7 and January 8, 1971. Finally on January 10, this edited version of the interview, including the most important statements already used, was broadcast as a special edition of "Face the Nation."

*Q. Mr. President, on the timetable for withdrawal, your first point, which you say must be established before you can extend the ceasefire beyond the February 5 termination date, what about the specifics of that timetable? What is your idea there?*

*A. Well—*

*Q. Should the Israelis say to you and would you require that they say we shall withdraw by such and such a date? Is that what you mean by a timetable? And how early would that date have to be?*

*A. Well, my idea in this is if the four powers, and I could have wished that the United States would have made it itself, but as far as I see now, they are taking the side of Israel completely. But if the four powers, for instance, give some guidance to Gunnar Jarring and recognize the withdrawals in this guidance, we consider this a practical step.*

*Q. Well, now, how does that satisfy a timetable? That doesn't say they will withdraw by such and such a date, does it?*

*A. If they give this guide to Gunnar Jarring, well, Gunnar Jarring will be making his negotiations with the parties, with us, with the Israelis, with Jordan, and then he will prepare for this timetable, and maybe according to some proposals that have been made before by the French or by the Russians, there will be steps for this withdrawal. This would be a practical step toward the fulfillment of the withdrawal and to the Security Council resolution. This is my idea.*

*Q. Do the Russians or the French at this moment have such a plan to put forward to Jarring?*

*A. I think they have done it before, in the Four Powers' meetings. I think they have done it before.*

*Q. And a renewal of that plan accepted by Jarring as the point of negotiations would satisfy you?*

*A. Yes.*

*Q. Would that represent the concrete progress of which you speak, that would enable you to extend the ceasefire?*

*A. That's right. That will mean that we are starting a practical way for the solution of the*

problems here in the Middle East, not to freeze the whole problem and just put it as a new—I mean—situation in the Cold War between the two superpowers.

*Q. Mr. President, you speak of your hopes and desires for peace.*

*A. Yes.*

*Q. I suppose that must be true of every leader in the world, really.*

*A. That's right.*

*Q. I hope that nobody really wants war. But isn't it necessary that some compromises be made for peace, that we each of us give up something in order that we can achieve peace in the world, and I wonder if there is anything that you would give up rather than have war?*

*A. It is a very important question. I must tell you this, frankly, Sisco has told our representative there in Washington that we must be prepared for concessions.*

*Q. This is our Assistant Secretary of State, Sisco, in charge of our Middle Eastern affairs.*

*A. The Middle East, yes. Must be prepared for concessions and negotiations—if it's to be successful, there must be concessions. Well, what concessions am I going to give? One thing—land. My land is occupied now—Sinai is occupied, and I return again to the remark that I told you. When a part of Florida or Texas is occupied, what concessions are you going to give? The other side can give concessions. The Israelis can give concessions, but what concessions am I going to give, except land? No one agrees in this country, or all over the Arab world, will agree to the surrender of one inch of the Arab land, because this is part of our land, our dignity, our honor. Well, you ask me now if the negotiations is to succeed, we must be flexible. For instance—well, how am I going to be flexible when my land—part of my land—one-fifth of my country is occupied? And then you want me to make concessions—what concessions am I going to give?*

*Q. Does your feeling about this land extend beyond the former Egyptian lands—I mean Jerusalem, Jordan, Golan Heights, Syria—does all of that have to be returned to satisfy your conditions?*

A. That's right.

*Q. You feel you are negotiating for the entire Arab world, is that right?*

A. For the whole land that has been occupied after the fifth of June, after the fifth of June.

*Q. You mentioned the possibility of a four-nation team, observer team or troops. I don't know precisely what it is you are suggesting—that's what I'd like to ask. What sort of a patrol over this agreement would you accept or would you suggest?*

A. Well, I accept—till the forming of a force from those four powers to guarantee the frontiers of Israel, and my frontiers also, because I need the guarantee more than Israel, believe me.

*Q. Are you speaking of observer teams now, or actually military forces?*

A. Both. I agree to both. On both sides.

*Q. On both sides of the frontier.*

A. That's right, that's right.

*Q. And would these be under the Security Council with a veto power operating over them?*

A. Well those who have the veto would be in this power—the four powers—those who have the veto will be there.

*Q. What about the—would you make an agreement within this area that these forces could not be withdrawn without the unanimous agreement of all powers, as opposed to the request from President Nasser in '67 for the withdrawal of the UN observer teams?*

A. Well, when we come to the details—I am speaking now about the principles—and because you have mentioned the secured borders for Israel, if it is a secure borders problem, it is not Israel's problem only, but it is my problem also.

*Q. But pursuing this four power force for the moment, do you think Israel would accept it?*

A. I don't know, but from what we hear, they would not accept it, because they want expansion. They don't want to fulfill the resolution of the Security Council, because the first item in this resolution is the withdrawal. They will not agree to this. But if the

problem is secure boundaries, well, let us speak about peace commitments, and let a force of the four powers guarantee the secure boundaries for Israel.

*Q. If you're convinced, and I think you said this before, sir, that Israel will not accept withdrawal, then really what you're saying is that you hold no hope for the current peace talks, since that is your prime condition for them.*

A. Well, let us come to the root of the whole problem. Why doesn't Israel accept this? Israel will not accept because they receive economic aid, military aid, everything they want from the States, well, if they receive anything—everything they want, why should they agree to withdrawal? Even more than that, Mrs. Meir, two days before, declared—and all the Israeli ministers also declared—that the United States policy is with Israel and behind Israel not to withdraw from the occupied lands before reaching a complete settlement. If Mrs. Meir declared this, and if Israel is convinced of this and receives all this military, and political and everything from the United States, why should they agree?

*Q. Mr. President, what are your proposals for settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem?*

A. Well, it is a problem that must be discussed on the level of all the Arab leaders and the Palestinians themselves. I can't say for myself.

*Q. So there is no immediate plan as to how it could be settled?*

A. No, but we have the United Nations resolution as a guide for this.

*Q. Is there any consideration given at all to the proposal put forth in several circles—I think that maybe John Foster Dulles first mentioned it—of using atomic power, under international auspices, to irrigate the Sinai and permit a Palestinian government in the Sinai?*

A. We are not going to surrender any inch of our land as a solution for a problem like this, but we are quite ready to take our part and our responsibility in finding a solution and a solution based on justice, and based also on the United Nations resolutions.

We are quite ready to take our part in this, but not to surrender our land for this.

*Q. Does this include admitting any Palestinian refugees to Egypt?*

A. They must say they were the Palestinian refugees. They must say they were according to the United Nations resolutions. And they have the right to their land, to their homeland.

*Q. In Israel.*

A. In Israel or in—on the occupied parts or in—anywhere. They have to say they were.

*Q. The Palestinian guerrillas never agreed to the ceasefire proposal or the peace talks. Do you think that a meaningful peace can be achieved without their prior agreement?*

A. Well, it is a very important question. They have the right not to agree to any settlements like this, because the land is their land, their fatherland, their homeland. But when I discuss my problem here, I say this very simply. I want the removal of the consequences of the aggression of '67. This means that we must return to the borders of the fourth of June, '67.

*Q. Well, that—is that likely to satisfy the guerrillas, Palestinians?*

A. It will not satisfy them.

*Q. But you think we could achieve peace—*

A. They have the right—they have the right not to be satisfied. And they have the right to accuse or to attack me also, but this is the fact. This is the fact.

*Q. So that you would reach an agreement even if they did not agree? I mean, that would then become their problem to work out on their own. Is that it?*

A. It is my problem also. It would be my problem also, but first, we want to remove all the consequences of the aggression of '67.

*Q. In the suggestion that it might be necessary to end the ceasefire on February 5th, how do you visualize hostilities being resumed? In the kind of shelling and occasional front-line raids that have been going on in the past, or is something bigger going to happen?*

A. Well, that is the problem of the military

men, and I shall discuss it with them. I have discussed it already partly, but it will be discussed much more in detail.

*Q. Do you see this as a coordinated operation with all of the Arab nations? Is there any likelihood of any of the nations not participating with you in that operation?*

A. That is for them to decide. I decide for myself, and it is for them to decide for themselves.

*Q. Mr. President, there were some who thought that statements of President Nasser preceding the '67 Israeli strike against Egypt might have provoked the Israelis into making that strike. Do you have any concern that your statements that you made here today, and that you've made over the last couple of weeks regarding the end of the ceasefire February 5th and the necessity to reclaim your lands might again provoke an Israeli attack against you?*

A. Well, it is very simple like that. First of all, I am responsible after all [for] what President Nasser [has] said and done, because I was sharing the responsibility with him, and I was hundred per cent backing him. Second, I'm not provoking Israel. Even if this problem is settled, we shall have a war after five years, because Israel wants from the Nile to the Euphrates. (PHRASE NOT UNDERSTOOD), we shall have a war after five years. They will not—they will not be quiet till they fulfill their dreams and prophecies from the Nile to the Euphrates. It is not—it is not statements said by me. I am just saying this. If there is a practical solution started by Gunnar Jarring up till the 5th of February, we are quite ready for peace.

If there is not a practical solution, well, we shall not prolong the ceasefire at all. And this will be our fate. We shall fight to liberate our land, because this is our duty to liberate our land. And there is a difference between liberating our land and waging war to gain a new land from the others.

*Q. Do you see any possibility, Mr. President, that a war in the Middle East now could possibly be waged without involving the major powers, specifically Russia and the United States?*

A. Well, this is a problem that I don't agree to at all—I don't agree to at all. And this is a point of difference also between us here and those who are making the policies there in Washington. As I told you, it is a problem for me. It's just a very simple problem. Part of my land is occupied. This part of my land I want to be liberated by peaceful solution, or, if it is not liberated by peaceful solution, it is my right and duty to liberate it. Why should you involve me in the global strategy of Mr. Kissinger, and of the power politics, and the two super-power politics—why should you involve me in this? I'm not—I have no interest to be involved in this at all.

*Q. Do you feel that Washington makes Israeli policy in Washington?*

A. It is made combined. For example, President Johnson gave the approval for the aggression in '67—no one denies this in the United States.

*Q. I didn't know that.*

A. Yes, he gave the approval. The whole plan was put before him and he gave the approval. He can't deny this, in his retreat in Texas now.

*Q. Speaking of the Israeli influence, Washington and Tel Aviv's or Jerusalem's association, which do you feel is dominant? Who—you say it's made between them, but does the United States make policy according to the needs of Israel, or does Israel make policy according to the needs of the United States?*

A. Before two months—what I felt—I'm telling you my feelings here—before two months the interests between Israel and the United States were combined, but since two months, up until now, I can see that the United States has interests and Israel has interests also, both of them against us, in the time that I have nothing against the United States at all.

*Q. What are the U.S. interests against you?*

A. Put yourself in my shoes, and then try to think why did the United States give the Phantoms to the Israelis, to reach our depths in the country here and to raid our factories

and schools, children, the schools, and send and advise in the shape of ultimatum on the second of February, '70, telling us that if you don't cease fire, the Israelis will reach over the depths of the country and we can't prevent them, while they are providing them with the Phantoms and the bombs and everything. Why should they do this? And they told them, frankly, there is nothing between us and the United States except the Israeli problem—nothing at all.

*Q. If the Israeli problem were settled, you see no other obstacle to an improved United States-Egyptian relationship?*

A. Ultimately, ultimately. What does the United States want here? At one time they say that the Soviet presence here, according to the strategists there in Washington also, the advisors of President Nixon, saying about the Soviet presence here in the area. Well, the Soviets were here before '67, in the Mediterranean, and they are here after '67 also in the Mediterranean. The only change is that we gave them facilities after '67 because they stood with us in the black hour. We gave them facilities, and mark this, we shall continue to give them facilities; frankly, quite frankly, they have stood with us in the black hours.

*Q. Mr. President, unfortunately our time is up. Thank you very much for being with us to Face the Nation.*

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**Statement Issued by Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al-Adgham, Reviewing the Work of the Committee from Early December 1970 and Appealing to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the Government of Jordan To Fulfill Their Obligations Under the Cairo and Amman Agreements (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, January 8, 1971**

Following the contacts made by the Chairman of the [Supreme] Arab Follow-Up Committee after his return to Amman on December 8, 1970, and the talks he had first with the representatives of the Jordanian government and then with officials of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee on December 28, 1970 submitted a memorandum to both sides which both appraised the situation in Jordan since the arrival of the Supreme Arab Committee and defined its powers and responsibilities in relation to events as determined by the Kings and Presidents in the Cairo Agreement. This provided for a ceasefire and the prevention of any move or action liable to lead to friction and the resumption of the conflict, and also stipulated that relations between the two parties were to be regulated on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between them which should ensure the continuation of commando action and respect for the country's sovereignty; in addition it stipulated that the Military Bureau of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee should be entrusted with the task of dealing with all military affairs related to the implementation of this agreement.

In this memorandum the Chairman of the Committee placed on record the positive results achieved by the Committee in this connection. He also placed on record the weak points that still exist in spite of the

efforts that have been made by the Committee, because of the failure to implement certain decisions taken with the approval of both parties, in particular those taken on December 9, 10 and 14, 1970. This prompted the Chairman of the Committee to make certain recommendations in his memorandum of December 28 to ensure that all remaining reasons for caution and all motives for refraining from implementing the resolutions are removed.

After the Committee had dealt with these problems at a series of meetings which lasted a full month and were attended by His Excellency Mr. Wasfi al-Tall, the Jordanian Premier, and representatives of both the Jordanian government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Chairman of the Committee decided to submit an urgent report to the Arab Kings and Presidents who signed the Cairo Agreement, listing those sections of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and the subsidiary agreements based on them that had been implemented, and those that had not so far been implemented. In the meantime he called on Brigadier Ahmad Hilmi, the Chairman of the Military Committee, to follow up the implementation of the resolutions.

In the view of the Chairman of the Higher Arab Follow-Up Committee the points that have not yet been implemented, many though they are, can be settled. It is also his view that it is essential that these points should be settled as soon as possible and not underestimated; on the other hand he does not think that they should be overemphasized or exaggerated.

The Chairman of the Committee is convinced that there is no longer a possibility of differences growing more acute or discord breaking out again. This is because he is sure that innocent citizens will never accept this after the cruel trials they have lived through, for their only aspiration is to live in an atmosphere of security and confidence for themselves and their children and in a situation which is both protected by the law and based on respect for human dignity, the proper treatment of citizens and their protection from all aggression.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the statement by al-Adgham (referred to in some sources as Ladgham), *al-Dustur* (Amman), January 9, 1971.

The Chairman of the Committee also believes that there is no justification for the exaggerated fears that possess the minds of citizens, because he believes that the conscience of every statesman and official will prevent his taking a negative attitude to all that is responsible for these fears, and that the conscience of the Arabs and moral and humane forces in all the countries of the world will never consent to such a thing and will adopt a decisive attitude to it.

The Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee addresses an appeal to the Jordanian government and to the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization to adhere completely to the obligations to which they have indisputably committed themselves, reminding them that the violation of the undertakings into which they have entered with the support and in the sight of the Kings and Presidents who represent the whole Arab nation would be a betrayal of the historic trust borne by both parties as regards the battle of destiny in these critical circumstances.

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**Statements by Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) Tracing the Clash of the Resistance with the Government of Jordan, Discussing the Mistakes Made by the Resistance, and Urging the Necessity of Rejecting Proposals Made for a Middle East Settlement<sup>1</sup>**

**Kuwait, January 9, 1971**

I will talk of our mistakes in detail—there have been mistakes. But in the first place I

say that, there has never been any one or any organization that has had the slightest intention of taking over the government [of Jordan], because we have realized and grasped the fact that if the revolution were turned into a regime it would no longer be a revolution, but would become something like the existing regimes—unable to raise its voice and without the will to challenge and reject. We have known this, and because of this and at the prompting of this belief we have never had the slightest idea of toppling the regime—we have never thought of the overturn of the regime. On November 4, 1968 there were not more than 200 rifles in all Amman, and these rifles were not in evidence downtown, and commando action had not yet made a single mistake. On November 4 we found the entire Jordanian army occupying the whole of Amman; we were surprised and asked about it. We were told that Taher Dablan had caused an accident with an army vehicle, and the whole army was looking for Taher Dablan's vehicle. When we told them that if it was a matter of Taher Dablan we knew the quarters that were financing Taher Dablan: "They are with you, in the heart of the Jordanian intelligence service, but if it is something else that you are after, speak out." Between morning and evening there was a change in what they were looking for; they started asking about the 200 rifles in the hands of the refugees who had been living in detention camps for more than twenty years without knowing the meaning of bearing arms though they had been longing to do so; then came the revolution and gave them 200 rifles, and the regime was furious with them and told us to hand over the rifles to them, but we refused. They had to back down because at that time the whole Arab nation was supporting the commandos. I say this because I am bound to say that today the Arab nation and the Arab masses are witnessing the tragedy of this revolution, the ordeal of this revolution without saying a word, without raising their voices—this is a fact, brothers, that we must recognize: today's massacre, for example—to digress for a moment—involves hundreds of deaths and [great] destruction....

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Khalaf's speech made at the Da'iya Secondary School in Kuwait as part of an information campaign mounted by the command of the Palestine Resistance, *al-Ray al-Amm* (Kuwait), January 11, 1971.



Having dealt with this incident. . . , I shall now return to my main story—the story of the two hundred rifles that they fought us for on November 4, 1968. Now, three years later, it is still the same story, still the same question—they do not want a people under arms. They asked us about the arms in the hands of the commandos or the militia, and why the arms were in the hands of the militia. I swear to you, brothers, what we want with these arms is not what they think, for rifles cannot bring about a coup in Jordan. We got the rifles because we know that the cardboard frontiers between us and Israel can be crossed by the Israeli army whenever it feels like it, at any time, either for reprisals or for occupation.

We had to think of arming the people, and as long as we had arms we had to distribute them to our people; we did not distribute arms for any other purpose. It was for this purpose only, so that, should Israel think of occupying further Arab territories, the people would have the means of opposing it. This is the story, neither more nor less, but they do not want to understand this. On November 4 they did what they did on February 10, 1970—this year is the year of clashes—this year, after the Confrontation Conference in Cairo, Bahjat al-Talhuni went back to Jordan before King Hussein, and the very day he arrived he amazed us by publishing a statement of fourteen points, all of which placed restrictions on commando action and all of which led to clashes between the army and the commandos—and we were much surprised by it. There were two or three clashes, after which we managed to get things under control and solve the problem by an agreement. Then there was the solemn Tripoli Conference and the Confrontation Conference. After this conference King Hussein came to Jordan, and for the first time he was pleased and we met and he said: “The Kings and Presidents meeting in Tripoli have now decided to destroy Israel.” We were really delighted and we said, “That’s wonderful; if we are now strong enough to destroy Israel, that’s very good.” But, as the proverb says: “How do you know it’s a lie? Because he’s talking so big.” The destruction of Israel all at once?

We felt at the time that there was something risky about it.

After this report he told us that he wanted to coordinate commando action, because the Kings and Presidents were going to send a committee headed by Qaid Ahmad to organize commando action. And the Committee did come and ask me to help in this. We met, there were repeated meetings, and we reached an agreement called the July 14 Agreement. In this agreement we tried to accept all the conditions we had previously absolutely refused to accept. All this was so that the revolution might continue and to make sure that Arab blood should not be shed in the wrong place. Never mind. People always say that it is those who are most concerned who make concessions; we made concessions in this agreement and signed it and accepted conditions that we had never accepted before. On July 14 the agreement was signed, and one of its provisions was that the Special Branch should be abolished. But the Special Branch increased its activities and its conspiracies against commando action and started to calculate, to pick on the mistakes of the commandos and to produce commando detachments of its own to imitate these mistakes, so as to increase the distance between the people and the commandos. The Special Branch continued its activities until things reached such a pitch that we were compelled to complain of Jordan to the Arab League. At the Arab League, as usual, there was a lot of beating about the bush, asking and giving of favors and kissing. In the end it was decided to send an Arab committee to Amman—the Arab committee headed by Amin Shibli, who came to Amman and started contacting us and the authorities. In spite of all the difficulties that confronted us and in spite of the fact that before the September massacre there were more than five or six incidents in which the Jordanian army attacked the people for the first time with shells and artillery, on the Monday before the Thursday on which the massacre started, on September 17, 1970, Amin Shibli, from the Sudan, contacted us and said: “I feel that there is something going on and I

think you had better conclude an agreement with Jordan."

At the time it was the government of Abd al-Mun'ëm al-Rifa'i, and we assembled the whole of the Central Committee of the Resistance and submitted the matter to it. Among the few decisions unanimously approved by the Central Committee was a decision to contact the government and make an agreement with it. We did in fact make this agreement and on the Tuesday we agreed on six points. Lieutenant-General Mashhur Haditha was present at these meetings and said, "I am going to the King to submit these decisions to him," and we for our part said that we should go to the Central Committee to submit the matter to it. This was the Tuesday, and the time for us to meet to sign the agreement was at 10 p.m. on Tuesday. In fact we did go at 10 p.m. after the Central Committee had unanimously approved the agreement. We waited from 10 until 11 o'clock, but Lieutenant-General Mashhur did not come; we asked for him everywhere but could not find him. Thereupon the then Prime Minister, Abd al-Mun'ëm al-Rifa'i contacted us and said, "Make the agreement on my responsibility." At 10:30 Amman Radio started saying "we are about to broadcast an important statement," and at 11:00 the agreement was broadcast from Amman Radio. At the time the masses thought that what was to have been broadcast was the statement of the agreement, but in fact the important news that Amman Radio had been giving notice of was the formation of the military government at the time when we were negotiating. This is proved by the fact that at 3:00 in the morning we learned from responsible sources that at 6:30 a.m. on Wednesday—one day before the massacre—there was to be a military government headed by Muhammad Daud. We tried to contact the authorities on all sides; al-Rifa'i told us, "I was dismissed at 5:00 o'clock, so there is no government. Look for Major-General Mashhur, or is he Lieutenant-General Mashhur?" But we could not find him or learn where he was. We looked for anyone in authority. At 4:00 a.m. on Wednesday morning Marshal Habis Majali appeared

and said: "I am Marshal Habis Majali," and you already know what else he said. We asked him what was going on, and why the [installation of a] military government when we had come to an agreement? He said: "There is no ground for hope. The military government wants you for the meeting." Here I must mention that many people have said to us: "If only you had met with the military government, it would have been possible to avoid the problem." But I say, brothers, it would not have been possible to avoid the problem, and we say this on the authority of important sources, reliable sources, headed by Muhammad Daud himself who said: "If you had come to the negotiations, we intended to obstruct them and keep on making condition after condition so that you might reject them and we should be able to tell the Arab public that you did not want an agreement, that you did not want to agree."

This was our plan. When the military government met on Wednesday, brothers, it drew up a single program consisting of two points.

The first point: For the restoration of law and order and the sovereignty of law in the country, all means must be employed to rid the country of the commandos, these means to include military force and bringing in the army.

The second point: Should the army fail in its task and should it be considered that the situation was sufficiently disturbed, the government should call on foreign forces to maintain order in the country.

I am not saying this to be provocative or to deceive; the document is to be found in the Foreign Ministry, signed by all the ministers in the military government, including Muhammad Daud himself.

To continue: on Wednesday we started assembling our brothers, and tried to make contact for the last time. We made an appeal to the Arab Kings and Presidents in which we told them what had happened and that the country was on the brink of a grave civil war. Brother Abu Ammar himself addressed an appeal in his own voice to the Arab Kings and Presidents and to the people, calling on them

all to use all means to stop the massacre and the conspiracy. We spent the whole of Wednesday between preparing ourselves to meet this attack and contacting our Arab brothers and calling on them for help; for, as I have said, if it had been our intention, our aim, our plan, to overthrow the government, this would have been the chance of a lifetime for us, in the situation we were then in. We were too good, because we had believed that we had a land in Palestine and that we had an enemy in Palestine, and had said that this was our principal enemy; we did not know that there were people determined to align themselves with the Zionist enemy. Therefore on Wednesday we were in a state of constant confusion, and kept saying that perhaps things would not get worse. We also tell you frankly, and I am one of those who tell you, that we did not imagine that there could be any ruler in the world who would send in his army and draw up a plan to attack the capital of his country and to attack his people.

It is at once comic and tragic to hear it said on the Jordanian broadcasting service that the army acted out of love for the people and for the sake of the people. We have never heard of a ruler anywhere in the world who loved his people in the manner of those who who were ruling Jordan. One who loves his people does not bomb and bombard them with artillery and tanks. Such love is unique in history. We never heard of a ruler who bombarded his city, the capital of his country. Nevertheless we kept silence and held fast in the face of the conspiracy.

Here I regret to say that there are men who are destroying this revolution. I tell you, brothers, although I have heard as I came from the Gulf that we have been defeated and not been victorious, that what defeated us was information that conspired against us; for in Amman we never once said, "We shall not lay down our arms until the subservient regime in Jordan is overthrown"; the slogan we employed in Amman was the protection and continuation of the revolution. But information that has conspired against us outside Amman has always said the fighters will not lay down their arms until they overthrow the regime. The people and

the masses knew as soon as we concluded the agreement that we were defeated, and said we were defeated, because the slogans were stronger than our swords outside Amman.

Inside Amman we employed a single slogan for all our men: "It is our duty to protect the revolution by all available means, so that we may protect these men and protect the Jordanian army itself from shedding its blood, for we are Arabs and know the state of mind of an Arab when his Arab brother is killed." This is the slogan we employed in Amman, but unfortunately certain persons engaged in the Arab information conspiracy have always tried to make out that we said we should never throw down our arms, we should never negotiate until the last commando is killed—as if they wanted to kill the last commando in Amman. But in fact the slogan we employed was that the revolution must be protected and continue in Amman.

From the start it was clear to every man of intelligence and understanding that the massacre was a conspiracy, that it was something out of the ordinary; it was quite impossible that Arab Muslims should be behind this attack on Amman, this artillery that attacked Amman. Only America could be behind this conspiracy; no Arab could dare to order his officers and men to kill the people, including women and children.

We know the whole of our history, and we have never heard of a man or a ruler daring to kill women, children and old people. We saw them in Amman; we saw them attacking families in a depraved way and killing women and children. Before my own eyes I saw them killing a wounded commando, while we gave first aid to wounded Jordanian soldiers. We treated them as human beings, but they treated us as animals, less than animals. We discovered these things from the very first day; we knew them on the second and third days. The battle of Amman went on for eleven days, with men holding their rifles in their hands and refusing to surrender, refusing to betray, to submit or to be humiliated. We know these men, we know how they endured, and anyone who says that the battle of Amman lasted eleven days is wrong

because, brothers, the battle of Amman has not yet ended today.

. . . . .

What I want to say now is that, for my part, I know, brothers, that there were mistakes, and if we did not admit these mistakes we should be like the ostrich which hides its head in the sand. We did make mistakes, and I can sum them up as follows:

1. Diversity in itself was the great mistake. I can understand that there should exist among the Palestinian people one or two trends of thought, one of which wants the fighting to be under its banner—I cannot and do not want to prevent it—let it create its own organization—and another which also wants to create its own organization. But I am talking about these organizations for whose existence there was no justification either, because certain Arab regimes wanted to create them so as to get their fingers in the pie of commando action and to know what was going on in it, or because some of the organizations are run by people each of whom wants to say, “Here I am; I am in charge.” These organizations have practically strangled us; they wormed their way into our veins and ate away at our hearts and sometimes when we have sat down [with them], we have really felt that we were sitting round the Arab League conference table because each one spoke in the name of some country or other, and we did not feel—and this is a fact—that we were speaking the same language, singing the same song or playing the same tune—we were like musical instruments, with each one playing a different tune. When every instrument plays a different tune, in the end there is discord and nothing comes out of it and there is nothing left. We say that there was no justification for the existence of these organizations, and they should have disbanded on their own. But now I can assure you that we are on the way to unifying everyone—first, the forces of all the commandos and all those bearing arms will be under a single military command.

. . . . .

The second of our mistakes was that our slogans went beyond our reach and the reach of our swords. When we employed a slogan we did not know where it would lead us, until we made the masses who heard us dizzy, poor things, impulsive as they are. Possibly this does not apply to Kuwait, which is an educated society and knows the meaning of a class war and a war of liberation and the stage of national liberation. But there are masses in the camps, poor impoverished masses, who fight night and day; these people we have helped to confuse and set in a whirl. One day we tell them that the liberation of Palestine is only possible through class war, another day through a nationalist war, and yet again we say through the establishment of this kind of society or that kind of society. We confused the masses, at a time when we could have drawn up a program of action for specific points on which all were agreed.

. . . . .

In our newspapers we used to push things without awareness, and on many occasions the regime led us on so that we fell into the trap. I tell you frankly, we started going in for offices, and we came to love offices—we love offices and we love ostentation. In Amman alone we came to have more than 250 offices. What did we want with 250 offices? Only think how many employees and workers there must have been in 250 offices, how many watchmen—this pretentiousness which came into our life nearly destroyed us. We must admit bravely and courageously that this last ordeal and the terrorism that is going on in Jordan now has served to chase away from commando action the butterflies that used to flutter round it, the butterflies that did not believe in the reality of commando action and were not ready to die for it, the butterflies that benefited from commando action, the butterflies that sat in offices, the butterflies that liked to be in the streets of Amman. And the streets of Beirut. When these butterflies saw the shelling and the violence, they scattered, and a good thing too, because we know that our people and the real revolutionaries and the real

strugglers will only be made stronger and more determined by terrorism.

Finally, I come to the subject of the conspiracies we have been talking about. I say that the last of these conspiracies, and there have been three of them, is that of the Palestinian state. . . . The Palestinian state has not been proposed by any Arab or international quarter either to the revolution or to Palestinians close to the revolution. The subject of the Palestinian state—all we hear and can imagine about it—suggests that America is going to propose a Palestinian state to us. But I tell you all, responsibly and honorably, that as far as I know—and I am in a position to know—there is no proposal for a Palestinian state, so that those who have acquired an appetite for one can set their minds at rest.

The second thing I have to say about the Palestinian state is that an idea has been proposed, sometimes by Allon, or by Israel, or sometimes it has been proposed in the form of rumors or whispers by certain American officials visiting the area, and claiming to speak either as journalists or as friends. We can tell you that these men get in touch with people who have nothing to do with the revolution; we have told these people quite frankly that we reject the Palestinian state, whether or not it is proposed, because as far as I am concerned the Palestinian state means that we are ourselves endorsing the defeat of the last twenty years. The Palestinian state means that all the suffering and tears of our people in the camps, the blood they have shed, has been in vain. This state is intended to be a bridge between Israel and the Arab countries so that Israel may again occupy these countries economically, and [market all the manufactures from its factories] and it will be able to offer a lot—so that after a year or two it would dominate the whole of the Arab world economically, even if it did not occupy all their territories. So every one must ask himself why the peaceful solution has been delayed when there are Arab countries that accept it? Because the price asked by Israel for a peaceful settlement—no Arab

ruler, of whatever description—no Arab ruler can accept to pay such an exorbitant price in addition to recognizing Israel. There are other things that Israel is asking—firstly that it should not withdraw from all Arab territories, like Jerusalem and Gaza, so it is reported, nor from part of Qalqilya and part of Tulkarm, and certain heights and territories, so that we shall be left with no more than a part of a part of the West Bank, and the whole of Gaza will be gone. What then do they want with the Palestinian state? However much they give us, if they ask as the price of this state that we should recognize them and humbly ask of them—we who have been struggling and fighting since 1936, we whose grandfathers fought for freedom and liberation in 1917—are we, the present generation, expected to recognize Israel and to ask the Arab countries to recognize Israel? This is what we are asked to pay as the price of this state. If it was only this price no Arab or Palestinian would dare to make such concessions in return for this state or to accept the Palestinian state. I believe that the Palestinian people who have fought for so many years, since 1917 and before 1917, and have fought long battles, can never exchange the slogan of armed struggle for treason, can never exchange this proposed state in return for the blood of their martyrs who have fallen in the land of Palestine.

Therefore I am confident—we are all confident and you should be more confident—that it is impossible that any one should commit treason at the expense of the rights of the people of Palestine, of the rights of our people which we regard as the one remaining hope that is embodied in these groups that fight and prove that the cause, our cause, exists and lives and can never die. As for the peaceful solution and the period of the Rogers Plan that preceded it, I do not think or believe that the peaceful solution can come about. Come, let us ask ourselves today: Why should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories? Because, as Arab states, we have achieved complete unity? Because we have armies that are fighting as much as they can and to the greatest possible extent? Because our situation and our mutual ties

are strong? Because the Palestine Resistance is before our eyes and in our hearts, and we respect it and are not trying to kill it while Israel looks at the Arab world, looks and laughs and is delighted at what is happening in the Arab world? Why then should it [not] disregard the Security Council resolution on withdrawal from the occupied territories? We know that it is impossible that Israel should withdraw from a single inch of territory or any piece of land unless we drench it with the blood of our martyrs. We all know this, and we know that every time Israel makes a nominal truce, it doublecrosses and takes advantage of it. You can remember the days of 1948, and you can remember now that every time there has been a truce, Israel has gained. In this last truce it got 500 million dollars, it got an undreamed of quantity of arms—to the extent that the American Secretary of Defense was staggered by the list of arms presented to him, and said, “I didn’t know we had arms of the sort that Israel is asking for.” This shows us to what extent Zionism has penetrated the American administration and the American state. Why all these tanks? Why all this aid? Are they for the people of Palestine? Someone else has taken on the job of slaughtering and killing the people of Palestine on its behalf, but it is the Arab nation that Israel wants to kill, its civilization and its very existence that Israel wants to destroy. There is an important question that confronts all of us, and we must always ask ourselves this question and be frank about it. We are a nation confronted by a problem: Are we to exist or not to exist as a nation? And we must answer frankly. Are we prepared to coexist with Israel or not? If the answer is “No,” there is nothing more to be said; if “Yes,” we must listen while the masses pass judgement. We are faced with the problem of whether we are to be or not to be, and when we look at all these conspiracies against our people and our nation, it is this question that spurs us to action. Many times our brothers in Bahrain, in Doha, have asked me: “Very well, when are we going to liberate Palestine?” I tell you all, the liberation of Palestine is a long-term battle. Anyone who thinks that

I am going to liberate Palestine tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, in a year or two years is mistaken. But I will say one thing: there is a cause that we are fighting for; there is a goal that we are fighting for, and if this goal is an ignoble one, you may all of you dissociate yourselves from the revolution. We are fighting at this stage because we know that even if this generation is incapable of gallantry for objective reasons, or because international, Arab and local circumstances do not permit it to achieve liberation, if this generation of the Arab masses, the Arab regimes and the Palestinian people are incapable of achieving liberation, still this generation has no right to abandon the cause, has no right to sell out the cause, has no right to bargain over the cause, to hand on an already settled cause to coming generations. Our task, and I say the task of all the Palestinian vanguards, is to preserve this cause, even if they cannot liberate a single inch or a single village. Because we are fighting on more than one front, because our attention is divided between Israel and those who are stabbing us in the back. If we are unable to achieve liberation because circumstances are unfavorable to all of us, we are capable of one thing—we can protect this cause and not hand it on already settled to future generations. We do not want it to be said of this generation that a new Spain was lost, as Spain was lost to us. None of us now can ask either for Spain or for anything else, because it has been sold and is no longer part of our history or our geography. We insist, and you must insist on protecting this revolution, because it is most important that you should insist on this matter, on this cause. It is most important that there should be no one in this nation prepared to betray this cause, to sell it or to bargain over it. We must maintain it in existence and alive....

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**Cable from Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) Appealing to Arab Heads of State To Halt the Fighting in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

January 11, 1971

Greetings from the revolution.

The situation in Jordan is extremely grave and is on the point of exploding as a result of the authorities' insistence on proceeding to the bitter end with their plan for liquidation, regardless of Arab attitudes. In the light of King Hussein's letter and the persistence of the Jordanian government, we appeal to you, in these critical moments in our history, to shoulder your responsibilities to this people and their revolution and to stop bloodshed and protect the future and the aspirations of the Arab nation.

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**Press Statement by Palestine Liberation Organization Official Spokesman Describing Alleged Jordanian Breaches of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and Deploing the Violence in Jordan<sup>2</sup>**

Amman, January 11, 1971

I welcome you and express the regret of the Central Committee that the conference should be held when the atmosphere in Amman is so disturbed, with firing being heard in many places and with tension and unrest prevailing in the East Bank.

After three months of ceasefire, the Committee had hoped that at this conference it might have been possible to talk of harmony and cooperation between the commandos and

the army, but I much regret to say that the atmosphere of September still prevails. Despite all the difficulties that confront it here, during last month commando action began stepping up its operations in the occupied territory, but the situation has once again become critical, and this is paralyzing commando action and interfering with its activity against the Zionist enemy. In the last few days, while the commando bases in al-Salt and Jerash have been molested and many attacked, notably the village of al-Salt, Israel has started to bomb our bases in al-Sawaliha and Dair Ala (in the Jordan Valley).

I will tell you briefly of the activities of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee:

Following the Cairo Agreement of September 27, 1970 and the Amman Agreement of October 13, 1970, which deals in detail with relations between the government and the commandos, the Supreme Arab Committee took action to ensure the implementation of these agreements. But it became clear that the state had no intention of fulfilling its obligations under these agreements. One example to substantiate this is that the authorities have established dozens of search points and detention camps. Although the

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The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjeh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*).

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat's cable, *Fateh* (n.p.), January 12, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.O. press statement, *Fateh* (n.p.), January 12, 1971.

number of search points was limited at first, they continued to increase until there were very large numbers of them. At these search points the commandos have been daily subjected to treatment that was not in accordance with the agreements: they have been beaten, insulted, abused and arrested, and their identity cards issued by the Central Committee in accordance with the Amman Agreement, torn up. And although the Cairo Agreement provided for the immediate release of detainees, many of them are still in detention today. The last remaining September detainees are still in prison, in addition to about 400 persons who were arrested last month. The commandos submitted to the demand that they should withdraw from the towns and return to their bases, but they have been subjected to shelling by army artillery—this has happened in Irbid, Ajlun and al-Salt, dozens of bases being involved. In this way the commandos have suffered from their own implementation of their obligations under the agreements, seeing that the commandos have fulfilled their obligations whereas the government has not done so. Obviously the commandos in the bases cannot resist such action because with the arms at their disposal they cannot reply to artillery fire; in the course of these attacks a large number of the commandos have been killed in their bases. The state has not fulfilled its obligation to return the army to the line of confrontation—it is still deployed throughout the whole of Jordan and engaged in hunting down the commandos.

In view of this violation, the Central Committee proposed at the meetings of the Supreme Arab [Follow-Up] Committee, that the provisions of the Agreements should be read and that there should be a discussion of which of them had been implemented and which had not, after meetings presided over by Mr. al-Bahi al-Adgham and attended by the Jordanian Premier as well as the representative of the state on the Committee. As a result of this the Supreme Arab Committee adopted a number of resolutions essential for the implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements; ninety percent of these resolutions having been made necessary

because the government had not fulfilled its obligations. Mr. al-Adgham submitted a memorandum to the two parties asking them to reply in writing within three days. He also published a detailed statement for the benefit of public opinion in which he said that Jordanian citizens, particularly in Amman, were living in an atmosphere of fear and alarm, and proposed that the Central Committee and the government should have talks with a view to eliminating the causes of the fighting. He also proposed that the government and the Central Committee should come to an agreement on how the Eastern Front could be restored, and that they should have talks with a view to reaching an understanding of the political and military aspects of the Palestine problem.

The Central Committee submitted the required reply within the required period and announced that it agreed to the proposed talks, adding that the talks could immediately proceed to discuss the reconstruction of the Eastern Front. But the state did not agree, and a few days later we learned that the Commander of the Second Division had given notice that an army unit was to occupy a deserted building called the Umm al-Rumman police post on the road to the commando bases in the Ajlun woods, and that he intended to operate a military patrol on the Jerash-Amman road which also leads to the commando bases. When this subject was discussed by the Supreme Arab Committee in the presence of Messrs. al-Adgham and al-Tall, it was agreed that the commandos should use the police post for provisioning purposes, and also that no military patrol should operate on the Jerash-Amman road. It was also agreed that a police detachment should be posted to guard the satellite relay station near the al-Buq'a Camp. This was on the evening of Wednesday, January 6, 1971; however, the Prime Minister consented only after he had contacted Amir Hasan. About two hours after that, the Premier contacted Ambassador al-Tayyib al-Sahbani of Tunisia, who is Mr. al-Adgham's assistant, and told him he consented to these agreements. Then at dawn on Friday, January 8, 1971, we were surprised to hear that an army force had



advanced to the old Jerash road which leads to the Ajlun area and that the police post building had been occupied; we also heard of very extensive military operations including the shelling of the commando bases in the al-Salt area and the blockading of al-Buq'a Camp, the Schneller Camp and al-Rusaifa. Statements were issued in the name of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Information to justify these large scale operations, the justifications being as follows:

— That a civilian vehicle had been searched on the old Jerash road;

— That two soldiers of the Sixth Battalion had been kidnapped by commandos in the al-Salt district;

— That the state had received information about intentions to blow up the phosphate mines, as well as information relating to the firing in Amman during the last few days;

— That a police vehicle had been attacked in Jabal al-Taj in Amman.

Even supposing that this information had been correct (which it was not), it would not have justified all these operations, and the Amman Agreement stipulates exactly how such incidents are to be dealt with. Therefore these military operations, which are still going on, can only be part of a plan to destroy commando action.

When the police post in Umm al-Rumman was attacked and when the army attacked the commandos in the north, the Committee condemned these incidents and said that they violated the Cairo Agreement. This decision was taken unanimously in the presence of the Premier. The Supreme Arab Committee also decided that in the case of any future violation by either side, it would not be permissible to use force, and that all violations must be dealt with one at a time and without resort to fighting. The military operations are not only violations of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, but also violations of the decisions of the Supreme Arab Committee. We still do not understand how the Premier can claim to be abiding by these decisions, in view of the fact that the next day there were the attacks on the commando positions and bases.

The allegation made at the Information Minister's press conference that it was in-

tended to blow up the phosphate mines and other installations was false. These economic installations are the property of the people, and the commandos are part of the people. In the September incidents all these installations were in the commando [-controlled] areas and no harm came to them, and you know the splendid fact that in all the areas that were in the hands of the commandos, in the gold and jewelry market in Amman—in particular, the Ahli Bank and the Central Bank were in the hands of the commandos—not a single ring was touched. The situation in Jordan is very bad, not only for commando action or the Palestinian people, but for the Arab people as a whole.

What is going on here now, especially when we remember that Jordan must inevitably be the heart of the Eastern Front, and that fighting with Israel may start again next month, is totally incompatible with the requirements of the Eastern Front which is indispensable for the Western Front. What is happening now is destroying the Eastern Front and, in spite of the Jordanian Minister's excuses, even if we grant that they are true, such excuses cannot be made a justification for the destruction of the Eastern Front.

The Jordanian army is deployed not to fight the Zionist enemy, but to fight the commandos. The Central Committee and the commandos are absolutely confident that, if only it was allowed to do so by the political planners in this country, the Jordanian army would be absolutely prepared to participate in the Eastern Front and for brotherly relations with the commandos. The Central Committee does not want fighting with the army.

It has rejected it in the past, and rejects it now and for the future. The Central Committee does not want fighting between soldier and commando, it wants them to be brothers; and it does not want division between Jordanians and Palestinians, who are one people.

The Minister of Information has talked about the Palestinian statelet. What we say to him, to the state, to the army and to the people, is that [it is] this policy as regards the Palestinian statelet in general and the com-

mandos in particular [which] will lead to the Palestinian state. When the Palestinians see their sons being killed and see the bias against them in all state institutions, when they see how the people of Gaza are treated in Jordan, deprived of work and prevented from moving about because their travel and work permits have been taken away from them—all these procedures put the Palestinians in a corner with their backs to the wall. Their only way out is the Palestinian statelet. Frustrating enemy plans for a Palestinian statelet is not a question of mere words; it calls for a particular line of conduct: the repudiation of particularism, the stopping of activities against commando action.

The question of coexistence between the state and the Palestinians—if only the state would be frank and say that it does not want to coexist with commando action, then the Central Committee could take the necessary measures.

The Committee definitely does not want fighting between Jordanians and Palestinians or between commandos and soldiers; it does not want people kept in a state of panic. So it is only too clear that there is trickery afoot, and whatever justifications the state resorts to to justify the attacks on the commandos could not—even if they were true—explain what is going on.

The Jordanian Minister of Information talks about the conspiracy in September; he accuses the commandos of conspiring and says that they are still carrying out their conspiracy. The Minister himself knows that he is lying. For two months the Minister has been distributing a secret book against commando action, full of hatred and malice against the commandos. Anyone who has heard Amman radio and television broadcasts recently knows that they are based on lies presented as facts with the object of inciting Jordanian against Palestinian and soldier against commando.

For example, the Minister talks of what happened in the Schneller Camp when the State took the arms of the Militia, which had been collected in specified places in accordance with the agreement made with the government under the auspices of the

[Supreme] Arab Committee, though the government had undertaken to respect these places as enjoying immunity.

The Minister of Information talked at his press conference about “intruders” and “a third party,” and insinuated that these elements are in the ranks of the commandos. This is not true; what is happening in Jordan is not unconnected with what Israel is planning because the killing of citizens and soldiers serves only the interests of Israel.

## 260

### **Statement Issued by the Government of Kuwait Announcing the Renewed Cessation of Financial Aid to Jordan in the Light of New Clashes Between Government Forces and the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Kuwait, January 12, 1971**

It was with great pain that Kuwait followed the events that took place in Jordan last September, because of the shedding of Arab blood and the dissipation of resources that should have been mobilized for the confrontation of the Zionist enemy. During that period of strife Kuwait also gave expression to its concern and anxiety that the Palestine revolution should continue and be protected as a strong bulwark in the Arab struggle against the powers of evil and aggression and one of the Arab nation's greatest sources of strength. And it was in conformity with its policy of supporting and escalating this revolution as an embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of the Palestinian people for the recovery of their usurped rights, that it took its former decision to suspend the aid it was providing to the Jordanian government in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartoum conference of 1967. It then re-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Kuwaiti press release issued after an emergency meeting of the Kuwait Council of Ministers called to discuss the situation in Jordan, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), January 13, 1971.

versed this decision of suspension, when it became clear to the government that the parties concerned were abiding by the agreements they had concluded and that the Jordanian theater was quiet. But in the last few days incidents have again taken place in Jordan, according to information available to us, and according to the report of the Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee. Therefore, in conformity with the joint appeal made by His Highness the Amir [Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah], and His Excellency Jaafar Muhammad Numairi, President of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, on Sunday, January 10, 1971, and in harmony with the attitude stated by His Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister [Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber] in his speech at the conclusion of the fourth session of the second legislative section of the National Assembly, and to ensure that Kuwaiti aid may be used only for the ends for which it was given, the government of Kuwait hereby decides to stop the financial aid which it is paying to the Jordanian government in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference, and affirms that it will not resume this aid without firm and definite assurances by the Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee that the responsible quarters are abiding by the agreements concluded between them.

261

**Communiqué Issued by the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Calling for a Cessation of Hostilities Between the Army and the Resistance in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, January 12, 1971**

In our desire to protect national unity,

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the joint statement issued by Jordanian Premier al-Tall and P.L.O.

which we regard as sacred, from violation, and particularly from attempts to drive a wedge between the gallant Jordanian army, one of the principal Arab forces in the battle of the whole Arab nation against the Zionist enemy, and their brethren the commandos of the Resistance movement, also one of the principal Arab forces in the battle, we, the Jordanian government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization condemn every shot fired in the capital, Jerash, Irbid, al-Salt or anywhere else, with the object of implanting alarm and despondency in the hearts of citizens and paralyzing their normal life.

We do not hesitate to accuse anyone who continues firing, for in doing so he is, whether intentionally or not, serving the enemy, and is thus a traitor to our nation and our common cause.

In view of our patriotic concern for this objective, we call on our brother citizens to resume normal life and carry on their business as usual, so as to create the pacific and orderly atmosphere which will enable our brothers to make every effort to restore the situation to normal and to eliminate the consequences of the past, thereby enabling us to build the soundest possible relations and to implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements.

262

**Statement Announcing Settlement Terms Agreed Upon by the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization<sup>2</sup>**

**Amman, January 13, 1971**

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,

Central Committee Member Ibrahim Bakr, *al-Dustur* (Amman), January 13, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the statement (excluding the schedule for collection of arms from the Militia and the Popular Resistance, at the end of the original document), *al-Dustur* (Amman), January 15, 1971.

At a meeting held in the Tunisian Embassy in Amman on January 12 and 13, 1971 there were present: on behalf of the Jordanian Government, His Excellency Premier Wasfi al-Tall; the representative of the Jordanian government Mr. Riyadh al-Mufleh; the Chief-of-Staff Major-General Muhammad Khalil Abd al-Daim; Major-General Sharif Zaid Bin Shaker, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations; the Director of Public Security Mr. Abd al-Majid al-Sharida; and the Director of Intelligence Brigadier Nadhir Rashid;

And on behalf of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Messrs. Ibrahim Bakr, Abu Sabri, Ibrahim al-Barghuthi, Hamid Abu Sitta, Kamal Adwan, Colonel Samir al-Khatib, Colonel Ahmad Affana—Abu al-Mu'tasem—and Major Nuhad Nusaiba.

The meeting was also attended by Brigadier Ahmad Abd al-Hamid Hilmi, Chairman of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission and Mr. Muhammad Anwar, Chargé d'Affaires of the Tunisian Embassy in Amman.

The following was decided:

1. A joint committee was formed to decide what bases the commandos should have; these bases were chosen and decided on and the commandos will return to them at once.

2. Arms belonging to the Resistance now held by the government will be handed over to the Resistance within a week.

3. Immediate effect shall be given to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces as regards treatment of the commandos and their vehicles at search points, to ensure that commandos are treated on the same basis as the army, and the Chief-of-Staff is commissioned to conduct a radical reconsideration of the search points in the light of the repeated complaints about these points, with a view to ensuring complete freedom for commando action and its requirements, this arrangement and the abrogation of all measures regarded as nonessential to be completed within not more than one week from today.

4. The Armed Struggle building in Ramtha shall be handed over immediately.

5. Attacks on commando bases and army positions for any reason whatsoever shall be forbidden and anyone responsible for attacks on these bases and positions shall be punished.

6. Commandos and their vehicles shall be assured freedom of movement on all roads without any impediment.

7. Identity documents issued by the Central Committee shall be recognized and respected.

8. All the offices and bases allotted to commando action by the Amman Agreement shall be opened within one month from today and the government shall facilitate this operation and ensure that it is carried out.

9. To control and facilitate all the activities mentioned in the foregoing articles a liaison office shall be established, its members to be Colonel Samir al-Khatib of the Central Committee, Colonel Muhammad Bashir of the Armed Forces and Colonel Ahmad al-Rusan of the Public Security.

10. It shall not be permissible to arrest any commando in any place except in the event of an attested offense, in which case the Armed Struggle Military Police shall be informed immediately.

11. All detainees and persons under arrest, except those who have committed ordinary crimes, shall be released by January 20, 1971.

12. Information campaigns carried out by all press, radio and television information media, and through statements and publications on behalf of the Jordanian government, and by all the Central Committee's information media, wherever they may be, shall cease immediately.

13. As regards the arms of the Militia and the Popular Resistance, the following was agreed:

a. The arms of the Militia shall be collected in special store-houses, the keys of which shall be held by officials appointed by the Central Committee and which shall have Militia guards.

b. The arms of the Popular Resistance shall be collected in the guardposts.

c. A four-member committee shall be formed to ensure that the collection is carried out and to report to this effect; its members shall be one officer from the Supervision Committee, one from the commandos, one from the Army and one from the Public Security.

d. The Public Security shall immediately, and within forty-eight hours from the decision, under the supervision of the four-member committee, make sure that all illegal arms are removed from the quarter.

e. As soon as this period of forty-eight hours is ended, the regular Public Security shall be returned to the positions with their usual arms.

f. Along with these steps there shall be a reduction of military manifestations in Amman and in the guardposts generally, to create a favorable atmosphere.

g. The houses in which the arms of the Militia are collected shall enjoy immunity, and it shall not be permissible to interfere with them in any way without the knowledge of the Central Committee.

h. The arms of the Militia shall be distributed for use only by decision of the Central Committee.

i. An officer from the Popular Resistance shall be made responsible for controlling the arms of the Popular Resistance collected in guardposts and for ensuring that they are not distributed or used except by order of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

j. The arms of the Militia and the People's Army in Irbid, al-Salt, Jerash and all towns and villages in the Kingdom shall be collected in the same way and within the appointed period, which ends on January 22, 1971, with the knowledge of a joint committee consisting of a representative of the army, one of the

Public Security, one of the Resistance movement and one of the military control in the area.

Amman, January 13, 1971

BRIGADIER AHMAD ABD AL-HAMID HILMI  
Chairman of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission

IBRAHIM BAKR  
Representative of the Central Committee of the  
Palestine Liberation Organization

WASEF AL-TALL  
Premier of Jordan

## 263

### **Statement on the Continued Attacks on Palestinian Commando Bases by the Jordan Army, Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee<sup>1</sup>**

January 14, 1971

Members of our people and our Arab nation:  
Commandos and members of the Militia:  
Officers and men of the Jordanian army:

For the seventh day artillery and tanks have been shelling the commando bases, and the blood of commandos, soldiers and unarmed citizens is being shed. Despite this and despite our people's bitter experience with the Jordanian authorities, the Central Committee of the Resistance movement hereby affirms its unbounded concern for our people, for every shot that is fired, for the life of citizens and for the protection of the country's economy from collapse, all this so that all the military and economic resources of our beloved Jordan may be mobilized to confront the Zionist-imperialist enemy.

Out of its intense concern for the revolution,

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.O. statement, *Fateh* (n.p.), January 15, 1971.

the soldiers and the army, the Central Committee has persistently called for a formula to ensure adherence to and implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements. It assures our people, our soldiers, the commandos and the people of the towns, villages and camps in Jordan, and the members of the Arab nation, that it is struggling with all its strength to put a stop to the bloodshed, although the Central Committee has no guarantees that the authorities will abide by the Agreements—and this is not the first time that the Jordanian authorities have failed to abide by them, in the sight and hearing of the Arab nation and the Arab countries.

The Jordanian authorities have continuously made every effort to encircle and annihilate the forces of the revolution by military means. The first time was on February 2, 1968, when commando action was in the Jordan Valley and as yet there was no popular militia in the towns and villages. The second was on November 4, 1968; this was followed by attacks on February 10, 1970 and July 6, 1970. The campaign of encirclement and annihilation reached its climax in the fifth attack, which was launched in bloody September. January 7, 1971 saw the beginning of the sixth attempt to liquidate the Resistance in the bases and in the Jordan Valley where the forces of the revolution had concentrated in accordance with the Cairo and Amman Agreements, and this took place in the sight and hearing of the Chairman and members of the committee established by the Arab Kings and Presidents. Masses of our people and our Arab nation: Commandos, officers and men:

The new agreements we have reached must not for a moment be construed to mean that there are guarantees that the authorities have abandoned their plan to liquidate the revolution; long and bloody experience has confirmed thousands of times that the authorities constantly break their promises. Despite this, however, we are making a sincere new effort to stop the shedding of blood. It is up to the Jordanian authorities to prove, for the first time in the history of their relations with the Palestine Resistance, that they truly

want to stop the shedding of blood. The Central Committee of the Resistance movement honestly hopes that the authorities will fulfill their undertakings so that we may be free to devote our whole attention to the Zionist enemy and that soldier and commando may stand together in one trench against the enemies of the Arab nation.

The Jordanian authorities are responsible before God, before history and before the Arab nation for violating these agreements which guarantee that the commandos should return to their bases, that they should be safe from all kinds of molestation on public roads, and that they should enjoy full freedom of action, activity and movement against the Zionist enemy and freedom to safeguard their material and military supply lines.

Long live the revolution.

Long live the unity of our people in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater.

Defeat to the conspiracies to liquidate the revolution and the Palestinian cause.

It is revolution until victory.

## 264

### **U.A.R. Memorandum Reiterating Egyptian Willingness To Implement Resolution 242 and Detailing Her Conditions for a Middle East Settlement, Submitted to U.N. Special Envoy Jarring in Response to His Transmittal of Israeli Peace Proposals<sup>1</sup>**

January 15, 1971

It is the belief of the United Arab Republic that any settlement, aimed at the realisation of peace in the area, should contain the necessary elements to make it lasting. This cannot be achieved unless it is founded on the purposes and the principles of the United

<sup>1</sup> English text of the U.A.R. memorandum submitted to Jarring on January 15, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, XXI, 1 (January, 1971), pp. 55–56.

(Reuter reported that Lebanon had submitted a statement to Jarring "over the weekend" previous to January 31, but that no details were available.)

Nations Charter and the scrupulous implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions.

In order to reach such a settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution, it is necessary that:

(1) The Israeli aggression be terminated and the Israeli armed forces be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 1967 lines, as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242 which reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.

(2) Israel declare its repudiation of the policy of territorial expansion which it has pursued at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States. This policy is repeatedly expressed in the statements made by Israeli leaders.

(3) A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must be reached. This can only be realised through Israel's respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

(4) The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in waterways.

(5) Respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

(6) Guaranteeing of peace and the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area.

The Security Council may decide upon the necessary arrangements which would provide security to all states in the area. These arrangements may, *inter alia*, include:

(a) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

(b) The establishment of demilitarised zones astride the borders.

The United Arab Republic has previously stated its readiness to implement its obligations

in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. This was clearly manifested in the United Arab Republic answers submitted to you on 5 March 1969. You may recall that during our contacts over the last 3 years the United Arab Republic has frequently assured you of this intention. Moreover, the United Arab Republic has declared in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, that to achieve a peaceful settlement it is indispensable that all the obligations provided for in the Security Council resolution be fully carried out and that this is the essential prerequisite for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area.

The United Arab Republic reiterates anew its full readiness to carry out all its obligations as contained in Security Council Resolution 242. It is essential that Israel, on its part, fully carries out all its obligations under the same resolution.

## 265

### **Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee, Affirming the Continuation of Armed Struggle and Denying Any Reversal of the P.L.O. Rejection of U.N. Resolution 242<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, Mid-January, 1971**

The Palestine revolution has not changed its stand rejecting Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 and the Rogers Plan, and is continuing its armed struggle for the full liberation of Palestinian soil.

However, this attitude of ours, which was reflected in an emotional reaction to the United Arab Republic in view of the political move it made when the Rogers Plan was announced, has been the subject of discussion by the Central Committee and the Secretariat. The conclusion reached is that our obligation to armed struggle is a Palestinian obligation, which we express by the continuity of the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.O. statement, *al-Dustur* (Amman), January 21, 1971.

Palestine revolution; this obligation does not place any restrictions on the United Arab Republic's attempts to eliminate the consequences of the June 1967 aggression, as long as these efforts do not waive the rights of the Palestinian people or impose on them any restriction that could prevent their continuing their struggle.

It must be clear that our understanding of the elimination of the consequences of the aggression is very different from all the proposals that have been made for a settlement, and we are certainly not opposed to total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, which would restore the situation that existed on June 4, 1967, without prejudicing the Palestinian right to struggle for the full liberation of Palestinian soil, especially as we are not, and do not intend to be, a party to these settlements since our struggle did not begin in 1967 but in 1965.

## 266

**Press Interview Statement by Crown Prince and Premier al-Jaber of Kuwait, Welcoming the Idea of Holding an Arab Summit Conference<sup>1</sup>**

**Kuwait, January 18, 1971**

*Q. There have been reports in the last few days of the possibility of a new Arab conference at summit level being held in Kuwait. Would Your Highness be so good as to say what truth there is in these reports?*

A. In its reply to Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's letter to His Highness the Amir, Kuwait proposed that an Arab meeting be held to discuss all aspects of the present situation and the joint efforts it requires. When the Libyan Arab Republic proposed that such a conference should be held in Kuwait we welcomed the idea of acting as host to this brotherly meeting which we hope—if it

comes about—will lead to positive and constructive consequences to the advantage of the Arab nation, and we believe that such a conference at the highest level is made absolutely necessary by the grave situation through which the Arab nation is at present passing. It has therefore been decided that the Minister of the Interior and Defense, Shaikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, should go to Saudi Arabia tomorrow, Tuesday, to exchange views with the authorities there on this subject. It has also been decided that the Minister of Guidance and Information, Shaikh Jaber al-Ali al-Salem, should go to Iraq the day after tomorrow for the same purpose.

We have learned that a number of Arab countries have expressed their readiness to attend this conference, and we have great hopes that the efforts being made to bring about this brotherly meeting in the present decisive circumstances will bear fruit.

## 267

**Jordan Government Memorandum Welcoming the Resumption of the Jarring Mission and Reiterating and Detailing the Jordanian Position on the Implementation of U.N. Resolution 242, Submitted to U.N. Special Envoy Jarring in Response to His Transmittal of Israeli Peace Proposals<sup>2</sup>**

**January 18, 1971**

The Government of Jordan welcomes the resumption of the mission entrusted to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to assist efforts to achieve a just and durable peace in the area in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242.

<sup>2</sup> English text of Jordanian statement submitted to Jarring on January 18, *New York Times*, January 26, 1971, p. 6.

(Reuter reported that Lebanon had submitted a statement to Jarring "over the weekend" previous to January 31, but that no details were available.)

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah's statement, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), January 19, 1971.



Jordan's acceptance of that resolution is based on its desire to achieve a just and speedy peaceful solution. It is further based on the provisions and principles of the Charter under which the Security Council has moved in its Resolution 242 towards the establishment of a just peace.

The Government of Jordan has always cooperated closely with Ambassador Jarring in the fulfillment of his mission and will continue to do so. As evident from Ambassador Jarring's report, the Government of Jordan has acted in a constructive and positive manner and has made its position very clear. In doing so it was prompted by a sincere desire to implement Resolution 242 in all its parts as well as all other relevant United Nations resolutions aimed at the solution of the Middle East crisis in all its aspects.

The Government of Jordan hereby reiterates its position concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution:

(1) Withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories without exception in conformity with Resolution 242, which emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." Israel must accept and put into effect this concept which governs relations amongst nations.

(2) Peace is indivisible. Every state in the area is entitled to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Israel should unequivocally repudiate its policy of territorial expansion.

(3) The Government of Jordan recognizes the religious and cultural importance of the Arab city of Jerusalem to all faiths. It will, therefore, guarantee free access to all religious and historical places to all concerned as well as freedom of worship. Jordan stands ready to make all necessary arrangements to this effect.

(4) A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must be reached. This can only be realized through Israel's respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

(5) The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in international waterways.

(6) Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area.

The four permanent members may, through the Security Council, obtain adequate arrangements to provide security to all states in the area. Such arrangements may include United Nations observation force in which the permanent members may participate.

Arrangements for insuring security of the states in the area might also include the establishment of demilitarized zones on a reciprocal basis.

(7) With the implementation of the above steps the elements of conflict and dissension will disappear and a just and durable peace will ensue. There will be respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force as envisaged in Resolution 242.

## 268

### **Statements by Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia, Expressing His Country's Confidence in the U.S. Desire for Peace in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**Tunis, January 22, 1971**

We shall not be telling the truth if we say that we agree with you in your estimate of the situation in this area, for we have no illusions about the situation in the Middle East or even in Israel itself.

We believe that the government of the United States is utterly attached to peace,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Masmoudi's speech at a banquet he gave in honor of U.S. Under-Secretary of State Irwin on a visit to Tunisia, *al-Amal* (Tunis), January 24, 1971.

and we cannot say the same about certain other countries. And I do not think that I am being paradoxical if I say that your attachment to peace constitutes a safeguard for the Palestinian people and the Palestine of tomorrow. It is sufficient that we should believe in the warmth of your attachment to peace for us to talk of our friendship for you without complexes, and we firmly believe that you can do much in this field, being primarily responsible for the world and its security and safety, and we expect from you more than we expect from others.

We are aware of the efforts you are making and we know that the Rogers Plan is a dynamic plan for peace, and we also know that you support Jarring's mission.

## 269

### **Statements on the Necessity for Political and Military Unification Among the Arab States and Among the Elements of the Palestine Resistance in Order To Combat Israel Effectively, Included in a Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya<sup>1</sup>**

al-Zawiya, January 24, 1971

So it is a question of self-defense, and in this connection the Libyan proposal advocating that the battle should be placed on a pan-Arab basis was submitted by us after we had studied the situation prevailing in the Arab world after the revolution, and as partners on the field of battle we have seen, in fact, that the Arab armies have no unified command as a result of the absence of a unified political command. That is to say, military unity cannot be successful unless it is preceded by political unity, so that there may be a single political commander who gives orders to the

armed forces. Among the Arab forces on the Eastern Front, for example, every army is under a different political command. Moreover, the deployment of Arab forces is still wrong; Arab forces are not stationed in the areas which directly affect the Israeli entity; they are still stationed in the wrong places. After considering the views of Iraq, in particular, and of Algeria, who have been taking part in the battle recently, although they are not confrontation countries—after considering their views, we agreed that the countries which are not confrontation countries, like the Libyan Arab Republic, Iraq, Algeria and any other country that is taking part, must state their views on the front and the battle, because they are taking part with their forces. In Iraq they said that the situation is not right, the deployment of forces is wrong. We want to take part more effectively, but on the basis of a pan-Arab plan, and Algeria has been asking about the attitude towards the 1967 Security Council resolution, about the ceasefire and other matters of this kind. When we saw them doing this we were encouraged and agreed with them because we have a point of view which is nearly the same as that of Iraq and Algeria. The Libyan proposal first asked whether every country was to enter the battle on its own, or whether the whole Arab nation was to fight the battle, and if the battle was for the liberation of Palestine, or the liberation of the territories occupied in 1967.

We asked these questions and asked for answers to them. The answer was that it was the duty of the countries concerned, which are the confrontation countries, to decide what the battle was to be like and what forces were necessary for it, and with this in view the commands concerned met in Tripoli on Evacuation Day and determined their objective and answered these questions and recommended that the military men and the Ministers of Defense should meet to draw up a military plan. Between the meeting of the heads of the confrontation states in Tripoli and the meeting of the Ministers of Defense, the Rogers Plan was put forward, and Algeria and Iraq protested by not attending the conference of Ministers of

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Qadhafi's speech at a Martyrs' Day rally, *al-Haqiqah* (Benghazi), January 25, 1971.

Defense. And the Ministers of Defense continued to discuss the recommendations of the conference of Heads of State and assigned additional military obligations to Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Sudan; they also asked the United Arab Republic and Syria to increase their military forces.

Everything was decided—time, place and magnitude—and we informed the Arab countries of their obligations. Iraq eventually answered that it refused to accept the obligations that had been allotted to it and at the same time withdrew its forces from the Eastern Front. After the Rogers Plan Algeria withdrew its forces from the Front; Algeria is still preparing its forces to take part in the battle, but there are points it wants to raise.

The other Arab countries have not given a decisive answer; they have given procrastinating answers. Kuwait recently replied that it wanted a conference to be held which it would attend so that it could take part in allotting obligations to itself and to the other countries because, it said, when the obligations were allotted it had not been present at the conference. So we replied to Kuwait that it should call for the convening of an Arab summit conference at which it could discuss the obligations we had allotted in conformity with the Libyan proposal.

In fact Kuwait made efforts to ensure that the Arab countries should meet there; in fact it was not we that called for an Arab summit conference but Kuwait that asked for it, and we gave our support. It transpired that certain Arab countries intended to send deputies, but we shall only attend a summit conference if it is attended by the Presidents and Kings themselves; if they do not attend it is not a summit, but the evasion of a summit.

It has transpired that Saudi Arabia wants to send a deputy and that Morocco will send a deputy; but we do not want to attend a summit conference unless it is really a summit. I tell you frankly that the Arab countries in their present situation cannot achieve the wishes and aspirations of the masses as regards the battle.

The present regimes in most of the Arab countries today are incapable of producing

armed forces even to protect their territorial integrity; how then can they take part in a battle of destiny?

I tell you that the Arab regimes in most of the Arab countries are weak and feeble, living parasitically on life and on the age we are now living in.

These Arab regimes, even if they met, could have no effective influence, but if the resources of certain Arab countries were mobilized they could have a strong influence on the battle. If the confrontation countries—in addition to Algeria, Iraq and Libya—if these countries manage to agree with each other they will be able to do something for the battle.

I say that the Arabs are capable of mobilizing a thousand planes for the battle and five thousand tanks and a million men: this force exists in the Arab world, scattered here and there, but I doubt that it will really get into the battle.

If the Arabs can manage to be prepared and escape from the fragmentation that now besets them, much of this force can be mobilized, three quarters of it can be mobilized by the confrontation countries along with Algeria, Iraq and Libya.

As for the other Arab countries, some of them have some strength and others have none, but if they are all gathered together they will be strong.

We do not want to take part in the summit conference which Kuwait has called for and we have supported unless the Kings and Presidents themselves attend.

This is making the battle a pan-Arab one; this is the proposal, but in any case the confrontation countries are resolved to liberate their territories, so long as one man is left standing, either on our side or on theirs, as the late President [Nasser] said.

At the Cairo meeting these things were studied, as you have heard, but it is not in our power to force Iraq, Algeria or any other country, though there are great hopes of Algeria.

The meeting also dealt with the question of the Resistance which is being liquidated; the Resistance must unify itself, it must urge its forces into the occupied territories

and avoid bickering and political manifestations which rob it of so much; it must avoid side conflicts which rob it of its efforts, and the regime in Jordan is seeking any justification for wiping out the Resistance.

There are also elements in the Resistance, like the Popular Front and the Democratic Popular Front, which we shall regard as deviationist splinter organizations. It is these organizations that organize civil strife and force Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization into false positions. These people write pamphlets and books and publish magazines and theorize about how the bourgeoisie is to be turned to Marxism-Leninism instead of thinking how to turn Palestine into a free country. At this time the Palestinians should not be occupying themselves with the problems of Marxism-Leninism or the problems of capitalism and such things; the free Palestinian is he who leaves these things and bears arms and crosses the frontier to inflict losses on the enemy every day. We have made every effort to ensure that the Resistance unites itself, and since we called on it to do so, very great efforts have been made in this direction, and the whole of Arab public opinion now demands that the Resistance should unite and rid itself of the errors that beset it. We know that certain errors are leading it into a clash with the regime in Jordan or Lebanon, and in Jordan they have been lying in wait for the Resistance.

This is the situation of the Resistance, which we have studied, and brother Yasser Arafat came to us and this is what we told him.

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**Statement Urging the Necessity of Opposing Any of the Proposals Put Forward for a Middle East Settlement, Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Early February, 1971**

The leaderships of the regimes and of certain sections of the Resistance which are allowing the peaceful solution to take its course, are involved in that solution and, as far as the outcome is concerned, are contributing to it. The generation that is allowing liquidation to take place before its eyes is guilty of cowardice and irresponsibility, and even though it displays varying degrees of ability to act, it will basically be a generation that allowed the conspirators to continue ruling it under the same slogans as they employed to reach the centers of power and authority, and which brought down on the Arab nation the defeat of Black June and the great defeat of solutions involving final liquidation.

Our glorious masses:

The surrender solution means the Palestine problem being settled forever, the establishment of the "Zionist state" being recognized by the Arab countries, economic doors being opened to it, its ships being allowed to sail through the Canal, the Holy Places being under its control, and full cooperation with it; it means the non-existence of the Arab liberation movement, and the Arab nation once more groaning under the yoke of odious colonialism in its new guise.

Similarly, the peaceful solution means the soil of Palestine being swallowed up by Zionism, the loss of parts of Arab territory and all Arab rights; it means, too, despite the appearances of relief that will accompany it, our Arab society remaining under the control of monopolies and capitalism.

The peaceful solution which is now taking

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the General Command statement, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), No. 335 (February 5, 1971), p. 10.

the form of constant extensions of the ceasefire and attacks on the Resistance in Jordan as a prelude to attacking it in certain other countries, and which sometimes takes the misbegotten form of a Palestinian state, is the Trojan horse which will bring Zionist control into the land of the Arabs.

This solution will put an end forever to all aspirations to national sovereignty, to national independence and to all possibility of escape from international spheres of influence; it will invalidate the world role which our nation ought to play in world affairs.

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### **Palestine Red Crescent Appeal for International Action Against the Conduct of the Israeli Occupation Forces in the Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>**

**Early February, 1971**

Since the beginning of this year the Gaza Strip has been subjected to a campaign of terrorism, annihilation and deliberate starvation of unprecedented ferocity. For forty days the camps of the Strip have been under a permanent curfew, during which the occupation troops have been killing, robbing and maltreating the citizens.

At the press conference he held in Gaza on February 2, the Israeli military spokesman, General Shlomo Gazit, admitted some of the crimes committed by the occupation when he acknowledged that the Israeli authorities in the Strip had arrested 1112 citizens in 1970, killed 161 and wounded 642.

Other crimes not mentioned by the Military Governor of the Strip include the blowing up of hundreds of houses and the eviction of citizens in large numbers to the Sinai desert and the East Bank of Jordan—in the first month of this year 54 persons were evicted

through the desert area of southern Jordan.

We call on all international bodies to protest against the barbarous conduct of the Israeli army of occupation, and to intervene to stop the campaign of annihilation, deliberate starvation and terrorism to which our people in the Gaza Strip are being subjected.

We also call on the International Red Cross to send medical supplies and foodstuffs to the Strip, and to take the necessary measures to ensure that relief materials provided by our society reach our steadfast people in Gaza.

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### **U.A.R. Memorandum Addressed to U.N. Special Envoy Jarring Commenting on Israel's Notes of January 10 and 27 and Her Continued Occupation of Arab Territory, and Calling on the Security Council To Take Measures To Ensure the Implementation of U.N. Resolution 242<sup>2</sup>**

**February 1, 1971**

On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967) and accordingly the Secretary-General designated you as his Special Representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

During your contacts with us, which started on 18 December 1967, we have confirmed to you our readiness to implement the resolution as a "package deal" and our willingness to carry out our obligations as stipulated therein. We have explained this in our reply to your questions handed to you on 27 March 1969. This reply was included in the report submitted by the Secretary-General

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Palestine Red Crescent appeal, *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 6, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> English text of U.A.R. memorandum to Jarring, as transmitted with a letter to the U.N. Security Council president by U.A.R. U.N. Representative Zayyat on February 2; U.N. document S/10098.

to the Security Council on 4 January 1970 [S/10070].

Our readiness to implement resolution 242 (1967) emanated from respect for the will of the international community and our compliance with the United Nations Charter. We have also welcomed all the international efforts exerted to achieve a peaceful settlement, declared our support of the French initiative of 16 January 1969, and accepted the American initiative submitted in June 1970.

All our international contacts were aimed at achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East established on the firm basis of justice and not dictated by the threat or use of force or as a result of territorial expansion. Hence our position remained that the settlement necessitates that Israel should respect the Charter of the United Nations and its decisions and implement the Security Council resolution in full. Each party to the conflict should pledge to abide by its obligations and the settlement should not reflect the weight of conquest or the consequences of the use of force against United Nations Member States.

Reaffirming our desire for peace and for the continuation and success of your mission, we have stated our position in the communication submitted to you on 15 January 1971, which was based on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in order to achieve a peaceful and durable settlement [see S/10083].

From our experience, during the long time which lapsed since the beginning of your mission, it has become evident that Israel refuses to implement the Security Council resolution and continues to seek to impose its terms from a position of strength thus blocking the progress of your mission.

Firmly believing in the importance of achieving a just and lasting peace in the area, and because of Israel's persistence in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, and being concerned about the continuation of your mission, we have submitted the issue to the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-fifth session. The General Assembly adopted resolution 2628 (XXV) on 4 November 1970 which expressed

serious concern that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) had not been implemented, and reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that consequently territories thus occupied must be restored. The resolution reaffirmed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and recognized that the respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The resolution also called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contacts with you with a view to carrying out at the earliest possible date your mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts. In adopting this resolution the United Nations has once more stressed the importance of achieving a peaceful settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution, thus rejecting Israel's policy which is based on the use of force to impose an Israeli settlement in the area, disregarding the Security Council resolution and the United Nations Charter.

Upon the adoption of that resolution on 4 November, the United Arab Republic Government declared its readiness to resume contacts with you and instructed its representatives accordingly. On the other hand, Israel has always refused to comply with the Security Council resolution, rejected all international efforts deployed towards achieving a peaceful settlement in the area, and continues to occupy Arab territories.

In these occupied Arab territories, Israel persists in carrying [out] a policy of repression, expulsion, and collective punishment against the inhabitants, adopting various administrative and legislative measures including the use of armed force to impound the property of these inhabitants. Moreover, it continues to establish settlements in the occupied territories whose indigenous Arab inhabitants are replaced by new immigrants. The General Assembly and the Security Council adopted several resolutions calling on Israel to abide by the provisions of the United Nations

Charter, norms of international law and relevant international agreements which obligate Israel to respect the rights of the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories. Nevertheless, the repressive measures being currently perpetrated by Israel in these territories clearly reveal its persistence in a policy designed to change their Arab character, establish Israeli settlements and create a fait accompli with a view to consolidating its occupation. This brings further evidence of its expansionist policy. This explicitly indicates that the peace claims of the Israelis are merely intended to delude world public opinion.

We consider that the two Israeli notes of 10 and 27 January 1971<sup>1</sup> which were submitted to you reveal that Israel continues in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since Israel does not commit itself to withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied in June 1967. We also consider that peace referred to by Israel in its notes remains meaningless as long as Israel evades total withdrawal from the Arab territories. Israel's refusal to commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories is a confirmation of the expansionist designs for the realization of which it had launched its 1967 aggression.

<sup>1</sup> During a visit to Israel January 8-10, Dr. Jarring held a series of meetings with Israeli officials including Premier Meir and Foreign Minister Eban. According to the "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East" of 30 November, 1971 (U.N. document A/8541 and S/10403), it was at an early stage of these discussions that Israel presented the U.N. envoy with its views on "Essentials of Peace," for transmittal to the other governments concerned. (The purported text of these proposals, as published in *Jeune Afrique*, appears as Document 4 above.)

On January 27, it was reported that Israel's U.N. Representative Tekoah had that day handed Dr. Jarring a new written policy statement for transmittal to the U.A.R., the contents of which were not disclosed (*New York Times*, January 28, 1971, p. 7). Reuter on January 27 quoted "informed sources" as having said that Israel was believed to be asking the U.A.R. to define more precisely the possibility of an "agreement to reopen 'international waterways' in the Middle East and to recognize the sovereignty and independence of all states in the area" (*Arab Report and Record*, 16-31 January, 1971, p. 76).

Israel's deliberate omission in its notes of peace guarantees, the open opposition by its leaders to the stationing of United Nations peace-keeping forces in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate to guarantee peace, and its opposition to the establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders, clearly underline Israel's rejection of a just and lasting peace.

In its notes, furthermore, Israel does not commit itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem, resolutions which were adopted by the General Assembly during the past twenty-two years, the last of which was resolution 2672 (XXV) of 8 December 1970.

In adopting a position based on the use of armed force aimed at dictating its terms to the Arab States in order to realize its expansionist design, Israel is obstructing the achievement of the peaceful settlement stipulated in the Security Council resolution.

The continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories is an act of aggression that constitutes a breach of peace in the area and seriously endangers world peace. Israel's adamant refusal to implement the Security Council resolution makes it incumbent on the Council, in exercising its responsibility under the Charter, to take the necessary measures required to assist you in the discharge of your mandate and the implementation of its resolution 242 (1967), thus securing the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the Arab occupied territories and establishing the requisite guarantees to ensure that international peace and security will not be endangered.

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**Statement on the Necessity for Total Elimination of Zionist Aggression, Included in a Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya<sup>1</sup>**

Benghazi, February 2, 1971

We in the Libyan Arab Republic also believe that the right solution is to put an end to aggression itself and that the elimination of the consequences of aggression does not directly result in the elimination of aggression itself. If we eliminate the consequences of aggression but leave aggression, the enemy will still be there and will continue to make himself felt every ten years. This is the inevitable nature of the Arab-Zionist conflict. Such setbacks will be repeated about every ten years, even if we eliminate the consequences of aggression in the meantime.

This is frank speaking and is meant to be heard by Arabs both inside and outside the area of confrontation. To eliminate aggression itself and to liberate Palestine it is not sufficient to eliminate the consequences of aggression, and the whole process will be repeated in ten years' time unless something new happens. So the elimination of aggression itself must be the strategic aim of the Arab nation—and let both our enemies and our friends hear this.

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**Speech to the U.A.R. National Assembly by President Sadat, Responding to the Appeal of the U.N. Secretary-General with a Pledge To Extend the Middle East Ceasefire Until March 7<sup>2</sup>**

Cairo, February 4, 1971

In the name of God. Mr. Chairman, brother Members of the National Assembly, I have deemed it my duty to our people in Egypt, represented here by you, and to our Arab nation of which our Arab people here in Egypt is the vanguard, to come to your honourable Assembly and to talk to you about what you know and I know preoccupies us all. I mean the cause of our holy struggle and our work on its course so far, as well as our responsibility to it in the future.

I believe complete truth means complete responsibility. Since responsibility is a duty for all the nation, the nation is entitled to the whole truth. I therefore ask your permission to summarise for you the major facts of our position today. I am not doing this merely to review what has happened, but so that we shall all remember, be sure and trust the accuracy of our calculations and the decisions we base on them. In other words, we summarise and then draw conclusions.

Brothers, I shall here divide my speech into three parts in order to give a complete and clear picture. The first part deals with our principled commitments to a cause which is undoubtedly the most honourable because it is the most just. The second part deals with our continuous work, using every means, for the protection of our principled commitments from the time we first accepted the trust until now. The third part is about the next steps we envisage as dictated by the values we stand for and the principles we believe in.

(1) Our principled commitments: Brothers, we have never denied to ourselves or to others

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Qadhafi's speech at a popular rally, *al-Haqiqah* (Benghazi), February 3, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Text of Sadat's National Assembly speech broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3603/A/1-A/7; reprinted by permission.



that our nation suffered a serious setback on 5th June 1967. We lost a battle. We had the dignity and courage to face the truth and face others with the truth. We did not deceive. We refused to bury our heads in the sand like ostriches or to pretend that the arrow aimed at us did not wound or hurt. We admitted that we lost a battle. At the same time we showed convincingly that we had not lost the war. This was not merely a claim on our part. It was the truth pertaining to our nation's will, our nation's resources, abilities and readiness.

A status quo at a certain moment cannot change the great truth—that is, if we are able to grasp the truth and if we in time of danger have strong enough nerves to absorb a shock and distinguish between what is superficial and transient and what is natural, real and has the strength to survive and endure.

We lost a battle in the war between ourselves and Israel. This was within the realm of probability. However, we have not lost the whole war because that is against nature, history and evolution. Clear proof of this was our Arab masses' stand behind our immortal leader, Jamal Abd an-Nasir, on 9th and 10th June 1967. That stand was not an emotional outburst but a genuine expression of the nature of things. The precise interpretation of that stand is that the Arab masses told Jamal Abd an-Nasir: Never mind the obstacle on the road. We shall stand up and start anew. We shall march forward together placing our belief in God, ourselves and the possibility of victory. We are ready to bear all the costs and consequences of victory.

After that day, Jamal Abd an-Nasir defined our view of our principled commitments in two points which were accepted by everyone. In their adherence to these two points, our people have devoted all they have—money, work and sacrifice. The first point is the necessity to regain all the territories which were occupied as a result of the 1967 aggression and the inevitability of the withdrawal of the occupation forces from these territories. These territories as defined by Jamal Abd an-Nasir to the masses of our nation are: Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank of

Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Heights and Sinai. We have never agreed to bargain over the land, because the land of any people is their national honour as Abd an-Nasir told you in this very place.

The second point is the necessity to preserve the rights of the Palestinian people, because we cannot and do not have the right to speak on their behalf, let alone relinquish or give anything in their name. We shall not be the generation which surrendered the rights of the Palestinian people. If we cannot extract any of the rights, then at least we must not be responsible before the nation, history and conscience for having relinquished any of these rights.

These were, still are and will continue to be, God willing, our principled commitments. No one can change them. Circumstances cannot change them, because our belief in them is stronger than all individuals and more durable than all circumstances. They are not just the rights of a nation, but are the necessities of destiny.

(2) Our work to ensure respect for our principled commitments has not ceased throughout the past years whether on the battlefield against the enemy, in explaining the facts of our commitments to the world, or in our efforts to co-operate with the international community to find a solution which guarantees just peace and is based on the principles of international law.

Our armed forces have not let the enemy live in peace, but have continued to clash with him even in the most difficult circumstances. The Ras al-Ushsh battle took place barely a few weeks after June 1967. Our naval units clashed with the enemy units and sunk his largest warship, Eilat, in 1967. The artillery duels against enemy positions began in 1968. The year 1969 was the year of the crossing operations to attack enemy fortifications and clash with his soldiers face-to-face. In 1970 our air defence forces fought a battle which the enemy wanted to be fierce and ferocious. The enemy's friends in the United States wanted him to have air superiority. Despite all that, the enemy suffered heavy losses in July of that

year. The sacrifices of our civilian masses in the firing line were enormous.

The enemy wanted to place the three main Canal towns—Suez, Ismailia and Port Said—at the mercy of his guns. The Canal people made great sacrifices and nobly just as any citizen would make sacrifices for his homeland. All the people's forces supported the front with their work, production, steadfastness, consciousness, faith and patience to a degree which can be achieved only by great noble nations which know the values of freedom, civilisation and humanity.

We realise that major conflicts and problems in modern times cannot be confined to the battle front or to national borders. For this reason we have tried to make contacts with the whole world and tell them our views and explain the facts. The crisis has proved that we have friends. Foremost of these friends—friends who are dear to us—are the people of the great Soviet Union who were not merely satisfied with showing understanding, but also hastened to give us things without which it would have been have been difficult to continue to fight strongly and effectively.

Through its support of us during this crisis the Soviet Union has established one of history's great friendships and has made such a friendship an example of international fraternity and of the unity of the forces opposing imperialism, intimidation and aggression. And so, the crisis has proved that the socialist people's front, the grouping of the non-aligned States, and the solidarity of the three continents—Asia, Africa and Latin America—are one strong front along which extends the strong and impregnable national liberation line.

Moreover, the crisis has proved that right has its supporters regardless of consequences. This is evident in the present important change in Western Europe's attitude. This attitude has unquestionably been influenced by French policy since the beginning of the crisis.

Throughout this time we have shown the greatest sincere co-operation and good will to the world community, represented by the United Nations, by taking part in all the

attempts to find a solution to the crisis before its dangers to world peace become difficult to contain. We have taken specific steps in this regard: We have accepted the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967; we have sincerely and honestly extended our hand to the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, Ambassador Jarring, entrusted with following up the implementation of the Security Council resolution; we have also maintained constant contact with him, particularly during the first 18 months of his mission when the Ambassador found himself visiting the Middle East capitals without being able to find any objective to hold on to. When he became tired of this, he was forced to suspend his mission temporarily.

In every international arena and world conference our call has always been the call of peace which we have made conditional on only one thing—that it be a just peace; otherwise peace cannot be established or maintained.

While we, on our side were acting in this way, the enemy on his side was procrastinating and evading any question put to him about his real intentions. It was clear all the time that he would not implement the Security Council resolution and that he was continuously looking for excuses not to fulfil its clauses. He was continuing his aggressive policy. This policy materialised in mad and destructive raids on factories and schools in Egypt, cities and camps in Jordan and airports and villages in Lebanon as well as in killing, imprisonment and torture of patient strugglers in the occupied territories. The enemy was doing all this as if he were free to do as he pleased, as if there were no one to stop him, and as if he were not afraid of any punishment.

Despite all we have seen and suffered, in July 1970 we accepted an initiative submitted on behalf of the United States by the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, so that we could prove to the world the sincerity of our intentions and our regard for peace—if ever there is a path to peace. Our reasons for this acceptance were explained by our eternal leader himself to you, to the people and to the nation.

The firing on our front, which faced the responsibility of constant confrontation with the enemy, stopped for three months. It was expected that during this time some progress would be made towards a peaceful solution of the crisis. But this was not achieved. This is because the enemy used the excuse of the Egyptian missile network on our front and therefore did not contact the UN Secretary-General's representative. The stipulated three months ended and the whole crisis was placed before the UN General Assembly which on 4th November gave its opinion extending the temporary cease-fire period for a further three months. It affirmed its adherence to the implementation of the Security Council resolution and drew up a plan for the UN representative to resume his mission.

Israel wasted the first cease-fire period until it obtained unlimited quantities of arms and equipment on the pretext of re-establishing a balance of power as a result of the claim about Egyptian missiles. Israel decided to repeat the same operation of defamation and extortion. It did not begin contacting the UN Secretary-General's representative until after it had contracted a deal for arms, equipment and economic aid amounting to 500 million dollars from the United States. The excuse this time was to reassure itself before it contacted Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Contrary to all that it says and claims, the United States encourages the aggressor and enables him to continue his aggression.

Israel finally contacted Jarring, but in our opinion it resumed its original position. Its documents to him contained a repetition of its previous attitudes which are against any hope for peace. Superficially it claims to be looking for peace, but it does not want peace. In fact, it accepts nothing more than expansion. It denies its expansionist intentions but exercises this desire for expansion. We have not forgotten, brothers, Israel's official declaration of its annexation of Sinai to its territory in October 1956. During the tripartite aggression it imagined that time was convenient for it to do so.

We began to hear calls to extend the cease-

fire because this period was insufficient. For this reason we were in contact with everybody to explain our views.

As you remember, the Soviet President, Nikolay Podgorny, came to Cairo. He was accompanied by an excellent delegation. With them we studied the situation and all its developments and possibilities. I say before you that in order to push matters forward and in appreciation of the historical responsibilities of our times, I sent a letter to the US President, Richard Nixon, and received his reply. I am sorry to say before you now that the US attitude is the same as it was: full alignment with Israel. In my letter I asked for a reply to a specific question: What does the United States want? I have received no reply to this question nor is it likely that such a reply will come.

At the same time, when the US Secretary of State sent a letter to his UAR counterpart, I encouraged the continuation of correspondence between them to reach the greatest understanding and clarity.

We firmly insisted on calling on the four big Powers to assume their duties and responsibilities to preserve peace in view of their permanent membership in the Security Council, their international position and their direct interest in the crisis. Our co-operation with the UN Secretary-General and his special representative entrusted with the task of implementing the Security Council resolution was unlimited and unconditional.

This week we reached a cross-road. On the one hand, the enemy continues his occupation of our territory and tries to consolidate this occupation by changing the nature of the ground, especially in Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Syrian Heights, where he is establishing settlements, and the Egyptian desert of Sinai. On the other hand, we cannot remain idle in view of what is taking place. Our holy duty which nobody can deny us is to liberate the land and to clash again with the enemy.

Contacts at the United Nations have not yet achieved a result which we consider satisfactory because the enemy continues to be stubborn and to defy us, the entire world and the international principles of law from

A to Z. However, several parties are trying to persuade us by various means to extend the cease-fire if even for a few weeks.

Brothers, we now come to the point of giving visible form to our future steps as dictated by the values we represent, the principles in which we believe and our commitments to world peace and the international society. I have discussed the aspects of the situation with the political and military leaders and at all the establishments through which our regime thinks and decides. There have been lengthy discussions in the Cabinet, the National Defence Council and the Arab Socialist Union Central Committee. The considerations open to us were briefly as follows:

(1) We cannot and we do not have the right to allow the automatic renewal of the cease-fire while there is no progress in the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. If we let such a thing happen, this would mean that the cease-fire lines would become a fait accompli, or political lines, as was the case with the 1949 armistice lines. We shall not allow such a thing to happen under any circumstances.

(2) We can see the extensive and regrettable skilful attempts to mislead world opinion, to depict the problem as other than what it is, and to present it as if it has become less important, as if it has become a question of a cease-fire or opening fire, so that this misinterpretation will create the impression that the party which begins the firing is intransigent.

The core of the problem is the aggression. Aggression is the imposed occupation by some force. But opening fire to end the occupation is a natural, legitimate and lawful right and the sacred duty of everyone who respects and believes in freedom for every land and for every people.

(3) We must frankly admit that there is nothing so far in Israel's statements and actions at the United Nations in New York or in the land of the crisis in the Middle East to indicate that it is ready to implement the Security Council resolution. Indeed, all indications point to its constant attempts

to make this resolution abortive and render it null and void, and to obstruct all international efforts to find a solution to the crisis. The simplest evidence of this is that there can be no talk of peace while land is occupied, and there can be no talk of peace while threats of arrogance and stupidity of power continue.

Despite this, the UN Secretary-General had a different view which he presented in the report he submitted to the Security Council, including his appeal to the parties in the dispute. He said in this report that although he admitted the need for more clarifications, he found scope for cautious optimism. He based his cautious optimism, he said, on the fact that these parties had resumed their contacts with Ambassador Jarring, that some progress had been made in defining the positions of the parties, and that the parties which had expressed a wish to implement the Security Council resolution were now describing in more detail their views on their commitments resulting from this resolution. The UN Secretary-General concluded by appealing to the parties to continue their role in the discussion in a constructive manner and to co-operate with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring with a view to implementing the Security Council resolution. In conclusion, the UN Secretary-General appealed to the parties to exercise self-restraint in this difficult situation and to renew the cease-fire when it expired on 5th February.

In this atmosphere, a considerable number of Security Council members, whose understanding of our position and sympathy with our struggle we trust, approached us with a persistent call for self-restraint. When the UN Secretary-General made his appeal, we heard these members' comments on it. They said that for this appeal to come at this serious stage in the Middle East situation meant that the UN Secretary-General, by virtue of his position and responsibility, felt he had reason to believe that there was a possibility for real progress towards the implementation of the Security Council resolution. They felt that it might be better to give the Secretary-General a favourable atmosphere to help him implement the Security Council

resolution, the task entrusted to him by the Council resolution of 22nd November 1967.

As for the third part of my speech, brothers, our deep, faithful and responsible discussions have led us to define our position as follows:

(a) The UAR considers itself bound by one commitment for which there can be no alternative: the liberation of all the territories occupied during the 1967 aggression. This is our original commitment for which we have exerted all our political, military, economic and diplomatic activity and for which we offer every sacrifice no matter how high.

The primary commitment of every nation is that of its freedom, within the framework of international law. Nobody can ask it to undertake or can impose on it any commitment contrary to that sacred commitment. Hence, it is every nation's right to reserve for itself the right to act freely in dealing with everything it faces.

(b) Despite this primary major commitment, we accept the appeal of the UN Secretary-General and decide to refrain from opening fire for a period which we cannot extend beyond 30 days ending on 7th March. During this period, the Secretary-General and the entire world community must ensure that there is genuine progress regarding the heart of the problem and not in its outward manifestations. We feel that it is imperative for the Security Council to hear, before the expiration of this period, a report by the UN Secretary-General on the progress made.

Although from now on we know that Israel, with US help and *carte blanche* support, will not budge from its present position, we pray to God that practice will prove that our doubts are unfounded.

(c) To all the efforts exerted to solve the crisis, we add a new Egyptian initiative, compliance with which we shall consider as a true yardstick of the desire to implement the UN Security Council resolution. We demand that during the period when we refrain from opening fire that a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal be achieved as the first

stage of a time table which will be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the Security Council resolution. If this is achieved within this period, we shall be prepared to begin immediately to clear the Suez Canal and reopen it to international navigation to serve the world economy.

We believe that by this initiative, we shall be turning envoy Jarring's efforts from ambiguous words into definite measures for the implementation of the Security Council resolution that will serve the interests of all countries whose economies have been harmed by the closure of the Suez Canal due to the Israeli aggression and terrorisation.

Brothers, I have asked the Foreign Ministry to submit to the office of the National Assembly chairman a detailed report on all the contacts which have taken place during the past years. I have also asked for the text of the National Defence Council resolution to be provided, because some of its provisions are secret. I have also asked for the minutes of the 3rd February 1971 meeting of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union to be given to the Chairman's office so that the whole picture with all its details may be before you and so that you may be fully aware of the reasons for every position we adopt.

Finally, I wish to state to you that the whole situation hinges on two facts: (1) The ceasing or not ceasing of fire is not the issue. The issue is the liberation of all the Arab lands and the restoration of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people. This is the issue for which we offer everything without reservation or hesitation until the end. (2) Regardless of every chance we give the world community out of our respect and appreciation, we must realise that, in the end, things depend on our strength alone. We know our enemy better than anyone else, no matter how interested in the crisis he might be. This is because we are the ones who have faced and are still facing his designs and plots. Only he who has been burnt knows what fire is. Through our knowledge of the enemy, we know that he will not be deterred except by force and will not retreat except under pressure.

Brothers, having spoken to our nation and people, we address a final word across

the border. We have already done our duty to the world and to peace to the best of our ability. It is time others did their duty to the world and peace. Duty is not a tax which some people must pay and from which others are exempted. Duty, particularly on an international level, is a general responsibility.

I say quite clearly that we have satisfied our conscience with regard to what we have been asked to take care of. But we want everyone to know that there is not anything we care more about than our homeland and nation. People do not care about others more than they care about themselves. Therefore, I say the time has come for others immediately to assume their share of the duty in a firm and decisive manner. The whole international community is called upon to adopt a frank and clear stand. The United Nations has the choice to be or not to be. The big Powers have the responsibility to safeguard the existing international system. They cannot evade this responsibility. The whole world's public is called upon to shatter the smoke-screen of misleading Israeli propaganda which is published everywhere assisted by the most modern means of artificial and fabricated influence.

We want the world to know that we have a right which we are demanding. At the same time, we want the world to know that we have the power with which we can demand this right which we shall not beg but demand honourably; we shall not ask but fight and sacrifice.

Brothers: Let us be strong through right, principle, faith, freedom, the fighting means in our hands and our armed forces who, with complete courage, confidence and nobility, are awaiting the signal to move. They are our soldiers and at the same time, through right and faith, are the soldiers of God. They will triumph, God willing, in honour of their immortal nation and to protect its dignity and prestige among the nations. [Verse from Qur'an.] Peace be with you.

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**U.A.R. Government Statement Issued in Response to the Rejection of Egyptian Peace Proposals by Premier Meir of Israel in a Speech to the Knesset<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, February 9, 1971**

We regard the statement made by Mrs. Golda Meir to the Knesset today as being a clear rejection of the Egyptian peace initiative and as once again affirming Israel's insistence on imposing its own conditions on the Arabs.

Golda Meir talked a lot about peace and her desire for peace at a time when all Israel's actions indicate her blatant conduct against peace and the establishment of peace. Israel refused to implement the Security Council resolution and placed every obstacle in the way of Dr. Jarring in the performance of his task. It then rejected the six-point peace plan which the United Arab Republic proposed to Dr. Jarring a few days ago. And today it frankly rejects the peace initiative announced by President Anwar Sadat in his speech.

In spite of this, Golda Meir talks of peace. But no talk of peace by Golda Meir or any Israeli official can mean anything at all as long as it is not accompanied by full withdrawal from all Arab territories, and whatever efforts are made to misrepresent the truth, they will not succeed in disguising the fact that Israel does not intend to implement the Security Council resolution or to relinquish the occupied territory.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the U.A.R. statement released by the official spokesman Munir Hafiz, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), February 10, 1971. (For Premier Meir's speech, see Document 23 above.)

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**Statements of Support for the Rights of the Palestinian People and Their Armed Struggle To Recover Them, Included in the Speech from the Throne of Shaikh Sabah, Amir of Kuwait<sup>1</sup>**

Kuwait, February 10, 1971

The aggressor state will deceive no one by pretending to desire peace and to accept the Security Council resolutions while it is making unrelenting efforts to impede their implementation and to achieve its expansionist ambitions by annexing part of the Arab territories it has been occupying since June 1967, not to mention its continued refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people. This conduct, based as it is on trickery, deceit and misrepresentation, increases our conviction of the worthlessness of a peaceful settlement, and we have more than once explained that we shall not agree to any settlement of the Palestine problem which does not satisfy the Palestinian Arab people whose rights in this matter are paramount. We shall continue to support the armed struggle of this people to recover their legitimate rights in their usurped homeland, and we are still committed to this policy.

Honorable Members:

There can be no question that events in another Arab country which affect its ability to endure in the face of our common enemy concern us all; this is why we, like others, have felt concern for the events that have taken place in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the last few months. The last Speech from the Throne dealt with these events, and with the consequent signing of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and the formation of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee and the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission to supervise their implementation.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the Amir's Speech from the Throne, read to the opening session of the newly-elected National Assembly by the Premier, Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), February 11, 1971.

But unfortunately this did not prevent the renewal of these clashes on an extensive scale at the beginning of this year. We sincerely hope that there will not be a repetition of that tragedy which can only endanger our nation at a time when it is urgently necessary that we should be united to confront any emergency or any new aggression by Israel.

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**U.A.R. Memorandum Setting Out the Commitments Egypt Would Make in Order To Bring About a Middle East Settlement, Issued in Reply to a Letter from U.N. Special Envoy Jarring<sup>2</sup>**

Cairo, February 15, 1971

The U.A.R. has informed your Excellency that it accepts to carry out on a reciprocal basis all its obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242/1967 with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this resolution. Referring to your *aide-mémoire* of February, 1971, the U.A.R. would give a commitment covering the following:—

1. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;

4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and

<sup>2</sup> English text of U.A.R. memorandum, *Arab Report and Record*, No. 5 (March 1–15, 1971), pp. 158–159.

5. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

The U.A.R. would also give a commitment that:

6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention;

7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law;

8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Sharm el Sheikh.

To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every state in the area, the U.A.R. would accept:

a — The establishment of demilitarised zones astride the borders in equal distances; and

b — The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of the Security Council's Resolution 242 of 1967. Israel should give a commitment covering the following:—

1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza strip;

2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugees' problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions;

3. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;

4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;

6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party;

7. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every state in

the area, Israel would accept:—

a — The establishment of demilitarised zones astride the borders in equal distances; and

b — The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives the commitments, the U.A.R. will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the aforementioned obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242.

The U.A.R. considers that just and lasting peace cannot be realised without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

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### **Tunisian Press Interview Statements by President Qadhafi of Libya, Stressing the Necessity for Arab Unification in Order To Combat Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Tunis, February 15, 1971**

The proposal that the battle should be placed on a pan-Arab basis is based on the following considerations:

1. Israel has not been content with Palestine and will not be content with what it has occupied in addition, but is continuing to engage in a strategic maneuver that is called in military language an "artichoke maneuver," which consists of the piecemeal occupation of objectives with the object of attaining the final objective by stages.

2. The United Nations and the so-called great and small powers have been unable to

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Qadhafi's exclusive interview with the news agency Tunis Afrique Presse, *al-Haqiqa* (Benghazi), February 17, 1971.



solve this problem for more than twenty-two years, while it is the Arab people alone who have suffered direct injury.

3. Israel is by no means a miracle from the military point of view.

4. Israel and its allies will be able to continue imposing their existence as long as they are confronted by Arab countries one at a time, and this individual action makes it impossible to make use of the resources of the whole Arab nation.

5. The enemy's allies reckon the full strength of the Arabs as being arrayed against the strength of Israel, and support Israel on this basis; in fact, however, the full strength of the Arabs is not mobilized for the battle, although it is reckoned as being so, and this constitutes a great danger which is ignored by the Arabs.

6. The decisive and natural solution is that all Arab strength should be mobilized for a pan-Arab battle against the present enemy, that the battle should start from all quarters at once, contrary to what has happened in the past, and that the battle should be offensive, never defensive, because the enemy is occupying Arab territory, which calls for attack. Defense is permissible when the enemy is outside the frontiers; this is the only explanation of offense and defense to be found in the military dictionary.

7. The Arabs are at present capable of mobilizing a thousand planes, five thousand tanks and a million men, and they will be able to mobilize more than that in the future. This is a sufficient force to defeat the enemy, on condition that it is mobilized in a pan-Arab battle. Otherwise it will have no effect either at the regional or the pan-Arab level.

[In reply to a question as to how far the Libyan Arab Republic can reconcile its agreement with France not to use the Mirages in the Middle East war with its undertakings to the Arab countries]: The fact that we have bought the planes from France does not mean that we have relinquished our national duties or the defense of our rights. We are free to use the weapons that we buy with our

own money. There are also other planes in the world than Mirages, and if necessary we can buy others from any country, and perhaps with greater facilities and at lower prices from other countries.

## 279

### **U.S. Press Interview with U.A.R. President Sadat Agreeing to an International Peace Keeping Force and to Free Passage for Israeli Shipping Through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, Given Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Territories and a Just Solution to the Palestine Problem<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, Mid-February, 1971**

*Q. Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, says that if you interpreted Prime Minister Golda Meir's speech as a rejection of your proposal for a partial withdrawal from the canal, you should perhaps read it more carefully. After a second reading, what is your conclusion?*

A. To begin with, as I told President Nixon, I think we differ on starting positions. The starting point for every Israeli attitude is that we were defeated and they can, therefore, dictate whatever they want. Our starting point is that we lost a battle—but not the war. If their starting point is erroneous, everything else is wrong.

*Q. What's the new starting point?*

A. If they want peace, we also want peace. But let's be frank. Can peace be induced while one of the parties occupies one-seventh of the land of the other? The occupying power automatically has a veto. This is no way to bring about a lasting settlement, which is what we most sincerely want. Let there be no doubt about that. A peace based on justice for all.

<sup>1</sup> Transcript of Sadat's interview, conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (Domestic Edition), LXXVII, 8 (February 22, 1971), pp. 40-41; © Copyright Newsweek Inc. 1971, reprinted by permission.

*Q. Mrs. Meir says she is willing to discuss any suggestions for reopening the canal prior to negotiating other matters. This could include your suggestion as well. She talks about normalization of civilian life in the canal zone and de-escalation of the military setup. Isn't this worth exploring?*

A. She speaks about normalization. But what authority does she have to speak about civilians in our own country? Would America discuss normalization along the Mississippi with a foreign power? The canal is Egyptian and was founded long before Israel became a state. This is a flagrant intrusion into our own affairs.

*Q. Does your proposal include free passage for Israeli ships?*

A. Yes, we have agreed to this in our memorandum to Ambassador Jarring. Free passage is clearly spelled out. But first Israel must fulfill its obligations under the U.N. resolution.

*Q. How do you feel about U.S. readiness to discuss Big Four guarantees with the other Big Three?*

A. A significant change. An encouraging development. I had always hoped that the U.S., apart from being a friend of Israel, as a major power would demonstrate its responsibility toward peace based on justice. I never dreamed that the U.S. would be on our side. I ask only one thing: can be U.S. be neutral and objective?

*Q. You have said that if Israel does not accept partial withdrawal from the canal, it will be throwing away the last chance for peace. How can your offer lead to permanent peace?*

A. Before Feb. 5, the U.S. Government and Israel raised hell all over the world about cease-fire or no cease-fire. The substance of the whole problem got lost in the shuffle. Well, with our proposal we say the problem is not cease-fire but how to dismantle the Israeli occupation in return for a lasting settlement. Let us tackle together real substance. If we do that and discuss through Jarring, in practical, concrete terms, the main problem, we are quite ready to cease fire. But a permanent cease-fire will automatically

lead to a permanent status quo and permanent occupation.

*Q. The Israelis say no withdrawal without peace and you say no peace without withdrawal. This strikes many outsiders as an exercise in semantics. Since insiders are talking about a package deal, couldn't you test Israel's real intentions by committing yourself to a peace treaty and then see if the Israelis commit themselves to withdrawal?*

A. That is a very important question. If you read the U.N. resolution very carefully it is an embryonic peace treaty. That is a solemn commitment on our part. But we are still waiting for a solemn commitment on the other side. Why should all the obligations be on us? Try to use elementary psychology. A partial withdrawal will test Israel's alleged good intentions, open the canal for free navigation for the whole world, and after that Jarring can work out a timetable to solve the whole problem. Then I can prolong the cease-fire for another fixed date. And then we move toward final peace. The trouble with the Israelis is that they are still dreaming about their victory. If they want real peace, we are more than ready for one too.

*Q. You ask for complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The Israelis reply they won't pull back all the way. Would the Arabs be prepared to negotiate minor border rectifications? For example, if the Israelis gave up all of Sinai in return for a strong U.N. presence at Sharm el Sheikh guaranteed by the Big Four and gave up the Golan Plain, including the Syrian city of El Kuneitra, would you have any objection to minor concessions in the Latrun Bulge, Kalkilya, Tulkarm and on the Golan Heights themselves?*

A. It's for the countries concerned to decide. The problem now is the larger aspect of peace. In our view, the Israeli demand for secure and defensible borders is a pretext for expansion. Some prominent Israeli intellectuals you yourself interviewed in *Newsweek* last year are of the same opinion. They described their government's policy as one of creeping annexation that is leading Israel nowhere. I will go even further. The party that needs secure borders is us, not Israel.

*Q. Does partial withdrawal mean that Israel has to begin by abandoning the Bar-Lev line—or would a thinning out of defenses along this line be acceptable as a first step?*

*A.* Partial withdrawal means to a line behind El Arish. Israel says we are seeking strategic advantages. I'm afraid Israel is living in the past. This is 1971, not 1967. We're not interested in making strategic gains. The Bar-Lev line was not even in my calculations. The idea of partial withdrawal has been suggested at different times by the French and the Soviets, even by the U.S. at one point. Let's face it, I don't have confidence in them and they don't have confidence in me. Let us try to restore confidence by testing their real intentions.

*Q. If they pulled back behind El Arish, what would you give them in return?*

*A.* I would guarantee to reopen the canal in six months to international trade. I would prolong the cease-fire to a fixed date to give Jarring time to work out the details. I would guarantee free passage in the Strait of Tiran with an international force at Sharm el Sheikh. Its composition doesn't matter; the Big Four or other nations—it's immaterial to us. It would be guaranteed by the Security Council and could not be removed without all four agreeing. We would finally be grappling with fundamentals and a final settlement would at last be in sight. We are open-minded and open-hearted about the rest of the program. We will be flexible and willing to discuss anything that could lead to lasting peace in this part of the world. But mark this. It must be an over-all settlement for all territories occupied in 1967, not just Sinai.

*Q. Some military experts say that Egyptian forces won't be a real threat for the Israelis for several more years. And some of your critics have been saying that by fixing yet another deadline on March 7—the third since last August—you are edging ever closer to a fourth round with the Israelis that you cannot win—and may lose. What is your answer?*

*A.* Those so-called experts don't know anything about our new army. We can

absorb whatever shocks, costs and sacrifices that may be in store for us. Whatever the power you are faced with, the will of the people cannot be changed. After ten years in Vietnam, you Americans should understand this. If Israel won't return our lands, we will have to pay whatever the price is needed to liberate our country.

*Q. The Israelis have made clear they won't fight again according to the ground-rules of last year's war of attrition. If you resume firing, this presumably means massive retaliation. So wouldn't a resumption of Egyptian shelling, in effect, trigger the fourth round?*

*A.* The third round, started by Israel in 1967, is still going on. The Israelis have bombed our heartland, used napalm, with as many as 180 planes in seventeen hours of raids in a single day. The U.S. bombs they dropped cost from half a million to a million dollars a day. All this has only been interrupted by the cease-fire. Israeli policy is to put fear and despair in our hearts. But this has proved fruitless. It does not bring peace.

*Q. Do you feel confident you now have the capability to cross the canal and hold and widen a beachhead on the other side?*

*A.* These are secret military plans. I'm not in a position to speak about them.

*Q. Is it true that your missile sites in the canal zone are now entirely manned by Egyptians?*

*A.* Correct. What the Israelis said about Russians in the canal zone was totally untrue. We don't want anyone else to fight our battle.

*Q. I think it's important that you spell out as clearly as possible what you would be prepared to put in a peace treaty.*

*A.* If Israel returns our land under the Security Council resolution, the inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, including Israel's. We pledge our solemn word on this. We have no designs on Israel, it is Israel that has designs on us. The territorial integrity of Israel in secure and recognized borders will be guaranteed by the Big Four. Israel will enjoy freedom of navigation in the canal and the strait, again guaranteed. For all this to happen, however, there

must be a just solution to the Palestinian problem.

*Q. There is still much confusion about the Palestinian problem. What would be your objection to adequate financial compensation for Palestinian refugees coupled with a referendum in the west bank and Gaza to determine whether Palestinians want a separate state, either federated or confederated with Jordan, or remain an integral part of Jordan?*

*A.* I'm not in a position to decide for the Palestinians but this sounds like a reasonable way to solve the problem—compensation and referendum. They must decide for themselves.

*Q. You have said you are not prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel. Could you tell me, specifically, then what you have in mind?*

*A.* Golda Meir once said that peace will only come when she can drive her car from Tel Aviv to Cairo to do some shopping. That is a pipe dream based on the victory complex. America, for example, recognizes China's territorial integrity but does not have normal diplomatic relations with Peking. The exchange of ambassadors is a technicality. It's a question of sovereignty. Each nation decides for itself. But Israeli propaganda has used what I said to claim that I wouldn't recognize Israel's territorial integrity. That is absolute nonsense, designed to confuse American opinion.

*Q. When I asked President Nasser two years ago whether he would agree to the stationing of units of the Big Four powers at Sharm el Sheikh as part of an agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, he said no very emphatically. Your position on this score has changed completely. Why?*

*A.* My proposal is motivated solely by my desire to facilitate a durable settlement. My people won't like it. That's why Nasser was against it. But I will take that risk. And after that, if world opinion doesn't understand our attitude, we can then say we've done our level best. It won't be our responsibility if the Israelis refuse the guarantees that are being offered.

*Q. What do you feel the U.S. could do that it hasn't done?*

*A.* The U.S. Administration is the key to peace. If they want peace, they certainly have the means to convince Israel of our good intentions. You have pampered Israel long enough. Why should you treat Israel differently from your other allies? In 1956 we didn't start the war and you helped get the Israelis to withdraw from Sinai. In 1967, we didn't start the war either. Three of our cities have been almost totally destroyed. If the U.S. still has a sense of justice and fair play, it still has a great role to play.

*Q. To conclude, what can you say that might convince Israel that your aim is no longer its destruction through a process to be resumed after a partial peace has been concluded?*

*A.* You have put the cart before the donkey. We are the ones who have to be convinced.

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### **Libyan Press Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Masmoudi of Tunisia, Expressing Support for U.A.R. Efforts and Noting That There Are Various Ways of Participating in the Battle Against Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Tunis, Mid-February, 1971**

I think that both the political and diplomatic moves and preparations that the United Arab Republic is making, together with the efforts we are making in Tunis to achieve a peaceful solution, amount to a political battle in which, if we are successful, we shall both put a stop to bloodshed and achieve liberation of the territory. If we fail to find a peaceful solution we are entitled to take all measures capable of realizing the right of the Palestinian people to recover their territory, and I believe that it is essential to provide political and financial support to the United

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Masmoudi's exclusive interview with *al-Thawra* (Tripoli, Libya), February 21, 1971, as reprinted in *al-Amal* (Tunis), February 23, 1971

Arab Republic as being the pioneer of Arab struggle, situated as it is on the first line of confrontation with the enemy. I also believe it to be essential that all Arab resources should be placed at the service of the battle and the liberation of Palestine.

Certainly the Arab nation possesses human, military and economic resources, in addition to oil, much more abundant than the real resources of the Israeli enemy, all of which must be subjected to the service of the cause, and a scientific, clear and carefully studied plan must be drawn up so that every Arab country in the great Arab homeland may know what its obligations are and what services it can offer.

I believe that there are some who cannot provide military assistance, but these can participate in other fields. For example, some countries have good relations with western countries; this enables them to explain the Palestine problem to the West. A division of duties in the battle can be extremely effective, by which I mean that everyone should offer what he has to offer to the battle, whether in the political or the military field.

## 281

### **Statement Addressed to Arab Heads of State by the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies Appealing for Resumption of Financial Aid to Jordan and for Strong Resistance to the Idea of a "Palestine State" on the West Bank<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, February 24, 1971**

To their Majesties, Excellencies and Highnesses, Kings and Presidents of the fraternal Arab States and Chairmen of the Arab National Assemblies, the Secretary General of the Arab Parliamentary Union, the Sec-

retary General of the Arab League and his Eminence the Rector of Al-Azhar:

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies makes a fraternal and sincere appeal to the fraternal Arab States which have stopped or frozen their material aid to Jordan to reconsider their attitudes and to fear God for the sake of this nation's destiny and the requirements of the higher Arab national interest. The material aid which was decided on by the Khartoum conference was never a gift or a donation but a national duty dictated by the unity of the common Arab destiny.

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies also appeals to the other Arab States which are aware of the realities of Jordan not to stand as indifferent spectators on the question of material aid to Jordan. They should exercise their influence to restore this aid. Dignity-loving Jordan, which is the shield of this nation's honour and dignity, is pained—both people and Army—by this ingratitude and disavowal by some Arab brothers.

The Chamber of Deputies also unanimously approved today the following resolution, which has been sent to the Arab Kings and Presidents and the Chairmen of the Arab national assemblies: The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies denounces the idea of establishing a Palestine State which is now being discussed behind the scenes in several foreign and Arab capitals. The Chamber, while vehemently condemning this idea, warns the Arab peoples that the Palestine State project is no more than an ugly Zionist plan aiming among other things at liquidating the Palestinian people's rights and the whole Palestine question.

The Chamber appeals to the Arab Governments in general, and to the Jordanian Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization in particular, to resist strongly the scheme of establishing a Palestine State. This country's sacrifices and the Arab nation's sacrifices must not be allowed to be wasted and forgotten by deviation and in pursuit of the temptations and plans of Zionism and its supporters.

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, which represents the people of both banks of the Jordan, affirms that our one people, which

<sup>1</sup> Text of Jordanian appeal broadcast on Amman home service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3620/A/6-A/7; reprinted by permission.

has lived in unity for more than 22 years, will not accept secession. They will remain one people united by blood and destiny.

The Chamber also decided at this session, which was led by the acting Chairman, Muhammad al-Khashman, and was attended by Premier Wasfi at-Tall and Ministers, to send parliamentary delegations to Arab countries in the Arab East and the Arab West and to the Arabian Gulf amirates to explain the latest developments in the situation in Jordan as part of the political action plan being followed by the Chamber. It is learned that the delegations are expected to leave Amman at the beginning of March.

## 282

### **Proposals for the Reconstitution of the Palestine National Council and Statements Opposing Any Acceptance of Settlement Proposals or a "Palestine State," Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

**February 24, 1971**

The Palestine National Council is holding its eighth session in Cairo overshadowed by the difficult and grim situation that confronts our revolution, and at a time when solutions involving surrender and the liquidation of our cause have reached a serious and dangerous stage, and when the reactionary subservient regime in Jordan is continuing its campaigns to strike at and crush the Resistance and carrying out further massacres of the masses of our Jordanian-Palestinian people. Meeting as it is in this critical period in the history of our revolution, the National Council is required to give clear and frank answers to and provide scientific and revolutionary solutions for the difficulties and obstacles that confront our revolution and point the way to our masses so that they

may continue their advance towards certain victory.

The fact that the reactionary authorities in Jordan are continuing their serious attempts to crush the Resistance, and that solutions involving surrender and liquidation have reached a serious and dangerous stage, means that two courses only are open to our cause—either to surrender, submit and accept the final liquidation of our cause and our right to resist Zionist settler colonialism, or to hold out and continue the struggle until we liberate our land and the will of our people is victorious.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which has made its attitude to the previous sessions of the Palestine National Council perfectly clear, and explained exactly why it was content with purely token representation in the Seventh Session by only one member of its command, hereby makes it clear to the masses that this time too it will be content with token representation by only one member. This is because the Popular Front still holds its previous conviction that the Palestine National Council, as at present constituted, with its present method of operating, the lack of clarity in the relations among the forces participating in it, and the obscurity and lack of precision of its attitudes, does not provide the minimal conditions necessary for the establishment of an effective and growing national front that can hold out in the face of all the challenges that confront the Resistance in this critical period.

The following are the conditions we regard as essential for the National Council to be capable of performing its role, and if these safeguards are provided we shall participate with full membership:

I. Amendments must be made to the Palestine National Charter in such a way as to

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. statement issued on the occasion of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 89 (February 27, 1971), pp. 3-4 *passim*.

ensure that it meets the requirements of the present stage:

By taking part in the Fourth Session of the Palestine National Council held in Cairo in July 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine played an effective part in amending the Palestine National Charter; for the time being this was an advance on the previous Charter and on the then prevailing situation. Since then there has been such a succession of incidents and such an accumulation of developments that the present amended Charter has ceased to provide answers to the many questions that confront the Resistance. Thus the interests of the revolution and the necessity both for the Council to constitute a framework for national unity and for the Charter to be regarded as providing the theoretical guidelines for the minimum required to ensure coexistence among the various points of view, demand that the Charter be studied with a view to making new amendments to it which will make it capable of meeting the requirements of endurance in the face of the attacks that are being launched by the reactionary Jordanian regime with the object of liquidating the cause and its combatant forces. What must be emphasized above all is that the new amendments must clearly provide for the protection of the revolution and its continuation with sufficient strength to repel the conspirators, and stress the necessity for rejecting all solutions that do not ensure the liberation of the whole of Palestinian territory and the exercise of Arab sovereignty over it.

The extent to which we adhere to the Palestine National Charter will depend on the nature of the new modifications and amendments that must be made in it so that it may be appropriate to and in harmony with the developments and bloody events which the revolution has had to face since 1968—from the events of November 4, 1968, February 10, 1970, and June 7 and September 17, 1970, to the acts of violence and oppression which Jordanian reaction has been perpetrating since September.

II. A formula for joint action must be

devised for the establishment of an effective National Front on a clear and specific basis:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has more than once made clear its views on this subject, by declaring that the basis which meets the requirements of serious and decisive confrontation at this difficult stage lies in the establishment of effective and serious cooperation among the different sections of the Resistance within the framework of action in the form of a front based on the following principles:

1. A progressive revolutionary program of political and military action that clearly defines the parties of the enemy's camp and those of the revolution, and their relations at the Arab and international levels, on a basis of which program the different sections of the Resistance will be obliged to define their fundamental political and military attitudes.

2. The formation of a unified political and military command which will assume the responsibility for planning for the battle and leading the confrontation with subservient Jordanian reaction and Israel.

3. Every section of the Resistance shall continue to enjoy its ideological and organizational independence and the right to amalgamate with another section should it so wish.

III. The Palestine National Council must be reconstituted on the following lines:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is of the opinion that the Palestine National Council, as at present constituted, is incapable of coping with the tasks that confront the Resistance; it must therefore be dissolved and reconstituted in such a way as to ensure the following:

1. Effective representation of the commando organizations in the Assembly on a basis of equality or near equality;

2. Representation in the Council of the masses' union—workers', students' and women's—institutions;

3. Exploitation of qualified Palestinians and their effective representation in the Council.

The amendment of the Palestine National Charter, the firm establishment of a National Front on a clearly defined and unambiguous basis, and the constitution of the National Council in conformity with the above principles and safeguards, require the performance of the following major tasks which confront the masses of our steadfast people and their combatant vanguard, the armed Resistance, which tasks can be listed under the following headings:

*I. The Frustration of Proposals Involving Surrender and Liquidation*

All the sections of the Palestine Resistance in particular and all Jordanian-Palestinian nationalist forces must be placed in a state of alert and all their forces and resources must be fully mobilized to frustrate all attempts to implement all settlement resolutions and proposals for liquidation, in particular the Security Council resolution which involves recognition of the colonialist, settler, expansionist Zionist entity by the Arab regimes which accept the resolution, and the total obliteration of the rights of our people as regards struggle, liberation and return, which the subservient reactionary regimes did not dare to do in 1948. In order to achieve this and subsequent tasks, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that it is necessary:

A. To release all the energies of the Palestinian masses wherever they may be, and especially in the Arab countries surrounding the occupied territories;

B. To escalate the struggle in the occupied territories to the greatest possible extent;

C. To escalate measures on the part of the Resistance to protect the revolution in Jordan, in view of the fact that the reactionary regime in Jordan is determined to crush our revolution and that the Jordanian theater is the principal mainstay of the Resistance's capacity for endurance and confrontation;

D. To release all the resources of popular Arab action and to strengthen the relations with the Arab masses and their progressive

and nationalist forces in all parts of the great Arab homeland;

E. To strike damaging blows at colonialist interests in general and at American interests in particular throughout the Arab area and the world;

F. To employ all means capable of impeding the implementation of the Security Council resolution and all the plans and proposals for settlement, surrender and submission to imperialism and Zionism and their agents in the Arab world.

*II. Rejection of the Palestinian State Project*

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that the proposal for a Palestinian state is just one aspect of efforts to perpetuate the Zionist presence in our occupied territory and to liquidate the Palestine problem as a whole. Therefore to accept it is nothing more nor less than to relinquish the right of our people to liberate and recover the whole of their territory, and to deprive them of their right to return to their homeland.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, aware as it is of the dangers in such a proposal for liquidation, as a matter of principle and to avoid any obscurity or ambiguity in the attitude of the Resistance as a whole to this proposal, calls on the Central Committee of the Resistance and the Palestine National Council, together with all the trade unions and nationalist institutions, to reject the proposal for a Palestinian state and to issue strong, clear and unambiguous statements that leave no ground for doubt or obscurity, so as to close the door to all pressures that may be exerted in an attempt to bring our people to accept this project for treason.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine regards acceptance of this proposal, or any slackness and collusion in this direction, as a historical treachery to our cause, our martyrs and our strugglers, and treachery to the right of our masses to liberate the whole of their homeland.



*III. Holding Out Against the Reactionary Regime in Jordan and Confronting Its Conspiracies, and Struggling for the Establishment of a Democratic National Regime in Jordan*

The subservient reactionary regime in Jordan, both in theory and practice, and on the evidence of what has happened since 1968, and especially the bloody incidents of September, and the accompanying and subsequent acts of ugly and savage barbarism against our people and our enduring masses, and as evidenced by the conspiracy of this regime against our revolution with the object of paralyzing its effectiveness and destroying it, and its continued implementation of its criminal plan, is regarded by the Popular Front as being an instrument of repression used by imperialism and Zionism to strike at our revolution and all nationalist forces in Jordan. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine also regards the Resistance's past failure to specifically condemn this regime, the vagueness of its attitudes, the obscurity of its slogans and its lack of seriousness in confronting this regime at the present stage—it regards the failure to condemn specifically in a clear and unambiguous manner, and the failure to participate in serious confrontation to repel it, as the source of the crisis which has beset the Resistance since the events of September.

Our confrontation of this subservient reactionary regime must be based on struggle to establish a democratic national regime in Jordan which will abide by a democratic nationalist program and advance on the basis of serving the masses and their interests by continuing and escalating the revolution against the Zionist enemy in our occupied territory, on the unity of the Jordanian-Palestinian people and their forces, and on combating particularist trends that try to weaken the unity of this people, which unity has ever been affirmed by events, by the shedding of their blood and the death of their martyrs.

The meeting of the National Council must be an occasion for all sections of the Resistance in general and the leftist sections in particular to recognize that they made a fundamental

mistake when they presented themselves at the political and organizational levels as the revolution of the Palestinian people only, and not the revolution of the whole Arab people against the Zionist and imperialist-reactionary presence in our Arab homeland.

The Resistance movement should have addressed itself to the masses of the Palestinian people and made every effort to mobilize our Palestinian and Jordanian masses as being a single people living in a single society, confronting a single danger and having a single cause.

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**Press Statement Issued on the Occasion of the Meeting of the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Called To Discuss Proposals for the Unification of the Forces of the Palestine Revolution<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, February 27, 1971**

This morning the Central Committee continued its discussion of the proposal submitted by Abu Ammar, study of which commenced at yesterday's meeting which was chaired by Abu Ammar after his return from Damascus. Ibrahim Bakr stated that those attending the meeting were still discussing the proposal for the unity of the forces of the Palestine revolution, the most important points in which are the following:

1. The Palestine Liberation Organization is the framework which comprises all the forces of the Palestine revolution for armed revolution to liberate all Palestinian territory. This Organization has a Charter which governs its procedure, determines its aims and organizes its activity; it also has a National Council and a command chosen by the National Council which is the Organization's highest executive authority and, as stipulated by the National Charter, this command lays

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.O. press statement, *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 28, 1971.

down general and unified guidelines for Palestinian action in all fields.

2. All the commando organizations, combatant forces and independent national bodies, federations and personalities subscribe to national unity and adhere fully to the Palestine National Charter and the decisions of the National Council.

3. The highest level of unification, which is advocated and sought, is the amalgamation of the organizations, but each organization has the right to maintain its internal organization on condition that all its other institutions are dissolved and merged with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

4. The Palestine National Council shall draw up a political, military, information and financial strategy that shall be binding on all.

5. A command shall be formed to assume responsibility for Palestinian struggle in all its aspects and in all fields.

6. Adherence to the decisions of the command shall be a fundamental condition for unity of advance.

#### *The Structure of the Organizational Framework*

The Palestine Liberation Organization shall have the following organizational framework:

1. A National Council; 2. A Central Committee; 3. A Political Bureau; 4. Organizations, Institutions and Departments; 5. A Military Staff for the Revolution; 6. The Palestine [National] Fund.

#### 1. The National Council

- a. The National Council shall consist of about 150 members.
- b. The National Council shall meet once a year except when otherwise required.
- c. Members of the Council shall be chosen on the basis of revolutionary, struggle and national qualifications, in full conformity with the Palestine National Charter.
- d. Palestinian labor and trade unions shall be represented.
- e. Representation shall be insofar as possible on a geographical basis.

f. The term of this Council shall be three years as from its first meeting.

g. A special committee shall be responsible for choosing the members of the new Council, which shall meet not later than June 1, 1971.

#### 2. The Central Committee or the Supreme Council

- a. Shall assume the functions of the National Council between its sessions;
- b. Shall be composed of 21 members elected by the National Council from among its members;
- c. Shall meet once every three months or when called on to do so by the Political Bureau;
- d. Shall, during its meetings, supervise the implementation of the decisions of the National Council, supervise the implementation of the political and organizational program and discuss matters submitted to it within the framework of the Charter and the decisions of the National Council;
- e. Shall be chaired by the Head of the Political Bureau;
- f. Shall choose one of its members as permanent rapporteur of its activities.

#### 3. The Political Bureau

- a. Shall consist of nine members, including the president, chosen by the National Council;
- b. Shall be collectively in charge of day-to-day Palestinian activity;
- c. Shall meet every week and whenever necessary;
- d. Shall be the highest executive authority of the revolution.

#### 4. The Military Staff of the Revolution

- a. The Staff of the Revolution shall consist of:
  - (1) The regular forces,
  - (2) The commando forces,
  - (3) The popular militia forces.
- b. Its tasks shall be:
  - (1) To command military action in the interior and on the frontiers,
  - (2) To draw up the necessary mili-

tary plans for the forces of the revolution,

- (3) To step up and protect military action within the framework of the program and the plan,
  - (4) To reorganize the forces of the revolution on a basis of unified organization, training, arming and operations,
  - (5) To develop the combatant forces,
  - (6) To draft a unified budget to be approved by the National Council,
  - (7) To appoint the General Staff of the forces of the revolution,
  - (8) To issue military communiqués.
- c. These forces shall have a commander-in-chief and a chief-of-staff appointed by the Political Bureau.
5. The National Fund
- The National Fund shall be the fund of the Palestinian people and the Palestine revolution to ensure the unification of the finances, revenues and expenditures of the revolution, on condition that the present financial system be changed.
6. Organizations, Institutions and Departments
- The Political Bureau shall establish the following for the performance of its duties and the achievement of its aims:
- a. The political and information departments,
  - b. The administrative secretariat,
  - c. The military departments,
  - d. The organization and mobilization department,
  - e. A welfare department for the families of killed, wounded and prisoners of war,
  - f. The regional committees for the regulation of the powers of all the organizations in special schedules to be approved by the Political Bureau.

The Central Committee will resume its meetings this evening to complete discussion of the proposal so that it may be submitted to the Palestine National Council when it meets today, Sunday.

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# **Memorandum Recommending the Formation of a New Palestine National Council Submitted to the Council's Eighth Session by the High Command of the Palestine Liberation Army<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, February 27, 1971**

To the Honorable President and Members of the Palestine National Council,  
Greetings:

Article 31 of the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization stipulates that the National Council shall be elected for two years, and that, if it is not possible to hold elections to the Council that is to follow it, it shall meet and either decide to prolong its existence for a further term or to form a new Council in such manner as it shall determine.

Inasmuch as the term of the presently existing Interim Council, as determined in the Interim Regulations, Chapter Five, Article 31 of the Constitution, has expired, and it has not been possible, nor is it now possible to hold elections to choose members of the Council to follow, and inasmuch as the Palestinian advance is passing through a leadership crisis, the High Command of the Palestine Liberation Army submits this memorandum proposing the formation of a new National Council from which will be appointed a new Command, for the following reasons:

1. The present Council was established on the basis of the majority of its members belonging to the organizations, in the hope that this would lead to the establishment of national unity and to the achievement of the unity of Palestinian struggle in the political, military, information and financial fields. These aims have not been achieved during the term of this Council, which means that to maintain it in power would be to maintain and perpetuate plurality and disunity.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.L.A. memo, signed by its Commander-in-Chief Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya, *Saut Filastin* (Damascus), III, 38 (March, 1971), pp. 64-66.

2. All the organizations to which the majority of the members of the present Council belong have maintained their diverse entities and their parallel institutions, which has done great harm to the Palestinian identity, prevented the Palestinian advance from achieving its tactical aims and impeded it in its struggle. Thus to maintain the present Council and the Command derived from it would be to maintain the entities of the various organizations rather than a single Palestinian entity and a single Palestinian identity.

3. This Council has not succeeded, through the Command derived from it, in putting an end to the contradictions among the national forces, contrary to the provisions of Article 8 of the Palestine National Charter, which states that the stage through which the Palestinian people are now passing is the stage of national struggle for the liberation of Palestine, so that the contradictions among the national forces are only secondary conflicts which must be stopped in the interests of the basic conflict, which is between Zionism and colonialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. These conflicts have continued in spite of the dangers that threaten the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian Arab people. Thus to maintain the present Council and the Command derived from it would mean that these conflicts would continue and deepen.

4. The present Council has not succeeded, through the Command derived from it, in effectively playing its role of mobilizing and organizing all the capacities of people and all the knowledge of the Palestinians, or in achieving cohesion in national struggle among the various categories of the people, and between these and the Arab masses, in conformity with Article 10 of the Palestine National Charter. Many people have come to regard the present Council as an assembly of various organizations rather than a Council representing all categories of the Palestinian people, and the Command derived from it has remained more effectively a command of these organizations rather than of the Palestinian people. Thus to maintain the present Council and the Command derived from it

would be to prevent the mobilization of all resources and capacities, contrary to the requirements of the battle of destiny.

5. This Council should have given rise to a collective command, in conformity with Article 15 of the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which stipulates that the command of the Organization should be a collective command whose members have joint and individual responsibility. But in most of its activities the Command derived from this Council has been an individual command, and this has given rise to many negative factors which have beset the Palestinian advance. Thus for this Council, along with the Command derived from it, to continue would mean that individual command continued.

6. This Council has, at its successive sessions, taken a number of fundamental decisions, the most important of which are those calling for the unification of Palestinian struggle in all fields and those which require the adoption of a scientific attitude towards the national struggle and call for the drawing up of a comprehensive plan for Palestinian liberation action in all its aspects and fields—military, political, economic, psychological and information—at the strategic level.

But the Command derived from this Council has not followed this path or pursued the course designated by the National Council, and the groups to which the majority of the members of this Council belong have not fulfilled their obligation to implement its decisions. This means that for the Council to continue would mean continued failure to implement its decisions and to follow the course stipulated by these decisions.

7. During the time this Council has been in power, and under the auspices of the Command derived from it, the trials and crises that have beset the Palestinian advance, the most outstanding of which were the bloody events that took place in Jordan in September 1970, and the events that preceded and followed them, have laid grave responsibilities on the shoulders of this Council and the Command derived from it, and for these responsibilities to be appreciated it is essential that the term of office of this Council

should not be prolonged, and that steps should be taken towards the formation of a new Council.

8. The events that took place in Jordan should have led to a fundamental change in the formulae, methods and patterns with which, from time to time, the Command derived from this Council has so persistently confronted the masses under one name or another. But in spite of the events in Jordan, this Command has continued to employ the same formulae, methods and patterns. Thus for this Council, with the Command derived from it, to continue, would mean the continued employment of these formulae, methods and patterns, which have not proved either suitable or valuable.

9. Article 28 of the Palestine National Charter states that the Palestinian Arab people affirm the authenticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all kinds of intervention, tutelage and subservience. But neither this Council nor the Command derived from it has succeeded in conforming to the spirit of this provision because they have not conformed with the requirements of this Article. Thus for this Council and the Command derived from it to continue would mean continued failure to act in harmony with this Article.

10. This Council has been confronted with situations and occasions to which it has not paid sufficient attention nor made the required response. Thus the continuation of this Council and the Command derived from it would mean continued failure to respond to advice or sympathy.

11. The Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization states that the Organization's Executive Committee is the highest executive authority, that it shall be in permanent session, and that its members shall not undertake any other activities. But the Executive Committee derived from this Council has shirked its responsibilities, and ceased to meet, and its members have not devoted themselves exclusively to its activities, which means that it is non-existent and that the measures related to the Palestinian advance are unconstitutional. This calls for the

establishment of a new National Council from which a new Command can be derived, which will be in permanent session, whose members will devote themselves exclusively to its activities, and which will fully meet its responsibilities.

12. The Central Committee of the Organization has established itself as a substitute for the Executive Committee, contrary both to the Constitution and to the decisions of the National Council determining the powers of the Central Committee. This has led to duplication of command, ambiguity as regards responsibilities and infringement of regulations and decisions, and therefore requires the formation of a new National Council, from which a new Command will be derived, to put an end to the present situation.

In view of these reasons and considerations, the High Command of the Palestine Liberation Army is of the opinion that the public interest requires that the term of office of the present National Council be regarded as having expired, in conformity with Article 31 of the Constitution.

It also deems it necessary that the new National Council should be formed on the following bases:

1. The majority of the members of the new National Council shall not be members of the organizations, while the principal organizations shall enjoy restricted proportional representation.

2. The members of the new National Council shall include a group of men of all sorts of qualifications and coming from all sectors of the Palestinian people and all places where Palestinians reside or are concentrated.

3. Organizations represented in the new National Council shall be assumed to agree in advance to:

- a. Adhere to the Palestine National Charter and implement the decisions taken by the Palestine National Council at its successive sessions, and accept that any organization infringing the National Charter or failing to implement the decisions of the National

Council be regarded as infringing national unity;

b. The unification of Palestinian struggle at the political, military, financial, information and organizational levels through the Palestine Liberation Organization;

c. The dissolution of the commands of the military formations of the organizations and their being placed under the control of the single military command;

d. The transfer of the organizations' funds to the Palestine National Fund as soon as they have met the financial obligations they have already incurred;

e. Adherence to the principle of collective Palestinian command, as represented by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and as stipulated in the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

4. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization shall be constituted so that most of its members, who should be Palestinians qualified in all fields, do not belong to organizations and the major Palestinian organizations should enjoy limited representation on the Committee.

5. A Preparatory Committee whose members do not belong to the organizations shall nominate the members of the new National Council.

The High Command submits this memorandum to the President and Members of the Palestine National Council with full appreciation of the historic responsibility at this stage, from its concern for the public interest and with the object of warding off the dangers that threaten the cause and the people and it believes that its proposals are an expression of the popular will and of a national demand on the part of the Palestinian and Arab peoples.

Respectful greetings.

BRIGADIER ABD AL-RAZZAQ AL-YAHYA  
Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine  
Liberation Army

**Statements Explaining Egypt's Participation in Diplomatic Activity Aimed at a Middle East Settlement, Included in a Speech by U.A.R. President Sadat to the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, February 28, 1971**

Brothers:

I want to define to you certain matters of principle, and to ask you to excuse me for not speaking in detail about certain problems. This is because we think that, by continuous and strenuous political efforts, we have succeeded in putting our enemy on the defensive for the first time in a long period. This started with Gamal Abdel Nasser's bold and courageous acceptance of the 1967 Security Council resolution and, later, of the so-called Rogers initiative. Gamal Abdel Nasser believed that the enemy wanted territory for expansion and, in his role as leader and with his historical responsibility, he undertook largescale political activity, the sole object of which was that the enemy should reveal himself in his true colors, and that he himself might reach the whole world so as to tell it frankly of the enemy's expansionist ambitions. Gamal Abdel Nasser thought that political activity at this stage would enable him to achieve much, very much indeed, if he succeeded in pressing the enemy so hard that he was obliged to declare his true intentions. We carried on with this task, and are still doing so, since the death of our immortal leader.

The whole world was pleased with the 1967 Security Council resolution but, as the President of this assembly has said, you have every right to reject it. We have known from the start that Israel does not regard this resolution as realizing the most important objective of its aggression—territorial expansion.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech at the opening of the P.N.C.'s eighth session, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 1, 1971.

We have placed only two restrictions on our political activity. They are:

First: Withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967;

Second: Insistence on the rights of the people of Palestine as determined by United Nations resolutions. The 1967 Security Council resolution refers to a just solution of the problem of the refugees, but the only basis for a just solution lies in all the relevant United Nations resolutions adopted since 1947.

Apart from this, we have given ourselves freedom of action, in keeping with revolutionary strategy and not merely out of revolutionary fervor. Our basic aim has been that Israel should reach the point where it discloses its real intentions and unmask its ugly ambitions. We have always known that our war with the enemy has to be fought on many different fronts and with all kinds of weapons. We have always rejected any attempt to restrict our activity to one front or our weapons to one kind only. If armed struggle proves to be the one course open to us, we want to be in the most favorable political situation to follow that course with the greatest possible degree of competence and reliability. We have always believed that the political framework in which we bear arms is no less important than the arms themselves or the skill with which we use them. Thus the liberation of the territory was the point we chose on which to make a decisive stand. It was therefore necessary that the enemy should reach the point where he disclosed his ambitions as regards our territory, and that the world should reach the point where it was fully convinced that we had no alternative to fighting in the situation that confronted us, because our people cannot relinquish their territory. We do not want to conciliate anyone, brothers; we do not want anyone to conciliate us; all we want is that all attitudes should be perfectly clear.

We do not, brothers, want to impose tutelage on anyone, but at the same time we do not accept anyone else's tutelage over us. What we want is joint action based on an agreed strategy and open to political action on the basis of absolute confidence. Either

we have confidence in each other or we do not.

Brothers:

I want to define to you certain matters of principle as regards our attitudes.

1. The United Arab Republic accepts and is faithful to all its obligations to the Arab struggle; in so doing it is acting in accordance with the logic and the exigencies of its national and international commitments, because the United Arab Republic is both a revolution and a state.

2. The United Arab Republic has fought and rebuilt its army for fighting and it will fight in defense of the territory and of justice.

3. The United Arab Republic can only provide the true framework for its legitimate and necessary fight in an atmosphere of world sympathy and international understanding which will make its fight a human cause. We therefore want to make our struggle a cause that concerns the whole world, and this can only be achieved by far-reaching efforts. Others may think that they have only to give orders to the world and it will obey, or that they can impose their will on the world and it will accept. But in all honesty we are not like them. Therefore our aim at this stage, the aim we hope to achieve through our political action, is the following:

A. To bind our friends to us more closely;

B. To neutralize our opponents;

C. To incapacitate our enemy.

4. In this context we believe that the conscientious Arab attitude towards our current problems must not be exhausted by simply being expressed, but that it must influence and interact with the actual situation.

Liberation will not be achieved by emotional outbursts or by the mere desire for liberation. It will be achieved by rebutting the enemy's arguments and by circumventing his policy. This is the atmosphere in which liberation can achieve its task.

We do not agree that people should be judged by their words; we want deeds to be

the basis of all judgements. We accept nothing else in the case of our comrades in the struggle, and we accept it from these comrades if they apply this criterion to us.

5. I want you to understand clearly that there is no such thing as an Egyptian solution or a Palestinian solution or a Syrian solution or a Jordanian solution. There is only one solution, and that is the Arab solution.

For our part, we have rejected the Egyptian solution, which has been offered to us many times. This is because we believe that there can be no partial solution to an aggression that befell the whole of our nation, and was not directed against one region only.

6. It is possible that there may be a variety of strategies in our confrontation of the enemy, but we believe that it is essential and inevitable that all these various strategies should derive from a single master strategy which will ensure the achievement of the Arab will.

It is essential that the revolutionary Arab mind should determine the stages necessary for continuous achievement and for the linking of the various strategies with the one Arab master strategy, and this is the challenge that now confronts us.

7. We reject the narrow view which sees the Palestine revolution as no more than a reaction to 1967.

In our view, the Palestine revolution—and this is its value and its proper role—is part of a comprehensive movement of Arab political, social and cultural awakening, and this is of course the origin of the special link between the Egyptian revolution and the Palestine revolution; it is a link that derives from their common Arab origin and their awareness of a common destiny.

Brothers:

Your presence here in Cairo will provide us with opportunities for further meetings which I am confident will be advantageous and beneficial for joint strategic planning and the practical implementation of that strategy in all its various aspects and with all the different weapons that will be employed.

We are facing a war that is dangerous and

complicated because it involves ferocious aggressive ambitions inspired by Zionist tendencies. It is also extremely complex because of the nature of the relations between Zionism and imperialism. For both these reasons its confrontation requires of all of us profound analysis and precise planning, for our way is long and we shall always be comrades as we advance along it to victory and what lies beyond victory, God willing. God grant you success, and peace and God's mercy be upon you.

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### **Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Najjar (Abu Yusif), Commenting on the Results of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, Early March, 1971**

At its meeting in Damascus, the Central Committee commissioned brother Abu Ammar to devise a formula for the unity of the different sections of the Resistance movement, and he submitted a proposal for unity which was presented to the Central Committee at the meeting it held in Cairo shortly before the meeting of the National Council. It was observed that some of the organizations wanted a political program, and Fateh did in fact submit such a program to the National Council, and it was approved by both the organizations and the National Council, thereby frustrating all those attempts which Fateh regarded as being nothing more nor less than a pretext to ensure that no formula for unity should be reached.

On the strength of the project for unity submitted to the National Council, approval in principle was also obtained for the provisions of the statement on unity. However, the situation of the National Council and that in which certain Palestinian organizations

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Najjar's exclusive interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 7, 1971.



have been living since the events of September, with a group of both members of the Council and of the organizations believing that a new appraisal should be carried out in the Palestinian theater so as to set things in their natural perspective, led those who attended the meeting to give the present Executive Committee, as a Liberation Organization command, the opportunity to perform two tasks. The first is to carry out an operation of appraisal and examination in the Palestinian theater at the political and military levels. The second task is to choose the members of the new National Council which will meet not later than June 30. When it has completed this appraisal, the Executive Committee will submit a detailed report to the new National Council so that it may assume its responsibilities for drawing up the main lines of the program for unity submitted by Abu Ammar.

During this interim period the Executive Committee and the Liberation Organization will be responsible for taking immediate measures for the implementation of what was agreed on as regards the unification of the military forces, and submitting the detailed program for the operation of financial and informational unification, together with the unification of all the institutions of Palestinian action.

Fateh, which bears the main responsibility in the Palestinian theater, at both the military and organizational levels, is of the opinion that the interim period before the new National Council meets is a most important and dangerous one; so, it will make all its resources available to ensure the implementation of all the decisions of the National Council that it has been agreed to abide by.

We believe that agreement on the political program was an important step along the road to unity, because the picture has been made clear to all who are operating in the Palestinian theater. Also, to keep the political command unchanged means, from Fateh's point of view, that it is still resolutely following the right course towards the achievement of unity at all levels in the Palestinian theater. However if, during the interim period, it should happen that factors beyond its control obstruct

the operation of unification, we shall adopt a frank and unambiguous attitude which we shall announce to the Palestinian masses and the new Palestine Council.

Therefore, until the new National Council meets, we believe that all the decisions taken can be regarded as being in the interests of the Palestine Resistance, if they are adhered to. It is our belief that the failure of any organization to adhere to the decisions and to apply itself immediately to the implementation of the military unity that has been decided on will inevitably determine the attitude of the masses and the new National Council towards any party which fails to adhere.

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### **Statement by Assistant Secretary-General al-Aisami of the Baath Party (Iraq), Criticizing the U.A.R. and Jordan for Expressions of Willingness To Negotiate with Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, March 3, 1971**

The statements by President Anwar Sadat and later by King Hussein and his Foreign Minister on the agreement by the United Arab Republic and Jordan to hold a peace conference with Israel and to end the Palestine problem by peace negotiations have confirmed what the Party has said many times in the past, to the effect that the elimination of the consequences of aggression after the June defeat cannot be achieved by negotiations, but only by armed struggle involving many sacrifices.

This readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Rogers Plan has provided indisputable evidence that the acceptance of this plan, and the above-mentioned statements that followed it, was not merely a tactical move intended to embarrass Israel and to expose its evil intentions to the world, but was intended to pave the way for withdrawal and surrender and to perpetuate the situation

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of al-Aisami's statement, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), March 4, 1971.

of military defeat, the aim of which is to force the Arabs to recognize the Zionist entity.

It is most regrettable that these recent statements should have ignored the slogan "No negotiation, no recognition, no peace with Israel and no independent action as regards the Palestinian cause," thereby confronting the Arabs with a worse fate than that which befell them in 1948.

In the critical circumstances that confront our nation in the present stage, we urge all struggling Arab forces to appreciate the gravity of the present situation and to take action to establish a front for endurance and for the rejection of surrender proposals of all kinds and degrees. This is because the danger constituted by Israel and Zionism, and world imperialism that supports it, cannot be confronted by a single Arab country or a single popular force, but only by action based on a front in all Arab countries and at the level of the whole of the Arab homeland.

We are confident that the gallant Arab armies and the struggling masses everywhere will not accept recognition of Israel, and if these masses are at present misled, frightened and helpless, we are sure that they will not surrender to the schemes of the conspiracy that is being planned by Zionism and imperialism against the Arab nation, but will follow the course of sacrifice and armed struggle, because this is the only course that leads to victory and the recovery of usurped Arab rights.

## 288

### **Political Program for the Conduct of the Palestine Revolution Adopted by the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, March 4, 1971**

Ever since, at the beginning of 1965, the

vanguards of our struggling people sparked off the armed revolution against the Zionist political entity established in the land of Palestine by force of arms, these vanguards, along with and supported by the vast Arab masses and all free men in the world, have confirmed that armed struggle is the one and inevitable way to full liberation of the soil of Palestine.

Today the revolution is passing through an extremely critical and dangerous stage of its struggle, confronted as it is with a ferocious operation of liquidation comprising both what happened in Jordan in September and the operations of annihilation and maltreatment that are being carried out in the occupied homeland itself.

This ferocious conspiracy is this time directed against the Palestine revolution and the nationalist movement in Jordan; it is also aimed at the liquidation of the revolutionary spirit and the whole of the Palestinian national cause. The forces of world imperialism and world Zionism, side by side with the Zionist occupying state and the anti-revolutionary forces in the Arab homeland, have all agreed that the time has come to embark on this ferocious attack aimed at liquidation so as to guard against the danger of the Palestine revolution escalating and spreading to cover the whole of the Arab homeland, sweeping before it all the enemy's interests, which would inevitably also lead to the destruction of their common interests in this part of the world.

Furthermore, the explosion of the situation in Indochina and the continuous advance of the revolution in Laos and Cambodia, not to mention the increasing victories of the Vietnamese revolution, have led American circles to seek all possible means to calm down the area by consolidating the military victory won by the enemy in the fighting of 1967.

Thus the Palestine revolution is no longer confronted with oppression, misrepresentation and deception on the front with imperialism and Zionism only; the same challenges have started to confront it on the whole of the anti-revolutionary front in the Arab homeland: those forces which have taken it upon themselves to smash the Palestine revolution

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.N.C. program, *Fateh* (n.p.), March 30, 1971.

from within by exhausting its strength in nonessential and internal conflicts.

Faced with this new and dangerous situation, all sections and forces of the Palestine revolution have agreed to announce their political program for the present stage, with the intention that it shall provide clear answers to all the questions posed at the present stage and constitute a guide to action for the escalation of the revolution and the increasing of its organized forces, and for the polarization of more extensive sectors of the Palestinian and Arab masses through the victorious advance of their revolution. This political program is as follows:

#### *At the Palestinian Level*

1. The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the masses of the Palestinian Arab people, in all their combat and political organizations and all their bodies, federations and societies, whatever their trends and ideas, on condition that they adhere fully to the principles of the Palestine National Charter, the decisions of the legislative and executive organs of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Organization's political and military program and internal regulations, and that they also commit themselves to struggle on behalf of the total liberation of the soil of Palestine and the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland.

It is absolutely impermissible to disqualify an individual or group for membership of the Organization except in cases of prejudice to the revolution or infringement of the principles of the National Charter, when the decision to disqualify shall be taken by the Central Committee of the Organization or by the National Council should it be in session.

2. While affirming that the fundamental and central aim of the Palestine revolution is the total liberation of the occupied Palestinian homeland, the aim at the present stage is to protect the revolution from its enemies, to escalate it and ensure that it advances along the road to the realization of its fundamental aim, by the revolutionary political, military and moral mobilization of the Palestinian masses, and by all of them taking part in the battle of liberation, by escalating the armed

struggle against the enemy and unifying all the forces of the Palestinian masses both inside and outside the occupied homeland to this end.

#### *The Nature of the Palestine Revolution*

1. The Palestine revolution is a national liberation movement. It therefore conforms, in its strategy and tactics, with all national liberation movements, the socialist countries and the revolutionary and democratic forces in the world, inasmuch as these constitute the movement of all the masses that are struggling against foreign occupation, that believe in the inevitability of liberation, and are prepared to join the struggle to achieve it. This means that all classes and national groups of the Palestinian people, and all their organizations and associations whatever their ideas and principles, must unite in a single cohesive rank in their armed national revolution.

2. The Palestine revolution represents the movement of progress in Palestinian Arab society for the following reasons:

a. Because it is combating a racist settler occupation which is part of the forces of injustice in the world that oppose the course of history;

b. Because it is combating world imperialism led by the United States of America, the protector of Zionist occupation, which is destroying the rights and aspirations of our people;

c. Because it aims to build a Palestinian Arab society governed by the principles of democracy, peace, justice, freedom and equality in which all principles and religions are respected and all rights and freedoms protected, and in which feudal domination, backward social relations and racial or religious discrimination are utterly rejected.

#### *Forms of Struggle*

The armed struggle sparked off by the revolutionary vanguards of the Palestinian people at the beginning of 1965 (guerrilla warfare escalating into a comprehensive war of liberation) is the principal form of struggle for the liberation of Palestine, and the conjunction of regular forces side by side with commando forces in the armed struggle

is the most powerful form of struggle for the achievement of the people's victorious revolution. In addition, all other forms of struggle must run firmly and directly parallel with the line of armed struggle.

### *The Only Solution to the Palestine Problem*

The only solution to the Palestine problem is the total liberation of the soil of Palestine by armed struggle. Therefore the liquidation solution or any other solution liable to prejudice the natural and historical rights of the Palestinian people to the whole of their homeland, is essentially an imposed solution. The Palestine revolution therefore declares its strict adherence, as a matter of principle, to the following:

a. Struggle without quarter against all attempts, efforts, conspiracies and forces aimed at halting the advance of the revolution, impeding it or diverting it from its course, as also against all projects for liquidation under whatever form they may be advanced. This makes it essential to develop the Palestine revolution and increase its effectiveness in all fields;

b. Resolute opposition to those who advocate the establishment of a Palestinian statelet in part of the territory of Palestine, inasmuch as efforts to establish such a state lie within the framework of the liquidation of the Palestine problem;

c. The taking of all resolute measures necessary to protect the advance of the Palestine revolution and Palestinian national existence, in the closest cooperation with the Jordanian nationalist movement and the Arab nationalist movement.

### *The Democratic Palestinian State*

Palestinian armed struggle is not a racist or sectarian struggle against the Jews. Therefore the state of the future in a Palestine liberated from Zionist imperialism is the democratic Palestinian state, in which all who wish to do so can live in peace with the same rights and obligations and within the framework of the aspirations of the Arab nation to national liberation and full unity [with] emphasis on the unity of the people of both Banks of Jordan.

### *Action at the Level of Jordan*

Jordan is linked to Palestine by a national relationship and a national unity forged by history and culture from the earliest times. The creation of one political entity in Transjordan and another in Palestine would have no basis either in legality or as to the elements universally accepted as fundamental to a political entity. It would be a continuation of the operation of fragmentation by which colonialism shattered the unity of our Arab nation and the unity of our Arab homeland after the First World War.

But this fragmentation has not prevented the masses, either west or east of the River Jordan, from feeling that they are one people, or from remaining united against the conspiracy of imperialism and Zionism.

In raising the slogan of the liberation of Palestine and presenting the problem of the Palestine revolution, it was not the intention of the Palestine revolution to separate the East of the River from the West, nor did it believe that the struggle of the Palestinian people can be separated from the struggle of the masses in Jordan. It acted in conformity with the exigencies of a specific historical stage, with the object of concentrating on the direction of all forces towards Palestine so as to give prominence to our cause at Palestinian, Arab and international levels.

Our concern for the unity of the Palestinian-Jordanian masses, and our knowledge of the role that they can play in escalating the battle of liberation, confirms our belief in the following:

a. That the unity of Palestine and the East Bank of the Jordan is a national duty which it is our duty to protect and strengthen; it is also our duty to combat all attempts to weaken and disrupt it.

b. This regional unity must be embodied in unity of struggle, taking the form of a Jordanian national front, one of whose basic tasks will be to establish a nationalist regime in Jordan which will participate in the liberation of Palestine and support the Palestinian fighting forces with all its resources. This, in turn, is part of the struggle of the Arab nation for its liberation and unity.

### *At the Level of the Arab Nation*

Palestine is an integral part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

The Palestine revolution is part of the Arab revolutionary movement; it is its revolutionary vanguard at this historical stage.

Therefore one of the fundamental tasks of the Arab revolutionary movement is to ensure that the masses play their part in fighting and protecting the revolution. Consequently, out of respect for national duty, the masses should work indefatigably to make the Palestine revolution a tangible everyday fact by adopting the following attitudes and taking the following measures. They must:

- a. Make every effort to frustrate all projects involving liquidation and surrender;
- b. Protect the Palestine revolution from the conspiracies of hostile forces, and from all their attempts to restrict or provoke the revolution;
- c. Provide all that is necessary for the struggle, specifically material and moral as well as political support;
- d. Play an effective part in the Palestine revolution;
- e. Make every effort to build a strong Arab front to support the Palestine revolution and the joint Arab struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the counter-revolutionary forces in the Arab homeland.

It must be clear that our relations with the Arab masses are of fundamental importance even if this means breaking with the regimes and fighting nonessential battles with them.

### *At World Level*

World imperialism, world Zionism and Zionist colonialism are among the real enemies of our people and, inasmuch as they are spreading like an octopus in many areas of the world and making use of many and varied forces against us, we must expand the field of our alliances and our action to cover the whole world.

This requires that we establish the closest possible relations with all forces struggling against imperialism, colonialism, oppression, racism and exploitation, and mobilize on our side all forces of justice, liberation and peace in the world.

### 289

### **Press Statement Commenting on the Ineffectiveness of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council, Made by Political Bureau Secretary-General Hawatma of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, March 6, 1971**

Even before the current session of the Council met, it was clear to the [Popular Democratic] Front that it would have nothing new to offer because the Resistance and the Palestinian national movement as a whole had not succeeded in absorbing the basic lessons taught by the experience of the last three years and, in particular, the experience of Black September. We had observed that most sections of the Resistance had published nothing in the way of a comprehensive critical examination of their situations, or their policies, with the exception of a first attempt by the Democratic Front, which published a critical report on its conduct and that of the other sections of the Resistance entitled "The September Campaign: Lessons and Consequences." All other attempts were made by individuals, and were not binding on their organizations.

It is clear from everything that has been made public since September [1970] that most sections of the Resistance, and in particular its right wing, have not learned any of the lessons taught by September, the most important of which are the following:

First: for the thousandth time the reactionary regime in Jordan has proved that it is determined to give priority to the secondary conflict—that with the Resistance and the nationalist movement—over the primary conflict—that with the Zionist enemy. In this way the reactionary regime has overthrown all the objective conditions of the view held by sections of the Resistance that the primary conflict must be given priority over the secondary conflict. It has become clear that

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Hawatma's statements made in an exclusive interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 7, 1971.

continuing and developing the armed struggle, and preventing the people of Palestine from taking part in any political settlement at the expense of their historic cause, depends on struggle to resolve the conflict with reaction in Amman and to establish a nationalist regime, friendly to the Resistance, which will enable it to aim all its rifles at the Zionist enemy.

The second lesson is that a vertical division has taken place in the body of Jordanian-Palestinian society, so that it is no longer a question of all the nationalist classes and forces being united in opposition to the reactionary class forces united with colonialism; since September it has been a question of a Jordanian society in opposition to Palestinian society and the army in opposition to the Resistance.

It is true that it was reaction that first promoted this vertical division so as to create a wide popular and class base that it could rely on in a battle against the Resistance and the will of the people of Palestine to continue the struggle and reject settlements at their expense. But the particularist tendency of the Resistance, which the right wing of the Resistance has persistently promoted by emphasizing the Palestinian aspect of the Palestine problem and failing to understand and apply the law of the mutual links between armed struggle and its development on the one hand, and what is going on in Amman on the other, have also made an effective contribution to this vertical division.

The third lesson is that the character of Arab relations with the Resistance, which its right wing has conducted through the Arab regimes, instead of establishing relations with the popular forces of the national liberation movement, has, to a great extent, made the Resistance the prisoner of Arab conflicts and the system of Arab official relations. This in turn has automatically led to the tightening of the stranglehold on the day-by-day political and struggle activity of the Resistance with respect to the necessity to take the initiative in resolving the conflict with the ruling regime in Amman.

The fourth lesson: as a consequence of this the Resistance movement has had to maintain

a position of self-defense against both the attacks of reaction and the schemes of imperialism. The result has been that it has been incapable of paralyzing the attacks of reaction in Amman and that all its attitudes, as regards policy, the masses and armed activity, have been adopted on the principle of being content to repel the attacks of reaction without taking the initiative in defensive policy so as to put an end once and for all to the attacks of the official authorities and to resolve the conflict with them.

The above leads us to the following conclusions:

The tasks at present required of the Resistance and the nationalist movement are that they should understand these fundamental lessons so as to be able to accomplish two things which are at once nationalist and revolutionary in the present situation.

The first is to maintain the basic forces of the Resistance and the nationalist movement and to ensure that they are not liquidated, either through disorganized political and military retreat or through armed adventurism. The latter would be nothing less than suicide, in view of the radical change which has taken place since September in the balance of power in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater. This change did not come about as a result of the upsetting of the military balance of power between the Resistance and the forces of the authorities, for this balance has been tilted in favor of the authorities for the last three years by virtue of the superiority in numbers and technical equipment of their forces. The real imbalance is the result of the vertical division that has taken place in the body of Jordanian-Palestinian society, giving the reactionary authorities, for the first time in their contemporary history, a Transjordanian popular base from which to fight the revolution.

The second is to maintain the people of Palestine in a nationalist attitude so that they will refuse to take part in any of the current political settlements which are urging them to relinquish their historical and natural right to the whole of the territory of Palestine in return for a political entity embodied in a Palestinian statelet in the West Bank and the

Gaza Strip as an integral part of a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine problem. Here it can rightly be said that there is no exclusively Palestinian solution of the problem, but only a single Arab solution.

So that it may be possible to perform these two tasks, it is necessary to deduce the immediate present consequences of the lessons taught by September. These may be summed up as follows:

1. To maintain the forces of the Resistance and to prevent the people of Palestine from taking part in the current settlement, it is necessary to create a Jordanian-Palestinian national front in opposition to the Jordanian-Palestinian front represented by the ruling authorities. One of the items on the list of this front's agenda must be to cope with the vertical division in the body of society by submitting a program of democratic national liberation covering the national and democratic problems both of the people of the East Bank and of the Palestine revolution. In this field what the people of the East Bank seek is the national and democratic interest (the socialist treatment of the problems of the peasants and the nationalist classes in the towns).

2. To provide the people of Palestine with a national alternative, there must be a struggle to establish a nationalist regime in the East Bank which will enable the Resistance and the people to direct all their rifles and all other forms of struggle against the Zionist enemy, instead of sectors of our people taking refuge in the Palestinian state so as to escape from the attacks of reaction and the torments and daily sufferings it inflicts on the people, which are pushing them towards the Palestinian state.

3. To rectify relations with the Arab world, there must be cooperation with the Arab masses for joint struggle to maintain the Resistance and democratic national liberation in the East Bank and the conflict against imperialism and the local reaction linked with it in the Arab area.

It was clear, both from the public statements of the sections of the Resistance and from the discussions of the Central Committee, that

most sections of the Resistance, and in particular its right wing, have not absorbed any of these lessons, but still persist in maintaining the same attitudes they held before September. Because of this there are indications that a "Palestinian June" is about to arise above the horizon now that the subjective inability in the ranks of the commands of the Resistance to understand the present stage and its tasks has been disclosed.

It was against this background that the Resistance came to the Palestine National Council—in an atmosphere of advance towards national unity (in the sense of all the organizations being merged in a single organization)—as if this was the magical solution for both the subjective and objective problems of the Resistance. In fact, however, it amounted to no more than a gathering together of all the contradictions in the ranks of the Resistance and the manifestations of incompetence in its various sections. The advocates of this unscientific trend have exploited the emotional state that arose in the ranks of the people after September and launched a campaign of political demagoguery—and this was the magical solution.

This is why we have thought, from the beginning of its session, that the National Council has nothing new to offer. For anything really new to come about, it must be preceded by new factors in the situation. At all its debates the Council has shown that there are in its ranks two mutually conflicting basic trends as regards the understanding of the fundamental crisis of the Resistance and the Palestine problem. There is one trend that calls for the absorption of the fundamental lessons so that the Council may produce the following new results:

- The building of the Jordanian-Palestinian front which will offer its program for the democratic national liberation of the East Bank as a remedy for the vertical division of society, and the establishment of a regime that is hostile to imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and friendly to the Resistance and the interests of the people, which lie in rejecting settlements and carrying on the armed struggle.

- The rectification of Arab relations for

the establishment of a broad Arab national front for common struggle against the common enemy: imperialism, Israel and the local Arab forces that are linked with them.

— The rectification of relations with the forces of the world liberation movement and the socialist forces within the framework of solidarity in the common struggle against world imperialism.

For this to be achieved a radical change must be brought about in the relations between the sections of the Resistance and the Jordanian national movement, on the basis of relations in the form of a front linked with a unified program for the mobilization of all forces in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater on a single line. Obviously it is not a question of whether or not the organizations are merged or not, but of a common understanding of current tasks and of the relations in the form of a front to which they give rise.

The other trend is in favor of maintaining the old situation; it employs the slogan of national unity, but without any real meaning. This trend has manifested itself in the following way. It has rejected, in practice, the joint Jordanian-Palestinian national front and insisted on maintaining the division in the body of society by insisting on the particularist character of the Palestinian struggle; it has rejected relations firmly established on the basis of a front and refused to rectify relations between the regimes and the Resistance.

The delegates of the Democratic Front stressed that those who call for national unity as a mere figure of speech, without any real meaning, do not, practically and objectively, want unity because of their insistence on maintaining the old situation.

All this leads us to say that maintaining the old situation unchanged can only mean greater paralysis in the ranks of the Resistance which, in turn, will lead to further military withdrawal in the face of the attacks of the reaction that rules in Amman and further political withdrawal in the face of Arab pressures. It also means greater enthusiasm on the part of daily expanding sectors in the ranks of our people for the Palestinian state, as part of the current settlement, in the absence

of a nationalist revolutionary alternative to the present situation.

We have also observed in the National Council a conspicuous trend not only towards continued paralysis, but also towards the shattering of the unity of struggle between sections of the Resistance in an attempt to construct an axis consisting of the independent elements, the Liberation Army and Fateh, to the exclusion of other forces. This, in turn, means starting on the course of subjecting the Resistance to current Arab policy in two stages. In the first stage, the progressive forces in the Resistance will be contained and made the particular target for blows by reaction, and in the second stage the progressive forces in Fateh and the Liberation Army will be contained, until there is only a purely formal Resistance, incapable of action and obliged to surrender to the facts of the present Arab situation. In this way there will no longer be any question of a Palestinian solution of the existing problem, but only of a single Arab solution within the framework of the Security Council resolution.

After a series of struggles both inside and outside the Council, the attempts to split the Resistance and to involve it in a battle against itself were frustrated. But the outcome was that the situation that existed before the Council met remained unchanged both as regards its political and military horizons and the relations among sections of the Resistance. In my opinion the resolutions issued were worth no more than the paper they were written on for they meant nothing at all. There are also numerous forces in the Council that do not want them to see the light, not to mention the fact that they did not deal with the current problems of the Palestine cause and the Resistance movement.

From the organizational point of view, the result of the Council's failure to change things is the perpetuation of the existing situation which has not profited by the lessons of September, and a sort of trick to deprive the resolutions adopted of any significance they might acquire under the auspices of commands that have a true view of the present situation and pay attention to the tasks of the present stage.



In my estimate the crisis through which the Resistance has been passing both before and since September will involve further political and military retreat at both Palestinian and Arab levels, to the extent that after a time we shall find ourselves confronted by a dead end after which either we shall have to surrender to the Arab consequences of the crisis, or be unable to confront. The result will be a "Palestinian June," as an extension of the Arab June, however much the Resistance employs its empty revolutionary slogans.

In my opinion the solution to the present crisis of the Resistance will not be found in the halls of the next Council, but in the establishment of a national front with a program common to all the progressive and nationalist forces in the Resistance and in the Jordanian theater of struggle, so as to perform the three outstanding tasks, which are: to maintain the subjective forces of the Resistance and to close the door to all attempts by the Palestinian people to enter into a settlement. Until this is possible there must be struggle to resolve the conflict between the Resistance and the Jordanian nationalist movement on the one hand and the ruling authorities in Jordan on the other, in the interests of a nationalist regime that will ensure the solution of the first and second problems in such a way as to ensure that the Resistance continues and develops into a people's armed revolution.

It is also my opinion that the international and Arab-Israeli political settlement is obviously on the way, and the Resistance can no longer resist it. All it can do is to keep the Palestinian people away from such settlements and maintain its armed forces to continue the historical, legitimate and long-term struggle of the people and the Resistance on the road to liberation.

## 290

**Press Statement Commenting on the Ineffectiveness of the Eighth Session of the Palestine National Council, Made by a Representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, March 6, 1971**

For us to be able to appraise the work of the National Council at its Eighth Session, we must first define the tasks it was required to perform; in the light of this definition, and in the light of what the Council actually presented we shall be able to assess the results.

The Council was required to submit to its members a study of the activities of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the period between its sessions, covering the activities of the various departments, including the department for the occupied territory and the popular or information organization, in addition to the political activities which the Executive Committee had been commissioned to, or did, carry out.

It was also required that a report by the Central Committee of the Resistance should be submitted to the Council, containing a comprehensive appraisal of its activities and an outline for the coming stage, forming a basis for a precisely timed program of action.

From the first day, when it became clear that the only report submitted by the Executive Committee was on its own activities and those of the departments it controls, and because the Central Committee also had not submitted the required appraisal, analysis and outline, any observer could see what results this Council was going to lead to.

The stage through which the Palestine problem and the Resistance are passing is an extremely dangerous one, alike at internal, Arab and international levels. It was assumed that the Council would draw up a program of action for coping with the stage through which the cause is passing, but in the event

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of statements made by the P.F.L.P. observer at the Palestine National Council, Ahmad al-Yamani, in an exclusive interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 7, 1971.

the exact opposite was the case. This was the result of the way the Council was composed and the nature of the relations among the sections of the Resistance and the forces participating in the Council.

It can be said in so many words that the only achievement was the political statement—called the Program for Political Action—which can rightly be regarded as a basis for agreement on a more or less common concept.

Apart from this the Council achieved nothing.

At previous meetings of the Central Committee, between December 5, 1970 and February 21, 1971, we submitted an outline program for political military action, a formula for relations, in the form of a common front, among the sections of the Resistance and an outline of the role to be played by the Jordanian nationalist movement through a national front capable of recruiting the different forces and mobilizing the Jordanian masses to perform their national role in the coming stage. But although the Central Committee, at its meetings December 5–8, did accept some of the proposals we made at that time, unfortunately it has done nothing to implement them. This is also the result of the nature of the relations and the difference of concepts.

In the next three months we shall continue to make the utmost efforts to convince others that it is essential to lay strong foundations for unambiguous and clearly defined relations.

## 291

### **Radio and Television Speech to the Nation Made by U.A.R. President Sadat Announcing the Government Decision Not To Commit Egypt to a Further Extension of the Middle East Ceasefire<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, March 7, 1971**

Noble strugglers in this land which we all hold sacred:

Men and women of Egypt:

Young people and children of Egypt:

I have preferred to speak to you directly today because we have reached the moment when every Egyptian must do his duty.

The Egypt that you love and for which you are ready to sacrifice yourselves is now threatened by a danger different from any that has so far confronted it throughout its history, because part of its sacred soil is now for the first time suffering the tribulation of having been seized by armed Israeli aggression. In the course of our people's struggle we have known invaders who came and went, who plundered or ruled, who seized power and collected taxes, but in spite of everything the unity of Egyptian soil remained whole and untouched, continuous and uninterrupted.

But now we are confronted by a challenge of another kind, a challenge to our territory itself, which threatens to destroy the unity of the soil of our homeland. Far from concealing his ambitions from us and from the whole world, our enemy has arrogantly and overweeningly stated them in an international document which he has submitted to the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has been entrusted with the task of ensuring the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

This resolution declares that the principle of obtaining territories by armed force is unacceptable, and that, consequently, withdrawal from all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967 is essential.

Brothers and fellow citizens, I have done everything in my power to secure peace based on justice.

During the last thirty days during which we have decided to refrain from firing, we have continued a detailed and largescale effort which started some years ago. We started it when we accepted the Security Council resolution [of November 22, 1967] and supported it by fighting in the field so that others might understand that we were prepared to accept danger and difficulty, and we resumed diplomatic activity by agreeing to the proposals submitted by the American Secretary of State, and known as the Rogers

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 8, 1971.

initiative. And we helped the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, who was entrusted with the task of securing the implementation of the Security Council resolution, to succeed by agreeing to the ceasefire. We accepted it for three months, and then extended it for another three months. But all this brought neither the Secretary-General's representative nor ourselves any nearer to a solution of the crisis, the reason being the aggressive and racist character of Zionism.

This Israeli challenge is not directed against us alone; it is directed against the whole of the international community and against the human values that should govern our world.

But there is a fundamental difference between our attitude to this challenge and the attitude of the rest of the world. The challenge directed against the world is a spiritual, moral and political challenge. But the challenge directed against us is a material and national one, a challenge to our destiny. In meeting the challenge that confronts it the world may decide to censure and condemn, even though in its concern for the future of international relations it may go further than that. But we cannot be content with censure and condemnation. We must resist and fight, we must give life so that we may have life, we must sacrifice lives so that the unity of the soil of our homeland may be protected for all time.

We have given warning of this fact, and others have thought that we were fanatical in doing so. But if we follow what has happened in the last month only, this should be enough for us and for others.

1. At the beginning of the month, on February 4, 1971, I announced that we would refrain from shooting for thirty days, to give the international community, the United Nations, the Big Four, the Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General and his representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, a further chance to exert efforts and concentrate on the problem. I made this announcement the occasion for also announcing an Egyptian initiative for partial withdrawal from Sinai in return for which we

would open the Suez Canal for international navigation. We did not regard this as a solution of the crisis, but it was a practical move towards a start on a solution and a test of intentions. But what we said and offered fell on deaf ears.

2. The representative of the United Nations Secretary-General found it appropriate, in order to properly channel and concentrate his efforts, to ask us and Israel to provide him with undertakings in conformity with the Security Council resolution and its provisions. From us he asked an undertaking to provide safeguards for peace in conformity with the Security Council resolution, and we gave him the undertaking he asked for, after we had asked him for clarifications and found his answers to our questions satisfactory.

But Israel procrastinated and in its arrogance and conceit chose not to answer him. It then sent him a memorandum replying to our memorandum to him. And—even more serious—in this memorandum it said with all possible haughtiness and arrogance that it would not return to the pre-June 4, 1967 frontiers.

3. Israel's reply, as we have all seen from subsequent events, came as a violent shock to the whole world—its governments and international institutions. All the great powers, in spite of their different attitudes to us and to Israel, regard Israel's reply to Jarring as being negative and hostile to peace rather than serving its interests. The United Nations regards Israel's reply as an attempt to destroy its efforts and its very existence. And world public opinion as a whole, as expressed in different ways in its press, is angry with and resentful of Israel and can find no excuse for Israel and no acceptable justification for its attitude.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations then sent an appeal to Israel on March 5, calling on it to respond to Ambassador Jarring's request that it should undertake to withdraw from Egyptian territory. But Israel ignored the Secretary-General's appeal because it is determined to annex the Egyptian territories and to expand at Egypt's expense, as part of the Israeli plan for expansion at the expense of the Arab countries.

Time is passing and our enemy will neither listen nor withdraw. He is possessed by the arrogance of strength, dominated by his ambition to expand, and no longer cares for principles, law or order.

Brothers:

In spite of all the efforts made by us and by others, no solution has been found for the crisis. But it is right and proper that I should point out that our efforts in the last month have not been in vain, but have had results of great value. The most important of these results is that Israel is now totally isolated from the international community and from world public opinion, and this is no small thing.

Brothers and fellow citizens:

As we face these important hours in our struggle, I want you to join me a while in considering the attitude of the friend who has helped us without hesitation, stood beside us unconditionally and made the greatest and most generous efforts to consolidate our struggle for liberation.

I do not need to tell you anything more about the attitude of the U.S.S.R. from the beginning of the crisis until today, in all fields—political, military and economic. You all know this attitude—you can see it for yourselves and know its worth and value.

The people and leaders of the U.S.S.R. have stood by us like honorable men and revolutionary strugglers, supporting our rights and strengthening our line with honor and resolution. Our history and our future generations will never forget its attitude to our just cause.

They were with us in the most difficult days in our history, supporting our right to peace based on justice.

The only new thing that I can add to what you already know is to tell you that I thought it proper last week to meet with the leaders of the U.S.S.R. These leaders had sent to me to say that circumstances demanded that we have consultations, so I decided to go to Moscow myself without announcing it.

In fact I left Cairo at dawn on Monday, March 1, and returned on Tuesday evening, March 2.

During those two days in Moscow I had

the opportunity of meeting the leaders of the U.S.S.R., our friends Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin. We talked about everything and discussed all possibilities frankly, clearly and honestly, and I returned to Cairo completely satisfied with what had been achieved and confident that the U.S.S.R. will support our rights absolutely and positively.

Brothers:

We are studying the steps we take with great care, and no provocation whatever will make us abandon our political and military planning. We shall take the initiative and observe developments and take action in accordance with the dictates of our principles and objectives, the first and foremost of which are liberation, the safety of Arab soil and the rights of the people of Palestine.

Although we have the highest esteem for the United Nations Secretary-General's appeal to us to practice self-control and to refrain from firing, we want to establish clearly and honestly to the whole world that we cannot extend the ceasefire longer than we have done already, and that it is not in our power to refrain from firing, when we have already done so for thirty days.

I therefore declare to you and to the world our decision that we not regard ourselves bound by the ceasefire or to refrain from firing.

This does not mean that political action will stop and that there will be nothing but guns firing. What it means is that we shall watch, we shall follow the course of events, and decide for ourselves what we believe to be our duty at the right time and in the right place.

Brothers and fellow citizens:

I want you to know that our performance of our duty is neither a luxury nor mere words. Others, far away from the field of battle, have preferred to talk about the struggle, and to use slogans rather than bullets. But we are not like them; we know, and we are entitled to know the meaning of our decision to perform our duty, and to know what this decision will cost us.

The cost can be counted in sweat and blood, and in no other way. At the same time we call on the Big Four powers to continue to

keep their eyes on a crisis which, because of its time and place, we believe to be at the very core of the question of peace or war.

We may add to this that we have confidence in the United Nations, in its Secretary-General, and in his special representative who is commissioned to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution, and we truly believe that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations are the one token of security in a world that cannot face the disaster of a third world war.

We address what we have said to all these quarters in the hope that all may realize that there are limits which we cannot pass.

We make only two conditions for a solution of the crisis: withdrawal from all the territories occupied since June 4, and the defense of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. We have reached the point where Israel has declared that there can be no return to the lines of June 4, 1967. From this we must make the proper deductions, and understand that anyone who does not want to return to the lines of June 4, 1967 cares nothing for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

After all this and on this basis, everyone of us must do his duty, and what gives us more self-confidence and assurance that we are acting rightly is the fact that we are now carrying on our struggle against what confronts us within a framework that is basically stronger and more appropriate.

We shall perform our duty to the full, even if at the same time we call on others to perform their duty in whatever way they wish. But we believe that no party, at the level of the international community or of its institutions, is entitled to stand aloof. In particular we call on the United States to do its duty; we are not laying on it a burden whose specifications are determined by us, we are only asking it to do what it has undertaken to do.

The United States of America has given us a direct undertaking, especially in the last month, that it opposes and will continue to oppose the principle of obtaining territories by force.

The United States cannot evade or escape from this undertaking. We are not asking of it more than is in its power; we are only

asking it to meet the undertaking it made to us. This we believe is not beyond its power as regards Israel, which is entirely dependent on it, and continues to challenge and kill while living at the expense of America as regards both money and arms.

I also want to tell you that I have had contacts with the United States of America, and that we have made our attitude known to the American authorities, clearly and precisely and with an honest appreciation of the responsibilities involved.

Brothers, the enemy will not stop his aggression unless we are in a position to resist him whenever he tries. But however strong and well prepared we are, we must realize in advance that the enemy will succeed in some of his strikes against us, that he will not hesitate, and I tell you that from now on everything in our territory will be in danger. But that is our destiny which we accept along with the honor and dignity of the struggle.

Brothers and fellow citizens, I shall now return to what I was telling you at the start—that we are facing the most decisive and dangerous moment. This is why I have spoken to every one of you, in all positions of responsibility, to every one of you in every house, great and small, in discharge of our undertaking that we shall share our burdens, that we shall endure today together for the sake of a tomorrow together. There is no time for despair, no time for words, all our time must be devoted to toil, all our toil to action, and all our action to one goal, which is the only one—the goal of victory, with God's help.

The battle will be ferocious, but it is the most honorable battle in life. The battle will be long and stubborn, but that is the destiny of free men. Thank God that we have the advantage. We are urged to the struggle by confidence, hope and the sanctity of every grain of soil on our land, while our enemy is driven to the madness of aggression, by fear of defeat and fear of despair.

Brothers and fellow citizens:

Once again I say to you that we know, and we have the right to know, the meaning

of our decision to do our duty and what this decision will cost us.

Today, as we stand on one line in the face of a single danger, I want all your sentiments, all your hearts, all your strength—I want them all to be a matrix that will surround your men, your sons, who are officers and soldiers in our armed forces, surround them with your prayers, your hope, your greetings and your admiration. They are Egypt's readiness, its hope and the guardians of its honor and of the glory of its flag.

Lord grant them victory, and inspire us, O Lord, with wisdom and with courage so that we may be true to the trust thou hast reposed in us for the glory of our land and the victory of our right, for thou art the Lord of glory and right, supreme over thy worshippers. Peace be upon you and God's blessing.

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### **Yugoslav Press and Radio Interview Statements by President-Elect Assad of Syria, Reaffirming Syrian Dedication to Arab Unity and to the Rights of the Palestinians and Stating Syria's Acceptance of Diplomatic Activity Despite Her View of the Inevitability of Renewed Conflict with Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, March 12, 1971**

*Q. One of Your Excellency's first political actions in the Arab sphere was the Syrian Arab Republic's decision to be the fourth member of the already existing three-nation federation. Does this mean that your country's attitude to the Middle East crisis will be coordinated with that of Cairo?*

*A.* We in this region are part of the Arab nation, and it is our duty to struggle to ensure that the different parts of that nation

are united in a single state. For us this is a basic principle, one that is not subject to or affected by any conditions. For us in the Baath Party it is the major goal, the goal of Arab unity. This is what led us to attach ourselves to the Tripoli Charter States regardless of international incidents, since for us, as I have said, it is a matter of faith. And in accordance with what I have said, we believe that fragmentation opens the door to all that is detrimental to the interests of the Arab nation.

Unity, however, will close the door in the face of those quarters whose aim it is to damage the interests of the Arab nation.

*Q. I am thinking of the basic Middle East issue because this issue is a basic one for all Arabs. But the attitudes of the Arab countries differ. Egypt accepted the Security Council resolution, Syria did not, and it appears that Egypt is going to pursue indirect, or perhaps direct, negotiations—I do not exactly know. If Egypt reaches an agreement or a compromise solution, what will Syria's attitude be?*

*A.* The result of the political struggle carried on by certain Arab countries and certain friendly countries has been increased arrogance and conceit on the part of Israel. There can be no doubt that this struggle has gone far towards revealing Israel's intentions to world public opinion. But, though this diplomatic activity has gone on for four years—which should have been long enough to achieve some results had Israel not been the expansionist entity she is—it has not brought Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 a single step closer. But the nature of this entity will always constitute an obstacle to all peace efforts: because expansion is the hallmark of this Zionist entity, in the long run we shall have to engage in armed struggle to defend our rights and to liberate our usurped territories. This political struggle, in which our friends in the world and some of our brothers in the Arab countries are engaged, is not, however, incompatible with the requirements of the battle, nor with the exigencies of the liberation of the occupied territory.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Assad's interview with Yugoslav journalist Dara Janekovic visiting Syria as correspondent for Yugoslav radio and a number of newspapers, as published in *al-Baath* (Damascus), April 2, 1971. (President Assad was elected president on March 12 and inaugurated on March 14.)

*Q. Do you regard Syria's inflexible attitude, which has been so much talked about, as realistic?*

*A.* We have misgivings about the latest stage we have passed through in Syria, as regards our internal situation, and perhaps also our situation in the Arab sphere, and consequently the course we must follow to attain what would help end the occupation. As regards a political solution, the fact is that we in Syria say that there can be no political solution, because the Zionist entity, on which such a solution depends, is expansionist and aggressive.

When we say it is an expansionist and aggressive entity, we are not talking at random. We say so on the basis of an analysis of the realities and the history of Israel; in all the history of Israel there is not a single indication of its being a peaceable state, as they claim. Zionism occupied Palestine in 1948. The United Nations has adopted many resolutions on Palestine and on the rights of the refugees, but not one of them has been implemented. There were demilitarized zones on both sides of the firing line before 1967, which Israel occupied in successive years, and neither the international organizations, nor the United Nations observer corps nor the Secretary-General of the United Nations was able to prevent it.

During the June 1967 aggression the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire on June 6 which Syria accepted as did Israel. Despite this, however, Israel occupied the Golan territories after this resolution had been adopted and she had announced her acceptance of it. This was [noted in] Resolution 235 of June 9, 1967. Does Israel abide even by the 1967 Security Council resolution? Doesn't Israel declare that she will never return to the pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers? Only yesterday Abba Eban, addressing the Knesset, said that Israel will never return to the pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers.

Not long ago Golda Meir told *Newsweek's* correspondent that the settlements established in the occupied Arab territories are there to stay. She said she did not recognize that there was any place in the world where Jews did not have the right to live. Of course

it is not a matter of Jews as individuals but of the Jews who represent a movement of settler colonialism, the Zionist movement.

Yesterday when Dayan was asked which he preferred: peace or Sharm el-Sheikh, he replied Sharm el-Sheikh. Before that Dayan told his forces: "The past generation achieved the 1948 frontiers; our generation achieved the 1967 frontiers; it is up to you to achieve the future frontiers."

This is the history of Israel in relation to the international organizations and the world. Can we possibly say it is a peaceable state? Therefore we in Syria say: Our attitude is not an extremist one, as certain newspapers in the world try to represent it; it is the result of an analysis which leads to the conclusion that a battle is inevitable, though we are aware that the battle will be a hard one and we know that our enemy possesses immense resources and enjoys the support of the United States.

We are defending right and justice; we are defending our right to be left to live in peace as honorable men in our territory and as free men in our homeland.

*Q. Supposing Egypt accepted certain frontier adjustments, what would your attitude be?*

*A.* For the reasons I have mentioned and because Israel is aggressive and has opposed all the efforts made by the United Arab Republic and its friends in the world, President Sadat announced that there could be no extension of the ceasefire. He also announced that Israel had closed the door on all peace attempts, and our friends in the world, including our Yugoslav friends, are aware of this.

*Q. We [Yugoslavs] are aware that diplomacy is still active and will continue to be active and that two major forces, the United States and the U.S.S.R., who of course have great differences between them, must be considered.*

*A.* The Israeli authorities say that the United States has not exerted any pressure on them, and American statements affirm America's commitment to defend Israel and to maintain the balance of forces. The balance of forces of course means that the United

States intends to maintain Israel's military superiority over the Arabs.

*Q. How do you think the Palestine problem can be solved, in view of the fact that there are complications: the Palestinians, Jordan, the King, Israel and the Arab countries too, each of which has its own interests? How do you hope that this problem will be solved?*

*A.* No solution of the Palestine problem which does not take into account the essence of the problem—the Palestinian people—can be of any use. As regards our view of Israel as a state that is making every effort to take possession of Arab territory and to expel the Arabs who live in it, the Arabs agree.

Any solution that takes into account the essence of the problem—the Palestinian people—will have to be proposed by the Palestinian people themselves.

The Palestine Resistance has proposed that there should be in Palestine a secular state consisting of both Arabs and Jews. We in Syria have not decided on such a solution, nor have we discussed such a subject. But from my point of view it seems that such a solution as the one proposed by the Resistance could well be discussed, especially in the light of experience. There are Jews living in all the Arab countries, and the history of this area bears witness to the coexistence of all religions.

*Q. But Israel will never accept this solution.*

*A.* What are we to do with this dispersed Palestinian people? They are living a markedly sub-human life in the camps, far from their homeland; they are a dispersed people in a state of revolution, and no one can stop their revolution. They feel that they are being unjustly treated and the only thing that can stop this revolution is a just solution that is an embodiment of the right. I want to affirm that the rights of a people never die, however much time passes. Individuals may die, but the rights of peoples never die.

This is the situation. Of course it is no easy matter.

*Q. No, it is a very complicated situation because attempts are being made by officials in Jordan and by Israel to destroy the Palestinians.*

*A.* It is impossible to wipe out a whole people. We should do well to remember that the Palestinians did not revolt when they left Palestine twenty years ago; they have only begun to do so in the last few years. This means that their sense of injustice is growing with the passage of time.

As for the authorities in Jordan, and as for Israel, it is not a question of an individual, for there are feelings that have started to pervade the heart of every Palestinian.

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### **Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Iraq Revolution Command Council Vice-Chairman Hussein, Opposing an Arab Summit Conference and Criticizing All Who Accept So-Called Peace Proposals, Including Some Elements of the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, Mid-March, 1971**

. . . . .

*Q. Does this mean that you are linking the proposed surrender solutions for the Palestine problem with the stand of the communists vis-à-vis the regime in Iraq and the pressures to which it is being subjected?*

*A.* We shall answer this question frankly as well, in the light of our understanding of things. When one keeps silent about the most reactionary and dictatorial governments but concentrates on Iraq, out of all the countries of the Middle East, only two explanations can be found for that fact. The first relates to the question of peaceful solutions and our rejection of such solutions; in fact we reject surrender solutions and not peaceful solutions, for the solution that has been proposed amounts to surrender. When we speak of what is peaceful and what is not, it appears to some people that we are advocating war,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Saddam Hussein Takriti's interview, *al-Dustur* (Beirut), No. 22 (March 15, 1971).



whereas we advocate neither war nor the shedding of blood, rather we are demanding the [restitution of] rights that have been forcibly taken from us. It is our belief that the formula that has been proposed for dealing with Israel is a formula that cannot give us back our rights. In rejecting peaceful solutions, which we term surrender solutions—and day by day it is becoming clearer that we are right in the belief that they are surrender solutions and not peaceful solutions—we are not seeking to challenge the policies of other states that are attempting to impose peaceful solutions. We are deeply appreciative of the efforts of the Soviet Union in supporting our causes. When the Soviet Union comes out in favor of peaceful solutions but we reject the [proposed] formula, it does not mean that we are trying to attack the Soviet Union, we only mean to insist on our rights. It would seem, however, that the matter is seen in a different light and consequently an insistent information and propaganda campaign is being waged against Iraq. It is strange that everyone should be attacking Iraq and saying that it is the only belligerent state in the Middle East. When we read the papers and listen to radio broadcasts, which will attract anyone's attention, and inasmuch as we are a progressive and revolutionary party, and our party seeks to implement socialism and to set up socialistic ties in society, not only in Iraq but throughout Arab society as a whole, one might come to believe that we are carrying out the true wishes of the Arab people, which is something we are proud of. In fact, this is our position.

If we had even one percent doubt about our basic principles, we would have shifted our position and adopted other, sounder principles. However, our absolute faith and trust in the soundness of our principles makes it certain that we shall continue on the path we have chosen for ourselves. It could be that certain people are aware that the soundness of our principles will cancel out or considerably weaken the role that they have to play. This means that we face a heavy attack for two reasons: the first has to do with the peaceful solution, and the other is connected with

this explanation, for how else could one explain it?

*Q. Why did Iraq reject the call for an Arab summit conference?*

A. Iraq took part in some of the Arab summit conferences, and at these conferences decisions were taken, but what can we assume to have been gained? The last Arab summit conference was held a few days before the Rogers Plan was accepted by certain Arab countries; at the conference a clear plan was adopted for the recovery of Arab rights, liberation being accepted as the way to achieve these rights. Then we were surprised by the acceptance of the Rogers Plan, which was really a clever colonialist game which divided the Arab people and the Arab governments, and made the Arabs fight each other from two opposing trenches instead of fighting the enemy from a single trench. The results of the Rogers Plan game are now clearly visible in the Arab theater in the form of the international moves now being made.

As for the aspect related to the present, what things have been offered as new formulae, as a fresh start and a new indication that there really are intentions different from those in the past? And have these intentions a serious aim, have they reviewed their previous positions and are they guiding the resources of the Arab nation on the course of liberation? There is nothing encouraging—on the contrary. Statements are made day after day on the question of direct negotiations with Israel and recognition of Israel. What I ask is: After all this, are we to agree to an Arab summit conference so that it may bestow legality on the initiatives—the initiatives that are taken in one country or another, in one place or another—for the recognition of the legality of Israel's existence? What I mean is, are we to agree to an Arab summit conference so that we may confer legality on these so-called initiatives?

The other thing is connected with the regimes of the countries that take part in the summit conferences, for these conferences, in themselves, if we regard them from the point of view of a revolutionary scientific

analysis, and in the light of the nature of the majority of the Arab regimes, lead us to the foregone conclusion that it is impossible to obtain any results [from them].

In the past when we attended the summit conferences, and especially the conferences attended by all the Arab countries without exception, we certainly did not believe that they would provide a formula or a basis for liberation, because it was not reasonable that these conferences, constituted as they were, should provide a base for liberation; even the minimum decided by these conferences—which constitutes the minimum aspirations of the Arab people—even this was not adhered to before the Tripoli conference. The Tripoli conference, of course, was differently composed, and it took decisions which were clarified by the Iraqi information media, but in spite of this it was soon replaced by acceptance of the Rogers Plan.

*Q. Now that some of the confrontation countries have agreed to peaceful solutions, what is the fate of the Eastern Front?*

*A.* The nature of the question provides the answer. The Eastern Front is a military formula. The existence of a group of Arab armies in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon quite simply means their existence in this sector and the existence of a command for these armies to strike at Israel in the light of the goal of liberation—but when things are being solved through direct negotiations and recognition of the existence of Israel, what grounds are there for the existence of the Eastern Front and of a command for the group of Arab armies that exist in this area? I think that there is no longer any justification for their existence: I mean this was the last hope even after the Rogers Plan, but the last formula for adherence to this plan has been rejected by those of our brothers who are concerned with the affair, in spite of Iraq's insistence on it at the time and its emphasis on the importance of this formula.

*Q. This area is passing through a critical situation. What do you predict will happen to the Palestine revolution?*

*A.* This subject requires frank treatment, because now that some have recognized Israel

or are on the way to recognizing that it is entitled to some of the territory it usurped in 1948, as is clear from statements by Israel and others, we must be frank with ourselves and with others. The Palestine Resistance was basically a collection of trends which the majority of the Arab regimes took up with, in conformity with their conflicting views. For example, when the Rogers Plan was recognized, some people in the Resistance recognized it. This is astonishing, because the Resistance came into existence for liberation, and the whole idea of the Resistance is organized armed action for the recovery of usurped sovereignty by force of arms. And now this armed revolutionary set-up is recognizing the Rogers Plan, which certainly leads us to think that there must be something really wrong with the composition of the Resistance. Another thing is that, according to the evidence of its combatant members, part of the Resistance, or part of its activities and part of its set-up, has been turned into an office set-up. Resistance depends on a basic principle, which is flexibility of movement; this flexibility requires that there should be [no] fixed base, for there cannot be this flexibility of movement if there are offices, telephones and cars.

The Arab Resistance was born spoiled, that is to say it came into existence in an atmosphere of luxury, rather than under the auspices of the formulae of revolutionary war, as was the case in Algeria, when our Arab people fought with old sporting guns and odd cartridges stolen from the foreigner and then turned against him. The Arab Resistance should have been like this from the start, and because every regime adopted a group of trends, when a man wanted to belong to the Resistance he had to have a specific rank, a fine new rifle and sufficient ammunition. The Arab Resistance in its general character has been a manifestation of luxury, and this has applied to all the combatant members of the Resistance. Class distinctions arose within the Palestine Resistance, and the class mentality is inevitably easy-going and leads to formulae other than that of armed struggle, which depends on

endurance. This is a factor that forms part of the calculations of every aware and progressive Arab revolutionary and every man who loves his people and is determined to recover the usurped rights of the Arabs, if not at this stage then in the future, to give a scientific and realistic diagnosis of things. The Resistance must understand this fact, and be aware of another fact—that it must act on the basis of a theoretical appraisal of the situation based on principles, on the assumption that there is no Arab regime capable of giving it direct support, and that if it does get such support, it must be regarded as a bonus payment. But to have the idea that it is possible to fight Israel under the auspices of the unanimous agreement of the Arab regimes is an illusion, because it is impossible that the Arab regimes in their present form should achieve unanimity on fighting Israel.

*Q. How might the Iraqi government respond to the Rogers proposal given that it embodies a surrender solution to the Palestine problem?*

A. The latest statement by the Assistant Secretary-General of our Party affirmed that Iraq is trying to form an Arab front, comprising the whole of the Arab homeland, for endurance and rejection of surrender solutions. This front will consist of the countries that reject a peaceful solution and of the progressive parties and movements which agree on the same question: the struggle against Zionism and imperialism. Our aim is to unify the struggle and to direct it towards endurance; we do not regard war with Israel as an easy operation, because we are not fighting Israel so much as the forces of imperialism. If some of our brothers have only now realized this fact, we do not blame them; we are only surprised that they did not realize it and act on it before now. Some of our brothers are now theorizing about the idea of submitting to the formulae proposed by Israel, now that they have discovered the truth about the links between imperialism and Israel, while we have long realized this fact and acted on it.

The confrontation with Israel in total war

is a difficult operation, but it is not impossible, meaning that we need patience and plenty of time, but we must not submit to surrender solutions; we must reject them all and spread a spirit of rejection among our people. The dissemination of a spirit of surrender can only lead to acceptance of the reality of Israel, and this is just what imperialism wants. Some people call themselves Arabs and patriots and, building up a theory on the idea of defeat, such and such a regime, for example, says: Brothers, with my present resources I cannot fight. This is much less dangerous than theorizing about the defeat by according Israel a halo of greatness and representing it as an invincible bogey. Such action has a direct influence on the Arab mentality and restricts the capacity to resist and endure. This kind of theorizing about the defeat is the most dangerous thing that confronts us in our present situation.

Then there is another thing: the old tune that is being struck up once again: You are Palestinian, you are Lebanese, you are Egyptian, you are Iraqi, and each one of you ought to concern himself with the affairs of his own country. This tune was composed by colonialism and we all know its object—divide and rule. This particularist refrain was heard after the treacheries of the Arab rulers which led to the disaster of Palestine in 1948, and now we have become accustomed to hearing it again. The object is to make the Arab people despair and isolate themselves within the regional frontiers of their countries. There are some people in Iraq who have picked up this tune, but they are a minority. There are some people in Jordan who are influenced by it, and also some in Egypt, but the conscience of our Arab people and the conscience of the whole of this nation cannot be influenced; our nation rejects everything liable to lead it to surrender.

There is another important point. The idea of taking the cause away from the people and handing it over to the governments is a conspiracy. The people must be allowed to play their part in everything, and the capacity of the Arab people must by no means be underestimated. It is they that have made revolutions and can make other revolutions

if they find that their rulers and regimes have deviated from the required revolutionary and nationalist line.

294

**Lebanese Press Interview Statements by President Assad of Syria, Expressing the Syrian Belief That the Solution to the Middle East Conflict Will Be Military and That the Only Viable Settlement Is the Secular Democratic State in Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, Mid-March, 1971**

*Q. And now what is the solution for Palestine? You must have a plan because Israel is not a new factor, something that has happened suddenly; it has been a cancer in our body for twenty-three years.*

*A. The only solution is fighting.*

*Q. And after the fighting?*

*A. The unified secular democratic state for all religions—Muslim, Jewish and Christian.*

*Q. Fateh's theory?*

*A. Exactly.*

*Q. And the other Palestinian state—the miniature state that the great powers are fashioning for us?*

*A. We do not accept it.*

*Q. And an international force?*

*A. We have not heard of it officially, but when we do hear we shall be against it. It would be another occupation.*

*Q. And the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967?*

*A. It is marginal and not in the interests of the Arab people.*

*Q. Is it true that America does not want the*

*Suez Canal reopened, so as to stop arms reaching Vietnam and Southeast Asia?*

*A. When America thinks about the Middle East, it thinks exclusively of the interests of Israel.*

*Q. Do you think that the Russians and the Americans have agreed on some solution? Or that the Arabs are the victims of the conflict between them?*

*A. I do not think that there can be any agreement between the Soviets and America on the Arab problem, because their differences are fundamental and essential in this field. The U.S.S.R. is a friendly country that adopts a just attitude to the Arabs, and gives us support. The United States is the friend of Israel, and gives it more than support. I think that the U.S.S.R. is striving at the international level to reach a just solution for the Arab problem.*

*Q. Your term of office started with a journey to Russia. What was the secret of that journey? To settle accounts, to discharge an obligation, or what?*

*A. My journey to the U.S.S.R. was a step along the course we embarked on a long time ago, the course of strengthening the friendship between us. Between the U.S.S.R. and Syria there are relations based on mutual respect. Our visit was successful.*

*Q. New arms? Loans to be repaid by instalments?*

*A. The U.S.S.R. constantly gives us valuable support in all fields—economic and military aid.*

*Q. Do you believe that America is unable to exert pressure on Israel? Or that it is unwilling to do so?*

*A. America is a country that is capable—more than capable—of making Israel do what it wants. But it is obviously in America's interest that Israel should maintain its superiority over the Arabs and, consequently, that Israel should retain the territory it has occupied, and occupy further territory too. As an Arab citizen I say that America is mistaken in this course of action and that it is not in its interests to stand by Israel.*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Assad's interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 17, 1971.

## 295

**Cable from Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) Calling on Arab Heads of State To Intervene To Halt New Fighting Between Palestinians and Government Forces in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**March 28, 1971**

Greetings from the revolution.

The Jordanian authorities have started in Irbid, and before that in Mafraq, a new massacre of our people and the refugees in the camps; they are now carrying out an abominable new operation of coercion and violation in steadfast Irbid, and the plan has started to operate everywhere and in all directions.

The situation is grave. Shoulder your responsibility to prevent the annihilation of our people who are faced with injustice and oppression in the occupied territory and Jordan. There can be no doubt that what is happening in Irbid and elsewhere is a brutal operation intended to wipe out and annihilate our refugees especially in view of the fact that the town has been in the grip of security men for months; there is no commando base there, and the arms of the militia have been deposited in six places in the town.

We call on you to stop this terrible bloodshed and continuing massacre.

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**Statement Issued by the Provisional Regional Command of the Baath Party (Syria), Announcing That Events in Jordan Indicate Intentions To Liquidate the Palestine Resistance<sup>2</sup>**

**Damascus, March 29, 1971**

For the third successive day the Jordanian authorities continue firing at the Resistance groups and the masses of the Arab Palestinian

people. This shelling of the Resistance bases and the Palestinian camps is taking place while the Jordanian authorities are issuing statements about their concern for the Resistance and their efforts to put an end to clashes and bloodshed.

The Ba'th Party Provisional Regional Command in Syria, which is following the situation with great concern and keeping close track of the events, and which is eager to see an immediate end to bloodshed, thereby saving every Arab resource for the battle, announces to the Arab nation that the events in Jordan—resulting from contrived clashes with the Resistance and continuous shelling of both the Resistance bases and the Palestine revolution's masses—indicate intentions to liquidate the Resistance movement.

The Ba'th Party, which from the very beginning has regarded the Palestine Resistance movement as a practical expression of our Arab Palestinian people's rejection of the reality of homelessness and extermination, and a basic element in the battle of destiny between the Arabs and their invading enemy, considers it its primary duty to continue supporting the Resistance movement and protecting it from every attempt at liquidation and extermination. While appealing to all Arabs to move rapidly to put an end to these side-battles which benefit only the enemy, we declare that our Party—the Ba'th Party—will remain the strong supporter of the Resistance and the Palestine revolution, and will give it all assistance to protect its existence and enable it to perform its duties in the occupied Arab territory.

The Party and its revolution in Syria, while reserving for themselves freedom of action to guarantee the Resistance's continuation, support and protection, is prepared to make every effort to achieve implementation of the provision of the Cairo agreement by all the parties concerned. Long live the Arab Palestine Resistance. Glory and immortality for our noble martyrs.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat's cable, *Fateh* (n.p.), March 30, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Text of Baath Provisional Regional Command statement as broadcast on Damascus Home Service in

Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3648/A/8-A/9; reprinted by permission.

## 297

# **Statements on the Clashes Between Jordanian Security Forces and Palestine Commandos Made to the Chamber of Deputies by Premier al-Tall of Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, March 29, 1971**

As is well known, we concluded a series of agreements with the [P.L.O.] Central Committee, which has implemented some but not others.

More than twenty days ago minor problems arose, especially in the city of Irbid and in the eastern quarters of Amman. The Liaison Office followed up these problems and tried to solve them gradually. The reason for employing this method rather than that of force is obvious, for those who caused these problems were a few dozen, or at the most a few hundred, so in our view it was sounder to deal with them by persuasion and constant pressure rather than by the use of force.

The lies, exaggerations and speeches you hear from certain quarters have become only too familiar to us, but they are all belied by the facts. Any citizen of this country can go to Irbid and find out that what has been said about the massacre of Irbid and the shelling of the refugee camps is all lies and slanders.

Our problem, in fact, is with our brother Arabs who, for one reason or another, believe one side without taking the trouble to verify the facts. What our brother Arabs ignore is that according to the agreements concluded, it is forbidden for armed men to be in the towns and villages.

When a bomb is thrown, a rocket is fired or explosives are let off, the security forces take action to restore security, and what those who make speeches against us forget is that

these explosives are forbidden in towns, villages and camps; to my knowledge, none of our Arab brothers will tolerate rocket or bomb attacks on police posts. This has been a continuous problem for two weeks, and when the security forces take action to deal with an incident it is said that the intention is to wipe out the Palestinian people and destroy commando action.

If we really wanted to destroy commando action we could do so, and for five months I, as the one responsible, have put up with criticism from you and others; I have put up with it with the intention of maintaining commando action. If we wanted to finish with commando action, it would be ended in a matter of hours. Commando action creates no military problem for us, but we have been patient so as to give it the chance to follow the right course. But in Irbid things went too far, and as a state we can no longer endure attacks on police posts and assaults on security men. So I gave orders to the Irbid garrison to reinforce the security forces in the town.

It is clear to me that it was not only a matter of infringing the security of the town, but also a conspiracy against the state and against commando action itself, and this drew the commandos into clashes with the army.

We are much more concerned about commando action than are those who make fiery speeches.

When the conspiracy failed the pressure on us was turned into information pressure and into a war of rumors about the economy and other things. We have put an end to all these conspiracies, and this country will never be brought to its knees so long as we have a single shot to fire.

On the other hand, the Central Committee is not completely in control, and there is no quarter with effective influence that we can deal with in this matter. After the Irbid incidents we were told that such and such a quarter was the cause of the problem, and you know what that quarter did.

As I said, it is a simple matter of providing the country with security and stability, for no country in the world can agree to the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall's speech, *al-Dustur* (Amman), March 30, 1971.

Premier al-Tall made many of the same points in an interview, conducted by Edouard Saab, published in French in *Le Monde*, April 7, 1971, pp. 1, 2.

holding of armed demonstrations, and no country in the world can allow its economy to be subjected to shocks.

For a month we have been asking for four killers who committed the crime of killing an official of the Premier's Office; the Central Committee has the information relative to this incident, and no self-respecting government can allow known killers to go untried.

I know of no military establishment in the world that has borne such provocations as this army or such brazen propaganda, but it will continue to be a steadfast fortress unmoved by the croaking of frogs.

This, in brief, is what we are facing. We have surmounted all the conspiracies, and we are ready to face new ones. We have survived the stage of weakened resolution.

Whatever government [we have] in this country is a national government if our people are content with it; and this has nothing to do with the temperament of any particular group. We do not want to quarrel with our brothers, but at the same time we do not want to return to our former subservience.

We now have no security problems with the exception of certain areas of Amman. These we shall deal with after allowing them as long a time as possible, and we shall try to deal with them as kindly as possible.

## 298

### **Statement Issued by the U.A.R. National Assembly Reaffirming Egyptian Determination To Preserve National Sovereignty and the Rights of the People of Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, March 29, 1971**

The National Assembly is following with the greatest concern our present fateful situation and the events that are taking place from day to day. The thoughts of its members are with the working forces of our people wherever

they are engaged in their daily task of building and strengthening our socialist society and preparing with all their strength for its protection and for the battle of liberation. The Assembly has every hope and confidence in our armed forces which it regards as the symbol of determination to protect our socialist society and as the instrument of the battle, in which the people stand behind them, for the liberation of our territory. It therefore resolves the following:

1. It affirms the support of the Assembly and the whole people for the statement and affirmation of President Anwar Sadat, the successor of the great leader Abdel Nasser, that under no circumstances shall we relinquish a single inch of our territory or a grain of our soil, whatever the circumstances and whatever battles this involves, and that there shall be no question of relinquishing or bargaining over the rights of the people of Palestine.

2. We shall never accept, under any circumstances, the demilitarization of Sinai, and the Assembly believes that any idea of making Sinai a demilitarized zone is an attempt to destroy the sovereignty of Egypt and its territories, to place Egypt, its people, its territory and all it represents as a center for Arab liberation at the mercy and under the control of Israel, and to pave the way for Israel so that it may in the future gradually realize its expansionist policy in Arab territories, which policy the Israeli leaders are constantly reiterating. As well as rejecting the above, the Assembly affirms that what President Anwar Sadat has declared in this connection fully expresses the views of the whole people.

3. While expressing the people's belief in the inevitability of the battle to liberate the territory, whatever the cost and however great the sacrifices, the Assembly confirms what our command has said to the effect that in this battle we must rely on ourselves, on our own will and on our own calculations. It also expresses its conviction that the United States, which sends Phantoms to Israel could, if it wished, exert pressure on Israel, whereas, on the contrary, it is allowing itself to be

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the statement, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), March 30, 1971.

subjected to pressure on the part of Israel, which insists on winning the fruits of aggression.

This strengthens our people's belief in the inevitability of the battle and makes them, in the light of the exigencies of history, increase their caution and vigilance and redouble their efforts for the battle of liberation and for the protection of socialism.

## 299

### **Statements by President Boumedienne of Algeria Noting That Israel Still Holds the Territories Occupied in 1967 and Reiterating Algeria's Position That the Solution Lies in Armed Struggle, Included in an Address to the Congress of Municipal Councils<sup>1</sup>**

**Algiers, March 29, 1971**

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All these causes are linked with one another; they are just causes, human causes which must be supported, there must be struggle for these causes until the day comes when victory is won. As regards these peoples, we may perhaps differ from some in our analysis of events, we may differ from our Arab brothers in our analysis of events in the Arab East, but when we differ our only motive here in Algeria is faith and good intentions. We said in the first days of the battle of the Arab East that the only solution, for which there is no alternative, is struggle, fighting and sacrifice until the Palestinian people recover their rights and the Arabs recover their honor. But since then, brothers, Algeria has been accused of adopting an extremist attitude, of not taking local situations into account, even of overbidding. But what is the bitter truth, what is the situation today? Has the situation changed after four years? Have the Palestinian people recovered their rights? Have the Arabs recovered their

honor? Have they liberated their territories? These questions answer themselves, and the answer, of course, is No. The answer is that the Zionists are still occupying the places they took by force in 1967—this is the truth which remains unchanged. It may be said that we have convinced world public opinion, but the Arab territories, Palestine and Jerusalem will never be liberated, either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, by world public opinion. The history of all peoples that have been liberated and the painful situation in which many peoples are living today prove this. The resolutions on the people of South Africa, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations with a nearly overwhelming majority, have not been applied, nor has the 1967 resolution [on the Middle East], even though the Arabs, headed by the Palestinians, regard it as unjust.

And what about the Security Council resolution on the Holy City (Jerusalem) calling on Israel not to Judaize Jerusalem? It has not been implemented. That is why yesterday, brothers, we said that the lesson of the defeat must be learned courageously and remorselessly, if this is necessary to the confrontation of this grave situation which the whole of the Arab nation is passing through. We called for this yesterday because we believe that it is the only solution, and we called for the battle to be comprehensive in the economic, military and cultural fields, in all fields, so that we may experience a resurrection when we come out of this battle. Then attempts were made at one summit meeting after another, at one ministers' meeting after another, but the lesson was not learned. When we said this, it resulted in our people and our country being criticized on many occasions by our Arab brothers and our allies, but did we mean any particular country by this analysis? No. Our only object in this analysis, and the political line which the country has followed as regards the problem of the Arab East for four years—our only object has been the higher interests of the Arab nation and the interests of the people of Palestine.

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<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Boumedienne's speech to the Fifth Congress of Municipal Council Chairmen, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), March 30, 1971.



We have said before now that we could offer a policy, but are the governments concerned capable of going along with us in this policy? I am doubtful of this, for the simple reason that many of the governments have strong and organic links with those who created Israel. Some of these governments have vast sums of money in the banks of Britain, America and Europe, but at the service of what? Is this money at the service of the Arab economy? Or the Arab revival? No, it is at the service of foreign economies. Let us take an example of those governments which we say are organically linked with the colonialist countries—the government of Amman, which America has decided to protect, just as it protects the government of Tel Aviv, and is ready to go to war to protect the Hashemite throne.

Is it through these people that the Arabs will be victorious over Israel, over their enemies?

We should be deceiving ourselves, our people and history if we believed this, when we have seen, we have experienced as Arab freedom fighters such massacres as those carried out by the Jordanian army on the Palestinians—massacres which the Palestinians admit were worse than any they have experienced at the hands of the Zionists. A government like this is still talking in the name of the Arabs and Arabism, and as long as this goes on the Arabs will never win. Thousands of people were massacred; guns and tanks attacked camps. As the Arab poet says: "A mighty lion, but in war an ostrich." They are as brave as lions only against the defenseless Palestinian refugees, but yesterday they did not die in Jerusalem, they did not die for the West Bank, and whatever the mouthpieces of colonialism may say, statistics prove that there were not more than two hundred casualties in the fighting in Jerusalem. The stories you heard in 1967 that there had been fierce fighting in Jerusalem—there is not a grain of truth in them, because if there is fierce fighting it leaves its traces in the country, as in Vietnam, but where are the traces [in this case]?

Brothers, we have talked of this and it is in our power to offer a solution for this

problem, but we are afraid that this solution will not satisfy everyone—it will probably not satisfy those who are most concerned with the matter.

They say that the Rogers Plan and the 1967 Security Council program can provide a solution for the problem. We say that if this policy is just a tactical move to gain time for building up armed forces and preparing for the battle of liberation, that is reasonable, as long as it does not go on too long. But if this policy is to be adopted as a strategy leading to the recognition of Israel—we cannot agree to a policy the essence of which is the recognition of Israel, and this is the point of difference and division between us.

Let us then differ and be divided, because there is no Arab government, however strong, that can impose a specific policy on the Arab people. The 1948 defeat—there are lessons to be learned from the 1948 defeat, and if any of the Great Powers still believes that a government can sign an agreement to put an end to the problem at the expense of the Arabs, we say it is mistaken.

For tomorrow another government may come and tear up the agreements that have been concluded, and not recognize them. This is the Arab reality, and if it does not recognize the right of the Arab nation to sovereignty and honor and the right of the Palestinian people to freedom and sovereignty, the solution will be worthless.

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## 300

**Cable Message from Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) Appealing to U.A.R. President Sadat To Intervene To Halt Attacks on Palestinians by Government Forces in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

March 29, 1971

The situation is very serious. The authorities began a massacre in Amman tonight after the end of Irbid massacre. The authorities sent forces into the city in all directions. We appeal to you in the name of our people to assume your historic responsibility and to intervene immediately to stop the alarming bloodbaths our people are being subjected to besides what they are encountering in the occupied territory.

## 301

**Statement by a Jordanian Official Spokesman, Criticizing the Cable Message on the Situation in Jordan Sent to U.A.R. President Sadat by Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>2</sup>**

Amman, March 30, 1971

I do not intend to discuss to what extent the claims in which Mr. Yasser Arafat has embroiled himself are false; it is enough for me to say that unfortunately we in this country have become accustomed—as have the Arab masses everywhere—to his infamous practice of manufacturing problems and then screaming and shouting for help for the revolution and the revolutionaries in Amman and Irbid.

Mr. Yasser Arafat's cable to President Sadat contains allegations that are without

precedent in political morality. He says that the army started a massacre in Amman yesterday evening, but everyone in Amman, including the Arab embassies, knows that this did not happen. It is quite obviously impossible that the movement of military forces should not be noticed by people: it is not a magical operation that can be carried out secretly at any moment.

The question now is: What was the object of this cable from Mr. Arafat?

It is to be observed that Mr. Arafat's cable says: "Our people"—meaning the Palestinian people—"are being made the victims of a blood bath in Amman." The only explanation of this claim is that Mr. Arafat is determined to smash national unity in Jordan by suggesting that citizens of the West Bank are being massacred. It is as if he were telling them that they are a separate group and that they should protect themselves against the other group, to enable him to smash the internal front, from which no one but the enemy will benefit.

If Mr. Arafat's intention in so persistently making such statements and sending such cables is to justify his dereliction of his fundamental duty, we should like to draw attention to the fact that never in the history of revolutions and liberation movements have revolution and liberation been achieved in this way, and he would do better to deal with his weak points than to ignore them and try to justify them.

By the mere fact of saying that the revolution in Amman and Irbid is in danger he is accusing himself, because he is admitting that his revolution is in the Jordanian towns only, and not where it ought to be. We should like to know, as would all our fellow citizens and all honorable men, what is the secret of his determination to stay in the towns—for this, it is clear, is his ultimate object in collecting money and training men.

Finally we regret that, by believing such claims, the Arab countries are not helping commando action as they should and this can only perpetuate the deviations of commando action rather than help to set it on the right path. We say this because the Arab countries know the true situation, just as

<sup>1</sup> Text of Arafat's cable broadcast on "Voice of Fateh" (Cairo) in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3648/A/4; reprinted by permission.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), March 31, 1971.

they know how seriously the leaders of commando action have deviated—or if they do not know, their embassies in Amman certainly do. Moreover, Jordan is not a remote country in the Pacific; it is right in the middle of the Arab world—anyone who has doubts can easily come here himself to verify the facts before passing judgement and adopting an attitude that can only injure this courageous and steadfast country and indirectly assist the conspiracy for a Palestinian state.

We also feel compelled to ask why these voices that are raised in support of falsehoods and fabrications are not to be heard when armed men wanted by the law are closing our shops and killers are endangering the lives of our infants and children, attacking our guard-posts and stabbing our men in the back. Why are they deaf to the voices of our people who condemn these actions and demand that they be stopped?

We wish to ask them one question only: Would any of them accept that the law of the jungle should prevail in his country at the expense of law, order and the security of its citizens and its economy? Would any of them condone any of the anarchistic and irresponsible activities with which our country is confronted?

We cannot but regret these attitudes for which Mr. Yasser Arafat is responsible, and hope that he himself will remember that Israel is still occupying our territory and, what is more, every day provides us with a new assurance of its determination to stay in our territory. If he remembers this, let us hope that Mr. Arafat will once more start thinking along responsible and patriotic lines in the service of the cause and the goals of liberation.

## 302

### **Press Statement by Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al-Adgham Explaining the Impossibility of Continuing the Committee's Work in Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Tunis, Early April, 1971**

Eventually the Higher Committee found itself at an impasse. When I was convinced that there was no possibility of reconciling the attitudes of the two parties, even on unimportant matters, and when I was also convinced that the two sides could not agree on any of the provisions, I left Amman, after having given both Jordanians and Palestinians many warnings of the consequences of a new escalation. I thought at the time that my task could be regarded as finished and that, in view of the way the problems had developed, it was necessary to devise another formula. This was because the Committee, which had so far consisted of myself, as representative of the Arab Heads of State, and of a Jordanian and a Palestinian representative, had, in my view, done all it could. I therefore submitted proposals, the first of which was that a formula should be devised according to which the representative of the Arab Heads of State should act as arbiter. But the Jordanian government did not consider itself obliged to accept this, and in this it was acting within its rights.

Thus the only thing to do was for me to submit to the Arab Heads of State, who had appointed me as their delegate, a proposal in which I asked for the assistance of two more representatives of two other Arab countries, which would mean that the Committee would consist of five instead of three members. King Hussein, who was in London at the time, accepted this proposal, as did the Palestinians. However, I received a reply from only one country.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the statement by al-Adgham (referred to in some sources as Ladgham) to the United Press correspondent in Tunis, as published in *al-Amal* (Tunis), April 7, 1971.

Once the first difficulties had been surmounted, the Jordanian government made me feel that it only grudgingly accepted the good offices of the Committee, which in its view constituted a sort of tutelage which was incompatible with Jordanian sovereignty. In my view there is absolutely no justification for this reproach, which can only be regarded as ingratitude to the Committee and to the military observers who had assisted in putting an end to the anarchy that prevailed in Jordan and who had, against their will, been obliged to share in settling certain problems which, though internal ones, were of vital importance.

The fundamental difference concerns the destiny of the Palestinians themselves—what future awaits them within the framework of a peaceful settlement being reached, what role they will play should there be a war, and what serious talks they would take part in. All this has been neglected, both by public opinion in general and by the Arab countries. The important thing is not recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in the future, but that they should be allowed to play a part in forming their own destiny as from now. But instead of this the Jordanians started to keep a watch on their actions and movements and prevented them from taking any initiative on the pretext that this infringed the sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As a result of this, my mission reached an impasse, so I left Amman and submitted to all the Arab countries proposals to the effect that an arbiter should be appointed or that the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee should be expanded. But I have received only one reply, and Jarring's mission and fear of a renewal of fighting have relegated the Palestine question to a position of secondary importance.

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**Statements by King Hussein of Jordan Denying Any Intention of Destroying the Resistance and Explaining His Position on the West Bank and Jerusalem Included in a Speech to Jordanian Senators and Deputies<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, April 3, 1971**

We accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and continued to coordinate and co-operate. For our part we interpret the resolution, as far as we are concerned, to mean the ending of the occupation of all the territories occupied in June 1967, and first and foremost Jerusalem. People have said, and it is true, that our position in Jordan is different from that of the other territories which have been subjected to aggression and occupation by the enemy. Our positions in the West Bank are military positions at which the fighting stopped in 1947, but as far as our brothers are concerned, theirs are territorial frontiers with Palestine. Our answer to this was that the line must be the line of June 5, if there must be adjustments then there must be reciprocal adjustments, and they must be very minor ones made with our approval. As regards Jerusalem, it is occupied territory and must be returned; without Jerusalem there can be no peace. Jerusalem which is ours, that of our fathers and forefathers; our presence in it was the continuation of a situation that had lasted more than a thousand years. The right of the Muslims to the city is clear, as is that of the Christians. When the question of internationalization was raised we said that this went back to the United Nations Partition resolutions, and if internationalization was to be discussed at all it must be complete internationalization, and that if this was to be part of what we were to discuss we demand a return to the Partition

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Hussein's speech made at a meeting at the Basman Palace attended by the Prime Minister, Senators and deputies and other Jordanian officials, *al-Dustur* (Amman), April 4, 1971.

resolution and full implementation of the Partition resolutions, most of which Israel disregarded in 1948. We also said that our Palestinian brothers must get together. This is our interpretation of the resolution. Our attitude is that there must be total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, that the Palestinian people must obtain their rights in conformity with the United Nations resolutions. We have believed in these rights and defended them.

As for us, in the face of all the attempts to misrepresent things, of the provocation and questioning, and perhaps of a certain feeling on our part, we have said and we still say, that when all the Arab territory is returned and we liberate the people living in it, we shall let them choose what they want—either to return to the situation we were living in before and which we were building up and improving, or to establish some kind of federation or anything else they should choose in complete freedom. I did not actually discuss this subject—by freedom I mean being free from expulsion and fear; it is neither right nor permissible that Israel's rifles should be withdrawn only to be replaced by others, so that the people would be deprived of the right to self-determination. The day when the occupation comes to an end and the people are rescued they will be given the chance to exercise their right to self-determination in full freedom. This is what I have to say on this subject. This is our attitude—there is no other—along with preparation and the building up of strength, because without strength we can have no effect on the enemy. We frankly believe that to cast the blame on this or that quarter in the world was probably right. We must ask the various countries to adopt specific attitudes, but the essential question is here. It has been widely repeated in our Arab homeland that the state intends to put an end to commando action, but if anyone were to search for a logical justification for this allegation he would be unable to find it. Because we believe that force is the way to liberation of the territory, putting pressure on our enemy, and making the world understand that there is a problem that must be dealt with and that it should change the

attitudes of certain countries, and since nothing we hoped for has been achieved, why should any man or any quarter in this country want to put an end to something that we regard as being from us and for us, and whose strength is part of our strength? Has Israel so far agreed to implement the Security Council resolution [of November 22, 1967]? Has Israel so far agreed to give us back our land and withdraw? Has anything we demand and seek been achieved with this dispute between us and some of our brothers? I myself cannot find the answer to this question, and I don't suppose anyone else can either. But most regrettably, all the conflicts of the Arab nation, all the conflicts of the world, have been introduced into this theater, to the land of the martyrs, and they are doing much to tear us apart, as regards our efforts and our energies, in a way which nothing but the awareness of the people of this country and the genuinely Arab reaction of its sons, Palestinians and Jordanians alike, could stop. The letter we recently sent to our brother Arab leaders was in fact a continuation of the discussion which was in the letter broadcast a few days ago and which was sent at the end of last year. I profoundly regret and am deeply pained by what is going on, by the attempts to make this country a scapegoat, to bring impermissible accusations against it.

I referred a short time ago to the role that I think the Resistance could have performed and that any resistance movement should perform in the occupied territory. This role, unfortunately, as is being performed in this country itself, attempts to split national unity, the pupil being prevented from going to school, the man being prevented from feeling secure about himself and his wife if she goes out of the house, and about his son and his daughter—a state of alarm and terror—and the soldier and the officer coming on leave from the front line—our bridges, our culverts, our oil refinery and our railways. In the past it was the enemy's forces that carried out the raids; now we ask what is the

reason and the justification. I want to go back with you to the period between 1948 and 1967 and recall how the enemy attacked remote villages, and what a fuss there was everywhere because the army wasn't there, so that we were obliged to distribute our forces all over the place, thereby providing the enemy with the opportunity to advance and get what he wanted more easily in June 1967.

It is obviously the same thing all over again—attempts to wear down our strength, attempts to turn us aside from our training and equipping, from our preparation and confrontation of the enemy in the most dangerous circumstances, at the most dangerous stage.

The situation on the Suez Canal may explode at any moment, it may explode here. Once again I must reaffirm to all our brothers that we feel that unless this country is ready in the full sense of the word, it will be a very great loss to our nation. We are aware and heedful of this, we constantly call attention to it, but there is a campaign of misrepresentation and distortion of the facts and perversion of meanings being directed against this country, both throughout the whole of the Arab homeland and abroad. Because our enemy does not want to return to the lines he started out from in 1967, he and those who sympathize with him are trying once more to change the situation in the territory in his interests.

So that when the time comes he may withdraw much less than we desire and hope for—and there are many indications that he is making a plan that will be carried out at our expense. It is being said that we are dealing with the situation with violence. We have been unspeakably pained that we should have to deal violently with anyone in this country—we use violence to deal with our enemies, the enemies of our nation—but what we have to put up with, what every one of us has had to put up with is not mentioned. We are continuing to put up with a great deal, but there are limits, and I must say with all frankness and quite clearly that we cannot bargain over the security and stability of this country, over its laws and regulations, over the security of the

soldiers and the citizen—under no circumstances can we permit this.

The situation that confronts this country is painful. Our enemy had long been planning to destroy national unity and to solve the problem on the basis of its being a purely Palestinian one. Of course it is connected with the Palestinians and certainly the people of Palestine are in the vanguard, and we are concerned that their rights should be fully implemented. But it seems that there is a contrary current encouraging such ideas and trends, at a time when the whole of Palestine is occupied by our enemy, when the whole of Palestine, in addition to other Arab territories, is occupied by enemies. Once again, the thing that I have felt for a long time is the fact that our nation is not doing all it could to ensure the outcome of this battle. It may be that for one reason or another people may find short ways of solving the problem and being rid of the consequences and the responsibilities. It pained me deeply when I went abroad recently and, as a result of the contacts I made, I realized that the talk about the state or the statelet or an entity, whether in the West Bank or in the West Bank and part of the East Bank, with the exception of Jerusalem or perhaps including parts of it, was extremely serious, and that Arab contacts were being made at international level—with the great powers in fact—in this connection. This was the reason why before I went away, as a result of the information at my disposal, I sent the letter that was broadcast a few days ago—the reason why I called again for a summit conference. We cannot imagine that there could be a graver situation than that through which we are now passing. I don't know what the outcome will be, but I have always hoped and I still hope that we shall confront this with complete frankness in our Arab homeland and know exactly what is intended, and if any of our brothers holds other views, we will make them clear in all frankness, so that we may know the way and what it is like and only bear those burdens and consequences that it is our duty to bear, except here at home—you can see what the situation

is like and how we are all living. Unfortunately there are some people who like to stir things up from time to time and to create an abnormal and unnatural atmosphere, and the strange thing is that our enemies abroad, the information media that are hostile to us, to our nation and our cause, follow the same line, say the same things, follow the same trends as some of those who are of us and ought to have been for us. During the recent deterioration we were also in touch with some of our brothers; we prepared a letter and sent it to the Kings and Heads of State. With our brothers in Syria, of course, things are much better than they were, and my brother went to Damascus and was very warmly welcomed by our brothers there. On the same day a responsible person came to this country, who was, of course, in direct contact with the Resistance and as soon as he arrived he sent cables of warning to all groups and sections of the Resistance, saying that the state was after them in Irbid and in such and such a place, so that they must be in the highest state of alert and readiness and preparedness. After this action the only explanation we could find was that attempts were being made to isolate and injure this country, attempts to follow a course that could only be of service to our enemies and the enemies of every man who claims to be concerned for Palestine and for action on behalf of Palestine.

As for Irbid, things went on for 24 hours without any kind of counter measure being taken, until it reached the stage where people made such an uproar that the garrison that was there was sent in, and the affair was ended quickly and simply, and people were greatly relieved. I was greatly pained when I saw how low some people stooped to justify certain actions. . . .

But real attempts are being made by those in authority to contact those in charge on the other side, and of course [attempts must be made] by us too, as is always our way when there is one hope in a million that the position

may be concluded without any kind of violence and that we may rid Amman of armed men and arms once and for all. It was something that should never have happened in view of all the agreements concluded between us and them and the fighting should have stopped in a very short time, for there certainly should never be fighting between brothers and relatives. Things have now got to the stage of attempts at sabotage in all parts of the country. As you know yesterday it was the refinery, the railway, and many other places—bridges, culverts, ambushing of armed patrols on the front lines.

Also at the Arab level, once more I repeat that it is not a question of either a peaceful or a military solution. There is only one possible solution we can accept—the recovery of our territory, the rescue of Jerusalem and the rescue of our people. But unfortunately the whole question is the result of the introduction into our theater of all Arab and world conflicts, and these include elements actually linked with our enemy. The Arab leaders will have to admit this when we meet them and talk to them, and all this demands that we should be on the alert, that every one of us should work in his own sphere and cooperate in warding off the schemes being made against this country, against our nation and our cause.

. . . . .

## 304

**Statement Issued by the High Command of the Forces of the Palestine Revolution Emphasizing Palestinian Adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements and Deploring Violations on the Part of Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**April 4, 1971**

Masses of our people, heroic revolutionaries:

In view of the deliberate escalation of the bloody fighting by the subservient separatist authorities against the members of our long-suffering people throughout the East Bank and against the bases of our revolutionaries provided for by the Cairo and Amman Agreements; in view of this deliberate escalation going on within the framework of an ugly colonialist plan, and causing the killing and wounding of hundreds of members of our people every day, it is necessary to state the following:

1. The command of the Palestine revolution has adhered fully and meticulously to the spirit and letter of the Agreements, and implemented all their provisions with a view to

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the statement, *Fateh* (Damascus), April 6, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjeh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

saving the people and the homeland from a disaster planned by those who are anxious to kill the Palestine revolution and to liquidate the Palestinian people.

2. The Palestine revolution has bent over backwards and gone much further than was required of it in implementing the Agreements; this we thought would lead to the authorities curbing their defiance, desisting from their plans for liquidation and abandoning their criminal intentions. But the exact opposite has happened; the massacres perpetrated at Jerash, al-Rusaifa, Mafraq and al-Buq'a, and the massacre in the town and camp of Irbid, were all carried out under the protection of the Agreements. These restricted us because we adhered to them, and gave the subservient authorities freedom of action against our people and our revolution because they did not adhere to them.

3. At the moment when an Arab conference at the level of Heads of State and Kings is about to meet, the authorities continue to implement their plans which were drawn up by American intelligence circles; they are continuing with the implementation of the remainder of their plans, as is shown by the following:

a. At this historic moment, for five days the heavy artillery and automatic weapons of the authorities have been shelling Gaza Camp and our bases in the Jerash and Jordan Valley areas, from the areas in which they are stationed in the Radar area and the Dair al-Layan areas. Every moment dozens are being killed and wounded in intrepid Gaza Camp, while at the same time the Zionist enemy is practicing the cruellest kinds of terrorism against steadfast and heroic Gaza.

b. The forces of the authorities are molesting all our patrols and supply convoys along the lines of communication guaranteed us by the Agreements. This has happened for three consecutive nights at the entrance to Ramtha, where the authorities have tried to capture our supply convoys. They are also constantly molesting our bases in the northern areas, and the authorities' forces have prevented access to sources of water to our



revolutionaries in the Jordan Valley in the hope that they will die of thirst.

4. The authorities have so expanded their campaign of arrests and imprisonment that the number of those in prison has risen to thousands, although the Agreements stipulated that detainees should be released and that the persecution and intimidation of citizens should cease.

5. The authorities have dismissed hundreds, indeed thousands of Palestinians and Jordanians, both civilians and military men, in an attempt to place our people in such desperate financial straits that they would be forced to submit and surrender to the colonialist schemes aimed at the liquidation of the people and the cause.

Masses of our steadfast people, heroic revolutionaries:

In the light of the above the following is clear to all members of our people and to the masses of our Arab nation:

1. That the subservient authorities in Amman are carrying out a scheme of liquidation that is completely in accord with Zionist plans, and that they are determined to implement this scheme even if the revolution goes further than adhering to the past agreements, and even if we make further concessions.

2. There is no guarantee that our people and our revolution will be protected now that the agents have trampled underfoot the Agreement signed by the Kings and Heads of State and all the agreements derived from it. Therefore, faced as they are with this bloody and regrettable tragedy, it is now incumbent on the forces of the revolution to resist, and firmly, in defense of the members of our people who are under attack and of our steadfast bases, and to strike hard at all who try to impede our steadfast revolutionary advance.

Revolution until victory.

### 305

#### **Declaration of Support for the Palestine Resistance Issued in the Final Statement of the Sixth Session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Constitutional Party of Tunisia<sup>1</sup>**

**Tunis, April 4, 1971**

The Central Committee fully supports the Palestinian liberation movement in its legitimate struggle for the freedom of the Palestinian people and for their self-determination in their usurped territory.

It believes that the countries of the Mediterranean basin should continue their efforts to make [the Mediterranean] a lake of peace, an area of prosperity and a point of radiation for cooperation and action for the achievement of peace and the safeguarding of international understanding.

### 306

#### **Press Interview Statements by Baath Party (Iraq) Assistant Secretary-General al-Aisami, Reiterating the View That Armed Struggle Is the Only Means to the Liberation of Palestine<sup>2</sup>**

**Baghdad, April 5, 1971**

*Q. How is it possible to define the scope of the battle in which the Arab nation is at present engaged?*

*A. The present battle is without the slightest doubt a battle of destiny, because the ferocious attack which Zionism and imperial-*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the Destour Socialist Party Central Committee's statement, *al-Amal* (Tunis), April 6, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Aisami's interview granted to the Iraqi News Agency on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the founding of the Baath Party, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), April 6, 1971.

ism are concentrating against the Arab nation is aimed not only at liquidating the Palestine problem, but, through its liquidation, at smothering and stifling the spirit of steadfastness and revolution in the Arab nation.

*Q. Ever since the [Baath] Party was founded, its literature has always expressed the idea that the way to liberate Palestine is through armed struggle, and the truth of this has been confirmed by history. How can the scope of the Arab battle be defined in the light of the Party's concept of our battle in Palestine?*

A. It is now obvious that Palestine cannot be liberated by peaceful and political methods, because it was usurped by force and aggression, and what was taken by force can only be recovered by force. This principle has been confirmed by the experiences of all struggling peoples. It is not too much to say that the history of the Palestine problem itself confirms this fact more than anything else, because the repeated revolutions in which the Arabs of Palestine have engaged since the end of World War I would not have failed had not the effete politicians intervened and stopped the advance of the revolution so as to deal with the problem by political means and compromise solutions. Therefore the commands of the Resistance have a great historical responsibility at this particular stage, when certain Arab rulers have brought the Palestine problem to the brink of liquidation. This responsibility requires of them that they should lose no time in unifying the forces of the Resistance in accordance with solid, serious and effective formulae for unity. They must also learn the lessons of their own cause, and take advantage of the experiences of other peoples and revolutions in the world that have struggled for liberation. The only way is revolutionary war, and there is no alternative to it as a decisive retort to effete solutions involving liquidation and to ensure the recovery of Palestine.

*Q. The Palestine problem has brought the Arab progressive forces to the parting of the ways and the revolutionary identity has been unambiguously defined so that there is no possibility of its being confused with anything else. What is the effect of this question on the Party and its*

*relations with the organizations and regimes?*

A. Erroneous and exaggerated conceptions of the situation before June 5, the concealing of errors and negative attitudes, the continued misleading of the masses by powerful propaganda, the elimination of their role, the imposition on them of tutelage and the fragmentation of the popular revolutionary organizations—all these led to the June defeat, which disclosed how false were the claims of the regimes to be revolutionary. These regimes which provided opportunities for the reactionary regimes and the leaders who are up to their necks in subservience, like the rulers of Tunisia, place themselves on an equal footing with them. A truce was made between the reactionary and the progressive regimes and agreement was reached on the methods to be employed to deal with the Palestine problem—the method of a peaceful solution, which is, in fact, surrender, and will lead to the Zionist entity being more firmly rooted and to the liquidation of the Palestine problem. This is why the forces of endurance and revolution had to lose no time in closing their ranks and confronting this policy, and to struggle obstinately to make these projects miscarry. In my opinion the Palestine problem is now the touchstone of all the forces, which will really disclose the extent to which they are revolutionary, because the methods, means, claims and slogans in existence before June cannot in these days continue to exist in the minds of the masses in the same form as before, the reason being that the problem has taken on an unambiguous character and placed all the forces in one of two positions—either steadfastness, confrontation and the adoption of the method of popular armed struggle, or advance along the course of peaceful solutions which in fact means acceptance of the *fait accompli*, the perpetuation of the June defeat, recognition of the Zionist entity, liquidation of the Palestine problem, regional self-sufficiency and compliance with the forces of imperialism and reaction.

## 307

**Press Statement by Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Khalaf (Abu Ayyad), Denying Any New Agreement Between the Central Committee and the Government of Jordan and Demanding Full Implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, April 5, 1971**

Certain news agencies have said that the statement issued yesterday by the Central Committee was the result of an agreement between the Central Committee and the authorities. We deny this and declare that there is no new agreement between the Resistance and the authorities.

We demand the implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements because we, for our part, have implemented everything related to them so that the Central Committee might not give the authorities any justification for entering Amman and carrying out a new massacre of its citizens. We removed the small quantities of arms that remained as a uni-

lateral measure, and not as the result of a new agreement, and we do not link this measure with any agreement for the release of the detainees or anything else. This has absolutely no connection with the statement of the Central Committee.

At this very moment as I am meeting you, the authorities are carrying out an artillery bombardment of our bases in the Jerash area begun at 3 o'clock this morning and still continuing. Their tanks are moving and, in my belief, an extensive military operation is going on in Jerash and the Ajlun woods. I should not be surprised if this proves to be the prelude to entering the city of Amman, as Amman radio has prepared for this with a number of trumped up justifications.

There are many indications that it is not a security matter. All the statements of Riyadh al-Muflih, those issued on March 31, 1971, and those in the cable he sent to the Conference of Kings and Heads of State or in the form of the King's message to the Kings and Presidents—all of them confirm that it is not a matter of security but of striking at the Resistance, a matter of whether it is to exist or not to exist. We know that many attempts are being made, including contacts with those connected with the authorities, to establish something to be known as "Honorable" Commando Action, and to regard the Palestine revolution as being non-existent in Jordan. The reason why the Central Committee issued its statement was to deprive the government of any justifications by which it might try to mislead Arab and world opinion, for there are neither arms nor commandos in Amman. We declare that Amman is open, and any security forces can enter it. But in spite of all this, it is very possible that the Army may enter Amman at any moment, especially after the incidents that have taken place in Jerash and Ajlun.

What is required at the present juncture? The situation is extremely grave and may well develop at any moment into a civil war which will not be settled, as the authorities think, overnight, but will be a prolonged conflict. If the authorities do not withdraw and announce that they are prepared to

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Khalaf's Statement, *Fateh* (Damascus), April 6, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjeh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements, the massacre will take place; then civil war is to be expected and will come about. What is required is that the government should announce that it will abide by the decisions, and this people must have a new national government which is able to implement these agreements and all the commitments announced by the authorities, such as a general amnesty and national conciliation. These things must be implemented, and in our view if the government does not issue an official statement to the effect that it intends to implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements, things will get worse.

If the authorities' attack on our bases in Jerash and Ajlun does not stop, it means that the attack on Amman will take place and that the conspiracy to liquidate the Resistance will run its full course. We of the Central Committee have made all the concessions we could, to the extent of being accused by the masses of feebleness and treason. All this we have done to avoid further bloodshed and a new massacre. Further than this we cannot go. Let everyone be responsible for the measures he takes. We regard the attack on Jerash and Ajlun, and the justifications put out by the authorities this morning and this afternoon as meaning that they are going on with the implementation of their plan. Our Arab brothers must hear us. Unfortunately the Arab meeting called a week ago has not yet taken place. All the Arab countries must move, because the object of this operation is complete liquidation. We do not hold the Jordanian government alone responsible for this, but also all the Arab governments that are unwilling to intervene to stop these massacres.

**Memorandum to the U.A.R. Embassy in Amman from the Foreign Ministry of Jordan, Stating Jordan's Refusal To Attend the Cairo Meeting of Representatives of Arab Heads of State and Reiterating King Hussein's Call for an Arab Summit Conference<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, April 7, 1971**

In his letter to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Kings and Heads of State, on November 25, 1970, His Majesty the King called for the convening of an Arab summit conference and he repeated this call on April 1, 1971, in the hope that there might be frank and full discussion of everything that affects and surrounds the Palestine problem in all fields and from his conviction that this was required by the situation and the grave circumstances through which that cause is passing.

Moreover, the Jordanian state is, for its part, meticulously implementing the Cairo and Amman Agreements and the agreements derived from them as it maintains its unwavering attitude of determination to sustain the noble Resistance of its people—that Resistance that is resisting the occupation which oppresses Palestine and the territory of several other Arab countries. It never has abandoned and never will abandon this attitude as long as occupation, aggression, and tyranny continue to confront us, and when they have passed away it will never abandon its determination that the Palestinian people shall exercise their right to self-determination, secure from all kinds of influence, pressure, intimidation and attempts to impose a situation they do not consent to by any quarter whatsoever, in absolute free-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the memorandum, *al-Dustur* (Amman), April 8, 1971. (*Al-Dustur* reported that the Jordanian Foreign Ministry received a memorandum on this subject from the U.A.R. Embassy on the same morning.)

States represented at the meeting in Cairo were Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sanaa), Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R.

dom. However, the Jordanian state rejects any bargaining over its laws and regulations as absolutely as it rejects any bargaining over the security of any of its citizens in the towns and villages or any part of Jordanian territory, or over the honor and safety of either the state or the citizen. The state also totally rejects the claim that any other quarter can be more concerned than it is over the shedding of a single drop of Arab blood or more determined that this blood should only be shed on the field of struggle in defense of the destiny of our Arab nation and the right of our Palestinian Arab people to recover all their rights in the occupied territory. Similarly the Jordanian state rejects any claim that any quarter whatsoever is more concerned than Jordan for honorable commando action. The Jordanian state also rejects any suggestion of tutelage over it on the part of any quarter whatsoever, and refuses to allow aspersions to be cast on the sincerity of its Arabism and of its sacred struggle, which the deaths of armies of martyrs have dedicated to a single, proud Arab people stationed on the longest line of confrontation which threatens both our Arab nation and its honor. The Jordanian state similarly refuses to bear the consequences of the blunders of the Resistance caused by the penetration into its ranks of all the conflicts of the Arabs and the world; the command of the Resistance is entirely responsible for allowing this to happen, as are certain other quarters outside this steadfast country. The state also refuses to set the honor of its soldiers, the safety of the rear of its armed forces and its security men in the balance.

The Jordanian state wishes to draw attention to the fact that Arab attitudes to Jordan, based on false claims or on the desire of some Arabs to shirk their responsibilities as regards support for Jordan, or resulting from an attempt to destroy its national unity as a prelude to proceeding with suspect and hostile plans, aim at creating a puny entity to satisfy occupying Zionism and to enable it to evade the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 calling for withdrawal from the occupied territory and, first and foremost, Jerusalem. Faced with the continued employment of this method, the Jordanian state adds

that it finds itself obliged to draw attention to the dangers involved therein to the Arab nation and its destiny; the Jordanian state also affirms that it regards this procedure as encouraging certain groups which live in security and order in this country to continue on their course of provocation of the homeland and its citizens, which is a matter that the state must deal with in a decisive manner. The aim of this course of action was to make commando action liquidate and destroy itself through a clash with the state. After this the blame was to be cast on Jordan, which was to be held responsible for what happened, as a prelude to the further dissolution of the political and military position of the confrontation states in their confrontation of the enemy, after which a start was to be made on the implementation of partial solutions which could do no possible good to Palestine or any of the other countries.

In the light of all this Jordan repeats the call of its leader for a summit meeting of the Kings and Heads of State and makes its excuses for not attending the meeting of the representatives of the leaders, some of whom are in Cairo. It believes that the atmosphere and form of the meeting can only lead to impermissible accusations being made against Jordan. Jordan holds these leaders responsible before God, man and history for such decisions as they may take, and calls on them always to follow the dictates of their consciences. At the same time it welcomes any or all of them, or any Arab who will take the trouble to come to Jordan to acquaint himself with the situation and the facts.

## 309

**Lebanese Press Interview Statements by President al-Bakr of Iraq, Deploring the Disintegration of the Eastern Front and Reiterating Iraqi Opposition to Acceptance of Proposed "Peaceful Solutions" in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, April 8, 1971**

*Q. Within what framework are Iraq's relations with Egypt, Jordan and Syria respectively to be viewed?*

A. Our relations with the Arab countries that surround Israel, are in all respects defined by the views held by the ruling regimes of the Palestine problem and the Zionist occupation that has oppressed its territory since 1948. For we see the aggression of June 5, 1967, as nothing more or less than an extension and expansion of the imperialist-Zionist aggression which started with the illegal establishment of the Israeli entity in our usurped Arab territory.

We have always been concerned that our relations with these countries should be good and fruitful, because we make a distinction between the attitudes of their governments and the interests of the Arab people in those countries. It is the established regimes in the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan that define our attitude to them in all respects because the revolution in Iraq has from the start regarded the problem of Palestine as being the crux of its Arab and international policy. Consequently its relations with other countries are defined in the light of their attitudes to the Palestine problem.

*Q. What is your view of the proposed union between Egypt, the Sudan, Libya and Syria?*

A.. Our Party has always given its blessing to any serious step towards union, on condition that it was of service to the goal of the

total liberation of occupied Arab territory, and that the people should be allowed to give full expression to their will, ambitions and aspirations, and that such a step should play its part in supporting popular armed struggle and should reject all formulae and solutions involving liquidation and surrender.

It is on this basic principle that we establish and define our attitude to the proposed union of the four countries.

Arab unity has foundations, conditions and safeguards that protect it from attempts at backsliding and separatism, and such a union, imposed from above on the basis of axes, being isolated from the toiling masses, could only help the enemies of unity to strike at the genuine concept of the comprehensive unity that is desired and which our people aspires to achieve on socialist, democratic and revolutionary foundations.

*Q. What are your comments on the article by Mr. Michel Aflaq published in the magazine al-Ahrrar in Beirut a few days ago, on the necessity for immediate union between Iraq, Egypt and Syria, on the grounds that their respective regimes are similar?*

A. Arab unity is one of the most important goals of the Baath Party; it is the pivot of its creed and the basis of its long struggle.

The pioneer experience of union in 1958 taught us that there must be objective foundations and conditions that will ensure its success and survival, and that there must be no neglect of those safeguards that guarantee its continuation and prevent a repetition of backsliding and secession. Moreover, unity, in our Party's view, must be based on the revolutionary masses and be guided by a popular socialist democratic regime, which eschews every kind of claim to superiority, bureaucracy and domination of the masses.

This is why we hasten to answer any call to unity which fulfills these conditions and can give the Arabs strength in their battle of destiny against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

*Q. What has happened to the idea of the Eastern Front? And what is Iraq's attitude to it?*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Bakr's exclusive interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), April 9, 1971.

A. The Iraq of July 17 threw all its weight and all its resources on the side of the establishment of a strong Eastern Front under a single military command, which would be capable of meeting its national obligations in full.

With this end in view, Iraq stationed the majority of its armed forces on the Front, providing them with the most modern arms and equipment and developing their combat capacity, in accordance with the slogan "All for the battle."

But unfortunately, from the start the Eastern Front was confronted with all sorts of fabricated impediments and obstacles which became more serious with the acceptance by some Arab regimes, of the Rogers Plan and Security Council Resolution 242, and culminated in the decision, taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Forces following the Tripoli Conference, to dissolve the Eastern Front command.

The disintegration of the Eastern Front was a grave blow to the unified Arab confrontation of Israel and her imperialist masters, and a service to world Zionism.

*Q. What does Iraq think of President Anwar Sadat's attitude since his speeches of March 7 and February 5 and subsequent new attitudes as regards Israel?*

A. From the start we definitely and decisively rejected Security Council Resolution 242 and all the proposals, formulae and solutions based on it, because we firmly believe that they cannot lead to the realization of the legitimate demands and rights of the people of Palestine and the Arab nation, and that, basically, their aim is to perpetuate the aggressive Zionist entity in our great homeland and ensure its survival which, in turn, would ensure the survival of imperialist influence and safeguard its inordinate and illegitimate interests.

There was nothing new in President Sadat's speeches of February 5 and March 7; they were a continuation of the United Arab Republic's policy of accepting peaceful solutions. In rejecting all solutions involving liquidation and surrender we are affirming that the only way to recover our rights in

full is the way of force supported by the shedding of our blood and the sacrifice of our lives.

*Q. How are Iraq's relations with Palestinian commando action?*

A. The commands of the Party and the revolution have provided all kinds of support to the Palestinian commando organizations, and made every effort to develop commando action and ensure its unification and independence, as being the vanguard of the Arab revolution in its violent clash with the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

In spite of all efforts to decry Iraq's attitude, our relations with the forces of the Palestine revolution remain normal, for the commando organizations realize that the Iraq of July 17 and its leading Party are the true allies of the sections of the armed struggle, and that it has stood by them in all conditions and given them every kind of support they have requested.

The visit to Baghdad of the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the discussion with the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, indicate how strong the relations and how close the cohesion between our Party and revolution and the forces of the Palestine revolution are in the service of rejection and steadfastness in the face of the plans to effect liquidation and to perpetuate the defeat.

*Q. Why have the Iraqi forces withdrawn from Jordan?*

A. Our gallant army went to the front to fight, in the performance of a sacred national duty, and when certain Arab regimes abandoned the concept of the battle being an all-Arab one and proceeded along the course of defeat and surrender, and when the Tripoli Conference adopted its resolution dissolving the Eastern Front command, there was no longer any justification for our forces remaining outside Iraq. We hope that our forces may be able to perform their national role in the near future, when the logic of steadfastness and liberation has prevailed over the mentality of surrender to the fact of

Zionist occupation. Our army and our people will respond to the call to battle as soon as it is sounded.

### 310

#### **Statement by Chief-of-Staff Tlas of Syria, Announcing the Formation of a New Committee of Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian Representatives To Effect the Implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and To End Clashes Between the Palestine Resistance and Government Forces in Jordan (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, April 9, 1971**

...I met Jordanian leaders headed by King Husayn and conveyed to them a verbal message from President Hafiz al-Asad. I informed them of his eagerness to preserve

the Palestine Resistance and the Jordanian Arab Army and said the Arab nation's interests dictated an immediate end to the fighting among the brothers because continuation of the clashes could only serve the Zionist enemy.

I also informed the Jordanian authorities on Lt-Gen. Hafiz al-Asad's behalf that Syria was completely ready to co-operate with Jordan in all fields in the service of the supreme Arab interest and for the prosperity of the two fraternal peoples. I found complete understanding of the situation and complete readiness to co-operate on the part of the Jordanian authorities. At the end of the meeting agreement was reached on the formation of a six-man committee to formulate measures to put the Cairo and Amman agreements into effect and for their implementation and complete respect by both sides. This Committee will be empowered to settle all problems between the two sides. Agreement was also reached that the aforementioned committee be formed in accordance with the following principles: (a) Two members, one of ministerial rank and one an officer of general's rank, to be appointed by the Syrian Government; (b) two members, one of ministerial rank and one of general's rank, to be appointed by the Jordanian Government; (c) two members to be appointed by the Palestine Resistance Central Committee.

This morning I met four brother members of the Palestine Resistance Command in Amman. I conveyed to them the agreement reached between us and the Jordanian authorities and they showed satisfaction at the results achieved....

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted text of Tlas' statement to the Syrian News Agency on his return to Damascus broadcast on Damascus Home Service in Arabic; English translation of excerpt in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3656/A/3-A/4; reprinted by permission. The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjeh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Document on Palestine 1970*.)



## 311

**Cable Message to the Representatives of Arab Heads of State from King Hussein of Jordan Asserting Support for the Palestine Resistance, Rejecting Arab "Tutelage," and Calling for an Arab Summit Conference<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, April 10, 1971**

To the representatives of the Arab Kings and Heads of State assembled in Cairo:

We in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, King, government and people alike, along with the armed forces which are an embodiment of, among other things, the solidity of our national unity in all its unstained purity, which unite in struggle the flower of our youth and grown men, and are the hope of our people and our nation on the longest and most dangerous line of confrontation with the enemy.

We and everything we represent are all of us zealous for the right of our people to resist occupation, oppression and aggression wherever they beset us; this we regard as our destiny, and also the noblest and most sublime thing that a resistance, as it is directed against the positions of the enemy who has usurped and is occupying our land, can represent. Our zeal for the Resistance in this struggle is unbounded, and no one, whoever he may be, can surpass us in our zeal. For the Resistance derives exclusively from us and is of our very essence. In this connection I absolutely refuse, as do all members of our people, to accept any explanation implying that there are problems between two parties in our land for, in all truth and frankness I cannot conceive of problems arising between us and ourselves. Moreover, we have always been and shall always be the shield of the Resistance; we have been its protectors and provided it with fuel for the battle of destiny. And we regard Arab

blood as being too dear and precious to be shed elsewhere than on the field of honor and of struggle on behalf of our loftiest goals and those of our nation, and in defense of the rights of all of us.

We believe that the occupation by the enemy of the whole of Palestine and of the other Arab territories usurped from other Arab countries can only be reinforced and made permanent by the repeated attempts that are being made to impair the sacred unity of our people here in Jordan, even before we have achieved our goal of liberating our Jerusalem and all the Arab territory occupied since June 1967, and before the total recovery of the right of our Palestinian Arab people to self-determination free of any kind of intimidation or pressure after liberation is achieved.

It pains us greatly to see and hear steadfast and struggling Jordan being constantly attacked and deprived of all the support and aid to which it is entitled in the battle it is fighting, a battle whose outcome will affect the destiny of the whole nation. It pains me, too, that there should be men who constantly make every effort to split and splinter unified Arab action in the political and military fields and in the field of struggle, and endeavor to rend apart our one people by introducing into their ranks all the conflicts that beset the outside world.

To all who are zealous for that which inspires our zeal we have responded and shall continue to respond in a genuinely and purely Arab spirit. The consequence of our response was the Cairo and Amman Agreements and the subsequent agreements they gave rise to. This was also the reason for continuous efforts on our part to organize the theater of struggle in conformity with the sanctity of the battle we are fighting. All this has been governed by a fervently Arab and nationalist spirit that is aware of the magnitude of the peril that threatens us and our nation. At the same time we reject all kinds of tutelage and incrimination, just as we refuse to bargain over the security of the homeland, the safety of the national unity of our people, the laws and regulations of the land, our national honor or the safety of the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Hussein's cable, *al-Dustur* (Amman), April 11, 1971.

States represented at the meeting in Cairo were Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sanaa), Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R.

citizen. Nor shall we ever agree to bargain over the right of our armed forces, which triumphed at Karameh, to be appreciated and esteemed and to feel confident that their rear is secure. They are also entitled to expect that the people and all our resources will back them in the battles they are fighting and in the protection and succor they are providing to those engaged in the struggle, in the manner of the armies of their martyrs who have laid down their lives for the honor and glory of this nation.

All of us have appreciated and responded fully to the Syrian national initiative, for it is the initiative of one brother towards another, of one comrade in the battle towards another, for the coordination, organization and sound mobilization of all righteous resources in the field of battle and, with God's help, this is our common destiny.

As for all that hinders our cause of destiny and the dangers that surround it, allow me, with my truest and profoundest respect for you, to affirm that the only way it is possible to decide how this problem is to be dealt with in the future is for all the Arab leaders to hold a meeting in a spirit of absolute frankness, after which they will assume their responsibilities to the full. For some time we have been calling for such a meeting, which is an urgent national necessity for the confrontation of all the perils and challenges.

In conclusion, things are proceeding as we, and every genuine Arab, wish that they should proceed, towards unmasking those who are tampering with our destiny and that of our nation. Throughout our course we have molested and challenged only those who challenged or injured us. It is mere hypothesis to demand the discussion of impending clashes in our territory, as you have said, were it not that hidden hands are preparing a clash with us in the service of the enemy; I beg that you will allow me to express my absolute confidence that steadfast Jordan will not be destroyed as its enemies and the enemies of our nation have planned and would wish.

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.

312

**Appeal for a Stop to Clashes in Jordan, Addressed to King Hussein of Jordan and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) by the Representatives of Arab Heads of State<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, April 10, 1971**

The representatives of the Arab Kings and Heads of State now meeting in Cairo, having received with the greatest regret the reports of the recent clashes between the Jordanian forces and the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in the light of the concern of the whole of the Arab nation that the Palestine Resistance should continue its holy war as the noblest and most sublime manifestation of gallant resistance, and on the basis of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, call on the two parties to put a stop to present or imminent clashes in order to provide an atmosphere favorable to dealing with the causes which led to the situation deteriorating, to preserve precious Arab blood and prevent its being shed in vain, with a view to reaping the fruits of the constructive Syrian initiative and to preserving Arab efforts and saving them for the day of the decisive battle with the enemy of the Arab nation.

We who attend the conference are confident that you will intervene immediately, from your position of national responsibility, to respond to this call without procrastination or delay, for we are convinced that war between brothers can be of benefit only to the Zionist-imperialist enemy who is preparing terrible plans to destroy Jordan as a base of steadfastness and liberation, and inasmuch as there are agents of this enemy who are creating incidents and trying to ensure that the blind strife continues, and from our belief that the cohesion of the armed forces and the forces of the Palestine revolution in

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the representatives' appeal, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 11, 1971.

States represented at the conference in Cairo were Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sanaa), Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R.

the face of the Zionist enemy can ensure victory, as happened at Karamah, when honor was recovered by brotherhood in arms and the mingling of the blood of martyrs on the field of battle.

### 313

#### **Declarations by the Kuwait National Assembly Supporting Kuwaiti Government Determination To Reject Any Proposed Middle East Solution Unacceptable to the Palestinian People and Not To Provide Aid to Jordan in the Event of Continued Clashes with the Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Kuwait, April 11, 1971**

Your Highness:

This Assembly shares the government's belief that the aggressor state, in spite of its deceitful and misleading claim that it desires peace and intends to accept Security Council resolutions, is in fact making unrelenting efforts, secretly and publicly, to impede their implementation, in the hope of realizing its expansionist ambitions by annexing parts of the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967. This is confirmed beyond all possibility of doubt by its continued refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. For all these reasons this Assembly fully supports the government in its refusal to recognize any solution of the Palestine problem which is unacceptable to the Palestinian Arab people, who alone have the right to take decisions in this case. It also fully supports the government in its continued support of the armed struggle of this people, as embodied in its gallant commando movement in all the occupied Arab territories,

and especially in its heroic actions in the area of steadfast Gaza, to recover its legitimate rights in its usurped homeland. This Assembly likewise supports the government in everything that may lead to its adhering to this right policy, and calls on it to continue its support of the steadfastness of the Arab countries situated on the frontiers with the enemy. However, it must be understood that Kuwait's attitude to the aid it provides to the government of Jordan must be clear and unambiguous, such aid not being renewed unless that government stops its war against the commandos and affirms its serious intention of fighting the usurping enemy, so that Kuwait may not be accused of contributing to this bloody and regrettable tragedy. This Assembly has been caused the profoundest regret by the painful incidents that have taken place in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in recent months, and are still taking place, and which have caused, and are still causing the useless shedding of precious Arab blood at the hands of Arabs; thereby cutting every Arab to the quick and inflicting a wound which still makes their hearts bleed. We sincerely hope that this tragedy which exposes our nation to such danger will not continue at a time when we are in such urgent need of full unanimity and unity of ranks for the confrontation of any emergency or any new perfidious aggression on the part of the unjust and criminal enemy.

In this connection this Assembly condemns in the strongest terms the attitude of the United States of America, which is one of flagrant alignment against the whole Arab nation and the cause of Palestine in particular, and its support for the Zionist oppressor. It also condemns America's general attitude to the problems of war throughout the world while her own war in Vietnam destroys her vaunted claims to love peace and the freedom of peoples. This Assembly furthermore condemns Britain's underhanded policy both as regards the Palestine problem and in the [Arabian] Gulf, South Africa and Rhodesia, and also the policy of West Germany. This Assembly therefore calls on the government to review its economic policy as regards these three countries. On the other hand this

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the National Assembly's draft reply to the Amir of Kuwait's Speech from the Throne read to the newly elected National Assembly on February 10, 1971 by Premier Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber, *al-Ray al-Amm* (Kuwait), April 12, 1971.

Assembly wishes to express its gratitude for and appreciation of the honorable attitude of the government of the U.S.S.R. and its friendly people in their support for and solidarity with the Arab nation in its just causes, at the forefront of which is the just cause of Palestine, and the right of the people of Palestine who have been evicted from their country, though there can be no shadow of doubt that they are its real owners, having lived on its land throughout the ages. This Assembly also wishes to mention the attitude of France and the countries of Eastern Europe, the non-aligned countries and other nations that really love peace and really work to support peace, justice and the freedom of peoples throughout the world, for their understanding of the just causes of the Arab nation and the just cause of Palestine.

## 314

**Letter to Arab Heads of State from Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar) Pointing Out That the Confrontation Between the Palestinians and the Jordan Army Tests the Commitments of the Arab World<sup>1</sup>**

**April 11, 1971**

I received your message and read it, along with my brother revolutionaries, at a time when we were engaged in savage battles in northern Jordan in the face of barbarous attacks by Jordanian government forces on our combatants and revolutionaries. We have complied with the Cairo and Amman Agreements for six months and we shall continue to do so. We have complied with all we undertook to comply with like men, and we shall continue to do so, even though the Jordanian authorities have complied with none of the provisions of the agreements and protocols; on the contrary, they have con-

tinued to implement their planned conspiracy against our people and our revolutionaries. The massacres, violence, intimidation and violations of the sanctity of the home that have taken place in Mafraq, Irbid and the Jordan Valley are yet another black mark against this regime.

Crimes are being committed incessantly and the plan drawn up by the American intelligence services and disclosed in statements made by American officials, and the arms and equipment that are pouring into Jordan have nothing to do with fighting the Zionist enemy. On the contrary, this military activity being mobilized against our people and our revolutionaries has been welcomed by the Zionist leaders who have expressed their satisfaction and their approval. All this shows how dangerous the situation is and puts all honorable men in the Arab nation to the test as regards their attitude to our revolution and our people, who are being massacred and humiliated in the sight and hearing of our Arab nation, not only in the occupied territory, the West Bank and Gaza, but also in Jordanian Amman and Irbid, Zarqa, Mafraq and the Jordan Valley. The criminal activity has reached the point of our combatants being prevented from crossing the river to fight the enemy in our occupied territory: Our revolutionaries going to and coming from our occupied territory are faced with fire from both sides.

Faced with this historic position, from their awareness of the greatness of the trust reposed in them and the gravity of the events that confront not only our people but the whole of our Arab nation, our people and our revolutionaries have decided to remain steadfast in the face of this barbarous imperialist-Zionist attack; the least we can do is to die with our boots on. No one in the world can snatch this weapon from the hands of our revolutionaries, and our hands will remain firmly on our rifles in all determination, faith and resolution.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat's reply to a cable from the Arab heads of state, *Fateh* (Damascus), April 12, 1971.

## 315

**Letter from Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al-Adgham, Reporting to Arab Heads of State on the Deterioration of the Situation in Jordan and the Impossibility of the Continued Functioning of the Committee<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, April 12, 1971**

To Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Arab Kings and Heads of State, Greetings and respects.

The letter I addressed to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Arab Kings and Heads of State, and the memorandum which accompanied it, on January 9, 1971, explained the position as regards the situation in Jordan and as regards the mission of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee. The letter concentrates on the following two fundamental points:

1. The necessity for the early implementation of the recommendations contained in the memorandum I submitted on December 28, 1970 to the Government of the Kingdom of Jordan and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

2. The necessity for joint efforts to be made on a different basis from that so far followed by the Committee in the performance of its mission.

At the meeting I held in Cairo with the delegates of the Arab countries on January 10, 1971, and also at the press conference I held in Cairo on January 11, 1971, I disclosed the conditions that I regard as essential if the Committee is to continue its activities to their natural conclusion. They were:

1. That the situation should be cleared up with His Majesty King Hussein in London, where he was undergoing treatment.

2. That a ceasefire should be observed in all parts of Jordan where, as soon as I left Amman, bloody incidents flared up, starting in al-Rusaifa and spreading to other places and going on until January 11, 1971.

3. That there should be speedy implementation of the measures previously taken with the approval of both sides in accordance with a short-term time schedule.

4. That the activities of the Committee should be resumed for a specific period of time, that it should be expanded by the addition of two members representing two of the countries that signed the Cairo Agreement, and that both sides should undertake to facilitate the performance of its task.

These proposals were submitted to His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal in the course of my second meeting with him in London on Thursday, January 1, 1971. He accepted them, promising to assist in their implementation as soon as he returned to Jordan.

On January 13, 1971, agreement was reached between the Jordanian and Palestinian parties, after discussions lasting two days, during which they reached temporary solutions for the various problems which had so far been impossible to settle. A feature of this agreement was the revival of a Liaison Office with the task of supervising and facilitating all the measures stipulated by the provisions of the Agreement. This office consists of representatives of the two contracting parties, but not the Supreme Arab Committee.

On January 31, 1971, I sent Ambassador al-Tayyib al-Sahbani [Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee] to Amman to examine and inquire into the situation and to take the measures necessitated by the Committee's activities, especially those involving the military aspect and problems of relief, and to deal with such current problems as might require attention. It was my intention, in the light of the information supplied to me by Ambassador al-Tayyib al-Sahbani, to write a final report to be submitted to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Kings and Heads of State.

But it became clear that the agreement of January 13, 1971 was meeting with the same obstacles as had been encountered by the Supreme Arab Committee when it was performing its task, as a result of the failure of the two parties to agree on the objectives of the struggle, and of the continuous in-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the letter from al-Adgham (referred to in some sources as Ladgham), *al-Amal* (Tunis), April 16, 1971.

fringement of the agreements that had been concluded.

It also became clear to me that the difference between the two parties had become a matter of principle and that coexistence based on brotherhood in arms and unity of goals existed only in words.

The reason for this difference was that the concept of sovereignty prevalent in Jordanian government circles was set above all other considerations. It was clear that the privileges and exceptional treatment allowed to the Palestinian side by the Cairo and Amman Agreements were now only grudgingly accepted by the Jordanian side, and it was no secret that the circumstances that preceded the September 1970 incidents were a major factor in establishing this conduct towards the Palestinians.

In my view these circumstances had already changed, and there was no longer any justification for the Jordanian government to resort to such measures of repression in coping with offenses committed by individuals, even though they belonged to the Palestine Resistance.

On the Palestinian side, I had observed a feeling of lack of confidence in the Jordanian authorities, and especially in the security forces whether civilian or military. As a result this side was in a constant state of fear and eagerness to be armed and, in particular, to obtain individual arms for legitimate self-defense. It is this, in my view, that explains the difficulties experienced by the Palestinian command in removing their arms from the towns. This is to be attributed to the legacy of the September tragedy, and to continued fears of repression and various kinds of persecution felt by large numbers of Palestinians.

On the other hand, in coping with current problems, I followed the course of wisdom, calm, and humanity, striving throughout my stay in Jordan to contain the incidents that flared up from time to time so that the reaction might not lead to a series of incidents, and for a long time I called on the two parties to follow this course. But unfortunately the Jordanian government did not respond to my wishes; on the contrary, the opposite

was the case, as I observed. Interference in minor incidents soon turned into the use of heavy armaments, then to major military operations that infringed the Cairo Agreement's stipulation of a ceasefire and the end of all military operations.

Whatever the offenses committed from time to time by certain Palestinian elements, I cannot measure the actions of individuals and those of the state by the same criteria.

It is very important that I should observe that it was not possible for the Supreme Arab Committee to perform its task of stopping bloodshed and allotting responsibility for incidents because, on most occasions, it was confronted with a *fait accompli*.

I am still receiving from the Central Committee reports and complaints of aggression by the Jordanian army against the commando forces or the refugee camps, and of obstacles being placed in the way of the Resistance moving its men and equipment or performing its duties. Then on February 1, 1971, Mr. Riyad al-Muflih, the Jordanian representative on the Supreme Arab Committee, contacted me in Jedda and asked in writing to submit a report to the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab countries informing them that all the problems between the Jordanian government and the Palestine Liberation Organization had been solved, that life had returned to normal, that the Jordanian armed forces had started to return to their positions, and that this operation was almost completed—which by no means accords with the situation as seen daily by the military observers. The incidents which took place recently in Irbid and elsewhere provide absolute proof of this.

The Jordanian Premier informed us of his desire to put an end to the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission set up by the [Supreme Arab Follow-Up] Committee and to send its officers home in view of the fact that, in his opinion, the situation no longer required their presence, and that the two parties had set up a liaison office to perform the same task that the Arab officers had been carrying out.

Then certain restrictions were placed on

the activities of the Arab officers, which made it impossible for them to perform their duties. I decided to reduce the number of these officers by stages and in conformity with circumstances, until the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission consisted of only five officers, in view of the diminution of the task of the office, and in conformity with the wishes of the officers themselves to maintain their honor. But this reduction did no good, as the Arab officers were forbidden to make any move in order to carry out inspection or control.

From all this it can be deduced that the Jordanian government is no longer willing that the Supreme Arab Committee should continue to carry out its task. It believes, as its representatives have repeatedly stated, that the Committee's task constitutes an infringement of the sovereignty of the Jordanian state and an intervention in its affairs. It also holds the view that the incidents that flare up from time to time in Jordan are no more than internal domestic incidents which the government and the government alone has the right to pass judgement on and to decide what measures should be taken to deal with them. There can be no stronger evidence of the deterioration of the situation than the incidents reported in detail in the report of the Head of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission Brigadier Ahmad Abd al-Hamid Hilmi. In this connection I feel myself obliged to praise in the highest terms the integrity and self-sacrifice of this officer and his assistants in the performance of the delicate tasks entrusted to them.

In view of the fact that the documents I submitted to Their Majesties and Excellencies in January 1971, which contained an accurate description of the renewed deterioration of relations between the Jordanian government and the Resistance, with an explanation of the reasons for this deterioration, and a review of certain definite proposals for dealing with this situation, including the expansion of the Supreme Arab Committee and the reorganization of its activities, have aroused no response from the Arab countries which signed the Cairo Agreement, the task of the Committee itself is virtually at an end.

Also, in view of the fact that the task of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission is now frozen, I have decided to submit this letter to Their Majesties and Excellencies, the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab countries so as to acquaint them with the developments which have taken place in connection with the missions with which they entrusted me, and so that they may decide what is right as regards the deteriorating situation in Jordan, for the consequences of which the Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee cannot bear the responsibility.

I trust Your Majesties and Excellencies will accept my greetings and respects.

### 316

#### **Cable Message to the Presidents of the Tripoli Charter States from Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar), Appealing for Support in the Face of Attacks by the Jordan Army<sup>1</sup>**

**April 13, 1971**

Revolutionary greetings.

While you are meeting in Cairo, our people throughout Jordan, and in Amman in particular, are being subjected in the most odious way to violence, terrorism, humiliating arrests, killing and torture.

The Jordanian army has entered Amman although the heavy armaments and the commandos have been removed from the city and they have done as they wished in the city on the pretext of security and internal sovereignty.

We are one Arab nation, and since 1948 our people have been a trust laid on the shoulders of the leaders and peoples of that Arab nation. The historical responsibility rests on your shoulders, and our people look

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat's cable to the presidents of the U.A.R., Libya, Syria and the Sudan, meeting in Cairo, April 13 and 14, *Fateh* (Damascus), April 13, 1971. (For an explanation of the Tripoli Charter, see Footnote 2 to Document 323 below.)

to you to support them in this terrible and bloody time of tribulation through which they are passing and in this barbarous war whose aim is annihilation, which was planned by American and Zionist intelligence circles and has been implemented, regrettably, by Arabs in heroic and steadfast Jordan. May God grant that at your meeting you decide what is good for Arabism and its future in this struggle for Arab civilization.

## 317

**Final Communiqué Issued by the Conference of Representatives of Arab Heads of State, Expressing Anxiety Over the Reports Submitted by Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee Chairman al-Adgham on the Situation in Jordan and Calling for the Implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, April 15, 1971**

In their eagerness to protect the supreme Arab interest and the unity of struggle in Jordan, and in their belief in the sacredness of Palestine fida'i action to preserve blessed Arab blood, and in response to the kind invitation of the UAR to convene a conference of representatives of Arab Kings and

Presidents to discuss the recent clashes between Jordanian and Palestinian revolution forces, the representatives of the Heads of State of the Democratic and People's Republic of Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, the UAR, the Yemeni Arab Republic, the State of Kuwait, the Lebanese Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen met in Cairo from 14th to 19th Safar 1391, corresponding to 10th to 15th April 1971. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan declined to attend despite an appeal to it to take part in this good effort on the part of the Arab brothers.

The conference studied the two reports by the Chairman of the Supreme Arab follow-up committee to Their Majesties the Kings and Their Excellencies the Presidents of the Arab States issued on 9th January and 11th April 1971, and reports and letters the chairman had received in connection with the recent events in Jordan. The conference expresses anxiety over the contents of these reports on the Jordanian Government measures which prevented the committee from exercising its duties and suspended the work of the military office. These measures included suppression by use of heavy weapons and major military operations blatantly contravening the Cairo agreement and what emanated from it. The conference condemns this.

The conference appreciates the nature and seriousness of these events at this momentous stage in the Arab nation's struggle against the usurping enemy; at this serious turning point and in these decisive days in the Arab nation's brave struggle against international imperialism and Zionism; and at this time when the enemy occupier is intensifying his ferocity and is determined to devour the Palestinian soil and other Arab territory, liquidate the Palestinian people and violate

<sup>1</sup> Text of communiqué broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3660/A/2-A/3; reprinted by permission.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjeh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)



their rights and sacred shrines. The conference sees that everything happening in the Jordanian arena in particular is not confined to this arena but extends throughout the entire Arab area—all its countries in the east and west. Any preoccupation or pretended preoccupation with anything other than the battle or mobilising in this arena for any other reason or under any other slogan at this particular time is considered an unforgivable crime against the entire Arab nation. Seeing that there is a plan to liquidate the Palestine Resistance the conference condemns this plan and considers it imperative to foil it. The conference affirms its full eagerness to preserve the Palestine Resistance as the noblest manifestation of Arab sacrifice and to strengthen it so that it can contribute effectively and positively to liberating the land and achieving the return of the Palestinian people.

The situation calls on the sons of the entire nation to meet their responsibility and face the fact that there has never been a comparable period in the nation's history. It is imperative that they should mobilise military and fighting potential on the Arab battle-fields confronting the enemy, especially along the Jordanian front. The conference believes that this is the truth which must take precedence over any side differences which may create unjustifiable hindrances in this mobilisation for liberating the usurped territory.

The conference considers the continuation of these events and the resulting bloodshed among Arab brothers and the exhaustion of Arab strength outside the framework of the historic battle which must be waged against the Zionist enemy will weaken the Arab people's resistance and steadfastness in confronting the imperialist-Zionist challenges and expansionist ambitions.

In view of the above:

(1) The conference expresses its deep anxiety over the bloodshed the victims of which are honest struggling Arab youths. The conference demands that all military operations against the Palestine Resistance cease immediately to preserve Arab strength, in-

stead of exhausting it in a manner benefiting only the Zionist enemy.

(2) The conference stresses the necessity to adhere to the Cairo agreement signed on 27th September 1970 at the highest Arab level. This agreement objectively stresses the responsibility of all the Arabs and their concern about the Jordan events which are directly connected with the cause of liberation. The conference also stresses the necessity to adhere to the Amman agreement signed on 13th October 1970, the protocols attached to it, and to the decisions and recommendations of the supreme Arab follow-up committee.

(3) The conference places on record the guarantee of the Jordanian Government and the Palestine Resistance to adhere to the Cairo and Amman agreements and the protocols deriving from the agreements to which H.M. King Husayn and Yasir Arafat bound themselves out of conviction in the objectives and aims of the agreements.

(4) The conference notes that during the time the committees formed under these agreements exercised effectively their duties, they participated fruitfully in sparing the blood of Arab brothers in Jordan. The conference expresses full appreciation to them for the mission they performed. The conference considers it necessary to create suitable conditions for the immediate return of these committees to perform their duties.

(5) The conference recommends that the Kings and Presidents of the Arab States bound by the Cairo agreement, seek to implement it sincerely by applying the provisions of the agreement in full.

## 318

# **Lebanese Press Interview by Premier al-Tall of Jordan Commenting on Jordanian Policy As Regards the Occupied Territories and the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, Mid-April, 1971**

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, attention in Beirut and in the capitals of the countries on the line of confrontation with the enemy is at present focused on Amman, not so much because of the crisis it has passed through with the leaders of the commando organizations as regarding what plans King Hussein's government has for the Palestine problem in general. What is the answer, if there is one?*

*A.* Everyone knows what the plans are. Our attitude is that we insist on Israel's withdrawal from Jerusalem and all the occupied territories—the West Bank, Sinai and Golan.

We are partners in political effort with the United Arab Republic as regards the Security Council resolution and the Rogers initiative.

Moreover, we in Jordan are the cornerstone of the Eastern Front, and our political and military planning is based on and derives from this position.

As for the attention of the Arab capitals being focused on us, in fact, as I see it, some of the attention is being focused on planning and action; this is the right sort of attention, so the answer is that Jordan's attitude is firm, as usual.

But it is plain to me that recently there have been kinds of attention that are not entirely innocent, which want to renew the clash between us and the Resistance and to incite such a clash. This kind of attention is a screen for conspiracy or is, willingly or unwillingly, following the line of a conspiracy to upset Jordan and, consequently, to upset the whole of the Palestinian cause.

In certain Arab capitals accusations are being made which have nothing to do with the facts or the truth, and which we can only explain as being aimed at renewing the clash and thereby destroying the Resistance or

overthrowing the regime in Jordan, which would inevitably lead to the weakening of the Eastern Front.

You have been in Amman and had the opportunity of comparing the facts with the accusations that are being made by certain information set-ups.

During the last two weeks Jordan has passed through a stage in which persons outside have succeeded in instigating or manufacturing a clash with the Resistance. Things in Jordan have proceeded with the cooperation of all the parties concerned and the most important loophole allowing access to clashes, disturbance and convulsion has been closed. This loophole was the problem of security, stability and order in the capital, Amman.

In spite of this the course that Jordan will follow from now on will be that of concentrating on its fundamental line as regards political effort, military mobilization and full cooperation with the commando forces.

*Q. I think that it is now clear that what happened in Amman was the result of the attitude of certain commando leaders. Now does the cooperation with the Palestinian forces you have referred to mean cooperation through the commands themselves or through the Liberation Army? This is particularly relevant in view of the recent calls in Beirut for the removal of the commando leaders on the grounds that they are responsible for the mistakes of the rapid escalation in creating the organizational cadres.*

*A.* What happened in September and afterwards in Amman and in Jordan was a largescale conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine problem at the expense of Jordan and to accuse it of responsibility for the liquidation. I should not be surprised if Arab quarters have, willingly or unwillingly, played a part in this conspiracy, nor should I be surprised if certain Arab quarters were partners in or paved the way for this conspiracy.

Jordan's attitude, as King Hussein has repeatedly stated, has always been that the Resistance is of us and for us and that it is a weapon that is being used for us and for our cause. So if it places itself in the context in which it performs its true task we shall grant it

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall's exclusive interview, *al-Hayat* (Beirut), April 17, 1971.

our unlimited support, cooperation and protection, regardless of all the differences and dissensions that beset the Resistance itself.

The duty of the Resistance is to "revolutionize" the occupied area. If it does this it will have our full support.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, while observing the operation of search for arms and explosives in Wahdat Camp I saw slogans written on the offices of some of the organizations saying "Revolutionary violence is the only road to Palestine." Some people think that this "revolutionary violence" has only resulted in the revolution feeling hatred for those it should not hate, and so was one of the reasons for the recent clashes. Has Your Excellency another slogan for the revolution?*

*A.* Revolutionary violence is a good enough slogan if it is directed against the occupying enemy. If it is directed against the base it is destructive, and this, most regrettably, is what has happened in some cases.

The revolutionary slogan is first the liberation of the land, and secondly, the conflicts arising from contradictions, if there are any, after liberation.

Revolution is action, not slogans.

*Q. Do you think, as is being reported, or as certain quarters are predicting, that the enemy is capable of, or is actually planning, another expansionist attack?*

*A.* I should not be surprised.

*Q. Major General Tlas's visit to Amman, and what it led to, led me to believe that there is now a trend towards the problems of the countries on the Eastern line of confrontation being solved by their own people. Is this trend the start of a new line comprising resistance and preparedness for the dangerous intrigues of the enemy?*

*A.* The consequences of President Assad's initiative and Tlas's visit and the proposal for a six-member committee for the purpose of coordination and cooperation between the Syrian and Jordanian armies and the forces of the Resistance are a correct and practical trend. Everyone knows that we and Syria are the basis of the Eastern Front and that cooperation between us is essential, both for obvious national reasons and obvious military reasons. What we here in Jordan hope is that

this Syrian initiative may be the start of real and unlimited cooperation in all fields between the two countries. In particular we pin our hopes on this six-member committee as a positive means of ensuring greater cooperation, benefit and support, not merely as a committee for the solution of such differences as may arise, although we sincerely hope they will not.

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#### **U.A.R. Press Interview with Chairman of the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee al-Adgham Explaining His Resignation and Criticizing the Actions and Attitude of the Government of Jordan (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, Mid-April, 1971**

*Q. Why did you leave Amman and return to Tunis?*

*A.* I returned to Tunis because I felt that the government of Jordan did not want the Committee to continue. We were told this by the Jordanian Premier.

I returned to Tunis after submitting the necessary reports on the stages that had been implemented, and I thought that our one hope was the continued existence of the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission. But this military committee was completely abolished, and the Jordanian authorities know who was responsible for ending its activities.

*Q. What is the picture of the situation as regards the start of the recent incidents in Jordan? What happened in Irbid?*

*A.* As soon as I heard of the bloody incidents in Irbid two weeks ago, I called on the Arab Ceasefire Observer Mission over the radio to go at once to Irbid and provide me with a complete picture.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of an exclusive interview with al-Adgham (referred to in some sources as Ladgham), *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 13, 1971.

Some hours later I received the reply of the Observer Mission in the form of a cable saying, "We have tried to reach Irbid... but were unable to do so.... The Jordanian government prevented us."

Once again I sent a radio message to the Observer Mission telling them to try again, and some hours later I received the same reply: "We have tried and been stopped."

Moreover, we received reports to the effect that the Jordanian military authorities had forbidden the Arab Observer Mission to fly its flags on its cars.

I say to the Jordanian authorities that it was thanks to the Arab Observer Mission, which was formed in conformity with a resolution of the Conference of Kings and Heads of State, and with the approval of the highest Jordanian authorities, that we were able to put a stop to the bloodshed in Jordan after the September incidents....

Even supposing that the information published about the situation in Irbid was exaggerated—as the Jordanians say—was it not logical that the Jordanian government should allow the Observer Mission to go to Irbid to submit a true report on what had happened?

*Q. What is the position, then, and what is the way out of the crisis?*

*A.* Now, after these incidents, I can truly say that anything is possible.

As a result of the interference with the activities of the Supreme Arab Follow-up Committee, I was obliged to issue my statement in which I held the Jordanian government responsible for violating the Agreements.

I did not submit a report but, being responsible for the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee and for all the bodies derived from it, I did issue a statement to the Kings and Heads of State in which I called attention to the gravity of the situation.

The attitude of the Jordanian authorities to the Observer Mission suggests that much graver incidents took place in Irbid than were reported by the news agencies and much graver than were published by the Resistance. If this was not so, how can the attitude of the Jordanian government be explained?

To sum up: We are confronted with a difficult and bloody trial in which the cream of Arab youth is being sacrificed and their blood being squandered for the wrong purpose.

*Q. How do you propose the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee should recover its powers and resume its activities? Are you still in favor of the powers of the Supreme Committee being made more extensive?*

*A.* The proposals you mention were made in a memorandum which I submitted to the Arab Kings and Heads of State at the time of the last crisis.

But I believe that things have gone too far to be dealt with by my proposals. All the same, a search must be made for a new means of confronting this grave situation.

*Q. How can the continuing bloodshed in Jordan be stopped?*

*A.* What has happened in Jordan has not surprised me at all. I expected everything that has happened. To avoid a repetition of these incidents, effective and severe measures must be taken to confront the deteriorating situation in Jordan.

I said all this in the reports I submitted to all the Arab countries. In these reports I called on them to face up to their responsibilities to the full, as otherwise the Arab struggle in general and the Palestinian struggle in particular would suffer the cruellest tribulations. But unfortunately no attention was paid to what I said. This is probably what led the Jordanian authorities to go so far.

There is now a new situation. The whole affair must be reviewed and appropriate measures must be taken. All this depends on the approval of the Jordanian government. We do not have the strength to force all parties to respect the agreements they have signed. The essence of the matter and the goal are one, and we are agreed on them; but an effective and decisive manner of implementation must be found.

No one can bear responsibility at national and Arab level, if he does not have the powers and the responsibility to act. I cannot bear the responsibility for all that has happened in Jordan, whatever the reasons.

*Q. There was every indication that there were going to be incidents in Jordan. How do you explain all that has gone on between Jordan and the Resistance after the signing of the Cairo Agreement?*

A. To sum up, I can say that I arrived in Amman on September 28, and we made every effort to devise a formula for coexistence between the authorities and the Resistance. And in fact the result was the October [Amman] Agreement, which was signed by King Hussein and Mr. Yasser Arafat—the basic agreement regulating relations between the two parties. I can say that we restored calm, security and normal life in Jordan.

Then came the surprise.

What I say is that the bodies that supervised the implementation of the agreements did not take part in the activities of the conference of Kings and Heads of State held in Cairo last September. The least that can be said of the mentality of these bodies is that they were not fully in the picture as regards the immensity of the effort expended at the Cairo conference, to which the great leader, President Abdel Nasser fell a victim. They were not filled with the spirit that prevailed at the conference, and they interpreted the Cairo Agreement in a manner completely incompatible with its spirit.

I affirm that the Jordanian government has not complied with certain essential matters, although they were stipulated by all the Agreements.

*Q. Has the Jordanian government carried out its undertakings to return the armed forces to their positions?*

A. It is impossible to affirm definitely that it has done so.

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### **Statement Issued by the Official Spokesman of Jordan in Response to the Resolutions on Implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements Adopted by Representatives of Arab Heads of State<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, April 16, 1971**

Certainly the statement contains positive aspects, and these we cannot but appreciate for their positive qualities, for they are in harmony with our attitude, from which we have never deviated—our attitude of constant insistence on the necessity for the unification of Arab efforts and Arab forces for the confrontation of the one enemy.

But most regrettably the statement also contains judgements based not on the truth and the facts but on a series of illusions and misrepresentations propagated by Mr. Yasser Arafat in a number of cables; it would seem that he believes them from the number of times he has repeated them, and they have also been repeated by certain Arab information media. Obviously judgements based on illusion, or conclusions reached on a basis of misrepresentation, can only arouse in the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the statement, *al-Dustur* (Amman), April 17, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

minds of our citizens here and of the Arabs everywhere grief and pain at what Arab political action has come to, especially at the present stage, when it is necessary to assess things—all things, whether political or military—with the greatest precision, honesty and sincerity. If this is not done what I fear is that this improvised policy will once more plunge us into the abyss of a setback or a new disaster.

It is known that the Jordanian government and the Central Committee came to an understanding that all armed men, and along with them all their arms, with the exception of the arms of the Militia, should be withdrawn from Amman. This was four days before the conference met. Although everyone knew this and expected that it would no longer be necessary for the conference to meet, certain quarters, headed by Mr. Yasser Arafat, insisted that it should meet, with wearisome repetition of such fanciful stories about massacres, confiscations and liquidations as have never before been heard in modern Arab history.

It is extremely strange that on the day when the commandos started their voluntary withdrawal from Amman by the hundreds, in columns seen by all the citizens and by the Arab embassies in Amman, the conference met to discuss what they called the blood-letting in Amman, as if the convoys of vehicles leaving Amman loaded with armed men and explosives were a stream of blood which must be staunched. Everyone was amazed at their action, but the delegates insisted on holding their conference all the same.

As for the quantities of heavy arms, rockets and explosives that were taken out of Amman, and which were enough to arm a whole division, in addition to the vast quantities which were seized and confiscated—these were seen by the Arab diplomatic missions. Did the honorable delegates take into account the fact that the commandos were in possession of these vast quantities of arms in Amman?

When their conference met and they wrote their statement, did it occur to them to ask themselves if any of them would have permitted even a quarter of this quantity of arms

in the capital of his country or in any of his cities?

Had not the delegates received reports from their diplomatic missions in Amman on what they had seen and heard on Amman radio and television of what the members of the Militia were saying in Amman? Or had they not taken the trouble to read these reports? Or was it that the intention of the conference was to have no regard at all for the truth and the facts?

Jordan is commando action, because the commandos are Jordanians from both Banks, and from the gallant Gaza Strip, and they are our sons because they are our citizens, and no one could show more concern for our citizens than we do. The same applies to support for commando action: we support it in fact; we do not just boast of doing so, because this land is theirs and it is their base and point of departure. They have received and are still receiving from us all possible material and moral support, and we shall never allow any quarter to regard us as two parties, because we are they and they are we, a single party united in existence and in destiny.

The people who are liquidating commando action are those who have persistently turned it aside from its basic task by political enticements, by unparalleled ideological misrepresentation and for considerations which are no longer a secret even from commandos who take the trouble to ask what these men want of them, and why they want to drag commando action into the labyrinth of political dealing.

Attacking Jordanian villages, outposts and police stations in the North from commando bases situated in Syria cannot be represented as concern for precious Arab blood. The people who claim to be concerned for this precious blood are those who encouraged one of the parties to shed it. And is not the blood of our soldiers, our people and our citizens precious in your sight?

## 321

# **Egyptian Press Interview Statement by Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi Emphasizing the Necessity for All Arab Nations To Oppose Zionism<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, April 17, 1971

Israel's policy of expansion and the racist plans of Zionism are directed against all the Arab countries, and in particular those that are rich in natural resources.

If Israel has so far concentrated her aggression against the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, after having usurped the Palestinian homeland, evicted its people, and established on its soil communities of various races, this is only because in her expansionist schemes Israel gives priority to aggression and domination. If the Arabs do not cooperate with faith and sincerity to repel this aggression, disaster will befall them, as it befell their brethren.

No Arab country is safe from the perils of the battle with Zionism and Israel if it does not play its role and bear its responsibilities for confronting the Israeli enemy.

## 322

# **Proclamation of the Establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics<sup>2</sup>**

Benghazi, April 17, 1971

1. The Arab people in the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic have decided, on a basis of free choice and equality of rights, to establish a unionist state to be called the Federation of Arab Republics.

2. The object of establishing the Federation of Arab Republics is to work for the achievement of comprehensive Arab unity, to protect the Arab homeland and defend its independence, to build an Arab socialist society, to work for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories, and to support the Arab national liberation movement and national liberation movements throughout the world.

3. The people of the Federation of Arab Republics are part of the Arab nation.

4. The Federation of Arab Republics shall have one flag, one emblem, one national anthem and one capital.

5. The form of government in the Federation of Arab Republics shall be democratic and socialist.

6. This Federation shall be open to all other Arab states that believe in Arab unity and work for the achievement of a unified Arab socialist society.

7. The Federation of Arab Republics shall have jurisdiction in the following fields:

a. Establishing the basis of foreign policy.

b. Questions of peace and war.

c. Organization and command of the defense of the Federation of Arab Republics, including the establishment of a military command responsible for training and operations, the movement of forces between the Republics being by the decision of the Presidential Council or those whom it empowers to do so during operations.

d. Protection of national security and the setting up of bases for ensuring the safety of the Federation. In the event of disturbances, either from within or without,

The Federation of Arab Republics is the final outcome of the agreement concluded in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 by Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R. This agreement, subsequently referred to as the Tripoli Charter, provided for economic, military and political cooperation among the original signatories. (An excerpt from the joint communiqué announcing the agreement appears as Document 462 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.) On November 8, 1970 it was announced that the three countries had agreed to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too was to join a "unified four-power command." By the time the F.A.R. was proclaimed, the Sudan had postponed its adherence to the federation.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan's interview, originally granted to the Cairo daily *Akhbar al-Yom* and republished in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), April 18, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the proclamation, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 18, 1971.

which may threaten the security of one of the Republics or of the Federation, the government of that Republic shall notify the Federal government immediately so that it may take the necessary measures, within the limits of its powers, to maintain security and order. In the event that the government of one of the member Republics is unable to ask for the aid of the Federal government or that the security of the Federation is endangered, the Federal authorities concerned shall intervene, unasked, to maintain security and restore the situation to normal.

e. Planning of the national economy and the drawing up of joint plans for development and guidance of federal economic institutions.

f. Formulation of an educational policy aimed at building an Arab nationalist socialist and believing generation.

g. Formulation of a federal information policy incorporating the aims of the Federal State and its strategy in peace and war.

h. Formulation of a unified policy for scientific research and coordination of the organizations of the different Republics.

i. Admission of new members into the Federation by unanimous decision of the Federal Presidential Council.

8. The following institutions shall be established in the Federation of Arab Republics:

a. The Federal Presidential Council, which shall be the supreme authority of the Federation, and shall consist of the Presidents of the Republics. This Council shall elect one of its members president and take decisions by majority vote.

b. A number of Ministers, to be appointed by the Presidential Council, to which they shall be responsible.

c. The Federal National Assembly responsible for federal legislation, consisting of representatives of the popular assemblies of each of the Republics. Each will have an equal number of members, elected by the popular assemblies of each Republic.

d. A Federal Constitutional Court appointed by decree of the Federal Presidential Council, composed of two members from each of the Republics. Its jurisdiction will

be confined to ruling on the constitutionality of laws and giving judgement in disputes between the institutions and authorities of the Federation and the Republics.

9. The establishment of the Federation shall in no way affect the provisions of the treaties and agreements concluded between member Republics of the Federation, or between any of them individually and other countries, which treaties and agreements shall remain in force within the framework determined for them when they were concluded in accordance with the principles of international law.

10. Each Republic may, within the limits of its legislative jurisdiction, conclude treaties and agreements with foreign states, and exchange with them diplomatic and consular representation.

11. The Supreme Command of the armed forces in each of the member Republics of the Federation shall be entrusted to the President of the Republic or whomever may be designated by the rules and regulations in force in each of the Republics.

12. The Republics shall have jurisdiction in all matters not falling within the competence of the Federation by virtue of these basic provisions.

13. Until a single Arab movement is established in the Federation, the political leadership of each of the Republics shall be responsible for organizing political activity in that Republic, and no political organization in any one of the Republics shall be permitted to engage in political activity in the other Republics except through its representatives in the leadership of the political front, which will include the commands of the political organizations of the Republics of the Federation.

14. The proclamation of the establishment of the Federation issued in Benghazi on *Safar* 21, 1391 (April 13, 1971) shall be an integral part of the fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics.

15. The fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics shall be amended only with the unanimous approval of the Federal Presidential Council and when, having been submitted to popular referendum,



such amendment obtains a majority in each of the Republics.

16. The fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics shall be ratified by the Higher Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic, by the Revolutionary Command Council of the Libyan Arab Republic and by the Regional Command of the Baath Party and the Council of Ministers and the People's Assembly of the Syrian Arab Republic before being submitted to plebiscite.

### 323

#### **Broadcast Address to the Nation by U.A.R. President Sadat on the Proclamation of the Federation of Arab Republics<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, April 17, 1971**

Brothers and fellow citizens:

I praise God who has accorded me the honor of announcing to you tonight the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, which the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic have agreed to set up. This is a great step along the road to the greater unity of our Arab nation. It will provide immense support to the ability of this nation

to fight the battle of destiny that confronts it. It is an act of reverence to the martyrs and heroes who have fought the battles of this nation throughout its glorious history of struggle for freedom, socialism and unity and the realization of a great hope for which the hero of this nation, Gamal Abdel Nasser, worked and laid down his life.

I praise God who has made the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics a reality, as a result of our meeting with our Brothers Muammar Qadhafi and Hafiz Assad in the city of Benghazi, whose name will forever be coupled with that of Tripoli, the scene of the declaration of the Tripoli Charter, which constituted the framework and the basis of the Federation of Arab Republics.<sup>2</sup>

I praise God who has reinforced the struggle of our nation, in a most difficult and critical stage, through this immense Arab base, from which and with which it can wage its just and honorable war against the gravest danger that has confronted its advance.

The enemy wanted us to grow weaker, but God has increased our conviction and our strength.

The enemy wanted us to be disunited and isolated, but God has strengthened the links and the unity which bind us together.

The enemy wanted to fill our hearts with despair, but God has made us firmer, more certain and more hopeful.

Brothers:

At this very moment Muammar Qadhafi is himself announcing the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics in the Libyan Arab Republic.

At this very moment in the Syrian Arab Republic, President Hafiz Assad is announcing the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics.

I am proud to perform this task here in the United Arab Republic.

Before I read to you the declaration of the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics which we agreed on and signed early this morning, and before I read to you the fundamental provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics, and before I communicate

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 18, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> The Tripoli Charter refers to an agreement concluded in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 just after the Rabat Arab Summit Conference. This agreement provided for economic, military and political cooperation among the original signatories: Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R. (An excerpt from the joint communiqué announcing the agreement appears as Document 462 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.) It was announced on November 8, 1970 that the three countries had agreed to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too was to join a "unified four-power command." The final outcome of the Tripoli Charter was the Federation of Arab Republics proclaimed in Benghazi on April 17, 1971, by which time the Sudan had postponed its adherence to the federation. (For the text of the proclamation, see Document 322 above.)

to you our agreement on the date on which the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics is to be submitted to plebiscite;

Before that, may I permit myself to echo the splendid words in which Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the establishment of the first union:

A great state has been established here in the Middle East, a state which is neither an intruder nor a usurper in the area, which is neither aggressive nor hostile, a state that protects and does not threaten, that preserves and does not squander, that gives strength rather than weakness, that seeks peace but does not disregard [its rights], that supports friends and repels the wiles of enemies, that is neither bigoted nor partisan, that neither deviates nor aligns itself, that upholds justice and supports peace, ensures prosperity for itself and for those around it, and for the whole of humanity, to the extent of its power and ability.

### 324

#### **Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee, Reiterating Its Adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements and Demanding Their Implementation by the Government of Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, April 28, 1971**

We made sincere efforts to implement the Amman Agreement, rising above our wounds and the blood of our martyrs who fought so gallantly in defense of their right to live and their free will to revolution. But the authorities from the very first moment insisted on proceeding with their plan to liquidate the revolution, pursuing a policy which was expressed both by their information media and in their conduct, and was based on three main courses of action.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the statement, read by Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) at a press conference in Amman, *Fateh* (Damascus), April 29, 1971.

1. Intimidation of the masses by persecution, arrests and imprisonment and attempts by intrigue, misrepresentation and the spreading of rumors [have been carried out] to win by terrorism a victory that they were unable to achieve by force of arms.

2. Despite the uproar created by the information media and the repeated statements about national unity, the organs of the state are engaging in particularist persecution of the Palestinians with the object of smashing the unity of the Palestinian-Jordanian people.

3. The small fires that have broken out in a number of industries and the battles that the regime so diligently manufactures have the object of kindling resentment and hatred among comrades-in-arms in the army and the revolution.

This frantic policy reached its climax in the Irbid massacre and the frenzy, insolence, bloodthirstiness and blind particularism that accompanied it. In this way it has become possible to proceed with plans to liquidate the revolution by a new massacre in which the people of Amman are to be slaughtered in a new September which, in accordance with an imperialist-Zionist plan to be carried out in our beloved Jordan, they hope will

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The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

achieve for them what they failed to achieve in the September massacre.

With the help of all the information media at their disposal and at the disposal of their allies, of all the hostile forces of the London and Israeli broadcasting services, and of all the subservient press, they have tried to represent the Central Committee's decision to end all military manifestations in Amman as a surrender by the Resistance and a victory by the authorities. In fact, however, the Central Committee's object in making this decision was to be faithful to its undertakings under the Agreements, to avoid further bloodshed among the commandos and in the army and to protect the masses from killing and terrorization. All those in authority at all levels played their part in a round of visits, parades and processions, and in statements, rumors and whispering campaigns to manufacture a fraudulent victory and to create an atmosphere of persecution, man-hunts, arrests and isolation of the masses so as to shake their morale and their faith. It was as if [the authorities] had already liberated the occupied territory from the Zionist enemy who has it in his grip.

Jordanian policy has recently been concentrated on the following three main principles:

I. Ignoring and liquidating the political identity of the Palestine revolution as being the sole legitimate and real representative of the Palestinian people's will to self-determination, and as imposing restrictions on the Jordanian regime's freedom to take what action it likes as regards Palestinian rights and the future of the Palestinian people: the regime is also trying to claim to represent the Palestinian people, in an attempt to disregard basic facts, the most important of which are that the revolution is the representative of the Palestinian people ... and that anyone who persecutes the masses has no right to represent them. They also forget that their persistent plotting against the political identity of the Palestinian people may well, by a process of historical inevitability, result in that identity being protected at an early date by means of a material political entity; that to attack what is called

the projected state is not the right way to confront the impasse they have brought about, and that the right course for them to follow is not to manufacture an artificial information outcry, but to improve their conduct in their dealings with the masses of the Palestinian people.

II. Isolationism and rejection of Arab concern for the problems between the revolution and the authorities, and slandering and misrepresentation of this concern as being a sort of external tutelage imposed on Jordan by the Arab states: this is despite the fact that it is obvious that the Arabs have to intervene in such an important national matter which affects not only Jordan but all the Arabs and that this Arab concern was initiated at the request of the Jordanian authorities at the Tripoli Conference and later regularized by the Cairo Agreement signed by the Kings and Heads of State and by the King as the Head of the Jordanian government, so that this Arab presence might ensure faithful adherence to the agreement.

III. An attempt to misrepresent the revolution and persistent charges that it is deviating into a purely internal revolution inside Jordan instead of being a revolution behind the lines: this attempt clearly reflects the thinking and the ambitions of the authorities who want the revolution behind the lines to be a group of combatants sent behind the lines by the army when it chooses, their existence in the East Bank not being accepted because of the extensive reaction it creates among the masses, arousing the will to fight in the country. Those who are behind this attempt forget that it calls into question the extent and nature of the interdependence of the two Banks and that half of our people live in the East Bank and are entitled to strike at the enemy from outside. They also forget the rights, duties and burdens imposed by this presence and interdependence.

These are the most important of the matters that the authorities, with the assistance of their various organs, are trying to establish firmly in the minds of the masses by liquidating the political identity of the Palestinian people, representing the Palestine revolution as consisting of groups of combatants,

and by isolating themselves from the Arab world to prevent any intervention in the liquidation that is now in progress; and for this end, which governs their behavior and conduct, the organs are absolutely ignoring the clear provisions of the Agreements, in the following ways:

I. Restricting the freedom of the Commando bases to exist and expand in the Jordan Valley, especially in the north of the Valley, by establishing a cordon of minefields and Jordanian regular army and militia ambush attacks on our patrols which cross the River into the occupied territory: our patrols going to and returning from the occupied territory still risk engagements with the forces of the authorities, and they are in greater danger of being killed, persecuted, hunted down and arrested in the East Bank than they are in the West Bank.

II. Restricting freedom of movement and travel: the Agreements provide for complete freedom of movement and travel in the areas west of the Amman-Ramtha road, and both sides are forbidden to erect barricades and positions on the roads. But the authorities have established a series of search points and patrols which constitute a blockade of the revolution's bases, molesting combatants and preventing supplies arriving and contacts being made between their bases. They have also closed the frontiers against combatants and supplies and arms convoys and placed such restrictions on the movement of combatants as threaten their security and freedom.

III. Prohibiting dealings with the revolution and restricting political freedom: government organs are persecuting all citizens who have dealings or sympathize with the revolution and warning the inhabitants of areas in which there are commando bases not to sell them provisions or have any relations with them. In the towns and villages the repressive intelligence services have been active in disseminating an atmosphere of terror by spreading rumors and persecuting, hunting down or arresting all who have relations with or sympathy for the revolution.

Recently there has been a wave of dismissals from jobs and institutions, especially government ones, on a basis of clear and

deliberate discrimination, and the authorities' prisons are still packed with about two thousand detainees and condemned prisoners, both commandos and citizens accused of cooperating with them.

Having disclosed these facts about the conduct of the Jordanian authorities in the last six months, as a last serious attempt on our part, let us say that we regard the Cairo Agreement of September 27, 1970 and the Amman Agreement of October 13, 1970 as still being the basis for the detailed relations between the revolution and the authorities being regulated in such a way as to maintain the revolution and the unity and stability of the country through faithful and scrupulous adherence to and honest application of their provisions without trickery or procrastination.

While insisting on strict adherence to and implementation of the provisions of the Agreements, as being the basis regulating relations between the revolution and the authorities, in a way that will ensure us freedom of movement to fight our enemy and to mobilize and organize our masses, we believe that the implementation of these Agreements by the authorities will inevitably have repercussions on the financial, political and military situation of Jordan and hence its ability to face up to its fundamental duties in regard to the present occupation of the West Bank.

So that all may shoulder their responsibilities and perform their duties, we address this statement to the masses in Jordan and to the Arab masses, with a view to ensuring the scrupulous implementation of these Agreements, to avert fighting and massacres so that no more Arab blood may be lost in the wrong way, and so that all efforts and all rifles may be directed against the occupying enemy.

We also address this statement to the Arab states and to those who signed the Cairo Agreement, so that we may hear their views on how they want the Jordanian authorities to meet their obligations, the revolution, for its part, having fulfilled all its obligations. We expect these governments to adopt an unambiguous and open attitude; and silent or negative attitudes will in themselves be

regarded as attitudes to the Palestine revolution and to honoring the commitment entered into by signing this Agreement.

We also demand that the Jordanian authorities adopt an unambivalent and honest attitude to these Agreements, an attitude that will be reflected in practical conduct and in the faithful and scrupulous application of their provisions.

### 325

#### **Lebanese Television Interview Statements by Premier al-Tall of Jordan Commenting on the Formation of the Federation of Arab Republics and on the Cut in Arab Financial Aid to Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, Early May, 1971**

*Q. Your Excellency, it is of course well known that a new state, or a new federal state, has been established—the Federation of Arab Republics. May we know Your Excellency's view of this federation?*

A. My view is that the federation—any federation—is really the right and natural reply to aggression and to Zionist invasion. Therefore any move towards federation has our blessing and we support it with all our hearts. In spite of all differences and in spite of all sensitivities we believe that unity is something eternal; the sensitivities and the differences pass away, but unity of effort remains, as does unity. I have stated my opinion on this and it has been published in the press. We believe that unity of effort and effort to achieve unity are essential, and that they must assume a logical form. We hope that every part of this union and every country that has joined it may in itself be a beacon of unity. What I mean is, we hope that it will not be turned into an axis; we want it to be a true unity, because unity means

effort, resolution and strength and we benefit from this resolution and strength by virtue of our position in the confrontation of aggression.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, is it possible that Jordan might think of joining?*

A. As is well known, Jordan is an extension of the Arab revolution. The Arab revolution has frank and unambiguous views on the subject of unity. The Arab revolution's view is that the Arab world is not a geographical unit from the Ocean to the Gulf, but that it is in fact made up of large units—the Arab Maghrib, the Nile Valley, the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula.

The movement towards unity must be subject to a universally accepted, economic, social and geographical logic, because we believe that union is not merely a question of joining areas of land and sections of population. We believe that the unionist operation is a creative interaction which gives rise to much more than the mere adding together of figures. This is what we believe, so that naturally, as regards unity of effort we are ready to take part in any embodiment of unity. But a real movement towards union—we believe that, for it to succeed and become that creative interaction which we mean by unity—must come about through these units. We, Syria, Iraq and the [other] countries of the Fertile Crescent must combine our efforts in whatever form the countries of this part of the Arab world desire, and at the same time encourage any union in, for example, the Nile Valley area. That is why I personally was extremely enthusiastic about the union of Libya, Egypt and Sudan. I believe that such a union fulfills all the conditions of geographical, economic and social logic and will create an extremely strong Arab entity. The same applies to the Maghrib, to the Fertile Crescent and to the Arabian Peninsula.

What I mean is, the concept of unity is not merely the gathering together of inhabitants, territories and materials. We believe that there must be an interaction that creates a new entity which is much greater than the mere arithmetical adding together of people and land.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall's interview broadcast on Lebanese television, *al-Dustur* (Amman), May 7, 1971.

*Q. Your Excellency, what about Arab aid, or the Arab aid that has been withdrawn from Jordan? Could you tell us if this is really affecting the economic situation in Jordan?*

*A.* Of course it is. But it must be made clear that our high expenditure is the result of our effort as a country at war so that Arab aid is going, in the first place, to affect the extent to which we can help our brethren in the occupied area, and after that the extent to which we can help those of our brethren who have left the occupied area. Our programs of military development are certainly going to be affected by this Arab aid, all of which was originally earmarked for this field. But as for economic survival or basic economic construction, I think we are capable of coping with this problem. If we were selfish and wanted to concern ourselves with the problems of Jordan only, regardless of our destiny and our duty as an Arab outpost, we should have no financial problems at all. But if Jordan bears in mind, as she must, her destiny as an [Arab] outpost, then of course we need support, and we are going to make super-human efforts to ensure that we get such help from whatever quarter, on condition that we continue with our programs and with the performance of our duty. Our present budget includes foreign financial aid, and this of course has happened because Arab aid has been cut off.

Moreover, these days it is not difficult to get aid from the quarter you want.

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**Statement Issued by the Lebanese Branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, Protesting the Middle East Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Early May, 1971**

Rogers' visit after all this conspiracy is

defiance of the sentiments of the Arab people and their progressive movement which has resisted and struggled, and is still resolutely struggling for the liberation of the land and its people.

The masses who have rejected all forms of liquidation and peaceful solutions express their anger at and disapproval of the visit of the envoy of imperialism.

Let us shout at the top of our voices; Rogers go home!

Let us go on with the mobilization and organization of the masses against the continuation and escalation of the conspiracy by fostering armed resistance and promoting the revolution.

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**Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Protesting the Middle East Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Excerpt)<sup>2</sup>**

**Early May, 1971**

The object of Rogers' visit to the area is to bring to a conclusion the conspiracy which started with the submission of the proposal, and our basic answer to this visit is continued rejection and persistence in struggle and combat against all projects which constitute an obstacle to our revolution and our liberation in alliance with the Arab masses and their progressive forces and the forces of liberation and socialism throughout the world.

May we see greater determination to fight for the revolution and for liberation.

P.F.L.P.—General Command statement, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), No. 348 (May 7, 1971), p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. statement, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 99 (May 8, 1971), p. 5.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the

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**Statement Issued by the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Protesting the Middle East Visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Early May, 1971**

The Palestine Resistance movement, the progressive forces in Lebanon and the Arab revolutionary masses, who have rejected the Security Council resolution from the start, are called on to reject the visit of Rogers and to express their rejection by protesting in every possible manner.

The Democratic Popular Front, which rejected the Security Council resolution and showed up and laid bare all the suspect surrender solutions brought to the area by Fisher and Sisco, and which regards as its duty the uncovering of all the schemes and conspiracies that are concocted against our people and our national causes, protests against the welcoming of the envoy of American destruction, rejects all imperialist conspiracies and calls for serious and unremitting action to unstrate all the schemes of imperialism and its agents.

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**Statements on Superpower Involvement in the Mediterranean, French Arms Sales to Libya and the Possibility of a Middle East Settlement, Made in a French Press Interview by President Qadhafi of Libya<sup>2</sup>**

**Tripoli, Early May, 1971**

*Qadhafi:* The Arab nation values its inde-

pendence; it refuses to live under the influence of either the East or the West. From now on any power that tries to draw it into either of the two camps will, in our view, be pursuing imperialist objectives.

*Q. Aren't you going against the wishes of your Egyptian and Syrian partners when you demand the departure of the Soviet and American fleets from the Mediterranean at a time when the presence of Russian naval units would seem to be indispensable to the defense of the Arab world in its conflict with Israel?*

A. Certainly we believe—quite as much as our brothers—that the Soviet fleet is a force of dissuasion whose entry into the Mediterranean was provoked by the presence of the Sixth Fleet. But when we demand the withdrawal of both of the naval powers we are defending a position of principle whose goal is to avoid a confrontation which would be catastrophic for world peace.

*Q. Is it true that President Nasser recommended that no Soviet weapons be bought, but rather French Mirages or failing these, American Phantoms?*

A. I don't remember. Before answering you I should have to question Mr. Haikal, the Editor-in-Chief of *al-Ahram*, who reported this matter. I should also have to consult the documents on the talks I had with the late President.

As for the Mirages, the French government, just like ours, understands perfectly the true motives of those who keep up the agitation against this transaction. Israel, which won the 1967 war thanks to these machines, wants to be the only country in the area to have them. Great Britain and the United States were expecting us to buy their fighter planes. The U. S. S. R. also hoped to be our sole supplier, after the fall of the monarchy. So there were many unsatisfied appetites....

*Q. It is none the less true that some people contest the viewpoint of Paris that Libya is not "a country on the field of battle."*

A. The French government's position is perfectly correct. It is a matter of geographical evidence. We have no common frontiers with the countries occupied by the Zionists....

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.D.F.L.P. statement, *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), No. 566 (May 10, 1971), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of Qadhafi's interview, conducted by Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, May 6, 1971, p. 6.

*Q. However, it seems that you reject all peaceful solutions of the Palestine problem, in particular the one based on Security Council Resolution 242....*

*A.* This resolution has been completely overtaken by events and it is curious that you should question me on this subject. Doesn't Israel's present conduct provide an eloquent answer to your question? Moreover, the combat we are engaged in against Zionism affects the very destiny of the Arab nation. For us it is not a matter of petty frontier questions or strategic positions. Our goal is to restore their land and their dignity to a people who have been dispossessed and dispersed in tents.

*Q. Mr. President, does this not run counter to Egypt, which has formally accepted the principle of recognition of the state of Israel?*

*A.* No, because Egypt has never said that it will conclude a peace treaty (in Arabic *sulh*), but a peace agreement (in Arabic *salām*). This distinction is fundamental.

*Q. Supposing that Israel withdrew to the 1967 frontiers and that, in return, Cairo agreed to conclude a settlement based on the terms of Resolution 242, would Libya agree to subscribe to such an agreement?*

*A.* Egypt is free to do what she likes. As for us, God is great.

[Before closing the interview, Colonel Qadhafi advised us to read Sura 17 of the Koran, entitled "The Night Journey or The Children of Israel." To the latter God says: "Ye will surely commit evil in the earth twice, and ye will be elated with great insolence." However, the day will come when the Lord will send His servants "to afflict thee, and to enter the Temple, as they entered it the first time, and to destroy utterly that which is insolent." The sura adds: "Peradventure thy Lord will have mercy on thee, but if ye return to transgress we also shall return to chastise thee, and we have appointed Hell to be the prison of the unbelievers."]

The message of the Libyan Head of State could hardly be clearer.]

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## **May Day Speech by U.A.R. President Sadat Reaffirming Egyptian Readiness To Conclude a Peace Based on Israeli Withdrawal from Arab Territory and Calling for a Clarification of U.S. Policy in the Middle East (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Helwan, May 1, 1971**

If [Rogers' visit] is on the subject of the Suez Canal initiative, we are quite clear, and I want through you to repeat what I said once more so that the people may hear, America may hear and Israel may hear, and know how far we shall go. We will not bargain or give anything up.

Firstly, the basic principle that the [United] Arab Republic adheres to, and will always adhere to, under all circumstances, is that there can be no peace as long as Israel continues to occupy Arab territories, and as long as the enemy continues to display expansionist tendencies, which are so clearly shown in the whole of Israeli policy and in the public statements and official documents issued by those who direct that policy, which contain affronts not only to the Arab position and Arab rights, but also to the United Nations itself, its Charter and its resolutions.

Secondly, the United Arab Republic has opened every door to peace and is still doing so, as is shown by the following two moves it has made:

1. The United Arab Republic accepted Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's proposals, while Israel refused to so much as reply to them.

2. President Anwar Sadat came out with an Egyptian initiative in the speech he made on February 4. This initiative mentions the possibility of the Suez Canal being opened to international navigation in return for a partial withdrawal by the Israeli forces.

Thirdly, let us be precise. The Egyptian initiative still exists, although it must be observed and understood by all parties that

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 2, 1971.



the proposed partial withdrawal in conformity with it is not a separate solution nor a partial solution, but a procedural move organically linked with a total solution on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution, the first of which is withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

Fourthly, so that things may be clearly defined during the implementation of this proposal—and this is important, because we want to make ourselves clear—the United Arab Republic reaffirms its conception as follows:

1. As soon as the partial withdrawal starts, it being the first stage of total withdrawal, the [United] Arab Republic is prepared to start clearing the Suez Canal.

2. With this as a beginning the United Arab Republic would agree to the ceasefire being prolonged for a specific period during which Ambassador Gunnar Jarring could draw up a time schedule for the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

3. The armed forces of the United Arab Republic will cross the Suez Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the East Bank of the Canal. Let me repeat this so that they may hear: The armed forces of the United Arab Republic will cross the Suez Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the East Bank of the Canal.

But out of its concern for peace the United Arab Republic would be prepared to accept practical measures that would ensure that the warring forces were separated, during the specific period of the ceasefire—the period that would be given to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to draw up all the provisions of the solution of the crisis and the time schedule for their implementation, the first provisions being total withdrawal from all Arab territories in Syria, Jordan, Gaza and Sinai.

4. If this period comes to an end without tangible progress, the Egyptian armed forces will have the right to maintain freedom of action on the basis of full commitment, both legal and as a matter of principle, to the necessity for the total liberation of all the occupied Arab territories.

5. The United Arab Republic absolutely

rejects any discussion of the demilitarization of Sinai but, in accordance with the Security Council resolution, it is prepared to accept demilitarized zones on condition that they are on both sides of the frontier.

6. The United Arab Republic will not allow any party to talk to it about an Israeli presence in Sharm el-Sheikh in any form whatsoever. It regards the dubious proposals that certain individuals have been circulating as regards the leasing of Sharm el-Sheikh to Israel for a specific period, or for Israeli forces to form part of an international emergency force, as a sort of joke which cannot and should not be discussed in the context of a crisis as serious as the Middle East crisis or with reference to a homeland like the United Arab Republic which has engaged in unyielding national struggle throughout its long history.

I read you this so that our agreement may be absolutely clear and precise, and so that we may know, because at this stage, as I have told you, I shall welcome him and talk to him. But I have not forgotten past history and I have a definite attitude before our whole people. As I have said, the battle is not on the battlefield only, the battle has many aspects—there is the battlefield, but there is also the political aspect I have told you about.

I have already spoken about America's attitude. I shall ask Mr. Rogers when he comes to give a clear definition of it. We thank America for her efforts, for she wants to reach a peaceful solution. If these efforts are really sincere, we thank her with all our hearts. But we want America to explain her attitude absolutely clearly and to define it absolutely definitely.

As for our Egyptian initiative that America says she will work on, we have said how far we will go. Israel has given America her answer, but America has not told us what it was. I am interested in knowing, and of course this will happen when Rogers comes. What interests me most is not Israel's answer, because I know it in advance; what interests me is America's attitude, and I shall disclose it to the people quite frankly, as always. As for the rest of the Big Four, France still

maintains her honorable attitude which is in conformity with the principles of peace based on justice. I take this opportunity and this occasion—there has been correspondence between me and President Pompidou, the President of France—I take this opportunity of sending him, and the people of France in his person, our sincerest thanks and gratitude for their attitude, which is characterized by justice and by aware understanding as a great power in this world.

The third is Britain. There has been a really tangible change in Britain's attitude—Britain's statement of her agreement to take part in the international peace force in the area, although Britain knows that Israel is desperately opposed to this change, is a radical change from the attitude adopted by the previous Labour government.

Certainly the Conservative government—and I said so to a delegation of Labour members of the British House of Commons—I said to them: "The Conservative government has been more courageous than you were and than your government, the Labour government, because it has succeeded in adopting an independent policy for Britain."

There has certainly been a change in Britain's attitude, and we welcome and encourage that change.

The U.S.S.R. is maintaining its honorable attitude unconditionally. People outside make propaganda about the Soviet presence. They say that the Soviets want to occupy the country, the Soviets dominate the economy of the country, the Soviets this, the Soviets that. It's all nonsense. It's quite unconditional. All our lives we have known—from the day of our Revolution, from the day we liberated our will—we have always known that our will was not for sale, and we shall never sell our will. The U.S.S.R. is a friend and gives its support to a friend quite unconditionally.

These are the attitudes of the Big Four. This is one aspect of the battle. As I told you, there is the military aspect and the political aspect. I have been talking about the foreign affairs aspect of it and the attitudes of the Big Four.

I now come to a very important aspect—the Arab aspect. In my estimate the Arab aspect is one of the gravest and most important aspects in the call to the battle today, and we have all agreed that there is no call more sacred than the call to the battle today. Of course you know that I have been charged by the constitutional and political institutions to go ahead with the Tripartite Federation to the extent that it is of service to the battle of our nation and achieves the aspirations that Abdel Nasser struggled for for so long. And I want to tell you the story of the Tripartite Federation, but before I tell it to you I will go back to the time when Gamal died, may God have mercy on him. In October a class graduated from the Israeli Military Academy, and Chaim Bar-Lev spoke at the passing out ceremony of this class, and what he said was published throughout the world and written about by the news agencies. He addressed the class that was passing out in October 1970, some weeks after the death of President Nasser.

He said to them: "Israel's future is very bright, so rejoice—the Eastern Front has disintegrated and ended for good—Iraq has left the battle. King Hussein has liquidated the Palestine Resistance—the Resistance is no longer effective. Syria is occupied with her internal affairs—so the Eastern Front is finished. On the Western Front Abdel Nasser has died and Egypt will never again be as strong as she was in the days of Abdel Nasser. So rejoice, new officers of Israel who are passing out in October 1970. The future is bright, and the battle is now only a matter of time for Israel to impose her will or for Israel to get what she wants."

This happened in October 1970, some weeks after the death of Abdel Nasser. The picture Bar-Lev gave—let us be honest with ourselves—was a true picture at that time—the Eastern Front really had disintegrated and it is still disintegrated today. When I say the Eastern Front I mean Jordan, Iraq and the Palestine Resistance, because we call Syria the Northern Front, and the Eastern Front is still in a state of disintegration up to this moment. We must admit the truth.

Iraq has withdrawn completely, the Pales-

tine Resistance has been attacked twice—the first time in September in the days of Abdel Nasser and the conference called by Abdel Nasser. The second time started in October. It was slow but carefully planned, and this is the cause of my difference with King Hussein. I personally—there is nothing between me and King Hussein personally, on the contrary, we still appreciate his attitude on June 5. We shall not forget his stand on June 5, 1967. We are not hostile to King Hussein, but the problem is the friction, and what is happening to the Palestine Resistance and the attack on the Palestine Resistance—and our constant warning about what is happening to the Palestine Resistance. We have continued on our course since Abdel Nasser's death as we agreed and as the people decided, and I state in your presence that there is absolutely no hostility between me and King Hussein, and I don't want any hostility or conflict. On the contrary, I believe that at this stage there must be concentrated Arab action with every man who can do so playing his part in the battle. The only point of difference, as I have told you, arises from the operation of liquidating the Resistance and the destruction of it and the provocative elements that surround King Hussein and try to make him believe that at one moment we are conspiring against him, at another that we want the Palestinian state, and at still another that we want goodness knows what. Every day they make some new suggestion to him about us.

Every day they make new suggestions to him. The Jordanian army, which we hold in such esteem, is not on the firing line, not in its natural place on the firing line confronting Israel. The Resistance has been attacked and is not allowed to take action. This is the whole of our difference. I hope and pray that we may be able to find a solution of this problem in the coming stage. As I said, there is absolutely no personal hostility to King Hussein, there is absolutely no intention of relations being strained with King Hussein personally for any reason at all; the only trouble is what has been caused by these elements, the provocative elements that surround him.

I now return to what we were talking about and Bar-Lev's speech that I told you about. The Eastern Front, alas, is still disintegrated, because the Jordanian army is still not on the firing line, and the Iraqi army has completely withdrawn. The Palestine Resistance has been attacked and has lost its effectiveness; it is carrying out operations, but they are not as influential and effective as could have been hoped. So what Bar-Lev said is true. But he forgot something. Bar-Lev forgot that here in Egypt after the death of Abdel Nasser there is a people who have filled the vacuum left by Abdel Nasser—34 million of them. Abdel Nasser was not alone. Bar-Lev left this out. And President Hafiz Assad in Syria was able very rapidly to carry out the magnificent operation of rectification which he carried out in Syria and Syria has come in to perform her Arab duty in the battle. Very well, Syria has taken her place in the battle, and we, since the death of Abdel Nasser—34 million of us—have stood firm and carried on and said "We will carry on with the job until it is finished, all 34 million of us, with all we possess." One of the fundamental lines that Israel has built her strategy on and stated in her books is no secret—it is well known in the world—that the Arabs are always divided among themselves and in conflict with each other. This is one of the articles of Israel's strategy—that the Arabs are divided and more than that, in conflict with each other, and the only quarter to benefit from Arab division or conflict is Israel. It is not unity or federation that annoys Israel, but just Arab solidarity. Just Arab solidarity between two Arab states annoys Israel; how much more if there is union or federation.

. . . . .

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**Press Conference Statements by Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia, Supporting the U.A.R. in Any Steps To Recover Her Territory and Reiterating Saudi Demands for Withdrawal from Occupied Territory and Support for the Rights of the Palestinians<sup>1</sup>**

**Riyadh, May 2, 1971**

*Q. Does Saudi Arabia approve in principle of a solution, if only an interim one, for the opening of the Suez Canal?*

*A.* It is impossible to answer yes or no. Because if I say yes, I shall have to lay down conditions and if I say no, I shall have to provide justifications. What I do want to say is that there is a thorny problem and that there is aggression against the Palestinian people, that there is aggression against Arab states, and that a solution to this problem exists, but this solution must not be divided into parts. When I say divided into parts I do not mean that the forces should be withdrawn in one day, for that is impossible in practice. And when we talk of opening the Canal, we do not mean that we do not agree to its being opened or its not being opened, but the problem is one of finding total solutions and then ensuring that they are implemented in accordance with a carefully prepared plan. In any case this concerns our brethren in Egypt; it does not concern us as much as it concerns them. It does in fact concern us, but not as much as it concerns them, and, of course they know, we are with them and under no circumstances shall we stand in their way.

*Q. Can you tell us exactly what Mr. Rogers proposed in the way of a solution?*

*A.* I cannot answer in English, for this is presumably going to be broadcast and the Saudi people should know it as well as you. I need make no comment, because here we do not hide things from the people and this is the method adopted by His Majesty in

his wisdom and in his treatment of the people of this country.

To return to the question, when Mr. Rogers came here I cannot say that he brought a solution; he came to investigate the facts, as I understand it, and to learn the various points of view on this subject. I am not in a position to say what passed between him and His Majesty, nor am I in a position to speak of President Nixon's message to His Majesty. What I can say is that Mr. Rogers had discussions with us here and learned our point of view and told us America's point of view, and I can say that we both understood each other's point of view entirely.

*Q. To keep the peace in a demilitarized zone?*

*A.* Mr. Rogers has proposed this idea, and no doubt he repeated it to you during his visit. In any case, if there is a settlement the United Nations has decided that there should be international forces stationed in territories between the two conflicting parties, and the states concerned have accepted this. But if the question is just an attempt to lead to the question of communism and the Russians, I will not evade it. We are against communism and combat communism because it is against our beliefs and our religion, so naturally we do not want it in our country or in our region. This leads us to say that the thorny problem of Palestine and the question of Zionist aggression in Palestine are not being dealt with effectively. There was aggression by the Jews, by the Zionists, against Egypt and Jordan, and after that aggression things were so presented so as to provide a justification for not withdrawing, because the Russians were in the area.

*Q. Does Your Excellency support Egypt's demand that her forces must occupy the areas evacuated by Israel?*

*A.* Frankly and clearly, we support Egypt in everything that can help her to recover her territories that have been attacked.

*Q. Do you agree to efforts being made to secure the presence of the Israelis as a guard?*

*A.* To guard what?

*Q. To observe in the territories that will then*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Saqqaf's press conference with Arab and international press correspondents, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), May 3, 1971.

*not be occupied and to see if moves are being made to rebuild military strength or anything like that.*

A. In the first place I do not believe that Egypt has agreed to evacuate the territories and let them be demilitarized, and even if she did agree there would have to be demilitarized territories in Israel that were observed in the same way.

*Q. Of course you reviewed with Mr. Rogers the latest developments in the crisis in the area. Is there any hope of overcoming Israel's obstinate refusal to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories?*

A. You know Israel's attitude, as it is declared by her leaders—it is an obstacle to any solution. But we pray God that the picture may have changed and that they may once more be thinking soundly and rightly about the situation.

*Q. Does Your Excellency mean that the solution or the interim settlement can only be part of a comprehensive settlement?*

A. As a Saudi Arab, Yes. And Egypt has frankly declared that she will not accept a partial solution which is not integral, but has said . . . that there should be partial solutions to be implemented in a specific period of time, and this is acceptable to our brethren in the countries which are Israel's neighbors.

*Q. That implies that you do not agree to this interim settlement unless Israel agrees to the principle of total withdrawal.*

A. In the first place I am talking about Egypt, and Egypt has announced this; Saudi Arabia does not need to restate her attitude to the problem. As far as we are concerned, withdrawal is fundamental. The rights of Palestine, of the Palestinian people, mean that withdrawal is fundamental. This is something that Saudi Arabia believes in and is working for. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, Jerusalem comes at the top of the list—the situation that existed before the aggression of June 5 must be restored there.

*Q. As regards Jerusalem, does Your Excellency think that it would be possible to accept a proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem, with the holy places administered by religious representatives?*

A. What Jerusalem do you mean?

*Q. Is he referring to the holy places in particular?*

A. We do not accept that; Jerusalem must be as it was before. We believe that the holy places in Jerusalem are Christian and Muslim; even the Wailing Wall, which the Jews claim is theirs, is a wall built by Muslims. Anyone who doubts this should study the documents of the League of Nations, which provide evidence that the *ulema* were sent to Jerusalem by the Commission and established that the Wall was built in the Islamic era. In any case, the Jews say that the clock cannot be put back more than 25 years. For Heavens sake, is it possible, is it permissible for the Zionists to say that the clock cannot be put back 25 years and expect us to put it back more than two thousand years? I am talking quite objectively, not emotionally. Are there any further questions?

*Q. Looking at the future, can you see any gleam of hope or possibility of cooperation between Israel and the Arab states?*

A. It is very difficult to answer this question. It is not a question of the ability to answer; it is a good question and considerably predates the time we are living in. But I do think that if Zionism thinks properly and in an enlightened manner and gets to know the area it is living in and learns that in the present age so-called secure frontiers or permanent peace exist only on paper, because in such matters tactics and technology have put an end to these things, and if they realize that even if their population rises to six million, by that time the Arabs will be 160 million; if they think in this way and accept a state called the State of Palestine in which Jews and Arabs live together then perhaps it will be possible to talk business.

*Q. Do you mean a binational state?*

A. A state to be established and called State of Palestine. . . .

*Q. How much material aid is your government giving the Palestinians, and to what organizations?*

A. We are supporting genuine Palestinian commando action; I cannot tell you the amount. In addition the Saudi people are contributing a great deal everywhere; you can obtain the details of these contributions,

because the newspapers publish them every day.

### 332

#### **Press Statement by Commissioner General Mahjub of the Regional Offices for the Boycott of Israel in the Arab Countries, Commenting on the Success of the Economic Boycott of Israel<sup>1</sup>**

Beirut, May 8, 1971

Israel is aware of the impact of the boycott and the extent of the great losses it has inflicted on her economy. This has been the case especially since the Arab boycott developed its methods of action, which made Israel resort to various means, both inside and outside the Arab countries, to destroy the boycott, making use of all her friendships with the West and of the information media which she influences.

In 1964 Israel wanted to strike at the Arab boycott through her ally, America, and increased pressure on the American Congress, which forced the government to pass a law preventing exporting companies from providing the Boycott with the information it required to ascertain the nature of their relations with Israel unless they obtained permission from the American government. This move was successful at first, as these companies were bound by the law, but the Arab Boycott Office imposed a total boycott on companies which refrained from answering any question put to them, and eventually they submitted, so that the Israeli scheme was a failure.

After that Israel tried to put pressure on France, Britain and West Germany, but they refused to respond.

In the last four years Israel has been exerting her influence in another way—by exerting pressure on chambers of commerce in Europe and the United States, in an attempt to stop

them attesting the reports required by the Arab Boycott Office from foreign companies, the most important being the certificate of origin of the goods they export, to ensure that they include no Israeli materials or merchandise. We then asked these companies to register their replies at a notary public and obtain approval from the Arab embassies, and thereby frustrated the Israeli plan.

The most important step taken by the Arab Boycott to improve Arab-foreign commercial relations was the establishment of joint chambers of commerce with certain Western countries, which were empowered to certify the documents required from the foreign countries. The Arab Boycott now has an American-Arab Chamber of Commerce in New York with numerous branches in the United States, another in France and a third in Turkey, and we are in the process of establishing three more in Britain, Austria and Yugoslavia.

In 1966 Israel realized the failure of her political pressures on the Arab Boycott, which was having an increasing effect on her. She therefore established an Israeli anti-boycott office, for which a budget of more than 20 million dollars per year was allotted. This organization started its activities in a variety of ways, the most important being its information activities. There were misleading publicity campaigns to the effect that the Arab Boycott was based on racial and religious discrimination, but we made it clear beyond all shadow of doubt that the Boycott had dealings with Jewish companies proved to have no relations with Israel, and that it had put on its black list companies owned by Muslims and Christians which had dealings with Israel.

In the last few years Israel has been threatening companies which respond to the Arab Boycott that she will wage a trade war against them and prevent the United States from consuming their goods. But these companies, and especially the French ones, have paid no attention to this threat, especially as the Boycott Office has recommended that Arab and friendly countries should increase their dealings with these countries, and this in fact is what has happened. For example, three

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Mahjub's statement to *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 9, 1971.

French companies have increased their production by 5 per cent, according to their own calculations, as a result of this measure.

Recently Israel adopted a new method, choosing an anti-Arab and pro-Zionist newspaper to publish articles which attempt to represent the Arab Boycott as futile, and those responsible for it as lacking both integrity and competence.

We realized this when we read an article in the anti-Arab *Der Spiegel*, the real aim of which was to destroy the Arab Boycott from inside the Arab countries by certain Arab newspapers copying the article, which is designed to confuse Arab public opinion and cast aspersions on the integrity of those responsible for the Arab Boycott.

It came out that the writer of this article is an Israeli living in Israel. He is the correspondent of *Der Spiegel* and works for Israeli intelligence. I consider it my duty to draw the attention of the press to this so that it may not publish anything that will further the ends of world Zionism, and check everything before publishing it.

### 333

#### **Press Statements by Defense and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia, Protesting Israeli Control of the Holy Places and Commenting on the Use of Oil To Exert Pressure in the Service of Arab Interests<sup>1</sup>**

**Beirut, May 11, 1971**

[As regards Saudi Arabia's attitude to current Arab problems, and in particular the problem of Palestine and Israel's aggressions against the Holy Places]: Saudi Arabia's attitude to this sensitive point is, in my view, the attitude of all who sincerely believe in God, whether Christian or Muslim. The

crimes Israel is committing and the way it is defiling our Holy Places in Jerusalem have evoked reactions not only from Arabs, for the United Nations has set up committees to inform the world of how Israel is offending against revealed religions in that noble place. Therefore our attitude on this point is that things should be restored to normal, that every religion should look after its own sites, and that Jordan should protect and take care of the Holy Places as it did for dozens of years, providing facilities for worship to adherents of all the religions, including Judaism. Therefore, as regards this matter, we can only accept that the situation that existed in the past should be restored.

[On the role oil could play in exerting pressure to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution]: Oil is a resource of the Arab nation, and it has therefore been used in Arab endurance and to ensure that the Arab nation has no need to resort to asking help from any foreign state. Arab oil has also been used to pressure the producing companies to raise prices and increase national income so that we can do our duties of ensuring the continuation of Arab endurance and Arab aid and the development of the Arab citizen so that he may live like others. None of this is pleasing to imperialists or tendentious persons, either in the West or the East.

Therefore, my advice as an Arab is that we should continue to exploit our resources and our gifts, intellectual, economic and social, in every way, and expend them with a view to benefiting and promoting our nation in the military and social fields in the interests of our present cause and our existence and of increasing our might in the future.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Prince Sultan Ibn Abd-al-Aziz's statements to the press, made during a visit to Lebanon, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 12, 1971.

## 334

**Press Interview Statements by Premier Naaman of Yemen (Sanaa) Urging That the Palestinians Be Allowed To Decide for Themselves on the Proposals for a Peaceful Solution in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

Sanaa, Mid-May, 1971

*Q. What do you think of a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem?*

*A.* It is up to those who are fighting the war to choose the solution that suits them, regardless of the spectators who are like the spectators at a bullfight. If the Yemenis had not courageously solved their problem by themselves, the civil war would still be going on today.

*Q. But do you not think that a peaceful solution would do away with the rights of the Palestinian people?*

*A.* No, not at all. The Palestinians would have been able to obtain their full and undiminished rights if they had been left to themselves from the start and if the Arabs had really helped them, without intervening directly and without making their problem a pretext for political overbidding and cheap heroics. At present the rights of the Palestinians are becoming clearer to the world than ever before, and we hope from the bottom of our hearts that they will overcome their differences among themselves and with their brother Arabs so that the total Arab effort may be made available for the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

## 335

**Statement Reiterating Syrian Determination To Recover Occupied Territory and To Support the Palestine Resistance, Made by Premier Khleifawi of Syria (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Damascus, May 17, 1971

We hold fast to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people in their territory and their homeland, and shall not agree to any of these rights being relinquished; we support the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to obtain their legitimate rights and recover their usurped territory; we provide full support and unconditional aid to the Palestine revolution and to commando action, and we believe that the Palestine revolution is a sacred right of the Palestinians, and regard it our national duty to support and protect it without reservations. As the President of the Republic said: "We are unchanged in our support for the Palestine revolution and our attitude against all attempts to liquidate it and in our support of all efforts to achieve unity of Palestinian action."

We shall take action within the framework of our goals for the present stage to liberate the occupied Arab territory and to reinforce popular endurance, being remiss in nothing, and we shall accept no solution whatsoever which does not enable us to recover our territory. We shall therefore reject all surrender solutions involving the usurpation of a single inch of the soil of the homeland, well aware though we are of the difficulties that lie ahead of us. The liberation of our territory is a sacred duty, and we shall perform that duty and carry out every task that may serve it; and whatever the views and plans of our enemy and those who are behind our enemy, we shall never be negligent in this matter, and the goal of liberation will remain the absolute pivot of our policy.

In the field of international policy the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Naaman's interview (shortly after the formation of his new government), *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 13, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Abdul Rahman Khleifawi's policy statement to the People's Council, *al-Baath* (Damascus), May 18, 1971.



government will take action to ensure the success of the policy of non-alignment in its new sense of hostility to imperialism and colonialism and resistance to the schemes of neo-colonialism, in alliance with the peoples and their sacred right to self-determination and to achieve their economic and political liberation. The government will also support and ally itself with liberation movements throughout the world, for we regard ourselves as an inseparable part of the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist liberation front.

The character of our struggle for liberation and the development of our society, the interests of our masses and the nature of the struggle now in progress in the world—all these stress the necessity for us to strengthen our relations with the socialist countries, headed by the friendly U.S.S.R., in economic, political and other fields.

As a part of the Third World, we shall do all we can to strengthen our relations with the developing countries with a view to serving our national and economic goals, and we shall join with them in diminishing the disparity between the advanced world and the backward world.

We shall also determine our attitude to the capitalist countries in accordance with their attitudes to our national problems, with due regard for the interest of our masses and our nation.

### 336

#### **Statement Issued by the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Refuting Accusations in the Jordan Government Memorandum to Arab Ambassadors in Amman<sup>1</sup>**

May 18, 1971

When we obtained the full text of the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Fateh statement, *Fateh* (Damascus), May 19, 1971. For the English text of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry's memorandum, issued May 16, 1971, see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3687/A/12-A/13.

message delivered by the Jordanian Foreign Minister to the Arab ambassadors in Jordan, we decided not to comment on it immediately, but to let it, and the lies and slanders it contains—which have become the hallmark of the present government—refute themselves. We therefore published the message and distributed it to all news agencies so that it might uncover the new plan adopted by the authorities under the umbrella of what it called "Fateh's destructive plan." But now that the government has fallen into the trap and disclosed its criminal methods, it is necessary to explain the following facts to the masses:

I. For more than two weeks the subservient authorities have in an infamous manner, been assiduously spreading the rumors that are contained in the message. The Premier and his Director of Intelligence have been telling stories in all quarters about the plans that Fateh intends to carry out, and at the official meetings of the Liaison Office the Premier and his aides have mentioned "the grave information they had obtained," and tried to make light of it, as if everything were under their control and in their hands. At the last meeting of the Liaison Office, to be precise, [that held] after the Wahdat conference on the anniversary of May 15, the Premier said:

1. The assassination of one of our side will mean the assassination of a hundred members of your commands, wherever they may be—in Jordan, Damascus or Beirut.

2. In the event of a strike from the Syrian frontier, we shall strike at the Syrian forces and strike hard. He added colonialism has supplied us with new long-range artillery with which we can hit the Yarmuk forces and their other forces.

3. An attack on any of our vital installations will mean total war and the occupation of Debbin, Ajlun and the Jordan Valley.

This summary of what the Jordanian Premier said confirms what was said in the message and the significance of the plan that the government intends to carry out.

II. Although the message speaks at length about the plans and the reasons and motives for them, if only for the purpose of covering up the conspiracy, it makes no mention at

all of the Cairo and Amman Agreements or the government's readiness to abide by them. We are also surprised that the Jordanian government should acquaint the Arab embassies with such internal matters when it rejects Arab tutelage, rejects Arab interference, as its information media and officials have been screaming for months!

III. The crux of the message is clearly revealed by the threats contained in it: "We shall allow no one to play fast and loose"; "we shall confront the position with the greatest firmness"; "we shall strike with a hand of iron." These are references to the government's new plan, the aims of which are as follows:

1. To justify keeping the army in Amman and other towns far from its proper place on the frontier;

2. To turn the army into a public security force during Rogers' recent visit, so that the forces of the Jordanian Arab army might not molest Zionist settlements on the frontier;

3. To undertake a large-scale campaign of arrests in the ranks of members of the revolution and sympathizers with commando action and the revolution;

4. To prepare the way for a new conspiracy on behalf of the battle for the final liquidation of commando action and the revolution in the Jordan Valley and the mountains of Jordan, the reason for these plans mentioned in the orders of the day of the army command as being to ensure that the Jordanian army continues to be injected with shots of hatred for the commandos and to justify their being killed in the sight of officers and men.

IV. At Abu Ayyad's Amman press conference, the revolution declared: "We have sure information to the effect that the authorities and their intelligence services intend to manufacture incidents in Amman to justify the army's remaining in Amman and to justify a large-scale attack on the commando forces in the Jordan Valley, Debbin and Ajlun." This means that the authorities started to implement their plan as soon as the message was delivered to the Arab embassies, and we are not surprised that such operations should be carried out to justify all the measures we have mentioned.

V. This is the first time that the authorities have faced themselves and spoken of the real nature of their hatred of Fateh, though they have long slandered the other organizations, claiming in the past that Fateh was moderate and that its leaders were moderates. How can such moderates suddenly have become the authors of criminal plans which threaten the existence of Jordan and its army?

VI. ... Those who conspire in the darkness and plan crimes against the people and the revolution have started to realize that the blood they have shed in Jordan has started to find them out, and that the masses whom they have humiliated, insulted and killed are bound to seek vengeance and hunt down the criminals and traitors, because the people cannot forgive the killers their massacres and their crimes against the revolution and the revolutionaries.

VII. Regardless of the vengeance that the masses will wreak on the authorities who humiliate and insult them in their attempt to destroy the noblest of mass revolutions, and regardless of whether the masses punish the agents and traitors, Fateh will stand up to this new conspiracy as one man, along with all the revolutionary commando organizations involved in the revolution against this barbarous new attack, and will not let the agents feel secure behind their desks in their palaces as they go on with their conspiracy. We shall not allow the agents to liquidate the revolution of the Palestinian people and the Arab masses as they confidently steal the wealth of the people, conspire against their cause and try to liquidate their revolution.

The government's message breathes a spirit of arrogance, conceit and conspiracy. We call on the Arab masses and all free men in the world to take a stand against the conspiracy that is being prepared by the authorities. It remains for us to call on our masses in Jordan, our combatants in the Jordan Valley, Debbin and Ajlun and our revolutionaries everywhere, to take a resolute stand in defense of the revolution and the masses.

337

**Statements Made by U.A.R. President Sadat to the Egyptian National Assembly Reporting on His Talks with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and Calling for a Clear Definition of U.S. Policy in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, May 20, 1971**

I met Rogers with an open mind and an open heart. I am not in favor of holding back. I do not go in for holding back. I know what I want—not an inch of our territory is to be relinquished and there is to be no bargaining over the rights of Palestine. So we talked with an open mind and an open heart. We discussed for a long time—two and a half hours. With me was the Foreign Minister. “I don’t ask anything of you because you haven’t gone to Israel, but when you have gone I want you, after you return to the United States, I want America to define her attitude, because the [other] three Big Powers have now defined their attitudes.”

There remains America’s attitude, and we must not ignore the fact that America is an essential element in the problem, because she supplies Israel, as I have said and say, with everything from a loaf of bread to a Phantom. He went to Israel and sent me what Israel said, and we analyzed it at a meeting with the Premier Dr. Mahmud Fawzi and the Foreign Minister, and Mr. Husain al-Shafii, the Vice-President of the Republic, also joined us at the meeting. I have given instructions to the Deputy Premier and the Foreign Minister to send our answer to America today, directly after this session, along the following lines, which I now make known to you, the people and the world.

The question of opening the Canal is not a separate problem nor a partial solution; it is one stage of total withdrawal according to a timetable. We shall never agree to discuss the question of our Egyptian forces crossing over to the East Bank.

We shall not agree to the ceasefire being extended indefinitely as long as there is a single foreign soldier in our territory.

Our territory is what it was before June 5 as far as we are concerned, and this applies to all Arab territories. The Foreign Minister has prepared our reply and directly after this session he will deliver it to America; it asks America to define her attitude; there have been enough exchanges of memoranda.

Rogers came to us and heard what we had to say and saw us, and we discussed everything with extreme freedom and with open minds and hearts. He went to Israel and saw them. It is now up to America to define her attitude clearly.

It is a question of war or peace; there is no need of another exchange of memoranda to and fro. We have had enough of philosophical discussions, playing with words and that sort of thing.

I told Rogers, and I hope he won’t be angry if I tell the secret, but I really must tell you and I think perhaps I told it to the parliamentary committee—I told him: “I cannot accept it when you say that you are going to convince Israel; I cannot even accept that you are putting pressure on Israel. I officially ask you to inform President Nixon that what is wanted today—while we are talking of peace, and you have come to us and seen us and seen that we really seriously want peace—I ask President Nixon officially to put pressure on Israel properly if it is really a matter of peace.”

If they want peace, we are for peace; however, what came from Israel, brought by Sisco, doesn’t touch us at all, because Israel is still beset by the arrogance of victory, by Nazi arrogance, and they are still trying to live in the dreams and fantasies of the past. None of this interests me. What does interest me is that America should define her attitude because we are today faced by historic attitudes which must be properly defined—because it is a question of war or peace.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat’s speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 21, 1971.

## 338

**Statements by U.A.R. President Sadat  
Reiterating Egyptian Insistence on the  
Return of All Occupied Arab Territory  
and Recognition of the Rights of the  
Palestinians As Conditions for a Middle  
East Settlement<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, May 26, 1971

As all the world can bear witness, we have done all in our power to find a peaceful issue to the crisis. We have made two conditions:

1. [The return of] the territory, all the Arab territory occupied since June 4, 1967. By this I do not mean only Egyptian territory—before Egyptian territory we insist on the return of Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza, the Syrian Heights and Sinai.

2. [Respect for] the rights of the Palestinian people, and it is the joint responsibility of all the peoples of the Arab nation, along with the Palestinian people, to maintain and defend them. These rights of the Palestinian people are more than a question of human sympathy for the refugees; they are national rights; we cannot agree that they should be decided on a charitable basis—they rest on a political and legal basis.

We have responded in full, not only to Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967; we have also responded to the initiatives of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, who is entrusted with the task of following up the implementation of that resolution.

What is more, we ourselves took a step after that with an Egyptian initiative in which we proposed a first stage of total withdrawal in return for a step by us in the form of opening the Suez Canal to international trade.

But colonialism and its tools are making a

great mistake if they imagine that our desire to get things moving comes from a fear to confront the responsibilities of fighting should we be required to take up arms in defense of the homeland and of our principles.

Israel has responded to none of these initiatives—neither ours nor those of the international community, and it is clear that what Israel wants is not peace, but expansion. This is what we reject and what we are prepared to fight against.

The United States has made efforts which we have not rejected, although we are well aware of Israeli-American relations, and we have made clear our fundamental attitudes, and we have waited with open minds and hearts.

We want everyone to know that we are not prepared to relinquish territory or rights in return for a mirage, nor are honeyed words a proof of good intentions.

We have clearly defined our attitude to the United States in a recent official memorandum in which we said “We regard continued American material and military support for Israel as American participation in the occupation of our territories and the aggression against the sovereignty of our homelands.”

## 339

**Statement by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia  
Expressing Hope for American Concern  
To Rectify Injustice in the Middle East,  
Made at the Start of His Official Visit  
to the United States<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, May 27, 1971

The real aggression to which our countries and our peoples are being subjected should arouse the concern of Your Excellency, your

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech at a banquet he gave in honor of U.S.S.R. President Podgorny on an official visit to the U.A.R., *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 27, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of King Faisal's speech replying to U.S. President Nixon's White House welcome speech, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), May 28, 1971.

government and your great people. This aggression, which is embodied in the occupation of our territories and holy places, and aggression against one of our peoples, is the cause of the tension between this country and the Arab and Islamic countries.

The love of the good and of justice, and the desire that truth may prevail, which grace your great people, yourself, Your Excellency, and your wise government, lead me to hope that you may surmount these difficulties and restore things to their normal course so that truth may prevail, justice be spread abroad and peace be preserved in the area.

### 340

#### **Statement Issued by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia's Special Adviser Prince Nawaf, Reporting the King's Talks with U.S. President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

**Washington, May 28, 1971**

His Majesty King Faisal at this meeting affirmed Saudi Arabia's total commitment to its responsibilities vis-à-vis the problems of the Islamic and Arab nations, and made clear to His Excellency [President Nixon] the dimensions and the gravity of the stage through which the Arab nation is at present living, in view of the ambitions of Zionism and the continued Israeli occupation of Arab holy places and territories. He referred to the need to take action to find a solution that will ensure that the Arab nation recovers its usurped legitimate rights, and affirmed that Saudi Arabia will go to all lengths in meeting its obligations to our Islamic and Arab nations. The speech made by His Majesty King Faisal on his arrival at the White House was a clear and frank expression of Saudi Arabia's policy vis-à-vis the Arab and Islamic states, and of its awareness of its duty to play a part in solving their problems. [His Highness

concluded his statement by saying that the two parties had exchanged viewpoints on all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and all world problems.]

### 341

#### **Interview Statements by Palestine Resistance Spokesman Shaath Rejecting the Idea of a "Palestine State" on the West Bank and Advocating a Democratic State for Arabs and Jews in All Palestine<sup>2</sup>**

**May, 1971**

*Q. What about . . . a 'Palestine State' on the West Bank, for example, which some people advocate.*

*A. Those who support the idea of a quasi-Palestine, a quisling state, are a few 'notables' which Israel, and America in particular, have been cultivating. The young people don't share their views. The quisling state would be a solution to the whole problem; Israel would be entrenched forever. It would retain full power over the West Bank and extend its economic exploitation without having to absorb the West bankers as citizens, without being burdened by the demographic problem that the expanding West Bank population presents.*

*Any talk about 'two Palestines' is really to talk about a South African situation. Israel is saying: 'What we have we hold and what you have is negotiable'. We are there to stay and you will have a Bantustan beside us. We shall carry out our 'mission civilisatrice'. We'll help you along. You'll be the junior partner. If all you want is a flag, you can have it. Malawi has a flag! This is completely at odds with the idea of a democratic State of Palestine for both Jews and Arabs, which is our aim.*

\* \* \*

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Prince Nawaf Ibn Abd al-Aziz's statement to the Saudi News Agency correspondent, *al-Bilad* (Jedda), May 29, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpts from Shaath's interview with David Hirst, Middle East correspondent of *The Guardian*, as published in *Middle East International*, 1, 2 (May, 1971), pp. 23, 24, 25.

[In the course of the discussion Dr. Shaath agreed that the guerrilla movement had lost "a good deal of popular support", and said one cause was the exaggerated expectations of the Arab people. He explained that the Arab individual had been basically a spectator, never contributing to the policy-making of any Arab country. He found new hope in guerrilla movement after the 1967 war but expected the movement to liberate Palestine overnight.]

*Q. It seems that the spectators included, most significantly, many West Bankers.*

*A.* The West Banker had an additional misery. Besides being an Arab, he was under occupation. He didn't know how long he would have to wait and suffer and felt that if this standstill continued the West Bank would inevitably be absorbed into Israel like other parts of Palestine were.

All this made him look to President Nasser, who had accepted the Rogers proposals, and entertain the hope, or illusion, that at least for this stage, something could be done to release him from immediate bondage so that he could carry on the struggle.

\* \* \*

*Q. Could not your democratic State be achieved by peaceful evolution, with a West Bank State as a stepping stone towards it?*

*A.* No. Israel cannot be held where it is, side by side with what I call a 'Palestinostan'. What happens is that the rich become richer and the poor poorer. It is the Gunnar Myrdal vicious circle. It is the powerful society which infiltrates the weaker one. So Israel will become more powerful, more racist, more capable of crushing any attempts to integrate these two areas—except on its own terms. The democratic State can only be achieved by the liberation struggle which will eventually involve the Jews of Palestine.

*Q. When the guerrilla leadership adopted the ideal of a democratic State to incorporate all Jews now in Palestine, did it have difficulties propagating this humane solution among the Palestine people?*

*A.* It was very difficult. On the one side

there is a victor, on the other side a vanquished. The Palestinian was robbed of his land, expelled, uprooted. Who did this? The Jews. The Jew came to him as a conqueror, the European invader, the colonialist settler. True, that very conqueror was persecuted where he came from. And the majority of Jews who came to Palestine did not view themselves as conquerors, as colonialist settlers. Many of them were literally thrown out of Europe; they were desperate and came to Palestine to survive.

But the Arabs never experienced the Jews as persecuted people. The Palestinian now has to reconcile himself to a new fact, a revolutionary fact: the fact that he can actually go back to that land, liberate it, and yet not liberate it from the Jewish individuals who came there, but from that particular system that made them, no frightened Jewish settlers, but conquerors, oppressors, occupiers. He is to liberate them as well as himself from colonialist Zionism. He is being told they are not his enemies, not inherently vicious. He can go and live with those who threw him out and kept him out, leave them in their houses and build his own alongside. He is giving them chances equal to his; he doesn't even insist on a majority.

He accepts them all whereas in the past he was told that, if he accepts anybody it would probably be the descendants of those who came in 1918 or 1947. This is new. It is changing the very make-up of Palestinian perception.

*Q. Are the guerrillas making persistent efforts to instil this idea?*

*A.* In the past two years Fatah has been spending a lot of time and effort on education. This education has to go into fantastic, completely unpredictable things.

It has to start, step by step, eradicating every little bias that has crept into the Palestinian mind against 'the Jews'. Even the use of the word *Yahuud* to describe Israelis has been constantly checked. So have little identifications of Jewishness with the enemy State, or Zionism.

The fight involves the teaching of Hebrew to children and adults, the teaching of Jewish

history. We also make continuous efforts to bring Jewish people to the camps – at present none of the visitors are Israeli Jews.

*Q. Isn't there a contradiction between your aim of creating a democratic Palestine, where Jews live in harmony with Arabs, and the fact that Fatah sometimes strikes not merely against soldiers, but civilians?*

*A.* This is paradox. But a paradox means only a seeming contradiction. On the one hand we have to persuade the Israelis the new thing we are offering is feasible, plausible, credible.

On the other, it is not just by painting a rosy picture of the future that we shall succeed. We can paint the rosiest picture, and the Israeli, enjoying the tranquillity of the state he is now living in, will say: 'OK, but why should I abandon what I have for, at best, a venturesome future?'

We have got to show him that he cannot have the tranquillity of an oppressor state.

### 342

#### **Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Representative al-Hasan of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Reporting on the Visit to China of a Palestine Liberation Organization Delegation<sup>1</sup>**

**Early June, 1971**

*Q. Were there official negotiations during the visit [to China by a P.L.O. delegation] and if so what were their results?*

*A.* The Palestinian delegation had several meetings with the Chinese authorities, at various levels. At all these meetings the Palestinian delegation concentrated on the following points:

1. The imperialist conspiracy to impose a political settlement is becoming daily more serious. Rogers' recent trip, which he made while the delegation was visiting Popular

China, was just one indication of how the scope of this conspiracy is expanding.

2. The imperialist conspiracy to impose a political settlement is now, and this is something very serious, proceeding hand in hand with the conspiracy of local reaction to strike at and liquidate the Palestine Resistance, the reason for this is that the liquidation of the Resistance is a fundamental condition if the settlement is to be pushed through, and that imperialist conspiracy and Zionist terrorism have not proved sufficient to put an end to the Resistance, so that the local agents had to be set in motion to carry out this task. It is in this light that we understand the massacre of September 1970.

3. In spite of the extremely difficult circumstances (both subjective and objective) which surround the Palestinian struggle, the will to endure and continue, along with an attempt to build it on sound political lines, are what we pledge ourselves to and hold to firmly.

4. Our friends' support for us, and especially the support of Popular China, which is based on a sound political attitude of absolute refusal to recognize the existence of Israel and of absolute understanding of her aggressive character and her organic links with world imperialism, constitutes an effective element in the Palestinian struggle's ability to endure and continue.

The Chinese always had the following points in mind:

1. Our attitude to the Palestinian cause is a matter of principle and our support is dictated by our international duties, and is never subject to political considerations.

2. We regard your battle against imperialism in the Middle East as of direct concern to Popular China, and we hope that, through your struggle, you will be able to bring American imperialism and Zionism to the stage of collapse that now confronts it in Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

3. Your national unity (and your Arab unity) are an extremely important element in your ability to reach this level.

4. You can always be confident of our support for you and you can be confident that our support for you is unconditional,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Hasan's exclusive interview, *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), No. 571 (June 14, 1971), p. 17.

as it has been in the past and will always be.

*Q. What can be regarded as new in these talks?*

*A.* I observed more than one new point in the talks. The first was our Chinese comrades' insistence that although imperialism and its instrument Israel are our principal enemy in the area, these forces may employ reaction to strike at us from within. Should this happen, reaction will have to be placed in the forefront of our enemies, and we will have to have plans to confront it. The second point is that it is not enough to talk of national unity in the abstract; this unity must be based on a sound political line. If there is no sound political line we will have to fight theoretically and persevere in this fighting until practice demonstrates the truth of the points of view that have been rejected, when the political line will be able to prevail. Our Chinese comrades pointed out that if we compare the situation of the Palestine revolution with that of the Chinese revolution (from the point of view of adopting a sound political line) our situation is more difficult, because in China the differences were within a single party, whereas our differences arise in a front in which there are conflicting intellectual and political trends.

The third new important point in these talks was the Chinese attitude, of which we were informed officially, and which may be summed up as follows: Popular China will henceforward provide its aid and support to the Palestine Liberation Organization, so that this aid may reach every combatant commando detachment; this is the kind of participation by which they are helping to promote Palestinian national unity. I think that this attitude, which expands the sphere of cooperation between Popular China and all the commando detachments, will lead to a strengthening of relations, and there can be no doubt that these three points are an expression of Popular China's understanding of the development of the situation in the area and of the nature of the internal situation of the Palestine Resistance especially at the present stage.

### **Press Interview Statements by Former President Helou of Lebanon, Reviewing Measures Taken by Lebanon at the Outbreak of the June War of 1967<sup>1</sup>**

**Beirut, Early June, 1971**

*Q. Did you expect the [1967] war?*

*A.* In calling these meetings I did not forget what a foreign observer had said to me after the Sharm el-Sheikh crisis—that the withdrawal of the international force from Sharm el-Sheikh would leave the field clear for Israel to realize her expansionist ambitions.

*Q. Did you acquaint the Arab capitals with this view?*

*A.* President Abdel Nasser knew it. But he depended on the estimates of certain military commanders in Egypt, especially in the air force, on the measures taken and the assured defensive capacity to repel aggression. There were also the representations made to him by the great powers, as he explained after the war. All this enabled the enemy to carry out its aggression.

*Q. At the Lebanese level, what happened?*

*A.* Before June 5, I had made tours of inspection on the Lebanese frontiers with Premier Rashid Karami and some officers. I visited the sectors to ascertain their preparedness and their morale. I visited the eastern, western and central sectors.

I still remember what General Jean Nujaïm said to us when we visited his sector—he was then a brigadier. He said that the orders given by the command were: No withdrawal. This was not just talk. These really were the orders. This means that every officer and man was intent on defense to the death.

*Q. When you learned of the aggression what measures did you take?*

*A.* I called Premier Karami to the Sinn al-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Helou's interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 5, 1971.



Fil Palace, and after discussion with him we decided to hold an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Before the meeting was held I sent for the Egyptian Ambassador to Lebanon, Major General Abd al-Hamid Ghalib, and in the presence of Karami and Ghalib I telephoned President Abdel Nasser and told him that Lebanon would not fail to do her duty, and that I called for coordination with the Arab countries on behalf of the battle, and especially with Egypt, and I asked for an Egyptian commander to be sent to Beirut for this purpose.

Abdel Nasser replied that in the present situation, the scope of the war having already expanded, he could not accede to my request. But he asked me to contact the Syrian authorities, adding that Syria had immense forces and massive war equipment, and that Lebanon could depend on cooperation with her in this connection.

So at once, with Karami and Ghalib still there, I contacted the Syrian President, at that time Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atasi, and told him of my talk with President Abdel Nasser. I added that Lebanon was absolutely ready to cooperate.

*Q. What was al-Atasi's reply?*

A. The Syrians' answer was always that they were not afraid that the enemy would pierce the Eastern Front; it was extremely strong and could not be penetrated. What they were afraid of was that the enemy might penetrate through the Marjayoun axis and encircle the Syrian forces from the rear.

I then assured him that the Lebanese army would defend this axis with all its strength, determination and faith.

*Q. What time did you get in touch with Abdel Nasser and al-Atasi?*

A. Not later than 11:30, I think.

*Q. How did Abdel Nasser sound? Was he happy?*

A. The reports of the fighting were contradictory and the facts had not become clear by then.

*Q. And al-Atasi?*

A. His tone was very strong and it was

clear that he was confident that the Eastern Front would not be pierced. I repeated to him that we were prepared for mutual understanding, cooperation and coordination.

Immediately after our talk, as an affirmation of our undertakings, I, along with Premier Karami, drafted a law permitting the government, in case of need, to allow Arab forces to enter Lebanese territory, the military command to be consulted and necessary arrangements to be made, within the limits of Lebanese sovereignty.

When the drafting of the law was completed, I asked for the Chamber of Deputies to be called to meet in extraordinary session to ratify the draft law, and at an emergency session which ended before 5 p.m. on the Monday evening the Chamber passed the law.

In the evening, at about 6 p.m., the army command contacted me and said that the military authorities in Syria had asked the Lebanese army command to allow Syrian forces to enter Lebanese territory immediately. The command naturally answered, as did Premier Rashid Karami, that there were certain prerequisites for coordination, and that certain conditions applied to the entry of Syrian forces, including the drawing up of an agreement, however rapid and simple, between Syria and Lebanon, explaining the object of the forces entering and the regulations governing the stay of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and defining their political and military privileges, and the timing of their withdrawal.

To avoid delay and to prevent anything that might affect the course of cooperation and coordination, we, along with Premier Karami, drew up a document based on the provisions we had previously sent to the Unified Arab Command, and which it had adopted.

That evening, the evening of June 5, I again contacted President al-Atasi and gave him some idea of these obligations, and asked him to fix an early date for a Lebanese delegation to meet a similar Syrian one to draft a form of final agreement acceptable to both parties in the light of which Syrian forces should enter Lebanon.

I then sent for Ambassador Ghalib, who had been sending me information about the Egyptian front, and thanking me for Lebanon's noble and brotherly attitude.

That evening too, I kept an appointment, made before the Israeli aggression started, with the American ambassador in Lebanon, Mr. Porter, and took the opportunity of expressing to him Lebanon's condemnation of the aggression and of the indignation of the Lebanese and the Arabs at the attitude of America, without which Israel would not have been encouraged to launch her attack.

*Q. Then what happened with Syria?*

A. President al-Atasi did not fix a date for the signing of the agreement on the entry of Syrian forces. We repeatedly reminded him; for three days we contacted Damascus with this end in view, but the date was not fixed and the agreement was not signed.

*Q. Did you depend on broadcast news?*

A. I did not listen to the radio. I received constant reports from the army command, from the Ministry of Information and from certain Lebanese ambassadors abroad, and from certain Arab ambassadors in Lebanon.

The next day the Council of Ministers met to follow up the developments in the war. At the end of the day we took a decision to ask our ambassadors in London and Washington to return to Beirut, in view of reports that were being received and of the rupture of relations between the Arab states and these two countries. We did not break off relations, but adopted a middle-of-the-road attitude.

## 344

**Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to Premier al-Tall, Alleging Treachery on the Part of Those Espousing the Idea of a West Bank State and Calling for a Resolute Stand Against Them (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Amman, June 2, 1971

In moves made recently the hostile scheme reached its evil extreme and its vicious climax in the suspect call secretly launched by those who are working in the service of that scheme for the establishment of a state, a government or an entity. These people did not care where the state was established, when the government came into existence or how the entity was formed: their only aspiration was to come to power, or to achieve some measure of power.

Our officers, men and citizens are accustomed to dying for Palestine with honor and courage, as our enemies themselves know better than anyone else, and are unable to deny. If there are today in our ranks agents of our enemies who allow themselves to be seduced into killing heroes with the mines of perfidy and the bullets of treachery, or if there is in our land a handful of men whose profession is conspiracy, whose trade is deceit and who delight in criminal actions against the fields, the peasant, the worker, the student, the merchant or the citizen, or if there has arisen in our path a group that wants to sell the homeland and liquidate the cause to establish a government and forget Palestine, we want our stand against them to be resolute and intrepid, leaving no room for hesitation, leniency or settlements.

We are continuing our advance—one people, one goal and one road—everyone who is of our people and loves and cherishes it, whoever believes in our goal and works for its achievement, whoever has trod our path and not relinquished his chivalry and honor

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Hussein's letter, *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 3, 1971.

is of us, and we are his, and we shall set him in the highest place among us.

As for him who disbelieves in our people, denies our goal and betrays our course, there is no place for him in our ranks.

It is our duty to disclose all this to all Arabs. It is also our duty to continue to be the hope of our people in the occupied part of our land and to protect with our lives our sacred unity until God grants us liberation, and Jerusalem becomes free and Arab once again and our rights are restored, full and undiminished. It is then that the people, who have endured and rejected, will say what they have to say about self-determination; it cannot be permitted that their part should be said today, untruthfully, by those who have made it their task daily to commit crimes in their name.

My greetings and best wishes to Your Excellency.

### 345

#### **Letter from Premier al-Tall of Jordan to King Hussein Undertaking To Maintain Law and Order and To Purge the Ranks of the Palestine Resistance (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, June 2, 1971**

Therefore we shall purge the ranks, all the ranks, of those who make a profession of crime under the veil of commando activity so that we may rescue commando activity from the evil being plotted against it, and in doing so we shall not hesitate, show leniency, or come to terms with any who have chosen the ranks of our enemies and recruited themselves for the destruction of our advance—the advance of all Arabs.

I beg Your Majesty to be confident that, just as security and stability have been achieved in our beloved country, and law and order have returned to our public life

thanks to the true awareness and firm loyalty of your loyal people, so this awareness and loyalty will continue to be the first safeguard ensuring that we attain our goals and aspirations under the protection of your faithful and intrepid command.

I am entirely confident that the day is coming very soon when genuine commando action will deliver itself from all errors and deviations and from everything that disfigures it and impedes its advance. Nor is the day far off when our arms join in an embrace so that all may be directed where they should be and used for the cause and not against it, for right and construction, not for wrong and bloodshed.

May God keep Your Majesty and watch over you: it is He who hears and answers.

### 346

#### **Speech Hailing the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Made by President Sadat to the Egyptian Popular Assembly (Excerpt)<sup>2</sup>**

**Cairo, June 2, 1971**

One of the most important and conspicuous of the positive developments in the recent period has been the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United Arab Republic and the U.S.S.R.

We wanted this treaty and insisted on its being signed because it provides our general struggle with new safeguards which had not been previously determined.

There are many aspects of cooperation between us and the Soviets that have been established over the years, and any references to them in the provisions of the treaty are merely reaffirmations. By this I mean the field of cooperation on behalf of world peace and the right of peoples to self-determination, respect for the principles and the Charter of

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall's letter replying to one from King Hussein, *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 3, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 3, 1971.

the United Nations, and economic, cultural and technical cooperation.

But there is something new in this treaty that is fundamental, and it is this that, as I said, made us want this treaty and insist on its being signed, and I am certain that this fundamental thing is embodied, above all, in the provision in Article Eight which says—and I ask you to give the closest attention to every expression and every point in it. This paragraph says:

"To strengthen the defense capacity of the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will continue cooperation in the military field on the basis of the appropriate agreements between them, and this cooperation will include, in particular, help in training the members of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic so as to increase their capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression and also to increase their capacity to confront aggression in general."

This is what is new.

This is what we want and what we hold fast to, in our belief that the battle will be imposed on us and that the last word in the struggle will be said on the field of battle.

We are still trying at the political level, we have closed no door and we shall let no opportunity pass; if there is a one percent hope of a peaceful solution we shall not hesitate to work for it. But in the end—whatever the circumstances—we shall fight for the liberation of our territory. This is a duty for us, just as it is a legitimate right.

Our will and our determination to put this in the form of a treaty have a basic significance that we want all parties in the world to understand.

The whole of the western press and western propaganda have tried to represent certain of our internal affairs as being a change in our political line which was determined and laid down by the masses of our people. This line is the liberation of all our territory.

The development of our economic and social life on the basis of the Charter and the statement of March 30: Friendship with those who are friendly to us and hostility to those who are hostile to us.

National independence and maintaining

an attitude of non-alignment in its positive, not its negative sense, which deprives it of all meaning and significance.

They have tried to convince themselves with their hints that a change has taken place in our policy, that our friendship with the U.S.S.R. is just a single phase, merely a tactic.

I am confident that I am expressing your will and the will of the masses of the whole of our nation when I tell you the following:

Friendship with those who help us—and no one else is helping us—to build, is not the friendship of one phase only; it is a friendship for all stages; it is not a mere tactic but a firm strategy.

We are doing this from a position of national independence.

We are doing it from a position of national will.

Because there can be no independence as long as our territory is occupied and there can be no will if there is backwardness.

We have set our will, our determination, on this treaty, so that we may say to all: Yes, we are friendly to those who are friendly with us and hostile to those who are hostile to us.

No, we shall never move from the goal of liberation, through peace or through war. Yes, we are determined to achieve progress and to build the modern contemporary state.

We trample on all the propaganda of psychological warfare that is directed against us, because we know its goals.

It wants us to be without a single friend as we fight the battle and as we build. It wants us to be unable to confront the military challenge. It wants us to be ineffective in confronting the challenge to our civilization. If they think that by the psychological warfare they are directing against us they can put us on the defensive, we say to them: You are mistaken; we are in offensive positions.

We are not at all indebted to them. We have one debt and we shall pay it. That debt is our loyalty to our usurped and occupied territory in which the enemy has been stationed for four years. This is our only debt; a debt to our territory, a debt to our honor, a debt to independence, and God willing we shall keep our promise, honestly and sincerely.

The United States of America declares that it has a firm policy, the policy that it officially announced—the policy of maintaining the balance of power in the area. What this policy means is that Israel should always be stronger than all the Arabs together. This is the permanent policy of the Republican Party and the Democratic Party; it is that Israel should always be in a position of superiority over the Arabs, this situation being called the balance of forces. As a politician I have to make my calculations not on the basis of the battle that confronts us today—I must draw up policy with regard to the future of the coming generations of our children. It is my duty to hand on the trust of this country to the next generation confident that it is secure. This was the policy of Abdel Nasser who died while he was building the army and who made it possible for us to say to Israel today: Depth for depth and napalm for napalm.

When the United States talks of Israel's military superiority it is not a question of superiority in numbers of tanks and planes, for if it gave every Israeli a tank and a plane we could defeat them. But the United States is supplying Israel with all the latest inventions and electronic instruments of war, and all the technique and science of war, which are advancing and developing every day, every minute.

In addition to this, Johnson announced in 1968 that the American Sixth Fleet is Israel's strategic reserve, and that he was ready to intervene should Israel be attacked.

It is my duty as a politician to see the picture as a whole, not merely the picture of the battle that is coming soon, but the picture of the whole of the present and the whole of the future. The Zionist invasion to which we are subjected will not end when we recover our territory; it is a new crusade invasion which will last for our generation and the generation of our children, and it is our responsibility as a generation, before we abandon the responsibility, to arm the new generation so that it may be strong enough to continue the battle after we are gone.

This is our duty, so that we may not allow the coming generation of our children to be

refugees, and we have not forgotten our duty.

I say to you that when our immediate battle is ended, the battle for the recovery of our territory, I shall not get a wink of sleep unless we have a whole army trained in the use of electronic equipment, for this alone can protect our homeland against a new Zionist attack.

It was for all these reasons that I insisted on the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Science and technology are complementary at both military and civilian levels in both countries, the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, one of which is friendly and honorable and has stood beside us in our darkest hours, while the other declares that it will safeguard the balance of power in favor of Israel forever.

In view of this I shall not hesitate to ask our friend to give us science and progress to confront this great challenge.

It was the U.S.S.R. that for ten years helped us to build the High Dam. This was the decisive answer to the statement of Dulles, the Secretary of State of the United States in 1956, that Egypt was a bankrupt country that could not build the High Dam. With the help of the U.S.S.R. our economy was able to bear the cost of building the High Dam, and with the same help our economy was able to bear the cost of building 1200 factories.

In recent months the U.S.S.R. concluded with us the latest economic agreement for five years, the implementation of which represents the strategy of the future and which will enable us to achieve military and civilian self-sufficiency.

It was for the sake of our future and of coming generations that we urged the U.S.S.R. to conclude this treaty. The help provided by the U.S.S.R. has always been honorable, and it has never asked anything at all from us. We are still prepared to talk to anyone about peace, but we are not prepared to abandon our coming generations either in the battle of today or in the future. We are not afraid of anything; our will is ours and the only authority in the country is ours, and the only will in our country is ours. But it is not

only the battle of today that preoccupies us but the battle of the future that stretches out before us.

To those who are accustomed to working in the dark I say that this treaty has no secret annexes. It is our custom to face things in the light of day and to face up to our responsibility. We are friendly with those who are friendly with us and hostile to those who are hostile to us. The friend who offers his friendship without terms or conditions—we must grasp him firmly by the hand and make sure of his friendship. Our will will always be free and our relations with the U.S.S.R. are the relations of one honorable friend with another. And the U.S.S.R. is assisting us in our battle for the liberation of our territory and for the building of the modern state to strengthen our independence and maintain our will.

## 347

**Lebanese Press Interview Statements by Premier al-Tall of Jordan, Commenting on Government-Resistance Relations and the Economic Sanctions Imposed on Jordan by Other Arab States<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, June 5, 1971**

*Q. After the incidents of last September you said that the relations then existing between the Jordanian government and the commandos were "hypocritical." What is the nature of the relations existing between the Jordanian government and the [Palestine] Resistance now?*

A. Relations between us and the Resistance now are sincere, clear, and frank; there is no concealment about them. What I mean is that all the government's intentions are quite clearly known by the Resistance. For example, we say to the commandos: You may concentrate in such and such an area, on condition that your being there does not worry the people who live there, and on condition that

full discipline is maintained and that conduct is good.

*Q. What is the Jordanian government's view on reports that a Palestinian government in exile is to be formed?*

A. It is our conviction that some groups of them want a Palestinian government, even if it only governs twenty acres. But this will not succeed; although we know that they are being encouraged in this by various parties, they will not succeed. The reason why there has been so much talk about such a government is that many of them suffer complexes, complexes of prestige, of rule, of knowledge, of army parades, none of which help the cause of liberation.

*Q. Is the dialogue between the Jordanian government and the Resistance still going on?*

A. The time is past for dialogue in the sense of negotiations. We are now in agreement about basic principles, and the King has given clear instructions in this connection. Everything is referred to the Liaison Office. As for the holding of continuous meetings and so on, that is not happening. There are a lot of meetings on side issues; that is all. There is contact, even if from time to time they say that they have cut off contacts with the government. At the moment the government has nothing to say to them. It has told them what is required and they have agreed, and we are implementing it to the full. This is not the job of the government, but of subsidiary organizations of the government.

*Q. Commando sources keep saying that the Jordanian government is not abiding by the Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol.*

A. The Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol are based on two points: the sovereignty of the Jordanian state and freedom of genuine commando action. This is our basis and this is the basis of the Cairo Agreement. But to go back to the formalities and details, how many offices, how many armed men and so on—it would be as if there were two states negotiating with each other, and this is really not practical and, what is more, is

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Tall's exclusive interview, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 6, 1971.

prejudicial to our national unity. Moreover, the circumstances in which we concluded these details no longer exist. The basis of the Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol are: the sovereignty of the Jordanian state and freedom of commando action.

*Q. But the commando leaders (including Mr. Salah Khalaf—Abu Ayyad) are always saying that the Jordanian government prevents the commando patrols from crossing the Jordan to their operations in the occupied territories.*

*A. Liars.*

*Q. But they say that they have made contacts with the Jordanian government on this matter.*

*A. Liars, liars, they have made no contacts.*

*Q. The Arab political blockade of Jordan—what steps is the Jordanian government taking to deal with it?*

*A. We are trying to explain things to our Arab brothers. We are trying to ensure that our relations with them are always good. We believe that they will see the truth in the end.*

*Q. What has the Jordanian government in view for the near future?*

*A. The problem of security and order is ended; all that is necessary is a little retouching here and there. We are proceeding in the direction of setting commando action on its right course. Our political and diplomatic effort as regards the Middle East is unceasing.*

*Q. What about the budget deficit [amounting to 8,170,000 dinars—about 73 million Lebanese pounds]?*

*A. We can cope with it.*

*Q. And if the flow of Arab aid is delayed [Arab aid has been denied to Jordan by Kuwait—about 140 million Lebanese pounds, and Libya—about 8 million pounds; the only Arab aid that has not been cut off being that from Saudi Arabia—about 145 million Lebanese pounds.]?*

*A. Arab aid is basically directed to our effort in the battle, our effort in connection with the displaced persons, our military efforts and our effort to increase armaments. The economic blockade will not hurt us as an economic establishment, but it will hurt our effort.*

*Q. It is being said in Amman that the government is thinking of stopping the payment of the salaries of officials in the occupied West Bank [a total of about 45 million Lebanese pounds].*

*A. This has not been decided yet, but if we did decide to reduce expenditure, and this is, of course, something that is of concern to us, we shall consider priorities. If we have to choose between our military effort and the salaries of officials in the West Bank, we shall certainly choose our military effort.*

*Q. But if the cutting off of Arab aid to Jordan continues, will Jordan resort to foreign aid?*

*A. Of course, although most regretfully. We do not like to depend on foreign aid.*

*Q. Is there anything new as regards the Rogers initiative?*

*A. I have nothing to add to what we have published, because we have published everything that passed between us and Mr. Rogers. The thing is that we warned him against dividing up the problem into parts especially as he intends to solve the problem as a whole. If the problem of the Suez Canal is solved alone, that would mean that the whole of the Palestine problem would be shelved. That is to say, we must not start surrendering the weapons we can use for exerting pressure one by one.*

### 348

#### **Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Including Analysis of the Shortcomings of the Palestine Resistance Movement and a Call for the Coordination of Theory and Action with Progressive Elements in Jordan and Throughout the Arab World (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**June 5, 1971**

However, in addition to all its positive

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. statement, issued on the fourth anniversary of the 1967 war, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 104 (June 12, 1971), pp. 8–9.

aspects, the Resistance has suffered from ills that have prevented its being completely absorbed in the major tasks that confront it. The reason for this is not its restricted military capacity as compared with that of others; the real reason lies in other factors of weakness that have made it fall short of the level of the requirements of its tasks. What then are these factors that have played a negative role in the advance of the Resistance and which must be surmounted?

#### I. THE RESISTANCE ON THE PLANE OF CLASS

Although it is the workers, peasants and other toilers who constitute the human structure of the sections of the Resistance organizations and bear the burdens of the fighting which have clearly embodied the ability of our masses to challenge their enemies and their readiness to fight a long-term battle; in spite of this, the majority of its commands are formed from the petty bourgeois alliance. This kind of command is not naturally qualified to command a battle as difficult as ours is. The experiences of peoples have confirmed that a people's war of liberation requires above all the endurance demanded by the extended length of such a war, and bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands do not possess this endurance. Our experience during the last four years has confirmed that many of these commands have begun to show signs of fatigue, and the heroic combatants have clearly seen and heard some of these commands wilting in the face of the pressures exerted by the difficulties and the rigorous new situation which these commands are partially responsible for leading us into.

The incapacity from which the ruling petty bourgeois commands are suffering has made itself felt in certain of the Resistance commands. This is very natural, for these commands can only express the character of their class structure. The most important characteristic of Vietnam is the nature of its commands.

Our people have proved that they are capable of acquiring a persistent fighting spirit which on many occasions has enabled our combatants, both male and female, to rise above the level of their impotent commands.

Our people are just as prepared as the people of Vietnam for sacrifice and just as ready to fight until victory is won.

One of the most important causes of the crisis in which the Resistance finds itself lies in the character of its commands, which are still in control of the masses and are imposing themselves on their destinies in a way that has impeded and is still impeding the release of [the energies of] our masses and has checked their revolutionary initiatives against the regime of the agents in Jordan.

#### II. THE RESISTANCE IN THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL SPHERES

By its idealistic thinking and its political slogans, which are in conflict with its strategic goal, which is the liberation of Palestine, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois character of the Resistance commands has determined the nature of their battle and their method of action. The slogans of "no interference in the affairs of the regime of the reactionary agents," "all rifles aimed at the heart of the Zionist enemy," "we are all commandos," and so on, inasmuch as they express the mentality and the class structure of these commands, have helped to mislead the masses and have paralysed their initiative. At a time when reaction in Jordan [was preparing] to liquidate the Resistance because of its awareness of the danger to it constituted by the existence of the Resistance and the fact that the masses were armed, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands were in such a state of uncertainty and idealism that they behaved as if there were a possibility of coexisting with reaction, which is inevitably aligned with imperialism and Zionism.

It is true that reaction is superior to us in its ability to take advantage of Arab and international official policy. Therefore the existence of a command of a more radical and revolutionary character will perhaps not completely invalidate the results we have achieved, but the existence of a Marxist-Leninist proletarian command would have reduced the negative aspects of the Resistance and put it in a better position than it is now in.

We do not claim that a command of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party



can do the impossible. But such a command and such a party can, by giving the masses a true picture of the situation that surrounds them, put them in a situation which will make their mobilization more effective, more capable of holding out, with a greater possibility of winning victory over the enemy.

Our rifles are no longer aimed only at the Zionist enemy, as the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands wanted, but also at the breast of reaction, in reply to the revolutionary violence practiced by the agents. They are doing this by virtue of the *fait accompli* in which they are living and which was imposed on them by reaction, as the commands should have realized when the Resistance started and as a result of the battles of November 4, 1968 and February 10 and March 7, 1970.

Your Popular Front has always stressed this fact which the situation has imposed on the Resistance, although the commands that control the Resistance have accused your Front of extremism and lack of commitment.

### III. THE RESISTANCE IN THE MILITARY SPHERE

The Resistance has possessed arms as have other popular resistance movements, although their commands, subject as they were to the thinking and methods of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, have not accorded arms their proper status as one of the forces that create revolution. Arms, as the instrument of revolutionary violence whose task it is to implement the political strategy of any revolutionary movement, play the role of the tool in the hands of the masses that enables them to depend on themselves and talk to their enemies in the language they understand.

Arms cannot be a substitute for action by the masses, and through their restricted mentality, some of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands have hampered the movement and the initiatives of the masses by their saber-rattling.

The result of this has been that those who are armed are now bearing the burden of confronting the army of the agents, practically alone, without being able to take advantage of the immense resources and the great impetus inherent in the masses, and which can only be called into the service of promoting the

revolution through revolutionary organization guided by revolutionary ideology.

The steadfast stand of our masses in Jordan in this period, which has reached a higher level than that of their leaderships, is only one indication of the lack of a plan for struggle, capable of mobilizing the masses for the battle. It also proves the inability of these commands to lay down a plan capable of mobilizing the masses and enabling them to play their role in battles of destiny such as the battle we are fighting today.

### IV. THE RESISTANCE IN THE ARAB SPHERE

The Resistance has offered itself as the vanguard of the Arab masses without performing the tasks that a vanguard should perform vis-à-vis the masses. While talking of the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, and ignoring—even refusing to recognize the existence of—Jordanian political forces other than itself, its actions, slogans and programs, in the political field and the field of struggle, have not embodied the contents of its slogans. At the level of the Jordanian masses, for example, it refused to consider recognizing the Jordanian national movement and let reaction go to extremes in its exploitation of the masses of the workers and peasants and all of the poor and the toilers. The result of this was that, in the eyes of the Jordanian masses, it was a regionalist Palestinian movement that was both unable to express the will of the Jordanian masses and unwilling to allow Jordanian political forces to do so.

At a time when the Resistance should have been encouraging the rise of Jordanian organizations and enrolling their resources to this end, it has been governed by the mentality of its commands. The Resistance did not, for example, raise its voice in defense of the vanguard forces of the Arab masses and in condemnation of the campaigns of violence and maltreatment to which they were subjected by some of the ruling organizations. This movement has also been unable to establish solid organic relations with the vanguards of the struggle movements in the Arab homeland, which are a part of its advance.

Here special attention must be drawn to

the extreme reluctance felt by the Resistance to abandon its regionalism and to strengthen its links with the Jordanian masses who were fighting, in its midst, a common enemy.

Toiling masses of our Arab nation:

Throwing all the blame for the consequences on the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands inasmuch as they state the responsibilities that they ought to shoulder, leaves the picture one-sided with no room for the leftist sections in the ranks of the Resistance or for confronting them with the consequences of their action and their share in the responsibility for what has happened.

It is true that the left of the Resistance is characterized by theoretical clarity and the rejection of the slogans of the rightist commands which have ignored the dialectical relationship between the Palestine problem and Arab problems, but, in addition to the disunity that beset it, this left has been unable either to diminish the influence of the rightist commands or to put an end to their domination. It has also been incapable of laying down a plan for struggle which would make its role in the fighting distinctive, and of strengthening relations with the Palestinian, Jordanian and Arab masses. It has also been incapable of unifying the programs of the leftist sections, which has led to some of its sections employing their resources in the service of the rightist sections of the Resistance to reinforce the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands.

For all these reasons the leftist sections must courageously stand up in front of their masses and conduct a critical examination. This will, firstly, confront the masses with their historical responsibilities and, secondly, constitute a solid base for the continuation of the Resistance and for the mobilization of the masses so that they may play their role in replying to reactionary violence with organized revolutionary violence.

Heroic fighters:

Free sons of our people:

Your Popular Front, speaking to you frankly as it has always done, believes it to be its basic duty in this critical period of its advance, to have no hesitation in admitting

its share of the responsibility for the errors into which the leftist sections fell.

Certainly the Front has played a prominent role, both in the political field and in the field of struggle, in opposing subservient Jordanian reaction, and in the field of combat in Gaza, the West Bank and occupied Palestine. It has constantly urged the Jordanian-Palestinian masses to seize their legitimate rights, played a vanguard role in leading labor strikes, and achieved successes in forcing the exploiters to grant many of the economic demands of our intrepid workers in Jordan. It has attempted to employ the methods of guerrilla warfare in confronting the reactionary attack. Its attitude to the problem of national unity has been based on ensuring that the masses and their leftist sections should feel proud of the vanguard role they have played, and it has promoted the advance of our people. But all this does not prevent it from seeing the shortcomings in which it has shared.

In spite of its initiatives and its clear-sightedness, the Popular Front has been unable, for both objective and subjective reasons, fully to translate this theoretical view into action. It has been unable to resist being swept along, if only partially, by the plans drawn up by the then commands of the Resistance, and accepted the formulae for national unity and common action proposed by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois commands. Although these formulae were better than the formula for action embodied in the Charter of the Liberation Organization and the Armed Struggle Command, this was the case only at formal and theoretical levels, and the Front did not succeed in making them the prelude to the drafting of a political and struggle program which would enable the Resistance to endure and to vanquish reaction. Moreover, the Front's material and military resources have not enabled it to act alone to protect the Resistance and prevent the victory of reaction.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine calls on all combatants and the masses and those of their members who are really eager to benefit from their errors, to

hasten to review and criticize their programs and practical activities and to share in clarifying their views on what must be done now, in the light of the difficult circumstances which confront all of us.

The Front is therefore of the opinion that all sections of the armed Palestine Resistance and all parties of the Jordanian national movement should as soon as possible:

1. Share in drawing up a political and struggle program appropriate to the nature of the new circumstances, on the basis of which all forces and elements prepared to protect the revolution and continue the fight against Israel and the reactionary agents in Jordan, can agree, and to confront reactionary violence with organized revolutionary violence which will put an end to the excesses of reaction and its repeated massacres of our people, and which will not be restricted to enabling the masses to take part in the battle against the agents. On the contrary, the hallmark of the content of this program and its class, ideological and political purpose must be the toppling of the subservient reactionary regime.

2. Form a Jordanian-Palestinian national front in which all progressive and nationalist forces will be mobilized to engage in an intrepid, merciless, uninterrupted and unceasing struggle. This must be a progressive revolutionary front which will engage in all forms of political struggle side by side with military struggle, with the aim of providing the violent response necessary to rout the agents and topple their historically worn out and collapsed regime. It must be a front based on an iron will which is superior to the will of the regime and overcomes its challenge to our revolution and to the will of the masses that the revolution should continue and that the fight against the Zionist enemy should go on.

3. Call on all parties of the Arab national liberation movement, including the nationalist regimes, and confront them with the responsibilities, so that the masses of our Arab nation may know the truth of the claims that are made and disclose all that is spurious in the attitudes that are adopted. In this way the Resistance will play the role of the

vanguard that can give judgement on any force or any elements by the criterion of readiness to fight against our imperialist, Zionist and reactionary enemies, a judgement which will provide the masses and their vanguard forces with a standard for their attitudes to this force or that, this regime or that, and support for their revolutionary struggle to show up the fraudulent, the deceivers and those who act in collusion.

4. Escalate combat activity inside the occupied territories and strike constant blows at the Zionist and imperialist enemy.

Heroic masses:

The events of the last four years have shown beyond all shadow of doubt that if the Resistance commands continue to follow the same methods and adopt the same strategy and tactics, this can only mean advance along the course of surrender to the will of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The only course open to us is to respond to our enemies in the ways available to us and with our latent forces, which will enable us to endure and triumph.

### 349

#### **Statement of Egyptian Conditions for Reopening the Suez Canal and of Hopes for U.S. Pressure for a Peaceful Settlement, Made by U.A.R. President Sadat in an Address to Troops<sup>1</sup>**

June 8, 1971

As you know, in February I produced an initiative and said that I was prepared to open the Canal if the Israelis were prepared to withdraw in a first stage as part of total withdrawal.

I made three conditions, which I told Rogers about, and I will now tell you what they are, because they were conditions on

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 9, 1971.

which I could accept no discussion. The first was that my forces must cross over to the East Bank, the second was that the ceasefire should last six months only and that a date should be fixed for it to end, as long as there was a single Israeli soldier in our territory. I was not going to make an open-ended ceasefire—only six months; if after the six months there had not been complete withdrawal, the solution would be up to my forces to liberate their territories completely. The third condition was that not an inch of our territories could be given up, either in the form of a lease, or by bargaining. My frontiers are the international frontiers with Palestine and not an inch can be given up.

These were the three conditions I made for opening the Canal, and my initiative still stands.

When Rogers visited me I asked him "What do you want of us?"

He said that Egypt had shown that if peace was possible she was eager for it.

I said to him: "When you have finished here you are going to Israel and then back to the United States. When you go back I want America to define her attitude quite clearly.

It is a question of peace or war. Either Israel really wants peace, and there is implementation of the first phase and Jarring comes in and starts on his task. Or Israel wants territory, wants conditions and wants strategic positions, and that can only mean war.

Israel doesn't concern me; what concerns me is the attitude of America.

In December 1967, the United States sent us a paper in which it recognized that the frontier between Egypt and Israel is the international frontier.

I asked Rogers: "Do you still hold the same view?" And he said: "Yes."

"We shall not give up an inch of our territory. Israel has been living at your expense in everything—from a loaf of bread to a Phantom plane; you give Israel a check for \$500 million. It isn't reasonable that a people of two million and a half should carry out raids with 200 planes for seven hours

daily when even the Great Powers cannot do this."

I was frank with Rogers and he was convinced by me.

I am awaiting America's reply and I shall announce it to you and to the people.

If America supports Israel in her occupation of our territory, I shall treat her as if she were Israel's partner.

If she has other views, let her tell me so, and we will go back to the heart of the matter.

As you see, we are proceeding along two parallel lines.

There is the military line, which you are engaged in—effort and sweat in the trenches and in all kinds of weather, and severe training and clashes and raids, a great battle of honor which will later be written about for the people here and for the Arab world.

I announced it on May 1.

They thought that the defeat had finished us.

By your efforts and your sweat we have become strong. On May 1 I said: "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, depth for depth and napalm for napalm."

We no longer accept the fable that Israel is the force that decides everything, that she is the only military force in the area.

I say this to you before all the world, and I said it to Rogers.

An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. If Israel strikes us in depth we shall strike Israel in depth. If Israel uses napalm we shall use napalm—they have already had a taste of it in Sinai.

When they hear what I am saying now they will know what I mean; they have already had a sample of what we have.

There is still a one percent hope of a peaceful settlement.

It is this hope that keeps me waiting; I don't want to give you the order yet.

America has not finally defined her attitude, and has asked for a delay before giving her answer. I am giving this delay. If nothing comes from this delay, we shall fight.

Israel is playing for time, and the present situation suits her best.

There is no firing or anything—they are occupying our territory and waiting for our internal situation to collapse so that they can

impose their conditions, but I shall not allow time to be on Israel's side.

### 350

#### **Statement Issued by a Spokesman for the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Including Recommendations for a Majority Representation of Active Combat Organizations in the New Palestine National Council (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

June 10, 1971

The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine submits to the masses the following basic points with respect to the formation of the new Council:

1. The majority should consist of representatives of the combatant forces who bear the historical and day-by-day responsibility in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater. It is these forces whose destiny is totally linked to the national revolution and to the masses who are fighting and struggling against the enemy and in defense of the right of the Palestine revolution to survive and to continue its armed struggle, and to ensure that the people may retain their arms to safeguard the continuation and protection of the Resistance against the national enemy.

2. The size of the representation of the combatant forces in the Council will determine vital day-by-day practice; the Front is therefore of the opinion that the basic groups in the Assembly must be of equal size.

3. All members of the Assembly should be elements that are active in the ranks of the revolution and have direct responsibility. The Council must include no reactionary elements or elements whose relations with the question of revolution are merely seasonal, starting when the session of the National

Council starts and ending when it ends. This means that the unaffiliated members should have political and technical qualifications and be active in the ranks of the revolution.

4. That the overwhelming majority of the new Council should be drawn from the principal theaters which have to bear the consequences both of day-by-day struggle and of the struggle of destiny, first and foremost being the Palestinian-Jordanian theater.

In forming the Council, care must be taken to avoid all particularist and chauvinist tendencies; it should be open to any struggler in the ranks of the revolution throughout the Palestinian-Jordanian theater. What determines Palestinian national identity is affiliation and commitment to the cause of the revolution, not racial (Ottoman Palestinian parents) or geographical origin.

These basic points are the most important principles which must be observed in forming the new Council. Otherwise, all we shall have is a Council which is in no way new except for some or all of the names, while its practical and objective structure will be no more than a reproduction of that of previous assemblies.

### 351

#### **Statements Warning That Continued U.S. Disregard of the Arab Nation and Assistance to Israel Would Prejudice American Interests, Included in an Evacuation Day Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya<sup>2</sup>**

Uqba Bin Nafi Airbase, Libya, June 11, 1971

Brothers:

We hoped that after the evacuation [of the former Wheelus Airbase] America would

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.D.F.L.P. statement, *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), No. 571 (June 14, 1971), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Qadhafi's speech marking the first anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. troops from the former Wheelus Field in Libya, *al-Haqiqa* (Benghazi), June 12, 1971.

turn over a new leaf so that we could deal with each other as equals, with the feelings and interests of the American people being respected. But most regrettably, brothers, what has happened is that all the well-intentioned and serious attempts that have been made to persuade America to take due account of the Arab nation and to appreciate the feelings of the Arab nation and not to continue to despise the Arab nation and not to ignore the great interests it has in the Arab nation—[despite all this] America has continued to go to extremes in supplying Israel the aggressor, which is still occupying Arab territories. America has continued to supply her with weapons of destruction. Even though Israel is the aggressor and is still occupying Arab territory, America is still supplying her with all sorts of arms.

Why is this? It must be for some serious reason, because Israel has occupied enough: she has occupied more territories than she can cope with. What is the meaning of supplying her with arms when she has reached this stage? It means that there is a major international conspiracy of which the Arab nation is to be the victim, and it is intended that Israel shall implement this conspiracy. This means that they want Israel to extend the Zionist presence so as to overwhelm the [Arab] presence. We know that this area is not large enough for two nationalities at the same time. This means that the struggle is now between us and Israel and the countries that support Israel and all those in the world who conspire against the Arab nation. The struggle today is a national struggle, a struggle for a civilization, a struggle for existence. The members of the Arab nation, wherever they are, must realize that the battle will be fierce and dangerous and that it is intended that the Arab nation—I repeat—be the victim of a major international conspiracy. So it must pay attention to this danger; its masses from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Arabian] Gulf must awaken so that the battle may be made a pan-Arab one which will frustrate all attempts by our enemies.

Brothers:

After the evacuation we wanted to have

good relations with America, but we have always affirmed that these relations must not be at the expense of the Arab nation or of the Palestine cause.

We are part of the Arab nation, and the freedom of the Arab nation is our freedom, and the freedom of this people is imperfect as long as the freedom of the Arab nation is imperfect elsewhere.

Arab territory is a single territory from the Ocean to the Gulf and any occupation of any part of it diminishes the independence of all the other parts.

Let the colonialists understand these facts; let the East and the West understand this.

Brothers:

America has continued in its injustice and in its contempt for the Arab nation, and we have warned it many times, and now we for our part will start making light of America's interests in the area, and all its relations, for it has continued in its injustice and in its contempt for the Arab will.

Brothers, when America went out Russia could not come in because our dealings with Russia are those of a friend with a friend and the U.S.S.R. is a people friendly to the Arab nation and they have kept up this friendship. And as long as the U.S.S.R. keeps up this friendship and treats the Arab nation as an equal, we shall be its friends although there have not been relations between the Libyan Arab Republic and the U.S.S.R. But in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has links of friendship and respect with other parts of the Arab nation, we have had to have good relations with it, and this will continue as long as the U.S.S.R. continues to respect the Arab nation and stand by it and help it and treat it as an equal.

## 352

**Communiqué Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Announcing Its Attack on the Israeli Oil Tanker Coral Sea, Alleging That Arab As Well As Iranian Oil Reaches Israel and Elucidating P.F.L.P. Determination To Strike at "Imperialist" and "Reactionary" Interests Everywhere As Well As at Israel Itself<sup>1</sup>**

June 13, 1971

*Communiqué No. I*

At 1.45 p.m. on Friday, June 11, 1971, a special unit of the Popular Front fired five missiles at an Israeli tanker called *Coral Sea* which was passing through Bab al-Mandeb to the Red Sea with a cargo of 65,000 tons of "Iranian" oil destined for the port of Eilat, where it was to be pumped to Ashkelon and from there to Western Europe.

The missiles hit the tanker in two places, igniting its cargo of oil. It stopped, and soon developed a list to the side where the missiles had hit. The Popular Front has kept silent for the last two days, waiting for Israel to admit not only the blow inflicted on her, but also the secret alliance that exists between her and subservient reaction.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, whose special marine unit carried out this operation, setting out from its base in Aqaba, announces its full responsibility for this operation, and at the same time reaffirms its adherence to its strategy which demands that it should strike at the Israeli enemy, his interests and his links with imperialism and reaction everywhere.

The Popular Front will later issue a detailed communiqué on this operation, with which it struck a warning blow at the Israeli alliance with reaction, to disclose the role played by reaction in supporting the Israeli enemy.

*Communiqué No. II*

In implementation of the plan drawn up by the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine to strike at the Israeli enemy everywhere, and to strike at his interests, which are linked with the interests of imperialism and subservient reaction both inside and outside the Arab homeland, a special marine unit of the Front shelled an Israeli oil tanker in the Red Sea with five rockets, causing extensive damage and setting fire to two of the large tanks in which oil is carried, which resulted in extensive damage which will take a long time to repair.

The Popular Front's special marine unit received a battle order from its command to leave its base in Aqaba and make for the target area. The unit was supplied with fuel, ammunition and provisions at the contact points it dealt with in more than one place on the Saudi coast, while the tanker *Coral Sea*, which recently started running on the Eilat line, was leaving the Iranian loading port on Kharj Island on its way to the Red Sea.

The unit encountered its target in the prescribed locality where, for certain reasons, the tanker had to follow a particular course and reduce speed; the rockets registered direct hits, and the unit left the scene of the operation unharmed.

The confrontation took place about five kilometers north of al-Buraim Island off the North Yemeni coast.

This operation was timed to take place when it did for the following reasons:

1. [It was intended] to affirm the strategy of the Popular Front which requires that it should strike at the enemy and his interests everywhere, and especially at the points where the strategic interests of the Israeli enemy coincide with the interests of imperialism and reaction.

The oil tanker *Coral Sea*, with its cargo of 65,000 tons of oil, was a point in which the interests of the Israeli enemy coincided with those of imperialism, as represented by the monopoly oil companies, and with the interests of Iranian reaction, both of which act in collusion with the Israeli enemy and supply the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline with the oil it requires.

The treachery of Arab reaction, which the Popular Front discloses in detail in its Com-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. communiqué, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut) No. 105 (June 19, 1971), pp. 5-6.

munique No. 3, and which, in cooperation with Iranian reaction, employs every stragem to supply the Israeli enemy with Saudi oil, can no longer, as has been the case since February 1970, when pumping Saudi oil through the Israeli pipeline started, go undisclosed and unpunished.

2. Again, this operation was carried out to administer a slap to those shirkers and enemies who have been spreading reports of the Resistance's alleged impotence and retreat.

The resurgence experienced by the reactionary enemy, and the delusion he concocts about his conspiracies, which are aimed at liquidating the Palestine cause and bringing the masses to their knees, and his insistence—along with all sections of his camp that advocate surrender—on disregarding the will of the Palestinian and Arab masses are all part of the campaign by imperialism, the Israeli enemy and subservient reaction to coerce the masses of our nation and force them to surrender.

This operation was a resounding slap in the face to those who propagate defeatism and neglect to arouse the will to fight in our masses, and to those reactionary, Zionist and imperialist enemies who think that they can decide the destinies of peoples against their will.

Masses of our great people:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which the masses acknowledge as being in the vanguard of the battle of destiny, promises them that it will proceed with armed struggle, through revolutionary violence, against all their enemies, wherever their influence, their interests and their strongholds are to be found.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is leading the ferocious popular struggle against the occupiers in Gaza, and has indefatigably escalated its operations in usurped Palestine in the last few months, promises you to continue to strike at the enemy wherever he may be, and to strike at his reactionary liaisons which take the form of infamous collusion with the enemy to consign oil from exploited and humiliated Arab territory to the arteries of the imperialist and Zionist enemy.

Victory to the armed struggle against the enemy wherever he may be . . . . Infamy to subservient reaction.

May the dirty oil which the agents and traitors suck up to inject into the veins of exploitation and the Zionist enemy go up in flames!

### *Communiqué No. III*

The ten brief points made by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the following communiqué disclose the significance, in the political and military fields and in the field of the struggle, of the slap in the face administered to the imperialist-reactionary-Zionist alliance by the commandos when their rockets hit an Israeli oil tanker which had been supplied at an Iranian port with oil that is pumped with the blessing of Saudi reaction.

These ten points, which expose one of the ugliest crimes that is being committed against the struggle of the people of Palestine and the masses of the Arab nation, should be firmly fixed in the mind of every struggler in the Arab homeland, because they provide an excellent picture of the dirty, Octopus-like enemy whom we confront, and whom we shall continue to hunt down and clash with in whatever form he appears.

1. From the beginning of next month, July 1971, the Israelis intend to increase the throughput of the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline to about 26 million tons of oil per year, by employing a temporary pumping station, and to do this successfully they must ensure the existence of:

a. The quantity of oil necessary to cover this throughput, part of which is used by Israel while the remainder goes to refineries in Western Europe, especially in Italy and Rumania.

b. Tankers capable of transporting these quantities of crude oil to Eilat, and others to transport it from the port of Ashkelon to Europe.

2. Because the ensuring of the necessary oil and tankers is of immediate prejudice to matters related to the enemy's military strategy and his relations with Iranian and Saudi reaction, in March 1970 a law was passed



forbidding the publication of reports about tankers in Israeli ports, their movements, sailings and dates of arrival or departure, under pain of penalties (in accordance with Article 23 of the Israeli Penal Code, the section relative to the security of the state, foreign relations and official secrets, which was published in the Israeli Official *Gazette* on March 19, 1970).

3. In the meantime Israel started planning to become "one of the greatest countries in the world in the field of transporting and marketing oil" (according to the government-inspired *Davar* on December 24, 1969). She therefore announced that by the end of 1972 she would have a fleet of tankers with a total tonnage of two and a quarter million tons.

4. From what source is Israel going to bring this oil to Eilat? There are only two sources in the area east of Suez—Iran and Arab, particularly Saudi, sources in the Gulf. Iranian oil supplies the Israeli pipeline with 550 thousand barrels per day, while the major companies constituting the Consortium (British Petroleum, Shell, Gulf, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco and the French company) which control production of oil in Saudi Arabia account for the remaining capacity of the pipeline—about 600 thousand barrels per day.

5. This Arab oil which pours into the tanks of Eilat is conveyed by means of a series of commercial frauds which are known to everyone engaged in oil production, and which can only be put into effect through the collusion of Iranian reaction with Saudi reaction, under the supervision of the major monopoly oil companies in the imperialist countries. This agreement was reached in early February between the Shah of Iran, when he was in St. Moritz, Switzerland, and one of the largest oil refining companies in Italy, which receives the greater part of the Iranian and Saudi oil that is pumped through the Israeli pipeline.

6. For this deal to become effective and be put into effect by the reactionary traitors in collusion with the imperialist and Zionist

enemy, the two parties employed large numbers of go-betweens to engage in misrepresentation and deceit. This operation of misrepresentation is supervised by the Israeli company "Transasiatic Oil," together with the international oil companies which control not only Arab oil but also the reactionary Arab governments which are so deeply imbrued in treachery.

7. The fact that Israeli tankers flying the flags of other countries are supplied with oil in the harbor of the Iranian island of Kharj in the Arab Gulf and sail for "an unknown destination" to await orders, as is alleged, cannot disguise the fact that a large part of this oil is Arab which, for purposes of misrepresentation, is sold through a third party. The Israeli company, "Transasiatic Oil," has established a complicated network of agents with a view to misleading any attempt to follow up the traces of this secret alliance between Saudi Arabian reaction and Israel and the monopoly world oil companies. The London *Sunday Times*, on December 13, 1970, and the American journal *Oil and Gas*, on June 8, 1970, disclosed in detail that one barrel in two of the oil loaded on to Israeli tankers in Kharj is Arab oil shipped from Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia.

8. So that the world monopoly companies may be able to supply the quantity of oil required for the increased throughput of the Israeli pipeline—the quantity required for a large fleet of tankers totalling two and a half million tons, which is to be ready by the end of 1972—Aramco in Saudi Arabia has decided to increase the production of Saudi oil by three hundred per cent in the next three years, to a total of three billion tons (*Le Monde*, June 5, 1971)!

9. The odious camouflage used to conceal this deal between the Israeli enemy and Iranian reaction, the measures taken by the Israeli enemy to conceal the treachery of Arab reaction, and the false claims made by Iranian officials denying that the reactionary regime in Iran supports the Israeli enemy, amount to one of the most odious blows struck by the triple enemy of the masses—Israel, imperialism and reaction—at the

interests of the Arab nation and their future dignity.

10. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine directed its missiles against this triple enemy not only to uncover this conspiracy which is a blow struck at the very heart of the interests of the Palestinian and Arab struggle, and the role of subservient reaction, deep-dyed as it is with treachery, but also to announce to the masses of our people its determination to follow up the enemy wherever he appears and on all fronts.

### 353

#### **French Press Interview by U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad, Criticizing U.S. Policy in the Middle East, Commenting on the U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Friendship Treaty and Reiterating Egyptian Determination To Liberate Her Territory<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, Mid-June, 1971**

*Q. What are the chances of negotiations on the reopening of the Suez Canal?*

*A.* In fact, there have never been any negotiations. Once again it is American propaganda which has led people to think so. Today, Secretary of State Rogers talks of an "interim solution." That reminds us of the 1949 armistice convention, where the armistice plan was presented so as to be attractive to the Arabs and the Palestinians. I was there, and I can tell you that at the end of the Rhodes talks, one could have had the impression that the Palestinians were soon going to be able to go home. In fact, it was sugared poison. Today, there are the same tactics, the same propaganda, the same deception. We then asked Mr. Rogers three questions and received in reply what we now call "the three no's": Will you exercise pressure on Israel? He answered: No. Will you stop your military and civil aid to Israel? He answered: No.

Will you support the activity of the four Great Powers in the Security Council to force Israel to give in? He answered: No. Then we asked him: "Why don't you go to Israel first and then bring us the results of your efforts?" Mr. Rogers immediately replied: "It wouldn't make any difference." In fact, you see, Mr. Rogers' mission was to delude us, to delude world public opinion, to give the impression of a change of direction, while in reality there was nothing of the kind. That was all to gain time and prolong the ceasefire.

*Q. What was in the Israeli counter-proposals Mr. Sisco brought back? Was there any trace of Israeli concessions?*

*A.* When Mr. Sisco came back, he brought what he called Israeli thinking. Very simply, this thinking meant the capitulation of Egypt. We were to agree to reopen the Canal without any commitment to evacuate the occupied territories; the ceasefire would be indefinite; Egyptian troops would not cross the Canal; Israeli shipping could use it; the Bar-Lev line would be kept and maintained. At most we would have been able to have three or four thousand Egyptian civilians on the East Bank. We asked if it would be the same as in the agreement of 1954 with the British when we allowed several thousand British civilians to stay in the Canal Zone. [Sisco] replied Yes.

What should we do? I left Mr. Bergus (American chargé d'affaires in Egypt) a memorandum restating the Egyptian position as defined by President Sadat on February 4, and several times by Egyptian diplomats. The main question is, of course, that of Israel's total withdrawal from the occupied territories. Could anyone imagine for one moment that we would fall into the trap of a partial solution which would allow our adversaries to keep the bulk of their conquests in exchange for reopening the Canal? That reminds me of the story of the peasant who, seeing the conductor on the Underground, asked him if he could buy the train.

Then, at the end of last month, Mr. Bergus tried again. He sent us a new memorandum. This time, it was no longer a proposal for

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of Riad's interview, conducted by Roland Delcour, *Le Monde*, June 18, 1971, pp. 1, 2.

an interim settlement but an arrangement to be signed. Once again, we left a document summarizing our position on Mr. Bergus' desk. We made no new proposals. We repeated the question: "Is Israel or is she not prepared to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories?" That is the whole point. We have yet to receive an answer. That is the unvarnished truth.

*Q. Did the Soviet-Egyptian treaty result from the negative attitude of the United States?*

*A.* Chance brought it about that [a number of Egyptian] cabinet ministers resigned on May 13. This event was seen as being related to our policy towards the United States. It was reported that Mr. Sadat was going to follow a policy different from Nasser's. This is ridiculous. It was also said that the resigning ministers were accredited intermediaries between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. But am I not just as much so? I have been to the U.S.S.R. nine times: four times last year, once so far this year. I am returning this month for the exchange of instruments of ratification for the treaty. Am I not just as good an intermediary as those people? As for the treaty, it was signed on May 27 because the Soviets and ourselves found we were ready. One cannot rewrite history. It is a fact that the idea of the treaty is a longstanding Egyptian idea, one of Nasser's ideas. But obviously, the time the idea was implemented was determined by events.

*Q. Why was President Sadat so critical of the U.S. in his June 10 speech to the Egyptian people, while two days before he was telling the troops that he was still waiting for a reply from the United States to his message of May 20?*

*A.* President Sadat didn't want to be the one to end the dialogue, the one to shut the door. This is why he used this formula in front of the soldiers. But he couldn't leave the people with illusions. He had to tell the truth, and the truth is that we have received no reply from America. Personally I have no illusions. I never have had. Already last summer, when the ceasefire was concluded and the whole world was rejoicing, when many people in France, Great Britain and even in

the U.S.S.R. believed in the good faith of the Americans, I doubted that they would keep their promises concerning the implementation of United Nations Resolution 242. But I said to myself: we are going to put them to the test, force them to show their hand. Today, they have already done so.

*Q. What can Egypt do in such an impasse?*

*A.* We are not in a desperate situation, since public opinion is on our side. France's help in this regard has been valuable. One of Israel's aims was to polarize the world into two camps, the Eastern camp supporting Egypt, the West entirely on Israel's side. Today, that's over. Following France's example, Great Britain has changed her attitude. And what about Greece or Spain, who are on our side? Aren't they Western countries?

*Q. Are we headed for renewed tension?*

*A.* We are in fact at war. We shall be at war for as long as our territories are occupied. Egypt, if she is forced, can renew the firing. She can choose the time; and, of course, she reserves the right to liberate her territory.

### 354

#### **Statement by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon Reiterating Lebanese Support for a Middle East Settlement Based on Full Israeli Withdrawal from Arab Territory and on Recognition of the Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>1</sup>**

**Beirut, July 6, 1971**

As you know, too, the President of the Republic sent for the Deputies and heard their views before Mr. Rogers arrived in

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Abu Hamad's statement reporting to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Parliament on the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), July 7, 1971.

Lebanon on May 3. The statements made by the American Secretary of State in the capitals he visited reached us before he did; they were to the effect that he had brought no new proposals, but had come to hear and become acquainted with the viewpoints of the parties concerned on the spot. So we took this opportunity to explain to Mr. Rogers Lebanon's point of view, which is in agreement with the views of the Deputies, and can be summarized as follows:

Lebanon adheres to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and believes that no agreement, of whatever kind, can be sound unless the following two fundamental conditions are met: first, total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, and second, recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. Lebanon has also persistently requested the United States of America to take the appropriate measures, as far as it is concerned, to ensure the fulfillment of these conditions. We drew the attention of Mr. Rogers to Israel's unyielding attitude, which is impeding political efforts.

Believing as we do that the aim of the American Secretary of State's visit was, as he stated, to become acquainted close at hand with the attitudes of the parties concerned in the area and to hear the viewpoints of them all, and that he brought with him no specific solution and did not expect any surprise developments, we feel that this visit provided a favorable opportunity for responsible Arabs to explain to Mr. Rogers personally the present situation and state to him their attitudes to the crisis, so that he might appreciate the danger that threatens the whole of this area, reflect on the matter and understand which of the two sides is sincerely striving to achieve peace and which of them is being obstinate and putting obstacles in the way of peace and in the way of the United Nations envoy Dr. Jarring.

**Statements Emphasizing Arab and Egyptian Commitment to the Palestine Cause and the Necessity for Unity Within the Resistance, Included in a Speech Delivered by U.A.R. President Sadat to the Palestine National Council<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, July 7, 1971**

If, to the Arab conscience, the Palestine problem has become an integral part of the struggle of any one people of our nation, it is the Egyptian people for whom it is an integral part of their very life.

Thus, as I talk about you, I find that I am not talking about someone else; I am almost talking about myself.

In the light of this, I hope that you will open your hearts to what I want to tell you in all frankness and honesty.

I. The Palestine problem, the struggle of the Palestinian people and the unanimous agreement of the Arab nation on the vital importance of their cause have never been clearer than they are today.

One of the most prominent positive aspects of the setback [of 1967] was that it raised the veil of oblivion or silence from the Palestine problem.

While the enemy thought that he had buried the whole of history and removed the traces of the crime by occupying the whole of Palestinian territory, the Palestinian element in the Middle East crisis flared up throughout the area. It came into the world alive, firm, entrenched, steadfast and extremely strong.

Since the setback all humanity has become many times more aware of the tragedy than before, and this in itself is a great gain.

II. Afterwards, this great moral effect had to be translated into material action that would strengthen and consolidate mankind's commitment to Palestinian rights so that it

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech at the opening of the ninth session of the P.N.C., *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 8, 1971.

might become an actual political influence capable of producing active attitudes.

The United Arab Republic has done much in this field, and if it is now evident that the enemy is isolated and condemned in the world arena, this is the result of the arduous and strenuous efforts in which we have all taken part, each of us to the limits of his ability, his circumstances and his means.

In this connection, I can say without boasting that I am proud of the United Arab Republic's share in achieving this result, meeting all the material and moral costs involved, at a time when others have contented themselves with calls and claims which do not defeat enemies so much as they embarrass friends, and this was the last thing we wanted.

III. After that, you of the Palestine Revolution had, by your positive action and in the field against the enemy, to bridge the immense distance between the world's recognizing the right and forcing the enemy to accept it.

I do not deny that you have done a great deal which will always be a source of honor to any standard of Arab struggle. But we must all accept that we could have done more than we have done. This is the true evaluation which the combatants should frankly admit to themselves in their unremitting efforts to serve the goal in which they believe and for which they are giving with such unbounded generosity.

IV. To be fair to you and to existing conditions, I must say that there were obstacles in your way, and the first of these was that the Eastern Front, in which the Palestine Revolution should have been one of the striking forces, has never come into existence.

Thus the efforts of the Palestine Revolution have remained isolated, vulnerable and exposed. Furthermore, the Palestine Revolution has been confronted with complications in Jordan, the very place circumstances had chosen to be its main base. Although, from my zeal for the many brotherly efforts which I hope will succeed and hit their mark, I do not want to go into details of what has happened, I can see no alternative to insisting once again that there is no way open

to any of us except the sincere and practical implementation of the 1970 Cairo Agreement, and the subsequent additional arrangements made in Amman.

This is perhaps the place to recall that the Cairo Agreement was the last paper to be signed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the last great action he achieved. You know, indeed, that it was the last beat of his heart, that heart which was always large enough to absorb all the sufferings of his nation, and constantly ready to share all its pain.

V. To be honest it is my duty to add that the factors which have stood in the way of the unity of the will of the Palestine Revolution have played a great part in bringing about the situation from which we suffer today and the shortcomings we complain of. This is something that we cannot conceal by silence, nor can we accept it for any reason or excuse.

You are the vanguard of the revolution in this nation, and consequently it is your duty to face the truth. As I have told you, these are moments of decision and resolve. As I have also told you, your struggle is clear; the world sees it in a good light and with admiration. Your enemy is isolated and condemned by mankind. Your responsibilities are a sacred trust to history and destiny and, as I have said, you enjoy the unlimited support of your nation on the basis of the Cairo and Amman Agreements.

Then what are we to do? In the end I find myself coming to the point of my talk. Prompted by brotherhood, love and that splendid unity that is created by comradeship in arms and struggle, I say to you that the unity of the will of the Palestine Revolution must come before anything else. In the name of your nation this is what is required.

. . . . .

## 356

**Palestine Liberation Organization Interim Report on Its Activities, Submitted by the P.L.O. Executive Committee to the Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council<sup>1</sup>**

July 7, 1971

The Executive Committee warmly welcomes the members of the Palestine National Council and hopes that, in this extremely grave stage, the Honorable Council may shoulder its immense historic responsibilities for achieving the unity of our people and leading their march towards our sacred goals of return and liberation.

The term of the previous Palestinian National Council expired at the beginning of March, 1971, and at its Eighth Session this council recommended that the new National Council should be composed of 100 members, that it should sit for three years from the date of its first meeting, and that it should meet once a year. The resolution also stipulated that the members of the Council should consist of:

A. Representatives of the fighting forces;

B. Delegates from the labor unions, professional federations and [other] mass organizations;

C. Men with intellectual and specialist qualifications committed to the revolution, representation being as far as possible on a geographical basis and the fundamental condition being adherence to the Palestine National Charter.

In implementation of these resolutions the Executive Committee formed a subcommittee to carry out preparatory consultations and contacts and to discover the general trends of the Palestinian masses in the various Arab countries. The most important factor discovered by this committee during its contacts with all sectors of the Palestinian people was their firm insistence on the

achievement of national unity in the ranks of the forces of the revolution which are pervaded by the urgent desire that the present Council should represent all forces and trends, so that it may be able to perform the fundamental task of the present stage—the task of achieving national unity and of fully responding to the wishes of the people, in conformity with Article IV of the organizational framework of the program of political and organizational action approved by the National Council at its Eighth Session. The Committee charged with constituting the National Council held a continuous series of contacts and meetings with the aim of ensuring that the revolutionary and popular working forces are represented in this Council.

This was not easy, in view of the multiplicity of interpretations and the difficulty of reaching a formula ensuring effective democratic representation. However as a result of unflagging efforts and of the sense of responsibility of all parties concerned, the committee succeeded in working out the composition of the present Council in the following manner: 41 independent members with technical qualifications; 85 members representing the fighting forces; and 25 representing the unions and federations [making] a total of 151.

It will be observed that by this distribution of seats the trade union forces of the people have been allotted more than twice as many seats as they had in the previous Council. Many members of the Executive Committee felt that the trade union forces should be given greater scope but for a number of reasons it was not found possible to allow these forces more extensive representation, especially as some of the federations are in the first stages of development and therefore unable to effectively represent their trade union sectors.

The Executive Committee, in recalling to you the complicated political and social circumstances that hold sway over our people who are dispersed throughout the length and breadth of Arab territory and in other parts of the world, is extremely proud of the democratic spirit that was the prime mover in building this Council, with the result that all the various Palestinian forces are repre-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Executive Committee's report published in two parts, *Fateh* (Damascus), July 9, 1971 and July 11, 1971.

sented in it, regardless of whether they support or oppose the present political leadership.

This insistence that all forces should be represented was an affirmation of the steps taken by the Palestine National Council at its Eighth Session with a view to achieving national unity, and you doubtless realize that the achievement of national unity, in circumstances such as those which surround our people, is an extremely complicated goal with many aspects.

During the last four months the Executive Committee, on the commission of the National Council, has been making important efforts to achieve this lofty goal. The Chairman of the Executive Committee has participated directly in all these efforts, and will himself submit a detailed review of the efforts, concomitants and results relative to this subject immediately after this report is read.

Concentration on the questions of the composition of the Palestine National Council and the achievement of national unity must by no means be allowed to distract us from the basic challenge that has confronted the forces of the revolution during the last four months. It is a challenge that has two parts:

#### *I. Steadfastness in Jordan*

Our steadfast forces in Jordan have insisted on establishing their right to fight in the Jordan theater and have held out in the face of continuous colonialist attempts to impede, blockade and liquidate them, just as our great people have held out in the face of attempts to degrade and humiliate them, and have insisted on their right to live and fight for the liberation of their homeland, and intrepidly resisted the forces of the authorities with a rare capacity for endurance. To those who cast doubts on the capacity of our great people, nine months after the start of the September massacre, we say: Go and look at the search points between Zarqa and Amman; that will give you an idea of the state in which the reactionary royalist regime is living as a result of the steadfastness of our men.

Recently our people and our commandos have not only given proof of their steadfastness, but also disclosed a number of historic points which show that their steadfastness will

continue and escalate until the will of the people to create a revolutionary atmosphere and a people's war of liberation is realized.

In connection with the steadfastness of our people in Jordan, it must be recalled that the way the revolutionaries of the Jordanian National Front started their struggle for their noble goals was a new indication of national unity and an affirmation of the will to hold out on the part of the masses of our people, and of their rejection of the artificial division between Palestinian and Jordanian. The revolution hereby declares that it supports the Jordanian National Front and will spare no effort to ensure that its programs and goals are represented.

#### *II. Armed Struggle Against the Enemy in Occupied Territory*

In the last four months we have seen how our people in Gaza have persisted in resisting the occupation in the streets, the tents, the roads and the fields, and Gaza has been able to force the enemy to take further violent security measures. The result is that the situation there resembles that during the last days of the Nazi occupation of Western Europe: the Zionist occupation forces are living in a state of complete terror, now that the popular masses have stood firm with all the burdens of their ordinary life and struggle against the occupying enemy has become part of their daily routine. Recent months have also witnessed successful operations in Hebron and other areas in the heart of the occupied homeland. There have been repeated commando operations over the frontier in affirmation of the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to engage in struggle from the areas adjacent to occupied Arab territory, and of their determination to deploy themselves in the principal theater of struggle, regardless of all internal and external factors. A report of this kind must also mention the efforts made by the different departments of the Palestine Liberation Organization to continue the Organization's regular activities, especially in view of the present abnormal circumstances. There follows a brief review of these efforts:

### *A. In the Political and Information Field*

Political activity in the Arab field has continued to make it its first objective to establish that the Palestinian cause is the most important political problem confronting the Arab nation, and to confirm the revolution's right to mobilize and recruit the Palestinian people in all Arab countries in which there are Palestinians, especially in the Jordanian theater, which is the principal theater of the battle. In the field of external political activity the Organization has taken part in important international conferences held during the last four months, the most important being:

1. The World Peace Conference held in Budapest on June 13, 1971, where the Palestinian delegation submitted a memorandum explaining the Palestine problem, made the necessary contacts, and ensured the adoption of a resolution mentioning the right of the Palestinian people to employ armed struggle to liberate their homeland and to practice self-determination in the whole of Palestinian territory.

2. The Tenth Session of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council held in Damascus from June 23-24, 1971. This conference was transformed into a demonstration of support for the Palestinian cause and took a number of successful detailed resolutions of a kind entirely new in the history of international conferences dealing with the Palestine problem. These resolutions affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their own territory and their right to employ armed struggle or any other means to achieve their goal of liberating their homeland. The Conference also condemned the reactionary royalist regime in Jordan, and its resolutions explicitly mentioned the right of the Palestinian people to engage in armed struggle to liberate their homeland in the Arab areas in which they live, and especially in Jordan.

3. Delegations of the Organization attended the Palestine Weeks organized by the Arab League in various world capitals, and explained the Palestine problem and clarified the present situation. It is to be observed that the Palestinian delegations were welcomed and supported in many parts of the world, especially in Peking, where the delega-

tion of the Palestinian revolution was received with a huge demonstration of support.

### *B. In the Field of Popular Organization*

Action has been taken to complete the building up of federations that did not really exist in order to develop the existing ones so that they should be capable of meeting the combat requirement of the present stage. An important step taken in this field was the establishment of the Supreme Council of Palestinian Federations whose aim is to draft a general policy for the activities of the federations and to promote their efforts and achieve their commitment to armed struggle, to organize their relations with the Arab and non-Arab masses and to take the appropriate material, moral and social action necessary for the revolution, on the basis of adherence to the resolutions of the Palestine National Council and the Executive Committee related to popular organization and its implementation, with a view to achieving national unity. At its conference held from May 15-22, 1971, the Supreme Council of Federations adopted important resolutions aimed at organizing the energies of the Palestinian people and mobilizing them for the battle. Here it is to be observed that the Palestinian federations shared effectively in dealing with the effects of the 1970 incidents in Jordan.

### *C. In the Field of Culture and Education*

Although so recently established, the Cultural and Educational Affairs Department has been active in dealing with cultural and educational problems in the various Arab countries. These problems are closely connected with the re-creation of the Palestinian personality and the mobilization of the new Palestinian generation to confront the responsibilities of the battle. The Department has also made a point of taking part in the meetings and activities of educational and student committees and conferences in the Arab League building, the most important of these being:

1. The Permanent Council for Educational Planning for Palestinians;

2. The section responsible for drawing up the educational programs broadcast to Arab students in the occupied territory;



3. The Arab Organization for Education, Culture and the Sciences.

The Department is also making exhaustive efforts to ensure that scholarships and educational missions organized by the governments of the Arab countries and friendly countries are awarded to Palestinians. Unfortunately the Department has not been as successful as could be wished in this field because of the ever-increasing chaos which besets the question of scholarships and because of other factors, both Palestinian and non-Palestinian.

The Department is making continuous efforts to establish a supreme council for scholarships, and is at present asking for more scholarships for Palestinians in Arab universities, especially for Palestinians from the occupied territories. The question of education for Palestinians in Kuwait has engaged even greater efforts on the part of the Department, in cooperation with the Supervisory Council for the Organization's Schools in Kuwait, which was recently established by the Organization. Only last week the Organization finished drawing up plans for the direction of activities, raising the educational standard in the schools in the coming year, and providing the necessary funds.

Recently also the Department has been coordinating relations between the Organization and the Palestine Research Center.

It is to be observed that the Center has published a number of books on the Palestine problem in various languages, and is now conducting a census of Palestinians and their situation in all parts of the Arab area, which study will be of great importance for the plans and projects of the revolution.

#### *D. The Department for Occupied Homeland Affairs*

The Department is making contacts in the occupied territory and the Gaza Strip, providing limited aid to evicted persons and facilitating things for those who return in the Gaza Strip through the International Red Cross in Cairo. It is also continuing to publish monitoring reports and revolutionary research work and studies related to the occupied homeland. Unfortunately the incidents in Jordan had a negative effect on the

activities of the Occupied Homeland Affairs Department, and on other departments in the Organization, which have been unable to engage in their usual day-to-day activities in the Jordanian arena, and the Departments of the Organization are continuing their efforts to ensure direct contact in Jordan and the occupied territory, if only to increase the minimum.

Brothers:

This report is restricted to the new developments that have taken place in the interim period that has just passed, and only contains passing references to the normal activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its various agencies. Another reason for writing this report is to stress that the Organization's agencies need to be supported, consolidated and reorganized so that they may be able to perform their revolutionary tasks at the level required for the confrontation of the challenges of the present stage and the plans of the counter-revolution.

### 357

#### **Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Analyzing the Problems Facing the Resistance, Addressed to the Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

July 7, 1971

What are these basic problems that face the Resistance and which the masses of our people, wherever they may be, expect the National Council to study with serious concern before adopting decisive attitudes to them?

#### *Urgent Problems Facing the Resistance*

In our view among the most important of these problems are:

I. Taking a critical and courageous look

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. statement, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 108 (July 10, 1971), pp. 3-7 *passim*.

at the Resistance movement and defining the major errors that have led to the present consequences;

II. The attitude to the reactionary subservient regime in Jordan;

III. The unity of the Jordanian-Palestinian national movement and its activities;

IV. Liquidation and surrender proposals, in particular [that of] the proposed Palestinian state, and how they are to be confronted and resisted;

V. The escalation of commando activity in the occupied territory;

VI. Striking at imperialist and Zionist interests outside the occupied territory;

VII. Palestinian national unity and the question of relations between the different sections of the Resistance movement, and the military, financial, information and administrative problems arising therefrom;

VIII. Resistance outside the occupied territory and outside Jordan and the rejection of attempts at containment and of violent response to liquidation conspiracies;

IX. The Resistance movement and Arab and world revolutionary action.

## I. Making a Critical Review

### II. The Attitude to the Regime in Jordan

In this period, when the slogan of the enemy camp in effect says that the Resistance must be contained, encircled and deprived of all its revolutionary content and combat effectiveness, it is becoming a matter of ever increasing urgency that the Resistance should adopt a decisive attitude to the reactionary regime in Jordan by cutting off all relations with it and working for its overthrow. We warn against the dangers inherent in continued failure to adopt a strong attitude in this respect and in reluctance to take the historic and conclusive decision to overthrow the reactionary subservient regime in Jordan through armed violence, which will place the revolution on the start of its true course.

We warn that failure to settle this matter will lead to the Resistance movement making

further concessions and withdrawals and accepting Arab mediation. This may result in the establishment in Jordan of a new government whose aim is to absorb the violent resentment felt by the masses against this regime and to make a temporary truce with the Resistance movement.

The overthrow of the established regime in Jordan through revolution and armed violence is now a historical demand of our masses who aspire to freedom and liberation, and it is up to the commands of the Resistance movement to respond to the will of the masses of the revolution.

### III. The Unity of the Jordanian-Palestinian National Movement and Its Activities

The basic condition for the success of the Jordanian-Palestinian national front is that the nationalist forces should conduct a critical and scientific study of all developments that have taken place in the national movement against colonialism, Zionism and reaction, with the object of analyzing the positive and tangible circumstances of the political, economic and military situation of a society that is fighting on its own territory, and of the enemy it is fighting. In the light of such study and analysis it should produce a program of joint action. The most important step to be taken towards mobilizing extensive sectors of the masses for violent resistance to their national and class enemy is that they should clearly recognize the link between the problems of their everyday life and the political battle which is aimed at that link. This will achieve the objective linkage between their day-to-day struggles to solve their problems and their struggle within the framework of the strategy of the people's war of liberation which is aimed at liberation and finding the radical solution to all these problems. This stresses the importance of mass and trade union organizations on the one hand, and also emphasizes the importance of the political program presented to the masses by the revolution, through which the masses

can clearly see the linkage of their day-to-day struggle with political struggle aimed at liberation, democracy and unity.

#### IV. Liquidation and Surrender Proposals, Including That of the Palestine State, and How To Resist Them

Finally, the central point in the plan of the Resistance movement to frustrate surrender solutions is that it should continue to be militarily and politically effective in the occupied area and in Jordan, for there will certainly be no political solution with a revolutionary Jordan and while the Resistance continues to be effective in all the occupied territories Israel will not see much point in any settlement.

Our view of the battle must always be a long-term historical one. On this basis the struggle of our people is a continuous struggle towards liberation, combatting every conspiracy against their cause, because it is through continuous struggle that the cause of liberation continues to exist, and that the advance towards it continues, in spite of all circumstances.

All who try to make it appear that the surrender solution is on the way and that everything is finished, must be shown up, exposed and combatted. What is historically important is that the armed resistance of the Palestinian people to their enemies should continue incessantly. What is important is that the enemy should be kept in a state of constant dismay by ardent resistance in Gaza, that there should be ever growing resistance in the West Bank and that there should be escalating revolution in all the territory. It is also important that in Jordan a revolution should continue to bear arms and to combat the reactionary subservient regime.

#### V. The Escalation of Action Inside the Occupied Territory

1. The battle against Israel and against the reactionary regime in Jordan is a single battle. The masses of our people in occupied Palestine are fighting against Israel, and the

masses of our people in Jordan are fighting against the reactionary regime.

2. If the Resistance fights against Israel, and if its fight is made increasingly effective and is firmly based on sure historical principles, this will strengthen the Resistance movement in its battle against Jordanian reaction and in all its other political battles.

3. It is of particular importance at this stage that fighting against Israel should continue and that serious action should be taken to increase its effectiveness. The reason is that in this way the character of the revolution as a national liberation movement will be clearly maintained, whereby the Resistance will win the support of more extensive sectors of the Arab masses, and such extensive support will be of benefit to the Resistance movement in all its other battles.

4. The central commands of the Resistance movement outside occupied Palestine must take care that the fact of their being outside the occupied territory does not result in their failing to interact sufficiently with the struggle of the masses in the occupied area. These commands must, indeed, be intent on the battle against the subservient regime in Jordan and on the other problems of the Resistance in the Arab theater. But they must be no less intent on performing their duty as the command of the revolution of a million or more of our people against Israeli occupation.

5. For the Resistance in occupied Palestine to be brought to a higher level where it can meet the requirements of the new stage, firstly, Israel's plans for the confrontation of the Resistance in the occupied territory must be thoroughly understood, then the experience of the Resistance in occupied Palestine must be examined and criticized, and thirdly, in the light of the foregoing, plans of action for the new stage must be drawn up.

6. The central point in the Israeli plan for the confrontation of the Resistance in the occupied territory lies in creating normal living conditions for the majority of the masses so that people may apply themselves to the problems of their daily life. In this way it is hoped that the Resistance may

become no more than a vanguard force without the support of the masses, with which the intelligence and repression organizations will be able to cope. This is the reason for the open bridges policy, the employment of [Arab] workers, and all the various other policies directed to this end, which both benefit the Israeli economy and are of service to Israel's policy of rendering the Resistance abortive.

7. The central point in the appraisal and criticism of the resistance in the interior is that in general it has taken on a military character of a primitive kind—the preparation and equipment of groups so that they may carry out military strikes.

8. Our people must apply themselves to establishing a revolutionary organization which will face up to the enemy and his plans and also face up to the situation of our masses in the occupied territory, and produce a suitable political and military program enabling mobilization and concentration of the persecuted, oppressed and exploited masses, who must hand over their cause to the program and embark on a long, harsh and conscious historical struggle, based on revolutionary violence, against the enemy who is occupying their land and exploiting their resources and the fruits of their labor.

#### VI. Striking Imperialist and Zionist Interests Outside Occupied Territory

The interests of imperialism are scattered throughout the world, as are the Zionist organizations which constitute the arteries that provide Israel with her life-blood and the lungs through which she absorbs the components of her strength. Thus it is our duty to turn our attention to striking at these arteries.

The Resistance movement knows that the greater part of the profits of the exploiting oil companies and of our vital resources go to Israel—millions of dollars in cash, millions of dollars' worth of arms and equipment and hundreds of planes and missiles—which are directed against us to annihilate us and to perpetuate our enslavement.

The Resistance must therefore give proof to all the parties of the enemy camp (Zionist Israel, imperialism and Arab reaction) that it is capable of striking in all directions and to such an extent that the forces of the enemy will be unable to guard against it.

#### VII. Palestinian National Unity and the Relations Among the Different Sections of the Resistance

#### VIII. Resistance Outside Occupied Territory and Outside Jordan and the Rejection of Liquidation or Containment

#### IX. The Resistance Movement and Arab and World Revolutionary Action

##### A. Arab Revolutionary Action

1. The Resistance will remain in a difficult situation if it continues to confront the camp of Zionism, imperialism and reaction alone, and the Palestinian people by themselves can hardly be expected to win final victory over Israel and her military establishment, the subservient regime in Jordan and its military establishment, and all the strength and resources of their Zionist and imperialist supporters. In fact, seen in historical terms, if the Resistance is to escape from its predicament, the Arab liberation movement must grow to the extent that the Resistance becomes part of the vast and broad movement of the Arab masses that is capable of obtaining the human and geographical depth that will enable it to triumph.

2. The existent Arab national liberation movement is no longer capable of continuing the national democratic revolution and realizing its conditions; consequently this movement needs to be radically revolutionized or reestablished, to enable it to continue the advance and achieve the tasks of national liberation, first and foremost of which is the task of a people's war of liberation aimed at uprooting imperialism, Zionism, Israel and reaction from our homeland.

3. By rectifying its subjective situation the Resistance will become one of the factors that

gives rise to such a movement. At the same time the Resistance movement cannot replace the Arab national liberation movement, although it is entitled to aspire to assist the birth of such a movement and fuse with it, in the event of its coming into existence, in embodiment of the principle of unity of the instruments of Arab revolution, the revolution of the one nation.

#### B. World Revolutionary Action

### 358

#### **Final Communiqué Issued by the Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council, Stressing the Necessity for Unity and Rejecting Any Settlement Failing To Assure Restoration of the Full Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, July 13, 1971

It was in extremely difficult circumstances, with the conspiracy against the Palestine revolution increasing in scope, that the Palestine National Council met in its Ninth Session in Cairo from July 7–13, 1971. The members of the Council continued discussion of the exigencies of the Palestine revolution at the current stage, with the Jordanian authorities engaged in aggression against the bases of the Palestine revolution and attacking its heroic men in Ajlun, Jerash and Gaza Camp.

In addition to the task it had assumed, the Council took all appropriate measures to cope with the situation; these were published at the time.

The Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council was marked by numerous special features which constituted steps towards national unity, the most prominent of these being:

1. The composition of the new Council was an expression of the fact that it represented a more comprehensive sector than had pre-

vious Councils. All the commando organizations without exception participated in it, and the trade union organizations were more extensively represented.

2. The Council reaffirmed the formula for national unity it had already established at its Eighth Session and in the light of it took new practical decisions on the unity of the forces of the revolution in all fields of command, organization, training, arming and combat affairs.

It also decided to establish a unified council for information and a unified system for the collection and expenditure of revenues.

3. On the basis of these moves and of the unanimous assent to them in the Executive Committee, which was elected as the supreme command of the Palestine revolution, the commando organizations were more extensively represented to ensure collective, rather than individual, action and also to ensure that all forces should participate in confronting the grave situation which threatens the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian people.

The Council first considered the grave situation faced by the revolution in Jordan, and in view of the determination of the Jordanian authorities to strike at the revolution and render it ineffective, the Council condemned the policy of repression and terrorism pursued by the Jordanian authorities and the particularist fanaticism it gives rise to, for the gravely negative effects this policy has had on Jordanian-Palestinian national unity in the Jordanian theater. The practical result has been that the unity of the masses has been weakened and that the right of the revolution to represent the Palestinian people and to realize their aspirations to the liberation of their usurped territory has been denied.

The Council condemned the Jordanian authorities for constantly placing obstacles in the way of the revolutionaries in their attempts to enter the occupied territory. These obstacles have included the blockading of the revolution's bases, the molesting of their supply convoys and armed attacks on men returning from military operations in the occupied territory.

The Council also condemned the constant disregard of the right of the Palestine revolu-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the P.N.C. statement, *Fateh* (Damascus), July 15, 1971.

tion to perform its fundamental duty, which was precisely determined by certain clauses of the Cairo and Amman Agreements. The Council demands that these agreements be adhered to. It also calls on the Arab states that signed them to adopt the attitudes to which they committed themselves to ensure the implementation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, and to withdraw financial aid from the Jordanian authorities who have continued to disregard and failed to honor these agreements, so that this aid may be employed for the objective for which it was allotted—the liberation of Palestine and the repulse of the imperialist attack from Arab territory.

The Council decided to support the efforts being made by the Jordanian nationalist forces to build a coherent national front to take action to support the advance of the Palestine revolution and to protect it from all who conspire against it.

One of the aims of the Palestine revolution in fulfilling its obligations to defend the national rights of its people in Jordan, is to strengthen the unity of the two Banks. It therefore affirms, through its National Council, that this unity cannot be strengthened by the policy being pursued by the Jordanian authorities, which fosters regional and separatist tendencies. It can only be strengthened on a national democratic basis which will consolidate cohesion among the people and unify their efforts for liberation.

Then there was the Council's stand as regards the danger of political settlements. In this connection it discussed the increasing efforts that are being made at present to ensure the implementation of a settlement, and in particular American imperialism's efforts to impose itself on the Middle East area by creating a deceptive situation which will in fact lead to the liquidation of the Palestine problem.

The Council affirmed its attitude of constant insistence on the full rights of the Palestinian people to liberate their territory through armed struggle and to reaffirm their decisive rejection of all surrender solutions and proposals which conflict with the natural and historical rights of the Palestinian people,

including their rejection of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

The Palestine National Council expressed the will and determination of the Palestinian people to continue their armed struggle until they achieve all their national objectives, in spite of the ferocious attack by the conspiracy to which the Palestine revolution is being subjected.

As it pursues its struggle at the cost of so many sacrifices, the Palestine revolution constantly looks to the Arab masses and their national forces and to national liberation movements throughout the world, in the expectation that they will do their duty in what is one of the most ferocious battles that is being fought by a peaceable people against Zionism and the forces of imperialism and its agents in the Arab world.

### 359

#### **Cuban Press Interview with Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar), Commenting on the Political Situation of the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Mid-July, 1971**

*Q. What is the real situation of the Palestinian revolution at the present time?*

*A.* We believe that our revolution is now stronger than ever, after the furious clashes between us and the Jordanian authorities. They thought that they could crush the Palestinian revolution in six months—according to the estimates of the CIA. That is what the computers had indicated.

However, as you can see, ten months have elapsed, and our revolution is now stronger than ever; we have increased and doubled our military forces. We have obtained a very rich experience.

<sup>1</sup> English text of Arafat's interview at the closing of the Ninth Session of the Palestine National Council, conducted by Osvaldo Ortega, *Tricontinental* (Havana), VI, 66 (September, 1971), pp. 28–35.

Our political situation is now stronger. The cohesion between us and our people is closer than it has ever been, and we have learned a very important lesson: there is no doubt that before last September we incurred in a series of errors.

It is true that we suffered over 20,000 casualties among our troops and the civilian population. Although this is a very high number of casualties in comparison with our small population of only three million, our people are ready to pay even more for victory.

*Q. Let us discuss the very important aspect of Palestinian unity. At what level is this yearn for unity now?*

It is important to know that some people speak of unity, unity. They do not use this word to save our revolution. It is true that unity among our organizations is very important—I would say essential—but we must understand the situation of the Palestinian revolution. There is interference between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab systems, because we are not facing a special enemy. We fight Zionism, imperialism and colonialism.

The danger is not facing only the Palestinian people, but we confront it with the help of the Arab people. These interferences cause a certain cloudiness in the relations among the Palestinian groups. Some of these groups have very strong ties with some of these Arab systems. Regardless of this, we believe that the Palestinian revolution has achieved unity; not a good unity, but rather a front through the Central Committee.

We have decided to follow the democratic system in order to establish this unity and are conscious that the construction of this system will require more time, but regardless of this delay, we are certain that we shall be able to establish our unity on a firmer and more concrete basis; with a greater effort we shall be able to advance on the road towards our unity. Unity means that all the organizations share in the cost of the struggle. Those who are not willing to sacrifice themselves do not have the right to speak.

Al Fatah is now leading the Palestinian revolution, therefore it must pay a heavier

price and exert more efforts to consolidate this unity.

*Q. You are stating that unity does not rest on formal aspects?*

A. That is correct. It rests on real facts and strong basis.

*Q. Is there an action program on which this unity would rest?*

A. Yes. In the previous National Palestinian Congress. All members, all the organizations, accepted the plans submitted by Al Fatah to attain unity. The political program and the framework of the organizational structure have been accepted by the congresses.

*Q. After the tragic events of September 1970 we have learned through the press agencies and newspaper reports, of the restriction imposed on the commandoes on military movements and attempts to infiltrate and operate in territory occupied by Israel.*

A. It is true. After the confrontation between our fighters and the Jordanian authorities, our military operations against Zionism-imperialism on the Jordanian-Israeli frontiers have decreased, but the actions within occupied territory have increased. Perhaps you have heard recently of the operations carried out by our volunteers, in which Tel Aviv was bombed and two buildings in Jerusalem destroyed. This is only an example. The operations inside occupied territory have increased while those on the frontier have diminished. The situation is similar regarding the other frontiers. During the last ten months, large military operations have taken place between ourselves and the Jordanian army of King Hussein, and even now great battles are going on in Jerash and Ajloun. This means that we are fighting on two fronts against Israeli-imperialist-Zionism and the Jordanian authorities and imperialism. Six thousand of our fighters are currently confined in the Jordanian prisons, and 29,000 Palestinian volunteers are held prisoner in occupied territory.

*Q. You mentioned the brutal repression of the Jordanian troops and two large fronts—that of*

*Israeli-imperialist-Zionism and the other, the Jordanian.*

A. [... interrupting us with a smile, Arafat says:] Jordanian-imperialist.

Q. *We are aware that due to the nature of the Palestinian cause, many soldiers in the Jordanian army have deserted and joined the resistance.*

A. Yes, some soldiers have done so.

Q. *Likewise, the Western press has reported a possible reincorporation of the Jordanian army to the Eastern front, perhaps considering this or other factors. Something similar was suggested by Anwar El Sadat during his inaugural speech at the Ninth Session of the Palestinian Congress.*

A. One of the principal aims of this conspiracy is to destroy the Eastern front. They started their attacks against the Palestinian revolution and at the same time, the Iraqi army was ordered to withdraw from Jordan. The result of this was that the Eastern front was broken. I consider that the first requisite for the rebuilding of this Eastern front is to allow the Palestinian revolution freedom of movement and, later on, permit the Iraqi Army to return to its former positions in Jordan.

Q. *The Ninth Palestinian Congress held in Cairo made news throughout the world.*

A. Undoubtedly. It is important to know that this Congress had a new character. There were conspiracies aimed at preventing its celebration. The fact that this Congress took place was very important for the Palestinian revolution: it was a great triumph to at last be able to have all the organizations, all the important figures within the revolution and inside the Palestinian peoples join this Congress. Among the first matters for discussion were the extension of our operations, our revolution within occupied territory and the finding of ways and means for a greater unity among our organizations and groups.

Q. *We have heard that during the Congress a number of small groups joined Al Fatah.*

A. That is correct, three joined: the Palestinian Arab Organization, the People's Struggle Front and the Front for Liberation Action.

Q. *What similarity do you find between the Palestinian liberation struggle and the struggle waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America?*

A. We wish all our comrades to see our revolution within this framework. We occupy the same trench as the fighters of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and are likewise side by side with those fighting for freedom in the United States. It is true that there are different trenches, but it is all one single battle. We are a part of this international liberation movement. The victory of the Vietnamese people is our victory. The victory of the Tupamaros is our victory. The victory of Al Fatah is that of Laos. We are all in the same battle against imperialism, colonialism and Zionism.

Q. *Do the differences among the Palestinian organizations rest on tactical or on strategic aspects of the struggle?*

A. In my opinion, they are of a tactical nature. I think that as the political program was agreed upon during the last Eighth Congress this may give you an idea that the differences between these organizations were not strategic. They cooperate and participate on other aspects; all military forces are under the same command.

Q. *Referring specifically to the Al Fatah movement, there is an event that represents a milestone—I am referring to the Kerameh battle. Would you like to tell us something regarding this battle, the conditions of the movement at that time and how the organization started to develop afterwards?*

A. It was a battle against very superior forces, but, of course, I am not the most adequate person to speak of that.

I do not like to speak much of Al Fatah. I prefer to speak of the Palestinian revolution. In 1965, everyone considered us a nation of refugees. However, at that time we were already working underground, training in the use of different weapons and in 1965—after the Jordan River was deviated, which was considered of tremendous importance—we received instructions to penetrate into occupied territory. From that date on, the history of our people started to change. We changed from refugees into fighters.



I remember that those days were very difficult, very difficult indeed. We were only a few fighters with a few arms and small resources. What we really did have was a very strong will. That is why we were able to continue. After the June war, which was a tragic surprise for the Arab nation, everything was sunk in a dark and hopeless fog.

*Q. Are there contradictions between the eastern and western Jews? In what measure can this situation contribute to the objectives of the Palestinian resistance?*

A. We do not expect to obtain immediate results from this conflict. It is evident that there is a schism between these two sectors of Israel. We used to say that there were two nationalities in Israel; the Israeli nationality and the Arab. There are really three: the European Jews (Ashkenazim), the oriental Jews (Sephardim) and the Arab nationality.

*Q. Some kind of class struggle in Israel?*

A. Especially economic, and also, second in importance, racial. The Palestinian revolution offers the solution to this problem, since its aim is the establishment of a Palestinian state, where Jews, Christians and Muslims may live in peace, with freedom and equality for all.

*Q. In case of a hypothetic political solution to the Middle East crisis, what would be the principal conditions of the Palestinian resistance?*

A. It is my belief that the Israelis are more concerned over the occupied territories than over peace. On behalf of the Palestinian revolution we would say that the only possible solution for us would be the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state, which is rejected by the other side.

Although there are several small groups in Israel, like the Matzpen, who are beginning to understand our principles, there is no political or military solution. There should be a just solution for the Palestinian people. We have been evicted from our homes and our lands. The largest part of our people live as refugees. That is the reason why we have the right to fight with all means at our disposal. Our revolution started before the June 1967 war.

Instructions were given to penetrate into occupied territory and start once more; we believe we were right in taking that decision at this critical time for the Arab world. Kerameh was an example, a symbol for the prosecution of the struggle, for the determination not to die ever. In this battle we confronted a well-equipped army which had been able to defeat the Arab forces. We faced them with our small group, and gave them a very hard lesson. In my opinion, this was the first victory obtained against a superior army.

To be more precise I will say that it was superior only numerically and considering its weapons. I have participated in very hard battles against this army. I participated in the battle of Kerameh and in that of Arkub in Lebanon, which lasted 24 hours. We also met the enemy in Sarafand on the Lebanese coast, only five months ago. We are able to win in these battles with only a small group, deeply confident in themselves, and in their arms and the objective of the struggle. We must understand that after the battle of Kerameh—which was the true birth of the Palestinian revolution—we have secured many other important victories. Among them, that of Amman. In this battle we confronted 45,000 Jordanian soldiers, tanks and armored cars during 11 days. During all that time, only small portions of the city fell into the enemy's hands, for example, the aristocratic suburbs, where we did not have members of the militia, but in the other zones where we did have them, they were unable even to approach near those zones.

*Q. To what extent do you feel that the victories obtained by the Fedayeen in their battles against the Zionist and Jordanian troops are due to the fact that the guerrillas constitute a popular army?*

A. Without a doubt they are. That is the principal reason. That is the revolution of the people, whom no one can conquer. They may defeat our troops in tactical battles, but in perspective, the victory is on our side. They used 120,000 tons of ammunitions against us in Amman.

*Q. Which were the refugee camps most intensely bombed?*

A. Whadat, the Hussein camp and the General Headquarters in Acharafie, located in a populous area.

*Q. Which corps of the Jordanian army fought more fiercely against the Palestinians?*

A. The Bedouins.

*Q. That is precisely one of the things we wanted to ask you: the composition of the Jordanian army.*

A. A fourth is Palestinian. The rest are Bedouins of the Eastern part of Jordan. It is important to know that 5000 officers and soldiers of that army joined our revolution and are at present with us.

We have great confidence in our Cuban friends. We know that they are very close to our cause. Support is something very important for the kind of struggle we are carrying on. We look firmly toward the Cuban Revolution. Our fighters are learning much from it, from its experiences. We have very good friends in Cuba. It is possible to find in our bases and camps many of our guerrillas who identify each other among themselves with the names of Guevara or Castro.

To the people of Latin America I can say that we are in the same trench and in the same battle and we want to increase our cooperation and unity, coming closer to each other. There is no sense in distance. Inside, we are close—very close to each other. Together with the fighters of Asia, Africa and Latin America we shall achieve our purposes and objectives and we are certain that we will obtain our victory in the future.

The Palestinian fighters and volunteers vow to continue their struggle until victory is obtained.

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**Statement of the Necessity for Struggle Against Zionism and Imperialism, Included in a Radio and Television Speech by President Bakr of Iraq<sup>1</sup>**

Baghdad, July 17, 1971

Our attitude to the question of Zionist and imperialist aggression has been clear and decisive from the start. We said that the problem did not start on June 5, but that it had existed since the start of the Zionist invasion of Palestine with the support of colonialism, and that the new invasion and usurpation that took place on June 5 must provide us with a strong incentive to discard the futile methods of the past and to engage in a struggle that will not stop until all Arab territories have been liberated from every kind of occupation and usurpation. This was especially the case inasmuch as the emergence of the Palestine Resistance has provided the objective reasons for impressing all the combat potential of the masses alongside those possessed by the Arab states. When we said this we were well aware of the sacrifices and dangers involved, but is any other course open to our nation if it is to preserve its freedom and its honor and protect its land from invasion and usurpation?

When we have refused so-called peaceful solutions, it was not because we sought war. On the contrary, our Arab people most urgently need peace to eliminate the traces of backwardness they have inherited from years of enslavement, and so we may build a new progressive homeland. But can we build progress in the shadow of a constant threat of aggression?

The experiences of twenty years have proved that imperialism is entrenching the Zionist entity in our Arab territory with the sole object of threatening our liberation, our unity and our progress. Therefore there can be no freedom, no unity and no progress

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Bakr's speech on the third anniversary of his coming to power, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), July 18, 1971.

except through revolutionary struggle against the Zionist enemy and imperialism.

### 361

#### **Declaration Deploing Jordan's Violations of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and Hailing Syrian Efforts at Mediation, Included in the Final Communiqué Issued by a Meeting of Representatives of the Tripoli Charter States<sup>1</sup>**

**Mersa Matruh, Egypt, July 17, 1971**

From *Jumada al-Ula* 21–24, 1391 (July 14–17, 1971), a meeting was held in Mersa

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the statement, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 18, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjeh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Tripoli Charter refers to an agreement concluded in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 just after the Rabat Arab Summit Conference. This agreement provided for economic, military and political cooperation among the original signatories: Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R. (An excerpt from the joint communiqué announcing the agreement appears as Document

Matruh [Egypt] of the heads and representatives of the Tripoli Charter states.

The meeting was attended by President Anwar Sadat, the President of the United Arab Republic; President Muammar Qadhafi, the President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic; Mr. Mahmud Ayyubi, Vice President of the Syrian Arab Republic; and Major Zain al-Abidin Muhammad Ahmad Abdel Qadir, Member of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister for Agricultural Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Sudan.

In the course of their meetings the representatives of the Tripoli Charter states discussed and studied the recent regrettable bloody incidents which have been renewed in Jordan, and which have reached a pitch intolerable to the conscience of the Arabs and of mankind. They viewed what is happening as a clear violation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, for the implementation of which the Arab Kings and Heads of State assumed responsibility.

In the course of these sessions there were meetings with leaders of the Palestine Resistance, and through a telephone call to Mr. Hafiz Assad, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, the representatives learned of the situation of the Palestine Resistance in Jordan and of its request to all to make efforts to stop the massacre and the operations of liquidation going on there.

In the light of the above those attending the meeting declare their absolute support for the Syrian Arab Republic's compliance with the request that it should send a commission to Jordan to devise an appropriate formula for action. They await the results

462 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.) It was announced on November 8, 1970 that the three countries had agreed to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too was to join a "unified four-power command." The final outcome of the Tripoli Charter was the Federation of Arab Republics proclaimed in Benghazi on April 17, 1971, by which time the Sudan had postponed its adherence to the federation. (For the text of the proclamation, see Document 322 above.)

of President Hafiz Assad's efforts with the greatest concern and anxiety, hoping that they may be crowned with success and that there may be no further shedding of Arab blood which should be saved for the coming battle of the Arab nation.

Those attending the meeting expressed the opinion that another meeting should be held in the near future so that an appropriate attitude may be adopted in the light of the outcome of the recent incidents in Jordan.

## 362

**Declaration of Policy on the Palestine Problem Included in a Policy Statement Made by Deputy Chairman al-Ata of the New Revolution Command Council Set Up After a Temporarily Successful Coup d'Etat in the Sudan<sup>1</sup>**

**Khartoum, July 19, 1971**

The Sudan hereby affirms that it will offer all its resources for the liquidation of Zionist-colonialist aggression against Arab territory, will protect the Egyptian people from the south and offer all that is required by the Palestine revolution for the liberation of its territory and the restoration of its democratic state. It rejects any solution that is not approved by the people of Palestine as represented by their democratic commando organizations, and in no way sets itself up as a guardian of the Palestinians in such a way [as would prejudice] their right to self-determination.

## 363

**Cable Message from Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Central Committee Secretary-General Habbash Congratulating the New Revolution Command Council Chairman Babikir al-Nur on the Coup d'Etat in the Sudan<sup>2</sup>**

**July 21, 1971**

In the name of the masses of the Palestinian workers and peasants who are engaged in bitter struggle in Gaza and the other occupied Arab territories, and are facing terrible and brutal massacres at the hands of subservient reaction in Jordan, which are being carried out in implementation of the imperialist-Zionist plan, and in the name of all the revolutionary strugglers who are members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, we offer you, the members of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Sudanese people, our congratulations on the step taken to correct the advance of Sudan's national democratic revolution.

The historic communiqué which defined the goals and the course of the revolution at local, Arab and world levels, has set [your aims] and the Arab revolution on a new course, the course of the workers and peasants and all who are ground down [by oppression]. The communiqué also clearly defines the progressive attitude to the problem of the Southern Sudan and to that most important problem of the Arab masses, the Palestine problem, and the rights of the people of Palestine, in such a way as to make clear both the revolutionary nature of the change you have made at this stage in the struggle of the Arab nation and the importance of continued struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is linked to the masses of Sudan and their revolutionary commands by bonds of brotherhood and common struggle,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Ata's statement, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), July 20, 1971.

Major Hashim al-Ata was one of the leaders of the pro-communist coup which overthrew President Numairi on July 19 and was reversed in a counter-coup carried out on July 22, 1971, which restored Numairi to power.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Habbash's cable to al-Nur (executed by firing squad on July 26 after a counter-coup restored President Numairi to power), *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 110 (July 24, 1971), p. 5.

is confident that the people of Sudan and their revolutionary and democratic commands will be able to surmount all the obstacles set in their path by hostile forces.

### 364

#### **Statements Denying Any Jordanian Violation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and Rejecting Any Interference in Jordanian Internal Affairs, Included in a Letter Addressed to Arab Heads of State by King Hussein of Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

Amman, July 22, 1971

I. The situation in steadfast Jordan is natural, normal and calm. Its one people are living in brotherly concord, assiduously and actively working and building for the sake of their sons and for the sake of all Arabs. Security and order are firmly established, watched over by the Jordanian Arab armed

forces and by the citizen himself, both day and night.

II. The talk about an alleged massacre is nothing but slander, lies and alarmist talk, in view of the fact that what happened was no more than a security operation which was only carried out because the other side deliberately committed an endless series of acts of terrorism against peaceable citizens and an endless series of deliberate and flagrant violations of the Cairo and Amman Agreements. The real extent of the losses has been ascertained and, thank God, they are quite inconsiderable as compared with the lying and slanderous claims that have been made.

III. The one major consequence of what happened has been the elimination of the impurities represented by intruders into the Resistance who, as the facts have proved, were working with the enemy. Consequently the party that has really benefited from the security operation is the genuine Resistance, now that it has been purged of the impurities and divisions which were daily leading to bloody clashes between the Resistance and the citizens.

IV. Thus the ground is now prepared in Jordan for the Resistance to reorganize itself on true and sound foundations which will ensure its effective strength, growth and continuity. Jordan is prepared to play the major and most important role in this field, because it is the country of the cause and its people are the people of the cause, and because of its belief in their right, the right of its people, to resist occupation, and oppose injustice and aggression. As usual, it is determined to support this action with all its resources and in its own territory, in coordination with all its brothers, especially those in the confrontation countries, because it believes that, had there not been a Resistance, it would have had to create and establish one itself.

V. At the same time Jordan, and its one people, while believing in the sanctity of the Resistance, which springs from its very self, believes that it has no right to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of any of its brothers. By the same token it cannot accept that anyone whoever he may be, should

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Hussein's letter to the Arab Kings and Presidents, *al-Dustur* (Amman), July 23, 1971.

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sana'a) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

interfere in [Jordan's] internal affairs, and if its national honor is infringed by so much as a jot or tittle it is prepared to protect its honor and defend its actions and its sacrifices with all the strength and power at its disposal.

VI. Jordan holds those who have insinuated themselves into the ranks of its sons and willingly or unwillingly executed the plans and conspiracies of the enemy, responsible for all the blood that has been shed and all the losses that have been sustained in the ranks of its people and its armed forces, and for the consequent damage done to Jordan itself and to the whole Arab nation.

VII. Jordan has neither abandoned nor disavowed either the Cairo Agreement or the subsequent agreement with the Palestine Resistance. On the contrary, it fully believes in the two mainstays of that Agreement—the sovereignty of the state and freedom of commando action—from its spontaneous and natural belief in the sacred right of its people to resist occupation in the occupied territory. Those who should define their attitude to this agreement are those who have been violating it every day and tearing it up every hour by their continuous defiance of the sovereignty of the state and their constant aggressions against the life, security and stability of citizens, and by the way they perverted commando action when they made Jordan, its people and its army, their goal and target instead of the enemy who is oppressing the people in the occupied territories.

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**Palestine Liberation Organization Call for Arab States To Sever Ties with Jordan and Recognize the Resistance As the Legal Representative of the Palestinian People, Included in an Executive Committee Memorandum to Arab Heads of State (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

July 22, 1971

Arab Kings and Heads of State:

The Amman government has trafficked in the question of security and employed all its information media to concentrate public opinion on this question. To deprive the regime of the opportunity to carry out another massacre, the revolution initiated a series of military measures in Amman. Then, in spite of the fact that this was in contravention of all the agreements and contrary to what was agreed on, the army entered Amman and searched it inch by inch and house by house. We have been patient and kept silent about all this to avoid a battle between the commandos and the army in which Arab blood would be shed. But the response of the regime to all these positive steps on our part has been to make further plots and to carry through its conspiracy to the end. We have warned against the treachery of the regime, its failure to honor its signatures and to respond to all the appeals and good offices of the Kings and Heads of State, and its defiance of these appeals with further repressive measures against the revolution, the last of which was the recent massacre in Jerash and Ajlun.

We shall not describe what happened, nor shall we reply to the base lies told by the Jordanian regime to justify and explain what happened. What we say to you is that we have been patient for more than twenty-five years with this hireling regime which colonialism imposed on us, on our people and on the Arab nation, to kill the spirit of fighting and struggle in our people.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the memorandum from the newly formed P.L.O. Executive Committee, *Fateh* (Damascus), July 23, 1971.

Today, now that we sincerely and honorably realize that we are alone in the battle, and that the Jordanian regime has become a real obstacle to continued advance along the course of armed struggle and revolution, we hereby request you, in the name of our stricken people who are living through the cruellest tragedy since the disaster, and in the name of the Arab masses who have taken the vanguards and revolutionaries of Palestine to their bosoms, to take the following action:

1. Inasmuch as the Jordanian regime is an obstacle to liberation, and inasmuch as that regime has itself severed all its Arab relations by its disavowal of the Cairo and Amman Agreements, we believe that the Arab states should sever all their diplomatic and economic relations with the Jordanian regime, and that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should be expelled from the Arab League.

2. Acknowledgement by an official document that the Palestinian people are represented solely by the Palestine revolution and its commands as embodied in the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its Palestine National Council, the contents of this document being communicated to all states and to all organizations, both Arab and international.

3. Acknowledgement of the right of the Palestine revolution and the Arab masses' support for it to rectify and build the unity of the two Banks on the following bases:

a. The right of the Palestinian people to continue their revolution and their armed struggle against the Zionist enemy for the liberation of all Palestinian national territory;

b. Full freedom for the forces of the Palestine revolution to move against the Zionist enemy;

c. The full right of the Palestinian people in Jordan to bear arms to fight the enemy and defend the revolution;

d. The right of the masses in Jordan to mass and organizational mobilization to support the revolution;

e. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their own territory;

f. The establishment of a democratic national regime to ensure the unity of the peoples of the two Banks and to safeguard all

the national rights of the Palestinian people.

4. Protection of Palestinian existence in the East Bank and adoption of a resolute attitude in the face of all attempts to subject our people to further massacres, killing, eviction and arrest.

Arab Kings and Heads of State:

These are the broad outlines of the tragedy through which our people are living at present. The Palestine revolution, which arose in the most difficult circumstances, is capable of forging ahead and continuing along its course of struggle despite all obstacles, and it will define its attitude to each Arab state on the basis of that state's attitude to the revolution and to the Jordanian regime.

Our greetings and the greetings of our people to you.

### 366

**Statements by U.A.R. President Sadat Criticizing the Deliberate Attempts To Liquidate the Palestine Resistance in Jordan, Stressing the Need for Arab Unity, Defending Egyptian Diplomatic Activity and Warning That 1971 Must Witness a Middle East Settlement Either Peaceful or Military<sup>1</sup>**

Cairo, July 23, 1971

King Hussein sent me a letter yesterday. It arrived today, I've brought it with me. Here it is. There's nothing unusual in my saying this—since the days of Gamal it's been our custom to put our people in the picture about everything.

I don't want to go into it, because it's in the same tone, the same sort of talk and overbidding.

But something very strange caught our

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, on the 19th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, at the opening of the second General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 24, 1971.

attention. In the letter he explains to me that he wants to reaffirm the following facts.

What does he say? That Jordan has not abandoned or denied either the Cairo Agreement or the subsequent agreement with the Palestine Resistance, and that, on the contrary, he firmly believes in the two fundamentals of that agreement, the sovereignty of the state and freedom of action for commandos [which grow] out of his spontaneous and natural belief in the sacred right of his people to resist occupation in the occupied territory.

I'm not going to read you the rest because it is worthless; when I read it I was puzzled.

He says that Jordan is abiding by the Cairo and Amman Agreements, but only three days ago his premier gave an official press conference and declared to the whole world that Jordan rejects the Cairo and Amman Agreements. Whom am I to believe?

But I want you, the people of the Arab world and the whole world, to hear the story from the beginning.

King Hussein came here last December, and we had a meeting at the Qubba Palace for official talks. There was a Jordanian delegation headed by King Hussein and an Egyptian delegation headed by me. The microphones were on the table and not under it, so that what we said was recorded with our knowledge.

What happened at this meeting?

At the time I had withdrawn our ambassador from Jordan, after Wasfi al-Tall had been appointed premier.

King Hussein was on his way to London, Washington and Paris.

During our talks we discussed everything. We talked about the Palestine Resistance and about the future. My own view—which was taped, and I am going to tell you about his view, which is also on the tape in his own voice—was that we were entering on a decisive stage in the history of the Arab nation—the year 1971—and I will tell you about it when I talk about the external situation.

I told him that we Arabs should get together, and that the Eastern Front, which consisted of himself and the Palestine Resistance and Iraq, should be unified under his command.

He said: "Iraq doesn't want to be under my command." I told him: "Iraq is free; we will make efforts to persuade it, but it is free. There will be you and the Resistance and the Jordanian army on the line." He said to me: "But you have withdrawn your ambassador." I told him: "We shall cooperate." He said: "I am ready." Right, what was his opinion of the Resistance? He said: "I believe that there are good elements in the Resistance, and they must be given the chance of carrying out commando action so the Palestine Resistance can become a reality in our battle." I said to him: "May you not be shamed. I agree with you on that." Moreover, I told him: "I know that there are subservient and deviating elements in the Resistance, and I am prepared. Perhaps you are embarrassed, but don't be. I have courage to say here in Cairo and to declare to the Arab world the incrimination of these deviating elements of the Palestine Resistance. I am with you in that, particularly regarding the Popular Front, which occupied our embassy in Stockholm three days ago as well as those of Saudi Arabia and Tunisia on the pretext that we are against the Palestine Resistance. It was an operation carried out by agents." It was in December that this happened. I told him that I was prepared to declare from here at the top of my voice, I have the courage—I will incriminate them before the whole Arab world. But he should give the good elements the chance to work, and I mean Fateh in particular. He said: "All right, I agree. How do we begin?" He said to me: "Send your ambassador back again." I said: "Wait for two days, and on the third my ambassador will be back with you, although I know what kind of a person your Premier Wasfi al-Tall is." And he did in fact go to London.

I sent our ambassador three days later, just as I had said, with the idea that we should cooperate to give a chance to the clean commando elements, such as Fateh, to take their proper place and clean up commando action, and so that we might incriminate the subservient and suspect elements in commando action. All right, our ambassador went back. But the moment King Hussein went away, first to London, then to Washington, then to Paris, I found something strange



going on. There was a plan afoot to liquidate commando action step by step. It was not like what happened in September [1970] when the late Gamal was alive—liquidation at one blow. No. Wasfi al-Tall was working piecemeal. For the first time I declare to you, to the Arab world and to the whole world, that I contacted King Hussein in London, then in Washington, and then in Paris, saying to him: “Brother Hussein, the situation is really getting worse.” Moreover, a report had come to me from Bahi al-Adgham’s [Supreme Arab] Follow-Up Committee. It had come to me in my private capacity. I sent it to him in its entirety, telling him: “I trust you, brother Hussein. But the situation is deteriorating.”

The people he left in Jordan—his brother and the premier—were going ahead with an operation to eliminate the commandos completely. I sent him messages when he was in London and Washington and Paris, and he replied to me. I am declaring this matter—to you, the people, and to all Arabs, for the first time. What I mean is, if I had wanted to attack him, or if I had wanted to accuse him, as he says in this letter of his, I could have shown him up long ago. But what I say is that I don’t want to stir up problems with anyone. I want to bring the [Arab] world together. We want to direct our battle against the enemy. I sent him a message and insisted, but in vain. Eventually he sent a letter from London to Wasfi al-Tall and his brother, telling them not to intervene, and that Jordan this and Jordan that, and talk about this and that. The least that can be said of the message is that it is lacking in tact and taste. I contacted you secretly, brother [Hussein]. I didn’t broadcast what I was doing. I never told anyone that I was contacting him until I told you, just now. Do I want to embarrass you? I have not embarrassed you, I have not daily announced that I sent you a cable saying things to put you in an awkward position. No, not at all. I sent you the message because I had hope in you. He immediately sent a message to his brother telling him not to interfere in Jordan and no, no and no. Also in this cable he sent me he talked about no intervention in Jordan.

And after all this he still tells me that Jordan acknowledges the Cairo and Amman Agreements. All right, am I to believe you or your premier who is doing everything? In this connection I must praise the attitude of King Faisal. King Faisal has declared that he adheres to the Cairo and Amman Agreements which were signed by the Arab Kings and Heads of State. King Faisal’s attitude is the attitude of a man who is zealous for Arab interests. King Hussein is prevaricating. My reply to King Hussein is a simple one and I make it in your presence. “Now that all this information has come out I am not prepared to believe you at all.” He must bear his responsibility for what is going on: for the crimes committed in Jordan, the massacre of the commandos, the wedge he has driven between his army and the commandos, the wedge he has driven between his people in Jordan and the Palestinians and the Palestine Resistance, the liquidation of the Palestine Resistance. Today King Hussein boasts that he has 2,900 members of the Palestine Resistance in prison, and that such and such a number of them have taken refuge in Israel to escape from him. I am putting all these facts before the Arab world so that it may pass judgement on King Hussein. I’m not going to describe him with the description he deserves; my very tongue shrinks from using such words. I will leave him to the Arab nation, I will leave him to his people. But there is something I want to say to him in the presence of the Arab nation and of America. Hussein cannot increase his weight even if America is behind him. His weight will remain the same.

Egypt is Egypt. Its weight is no greater and no less, even if we are in a battle. Our weight is known to all—to America and others who support Hussein. Our weight is what it is, and we shall never renounce the rights of the people of Palestine and we shall never bargain over them.

What we here in the Arab nation need more than anything else is unity, but in accordance with a formula drawn up after learning our past experience with Syria. Each state must

keep all its own constituent factors lest there be sensitivities. All of us could be joined at the top by a presidential council and coordinate our policy. It is no longer a question of one language, one history and one destiny. No, it's much more important than that—it's Israel—Israel which is in the heart of the area, and as long as we are not a single entity we shall never be able to confront this ferocious attack by Zionism. It took Saladin eighty years to rid the area of the Crusaders and before them there were the Tartars; we have learned our lesson both from the Tartars and Saladin. Egypt and Syria must be together and there must be Arab unity. Without this the Arabs cannot triumph. I went and explained this to the Central Committee, but no one responded, no one took any notice; they were all waiting to see how the voting went, because the group in question had arranged the operation.

Right, today, as I have told you, the world is no longer a world of small entities. Large entities must arise in order to survive and defend themselves, economically, or in any other way. Small entities cannot live. You see how America, with all her might, goes to China today. We welcome this. We welcome this step, and pray that it is not merely an electioneering move for electioneering propaganda purposes. Why is this? Because if it is a genuine move it will be good for world peace. We want peace; we support peace. Even America is turning to China.

Then, thank God, there is the Federation of Arab Republics, including Egypt, Syria and Libya. Brother Husain al-Shafi'i, the Vice-President of the Republic, has completed the constitution along with our brothers in Syria. In the future, God willing, we three Heads of State shall meet to examine these provisions and prepare the constitution for a plebiscite on September 1. Most probably we shall agree, because brother Husain has worked hard to make sure that all the problems between us and our brothers that needed solving are solved. This Federation will be established, God willing, and the plebiscite will be held on September 1. The battle is the starting point of this federation.

I now come to my last point, which is the situation today, because there has been talk about the situation in the battle today. You will remember that on March 7 I announced that we were not committed to the ceasefire or to refraining from firing, and that we were free to choose the timing of the battle as we liked. After that America asked to exert efforts. We said we had nothing against that, and I still say we have no objection. Some of the plotters have insisted that I should not talk to the Americans. Anyone who says that I mustn't talk to the Americans is like an ostrich, hiding his head in the sand. Who is it who gives Israel everything from Phantoms to a loaf of bread? I say, and I said to Rogers, and they can hear now: "You give Israel everything from a loaf of bread to a Phantom." The Americans are the ones in the battle. If America wants to talk to me, it's most welcome. I will talk because I never stop searching for any possible way to peace, if there is a possibility of peace. But if there is no possibility of peace there must be a battle. There can be no argument about it. But I have not exhausted everything. The Americans said they want to come—all right, let them come. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, came here and I told him my attitude, and I repeat it in your presence, so that our people may hear it, so that the Arab people, and King Hussein may hear. When I put forward my initiative for the opening of the Canal, I said exactly what I am saying now; the Americans can hear me now as I say it to all the world. I said that my conditions for the opening of the Canal are that my forces cross over to the east Bank of the Canal, and that the ceasefire should be for six months only; and that if the problem was not solved, with Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories—not only from Egypt, King Hussein, from all Arab territory—our forces should have the right to start the battle. And I said that my frontier was known—the international frontier between Egypt and Palestine. I am repeating my conditions so that you may hear them, so that the Arab people may hear them, so that people in the whole world may hear them.

We are broadcasting today on short and medium waves to the whole world. America hasn't answered yet. At first it gave some sort of an answer, but it was still discussing things, and still putting on pressure and hadn't yet come to a decision, and then it asked for time to think things over, and I gave them time, and the time I gave them is not up yet.

I want to say to the people concerned that we must be extremely wise when we take the decision of peace or war, we must understand the responsibility perfectly. What could be easier than just saying: I shall take the decision tomorrow and that is that—to enter the battle. No, there is a world opinion, many circumstances, great powers. When Serner came recently, in the last two weeks, there was such a fuss, and they said: "He has brought new proposals." I told them: "Ask the Foreign Ministry; it will tell you there were no proposals." And if there were proposals, is there any reason why we should be afraid? We don't work in the dark. They said the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty had secret clauses; but why should I make secret clauses? Whom am I afraid of that I should make secret clauses? I make open clauses for everyone to see; if I need clauses I make them public. I mean, there's no need—if I have to do anything, my people must approve of it and know about it.

They caused confusion, saying that it was a partial agreement, a partial solution. But it is perfectly clear. As I have said, they are to complete the first stage of withdrawal.

My forces will cross. I will extend the ceasefire for six months only; I have no objection. We shall clear the Canal, we shall go ahead with the operation; if nothing happens, then there is no solution but battle. I must tell you and tell the people frankly through you: the decision on the battle will be ours; it will be our own national decision, and we must be ready for it. At military level everything is going ahead—you may be confident of that—and my sons at the front know this very well. But it is our decision. The battle is first and foremost our battle, not anyone else's. It is we who shall fight it, and this must be quite clear to us as a

people. In this connection I must report to you that the U.S.S.R. has honorably and unconditionally given us aid without which we could not have held out as we have for these four years and stood up and made ourselves heard today. On the other hand America gives Israel everything—everything, unconditionally. Indeed, according to intelligence reports America is manufacturing arms especially for Israel to use in the battle. I have these reports with me. I must tell you what the situation is today. I have already announced to our forces on the Canal since May 15, and I repeat the announcement to you and through you to the entire people, the Arab nation and the world, to our friends and our enemies: I shall not allow the year 1971 to pass without this battle being decided. This means that I am giving Israel time, because the best possible situation from Israel's point of view is the present one, of no war and no peace. Israel is sitting on the East Bank without losses and waiting for an internal explosion, for someone to come and make an explosion. It came out in the inquiry—Ali Sabri said he wanted to make an internal explosion.

[If the objective is to maintain the present state of no war and no peace so that my internal front and armed forces will grow tired, then I say "No." I have said and I repeat that 1971 will be a decisive year. If the battle demands the sacrifice of one million, then we are ready to sacrifice one million.]<sup>1</sup>

America must understand that our people are no longer hesitant. Our armed forces—your sons—if you could see them you would be proud of them all your lives. They are real men who are thoroughly aware of their responsibility. They have been under hard and rigorous training for twenty-four hours a day on the front lines, in the sand for four years, and not one of them complains. The last time I saw them, after May 15, the only complaint about me or to me was: "Why

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph, omitted from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram*, is taken from the English translation of Sadat's speech as broadcast in Arabic on Cairo Home Service and "Voice of the Arabs," BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3744/A/17.

don't you give us the order to cross?" No one asked a special favor of me or complained to me or submitted a petition to me. These are our sons on the Canal; we are behind them with all our love and honor and everything we possess. Everyone must know that the year 1971 will not pass without this battle being decided, either by peace or by war. We cannot accept the situation of no war and no peace, however great the sacrifices.

So much for the military field, and I hope that what I say will reach everybody and that they will hear it. As for political action, I also want to praise the U.S.S.R.'s role in giving us political support just as it has given us military support since the beginning of the aggression. It really is standing by us loyally. Then there are the non-aligned countries, for example Yugoslavia, Ceylon and India. I must praise their stand beside us to you and to the people. Then there are the Islamic countries, headed by Pakistan. I must also praise to you the role they are playing in support of us. As for Europe, and France in particular, I truly and wholeheartedly salute President Pompidou; I salute the French people and government for the attitude adopted by France, as a great power, on the side of right and justice.

Britain too—her attitude has improved. Certainly. Certainly, as I said on a previous occasion. There is no doubt that the Conservative Party has changed the policy of the Labour Party in a really courageous way.

I want to state our attitude today so that the whole world may hear. So far we have accepted the Security Council resolution, and we say that the withdrawal mentioned in its first paragraph is withdrawal from *all* the territories. I say "all the territories," not "territories," as some people say. We accept the resolution, our attitude today is that we accept the Security Council resolution, and the withdrawal mentioned in it from all the territories. We support Jarring's mission. The initiative I proposed still holds good. But as I said, everything has an end. We shall not allow 1971 to pass without the battle being decided, by peace or by war. I say all this, I say that we accept the Security Council resolution and Jarring, and we still propose

our initiative, because we don't want to complicate things. Let it be Israel that complicates things. We don't want to complicate things, we have confidence in ourselves. But America must realize, Western Europe and the whole world must realize—and I repeat it—we shall not let the year 1971 pass without deciding the matter, politically or militarily.

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**Statement Issued by the Government and Revolutionary Council of Algeria, Pledging Continued Support to the Palestine Revolution and Suspending Algerian Relations with Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Algiers, July 29, 1971**

Algeria, faithful to its revolutionary principles continues to support all the Arab causes, first and foremost the cause of Palestine, which it supports militarily, materially and morally in her belief that armed struggle is the only means for the recovery of usurped Palestine and all the stolen Arab territories, and in her conviction that the Palestine Revolution is the only legal representative of the Palestinian people. This means that Algeria rejects any form of trusteeship over the Palestine Revolution and that it rejects mediation between the Revolution and its enemies. On this basis Algeria declares once again that the success of the Palestine revolution and its overcoming all obstacles depends upon the achievement of unity in the ranks of the Resistance, upon making use of the territories of neighbouring countries for its base camps and upon the supply of material and moral support from all Arab countries. Algeria also declares that the mass killing of the Palestinian people is part of a

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Algerian government statement broadcast on Algiers Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3749/A/2-A/3; reprinted by permission.

plan for the all-out liquidation of the Palestine cause.

The Council of the Revolution and the Government during the course of this meeting studied the Note submitted by the Palestine Revolution to the Presidents and Kings of the Arab states. In reply to the Note the Council of the Revolution and the Government resolved as follows:

(1) To suspend relations in all fields with the present regime in Jordan.

(2) To consider the present regime in Jordan to be incompatible with the continuation of the struggle of the Palestinian people and with the interests of the Arab nation.

(3) To reaffirm the principle of recognition of the Palestine Revolution as the sole lawful representative of the Palestinian people.

(4) To continue to support the Palestine Revolution militarily, materially and diplomatically.

(5) To facilitate the arrival of supplies and assistance dispatched to the Palestine Resistance.

(6) To declare that the real solution of the Palestine problem consists in the pursuance of the struggle on all fronts and in the rejection of peaceful solutions.

(7) The need to define the position in relation to the Palestine Revolution with utmost clarity in terms of being for it or against it.

The Council of the Revolution and the Government consider that the implementation of those principles is an essential condition for the clarification and elucidation of the ambiguity and for making possible new upsurges for the Palestine Revolution. This is because the ordeal suffered by the Palestinian people since 1948 has continued to create adverse effects upon the development of affairs in the Arab countries, particularly after the defeat of 1967, which led to the exacerbation of Arab incompatibilities. These incompatibilities will endure as stumbling blocks in the way of all efforts towards effecting internal development and construction and liberation for as long as the heart of the problem is not tackled and it is not subjected to a fundamental solution.

### 368

#### **Resolutions Adopted at the Tripoli Conference of Arab Presidents Pledging Continued Support for the Palestine Resistance and Criticizing Jordan for Failing To Implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements<sup>1</sup>**

**Tripoli, July 31, 1971**

The assembled presidents resolved:

I. To regard anything that prejudices the Palestine revolution and its honor as offending the honor and the conscience of the Arab nation.

II. To support any action leading to the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the conference statement, *Fateh* (Damascus), August 1, 1971.

Participants in the conference were President Sadat of the U.A.R., President al-Iryani of Yemen (Sanaa), Presidential Council Chairman Rubayyi of Yemen (Aden), President Assad of Syria, P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat, and President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Cairo Agreement calling for a cessation of the fighting between the Jordanian army and forces of the Palestine Resistance and establishing the Supreme Arab Follow-Up Committee to supervise the ceasefire, was concluded in Cairo on September 27, 1970. The signatories were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah; President Nasser of the U.A.R.; President Qadhafi of Libya; President Numairi of the Sudan; King Hussein of Jordan; Premier al-Adgham of Tunisia; President Franjieh of Lebanon; Republican Council Member Shami of Yemen (Sanaa) and Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar). (The text of the agreement is published as Document 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

The Amman Agreement, the supposed "final agreement" for ending the Jordan Civil War, included clauses providing that the Jordanian government would in no way work against the Palestine revolution. It was signed by King Hussein, Yasser Arafat and Premier al-Adgham in Amman on October 13, 1970. (The text is published as Document 514 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

implementation, in letter and in spirit, of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and to the establishment of practical safeguards to ensure that these Agreements are not again violated, in order that all efforts may be united and directed against the enemy.

III. To support all the measures taken by the Arab governments to confront the Jordanian authorities in their violation of the Cairo and Amman Agreements and their actions in liquidating the revolution in Jordan, and to support the development of these measures in conformity with the development of the situation.

IV. To keep a watch on the attitude of the Jordanian government, and if it is clear that it is persisting in refusing to implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements it will be the duty of all Arab governments to take such practical measures as they deem appropriate, both individually and collectively, to protect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to continue their legitimate struggle, and to ensure freedom of action for the Palestine revolution in Arab and Jordanian territory until complete liberation is achieved.

V. To undertake to provide the Palestine revolution with financial, moral and military support to enable it to continue its struggle and protect its existence in Jordan, as being the natural base of the Palestine revolution.

VI. To regard the Libyan initiative of calling for volunteers to allow the Libyan Arab masses to play a part in the Palestine revolution as a splendid example that should be followed.

While proclaiming their profound belief in the inevitability of the victory of the Palestine revolution, the Presidents assembled in Tripoli salute and express their appreciation of the heroic steadfastness of the people of Palestine in the occupied territories, which has won the admiration of the whole world and is an expression of the devotion to struggle of the Palestinian people and of their determination to carry on with their revolution until victory is won.

369

**Cable Message from President Numairi of the Sudan Congratulating President Qadhafi of Libya on the Resolutions Adopted at the Tripoli Conference of Arab Presidents<sup>1</sup>**

**Khartoum, Early August, 1971**

To my brother Muammar al-Qadhafi, President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Premier, the Libyan Arab Republic.

I congratulate you on my own behalf and on behalf of my brothers of the Revolutionary Command Council, on the success of the emergency Arab summit conference. We have been greatly moved by the pioneer Libyan initiative to support the Palestine revolution with volunteers from intrepid Libya.

The historic and decisive decisions taken by you and our brothers the heads of state, at the summit conference, are a true expression of the firm advance of the Arab nation along the road of the great revolution for liberation. The Sudanese people, who have been with you in their hearts, their thoughts and their emotions, as they followed the course of your great conference, clasp your hands with boundless aspiration and support in the hope that this may enable the Palestine revolution to intensify its struggle, consolidate its existence and smash the perfidious conspiracies aimed at liquidation that are being executed by the agents of colonialism.

May you and our righteous brothers live long as the bulwark of the Arab nation. Long live the Palestine revolution in its inflexible struggle, along with the masses of our Arab nation, for the realization of their mighty hopes on behalf of which so much blood is being shed, so many lives are being lost.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Numairi's cable, *al-Haqiqa* (Benghazi), August 8, 1971.

## 370

# French Press Interview with King Hussein of Jordan, Explaining His Differences with Other Arab Nations and His Clashes with the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>

Amman, Early August, 1971

*Hussein:* I think that in the present circumstances any peace would be equivalent to capitulation. We must first unify Arab ranks and agree on a common strategic policy capable of deterring the enemy from annexing the territories conquered in June 1967. However, even these minimal conditions are not met today, and I don't understand how certain Arabs can envisage a political solution to their conflict with the Hebrew state while they are no more able to take on peace than war.

*Q. Yet it has been said that you have gone so far as to meet Mr. Yigal Allon, the Israeli Vice-Premier, to discuss certain forms of political settlement.*

*A.* I have not met Mr. Allon. Those are calumnies to which I have always preferred not to reply. Besides, it is easy to denounce the motives and intentions of those who spread them. Jordan considers itself bound by Security Council Resolution 242 in the same way as the other Arab countries who accepted the U.N. as arbiter. It is in this spirit that we cooperated with Dr. Gunnar Jarring and later subscribed to Mr. William Rogers' plan, after Egypt, by the way, had taken the initiative of accepting it without consulting us. Need I recall here that our first differences with the fedayeen go back to this measure? In any case, there was no reaction from Israel. We weren't even granted a declaration of intent. And yet some people keep on urging peace. If they rely on international pressures alone to obtain justice, they won't get very far.

*Q. In the meanwhile, have you done everything to open the way to a political solution?*

*A.* How do you mean?

*Q. The Palestine Resistance has been liquidated. And without the commandos, who can harass the enemy or threaten the security of the Jewish state?*

*A.* We are still seeking those commandos to whom you refer, those willing to fight in Palestine and not elsewhere. This must be understood: a genuine resistance would do more for Jordan than for any other Arab country. That is why it would be absurd to think that we could have considered liquidating a resistance movement which was prepared to fight where they should have been fighting; the one we were dealing with only wanted to destroy Jordan.

[Expressing the view that the people of the West Bank are relieved that stability and order have finally won over anarchy]: We are the object of a conspiracy as serious as that which lost the Arabs Palestine. The troubles in Jordan have quite simply served to sanction the *fait accompli* of Israeli occupation. Whatever happens—and our Palestinian brothers are witness to it—we did the impossible to coexist with the commandos, to put up with their abuses and even their crimes. It was too much. In the end people criticized us for resignation and weakness. I don't think that it was humanly possible to be patient any longer, to do any more to avoid armed confrontation. On that we have a clear conscience, and no one will be so cynical as to make us responsible for fighting which we never wanted.

[Asked if he knew what would become of the Hashemite Kingdom if the Palestinian people were to be granted the right of self-determination, King Hussein replied that three formulae should be kept in mind: the reestablishment of Jordanian sovereignty on the West Bank of the Jordan River, a federation of two autonomous states, or total separation.]

But all these hypotheses can be envisaged only once our territory is liberated. That, in my opinion, is the urgent priority and, taking account of our common desire to recover the usurped homeland, the one and only objective which should stimulate our efforts.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French text of King Hussein's interview, conducted by Edouard Saab, *Le Monde*, August 11, 1971, p. 5.

*Q. And if, to take charge of this struggle which you predict, a provisional Palestinian government should be formed, how would you receive it?*

*A. Who would it include?*

*Q. Representatives of the Palestine Resistance organizations.*

*A. But what do these actually represent? To find out, the Palestinian people themselves—those who live in their country, those in Jordan and of course those in the occupied territories—must be consulted. The people of the West Bank think that they are in a far better position to speak in the name of the Palestinian people than those gentlemen who hold court in Damascus, Beirut or Cairo. I wonder if it isn't in the enemy's interest to negotiate with these people now that they have revealed their powerlessness.*

[The King commented on the failure in his eyes of Saudi attempts at mediation and the fact that he is in no hurry to resume relations with the commandos.]

*Q. In Your Majesty's opinion, what is it that justifies the massive aid which the United States is granting to the Hashemite Kingdom?*

*A. It is a fact that our open policy towards the West brings us aid from the United States. Others have chosen the Soviet Union. They profit from it and that is their right. The Arabs lose nothing from mobilizing the greatest [possible] number of men in the world to struggle against Zionism; indeed they need them badly. There are only a few countries left who are self-sufficient economically. Besides, when the United States helps Jordan, they know that we are one of the rare countries of the region to have maintained a dialogue with the West both before and since the war of June 1967. That should count. As for those who reproach us for our relations with the Americans, they would do better to clarify their own position with regard to the East as well as the West. We certainly wished to rely on our Arab brothers after the catastrophe of June 1967. The Khartoum Summit of September 1967 decided to grant aid to Jordan to help it carry on the war effort, since it defends the largest part of the Arab-Israeli front. Several months later, we were deprived of two-thirds*

*of the aid promised us. It could well be asked if behind these maneuvers people were seeking to destroy our country.*

*Q. But in whose interest?*

*A. No doubt in that of Zionism. Obviously we defended ourselves and today we are more confident than ever about the future and the unity of our people. From now on no decision will be taken regarding the kingdom which doesn't first and foremost take account of the interests and dignity of the Jordanian people. It is high time that Arab leaders undertook an examination of conscience.*

*Q. There is a lot of talk here about the Jordanian army, its striking force, defense potential and its courage. How did it happen that in June 1967 it lost Jerusalem in such a short time?*

*A. A week before the outbreak of hostilities, we had to abandon our own plans to integrate with the overall strategy of the unified Arab command. That is really the secret of the fall of Jerusalem and the loss of the West Bank. I can't say definitely that we could have saved anything except, of course, our honor. And even so, the enemy took longer to reach the walls of the Old City than to reach the East Bank of the Suez Canal. Our misfortune was to believe blindly in inter-Arab co-operation and military coordination.*

### 371

#### **Saudi Arabia-U.A.R. Joint Working Paper Setting Forth Principles for the Settlement of the Crisis Between the Government of Jordan and the Palestine Resistance<sup>1</sup>**

**Early August, 1971**

1. The Jordanian authorities should declare their full commitment to the implementation

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the working paper reportedly delivered to Jordanian government officials by Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf and Egyptian President Sadat's special representative, Hassan Sabri al-Khauili, and reported by Amman Radio on August 14 as being unacceptable to Jordan, as published in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 12, 1971.



of the Cairo Agreement signed by the Arab Kings and Heads of State on September 27, 1971, and the implementation of the Amman Agreement signed by King Hussein and Mr. Yasser Arafat (the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization) in the presence of Mr. al-Bahi al-Adgham, the Tunisian Chairman of the [Supreme Arab] Follow-up Committee for the implementation of the agreements between the two parties.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia believe that the implementation of the Agreements will establish the sovereignty of the Jordanian state over its territory and ensure freedom of Resistance action.

2. The Arab political and military committees should resume their activities in Jordan and supervise the sound implementation of the Agreements.

3. The Jordanian government should release the Palestinian commandos it has arrested.

4. The command of the Palestine revolution should suppress all secret organizations.

5. All information campaigns by the Jordanian authorities and the Palestine Resistance directed against each other should cease.

6. National conciliation should be declared so that security and stability may be restored in Jordan and Palestinian commando action may resume the performance of its basic tasks against the Israeli enemy.

### 372

#### **Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization Outlining the Main Points of the P.L.O. Working Paper Presented to Arab Officials Attempting Mediation in the Conflict Between the Palestine Resistance and the Government of Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

August 16, 1971

I. The study of the working paper, and the

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic of the P.L.O. Executive Committee's statement, *Hisad al-Asifa* (Beirut), No. 2 (September 14, 1971).

talks that are being held in connection with it, are being carried on in the name of the Executive Committee and within the framework of the decisions it has taken to ensure the interests of the Palestine revolution on a basis of adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements. There is no question of political maneuvering aimed at evading the text or the provisions of these agreements, the enforcement of which requires the implementation of the effective Arab guarantees which are clearly and unequivocally set out in the memorandum unanimously approved by the Executive Committee. This memorandum, which was submitted to Messrs. al-Saqqaf and al-Khauili, emphasizes the following points:

A. That the working paper should be accepted in principle as constituting full implementation of the Cairo Agreements in both letter and spirit;

B. That the Jordanian official and semi-official interpretations are to be regarded as incompatible with the working paper and the Cairo and Amman Agreements;

C. That the Palestine revolution, as represented by the Palestine National Council and the Executive Committee, is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and their natural right to self-determination;

D. Profound belief in Jordanian-Palestinian national unity and serious action to establish it on a sound basis;

E. Freedom of commando action in the military, administrative and popular spheres, as stipulated by the Cairo and Amman Agreements;

F. Emphasis on the necessity for effective Arab guarantees to obviate all possibility of new massacres being carried out against our people and our revolutionary strugglers, in conformity with the elucidations contained in the Central Committee's memorandum to the envoys;

G. The release of all members and supporters of the revolution, both military and civilian, who are in detention and the rescinding of all sentences passed against them, either in their presence or *in absentia*.

II. The Executive Committee affirms to the masses of the Palestinian people and the

masses of the Arab nation, that it will never renounce or bargain over any of the rights of the Palestinian people—neither their right to continue armed struggle until liberation and return are achieved, nor the natural right of the Palestinian people to [exercise] self-determination, to maintain all national rights and to take all measures to surmount obstacles so as to ensure the continuation and the freedom of the Palestine revolution. Moreover, the Jordanian authorities have been concentrating on having Arab aid to Jordan resumed and the campaigns against it stopped, as if the interruption of aid and these campaigns were the reason why the regime attacked the revolution. The revolution replied that these were the results, not the causes, of Jordan's attack on and conspiracy against the revolution, and that when the regime stops its attack on the revolution these consequences will also cease.

We are confident that the coming days will reveal to the masses the real attitudes of both the revolution and the regime.

### 373

#### **Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Rejecting Any Mediation in the Conflict Between the Palestine Resistance and the Government of Jordan (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**August 18, 1971**

The massacres of September 1970, and the subsequent incidents, ending with the recent slaughter at Jerash and Ajlun and the meetings of the subservient regime with the Israeli leaders, have clearly disclosed the conspiratorial face of the Jordanian regime and its subservience to American imperialism, and the fact that it is the compliant instrument for the achievement of the aims and ambitions of Zionism.

The blood of our people that flowed in Black September; the blood of our strugglers that has been shed at Jerash and Ajlun, the thousands of our citizens who are detained in the prisons of the subservient regime, and the gallows that have been erected in Amman for our heroes—all these have revealed the plan of the reactionary regime in Jordan to crush the revolution of our people and to wipe them out to make way for the conclusion of a separate peace.

We of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in defining the nature of our conflict with this regime, reject any kind of mediation with it, for our bitter experience in the past has taught us that, in the end, such mediation is always in the interests of the regime which has been entrusted with the task of crushing the Resistance, which is the last remaining party to reject all solutions involving surrender and liquidation, and to be capable of showing up slackers and those who are ready to surrender.

We of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, opposed as we are to adventurism and overbidding, can see no way of coexisting with the reactionary regime in Jordan and we believe that we are capable of initiating a struggle against it which, beginning by severing all relations with it and refusing to coexist with it, will end by overthrowing and crushing it.

We of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine reaffirm our rejection of all kinds of mediation with this regime, from whatever source, and we persist in affirming that this regime constitutes a fundamental obstacle to our liberation of Palestine, so that we must direct all our efforts to smashing and eliminating it.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the P.F.L.P. statement, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), No. 114 (August 21, 1971), p. 3.

## 374

**Damascus Declaration Issued by Presidents Qadhafi of Libya, Assad of Syria and Sadat of the U.A.R., Hailing the Establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, August 20, 1971**

In the course of the discussions among them and of their meetings with the delegations that accompanied them, which centered on the battle and the appraisal of the situation and all its aspects and eventualities, the three presidents affirmed that the confrontation with the Zionist enemy occupying our Arab territory has reached a decisive point and that, realizing this, the enemy has increased his ferocity, savagery and determination to perpetuate his occupation through the use of the most odious methods of coercion and fury against the Arab citizens of the occupied territories. In addition to this there is the escalation of their conspiracies by the forces of world colonialism, led by the United States of America, which is hostile to the Arab nation and the Arab future, in a frenzied effort to weaken our front of confrontation with the enemy, to shatter its unity in struggle and rob it of its ability to settle by military means the battle with the enemy in favor of legitimate Arab rights. The attempts now being made to liquidate the Palestine Resistance and to render its movement abortive

are part of the large-scale Zionist-colonialist plan aimed at protecting the Israeli occupation of Arab territory, and safeguarding, strengthening and protecting it against the great upheaval for which the Arab people are preparing throughout the length and breadth of the Arab homeland.

The three presidents affirm that this Zionist-imperialist plan is doomed to failure in the face of the determination of the Arab people to liberate their land and recover their honor, and that the Arab nation possesses sufficient decisive resources and arms for it to engage in the battle of destiny against the most arrogant of challenges and to settle the conflict in favor of right and peace.

The three presidents regard the unionist action achieved by the Benghazi Declaration and the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, in this difficult period when the enemy believes that he has come close to imposing surrender on the Arab nation, as constituting the decisive answer which affirms the resolute Arab will to pool its resources to confront its enemies and to frustrate their conspiracies.

## 375

**Statements by President Assad of Syria Stressing the Necessity in the Face of the Zionist Threat for the Step Towards Unity Represented by the Establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics<sup>2</sup>**

**Damascus, August 30, 1971**

I want to add that unity is not a response to a grave danger or to a challenge. It is a return to the natural state of affairs in the Arab nation, although it is true that the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the statement, *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 21, 1971.

The Federation of Arab Republics is the final outcome of the agreement concluded in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 by Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R. This agreement, subsequently referred to as the Tripoli Charter, provided for economic, military and political cooperation among the original signatories. (An excerpt from the joint communiqué announcing the agreement appears as Document 462 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.) On November 8, 1970 it was announced that the three countries had agreed to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too was to join a "unified four-power command." By the time the F.A.R. was proclaimed, the Sudan had postponed its adherence to the federation.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Assad's broadcast speech to the nation in which he urged a positive vote at the plebiscite to be held on the proposed federation of Syria, Libya and the U.A.R., *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 31, 1971.

challenges do increase the need for rapid steps along the road to unity, and thus affirm that unionist action can brook no postponement or delay, now that it has become clear how immense is the Zionist peril and the ambitions and determination of the enemy to consolidate this position in that part of our Arab territory that he has usurped in anticipation of further expansion at a later stage. The battle of destiny that confronts us is at once a military, political and economic battle, which we can only win through resources as great or greater than those of the enemy and the American support he receives. These resources are the resources of the Arab nation, and unionist action is the sound and solid framework for mustering these resources and directing them into a single channel that will make them a single striking force that will yield the best returns for our Arab nation,

In our preparation for this battle there is a clear commitment which is mentioned in the proclamation of the establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics, and also in the historic Damascus Declaration—the commitment that the liberation of occupied territory should be the goal to which all energies and resources must be devoted; that there is to be no peace, no negotiation and no relinquishing of a single inch of Arab territory; that there shall be no dissipation of the Palestinian cause and no bargaining over it. Within the framework of this commitment we shall act with absolute freedom, in all fields of struggle, everywhere in the world, now that we have smashed the deathly state of inaction that prevailed before November 16, 1970. Nothing shall restrict or check our freedom but our commitment to the principles of our great Party, the Baath Party, which is the embodiment of the interests of the homeland, and to the goals mentioned in the Benghazi Declaration, the Damascus Declaration and the basic provisions of the Federation.

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### **Statements by U.A.R. President Sadat Stressing the Importance of the Step Towards Unity Represented by the Establishment of the Federation of Arab Republics<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, August 30, 1971**

Some people are crying out and asking what effect Arab unity has on the battle, what effect the federation of republics that has been established is going to have on the battle. What I want to say is that the Federation of Arab Republics, which, God willing, we shall vote in favor of in two days time, is one of the fundamental mainstays of the battle. Speaking frankly, as I always have done with you, there is no longer anyone on the front against Israel but ourselves and Syria.

We form the Southern Front and Syria forms the Northern Front. Libya forms our [strategic] depth in the battle. The Sudan also constitutes [strategic] depth. Libya to the west and Sudan to the south constitute [strategic] depth for the battle. There is no longer anyone else but us in the battle. Why is this? Where have the confrontation countries gone? Jordan is completely out of the battle. We all know what Jordan is doing today. Its forces are concentrated against Syria, not against Israel. Iraq has completely withdrawn its forces from Jordan. King Hussein has completely destroyed the Resistance inside Jordan and regards this as a victory, and unfortunately boasts about it. Quite simply there is no longer anyone in the battle except us. Of the confrontation countries only we and Syria are left, and we have depth in the west, that is Libya, and depth in the south, Sudan.

Today the Federation of Arab Republics is something absolutely vital for the battle.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's broadcast speech to the nation in which he urged a positive vote at the plebiscite to be held on the proposed federation of Syria, Libya and the U.A.R., *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 31, 1971.

It is not only, as I said, that we and Syria are the only confrontation countries in the battle, with depth behind us, and with the Sudan also participating in the front with one additional brigade. No, it is more than that. All of you realize that in the latest stage the Arab nation has passed through an extremely bad stage of disarray. King Hussein strikes at the commandos and his premier holds a press conference at which he announces victory over the commandos. We all know what has happened in Morocco; we all know what has taken place in the Sudan. Some of our Arab brothers, God forgive them, are outbidding us, sitting thousands of kilometers and miles away from the front. But they want to outbid us with words only. There is a state of disarray. The Federation of Arab Republics that we are establishing is not only for the battle and the confrontation countries. No, it's a response to the state of disarray that exists in the Arab nation today. It's so that we may say to every Arab, to our friends, and to our enemies, that the Arab nation never dies; that on the contrary, when disarray is at its worst there emerges a solid core, a federation of three states including half the Arab nation or more, with one single will, one policy, one single plan, and with the determination that we shall live free. This is why when we go to vote the day after tomorrow, God willing, for the Federation of Arab Republics, it won't be only for the battle; we shall be saying No to our enemies, who thought that the Arab nation had died, forgetting 1969 when there was the revolution in the Sudan and the revolution in Libya—in 1971 we say to them Never, that the Arab nation constantly renews its youth. Yes, the greater the bitterness and pain and disarray, [the more strongly] the Arab nation comes out of it with a new form, with a new will, with new resolution and determination—as is demonstrated by the Federation of Arab Republics.

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**Proposed Charter for the Jordanian National Union Explaining the Need for Such a Political Organization and Stressing the Unity of the Two Banks of the Jordan (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, Early September, 1971**

From our conviction that simply expressed ideas are the truest, most authentic and most profound, we say that:

1. Both Banks of Jordan, and the people of both Banks, are today passing through a crisis in their destiny and their existence.

2. Jordan is in a state of conflict with a strong and clever enemy.

3. Our economy is in the first stages of growth and formation.

4. We are passing through a stage of intellectual, moral and social disintegration as a result of having lost our self-confidence and of having strayed in the mazes of alien thinking. This disintegration is being fostered by our enemies with all the weapons of perfidy, intrigue and the sowing of dissension at their disposal.

5. We are suffering from a childish alienation from our national and spiritual heritage, ignoring the fact that this heritage is part of human civilization and one of its mainstays.

6. Many groups of our people have taken to acting in accordance with political and social concepts derived from abroad which give those who accept them the idea that our small people is incapable of promoting its own experience, which in fact may be said to play a vanguard role in the Arab world, or at least to make a substantial contribution to the experience of our brother Arabs. These groups have adopted the method of receiving guid-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the draft charter, distributed at a meeting of some 300 prominent Jordanians convened as a steering committee charged with producing a final form of the charter for the Union, announced by King Hussein on September 7 to be the only authorized political organization in Jordan, *al-Dustur* (Amman), September 9, 1971.

ance, prompting, aid and remuneration from outside our homeland, forgetting that every national movement has its own climate, and that revolutions cannot be imported and exported.

It is in the light of this extremely complicated and difficult situation that we are taking action. What we wish to originate is not a mathematical equation with ourselves squeezed in between its two terms, but a general framework and a broad and spacious road based on intelligence and belief, which our people can fill with their personality, their experience and their peculiar circumstances. This framework is the Jordanian National Union which will organize all the forces of the people in the political, economic, social and cultural fields in conformity with intellectual factors and general ideological guidelines that are humane in content and objective.

### *Section Three*

#### **General Principles**

1. The Jordanian people is an integral part of the Arab nation.

2. The system of government in Jordan is a constitutional monarchy.

3. Any conspiracy against the entity and existence of Jordan is a conspiracy against the Arab cause and in particular against the Palestinian cause.

4. The unity of the Jordanian people in a single rank is a national necessity for the confrontation of all challenges and perils.

5. Struggle by all methods to liberate the occupied territory is an absolute national necessity for the recovery of usurped Arab rights in Palestine.

6. The unity of the Arab states and the subsequent unity of the Arab nation require, first and foremost, the unity of the people's forces in every Arab region, provided that this unity is achieved by aware democratic processes, due regard being paid to objective circumstances, social, economic, political and geographical, and to the time factor and the stages of development, so that no union may be proclaimed and no unity be born which bears within itself the seeds of its own dissolution.

7. The unity of the people of both Banks of Jordan is an original and destined unity, stemming from their unity of history, territory, objectives and destiny, their tragedy of today and their hopes for tomorrow.

8. The unity of the line of confrontation with the enemy absolutely requires that Arab forces should be mobilized for the battle, and that their commands, planning and operations should be coordinated and unified, to prevent the enemy striking at each of them separately.

9. The unity of the political line of confrontation in the conflict requires a unified foreign policy for the Arab states directed against the plans of the enemy in all international fields.

10. The only fundamental conflict in the Arab theater is the conflict with the enemy. It is therefore the duty of all the Arab regions to stand in a single rank against the common danger. This requires the mobilization of all Arab energies, the resolution of differences through quiet dialogue and the adoption of manly and responsible attitudes of brotherly and positive cooperation so as to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and self-confidence.

11. Inasmuch as many other Arab regions are passing through the same stage as Jordan and confronting similar internal and external problems, and in view of the fact that the stage we are passing through requires the establishment of national federations deriving from a situation similar to our own, the Jordanian National Union will work to strengthen its relations with these organizations, whatever they may be called and by all the means at its disposal, because we believe that this is the sound basis for the establishment of a union of the Arab states and the unity of the Arab nation.

12. So that we may appraise our forces in the battle of destiny against Zionism, its allies, and its state of Israel, it is essential for us to determine the characteristics of the enemy, the reasons for his strength and the elements of his weakness, so that the action we take may not consist, as it has in the past, merely of reactions to the actions and plans of the enemy.

13. The principal danger that threatens us in this stage is the Zionist danger, and we

must confront this danger united in hands and hearts; whoever fails to perform his national duty belongs neither to a specific group nor to this homeland, but to a rotten group which harms itself before it harms the homeland, and which society casts to the side of the road as the people continue their advance.

## 378

### **Statements on the Significance of the Federation of Arab Republics, Made by President Qadhafi of Libya<sup>1</sup>**

**Tripoli, September 1, 1971**

Brothers, those who have offered nothing, those who have not responded to the call to make the battle a pan-Arab one—there is no place for such as these in the Federation of Arab Republics. Those who have not responded to the call for the pan-Arab battle of the Arab nation have obliged their masses to resort to revolution to make the battle a pan-Arab one.

Brothers, today we must tell Arab reaction not to deceive itself into believing that we

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Qadhafi's speech on the second anniversary of the September 1 revolution, *al-Haqiqa* (Benghazi), September 2, 1971.

The Federation of Arab Republics is the final outcome of the agreement concluded in Tripoli, Libya on December 27, 1969 by Libya, the Sudan and the U.A.R. This agreement, subsequently referred to as the Tripoli Charter, provided for economic, military and political cooperation among the original signatories. (An excerpt from the joint communiqué announcing the agreement appears as Document 462 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.) On November 8, 1970 it was announced that the three countries had agreed to form a union and on November 27 that Syria too was to join a "unified four-power command." By the time the F.A.R. was proclaimed in Benghazi on April 17, 1971, the Sudan had postponed its adherence to the federation. (For the text of the proclamation, see Document 322 above.)

shall bargain or offer it the hand of friendship. The Federation of Arab Republics adds new strength to the Arab revolution; it is a new stage which advances the Arab revolution from the stage of slogans and hopes to the stage of the fundamental realization of those slogans. The Federation of Arab Republics will be a force that protects Arab revolutionaries everywhere; it will be a force that fosters the Arab revolution and sets it ablaze. The Federation of Arab Republics will be a new center of gravity that will polarize the unionist forces of the Arab homeland.

## 379

### **Statement Issued by the Newly Elected National (Pan-Arab) Command of the Baath Party (Syria) Reporting on the Work of the Party's Eleventh National Congress (Excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

**Damascus, September 5, 1971**

#### *Arab policy*

Masses of our Arab people:

Having conducted a scientific and objective analysis of the present situation of the Arab homeland, the Conference expressed the view that backwardness and political fragmentation have always been the principal instrument used by colonialism to curb the Arab movement towards liberation and progress. It has always been and still is the political class framework which Arab reaction uses as a shield to defend its territorial positions and to perpetuate its exploitation.

The Arab nationalist movement, which is a movement of liberation, progress and unity, has achieved important gains and transformations on behalf of the masses within the regional framework. But it has proved impossible for these gains to attain their full dimensions at national level and to support the

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the (Syrian) Baath Party's National Command statement on the congress held in Damascus in late August, *al-Baath* (Damascus), September 6, 1971.

struggle for liberation and progress in the other Arab regions. The Arab revolution suffered a cruel setback after the aggression of June 1967, and withdrew to defensive positions in the face of the vicious imperialist-Zionist attack, in which the Zionist state was the spearhead, and which made it clearer than ever before that in establishing a state for the Zionists in Palestine, colonialism hoped to achieve the following aims:

1. That the Zionist state should be an obstacle to the Arab unionist struggle and a stumbling block in the way of the Arabs' yearning for unity; and that it should constitute a geographical barrier between the Arabs of the East in Asia and those of the West in Africa.

2. That it should be an armed base for colonialism and a stick to be brandished in the face of the Arab liberation movement and when necessary used to stem the Arab revolutionary tide by armed aggression.

3. That it should be the means by which colonialism perpetuates Arab backwardness because, on the one hand, the Zionist state is a basic obstacle to the achievement of Arab unity, and consequently consolidates backwardness, because of its organic relationship with fragmentation, and because, on the other hand, acting as it does like a cancer in the body of the Arab nation, the Zionist state leads to much of our nation's economic capacity being exhausted in its self-defense against the Zionist peril, thereby becoming a basic obstacle to its economic plans in the field of development. To sum up: Inasmuch as the aims of the Arab masses from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Arabian] Gulf can be summarized as unity, freedom and socialism, the Zionist state is the principal instrument in the hands of colonialism and imperialism for the perpetuation of fragmentation, domination, colonialism, exploitation and backwardness, and the Zionist peril to the Arab nation becomes increasingly grave whenever the Arab revolutionary tide flows more strongly and mass struggle to achieve the aims of the masses of the Arab nation gains impetus.

For all these reasons the Eleyenth National Congress stresses that the Palestine problem is still the pivot of Arab struggle and that the

attitude adopted by any regime or any political movement to this problem is the true criterion of its national and socialist commitment.

The Conference also stresses that the Palestine problem is the first and foremost Arab problem, and reaffirms the attitude of the Party, as expressed in the resolutions of its successive Conferences, of rejecting all proposals aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem. The Conference also declares that the Palestine revolution is the culmination of the struggle waged by the Arab masses, that qualitatively it transcends that struggle, and that through it the defeat that befell the honor of the Arab nation in June 1967 is being avenged. The Conference therefore demands that a practical formula be found for the realization of the slogan of the unity of combatants in the field of resistance. The Conference also declares its support and admiration for the efforts made by the Syrian Arab Region to protect the Resistance, and condemned the policy of the subservient Jordanian authorities which is aimed at the liquidation of the Palestine Resistance; it also calls on all nationalist forces in the Jordanian Arab Region to stick together and unite their ranks in a unified national progressive front. The Conference resolved that the principal objective on which the strategy of the unionist and socialist struggle must concentrate at this stage is the liberation of the occupied territory. The Conference therefore called for the enlistment of all the resources and energies of the Arab masses and for the mobilization of all human, military and economic efforts for the battle of liberation. The Conference expressed the opinion that it was essential to establish a broad Arab nationalist and progressive front to buttress the waging of this battle, and that the establishment of such a front in every Arab region is a national necessity imposed by the circumstances of the battle with colonialism, Zionism and reaction.

In the light of the above the Conference welcomed the serious action that is being taken by the Baath Party, and announced its support for the resolutions adopted in this connection by the Fifth Syrian Regional Conference and the measures currently being



taken to devise a formula for action in the form of a front. It also expressed the view that the establishment of such a front in the Syrian Arab Region will provide support to the struggle of the Arab masses in the other regions and be a model to be followed in the establishment of similar fronts in those regions.

#### *The Conference and International Problems*

International Zionism, because it is an organized racist and aggressive movement in alliance with world imperialism, and because of its economic forces and political influence, is a danger not only to Arab existence but also to the majority of the national and progressive interests of the peoples of the world, and the dangerous colonialist role it is performing in our Arab homeland, in the Third World and even in the socialist world through its political and economic sabotage, is a tangible fact that must be resisted, combated and eliminated.

#### *The Attitude to Imperialism*

Continued imperialist support of the Zionist presence in our homeland is the natural consequence of the alliance that exists between Zionism, which aims at expansion and at maintaining our backwardness, on the one hand, and world imperialism, in particular the United States of America, which is striving to maintain its economic and military domination of this important area of the world, on the other. Therefore the conflict between our people and their will for liberation and to build a unified Arab socialist society, on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other, is a fundamental conflict which requires greater struggle against imperialism and its supporters and against the Zionist presence in our homeland, so that this conflict may be resolved in favor of our masses as well as the world liberation movement.

380

### **Comments Criticizing the Role Played by the Palestine Resistance in Jordan and Reaffirming Jordanian Solidarity with Egypt, Made by King Hussein in a Speech Announcing the Establishment of the Jordanian National Union<sup>1</sup>**

Amman, September 7, 1971

Resistance generally arises where there is occupation. We have always believed that we should support this kind of resistance, and also support the right of our people to resist the occupier. But, most regrettably, what has happened is that the conflicts of the Arab world and of the whole world have found their way into our ranks here, and are changing this weapon into one which, instead of performing its duty in the occupied territory, has performed almost the same role here in our theater, by destroying our national unity, dissipating our strength, molesting our armed forces, impairing their morale and their opportunities to train and to raise themselves to the required level and adversely affecting our economy and our morale. We have been living in a maelstrom of destruction. We have tried to do the impossible—to put things right before it is too late, and to protect all that is most dear to every soul, to every man. But our moves, our appeals and our attempts have been interpreted as arising from weakness instead of, as is really the case, from our zeal that the advance may continue and that Arab blood may be shed only on the field of honor and self-respect. We have had much to put up with. Our coordination and cooperation with our brethren the United Arab Republic continued until they accepted the American initiative. This came as a complete surprise to us here; explaining it, the late President said that he had tried and desired to bear all the responsibility for this step himself. We said

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Hussein's speech to a committee of some 300 prominent Jordanians charged with preparing a draft charter for the proposed Jordanian National Union, *al-Dustur* (Amman), September 8, 1971.

to him: "We accept what you accept and reject what you reject, from our zeal for continued coordination and cooperation."

Our Palestinian people alone, with the whole of Palestine under occupation, cannot recover their rights from our usurping enemy. We and they together cannot do much more; our chances of achieving anything are limited. But along with our brethren in the United Arab Republic we may have a better chance, and along with our brethren in the whole of the Arab homeland we will certainly have much better chances. The question is that of the efforts made by this nation as against the efforts made by our enemy, and the means that are constantly being made available to him to build greater strength and to continue along the course he is following.

Following the disaster of 1967 none were closer than we were to our brethren in the United Arab Republic. There was widespread expression of malicious pleasure in the misfortunes of others. Together we were abandoned to our fate, there was slackness—but in the face of all this we always stood beside them, and spoke out on their behalf throughout the world and served one cause and one objective.

Many attempts were made to influence their attitude, attempts which were in conformity with the feelings even of many Egyptians, that they must follow their course alone. [There were] attempts to isolate Egypt from the Arab world; when we accepted the American initiative, we did so to prevent that happening.

It was a surprise because, in brief, from the time we accepted Security Council Resolution 242 there had been a great difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the resolution. We understand it in one way, and others understand it in another. We have been in constant contact with the United States, the great power that has so much influence in this area, asking it for its interpretation of the resolution it shared in drafting. We told [the Americans] that what concerned us was the essence, that we should know that we are in agreement with them on an interpretation satisfactory to us, so that we may

be able to take action. I can say that the picture is still not clear, and we have not received frank and unambiguous replies. This is why, when our brethren in the United Arab Republic took a step, it came as a surprise to us. But, as I have said, we chose to adopt the same attitude without hesitation, and to take the same steps.

Here the situation exploded and the battle was in fact a battle in coordination with our brethren in the United Arab Republic. It was their battle just as it was ours.

I regret to say that the Resistance was not in its right place in our towns and villages, our fields and forests; it was not in its right place behind the ranks of our armed forces; it was not in its right place among women, children and men; it should have been over there, in the occupied territory, which lives in our hearts and which we protect with our lives and with all our might.

In the period that has just passed, during the last year, in which we have healed the wounds and started to advance, I have constantly met our brethren and we have examined and discussed many things. The incidents and experiences disclosed many facts, the most important being the need to establish a public organization embracing all the sons and daughters of our people to organize the energies and resources of society and direct them towards clear and specific goals with an impetus that cannot be checked by obstacles or surprised by shortcomings and deficiencies. The Charter we are submitting to you and to all our fellow citizens is, in fact, the embodiment of the constructive ideas of all we have heard, of all we have believed in, all we have felt, all we have spoken of so continuously in all fields. It is not an organization, it not an organized party in the generally accepted political and social sense; it is a general framework for the organization of human beings and their lives in our beloved country. It is an immense melting pot in which all our various kinds of energies will fuse to create the Jordanian miracle which will open up to us the road to victory, and build a better and more noble future for our sons who

come after us. It will be the light that enters every house and every heart to illuminate for every one of us the way of sincere service and honorable action for Jordan, the Arabs and the cause.

. . . . .

### 381

#### **Statements Accusing the United States of Failing To Fulfill a Promise To Define Clearly American Policy on the Middle East Conflict, Included in a Speech by U.A.R. President Sadat<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, September 16, 1971**

. . . . .

We accepted the Rogers initiative and there was a ceasefire—once and then again and then a third time; we voluntarily refrained from firing. Then we declared that we were not committed to a ceasefire and to refraining from firing.

Rogers, the American Secretary of State, asked if he could visit us. I told him he was welcome, so he came and visited us. We had talks lasting two and a half hours. I asked him what he wanted us here in Egypt to do? He said that nothing at all is wanted of Egypt at present now that she has come forward with her initiative and after her recent move when she gave a positive answer to Jarring, and the constructive attitude she has adopted. All right, nothing is wanted of us. What about the initiative that I took, what about its background? Western Europe is suffering from the closure of the Suez Canal, and the price of oil has risen twice, once because of the diversion round the Cape of Good Hope when the Canal was closed, and the second time when [O.P.E.C.] took the decision to raise the price. All right, we are prepared to open the Suez Canal, but on condition that everything starts moving. What I mean is that Israel should carry out the first stage of withdrawal within the framework of a program for complete withdrawal—not a partial settlement, but

a first stage within the framework of complete withdrawal or within the framework of a complete program for complete withdrawal from Arab territory, and the settlement of the problem. I declared at that time the conditions of our initiative, namely that our forces must cross over to the eastern side of the Canal and that a ceasefire would be observed for a maximum of six months so that Jarring might be able to find a solution during that time, after which the second stage of withdrawal from the Arab territory occupied on June 5 [1967] to the international frontiers should take place. We made ourselves perfectly clear in all this, and when Rogers came here I frankly explained the situation to him and told him what our position was. Then Rogers went to Israel and after he had gone there he sent Sisco here. Sisco said that the Israelis were still reluctant and didn't want troops to cross [the Canal] and still wanted discussion and talks. I told him our final position was quite clear and that there could be no argument about it. Our forces must cross over to the east side of the Canal to perform their national duty and to protect the Canal and the cities on the Canal. The ceasefire must be for six months only. As for a permanent ceasefire, or an indefinite one, we should never accept it, as long as there was a single foreign soldier in our territory. I have fixed the length of the ceasefire—I fixed it at six months, and for a definite date. When we conclude the agreement the date will be fixed. If the settlement is not completed by that date, my forces that cross have the right to complete their task of purging Egyptian territory.

There is no discussion or argument to be had over our frontier—the international frontier. As for Sharm el-Sheikh, and the talk there is about it, and the dreams and the daydreams—all that talk—I told him we don't agree to so much as discussion and we won't relinquish a foot, not an inch of our territory or of Arab territory.

This is what I said to Rogers and Sisco. Then last July 6, about two months and ten days ago, the Head of the Middle East desk or the Director of the Egyptian section in the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 17, 1971.

American State Department came to me with a message from the American President and Mr. Rogers, the Secretary of State. He met me here. What was the message? The role of Rogers and Sisco, and the role of America had been what you might call the role of a postman until that date; one would come and sit with us and we would talk, then he would go to Israel and talk there and then come back to us and bring the answer, just like a postman. You will remember that at that time I said that I wanted America to define her attitude. I want to know what her attitude is. I'm not angry; I won't say I'm angry with America. I just want her to declare her attitude to the whole world and to the Arab nation in particular.

As I told you, on July 6, two months and ten days ago, the Director of the Egyptian section in the American State Department brought me a message from President Nixon and Rogers. The message said that the United States and the American President himself had decided to adopt a specific attitude to the problem. This was good news; this was what we had been saying to them for a long time—to tell us what their attitude was. They also said that all this postman business was finished, that they wouldn't go on with it. Now they were going to have a specific attitude, but before that they wanted certain explanations, they wanted to ask me for them. I said that was all right, [to] go ahead.

[They asked if we] agreed that America should play this role, should define its attitude. I said that is exactly what I have been asking for for a long time; I really want America to define her attitude. [They asked if] the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty had changed relations or had any effect—that means, of course, according to their way of thinking: Were we or were we not free to do as we choose? I said to them that the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty has changed nothing in our situation. The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty has formulated Egyptian-Soviet relations within a framework, the framework of the Treaty. But we are free to do as we choose—we always have been and we are now, and, God willing, we always shall be. Because this is our problem with the whole world, and with West-

ern colonialism in particular—we Egyptians insist on being free to do we choose. All right. They said that Sisco was going to Israel on July 26, and that after that he would either come back here or go back to the United States. In any case after Sisco returned to America she would define her attitude in a clearly phrased document and would declare her attitude quite clearly. I said [that was] excellent; we are ready and prepared and waiting to see.

As I said, this was on July 6 of this year, 1971, but from that date until September 16—two months and ten days—America has never contacted us at all, except when we insisted and asked what had happened with the Sisco business. Then they sent a memorandum saying that Sisco had gone to Israel and had three long meetings with Mrs. Meir and Allon and Dayan and Eban all together, and also had a separate meeting with Eban to discuss bilateral relations, and that Mr. Sisco had concentrated in his discussions on the following points:

1. The relationship between the phased settlement and the comprehensive settlement;
2. The question of Israel's using the Canal;
3. The nature of the ceasefire;
4. The question of the Egyptian presence east of the Canal;
5. The extent of the area from which Israel would withdraw;
6. The nature of the manner of supervision.

That was all. Sisco had these three meetings and discussed all this. But what is America's attitude? What does Israel say? What are America's views on a solution? What has happened to the American President's decision to stop doing the postman's job and to replace it with a specific attitude on the part of America?

Nothing was said about all this or, in other words, for two months and ten days relations and contacts between us and America have been at a complete standstill.

I said at the beginning of my speech that I had looked and found that at the present time a major process of misrepresentation and deceit was going on, before our people first of all before the Arab world and before the world. What is the reason? America is

spreading it about everywhere that there is constant contact between herself and Egypt, that there is ground for optimism, that a solution is on the way. Indeed America has gone further than that and said that Egypt has accepted a partial solution. America has said this even to the U.S.S.R. The American alternate delegate told the last meeting of the Big Four in effect to relax and keep quiet: "We have contacted Egypt, and Egypt goes along with us in the solution; we are in contact and the solution is on the way."

Very well, I hereby declare to our people as being the first and principal party to the cause, to the Arab nation as being party to the cause, and to the whole world, that contacts between us and America have been at a complete standstill for two months and ten days. There is no agreement, and America has not offered us anything definite. Our attitude is as I have said, and America's attitude is as I have said. Sisco went [to Israel] and chatted a bit about six points. These six points I regard as being a retreat from the position we reached with Rogers and Sisco when they visited Egypt, because when Rogers and Sisco visited Egypt we defined things for them as regards the first stage of withdrawal quite precisely, and now they are again talking about the chat that Sisco brought from Israel, about the list of ways in which the phased settlement relates to the total settlement. Our views on this are perfectly clear—and Rogers admits it and knows that we will not accept a phased settlement without a comprehensive settlement. The second point, Israel's use of the Canal, is rejected until Israel implements all its obligations under the Security Council resolution, and America knows this.

They also know the nature of the ceasefire for we have told them that we do not accept a permanent ceasefire. Indeed, even if they deny it in America I say here that the Americans said: "You are right. You cannot allow the ceasefire to go on indefinitely so long as there is a single foreign soldier in your territory." Rogers and Sisco may deny it today, but that is what happened. Even today they are repeating these words.

As for the question of Egyptian presence

east of the Canal, I made our attitude to this clear to them, and they know that there can be no discussion of it. The east of the Canal is not Israeli, it is Egyptian territory and cannot be discussed with Israel; an Egyptian presence east of the Canal is our right.

The extent of the area of withdrawal, the nature of the means of supervision—to all that chatter of Sisco's we say quite simply that America has not given up the role of postman just because, as they said, they were going to define their attitude. No, she hasn't even played the postman, she has relinquished the role of postman and now there is nothing but chatter. Sisco went to Israel and [back] to America and would not reply to us for two months and ten days. That is why I declare to our people, to the Arab nation and to the whole world, and to the United Nations that is meeting in a few days, that America has again resorted to deceit and misrepresentation. There have been no contacts between us and America for two months and ten days; there have been no agreements between us and America.

America hasn't given us any paper defining her attitude. What is the need for the talk that America is filling the world with, to the effect that America is making contacts, or the statement by the alternate delegate to the meetings of the Big Four to the effect that all is finished and Egypt has reached agreement, or is about to do so, and their statement to the U.S.S.R. that Egypt has accepted a partial solution. All this is absolutely untrue. It is deliberate deceit and misrepresentation on behalf of Israel. They want 1971 to pass. They also want 1972, the year of the elections, to pass so we may enter on another decade—so that the day may come when the matter will have become a *fait accompli* and when we keep quiet or accept Israel's terms. As I declare this today, I add that they were asking for "quiet diplomacy" and said that there was no need for us to say anything or to declare anything. We said, "All right, we won't," and said nothing. I told them we wouldn't say or declare anything, but that we were putting our house in order at home. But today, in the face of the campaign of deceit and misrepresentation launched by America

throughout the world, I must tell the truth to our people, to the Arab nation, to the world and to the Big Four, and to the United Nations, which is to meet in a few days. The Big Four must face up to their responsibilities; the Security Council must face up to its responsibilities; the Secretary-General of the United Nations must face up to his responsibilities.

I want the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit a report to the Security Council on Israel's attitude and our attitude. It is about time he did; the United Nations is going to meet. Today I want Jarring to submit a report to the Security Council and the Secretary-General on Israel's attitude and ours.

I want the Security Council at some stage to meet at Foreign Minister level, so that we may know people's definite attitudes, so that everyone may define his attitude, so that America may come and state her attitude before the Security Council at Foreign Minister level.

We have waited a long time, and our intentions have been perfectly good, and we still have perfectly good intentions, but everything has limits.

I have given instructions to the Foreign Minister that we should go to the United Nations and explain all this frankly to the international community so that it may face up to its responsibilities.

### 382

**Cable Message from the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Calling on U.N. Secretary-General U Thant To Take Action To Halt the Excesses of Israeli Occupation in the Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>**

**September 17, 1971**

The people of the Gaza Strip have suffered from years of continuous curfew, the killing

<sup>1</sup> Text of the P.L.O. telegram to the Secretary-General as transmitted by Egyptian Permanent Representative Zayyat; U.N. Document A/8395 and S/10328.

and maiming of scores of young men and women under detention, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial, the taking of women and children as political hostages and the systematic banishment of communal leaders. The latest measure in this policy of terror and colonization has been the callous bulldozing of thousands of homes and the forcible eviction of over 15,000 of their inhabitants in conditions of indescribable cruelty. We protest in the strongest terms these blatant violations of the basic precepts of human decency and civilized behaviour justified by the Israeli authorities on the false pretext of security and so-called town planning, and urgently request Your Excellency:

1. That Israel cease all forcible population transfer and return immediately those people already made homeless.

2. That the Israeli occupation authorities stop immediately the killing and maiming of innocent people by their trigger-happy armed forces.

3. That the United Nations dispatch an investigating committee to look into assault upon the lives, rights, and property of the people of Gaza.

4. That Israel be ordered by the United Nations to cease immediately her calculated policy of terror and oppression on pain of sanctions and expulsion from the United Nations.

### 383

**Statement Issued by the Third Conference of the Organization of Arab Cities, Condemning Measures Taken by Israel To Change the Status of Jerusalem<sup>2</sup>**

**Tunis, September 22, 1971**

The Organization of Arab Cities, at its

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the letter, sent to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and the Security Council on the occasion of the Security Council debate on the Jordanian government's complaint on the Judaization of Jerusalem, *al-Amal* (Tunis), September 23, 1971.

third conference held in Tunis, strongly condemns the wanton administrative and legislative measures of usurpation which the Israeli occupation authorities are continuing to take to change the character of Jerusalem. These measures include excavations around the Haram al-Sharif, the destruction and confiscation of real estate, the expropriation of Arab lands and the eviction from them of their Arab inhabitants, and the erection of housing, industrial, tourist and student establishments with the object of increasing the Jewish population for political objectives, the violation of Islamic and Christian holy places, aggressions against cultural features, and violation of human rights, all of which infringe the United Nations Charter and all the international laws which insist that occupation forces should refrain from changing the character of the areas they occupy.

The General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and UNESCO, have all condemned Israeli measures, actions and violations in Jerusalem, but the Israeli occupation authorities have disregarded all these resolutions and are continuing with their plan for the Judaization of Jerusalem, thereby not only threatening peace in the Middle East but undermining the cause of peace throughout the world.

The Conference of the Organization of Arab Cities calls on the United Nations, the Security Council and UNESCO, which were created to protect peace and the rights of peoples and to ensure the observance of international pacts and resolutions, to take decisive measures to check Israel's improper action in changing the character of Jerusalem and to put a stop to the measures for Judaization and the eviction of the Arab inhabitants from their homes in the city.

## 384

**Danish Television Interview Statements by King Hussein of Jordan, Admitting the Possibility of Jordan's Concluding a Separate Peace with Israel and Stating His Willingness To Allow the People of the West Bank Self-Determination After Liberation from Israeli Occupation<sup>1</sup>**

**Late September, 1971**

*Q. What are the peace terms of Jordan with Israel?*

A. ...Security Council Resolution 242, all the principles it contains, which we accepted, and more recently the American [initiative].

*Q. But are you willing to make a separate peace with Israel?*

A. The point is: what is Israel prepared to

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English transcript dated September 26 of Hussein's Danish TV interview conducted by Ole Sippel as provided, on request, by *Danmarks Radio*; (transcript was edited in the interest of coherence).

The bulk of the remainder of the lengthy interview is not published here; the main topic covered was the Jordan Civil War of September 1970 and subsequent Jordan government relations with the Palestine Resistance. Comments by King Hussein on this topic are included in this volume in Documents 364, 370 and 380 above.

Israel Home Service in Hebrew reported on September 25 that Hussein had said that "he does not rule out a separate peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967 U.N. Security Council resolution" (see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3798/A/10). Subsequently, an "authoritative spokesman at the Hashemite Royal Court" made the following statement: "There has been some distortion of the statement made by His Majesty to the said correspondent. The King answered a question on this subject by saying: Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt have accepted UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 and the US initiative. For its part, Jordan is still prepared to implement Security Council Resolution No. 242 because the US initiative and the basis for the resolution are the only things which, when implemented, can lead to permanent and just peace in the area." (Relevant paragraph excerpted from statement broadcast on Amman Radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3798/A/11.)

give us for peace? Or . . . anyone else, for that matter?

And that is where the problem lies. . . . You can say: Why don't you make moves? We've accepted [Resolution] 242; we've accepted the American [initiative]. We've accepted all the principles they contained. These are the only foundations for a just and durable peace. If Israel doesn't accept them, then what kind of solution could be found?

*Q. No, but if Israel tomorrow offered a separate peace with Jordan, would you start indirect negotiations with Israel on this basis?*

A. On the basis of 242 and the American. . .

*Q. Yes. . . .*

A. . . .initiative? Well, if that was the case I'm sure that we wouldn't lack the courage to do whatever is necessary to save our people and our land. And we would approach it openly and probably present it to the Arab world, present it to our people and probably move.

*Q. But, Your Majesty, isn't this a bit of [a] change in Jordanian policy? Because I think before you have said you won't make peace without the Egyptians making peace as well.*

A. Well, I believe that the main concentration of effort in any event now is on the Egyptian side. . . . [passage unclear]. We obviously believe that on our own we won't get very much. [Passage unclear.] And so, collectively as a whole, we might have better chances of establishing a just and durable peace.

This has always been our feeling and our belief.

*Q. Speaking about an eventual political solution, how do you see a solution for the Palestinians?*

A. Obviously, the solution is the liberation of the occupied territories—occupied in June of '67, and action to resolve the problem of the refugees in terms of U.N. resolutions to that effect. And after that, what they choose—but after that time. We are fighting their cause—they're our people. And in particular, I'm speaking, obviously, of the West Bank of [the] Jordan.

*Q. You say "choose." Choose between what?*

A. Well, whichever way they wish. We believe that we still are one family and one people, and we will remain so. There may be some ideas that could be developed in terms of our way of life in the future, in terms of our relationship. But obviously, all this is premature until such time as we recover their rights for them, and are reunited.

*Q. Do you think in the terms of a general vote [i.e. referendum] for either going back under the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or setting up their own independent state?*

A. After the liberation, I have said in the past, that we are willing to give them their choice: whether we remain as one—and I believe this is the basic objective of all Arabs, whether we have some form of union which would preserve their identity in the area west of the river and ours here in the East Bank in terms of our people, or whether we'd return to something similar to what existed up to June of '67, but with many improvements. This is what we would have to decide after the liberation and after a solution is reached.

*Q. But how do you look upon present endeavors in the West Bank among the leaders there to set up a political body? I think . . . an Executive is planned; and this Executive Committee should lead to some form of a parliament as far I understand.*

A. I think this is a product of despair, probably. Occupation has lasted too long. The situation there [cannot remain?] as it is. There have been many serious attempts to try to break up the unity of our people.

However, if the solution were forthcoming, I'm sure that there [would] be a lessening of these activities to a very, very large extent. This is my feeling.

. . . . .



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**Statements Emphasizing the Necessity of Commitment to the Palestine Cause by All Arabs, Included in a Speech by Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, Delivered at the Opening of the Country's National Consultative Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

Abu Dhabi, October 3, 1971

I herewith salute in your name our heroic brothers stationed on the front line in confrontation of the Israeli enemy on all Arab fronts, defending our nation and sacrificing themselves for its honor and glory and affirming Arab rights. For the cause of Palestine is a sacred Arab cause which lays on all Arabs the responsibility for making sacrifices on behalf of the recovery of the usurped territory.

Brothers, Members of the National Consultative Assembly:

Our Arab nation is today passing through a historic and decisive stage in which it requires pure hearts, self-denial and the placing of higher Arab interests above every other consideration. This is doubtless the goal of my brother Arab leaders, which will ensure us a broad Arab front capable of confronting, repelling and defeating every aggression when the time comes.

Brothers:

I believe that it is important that there should be continuous and direct Arab meetings to ensure such constant and uninterrupted dialogue as will enable us to study the problems and attitudes that confront us, so that we may unanimously adopt attitudes that are effective and influential at world level, and are capable of presenting the truth we advocate for the achievement of peace based on justice and the restoration of legitimate rights to their legitimate owners.

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**Magazine Interview with Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh) Leader Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) Commenting on the Effects on the Resistance of Opposition on the Part of Arab Governments and of Ideological Differences Within the Movement<sup>2</sup>**

Mid-October, 1971

*Q. What lessons has the Resistance learned from the September [1970] civil war and the subsequent slide towards defeat in Jordan?*

A. We were not seeking a trial of strength with the Jordanian regime. I understand the term on the theoretical level as well as in its ordinary sense. I believe that coexistence with the Jordanian regime is impossible, but I know that the Resistance did not consider as decisive either attempts to achieve coexistence or an attack on the regime. A firm position one way or the other would have been more worthwhile for us. Instead, there was no clearly defined political line. We were indecisive and this fostered the chronic divisions within the movement.

On the one hand there was a tendency to act very aggressively without the means to do so and on the other a powerful tendency which never managed to make use of its power. I am not talking about [differences among] the Resistance organizations but rather of the tendencies which, in varying degrees, have existed within most of the organizations. We were obsessed by tactical problems; if we had had a strategy, however, then our choice of tactics would have been easy. Instead, tactics took the place of strategy. Thus we were challenging Hussein's power without really trying to take it from him. On the other hand, however, the Jordanian regime proved to be very determined. They had a strategy and they won the first round which began in September [1970] and ended last July in the forests of Ajloun and Jerash. I don't think that we have yet profited from this lesson.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Shaikh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nahayyan's speech, *Abu Dhabi on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shaikh's Accession* (Abu Dhabi: Documentation and Study Center of the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, n.d.) p. 152.

<sup>2</sup> Translated from the French text of Khalaf's interview, conducted by Abdullah Schleifer, *Jeune Afrique*, No. 563 (October 19, 1971), pp. 24-26.

Otherwise, we would not have taken part in the attempts at mediation at Jedda.

Of course it can be argued that there was no objection to our going to Jedda, this meeting being just a form of political struggle in our relations with the Arab regimes which allowed us to gain time—a breathing space to prepare ourselves. But the question of our coexisting with the Jordanian regime can no longer be raised. We cannot; and we must evince the same spirit of decision as the Jordanian regime.

I am aware of the outside pressures from the Arab regimes which forced us to negotiate despite the opposition of an overwhelming majority within the Resistance and among the groupings of Fateh, but these negotiations were at best no more than an insignificant maneuver which won't do us any good. The congress of Fateh gave the movement's leadership a free hand to act within the framework of the congress' general opposition to coexistence. I am not sure we can compare the Jedda talks with the Rogers talks which have lasted more than a year and which have brought about division among the Arab regimes. It has been suggested though that the Jedda meeting was organized for the purpose of dividing the guerilla groups.

*Q. Who speaks for Fateh? Who is its head?*

A. Fateh has always been based on a collective leadership, but at times there have been individual efforts or initiatives. When the movement came out in the open after the June War of 1967, we chose an official spokesman; but there is no specific leader. . . . There is only the collective leadership. Yasser Arafat is a member like the others of this collective leadership with one vote like the other members.

*Q. Why has the Resistance not been able to get a general strategy underway?*

A. There are three basic reasons.

During the first Palestinian operations, elements more dedicated to certain Arab regimes than to the revolution were able to infiltrate and they have acted in this manner from within the Resistance. For example, Saika and the Arab Liberation Front are

much more interested in (and in fact are a part of) the general strategy of Syria and Iraq respectively than in the strategic necessities of the Resistance. And while Fateh has always represented the major independent force within the Palestine Resistance, our movement was greatly concerned with the geography of the region and didn't wish to come into conflict with Syria or Iraq.

Certain groups involved overbid their hands. The Popular Front and the Popular Democratic Front launched slogans which the present state of the struggle did not justify. The Palestinian masses were confused. Were we involved in a class struggle or in a national struggle?

Fateh held the belief that it was a struggle for national liberation and that those who called it a class struggle lacked realism, particularly in Jordan where this choice meant that the emphasis had to be put on strikes and class conflict in a tribal society and in a country with barely three factories in all its territory. Jordan, an important base for the Resistance, was not at the stage for class struggle.

The third major problem became apparent when Fateh, as a leading group, launched the slogan of "non-interference" in Arab politics and at the same time interfered without interfering. A paradox, a contradiction? No, because, from the military point of view, Fateh was convinced that the Resistance needed a belt of staging zones or bases for retreat encircling Israel, which meant the presence of armed forces in the territories bordering Israel, forces which would be independent of the authority of the governments of these territories. To protect these bases, we needed the popular support of the masses which would prevent the governments from attacking us. So, seeking such support and making use of it, that was interference. The struggle which Fateh waged in Lebanon (October 1969) is an example. The failure of Fateh to explain the full significance of its slogan of "non-interference" contributed to the creation of this problem.

*Q. But I can't imagine on what basis other than*

*that of social struggle you could have hoped to rally the villagers and Bedouins of eastern Jordan. . . . Certainly not in talking to them about the return to Haifa or Jaffa. If your struggle were a national struggle for the Palestinians, what did they have to do with it?*

A. I was talking about the Palestinians in Jordan. As Palestinians, we know that our movement is part of a movement for Arab liberation and we think that the social or class struggle is a part of that movement. But class struggle in Jordan should have been initiated by East Bankers, by a Jordanian national front. We wished for close ties with such a front and we would have helped it. But our specific watchwords were the national liberation of Palestine.

Unfortunately other Resistance groups opposed the creation of such a front because they themselves wanted to play this role and because the initial impetus of the Resistance and the popularity of the commandos during the first years following the 1967 war acted like a magnet drawing to the Resistance just those elements which could have organized and fought within a Jordanian national front.

The situation in Jordan mustn't be forgotten either. It isn't only the Jordanian regime which depends on its army. If you add to the regular forces of the royal army (75,000 men) the civilian employees, the security and espionage services and the social services, you have more than 100,000 people, East Bankers for the most part, in the service of the royal army. This means that the great majority of East Bank villagers and all the Bedouins live thanks to the royal army.

We had the support of the East Bank villagers up to and into the civil war of September 1970. But when 15 boys of a village who served in the royal army were killed during that civil war and their bodies were secretly mutilated by the Jordanian secret service before being returned to the village for burial, then those villagers turned against the Resistance.

*Q. Strategy in itself expresses a state of mind or an ideology. There are three major ideological currents which have animated the organizations or the individual militants of the Resistance: nation-*

*alism, Marxism and Islam. Why has the Resistance proved incapable of integrating these currents?*

A. Fateh has succeeded in doing so. These three tendencies have existed within it. But the Arab governments and the leftists of the Resistance wouldn't leave Fateh alone. Within Fateh the principal current is nationalist, but the nationalists have neither complexes about nor hostility toward the other currents, and I still maintain that Fateh is very close to the Algerian experience as well as to the Vietnam experience.

*Q. These currents may exist in Fateh, but during the Algerian revolution they were consciously integrated; there was a platform rather than an ideological vacuum.*

A. In Algeria you had one front. We ourselves were a movement of individuals coming from different backgrounds. Even so, the main problem was outside Fateh. We tried through the P.L.O. to regroup all the other organizations, but this experiment has not yet succeeded, and I believe that the experience of the P.L.O. must be deepened in order to be able effectively to unite within itself the P.F.L.P. and the P.D.F.L.P. You must also remember that when we joined the P.L.O. (at the end of 1968), it was for us only a matter of avoiding a danger. We were afraid that certain Arab governments would make use of the P.L.O. against us. So we joined the P.L.O., not because we had faith in the organization but rather to neutralize it. We planned to stay in it only temporarily. Fateh has also tried to create its own public services rivaling those of the P.L.O. and the result was what you have on other occasions called the bureaucratization of Fateh and the Resistance. There were two of everything: offices, social projects and even conventional military units. Now, we are trying, despite all the difficulties, to integrate and to work only, so far as the public is concerned, within the P.L.O.

Once I earnestly begged Nayef Hawatma to join Fateh. He could have done much more effective work from inside Fateh than with his Popular Democratic Front. Yes, the Chinese have understood this. They aid Fateh as the organized expression of the masses rather than the self-styled Marxist groups; but there

were secret and far-reaching ideological discussions between us and the other groups, which in the past were frustrated for complex reasons, but which lost all meaning when the situation of the whole of the Resistance became critical.

*Q. Does it seem true to you that politics in the area have been marked by a swing to the right since the Rogers mission in June [1970]?<sup>2</sup>*

A. Yes, the rightist tendency is certainly there. And we have unceasingly warned the progressive movements of the region that every blow dealt to the Palestine Resistance would be the prelude to the liquidation of the left. But this rightist orientation is a defeatist tendency: it can't last. The history of the Palestinian struggle in particular shows that after each setback, the struggle resumes with yet more vigor and on a higher plane.

We are at the edge of a cliff. Until now, the masses have not reacted because they have accepted all the official expressions of willingness to reach a compromise with Israel that they have heard from the Arab leaders as being tactical. What Israel is asking is far too difficult to accept, even for the most reactionary regimes. But if these regimes attempt to impose peace in the area by force, a popular revolt will break out.

I am convinced that this region is pregnant with new revolutionary possibilities. The beginning of the change will be marked by still more attacks on the Arab liberation movement and the Palestine Resistance. But this time, we expect attacks from the most unexpected of directions and places. The attack is indispensable to the attempt to impose a peaceful solution by force since, in effect, only the liquidation of the Resistance could demoralize the Arab masses to the point where they would, in despair of the cause, accept a settlement with Israel.

We must overcome past errors due to the absence of a plan of action; we must recover from the blows we have been dealt. The enemies of the Palestine revolution are like the links of a chain which begins with American imperialism, leads to the Arab regimes attached to it and finally to Israel

itself. These links form a front and if we mean to succeed, we must maintain contact with all the forces both within and outside the Arab world which stand against this counter-revolutionary front.

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**Statements on the Necessity for Unified Arab Military Action in the Face of Israeli Intransigence, Contained in a Speech from the Throne by Shaikh Sabah, Amir of Kuwait<sup>1</sup>**

**Kuwait, October 26, 1971**

Although events have proved the inefficacy of the resolutions adopted from time to time by the General Assembly and the Security Council in condemning Israel and denouncing her attitude to various aspects of the so-called Middle East problem, the Security Council has again discussed the matter of Jerusalem, and last month adopted a new Resolution reaffirming the contents of its previous resolutions. As usual, Israel immediately rejected this resolution both as a whole and in detail. Kuwait, through its Foreign Minister, declared at the General Assembly that the United Nations had gone beyond the stage of adopting resolutions of condemnation and denunciation and that since the aggressor state would continue in its defiance as long as it enjoys material, political and military support from certain great powers, in particular the United States of America, it was now incumbent on [the U.N.] to resort to the imposition of sanctions on Israel to make her implement these resolutions. In his latest report the Secretary-General warned that if Israel continues to maintain this attitude there will be another round of fierce fighting in the area, graver and more ferocious than the previous

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Amir's message, as read by Prime Minister Shaikh Jaber Ahmad Jaber al-Sabah at the opening of the Second Session of the Third Legislative Season of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, *al-Ray al-Ahmm* (Kuwait), October 27, 1971.

rounds. The truth is that after the Arab efforts that have been expended, and in spite of recent proposals and maneuvers, there can no longer be any doubt that the Israeli enemy is procrastinating and will only submit to the logic of force. We therefore believe that the only way to ensure the realization of the goals of our nation as regards the recovery of the usurped territory and the restoration to the people of Palestine of their legitimate rights, is for the Arab countries, and in particular the confrontation countries, to complete their military preparations, with full coordination among them, in disregard of all differences liable to impede such coordination. It is on this basis that Kuwait has approved the plan of Arab action, outlined in the recommendations of the Political Committee of the Arab League last September, for the coordination of Arab efforts and energies. And we hope that these recommendations may be seriously implemented.

Kuwait has followed with concern and regret the renewal of clashes in Jordan throughout the month of July of this year between the Jordanian army and the Palestine Resistance movement, and the results of those clashes, the most important of which was that the Palestine Resistance was paralyzed and prevented from performing its duty in the desired manner. We have declared and we still affirm that the Cairo and Amman Agreements which were signed last year to prevent the further shedding of Arab blood constitute a basic safeguard of stability in Jordan and that it is the duty of both parties concerned to take action to implement them honestly and sincerely. We still hope for the success of joint Saudi-Egyptian mediation between the two parties, believing as we do that it is essential that armed struggle should continue and be supported by all Arab quarters so that it may be possible to direct all Arab efforts and energies to the service of the battle of destiny that is to be forced on us and to stand up to all the challenges that confront our nation.

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**Statement by Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Chairman Arafat (Abu Ammar), Reporting on His Visits to the G.D.R. and the U.S.S.R.<sup>1</sup>**

**Beirut, Early November, 1971**

The visit paid by the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the U.S.S.R. and East Germany achieved important results which can be summed up as follows:

1. The visits to the two countries were made within the framework of a broad plan to establish extensive relations at the international level, especially with the socialist countries.

2. The Soviets displayed full understanding of the point of view of the Palestine revolution and there was identity of viewpoints in particular as regards the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their land. They declared their solidarity with the intrepid and just struggle in which the Palestinian Arab people are engaged against the occupiers, whatever form this struggle takes.

3. Full aid and support on the part of the U.S.S.R. and East Germany for the revolution at all levels, political, military and informational, [can be expected].

4. The visit confirmed that the Palestinian people, thanks to their struggle and their martyrs, have become a force that cannot be disregarded in the international sphere and at the level of the Middle East problem.

5. The visit provided confirmation of the international sympathy enjoyed by the Palestine revolution and of its capacity for rapid and extensive movement to establish relations aimed at securing support for the revolution and the protection of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Arafat's statement, *Hisad al-Asifa* (Beirut), No. 47 (November 4, 1971).

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**Radio Interview Statements Made by  
Palestine National Liberation Movement  
(Fateh) Leader Qaddoumi (Abu Lutf),  
Reporting on the Visit of a Palestinian  
Delegation to the U.S.S.R.<sup>1</sup>**

November 11, 1971

*Q. Have you observed, brother Abu Lutf, that there is a perceptible change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards the Palestine revolution and the people of Palestine?*

*A.* I would not say a change, but a development for the better—that is to say that relations in their present form have started to become better and better; indeed, they have grown stronger. Here I must say that the improvement and escalation of these relations at all levels—political and military—is one of the most urgent requirements of the Arab cause and its relations with the world progressive and socialist camp. For we as a Palestinian revolution are part of the world liberation movement and our interests are part of its interests. Thus both from our point of view and that of the forces of liberation throughout the world it is essential that we should enhance our links with it, so that we may be able to eliminate all the bases of colonialism and imperialism in the world. There can be no doubt that increased understanding and development has come about in the U.S.S.R. as a result of popular mobilization there, where the Zionist movement has been condemned from the start and where Israel, with all its aggressive trends and policies, is also now condemned. The U.S.S.R. therefore felt that there must be a firm alliance with the forces that are hostile to those imperialist trends. That is why the U.S.S.R. has begun to strengthen its relations with all the progressive forces in the area and first and foremost, with the Palestine revolution.

*Q. As regards the most important political subjects discussed during your visit, we should like to know something about these matters: in particular, was there renewed discussion of the revolution's attitude to Security Council Resolution [242] during your talks?*

*A.* Certainly the revolution put forward a number of issues on which it sought greater understanding on the part of the U.S.S.R., while the U.S.S.R. also put forward various matters on which it sought further clarification as regards the attitude of the Palestine revolution. The Twenty-fourth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted a clear and unambiguous resolution of support for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. This, in our view, required clarification; we succeeded in obtaining such clarification from the U.S.S.R., and it was extremely satisfactory. This is one point; there are also other points. Certainly the U.S.S.R. accepts the Security Council resolution. Meanwhile it also realizes that the Palestine revolution rejects this resolution, because it is not even remotely connected with the vital interests of the Palestinian people, it doesn't fulfill even the minimum of these vital interests. Thus, the U.S.S.R. realized that we reject this resolution and wanted to know whether there was any change in this attitude. Certainly there has been no change in our attitude. However, we say that we consider that allies do not necessarily agree on all issues under discussion. Meanwhile we know that we are in agreement with allies and friends when it comes to general strategy. We also know that some Arab countries have approved the proposal. However, we again explained our attitude to this resolution. The basic issue that we discussed in detail and in which both sides were very much interested was, as I said, the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, their right to self-determination and the necessity for them to return to the whole of Palestinian territory. These were the political problems we concentrated on, and there was a perceptible response on the part of our friends as far as these problems were concerned. As for the problems of material and military aid, I can tell you that I am very optimistic

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic transcript of Qaddoumi's *Saut al-Asifa* interview, *Fateh* (Damascus), No. 312 (November 17, 1971), p. 16.

that the U.S.S.R. is ready to stand beside the Palestine revolution at all levels and to cooperate and coordinate action with us as regards all problems that concern the Palestinian and the need for him to obtain his legitimate rights and his right to self-determination. Among the political issues we discussed was our attitude to the coming battle. We felt that there was a perceptible trend towards realizing the necessity for action by all basic means, and this, in our view, is part of the remarkable attitude we observed on the part of the U.S.S.R. Arab strength and the unity of Arab strength are a basic factor in winning the battle, and the U.S.S.R. is anxious to avoid an inter-Arab conflict of whatever kind. That is why the U.S.S.R. appreciates our escalation of armed action in the interior, and realizes how necessary it is for us to avoid any kind of inter-Arab conflict. It also appreciates the role we are playing in unifying Arab forces to strike at the imperialist scheme.

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#### **Statement Criticizing the U.S. As Having Impeded Progress Towards a Middle East Settlement and Reiterating Egyptian Insistence on Israeli Withdrawal and on Recognition of the Rights of the Palestinians, Made by President Sadat of Egypt in a Speech to the Popular Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, November 11, 1971**

Although we were extremely vexed at some of the things the United States has tried to do, we chose to watch and wait so as to get the complete results as incriminating evidence for all the moves.

The United States of America set aside the Security Council resolution. We waited.

Then the United States bypassed the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his special envoy to the area. We waited.

Then the United States ignored the role of the Big Four and their responsibility for implementing the Security Council resolution. We waited.

The United States then confined its efforts to an initiative to start the first stage of withdrawal in return for the reopening of the Suez Canal, and once again we waited and watched with the greatest patience and the greatest caution.

The American Secretary of State, William Rogers, came to Cairo and I explained to him my initiative in detail and directly, in a way that left no room for speculation, as follows:

1. I proposed a first stage of withdrawal in implementation of the Security Council resolution in return for the reopening of the Suez Canal to world shipping.

2. The first step that I proposed must be clearly linked to a comprehensive solution in accordance with the Security Council resolution.

3. For us, withdrawal means withdrawal not only from Egyptian territory but withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

4. Egyptian forces must cross over to the East Bank of the Suez Canal to assert Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory.

5. In conformity with the provisions of this initiative the ceasefire must be limited to no more than six months, as anything else means accepting a permanent ceasefire or, to be more precise, accepting new armistice lines in the middle of Sinai.

I explained all this frankly to the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, when he was in Cairo.

Then the American Secretary of State went to Israel, and two days later he sent me his assistant with the observations of the other side, and I repeated to him the basic principles of our attitude.

I should like to add in your presence that when he met me, the American Secretary of State said to me verbatim: "I have nothing to ask of you; all I have to ask is of the other side."

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's speech opening the new Popular Assembly, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 12, 1971.

After that we did not hear from the United States for a long time, until an official message came to me from President Nixon and from his Secretary of State, William Rogers, asking me if my attitude had changed after the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty. My reply was that Egyptian policy is laid down in Cairo and nowhere else, and that my position, based on the principles I had declared and explained, had not changed.

Contact was then interrupted again for more than sixty days, but we were following what was going on.

At one moment it seemed that the United States was trying to put pressure on Israel, but immediately afterwards it transpired that it was Israel that was putting pressure on the United States.

The American pressure on Israel was insignificant, but the Israeli pressure on America was immense. Some of the attitudes were really unbelievable! Israel, the small protégé of the great power, the United States, had reversed the roles.

It was as if Israel was the great power and America the small protégé living as a burden on her and at her expense.

This was something unbelievable, for how could a great power allow itself to be treated in this way by a small party depending on it for everything, from a loaf of bread to a Phantom plane?

But in fact the question is more complicated than that.

Zionist pressure on the United States is not the whole of the matter. In addition to this there is the fact that the United States considers Israel as its tool for achieving what it sees as its own interests in the area.

The United States regards Israel as the greatest means of coercion and intimidation to check inevitable development in Arab territory.

This is the fundamental source of Israel's strength vis-à-vis the United States, in addition, of course, to potential Zionist pressure.

We believe that the United States has three objectives in the area.

—The first is to get the U.S.S.R. out of the area. We find in the U.S.S.R. a friend in both war and peace.

—The second is to isolate Egypt from the Arab nation. But in terms of history and destiny we cannot accept this, because Egypt is part of the Arab nation as regards both its destiny and its future.

—The third is to destroy the socialist experiment in Egypt. But we believe in our path to development and are resolved to follow it to the very end.

Brother and Members of the Popular Assembly:

The attitude of the United States is now clear, and we believe that, in view of this, one of the most essential things for us is to determine our attitude decisively and firmly.

The United States is now trying to exploit our initiative and turn it into something that has nothing whatever to do with what we intended by it.

The United States is talking now about an agreement about the Suez Canal. We are not prepared to talk about an agreement on the Suez Canal.

The Suez Canal is not the problem; the problem is the territory occupied since June 5 and the lost rights of the people of Palestine.

Our attitude now has been decisively determined.

1. The whole world now knows what we want and what the others want. We want peace and the others want expansion. That is to say, we want a solution and the others want war, because that is the sole consequence of expansionist pretensions.

2. We are not prepared to downgrade the solution we want to the level of an agreement on the Suez Canal. What we are talking about is a comprehensive solution in accordance with the Security Council resolution and what it implies with respect to two principles:

- a. full withdrawal;
- b. the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

3. That is why our acceptance of the Security Council resolution still stands, and why the initiative we announced here on February 4 also still stands, in the sense in which I proposed it, but not in any other.

4. In order to guarantee this and so that there may be no ambiguity, there is now an



indispensable condition before any other step is taken. This condition is that Israel should give an affirmative answer to what Ambassador Jarring asked of her on February 8, 1971.

This is what is required before anything else. Without this affirmative answer from Israel there can be no discussion or debate.

5. We are fully prepared to bear the responsibility for and the consequences of any attitude we adopt, and we believe that our prime, supreme, sole duty in these circumstances is to liberate our Arab territories that are now under Israeli occupation whatever the difficulties and sacrifices involved.

We shall not allow the United States to distort and undermine the truth any longer. We shall not allow the United States to dissociate itself from or evade its responsibilities.

We regard the United States as being the prime factor responsible for Israel.

The flood of money that pours into an Israeli economy which is strained beyond endurance all comes from the United States.

All the arms in Israel's hands now come from the United States.

The Phantoms that raided our towns, factories and schools were not only of American manufacture; they were a gift from America to Israel.

The Skyhawks which constitute the largest numbers in the Israeli air force are not only of American manufacture; they were a gift from America to Israel.

The long-range guns and sophisticated missiles, from Hawks to Shrikes, are not only of American manufacture; they were a gift from America to Israel.

Israel would not have been able to make any military move but for aid from the United States of America. Nor would she have been able to make any political move in the form of maneuvers, deceit, lying and defying the United Nations and public opinion throughout the world without American collusion, be it through actual plotting or by simply remaining silent.

For our part, in view of future prospects, we warn that we shall not yield to any pressure, nor shall we waver in the face of any danger.

Nor shall we be afraid to defy any danger. We shall accept all losses, but we shall inflict on our enemy losses which are greater than he imagines and more serious than he thinks in his arrogance and conceit.

Similarly the United States will have to bear the burden of the crimes it is committing or the crimes that others commit with American arms.

We say this clearly, so that the whole world may know and be fully aware.

I have already stated and I now repeat in your presence today that 1971 must be a decisive year because we cannot remain forever suspended in this state of no peace and no war.

We must take our decision at the right time, in appropriate circumstances and in the proper manner.

Brothers and fellow citizens, Members of the Popular Assembly:

I do not want to go into details of what decisions we shall make, but I pray God, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser, that He may so inspire us that we may make our decision not a moment before and not a moment after the right time. For it is a great decision, a decision of destiny.

Fortunately, in the situation that confronts them, our people rely on fixed rules when they make their decision.

They rely firstly on their confidence in God, in themselves and in their armed forces which, with God's help, will prove that we are right to pin our hopes on them, and that they are our mainstay and our bulwark.

Our people also rely on cooperation with the U.S.S.R. which has given proof of its truthfulness, its integrity and its firmness in all circumstances.

They also rely on an Arab nation which today knows that the one choice before it is to exist or not to exist.

They also rely on greater world understanding of our cause than has ever existed before.

In the last few weeks I have been in touch with almost the whole of the world. I have been to several capitals—to Moscow, Damascus, Tripoli, Teheran, Jedda and Kuwait.

In Cairo I met many parties that are con-

nected with the crisis, particularly our friend, the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary. And recently I had the good fortune to have detailed meetings with the four African Heads of State representing the Organization of African Unity.

I have been in constant contact by correspondence with all the leaders of the contemporary world who are capable of contributing to work for peace based on justice.

Finally, I could not be more confident of the soundness of our attitude.

Brothers, fellow citizens, Members of the Popular Assembly:

We shall go forward with confidence in God, in ourselves, in our friends and in those who are close to us, with confidence in right and justice. And Almighty God will guide our advance and keep it under His protection.

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.

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#### **Provisions for Arab Policy Emphasizing the Necessity for Unity and for Protecting All Arab Territory, Included in the National Charter Proposed for Iraq by the Baath Party (Iraq)<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, November 15, 1971**

In the Arab field the revolution's policy is determined by its unionist, progressive and popular democratic identity and by its belief in socialism. The historic task of the revolution is full, effective and vanguard participation in the Arab struggle movement and in achieving its goals, which can be summed up as the building of a unified Arab democratic and socialist society.

With a view to giving expression to this

policy and achieving its goals, the Charter calls for:

1. Resolute and comprehensive struggle, by all means, against imperialism, its influence and its supporters; the liberation from imperialism of every part of Arab territory, and violent opposition to its attempts to infiltrate, either directly or indirectly, into the Arab homeland.

2. Resolute opposition to foreign attempts to usurp any part of the Arab homeland, to impose hegemony on it or to sever any part of it; and inasmuch as the Arab Gulf is at present being exposed to incessant attempts organized by imperialist quarters and the puppet government of the Shah of Iran to eliminate its Arab character and to usurp part of it, the struggle against these attempts is a sacred national duty.

3. Struggle by all available means to achieve comprehensive Arab unity on a liberationist and popular democratic basis, and on a basis of the masses being the effective instrument in bringing about the historical process of unity; likewise struggle against spurious forms of unity, which must be shown up and laid bare because their goal is to distort the essential nature of unity and they constitute one of the ways of conspiring against it.

4. The problem of liberating Palestine from Zionist usurpation is a central problem in Arab struggle, and is dialectically linked with the struggle for liberation, unity and the building of socialism, and on the basis of the right of the people of Palestine to return to their land once it is liberated and to exercise to the full their right to self-determination in that land. This means condemning all surrender solutions and proposals aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem or weakening it through partial solutions.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the proposed National Action Charter aimed at preparing for a permanent constitution for Iraq, as presented by President Bakr in a broadcast and televised speech on November 15, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), November 16, 1971.

**Press Conference Statements by President al-Bakr of Iraq, Emphasizing the Pan-Arab Nature of the Struggle Against Zionism and the Necessity for Resisting So-Called Peaceful Solutions<sup>1</sup>**

**Baghdad, November 17, 1971**

*Q. What were the reasons for Iraq's withdrawing its army from the Eastern Front: What are Iraq's conditions for returning to the Front, and what is the advanced formula proposed by Iraq for establishing the Front in a more effective and positive manner?*

A. We have repeatedly stated our views on the question of the Eastern Front, saying that it should be established on the basis of the battle being an all-Arab one and on the basis that there should be an actual battle. At the first Tripoli Conference in June 1970, we submitted a complete proposal for liberation including an effective formula for the Eastern Front. As regards the withdrawal of our army from Jordan, we did not withdraw from the battle; we withdrew from the atmosphere of no-battle and from the situation that was undermining our army, turning it aside from its basic task of fighting against the Zionist enemy, and therefore intended to secure the implementation of plans aimed against the revolution in the Iraqi region. We still believe that the Eastern Front must be established on the basis we mentioned at the first Tripoli Conference, and Iraq is fully prepared to meet its pan-Arab obligations. However, we have emphatically affirmed that we shall not allow our army to be employed on the Eastern Front or anywhere else as an instrument to push through so-called peaceful solutions.

*Q. What is Iraq's point of view on the Middle East crisis, and what is its attitude to the slogan of the pan-Arab character of the battle?*

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Bakr's statements at a press conference with 160 Arab and international correspondents, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), November 18, 1971.

A. Iraq has explained its point of view on the Middle East crisis, pointing out the aggressive nature of the Israeli entity and the role played by world imperialism and Zionism in occupying Arab Palestine and evicting our people from it, and in creating constant tension in the area in favor of Israeli expansionist thinking and at the expense of the Arab people and their territories. We have repeatedly affirmed that it is no simple matter to remove the traces of aggression because the foundations on which the Israeli entity was established consisted, fundamentally, of permanent aggression against the people of Palestine and their rights to their land, and the aggressive character of Israel is being daily established by much evidence. As for our attitude to the slogan of the pan-Arab character of the battle—it is we who proposed this slogan, inasmuch as Israeli aggression is not concerned with the people of Palestine only; it has occupied Arab territories in the Arab regions neighboring the occupied territory.

We are doing all we can, in cooperation with Arab forces, to transform the slogan of the pan-Arab character of the battle into something practical, into a comprehensive pan-Arab mobilization that will fulfill the tasks of the struggle for liberation, and this is what we proposed at the first Tripoli Conference.

*Q. What is the use of submitting the Palestine problem to the United Nations?*

A. Our basic goal, represented in the struggle to liberate Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, is a pan-Arab goal which polarizes and encompasses all our pan-Arab goals.

To achieve this goal we regard it as essential to adopt all serviceable ways and means to achieve this goal or to pave the way for its achievement.

In our estimate, which is inspired by the basic principles of the revolution, armed struggle is the basic course for liberation. In addition to this course we regard it as essential to take the greatest possible advantage of the United Nations, so that it may be a tribunal

for the defense of the rights of persecuted peoples, and in particular the rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

*Q. Do you think that war will break out in the Middle East at the end of this year?*

A. Basically war is unleashed by the Israeli entity which is basically aggressive in nature. Acting in the light of present facts in the Middle East, we draw attention to two matters: the first is that Israel is a racist and Fascist entity which does not and can never halt its aggression. A simple catalogue of new occupation of extensive Arab territories reveals her nature completely.

The second is that the forces of the Arab revolution cannot remain passive or indifferent in the face of this aggressive war which is being countered by a popular armed struggle which will radically end the question of aggression.

War in this sense exists; it may appear in different forms, and the people's war of liberation is the policy that we advocate to confront the Zionist war of aggression against our Arab nation.

We are in fact greatly concerned with the attitudes expressed by the government of the Egyptian region, which are reflected in the speeches and statements of Egyptian officials. Israeli aggression has inflicted great losses on the sister Arab region—Egypt. The occupation of Sinai, the pressures on Suez, and the constant declaration of war against the sovereignty of Arab Egypt are things that determine Egypt's special attitude in resisting this aggression.

We unconditionally support all Arab efforts aimed at repelling Israeli aggression and the protection of Egypt's sovereignty and her right to her territories.

*Q. What about Egypt's efforts to ensure a meeting of a new summit conference? Would Iraq attend it?*

A. A new Arab summit conference is conditional on the approval of the Arab Kings and Heads of State.

As for Iraq's participating in summit conferences, I have already explained her attitude

to the question of the Zionist occupation of Arab territory and the way to achieve its full liberation through the complete proposal I submitted to the first Tripoli Conference held in 1970, which adopted the pan-Arab character of the battle as being the basis of liberation.

The development of events in the Arab area has proved how right were the July Revolution and the Party which led it, in their assessment which led them to reject so-called peaceful solutions, because they end in an impasse, require that we pay an exorbitant price in our honor and our rights, and are at the expense of the people of Palestine and their right to self-determination.

To follow the course of the complete liberation of the Arab territories occupied before and since 1948 requires the mobilization of Arab energies and "everything being placed at the disposal of the battle" of destiny against the imperialist and Zionist enemy. Our latest pan-Arab initiative emphasized the necessity of creating an atmosphere favorable to the establishment of a unified Arab confrontation to repel the ambitions and aggressions of the enemies of Arabism and to win total victory.

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#### **Speech Made by President Sadat of Egypt Announcing to His Front-Line Forces That U.S. Procrastination and Israeli Intransigence Were Forcing Egypt into Renewed Military Action<sup>1</sup>**

**Suez Canal, November 20, 1971**

In the name of God, brothers and sons,

<sup>1</sup> Text of Sadat's speech to the troops broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3845/A/6-A/7; reprinted by permission. The following day, November 21, Sadat addressed Egyptian Air Force pilots on the same theme—see *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3846/A/1).

I am happy today to come to you and meet you. In fact I have come first to say many happy returns of the day to you. Second, to tell you that the time for battle has come. There is no longer any hope whatsoever of peaceful or other solutions. Perhaps it is God's wish that I should have this opportunity of meeting you now to tell you that our decision is to fight and to hear from you what going on in your minds and to answer all your questions.

During the past eight months we made the utmost efforts for the one per cent of a hope that our forces would cross the Canal without an assault battle—we were convinced that the battle was coming; our belief in this did not change—until it became certain to us that the one per cent hope had died and there was no argument about it.

When I met the Armed Forces Supreme Council I put to them all the details concerning the situation and explained the results of the journey I made to the Soviet Union and Syria and informed them of my final decision—battle.

The latest contacts with the United States in the last few days were four days ago. I agreed to meet the officer in charge of US interests in Cairo. When he asked me about the position in accordance with instructions he had received from the US Government, I told him: It is really a regrettable thing that you inquire now about the position at a time when you must proclaim your position. Our position was announced to you during Rogers's visit to Cairo and in the contacts and meetings held in recent months. I also told him that I had no confidence in the United States after eight months of procrastination. Now, when they have returned to the point from which they began with the Rogers initiative and have retreated from all their attempts and succeeded in freezing the Security Council and the Big Four meetings, they have asked us to send a delegate to New York so that they can ask Israel to send a similar delegate, and they have said that Sisco will carry out the role of conveying the views of one to the other for the reopening of the Suez Canal.

The United States says that the disputing

parties should make concessions so that the problem can be solved. How can I make concessions while my land is occupied. The aim of the United States is to give Israel what it could not obtain by fighting. Their ways, attempts and policy are to give Israel what it did not get in 1967. The Americans imagine that we have lost our fighting spirit. They speak therefore about an agreement for the reopening of the Suez Canal while discussion on the withdrawal is deferred.

I have asked the officer in charge of US interests to inform his Government that there is no further room for discussion. All that has come to an end unless Israel answers Jarring's paper of 8th February and accepts complete withdrawal. After that the dialogue can be resumed on the basis of a crossing by our forces and a cease-fire for six months, provided that if Israel does not withdraw in this period our armed forces will carry out their duty of expelling the enemy.

Israel will not accept Jarring's paper. Israel is demanding Sharm ash-Shaykh and is demanding a permanent cease-fire and negotiations—negotiations which will, of course, drag on for 10 years while the land remains under occupation, and then the question will freeze, the world will forget it and occupation will become an established fact.

There is only the battle before us to defend our homes, answer the challenge and prove that we are worthy of living on the soil of Egypt. Your duty is grave and historic before your country, the armed forces, the people, the Arab nation and the world—both enemy and friend.

The coming battle is a battle of the will to fight, a battle of the resolution of the fighter. It will differ from all other battles which have come before. Israel is no longer a legend or a ghost as it has been trying to depict itself. The military command made a mistake and issued an order for withdrawal—hence the Israeli victory appeared bigger. Israel is afraid to confront you. The men whose training was supervised by General Sadiq, who entered [occupied territory] and fought, saw what the enemy is like in confrontation. Our people have placed their hopes on you. They have full confidence and are standing

behind you in one steadfast front. Plans to prepare the internal front for the battle were drawn up during the month of Ramadan. Implementation of these plans will begin today. While you wait for the order to cross, I request you to carry out hard and fierce training. The road to the crossing is a one-way road. The next time we shall meet in Sinai, God willing. May God grant you success.

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**Egyptian Memorandum Transmitted by President Sadat of Egypt to Chairman Senghor of the Organization of African Unity Subcommittee on the Middle East, in Response to That Committee's Settlement Proposals<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, November 23, 1971**

Your Excellency,

In reply to the request voiced by the Subcommittee of the Heads of the Four States, I have pleasure in submitting to you the attached memorandum, which explains the attitude of the Arab Republic of Egypt in regard to the talks with the Subcommittee in Cairo and on the points that were raised during the talks.

I am anxious once again to express my thanks to you, Mr. President, and through you to the members of the Subcommittee, for the efforts you have made to secure the implementation of the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967, and to help the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his task.

I beg Your Excellency to accept this assurance of my profoundest affection and my highest esteem.

With my best wishes,

Anwar Sadat

The Arab Republic of Egypt welcomes the Committee of the Heads of African States and expresses its gratitude for the efforts it has made to secure the implementation of the resolution approved by the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa on June 23, 1971, stipulating the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories to the June 5, 1967 lines, in conformity with Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. The resolution of the Organization of African Unity expresses, among other things, the full support accorded by the Heads of the African States to the efforts made by the special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to secure the implementation of the Security Council resolution and, in particular, his peace initiative of February 8, 1971.

The decision stresses the solidarity of the African Heads of State with Egypt and praises her positive attitude as expressed in her reply to the initiative of the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General on February 15, 1971. The Organization of African Unity's decision condemns the defiance with which Israel met this initiative, and calls on her to give an affirmative answer to Ambassador Jarring's memorandum immediately, as Egypt has done.

The Arab Republic of Egypt expresses its gratitude to the Acting President of the Organization of African Unity and the members of the Committee of Ten for the efforts they have made to secure the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that the Acting President be commissioned to hold consultations with African Heads of State and Prime Ministers so that they may use their influence to secure the total implementation of the said decision.

Egypt, anxious to establish lasting peace in the Middle East, has made proof of her total cooperation with the Subcommittee, at all stages of their work, being convinced that the success of this work will assure implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and free Ambassador Jarring's mission from the impasse created by Israel's refusal to respond positively to his memorandum.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of Sadat's letter to Senghor (President of the Republic of Senegal) and the Egyptian reply to the O.A.U. memorandum, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 19, 1972.

The Subcommittee, through the meetings it held in Cairo, affirmed that the task comprises the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, in conformity with the resolution of the Organization of African Unity. It expressed its full support for Ambassador Jarring in the performance of his task, inasmuch as his memorandum of February 8 to the parties set as its objective the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The Subcommittee made it clear, among other things, that it has no intention of putting itself in the place of Ambassador Jarring but that, on the contrary, its task is to assist the envoy of the Secretary-General and ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution in conformity with his initiative in that respect.

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in the course of his talks in Cairo with the Subcommittee of African Heads of State, intimated that Egypt was quite ready to implement Security Council Resolution 242 to the letter and that it accepted Dr. Jarring's initiative as set out in his memorandum of February 8, 1971.

In reply to the request of the Subcommittee, the Arab Republic of Egypt gave the following clarifications of its attitude to the points raised during the talks:

1. Acceptance of indirect negotiations under the supervision of Dr. Jarring for the implementation of all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 and also of the initiative of Ambassador Jarring for reaching a peace agreement.

2. Egypt is prepared to take the necessary measures to reopen the Suez Canal in return for Israeli withdrawal as a first step in conformity with the initiative as defined by the President in his speech of November 11, 1971, on condition that Israel gives an affirmative answer to Dr. Jarring's initiative of February 8, 1971.

3. We agree that the peace agreement should provide for secure and recognized frontiers, on the basis of the resolution of the Organization of African Unity which stipulates the necessity of withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory, and on Ambassador Jarring's initiative which stipulates the

necessity of Israeli retreat to the Egyptian international frontiers.

4. Acceptance of the following guarantees of peace:

- United Nations guarantees;
- the creation of demilitarized zones on both sides of the frontier;
- the presence of international forces at certain strategic points.

5. Egypt accepts the presence of international forces in Sharm el-Sheikh to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran.

. . . . .

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#### **Broadcast Statement by King Hussein of Jordan Announcing the Assassination in Cairo of Jordanian Premier al-Tall<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, November 28, 1971**

God has willed that I see more than one father, brother, friend and companion fall on the road we have chosen and which we have found is more honourable, nobler and more lasting than life itself. Those who preceded us walked this road, and our martyrs in the land of Palestine also walked this road. In our political life, there have walked on it Hazza [al-Majali, former Premier] and all those who struggled for the cause, for stability—for the security and safety of the young and the old in our country—for the dignity of citizens and the homeland, for the dignity of the soldier, the safety of the student, and to ensure the continuation of the march, and to hold the mission high like a flying banner.

This afternoon I was on my way to convey condolences and sympathy when I received the tragic news about the martyrdom of Wasfi and the wounding of Abdullah Salah

<sup>1</sup> Text of Hussein's statement broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3852/A/7-A/8; reprinted by permission.

while they were returning from Arab League headquarters in Cairo to their hotel. Wasfi lived the life of a soldier who dedicated himself to serving his country and the nation. He struggled honourably and in a manly fashion for them and for their sacred cause. He died like a brave soldier struggling for them with manliness and honour.

If the hand of treachery and treason willed today to strike at him, we know that this hand is aimed against the domestic unity of our one people in the dear homeland. We know that this hand is planning to kill that unity, because it is our enemies' aim to kill that unity. This hand is serving those enemies.

While our distress as a result of this flagrant crime is unlimited, the distress to honour and manliness over what that treacherous hand represents, is also unlimited. There is one answer to all these crimes—I ask it from all of you, man and woman, soldier and civilian—increased faith in domestic unity, increased adherence to it and increased safeguarding of it. Then our ship will sail with determination and faith, no matter how many beloved comrades pass away.

My condolences to Wasfi's family, his relatives, brothers, and the people—sons of the one Jordanian community in both banks.

Reassured soul, return to your God satisfied and satisfying to God. Enter his paradise. Almighty God is truthful.

### 396

#### **Review of U.S. Secret Diplomacy in the Middle East and Replies to Questions on the Military and Diplomatic Dead-lock, Given by President Sadat of Egypt in an Interview with a U.S. Publication<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, Early December, 1971**

I still have the feeling [that the U.S.

Administration is the key to peace]. But unfortunately, we are now back to where we started from eight months ago. We have lost almost a year. Top U.S. officials have always said to me, "Please have confidence in us, bear with us, we are a world power and, as such, we will assume our responsibilities." But the whole story has ended very sadly. When I made my initiative last February, it was warmly welcomed by the U.S. I told Washington it was a real test of the other side's intentions. And Washington told me that my initiative had provided an outlet for U.S. diplomacy to demonstrate its effectiveness. The stalemate, they said, had finally been broken. And when I declared that we no longer felt bound by the cease-fire [which officially expired in March], Washington asked me to exercise restraint because it was working on a solution based on my initiative and because the U.S. was the only power that could get anywhere with Israel.

I decided to wait. Secretary [of State William] Rogers came to Cairo [in May]. We talked for two and a half hours. We felt at ease in each other's company. Mr. Rogers told me that the Israelis had contended all along that we would never agree to a final peace agreement and that I had now refuted Israel's basic premise. Mr. Rogers—sitting where you are sitting now—said he had nothing more to ask of me. "You have done your utmost," he said. Toward the end of our talk he had not even raised the matter of the Soviet presence in Egypt, and I asked him why. He said he didn't want to embarrass me. No embarrassment, I said, and I told him the whole story. Yes, we have officers and soldiers of the Red Army in their own uniforms on our soil. But they are not on the canal. Mr. Rogers interrupted me to say, "Yes, I know." They are in SAM sites to defend our heartland and they only came after Israel began bombing our heartland. That's when Nasser went on a secret mission to Russia in January 1970.

The Soviets told us it would take eight months to train Egyptian crews for the SAM III's. So we needed Soviet SAM crews

<sup>1</sup> Text of Sadat's statement and of the interview with him conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (Domestic Edition) LXXVIII, 24, December 13, 1971, pp. 43-47. © Copyright Newsweek Inc. 1971; reprinted by permission.



on the ground until our own people were trained. In fact, as I explained to Mr. Rogers, their training was not completed until after the cease-fire went into effect in August 1970. But instead of sending the Soviet crews home and replacing them with Egyptians, we asked Moscow to send more batteries for the Egyptian crews they had just trained, thus doubling our air-defense capability. This was—and still is—quite a sacrifice for us, because we agreed that all the Soviet officers and men be paid in hard currency, not Egyptian money. We are paying through the nose for the maintenance of these Soviet SAM crews in Egypt.

Bill Rogers then asked me whether we would agree, after the first phase of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, that Soviet forces would return to their country. I didn't have to be talked into this. We are suffering from a terrible shortage of hard currency. I promised Bill that after the Israelis pulled back under the first phase, Soviet SAM crews would leave. At that point, I said, we would also restore full diplomatic relations with the U.S.

A whole regiment of Soviet SAM crews, incidentally, went back to Russia last week on the same ship that brought into Alexandria an Egyptian regiment trained in the Soviet Union. Going back to the narration of this whole sad story, I told your Secretary: "You don't have to ask me because I am eager to send the Soviet units home." On another aspect—the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean—I told Mr. Rogers, "You are both superpowers and it really is not our responsibility." In a handwritten letter, I told President Nixon that we have given the Soviet fleet facilities because they have stood by us in our darkest days. Not bases, mark you, only facilities. Your President replied he had no objections and that he didn't want to cause problems between us and our Soviet friends.

After all this, Bill said he was going to tell Mrs. Meir that President Sadat had taken up her challenge and had agreed to a permanent peace agreement. Because, don't forget, Mrs. Meir had said over and over again that if Egypt was willing to sign

a peace agreement—as I told you last February we would—then she would put all her cards on the table. Rogers said he was going to ask Mrs. Meir to do just that. Then he added that he would send [Assistant Secretary of State Joseph] Sisco back to Cairo to tell me about the results of the Secretary's mission to Israel. Sisco came back two or three days later, and in this very room we talked privately for two hours. He told me the Israelis had reservations and that they were opposed to my initiative on three points.

First, the Israelis didn't want our forces to cross the canal. Second, they wanted an unlimited cease-fire and, third, they wanted no mention of the international borders of June 5, 1967. "What's your idea, Joe?" I said to Sisco. Regarding the stationing of Egyptian forces on the other side of the canal, Joe said the Israelis were very stubborn. I said, I'm quite willing to be flexible [but on] the principle itself there could be no discussion. After all, it's my country we're talking about. How are you going to be flexible? Joe asked. I said I was ready to compromise. So Joe drew two theoretical lines—Egyptian forces, he said, would be on line A to B on the eastern side of the canal and Israeli forces on line X to Y also on the eastern side. This was his own terminology. I said I was perfectly willing to accept that armaments should be equal on both lines. Artillery of only such-and-such a caliber in equal numbers on both sides or whatever other arrangement based on equality that Joe could work out. More than that, I said I was ready to agree that between these two lines U.N. forces or troops from the four powers [the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union] should take up position. Sisco said: "I think we can work something out on this basis. It sounds reasonable to me."

Then he said the Israelis don't want a cease-fire limited in time. I had specified six months so that [U.N. mediator Gunnar] Jarring would have time to go to work again. But here again I told Joe I was willing to be flexible. How? he asked. If Ambassador Jarring asks for a prolongation and things

seem to be progressing, I replied, the cease-fire could be stretched into a year.

I forgot to tell you that I said to Bill Rogers that if the first phase of the withdrawal was completed, a whole new atmosphere would be created. Our cities on the canal would come to life again and the canal would be reopened. A real momentum for peace would be under way. But as long as a foreign soldier is on my soil, I said to Sisco, I could not agree to an indefinite cease-fire. Joe said: "You are quite right on this point. We agree with you."

On the third point, Sisco said the Israelis flatly refused to agree to any mention of the June 5 borders. Do you agree, Sisco asked me, that the U.S. should make some declaration about the international borders between Egypt and Israel—along the lines of the Rogers plan of December 1969—but that in the interim agreement we will only say the international borders will be in accordance with U.N. resolution 242? No, I told him, I cannot agree. I want either the Security Council or the four powers to state this for me. Don't forget, I reminded Sisco, that the Israelis have already rejected the Rogers plan, so I need a guarantee. Joe said he felt something could be worked out. He asked me to hold everything while he went back to the U.S. to sort things out. "Have confidence in us," he said as he left.

One day, Mr. [Donald] Bergus, your man in Cairo, submitted to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry a paper which, he said, was a summary of our exchanges drafted on his own initiative. This paper included every word I discussed with Sisco in this room, the A-B and X-Y lines and everything else. We noticed minor discrepancies with our own text and amended it accordingly, but we certainly didn't refuse it. The Israelis found out about it a week later and Sisco promptly denied that the State Department had any knowledge of this paper. Don Bergus became the fall man. Yet I must say, for the historical record, that every word in this paper had been discussed between me and Sisco in this same room.

There followed another long period of silence from Washington. Then on July 6, President Nixon and Mr. Rogers sent me

Mr. Michael Sterner [chief of the Egyptian desk at the State Department]. Sterner informed me that your President had taken a major decision. The U.S., he explained, would now take an active role in the Mideast crisis and cease to play the part of the mailman between the two sides. Sisco, said Sterner, would be sent to Israel on July 28. But before the U.S. took an official stand, President Nixon needed some clarification. "The President is waiting for my telegram," Sterner said to me. "And if the answers are satisfactory, the President's plan will be in effect as of this evening."

"Shoot," I said.

Nixon wanted to know if the treaty [of friendship and cooperation] between us and the Soviet Union had changed anything in our position since I last talked with Bill Rogers. No, I replied, the treaty was only a new frame for already existing relations—nothing really new. I pulled my pen out of my pocket and told Sterner to bring me something along the lines we discussed with Rogers and Sisco and I would sign it immediately. The President's second question to me that night was whether I would still hold my promise to restore diplomatic relations with the U.S. after the first phase of an Israeli withdrawal. Yes, I said. Perhaps even before that phase is actually completed. And the third question was whether I still intended to send Soviet personnel home at the end of phase one. I said, yes, because I'm just as keen as you [on that], as I'm the one who has the financial difficulties. Sterner left after saying: "You may consider that the decision of the American President becomes effective tonight"—the decision, that is, to play an active role. After sending Sisco to Israel, I was informed, the U.S. position would be formally put to both sides.

I was very happy. Joe went back to Israel and stayed a week. And then we had a 70-day blackout from America. Absolutely nothing from anyone. We were never told what Sisco had done in Israel. Nothing from Don Bergus, nothing from our embassy in Washington.

Sterner had said that we must give the U.S. time to work something out with Israel. I told him I would be patient until

Aug. 15. But we allowed 70 days to go by and then I saw Bergus and asked what was new. Nothing, he conceded. At that time, it was quite obvious that Sisco's mission had been a complete failure.

I went on TV Sept. 16 and told my people something was seriously wrong. Then came my trip to the Soviet Union Oct. 11. Bergus came to see me and even though he still could not tell me what proposals the U.S. had put to Israel or what Israel had replied, he was clearly under instructions to squeeze more concessions out of us, even though Bill Rogers had told me he had nothing more to ask of us.

It was at that point that Rogers gave his speech at the U.N. General Assembly and listed six basic principles [for negotiating a Mideast settlement]—for example, that any interim agreement must be connected with an over-all solution. But he was sly when it came to the critical point about the crossing of the canal by our forces. The two parties, he merely said, were adamant—despite the fact that the U.S. had already approved our basic position. It was clear that his main intention was to bring us into negotiations with the Israelis.

Bergus then gave me a message from Rogers asking me to send a special representative to the States because the U.S. wanted to take an active role as a go-between. He should have a "broad mandate," the message added. I will agree to the latest U.S. idea, I replied, provided 1971 is regarded as the decisive year. Bergus said Washington agreed with me and that's why it wanted my man to have a broad mandate so that the U.S. could successfully complete "an intensive effort to reach a solution by the end of the year."

We agreed to the so-called "proximity" talks [a scheme under which representatives of Egypt and Israel would occupy nearby hotel rooms in New York and Sisco would shuttle between them]. My decision was relayed to Bergus by Hafez Ismail, my Kissinger, even though Bergus admitted that Israel had not yet been contacted on the proximity idea, let alone approved it. I even designated my emissary, Minister of State Murad Ghaleb.

I then asked Bergus what precisely would be Sisco's role between the two sides. Washington replied he would be active and strive for rapid agreement. Two weeks later, Bergus met Ismail and said Sisco would be the "catalyst." I asked for a definition. Instead, I was given an explanation about chemical processes. And a few days later, further amplification arrived, via Bergus and Ismail, that Sisco would not be a passive mailman but an active one. It all seemed like a rather thin reed to me.

When I visited my troops last week, I said quite frankly that I had lost confidence in the U.S. We are now back to square one. But this time it seems to be worse. I protested vehemently through Bergus about Rogers's recent interview in which he said the two parties must make concessions. Once again, we are being put on the same level as the aggressor who is occupying one-seventh of Egypt's territory. I told Bergus to tell President Nixon and Rogers that while we lost a battle we are far from defeated.

The other message I sent was about the Lance ground-to-ground missiles that you were reported about to give to the Israelis. If this happens, I said, it will be a step up on the escalator. It would also mean that the U.S. is taking part in the occupation of my land, which, in turn, means a partnership in aggression. Today, I received a message from your President that the Lance is not yet serviceable and won't be delivered to U.S. forces until 1972. That brings you up to date to the present moment.

*De Borchgrave:* Are shipments of Soviet war materials to Egypt threatening to upset the Mideast military balance?

*Sadat:* Mr. Rogers himself said that Soviet arms shipments to Egypt had been "very moderate." And reports from Washington on Nov. 5 indicated that your intelligence people believe that the Israeli Air Force is still far ahead in capability.

*Q.* Recently, Egypt acquired additional Soviet TU-16 bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles as well as a new squadron of MIG-23s flown by Soviet pilots. Aren't those important changes?

A. There are always military changes and improvements going on. But to talk of

this as a threat to Israel is ridiculous. Israel says that if we try to get our own—I repeat our own—land back, she will strike at Egypt's heartland once again. They have already bombed our factories and schools with napalm in January 1970. Naturally, we have to be prepared to pay them back in kind. If they hit our heartland, we will hit theirs—and we have developed a capability to do so. Some of your leading senators who are part of the Israeli lobby in Congress are now demanding that President Nixon take over directly Mr. Rogers's key role in America's Middle East policy. Why? Because Mr. Rogers has tried to show neutrality between the two sides. Now the Jewish financiers feel they can manipulate political campaign funds to force Mr. Nixon to return to a policy of all-out support for Israel.

*Q. What would you hope to gain out of a war? Wouldn't you be triggering something you could not win?*

A. First let me say we don't want war. But after exhausting every conceivable avenue to get Israel to withdraw from our country we have come up against a stone wall of intransigence. If you think there is another way and that there is still any hope of Israel's voluntarily leaving the part of Egypt she has taken over, and the other occupied territories, you would make me a very happy man.

*Q. Do you have any fresh ideas on how the deadlock might be broken?*

A. Israel claims it wants a permanent settlement. I don't claim anything. I want one. The sooner the better. I am ready to meet the Israelis in the Security Council, or with the four powers, in the presence of Ambassador Jarring, to implement the resolution that was designed by the world community to bring permanent peace to the Middle East—and that peace includes Israel, of course.

*Q. Are you still interested in an interim agreement—linked to a permanent settlement to be negotiated later—that would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal?*

A. Most definitely. Let's get on with it.

*Q. Would an Israeli pullout to the Mitla Pass in Sinai be acceptable as part of an interim settlement?*

A. The Mitla and the other two main Sinai passes. But I must have control of the passes as I will be responsible for reopening and operating the Suez Canal.

*Q. If Israel committed itself to withdrawal under the U.N. resolution, would you then be willing to agree to direct negotiations for the drafting of a peace treaty?*

A. Yes. But note this. I shall never agree that the occupation of our land shall be used as an instrument to impose conditions. If Israel agrees to withdraw to international borders, I am ready to negotiate the details and clauses of the final, permanent peace agreement.

*Q. What will you do if nothing is achieved by your end-of-year deadline?*

A. I shall do what any nation does to liberate its land. Because this will mean that Israel is closing all doors for a peaceful settlement. And it will then be my duty to try to liberate Arab soil—whatever the sacrifices.

*Q. What advice are the Soviets providing on how best to achieve peace between Egypt and Israel?*

A. I wrote President Nixon that the Soviets are far more keen for a peaceful settlement than the U.S. On the other hand, they condemn any seizing of territory by force.

*Q. But don't the Russians have any ideas?*

A. No, we don't get any ideas from them.

*Q. Is it true that Russia will pull its military forces out of Egypt once a peace settlement has been reached?*

A. Brezhnev told Tito that and Tito told Nixon. There's no secret about it. Of course they will leave.

*Q. Why did you personally take over command of your armed forces a few weeks ago? Are your generals getting impatient with the lack of diplomatic progress?*

A. Not at all. But in times like these I am the one who is ultimately responsible. And the time has come for me to coordinate between the political and military sides.

I have no other alternative than to get ready for whatever happens.

*Q. Are you confident of being able to liberate the occupied territories by force?*

*A.* You Americans have learned a lesson from Vietnam. It is the will of the people that decides the battle. My people, fortunately, have the will. Military technology is only a part of it. If history has taught us anything it is that, on the military side at least, the will and solidarity of a nation to liberate its land is decisive.

### 397

#### **Statements Emphasizing Jordanian Devotion to the Struggle for Palestine and the Need for Unity, and Rejecting the Proposals for a West Bank State, Included in a Speech from the Throne Made by King Hussein of Jordan<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, December 1, 1971**

Honorable Senators and Deputies,

In spite of the clouds that have darkened the sky of Arab relations as a result of differences of interpretation and views, my government has continued its sincere efforts to serve our great cause and every Arab cause, and a number of Arab foreign ministers and officials have visited our country.

Similarly, our foreign minister and a number of Jordanian officials have visited a number of Arab countries, and among the results of these moves were the convening of the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo, its agreement with our appraisal of the international situation, a consensus on the necessity to support the line of confrontation with the occupying enemy, and affirmation of the need for inter-Arab relations to be restored

to their proper course (on the belief that the minimum requirement for making preparations to confront the perils and challenges is that these relations should be unclouded). We have no doubt that it was an inevitable result of the dissipation of Arab efforts that the United Nations resolution, which we accepted as a formula for a peaceful settlement, should remain a dead letter in the lobbies of the United Nations. There was no one to influence Israel to accept and implement it, as long as those whose cause it was remained divided in views, exerted different degrees of effort and differed in their view and assessment of responsibility. This is the reason why the occupation has continued to this day and why the perils threatening our Arab right to Palestine have grown graver.

The struggle has been and will continue to be our *raison d'être* and the emblem of our advance until our Arab right in Palestine is restored. This will continue to be our destiny, which we shall follow with sincerity and which will clearly define our roles in all fields and at all levels. For us work means bearing arms: production is the mainstay of steadfastness; construction here and there is the means for mobilization; order is the weapon of victory; security and stability are the source of sacrifice and the ability to give, and national unity is the basis of all the hopes and objectives we aspire to realize.

It has been ordained that this country shall continue to protect its homeland and defend its rear; it has been the first bastion in the face of danger. It has never turned aside from discharging the mission of the great Arab Revolt—the mission of unity, freedom and a better life. This fact explains this country's achievement of an ideal illustration of the significance of unity, the unity of both banks of the Jordan. This fact also explains Jordan's initiative in giving its blessing to any form of unity between one Arab country and another, out of a belief that comprehensive unity must inevitably come about no matter how long it takes and how long the way. This fact also explains why our Jordan has so strongly condemned all attempts to deceive our people in the stricken West Bank, first

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Hussein's Speech from the Throne at the Opening of the Ninth Parliament, *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 2, 1971.

luring them towards the pitfall of autonomy, and then throwing out hints of a misbegotten state to be fabricated in part of the occupied homeland. We regard such calls as a discord existing only in the dreams of those who advocate them in the corridors of fickleness, opportunism and darkness. It has been our duty to reject these calls. We declare today what we have always declared—that after the liberation of the territory the Arab people of Palestine will have the right above all else to decide their own future and to choose the course that satisfies them.

Honorable Senators and Deputies,

My government's interest in achieving the greatest possible extent of mobilization for the battle is illustrated by our home front, by our quest and by our support, along with the home front, for the foundations and elements of national unity, in accordance with general principles which rally the sons of our homeland, each in the field where he can serve and give. This was the source of our call for the Jordanian National Union and the principles and objectives set out in its Charter. These principles and objectives have lived up to our wishes. They are the well-springs of our civilization and are backed by our authentic experience. We are a nation that has given to and taken from the world the best that could be given and taken. We hold fast to our Jordanian experience which we have wanted to serve as an example in view of its authenticity and constant regeneration; which we have wanted to keep constantly open to the whole world, ever forging ahead, armed with faith in God, the right and the good, and employing knowledge, work and the ability to give. We also keep before our eyes the requirements and challenges of this world that confront our generations, our youth and our society in this world.

Honorable Senators and Deputies,

My government has successfully established security, sovereignty of law and respect for order, and restored the flourishing picture by which our homeland has been known throughout the ages as a haven for honesty and brotherhood and a oasis of confidence and security. We should never have attained this goal but for the vigilance of our people,

the response of the sons of our homeland and the way every citizen has contributed to this end.

398

**Statements Emphasizing the Unity of the Two Banks of the Jordan, Included in the Response of the Parliament of Jordan to King Hussein's December 1 Speech from the Throne<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, December 8, 1971**

Your Majesty:

The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, the legitimate representative of the people of both Banks of the Kingdom, joins you in sending its greetings, accompanied by the profoundest pride and the greatest esteem, to our steadfast and long-suffering people in the stricken West Bank of our beloved Jordan and in every part of the occupied Arab lands. The Chamber of Deputies regards every claim and pretention to represent the Palestinian people as nothing more nor less than a conspiracy aimed at destroying national unity and arousing division and dissension among the sons of the one homeland. It declares in the name of the people that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in both its banks, constitutes a single people within a single state, who are represented by His Majesty the King and the legitimate authorities of the state.

This is why Jordan has so strongly condemned all attempts to deceive our people in the stricken West Bank, first luring them towards the pitfall of autonomy, and then throwing out hints of a misbegotten state to be fabricated in part of the occupied homeland. We are confident that our people are fully on their guard against such tendentious calls, the sole object of which is to serve the enemy and to realize the ambitions of defeatists.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Chamber of Deputies reply, *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 9, 1971.

Your Majesty:

This Chamber, which is so proud of your leadership, has the highest appreciation for the efforts of the late Wasfi al-Tall and those of the intrepid Arab Jordanian forces and the public security forces, to entrench security, stability and the sovereignty of law and order, strengthened and reinforced by the vigilance and support of our long-suffering struggling Jordanian people. This would never have been achieved for us but for the wisdom, courage and faith of our guide and leader.

In this context we join Your Majesty in offering our greetings and the expression of our esteem to the intrepid members of the armed forces and their brethren in the public security forces.

### 399

#### **Statement Issued by the Government of Jordan Rejecting the Decision of the Israeli Authorities To Hold Municipal Elections in the Occupied West Bank<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, December 8, 1971**

Adhering to the legitimate sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan over all its territories; abiding by the principles, spirit and provisions of international law, the 1949 Geneva Convention, the United Nations Charter and the resolutions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other agencies of the international organization on the Arab territories that have been under illegitimate Israeli occupation since June 1967;

Affirming the absolute right of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to insist on the necessity for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and their return to the constitutional and legitimate position that prevailed before the said aggression;

Exercising its sovereignty over the West Bank and expressing its zeal for the interests of its citizens there and for their sound rights and demands;

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

1. Affirms that the decision of the Israeli occupation authorities to hold elections to the Municipal Councils of the West Bank is absolutely invalid because it is not based on a shadow of law or legality and is incompatible with international law, the Geneva Convention and the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

2. Regards the said decision as constituting a flagrant aggression against the sovereignty of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan over the West Bank, a violation of the rights of its citizens and an interference in their affairs.

3. Is confident that the above decision was taken within the framework of a plan aimed at perpetrating Israeli domination of the occupied Arab territories.

For these reasons, the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan declares that it:

1. Does not recognize the decision of the Israeli authorities to hold elections to the Municipal Councils in the West Bank;

2. Regards the existing Municipal Councils of the West Bank as the sole legal Municipal Councils and calls on them, in conformity with Paragraph 2 of Article VIII of the Jordanian Municipalities Law, to continue to meet their responsibilities and perform their duties;

3. Warns citizens of the West Bank against the objectives and schemes that lie behind this Israeli decision, calls on them not to acknowledge it, and exhorts them to adopt such resolute attitudes to foil the conspiracy as are required by the dictates of duty and the national interest;

4. Expresses its absolute confidence in the citizens of the West Bank, and in their vigilance, their sincerity and their loyalty, and assures them that it will not hesitate to exercise all its legal rights and constitutional powers against all who deviate from the right course and cooperate with the enemy in implementing the above decision.

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the Jordanian statement, *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 9, 1971.

## 400

**Statements and Recommendations on the Role of Writers in the Arab Struggle Against Zionism and Imperialism, Issued by the Eighth Conference of Arab Writers<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, December 15, 1971**

The battle of destiny in which the whole of the Arab nation is involved, with the Arab writer in its vanguard, constitutes an all-out challenge to its civilization. In this battle, therefore, it is essential that the Arab nation should be victorious in the social, economic and cultural fields, as well as at the level of the political battle.

In spite of the calamity that befell our usurped Arab homeland in Palestine more than twenty years ago, and in spite of the fact that more than four and a half years have passed since the Zionist-imperialist aggression was launched on June 5, 1967 by the forces of expansion, usurpation and fascism represented by Israel and world imperialism, it is still the duty of Arab writers and thinkers to continue to play their historical role, along with the Arab vanguards, of bearing their great responsibilities and mobilizing their energies, resources and talents for victory in the battle of destiny.

The Eighth Conference of Arab Writers was held from December 11-15, 1971 under the slogan "The Arab Writer in the Battle of Destiny." The conference was attended by delegations from the following twelve Arab countries: Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen as well as the Arab League; delegations from certain organizations and friendly countries attended as observers.

The Arab writers realize that the battle of destiny lies in resisting the forces of imperialism, Zionism, colonialism and racism in order to establish the principles of freedom,

progress, socialist construction, peace, social justice, and spiritual, cultural and civilizational prosperity for mankind.

The Arab writers fully realize that by taking part in the struggle on this anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist front the Arab people are supporting not only the Arab cause and the Palestinian cause, but also the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Indochina, South Africa, and Chad, the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and every place where the battle against the common enemy is necessary.

The Arab writers realize that the battle of destiny which the Arab people are fighting for victory, is linked with the elimination of the imperialist presence from Arab territory; that Zionist occupation, which is directed against the Arab spirit as much as against Arab territories, depends on imperialist aggression and the exploitation by monopoly capitalist companies of the material and human resources of the Arabs; and that the armed struggle in which the people of Palestine and the whole of the Arab nation are engaged, especially on the lines of confrontation with the enemy, plays an effective part in this interlinked struggle for the liberation of occupied Arab territory, the recovery of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland, the smashing of the artificial barriers left behind by colonialism in the Arab world, the bridging of the gulf of civilizational backwardness and the achievement of a future brilliant with freedom, security, justice and prosperity.

The Arab writers undertake to support Palestinian armed struggle, to support the role that is being played by the Palestine revolution and to take a resolute stand against the conspiracies aimed at liquidation that are being hatched and implemented by imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

**Recommendations Adopted by the Arab Writers on Freedom and Commitment in the Battle of Destiny:**

1. Freedom to become acquainted with world thought;

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the Conference of Arab Writers' statement, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 16, 1971.



2. Association of the masses in appraisal of the literature of the battle of destiny and coordination between Arab writers' federations and information organizations to make the masses more aware;

3. That Arab writers be urged to take part in the real role of the information media;

4. Commitment to the use of classical Arabic;

5. Commitment to the line of the Arab revolution, which is the only way to progressive unity;

6. Seminars to present and elucidate the basic concepts of commitment to the battle of destiny.

As regards the role of the Arab writer vis-à-vis the heritage and participation in the battle of destiny, the Conference makes the following recommendations:

1. Arabic should be the official language of higher education in Arab universities.

2. The Federation of Arab Writers should adopt the idea of holding a conference on the Arab heritage every two or three years to discuss anything new, and that a seat at the Arab League should be devoted to the Arab heritage.

As regards the defence of Arab writers in the occupied territory the Conference recommended the following:

1. Congratulations should be sent to Palestinian writers in the occupied territory on their vanguard struggle, and on their performing the true mission of the writer, which is to kindle the spirit of resistance to Zionist-colonialist occupation.

The Conference salutes these writers and calls on their brother Arab writers to bear the same banner and to cooperate fully with them in the defense of freedom and progress.

2. A day should be appointed every year for moral and literary solidarity with writers in the occupied territory, and to call on free writers' federations throughout the world to continue to support them in their just struggle and to take action to protect them against the campaigns of defamation and slander to which they are subjected because of their attitude of struggle against the occupation authorities. This solidarity should be as wide as possible;

3. The literary and material rights of the writers in the occupied territory when their work is published should be safeguarded. The Conference believes that the Federation of Palestinian Writers should deputize for them in protecting these rights, in cooperation with the Arab Federations and the General Federation of Arab Writers, and that these federations should take action to print and publish the literature of the occupied territory in Arabic and to translate it, and make it their task to provide centers of oriental studies and other interested institutions with these translations and their Arabic originals.

4. The Palestinian Arab writers' full right to write should be protected, the Arab federations being called on to adopt this cause and to defend the freedom of all Palestinian and Arab writers.

5. The role played by Arab broadcasting services in the service of the Palestinian cause and the devotion of greater interest to radio programs and efforts to ensure that the literature of the occupied territory reaches the masses both in the Arab homeland and elsewhere, should be strengthened.

6. A day should be fixed every year for world solidarity with the Palestinian Arab people in their struggle, free writers throughout the world being called on to take part in this day.

. . . . .

## 401

**Resolutions and Recommendations Relative to Economic Relations Between Arab and Non-Arab States, Adopted at the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Arab Economic Council<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, December 18, 1971**

The Economic Council, having reviewed the report of the Secretariat General on economic interests between Arab and foreign countries,

Recommends the following:

First, that the Arab states should persist in their economic and commercial policies to strengthen their relations with foreign states that support the Arab attitude towards Israeli aggression and to influence the attitudes of foreign states that oppose the Arab attitude;

Secondly, that the importance of implementing this principle should be stressed at the present grave stage in the confrontation with aggression, along with preparedness for such developments as may come about in the near future requiring the adoption of clearly defined attitudes towards the states which adopt an attitude of hostility to the requirements of the battle.

Resolves the following:

First, that a comprehensive and detailed study of the economic interests between Arab and foreign states be prepared in accordance with the following system:

*I. Definition of the economic interests between Arab and foreign states:*

*A. The interests of Arab states in foreign states:*

—Commercial interests (exports and imports) with details of the kinds of merchandise which are of strategic impor-

tance and of the principal companies and groups that do business with them;  
—Financing interests (loans and financial aid);

—Other economic interests (immigration, technical expertise, etc.).

*B. The interests of foreign countries in the Arab countries:*

—Commercial interests (exports and imports) with details of the kinds of merchandise that are of strategic importance and the principal companies and groups that do business with them;

—Financial interests (investments in the Arab countries, investment of funds in foreign markets by Arab states);

—Other economic interests, if any.

*II. Definition and appraisal of the means of influencing the attitudes of foreign states:*

*A. Positive means:*

—Commercial policies (conclusions of commercial and customs agreements and the direction of Arab imports);

—Monetary and financial policies (direction of the investment of Arab funds in foreign markets);

—The listing of foreign companies and interests that benefit the Arab world with a view to enlisting their help in supporting the Arab cause in their mother countries.

*B. Negative means:*

—Reduction of imports from unresponsive countries;

—Possible forms of boycott and their effects on both parties.

*III. Appraisal of the existing economic organizations common to the Arab countries and foreign countries and the means of strengthening them or establishing additional organizations:*

—Joint chambers of commerce;

—Joint companies;

—Federations.

*IV. A study of the situation of Israeli economic power as regards its ability to influence foreign countries:*

—Israeli participation in joint companies;

—Israel's employment of Jewish economic colonies;

—Joint chambers of commerce and federations.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the resolutions and recommendations adopted at the 17th session of the Arab Economic Council meeting in Cairo, December 14–18, 1971, *Arab Economic Report* (Beirut: General Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of the Arab Countries, January, 1972), pp. 139–142.

Member states of the Arab Economic Council are: Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, Egypt and Yemen (Sanaa).

V. *Proposed policies and measures to influence the attitudes of foreign countries and means of pursuing them:*

- A. Short term;
- B. Long term.

Secondly:

I. That the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States be requested to supervise the preparation of this study, with the help of such experts and subsidiary organizations of the League of Arab States as it sees fit, and to ensure that the study is completed (at the latest) by the end of March 1972.

II. That the Ministries of Economy of the member states be requested to provide the information and statements necessary for the study at specific dates, and appoint a liaison officer to submit such information and statements.

III. That the Secretariat General be requested to allocate the sum of ten thousand dollars to meet the expenses of preparing the required study.

Thirdly:

I. That a follow-up committee, consisting of the Ministers of Economy of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Lebanese Republic and the Arab Republic of Egypt, be formed to follow up the preparation of the said study and to review it when it is completed, in preparation for its being submitted to the Arab Ministers of Economy at a session held specially for that purpose, and to follow up the measures taken by the member states to implement this resolution.

II. That the follow-up committee hold a meeting with those charged with the task of preparing the study in the first half of January 1972 to review the executive measures relative to the preparation of the study.

(The Minister of Economy of the Syrian Arab Republic expressed the view that mention should be made of an Arab economic attitude to the United States of America and the possibility of a total boycott should it maintain its present attitude.)

(The head of the Saudi Arabian delegation stated that he did not approve of the two

recommendations, or of Section B of Article 2 of the resolutions entitled "Negative Means" until such time as his government expresses its view thereon.)

## 402

### **Address by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria to the People's Assembly, Surveying the Goals and Strategy of Syrian Foreign Policy (Excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

**Damascus, December 22, 1971**

1. The basic problem that constitutes the crux of our struggle is the problem of the Zionist presence on Arab soil and the confrontation of that presence.

2. Unionist action is the principal course to be followed for the realization of our people's aspirations to build a unified Arab socialist society.

3. The problem of confronting the Zionist presence is an Arab problem, and this requires that action be taken to mobilize all possible economic and military resources for the battle.

4. Our relations with other Arab countries are determined in the light of their attitude to the battle.

5. The Palestine Resistance is a fundamental and important part of the Arab revolution, and must therefore be supported.

6. [We must] strengthen our relations with all the countries of the socialist camp, and first and foremost the Soviet Union.

7. [We must] strengthen our relations with the peoples and countries of the Third World and with the Islamic peoples and countries, to ensure support for our national causes, first and foremost of which is the Palestine cause.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of Khaddam's statement to a meeting of the Syrian Arab Region's People's Assembly called to elect 20 of its members to serve in the National Assembly of the Federation of Arab Republics, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 23, 1971.

8. [We must] take advantage of the present conflict within the capitalist camp and develop our foreign relations with the countries of the Western world with a view to ensuring that these countries adopt a better attitude to the Palestinian cause.

9. [We must] constantly affirm that Zionism and imperialism are the principal enemies of the Arab nation in its struggle to build its Arab socialist society.

In the light of these basic principles which the revolutionary government of this region has adhered to, the following have been achieved:

In Arab policy:

In the light of the strategic goal of the revolution in this region, which is the goal of liberation, we have taken action on the following axes:

1. The unionist axis, from our belief that Arab unity is the natural reply to the presence of Zionism and imperialism and to their constant plotting against our people and our homeland. The revolution has achieved an important success in this field: the Federation of Arab Republics has been established, the Constitution has been submitted to plebiscite, the Presidential Council has been formed and preparations are being made for the establishment of all the institutions provided for by the Federal Constitution.

The establishment of this Federation is an important step not only on the course of unionist action, but also on the course towards liberation.

The mobilization of military, human and economic resources in the Federal State, in conformity with a clear strategy which was set out in the Benghazi Proclamation and was submitted to plebiscite along with the Constitution, is an important and fundamental matter, and this strategy clearly affirms that there is to be no peace and no negotiation with the enemy, no relinquishing of a single inch of Arab territory, and no waiving of [the rights of Palestinians] or bargaining over the Palestine problem.

2. The second axis is based on the fact that the responsibility for confronting the Zionist presence is an all-Arab responsibility, even

though the principal burden falls on the Syrian and Egyptian regions. It is therefore necessary to take action with all available means, in spite of the present Arab situation, to implement the slogan of the mobilization of human, military and economic resources for the battle, it being made perfectly clear that our attitude towards any region is determined in the light of that region's attitude towards the battle.

In the light of this basic principle, this region has set about creating an atmosphere in the Arab world that would enable us to take serious action to mobilize Arab resources. With this end in view steps were taken to end the diplomatic estrangement between [Syria] and the Arab regions that had come to congratulate the President of the Republic on his assuming the Presidency after the popular referendum. As a result of these meeting and exchanges of visits with the other Arab regions, this region was able to recover its natural position in the leadership of Arab action after years of stifling isolation. It is to be observed that the unambiguous Arab policy laid down by this region, and the practical activities carried out under the direction of the President of the Republic helped to make it possible to hold the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo on September 13, 1971, where we made proposals based on the following points:

a. The creation of a positive Arab atmosphere by mobilizing Arab military, economic and human resources for the battle;

b. The convening of a meeting of the Arab Defense Council to define the needs of the battle and its financial requirements;

c. The convening of a meeting of Finance Ministers with a view to taking advantage of all Arab resources in the battle of confrontation;

d. Support for the Palestine revolution.

The Foreign Ministers approved these principles, and on November 27, 1971, there was a meeting of the Arab Defense Council in the course of which the report of the Assistant Military Secretary-General was discussed, the question of the financial requirements of the battle and of placing Arab efforts at the

disposal of the confrontation was debated and several extremely satisfactory decisions were taken, which we are making every possible effort to implement.

On November 15, 1971 a meeting of the Arab Economic Ministers, which had been approved by the Foreign Ministers and sanctioned by the Arab governments on October 1 of this year, opened in Cairo to discuss matters of concern to them.

Brothers, our appreciation of the gravity of the present stage and the immensity of the responsibility leads us to take constant action to realize our policy, whatever obstacles we may encounter as a result of the present situation. It also leads us to continue to make every possible effort and if we fail in one effort we must make new efforts, for despair, in our view, is a great step towards ruin and surrender.

3. The third axis is the axis of the Palestine Resistance; this region has adopted a clearly defined attitude of support for the Resistance for the following reasons:

- a. The Resistance embodies Arab rejection of the Zionist presence;
- b. It makes the Palestine cause a living cause for the Palestinian people and attaches the Palestinian to his homeland;
- c. The Resistance plays a military role against the enemy on the field of battle;
- d. The existence and continuation of the Resistance is an affirmation to the international community that the Palestinian people, although nearly a quarter of a century has passed since they were evicted, are a people that live and exist, and no power on earth can disregard the existence of a living people.

It is natural, brothers, that the first problem to occupy the minds of all of us should be the problem of the Zionist presence on Arab soil and the real dangers that threaten our existence, because the question that must be answered is: Are we to exist or not to exist? For the threat is not only to the land, but to our national and human existence in that land.

This region has therefore adopted the following unambiguous attitudes:

1. Rejection of all formulae involving perpetuating the Zionist presence and relinquishing of the Palestine cause.

2. The inevitability of confrontation with the enemy who is planning to build a state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

. . . . .

Our attitude to all these attempts has always been perfectly clear. It is as follows:

1. Any solution must be based on two basic principles:

- a. Recognition of the full national rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their territory and their homeland;
- b. Complete and unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories.

2. We have opposed all attempts to reach a partial settlement because we are convinced that this would lead to untold national injury.

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#### **Policy Statement Presented by Premier al-Lauzi of Jordan, Setting Forth Fundamentals of Jordanian Policy Regarding Resistance Against Israeli Occupation of Palestine (Excerpt)<sup>1</sup>**

**Amman, December 27, 1971**

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There are basic mainstays that no official or citizen can bargain over, renounce or neglect. They are:

1. The security and stability of this country. This is an essential mainstay that the government will employ all ways and means to make deeper and stronger, and it will not allow it to be impaired in any way.

II. The unity of Jordan is something sacred that cannot be waived or bargained over, the unity of the land and the community is the solid base of all effort, mobilization and building, and if it is the duty of a man to sacrifice himself and his blood for his homeland, he

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Lauzi's policy statement, *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 28, 1971.

will not be forgiven for harming that homeland for his own interests or personal ends.

III. The steadfastness which we have explained in detail does not mean inaction, nor does it mean silence; on the contrary, it is the firm foundation of movement, the strong basis of genuine effort. We in this country have not lagged behind any joint Arab effort in either war or peace. We have been the first to abide by the Arabs' pacts ever since they had pacts, and today we again offer our hand to every Arab hand in any Arab country from our belief that our nation has a single destiny and that its future, as far as we are concerned, is above all differences and above all other goals and objectives.

IV. We in Jordan were the first to believe in the legitimate right of our people to resist the occupier and we shall continue in this belief until God grants us victory. We have believed in this right for ourselves, for the people of Palestine and for all the members of our nation, and we have embodied our belief in our battles of steadfastness and in withstanding the attacks on our towns, villages and mountains, the climax of which was the battle of Karameh, which will ever be a great landmark in our history of resistance to aggression. But the people who have abused the right of their nation are those who have diverted resistance from resisting the occupier into the mazes of misrepresentation, opportunism and side issues, into contradictions, crimes, assassination and interference in the internal affairs of our country. They alone bear the burden of the crimes they have perpetrated against our nation in the sight of God and of history. This is why we give support only to honorable resistance which has rifles aimed against the occupier and which operates in those areas where the enemy is stationed and which are groaning under occupation; there is no place for it in our ranks if its aim is to threaten the security and life of the citizen and the safety and stability of the homeland.

**Egyptian Press Interview Statement by Foreign Minister al-Suwaidi of the United Arab Emirates, Stating the Federation's Duty To Take Part in the Struggle Against Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Cairo, Late December, 1971**

III. Cooperation with the Other Arab Countries

The extent of this cooperation has been determined by the provisions of the Charter of the Federal State, which is part of the Arab nation, and in this field we have two responsibilities:

The first is that we should persist, along with our brothers, in the performance of our duties in regard to our enemy, for we are partners in the responsibility to liberate Arab territories from our enemy, and this partnership requires that we share in bearing the burdens of the fighting if Israel persists in her attitude of occupying Arab territories and in her policy of expansion and aggression. There is no need to state this, but we wished to mention it because duty is necessarily duty.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Suwaidi's exclusive interview, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 29, 1971.

United Nations





## PART I: DOCUMENTS

### Annual Documents Submitted to the General Assembly

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#### **Introduction to the Annual Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1970–15 June 1971 (Middle East Section)<sup>1</sup>**

**September, 1971**

217. More than four years have now elapsed since the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East, and yet a peaceful and agreed settlement is still not in sight.

218. A year ago the situation took a turn for the better. Following the acceptance by Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic of a United States peace initiative, quiet was re-established along the Suez Canal on 7 August 1970 after 16 months of fierce fighting, thus opening the way for the resumption of the peace talks under the auspices of my Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring. Unfortunately the high hopes raised by this turn of events were short-lived. The talks began on 21 August 1970, but shortly thereafter Israel refused to continue to participate in them because it alleged that the United Arab Republic had violated the cease-fire standstill agreement in the Suez Canal area. The talks were resumed in January 1971 and continued until the beginning of March, when they were forced once again into abeyance.

219. While the resumed talks did not achieve the break-through that had been hoped for, some progress was made. In February, Ambassador Jarring took the important initiative of breaking the existing deadlock by seeking from Israel and the United Arab

Republic parallel and simultaneous commitments that seemed to him necessary as preconditions to progress in the talks. In brief, he sought a commitment from Israel to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine, and a commitment from the United Arab Republic to enter into a peace agreement with Israel with various undertakings and acknowledgements arising from the relevant principles mentioned in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The United Arab Republic accepted the specific commitments requested of it, but so far Israel has not responded to the Special Representative's request. Ambassador Jarring feels, and I agree with him, that, until there has been a change in Israel's position on the question of withdrawal, it would serve little useful purpose to attempt to reactivate the talks. It is still my hope that Israel will find it possible before too long to make a response that will enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring's auspices to continue.

220. It is a matter of gratification that, despite this impasse, the quiet which was re-established in the Suez Canal sector on 1 August 1970 has continued to this day. It began with an agreement for a 90-day cease-fire as part of the United States peace initiative, and although this cease-fire agreement was allowed to lapse, after two extensions, in March 1971, quiet has nevertheless been maintained. In the Israel-Syria sector there have been almost daily exchanges of fire, but these have generally been minor isolated incidents, and by and large quiet also prevailed in that sector. The United Nations has no observation machinery in the cease-fire sectors between Jordan and Lebanon, but all the available information indicates that these sectors, too, have generally been quiet during the period under review, although there

<sup>1</sup> Middle East section excerpted from Chapter IV, "The Middle East and Cyprus," of "Part Two: Current Issues" of the Introduction to Secretary-General U Thant's 1970–1971 annual report; U.N. doc. A/8401/Add.1, paras. 217–229.

were reports of incidents along the Israel-Lebanon border involving activities of Arab guerrilla groups based in Lebanon against Israel and incursions by Israeli forces into Lebanese territory.

221. It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East.

222. I see no other way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality than by intensifying the search for a peaceful and agreed settlement. I believe there is still a chance of achieving such a settlement. I do not overlook the formidable difficulty of the problems to be tackled, but there exist several important assets on the side of peace efforts as well. The Security Council's cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 and its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, if implemented simultaneously and fully, should provide the framework for achieving a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict. To promote agreement for such a settlement, we are fortunate to have the services of Ambassador Jarring, who is uniquely qualified for this almost impossible task.

223. Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned.

224. The United States Government, whose peace initiative last year led to the re-establishment of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector in August 1970, recently took a second initiative with the objective of securing an interim agreement from Israel and the United Arab Republic for the reopening of the Suez Canal. In this connexion, the United States has assured me that its initiative aims at promoting and facilitating the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission and is within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967). The information so far available does not indicate that an agreement can be reached in the near future.

225. But time is of the essence. I feel that if moves for even a partial solution do not bear fruit before too long, the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, will have to review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward.

226. Despite many difficulties, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has continued to provide assistance to refugees. Of the many difficulties encountered during the past year, two were particularly serious. The Agency's operation in East Jordan was disrupted during the armed clashes that erupted between the Jordanian Army and the *fedayeen* in the autumn of 1970 and again, though on a much lesser scale, in July 1971. The Agency, however, was able to resume its services to the refugees after brief periods of suspension. More recently the Agency was confronted with another serious problem, this time in the Gaza Strip, when the Israeli authorities decided, for what they considered as compelling security reasons, to demolish large numbers of shelters in three refugee camps and to remove the occupants, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip. The Commissioner-General of the Agency has protested against these measures, not only because of the personal hardship inflicted upon the refugees and the resulting disruption of the Agency's services, but also because they are contrary to certain provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949

relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and to General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV), which affirmed a number of basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts. On 18 August, I approached the Israeli Government through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and requested that it undertake promptly all measures necessary to ensure the immediate cessation of the destruction of refugee homes in the Gaza Strip and to halt the removal of the refugee occupants to places outside the Gaza Strip. According to the information received from the Commissioner-General, the Israeli operation was suspended as of 26 August.

227. The persisting financial difficulties of the Agency are also a matter of great concern to me. Last year the General Assembly set up a working group to look into this problem. Thanks to the efforts of the Chairman and the other members of this group, to the assistance provided by the specialized agencies concerned, and to the generous response of a number of Governments, the deficit for 1971 has been considerably reduced and the Commissioner-General has been able to defer new reductions in the Agency's services. However, the long-term problem remains unsolved. If new resources are not found, the deficit for 1972 will probably exceed \$6 million and the Agency will have no alternative but to reduce some of its essential services to the refugees. Once again I must commend this problem to the serious attention of the General Assembly.

228. I cannot conclude my comments on the situation in the Middle East without making a reference to the question of Jerusalem. This question is of direct concern to me not only because it is one of the most complex and difficult problems in the Middle East conflict, but also because both the General Assembly and the Security Council have requested me to report to them any developments which tend to change the City's legal status.

229. During the year under review, there were many reports from the Press and other sources concerning a master plan prepared by Israeli authorities for the construction

of housing projects in the Jerusalem area, including the sector controlled by Jordan before June 1967 and the area between the Armistice Demarcation Lines. As soon as I heard of those reports, I sought from the Israeli authorities detailed information of the reported master plan, but the Israeli authorities have not yet responded to my request. Thus I have not been able to fulfil the reporting responsibilities laid upon me by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In this connexion, I have also been in correspondence with the Israeli authorities concerning the United Nations premises at Government House.

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### **Review of the United Nations General Assembly Twenty-Fifth Session Debate on the Middle East, Included in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1970–15 June 1971<sup>1</sup>**

**August, 1971**

#### *B. Consideration by the General Assembly*

At its twenty-fourth session, the General

<sup>1</sup> Text of Section B "Consideration by the General Assembly," Chapter I "The Situation in the Middle East," of "Part One: Political and Security Questions," of Secretary-General U Thant's 1970–71 annual *Report on the Work of the Organization*, the foreword of which is dated August 7; U.N. doc. A/8401, pp. 5–10. The section of the report published here reviews the Middle East debate of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly (October 26–November 4, 1970) which led to the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2628 (XXV) Calling for a Three Month Extension of the Ceasefire and for Talks Under the Auspices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative with a View to Implementing Security Council Resolution 242, November 4, 1970 (published as Document 330 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*).

(The remainder of calendar year 1971 will be covered in the report for 1971–1972, relevant portions of which are to be included in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.)

Assembly had decided that the debate on the item relating to the situation in the Middle East should be deferred to the twenty-fifth session and, that the item be included in the provisional agenda of that session. On 18 September 1970, the General Assembly included the item "The situation in the Middle East" in its agenda and decided that it should be discussed in plenary meetings. The item was discussed at thirteen meetings held between 26 October and 4 November 1970.

The debate was opened with a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, who said that his Government had asked for a resumption of the consideration of the situation in the Middle East by the General Assembly in view of Israel's rejection of all international efforts towards a settlement during the past three years and its insistence on following an expansionist policy, thus creating an ever increasing threat to international peace and security. His Government had felt that the General Assembly should play a positive role in assisting the Security Council to implement its resolution 242 (1967). Israel had not only consistently refused to co-operate in all efforts to have that resolution implemented, but by its withdrawal on 6 September 1970 from the contacts with Ambassador Jarring it had further emphasized its determination to undermine the efforts to establish peace in the Middle East. In contrast, the United Arab Republic had not only accepted resolution 242 (1967) but as early as December 1967 had expressed to Ambassador Jarring its readiness to fulfil all its obligations under that resolution.

The United Arab Republic had accepted the United States initiative in full and had designated its representative for talks with Ambassador Jarring. Israel, on the other hand, had not made one single substantive contact with Ambassador Jarring after accepting the American initiative and had justified its position by alleging violations of the cease-fire arrangements by the United Arab Republic.

The fact, however, was that early that year Israel had embarked upon a new

stage in its aggression by carrying out air raids against the civilian population of the United Arab Republic and had extended that aggression to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The United Arab Republic's motives were primarily self-defence. It was regrettable that the United States had assisted in that aggression and had provided Israel with Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft, as well as massive economic aid. Indeed, following Israel's declaration not to withdraw from the territories occupied by it in the 1967 war, the United States had announced the delivery of additional weapons to Israel, including 180 of its most advanced tanks, as part of the \$450 million credit facilities for arms purchases. By taking that hostile position towards the Arab peoples and by supporting the aggressor, the United States was obstructing the realization of peace in the Middle East. At the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in September 1970, the international community had adopted resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967, in implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

In asking the General Assembly to consider the situation in the Middle East, the United Arab Republic had felt that the United Nations should give that situation its close attention and follow constantly the efforts that were being made until peace was secured by the withdrawal of Israel's forces from all the occupied Arab territories.

The representative of Israel stated that the United Arab Republic had violated the cease-fire standstill agreement through the construction and forward movement of a great missile system. As a result of that, the equilibrium of the 7 August agreement had been broken and that factor, together with Egypt's propaganda campaign, had undermined the chances of an understanding being established. Israel, on the other hand, had agreed to indirect talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. It had also acquiesced to a limited cease-fire and had declared its readiness to accept and seek agreement

on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Furthermore, it had stated its willingness to withdraw its troops to agreed, recognized and secure borders to be determined in the peace negotiations. Israel's decision in that respect had been conveyed to Ambassador Jarring on 6 August 1970 in the form of an affirmative response to the United States peace initiative. The central point of that initiative, however, was the cease-fire standstill agreement under which the parties had undertaken to refrain from changing the *status quo* within a zone extending fifty kilometres to the east and west of the cease-fire line, and specifically, to do nothing but maintain installations at the then existing sites and positions. Contrary to those precise undertakings, Egypt had established between 500 and 600 operational SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in the standstill zone, in violation of the agreement of 7 August. Those were not defensive measures, as claimed by the United Arab Republic, but offensive preparations designed to change the cease-fire lines by renewed war. The violations had continued daily and the United Arab Republic had refused even to address itself to requests for rectifications. It was impossible to consider negotiating a new agreement while the existing one had been shown so little respect. The most urgent task was to restore the trust necessary for all peace dialogues. The representative of Israel then said that the General Assembly should not destroy the existing consensus among the parties on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) by adopting measures which might give a new formulation or balance to that resolution by putting emphasis on one part or the other. Moreover, the Middle East situation was still being actively considered by the Security Council and, therefore, any recommendation by the Assembly implying a change in the balance maintained by the Council resolution would be in violation of the spirit of Article 12 of the Charter. In those circumstances, the General Assembly should urge the parties to observe strictly the cease-fire standstill agreement to which they had agreed, and call for the restoration of the situation as it had existed on and before 7 August 1970 in order that

the Jarring mission could make progress in all sectors.

On 29 October, a draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Under its operative part the General Assembly would (1) reaffirm the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, and consequently territories thus occupied must be restored; (2) recognize that full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, as affirmed in the General Assembly resolutions, was a prerequisite to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; (3) urge the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which provided for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East; (4) express its full support of the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in carrying out his mandate for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); (5) call upon the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts; (6) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); and (7) request the Security Council to consider, if necessary, taking steps, under the relevant articles of the Charter, to ensure the implementation of its resolution.

In the discussion that followed, the representative of the United States said that ever since the adoption of resolution 242 (1967) his Government had made every effort to help achieve its objectives. It was because of its concern that it had taken an initiative that had led to the developments reported by the Secretary-General on 7 August 1970. As a result of an intensive period of quiet diplomacy, an arrangement had been worked

out with the countries concerned whereby they had stated explicitly their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and had committed themselves to pursuing the goal of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace. Moreover, the observance of the cease-fire had replaced the daily shelling on both sides of the Canal, and the escalating danger of a great Power confrontation had also eased.

After pointing out that it had taken almost three years to get from the States directly concerned explicit agreement to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, the representative of the United States said that the General Assembly should be careful not to adopt any resolution that might appear to add to, subtract from or distort the careful balance of resolution 242 (1967). That was the problem that the United States delegation had found with the nineteen-Power draft resolution, which, by overemphasizing only one part of resolution 242 (1967)—the part concerning the withdrawal of troops and the non-acquisition of territory by force—could very well run the risk of altering the carefully worked-out balance of the Council resolution. Therefore the United States Government, which valued the roles of both the Assembly and the Council in dealing with the problem of the Middle East, would urge the Assembly to avoid taking any unrealistic action and to assist in the efforts to bring about a resumption of the discussions between the parties and to ensure an extension of the cease-fire arrangements between them. The United States was ready to pledge all its support for the successful conclusion of those discussions, hoping that all those concerned with a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict would make similar necessary efforts. To that end, the United States delegation was submitting a draft resolution, whereby the General Assembly would (1) endorse Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and urge that it be carried out in all its parts; (2) recommend to the parties and all concerned to exert their efforts, taking into account the obstacles and difficulties which had arisen since the cease-fire standstill agreement had gone into effect, to create, in accordance with that agreement,

the conditions necessary to establish the confidence in which the parties could resume discussions promptly, under the auspices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in accordance with the proposal contained in the Secretary-General's note of 7 August 1970; and (3) endorse the Security Council resolutions of 1967 on the cease-fire and recommend that the observance of the cease-fire, as contained in the note by the Secretary-General of 7 August, be extended for at least three months in order to facilitate the promotion of an agreement as set forth in resolution 242 (1967).

The representative of France stated that since the Charter had conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, there was no question of the Assembly assuming the role of the Council or making an attempt to weaken a Council resolution. However, it would be appropriate for the Council to seek the Assembly's views, and because of the exceptional circumstances the whole moral force of the Assembly would have to be expressed in its decision. The majority of the Assembly members also believed that a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East [conflict] would have to be based on resolution 242 (1967). Moreover, the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel had publicly confirmed their acceptance of that resolution. The four permanent members of the Security Council had concentrated their efforts as well, each one making very constructive proposals. However, the objective of those efforts had not been achieved and in the view of the French delegation this was due to a lack of determination to accept or to force acceptance of the Security Council's recommendations. It was on that point that the moral pressure of the General Assembly might be exerted and, if necessary, there might be a new action by the Security Council in the light of the lessons that had been learnt from the difficulties involved in the efforts to implement resolution 242 (1967). The United States initiative, which deserved full support, had called for a resumption of the Jarring mission and for a renewal of the cease-fire with standstill arrangements. It had

been said that those arrangements had been violated, but, while deploring any failure to fulfil one's commitments, the French delegation would point out that those arrangements had not had a broad enough basis. In the same way, the confidence that was supposed to have been shaken by the violation of those arrangements could be restored by a resumption of negotiations within the framework of the Council's resolution. Therefore, at the present time three steps were necessary for a settlement—the resumption of talks, the extension of the cease-fire and the implementation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967). It was in the light of those considerations that France would determine its position towards the draft resolutions before the Assembly.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that Israel's continued aggression against the Arab countries had impeded the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East and compelled the United Nations to adopt further steps to make Israel accept a settlement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). Israel's continued defiance of the United Nations had been made possible by the support given to it by the imperialist and neo-colonialist forces, whose aim was to hold back the progress of the States in the Middle East. In pursuance of that policy the United States had taken such measures as the deployment of its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the delivery of new Phantom aircraft and the extension of credit to Israel for the purchase of American technology and equipment. The United States had also given support to Israel's expansionist policy by making the withdrawal of Israeli troops conditional upon the rectification of borders, which was in contradiction to the principles of resolution 242 (1967) and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, when Israel had recently interrupted its contacts with Ambassador Jarring, using as its pretext the so-called violations of the arrangements reportedly made under the unilateral United States initiative, the United States had followed suit and had used Israel's negative position, to stop its participation in the practical work of the

working group at the four-Power talks. That united action of Israel and the United States was aimed at blocking the progress of the Jarring mission. Similarly, the United States had submitted its draft resolution in order to assist Israel in its defiance and block the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). The United States draft resolution had asked for the establishment of confidence, but confidence could not be established without the withdrawal of Israel's troops. Moreover, the difficulties and obstacles in the way of a settlement referred to in the United States draft were of Israel's making and were supported by United States insistence on military superiority for Israel in the area. Israel had been refusing to withdraw its troops, stating that it could do so only to recognized and safe borders. However, safe borders could not be achieved by a policy of expansion but only through international legal recognition and consolidation. They could be guaranteed by the setting up of demilitarized zones on both sides and by the presence of the United Nations at various points in those zones. Direct guarantees could also be given by the four permanent members of the Security Council or by the Council itself as a whole. All these elements of settlement could then be included in an agreement mutually binding on the parties and presented in the form of an international act, with corresponding guarantees for the implementation of its provisions. It was, therefore, necessary that Ambassador Jarring's mission be resumed, as had already been suggested by the Secretary-General, and endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of the four-Powers, who had urged that all steps be taken to ensure a peaceful settlement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967).

The representative of the United Kingdom said that, as the Secretary-General had pointed out in his statement of 23 October after his meeting with the four Foreign Ministers, resolution 242 (1967) provided the only basis for the settlement of the Middle East situation. However, a settlement could not be imposed on the parties—it would have to be contained in an agreement binding, according to international law, on all the parties and endorsed by the Security Council.

The two most important elements in the package agreement would be commitments to peace, on the one hand, and the withdrawal of troops and the determination of boundaries, on the other. First, the Arab States and Israel must agree to establish a genuine state of peace between them and must respect and recognize each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Secondly, on the question of withdrawal of troops and the determination of boundaries, the Assembly must be guided by the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Therefore Israeli forces must withdraw, with the possibility of minor rectifications, from territories occupied in 1967. Concerning Jerusalem, any settlement of the status of that city must incorporate as an essential part an agreement providing for freedom of access to all the Holy Places. The agreement should be endorsed by the Security Council and, as a guarantee thereof, a United Nations presence in the area could be established. Other prerequisites should be the establishment of demilitarized zones under the supervision of the United Nations, freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. Furthermore, any settlement must take into account the Palestinians, whose support should be enlisted by the Arab Governments concerned, and must provide for a just solution of the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom, while understanding the reasons for which the Middle East situation was brought before the General Assembly, could not, however, support any resolution which might in any way alter the carefully worked-out balance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

The representatives of the Arab States, in supporting the request of the United Arab Republic for consideration by the General Assembly of the situation in the Middle East, stated that some action by the Assembly was necessary in support of resolution 242 (1967), particularly on the question of Israel's withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. They also gave their support to the Palestinians in their fight for the right of self-determination, adding that the Palestinian

people had the same rights as others under the Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of Algeria, in particular, said that only the Palestinians, through their legitimate representatives, could decide about the future of their country and that there could be a positive discussion of the Middle East situation only when the General Assembly recognized the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to liberate their homeland and to maintain its territorial integrity. The representative of Saudi Arabia declared that, since the Palestinians formed the core of the problem, the Assembly should not ignore them if it wanted to find a just solution of the Middle East problem.

Several Arab representatives also deplored the United States military support of Israel which, they considered, had helped Israel in its aggression and in its defiance of the United Nations. The representative of Morocco, after referring to the reported delivery of 200 tanks and two squadrons of Phantoms to Israel by the United States, stated that those new weapons in the hands of Israel posed a great threat to the chances for peace in the Middle East. The Arab representatives also warned against making the Middle East a special arena for the playing of Power politics and against attempting to solve the problems of that area outside the United Nations.

Several representatives from African and Asian countries and from socialist States emphasized the need for a resumption of the Jarring mission and felt that Israel's demand for a rectification of the so-called violations of the standstill arrangements was only a pretext for sabotaging the mission.

A majority of the representatives participating in the debate thought that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) provided adequate grounds for the resumption of the talks and eventually reaching a settlement, and they added that it was incumbent upon the United Nations to take effective action to translate the provisions and principles of that resolution into reality. In that respect the representative of Brazil recalled the suggestion made by his Government in April 1970, in a memorandum to the



Secretary-General and the Security Council, concerning the desirability of the establishment by the Council of subsidiary organs, with the participation of the interested parties, to deal with the essential aspects of disputes. He added that there was no reason why the Council should not, in the case of the Middle East, give serious consideration to such a possibility. He added that it would be within the Council's powers to associate the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with the work of a subsidiary organ that it might decide to establish. He felt that the General Assembly might consider making a recommendation to that effect.

On 3 November, the representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a revised text of the nineteen-Power draft resolution of which the People's Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone had also become sponsors. The revised text contained a new operative paragraph 2 by which the General Assembly would reaffirm that the establishment of peace required respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area; the original paragraph 2 was revised and under it the Assembly would recognize that respect for the rights of the Palestinians was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; the original paragraph 4 was deleted and a new paragraph 6 was added by which the General Assembly would appeal to the parties to cease fire for a period of three months in order to facilitate the task of the Special Representative.

On the same day the representative of Argentina submitted a draft resolution co-sponsored by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Under the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly would (1) express its full support of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and affirm the need for the speedy implementation of all its provisions, in the spirit of

justice and equity with which it was imbued; (2) also express its full support of the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East to carry out his mission to promote agreement for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); (3) request the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume discussions with the Special Representative in order to enable him to carry out as soon as possible his mission to promote agreement for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) in its entirety; (4) support the Security Council resolutions of 1967 concerning the cease-fire and recommend, in order to facilitate promotion of the agreement envisaged in resolution 242 (1967), that the cease-fire mentioned in the Secretary-General's note of 7 August 1970 should be scrupulously observed and should be extended for three months, with the addition of suitable measures for the proper supervision of its observance, including, if possible, the use of United Nations observers now stationed in the region; (5) request the Secretary-General to report to the Council within a period of two months and to the Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

In submitting the above draft resolution, the representative of Argentina, on behalf of the sponsors, stated that neither the United States draft nor the first twenty-one-Power draft before the General Assembly had the requisite impartiality needed to meet the present situation and also the approval of the Assembly. The sponsors had drawn the inspiration for their draft from the traditional position of the Latin American group, which had always tried to approach the situation in the Middle East constructively and in a balanced way; they had been guided by the wish to maintain the balance of resolution 242 (1967) and to assist the Jarring mission to achieve its objective by securing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

On the same day the representative of France submitted amendments to the first twenty-one-Power draft resolution. Under the French amendments: (1) the third pream-

bular paragraph would be deleted; (2) in the fifth preambular paragraph, the words "by the armed forces of Israel" would be deleted; (3) operative paragraph 2 would be replaced by a new paragraph in which the General Assembly would reaffirm that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles, (a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; (4) the fourth French amendment had already been incorporated in the revised text of the twenty-one-Power draft resolution; (5) a new operative paragraph 6 should be added by which the Assembly would recommend to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they might enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967); and (6) in operative paragraph 8 the words "taking steps" would be replaced by the words "making arrangements".

On 4 November, Ghana joined as a co-sponsor of the twenty-one-Power draft resolution. On the same day the representatives of Senegal and Nigeria stated that the sponsors of the twenty-two-Power draft resolution had accepted the amendments submitted by France and that those amendments had then become part of the draft resolution. Under the amended text, the General Assembly would (1) reaffirm that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored; (2) reaffirm that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles: (a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknow-

ledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; (3) recognize that respect for the rights of the Palestinians was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; (4) urge the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which provided for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East in all its parts; (5) call upon the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts; (6) recommend to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they might enter into talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative with a view to giving effect to resolution 242 (1967); (7) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months and to the General Assembly as appropriate on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of resolution 242 (1967); and (8) request the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant articles of the Charter, to ensure the implementation of its resolution.

On 4 November, the General Assembly proceeded to vote on the three draft resolutions before it. The representative of the United States announced that his delegation did not wish to press its draft resolution to a vote. The twenty-two-Power draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 57 to 16, with 39 abstentions, as resolution 2628 (XXV). The Latin American draft resolution was rejected by a roll-call vote of 49 to 45, with 27 abstentions.

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## **United Nations Security Council Report on the Situation in the Middle East, 16 June 1970–15 June 1971<sup>1</sup>**

November, 1971

### **CHAPTER TWO: THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

#### **A. Communications, reports of the Chief of Staff and discussion by the Council concerning the status of the cease-fire**

##### **1. COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL**

*Communications to the Council from 16 June  
1970 to 15 June 1971*

3. In a letter dated 30 June 1970 (S/9852), Jordan charged that Israel jet aircraft had attacked and strafed a bus carrying civilians on a main road in the northern part of the Jordan Valley. As a result of that attack, two persons had been killed and thirteen wounded. Jordan further charged on 13 July (S/9864) that Israel jets had attacked an Arab village of Kufr Awa and the suburbs of Irbid with rockets and heavy machine-guns, killing 7 persons and wounding 27.

4. In a letter dated 16 July (S/9869), Jordan stated that thirteen farmers had been wounded during a raid by Israel jet aircraft on the market place of a village in the northern part of Jordan.

5. In a letter dated 20 July (S/9879), Israel stated that, following an agreement signed on 7 July between Jordan and the terror organizations, attacks launched from Jordanian territory against Israel villages in the Jordan and Beit Shean Valleys had increased, totalling 114 during the period from 7 to 20 July, and that Israel had been compelled to act in self-defence against the bases of those attacks. Israel added that Jordan's complaints to the Security Council (S/9864 and S/9869) were designed to serve

as a smoke-screen to conceal Jordan's responsibility for the continued bloodshed and suffering on both sides.

6. In a letter dated 29 July (S/9894), Jordan charged that mines laid on 28 July by an Israeli patrol, which had crossed the border in the area of a village in the northern part of the Jordan Valley, had exploded the following day under two civilian cars and had caused injuries to twelve civilians.

7. In a letter dated 18 August (S/9912) Jordan submitted to the Security Council a list of further Israeli violations of the Armistice Agreement and stated that more than 100 attacks had been carried out between 11 April and 28 July by shelling, bombing, strafing, infiltration and mining. Those attacks, which had resulted in the killing of 28 Jordanians and the wounding of 111, reflected a deliberate policy on the part of Israel to undermine and sabotage recent international political efforts.

8. In a reply dated 24 August (S/9916), Israel stated that, since 20 July, 225 additional acts of aggression against it had been carried out from Jordanian territory and that 105 of those attacks had taken place since 7 August, when a new international effort had been initiated to maintain the cease-fire to which Jordan was a party. After reserving its right to act in self-defence, Israel stated that the observance of cease-fire was binding on all who were a party to it.

9. In a letter dated 28 August (S/9921), Jordan charged that Israel jet aircraft had carried out raids against areas in the Jordan Valley, resulting in civilian casualties, in a further effort to undermine international political efforts.

#### **2. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE ISRAEL-UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SECTOR**

10. From 16 June to 8 August 1970, the day when the standstill cease-fire agreement entered into effect in the Suez Canal sector, the Secretary-General issued supplemental information received on an almost daily basis from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), containing reports

<sup>1</sup> Text of Chapter Two, "The Situation in the Middle East." of the 1970–71 annual *Report of the Security Council*; U.N. doc. A/8402, paras. 3–128. (The remainder of calendar year 1971 is covered in the report for 1971–1972, relevant portions of which are to be included in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.)

on the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. Those reports (S/7930/Add. 778, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790, 792, 794, 798, 800, 801, 803, 805, 807, 809, 811, 815, 817, 819, 821, 823, 825, 829, 831, 833, 835, 837, 839, 840, 842, 844, 846, 848, 850, 852, 854, 856, 858, 860, 862, 864, 866, 868, 870, 872, 875, 877, 879, 881, 883, 885 and 887) related to firing incidents in which artillery, mortar, machine-guns and rifles had been used by both sides. They also indicated that aerial activity in the Suez Canal sector had been intensified. In most cases, the reports identified the aircraft as Israel forces Phantom and Skyhawk jet aircraft, which had carried out attacks with bombs, napalm and cannon fire against targets on the West Bank. During those attacks there had been anti-aircraft fire from the United Arab Republic forces. The reports also stated that there had been shots at or near United Nations observation posts on either side of the Canal, although no military personnel of either side had been at the vicinity of the post at the time of the incidents. As a result, damage had been inflicted on some of the United Nations observation posts, equipment and installations.

11. In supplemental information dated 16 July (S/7930/Add. 839), the Secretary-General, after having received a report from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, stated that he had to announce with deep shock and regret the tragic death of Lt.-Colonel J.E. Bögvad of Sweden, a United Nations military observer in charge of the Kantara Control Centre, who had been killed that day when a reconnaissance party led by him had come under small-arms fire from the United Arab Republic forces' positions in the area of Observation Post Blue. At the same time, Major R.S. Fox of New Zealand, an Operations Officer in UNTSO Headquarters, had received wounds in his left arm. In supplemental information dated 4 August (S/7930/Add. 874), the Secretary-General issued a further report, incorporating the report of the Board of Inquiry that had been set up to examine the circumstances surrounding the death of Lt.-Colonel Bögvad.

12. In its report, the Board of Inquiry

stated that at 1130 GMT on 16 July, Lt. Colonel J.E. Bögvad of the Swedish Army, Officer-in-charge of the Kantara Control Centre on the East Bank of the Suez Canal, had led a reconnaissance party consisting of three UNTSO officers and three Israeli liaison officers to select a new site for the possible reopening of Observation Post Blue on the East Bank. The Senior United Arab Republic Liaison Officer had been notified on 11 July of the reconnaissance mission, and his concurrence had been received on 15 July. On its way back from the former location of the Observation Post Blue, the reconnaissance party had stopped to discuss the possible new site for that post when, at 1145 GMT, a single shot had been fired from the West Bank, followed shortly by machine-gun fire, which had been directed at the party and had lasted until 1153 GMT. Major Fox had been wounded in his left arm and Lt. Colonel Bögvad had died in the course of duty as the result of being hit in the throat by a bullet. From the evidence before it and from its own independent inquiries, the Board concluded that the bullet had come from a machine-gun position on the West Bank in an area manned by United Arab Republic forces that had directed fire at the reconnaissance party.

13. In a note dated 7 August (S/9902), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic had informed his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, that they had agreed to observe strictly the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council effective 7 August until at least 5 November.

14. During the period from 8 August 1970 to 10 March 1971, the reports issued by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Suez Canal sector related mainly to the relocation or reopening of United Nations military observation posts that had been closed temporarily in that sector. In supplemental information dated 25 August 1970 (S/7930/Add. 907), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO announced the reopening of Observation Post Blue, which had been closed on 7 June 1970. In supplemental information

dated 1 and 23 September (Add.915 and 938), he announced the reopening of Observation Posts Charlie and Mike, which had been closed respectively on 7 August and 25 September 1969. In supplemental information issued respectively on 11 January and 2 February 1971 (S/7930/Add.1043 and 1066), he announced the relocation of Observation Post Hotel and the Ismailia Control Centre, and in supplemental information dated 22 February (S/7930/Add.1085), he announced the reopening of Observation Post Pink, which had been closed temporarily on 6 February 1970.

15. During the same period, only one complaint from Israel (S/7930/Add.893) of a cease-fire violation in the Suez Canal sector was reported.

16. In supplemental information dated 10 March 1971 (S/7930/Add.1104), the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the Suez Canal sector had been quiet since 8 August 1970, although during that period there had been a number of overflights by one party or the other. He felt that in the circumstances, it was advisable to resume the practice of reporting to the Security Council concerning the Suez Canal sector which had prevailed before 8 August 1970. It was the Secretary-General's hope that his reports might be helpful during a period when the maintenance of quiet was crucial to efforts that were being made then to find a peaceful settlement in the whole area. He then reported that although there had been no ground activity in the Suez Canal sector, Israel aircraft and one unidentified aircraft had crossed the Canal from east to west and that the Israeli overflights had been confirmed by several United Nations observation posts.

17. In supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO issued between 19 March and 15 June (S/7930/Add.1111, 1115, 1117, 1120, 1128, 1130, 1134, 1138, 1144, 1153, 1154, 1162, 1164, 1166, 1168, 1174, 1179, 1182, 1186, 1188, 1209, 1211 and 1220), little or no ground activity was noted, but, from time to time, there were reports of some aerial activity over the Suez Canal sector involving the crossing

from east to west by Israel jet aircraft and their recrossing minutes later from west to east; similarly, there were reports of overflights by United Arab Republic jet aircraft over Israel's positions on the East Bank. Some of those aerial incidents were reported by United Nations military observers, and occasionally they were the subject of complaints by one party against the other.

### 3. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

#### (a) *Communications to the Council and request for a meeting*

18. By a letter dated 4 September 1970 (S/9924), the representative of Lebanon transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon. After charging that Israeli armed forces had committed fifty-eight acts of aggression against Lebanon during the preceding two weeks, the Foreign Minister stated that Israel's aggressive actions were increasingly assuming the dimensions of actual military hostilities and were no doubt a prelude to the resumption of hostilities on the other fronts. They were directed not only against Lebanon and the other Arab countries but against those of the great Powers that were trying to preserve world peace against a possible extension of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The tragic experience that Lebanon had been undergoing on its frontiers was a test of the effectiveness of the Security Council's efforts to ensure that right should prevail. Although Israel claimed that it respected Lebanon's frontiers, it was, in fact, constantly violating those frontiers, and those violations were calculated to imperil the social, political and economic stability of Lebanon.

19. In a letter dated 5 September (S/9925), the representative of Lebanon stated that at 1300 hours, local time, that day, two infantry companies of Israel armed forces, under heavy air support, had penetrated Lebanese territory to a distance of 7 kilometres, bombing civilian installations and opening roads for Israel military use. In view of that grave situation, endangering the peace and security of Lebanon, he request-

ed the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

*(b) Consideration at the 1551st meeting  
(5th September 1970)*

20. At its 1551st meeting on 5 September 1970, the Council included the complaint by Lebanon in its agenda. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

21. At the beginning of the meeting, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had received two cabled messages from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the matter on the Council's agenda. The first message reported that on 5 September the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received from the Lebanese authorities a message to the effect that on 4 September Israel aircraft had attacked the Lebanese region of El-Arkoub, which it had subjected to heavy artillery bombardment, causing material damage. When the bombardment had ceased, an Israel mixed infantry and armoured force had penetrated the region, destroying the road network in the area and blowing up several houses. Up to 0930 GMT, the Israel forces had not withdrawn from the territory. Lebanon had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to have its charges confirmed by United Nations military observers and called for the immediate withdrawal of the Israel unit from Lebanese territory. The Chief of Staff had instructed the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission to provide two United Nations military observers for on-the-spot enquiries. However, up to 1500 GMT on 5 September, the Assistant Israel Defence Force Liaison Officer had not had any information on the alleged incident. In the second message, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the Assistant Israel Defence Force Liaison Officer had informed him, at 1705 GMT on 5 September, that all Israel forces had withdrawn from Lebanese territory. The Secretary-General recalled that, during the meeting of the Council on 12 May 1970 on a similar question, he had stated that he

had long sought to increase substantially the number of United Nations observers on both sides in that area but without success. That, he added, accounted for the fact, among other things, that he could not provide the Council with detailed information of actions such as those that were then in progress in the area.

22. The representative of Lebanon stated that a few hours after he had transmitted to the President of the Security Council the letter from Lebanon's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel ground and air forces had launched an attack on Lebanese territory and had reached the village of Kfarchouba, 4 kilometres within Lebanon's borders. The Israeli forces were continuing their aggression and had penetrated another 7 kilometres within the borders, bombing civilian centres and populations. In face of that aggression, the Lebanese army had entered into action against the Israel forces and, according to a message he had just received, they were still engaging them on Lebanese territory. Israel's unwarranted attack on Lebanon had resulted in two civilians being killed and others wounded, in addition to causing considerable material damage to civilian installations. The situation created by Israel's aggression constituted a test of the Security Council's ability to ensure the security and independence of small nations. In the past, when aggression had been committed against it, Lebanon had sought guarantees as promised by the Charter. It therefore asked the Security Council to discharge its responsibility by calling for immediate and complete withdrawal of all Israel forces from Lebanon and by strongly condemning Israel's acts of aggression against Lebanon in violation of the Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the Council. Since by paragraph 3 of resolution 280 (1970) the Council had warned Israel that it would consider taking effective measures in case of a repetition of armed attack, Lebanon demanded further the application against Israel of Chapter VII of the Charter.

23. The representative of Israel stated that Lebanon had merely attempted to dramatize a minor patrolling incident that was justified by the free hand given to the terrorists by the Government of Lebanon. The adoption by

the Security Council of resolution 280 (1970), which was inequitable and one-sided, had given encouragement to the terrorist organizations. Since then, more than 200 acts of aggression had been committed from Lebanese territory against Israel, resulting in the killing of fifteen Israeli civilians and five military personnel, and the wounding of thirty-eight civilians and fifty-five military personnel. The terrorist activity in the area corresponded to the proclaimed design of terrorist leaders to sabotage the diplomatic efforts then being made to reach a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis. Members of the Security Council were aware of the Cairo agreement between Lebanon and the Palestinian commandos that had provided the terrorists in Lebanon with a base for their activities against Israel. That agreement had declared that the armed struggle of the Palestinians was in Lebanon's interest and, accordingly, Lebanon had undertaken to co-operate in the installation of supplies and rest and aid posts for the commandos. In view of the continuous attacks from Lebanese territory and the admitted helplessness of Lebanese authorities, Israel had been compelled to exercise its right of self-defence. It had sent a small unit of its forces to carry out a search-and-comb mission in the foothills of Mount Hermon. Those units had been evacuated from Lebanon's territory after having completed their mission. In that minor action, the Lebanese army had not been directly involved. It was incumbent upon Lebanon to prevent the use of its territory by irregular and regular forces for aggression against another Member State of the United Nations.

24. The representative of Spain stated that from the statements of the Secretary-General and the representatives of Lebanon and Israel it was evident that an invasion of Lebanon had taken place and that Israel had not denied it. After recalling that when, in a similar situation last May, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its armed forces from Lebanon, assurances had been given that the withdrawal had been completed when the Council took up the question. However, the facts later proved that the withdrawal had not been

completed. Bearing in mind that an invasion had occurred in violation of the Charter and even though a withdrawal might have been initiated, the Council could not remain inactive because of its past experience. Therefore his delegation was proposing a draft resolution which it would ask to have put to a vote immediately. The draft resolution submitted by Spain (S/9928) read as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Demands the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory."*

25. The representative of France supported the Spanish proposal.

26. The representative of Israel stated that, inasmuch as he had already informed the Council that Israeli forces had evacuated Lebanese territory, the draft resolution proposed by Spain was divorced from reality. It would be unfortunate if the Council should vote and adopt a draft resolution that was marked not only by an absence of equity but by a refusal to take cognizance of the plain facts of the situation.

27. The representative of Spain reiterated that the penetration by the armed forces of a State into the territory of another State was a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the Council should proceed to a vote and call for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.

28. The representative of the United States considered that the Spanish draft resolution was being presented in haste and before there had been an opportunity to ascertain through UNTSO what the precise situation was along the border. In view of the conflicting evidence, his delegation would abstain on the Spanish draft resolution, making it clear, nevertheless, that his delegation's abstention in no way detracted from his Government's continued and full support for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Lebanon.

**Decision:** *At the 1551st meeting, on 5 September 1970 the draft resolution submitted by Spain (S/9928) was adopted by 14 votes to none, with one abstention (United States), as Security Council resolution 285 (1970).*

29. After a vote, the representative of the

United Kingdom stated that despite the conflict of evidence, it was appropriate to adopt the draft resolution, inasmuch as the armed incursion into Lebanon had not been denied. If the Israeli forces had withdrawn, all would welcome it; if they had not, then there was every reason for the Council to demand their immediate withdrawal. Nevertheless, his delegation deplored all actions that were likely to impede the progress of Ambassador Jarring's mission and negotiations for an eventual settlement, including breaches of the cease-fire by the *fedayeen*.

30. The representative of Lebanon thanked the members of the Council for their support and expressed regret that one delegation had been unable to support the principle of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of independent and sovereign States, particularly when that delegation professed to be working for peace in the Middle East.

31. The representative of the United States, exercising his right of reply, stated that the abstention of his delegation was not related to the principle of withdrawal. The facts about the withdrawal were unfortunately in dispute. If the Israeli forces had withdrawn, that would be welcome. If not, then it was the view of his delegation that they should withdraw immediately.

32. In a report dated 7 September (S/9929), the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had received a cable from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO stating that the Lebanese authorities had informed UNTSO officially that Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanese territory as of 0700 GMT on 6 September 1970 and that, in the absence of United Nations observers in the area, there could be no direct observation by them of the circumstances of that withdrawal.

(c) *Subsequent communications to the Council*

33. In a letter dated 28 December (S/10063) addressed to the President of the Security Council, Lebanon stated that, early that morning, a company of Israeli forces, carried by two helicopters, had attacked a village in southern Lebanon, killing two civilians and wounding two others, besides destroying several houses. The letter added that, since its

attack two years earlier on the International Airport at Beirut, Israel had repeatedly attacked Lebanese territory with the aim of disrupting the peaceful life of the population and deliberately extending the area of conflict.

34. In a letter dated 30 December (S/10067), Israel stated that although Lebanon, under the cease-fire agreement, was committed to prevent the use of its territory for attacks against Israel, it was a matter of common knowledge that Lebanese territory, particularly villages in southern Lebanon, were being used as bases for terrorist aggression against Israel. On several occasions throughout 1970, Israel had drawn the attention of the Council to such acts. In recent weeks there had been serious increase, and since 26 November 18 attacks by Lebanese-based saboteurs had taken place. It was against one of those bases that Israeli defensive action had been taken on the night of 27 December. As had been indicated previously to the Security Council and to Lebanon, Israel's policy regarding Lebanon continued to be based on scrupulous maintenance by both sides of the cease-fire, but Lebanon was continuing to facilitate terrorist activities against Israel.

35. In a letter dated 15 January 1971 (S/10078), Lebanon stated that helicopter-borne Israeli armed units had attacked a village located about 43 kilometres north of the Lebanon's southern borders and, after having been engaged by Lebanon armed forces, had withdrawn at three o'clock that morning. The Israeli authorities had attempted to justify their action by alleging that on 2 January six *fedayeen* coming by boat from that village had landed just south of Lebanon borders and that five had been captured. However, investigation by Lebanese authorities had established that Israel had engineered the whole plan. Thus, Israel had first initiated an incident and then used it as a pretext for military action against Lebanon.

36. In a letter dated 19 January (S/10081), Israel stated that since 30 December there had been a further intensification of sabotage raids and of shelling attacks on Israeli villages carried out from bases inside Lebanon. In all their activities, the terrorists had full support



and encouragement from the Lebanese Government. As for the complaint made by Lebanon in its letter of 15 January, Israel stated that, on 2 January, five raiders coming from the Lebanese harbour of Sarafand, which served as a base of operation against Israel, had attempted to land in northern Israel but had been captured. During the night of 14/15 January, an Israeli unit had acted to disable that terrorist base and, in the ensuing encounter, had killed ten saboteurs and wounded many others. Six Israeli soldiers had been injured. Thus, Israel's action had not been against a civilian village, as alleged by Lebanon.

37. In a letter dated 5 February (S/10101), Lebanon stated that on 1 February Israeli patrols had crossed the Lebanese border and attacked villages in southern Lebanon, blown up some houses and abducted some civilians in another premeditated encroachment upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

38. In a letter dated 8 April 1971 (S/10172 and Corr.1), Lebanon charged that on 5 April an Israeli patrol, in violation of the Armistice Agreement and in defiance of relevant United Nations resolutions, had crossed the borders at three points and had blown up several houses in three different villages.

39. By a letter dated 12 April (S/10075), Israel drew the attention of the Security Council to the intensification of attacks committed against it from Lebanese territory and stated that, between 11 March and 10 April, 19 such attacks had been carried out by terror organizations from bases in Lebanon against Israeli villages, compelling Israel to take self-defence measures to protect the lives and property of its citizens.

#### 4. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA

*Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of cease-fire from 16 June 1970 to 15 June 1971*

40. In supplemental information issued during the latter part of June 1970 containing reports on the situation in the Israel-Syria sector (S/7930/Add. 779, 781, 783, 785, 787, 789, 781, 793, 795 and 796 and Corr.1),

the Secretary-General indicated that firing incidents involving the use of machine-guns, mortars and small arms had taken place in that sector.

41. In supplemental information on the Israel-Syria sector dated 25 June (S/7930/Add. 797), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported intensification of fire exchanges involving the use of heavy and light weapons along the cease-fire line. On the following day, he reported (S/7930/Add. 799) that the Officer-in-charge of the Tiberias Control Centre had informed him that Israeli tanks, supported by armoured personnel carriers, had crossed the cease-fire line and had been seen up to 5 kilometres inside Syrian territory. At the same time, a heavy exchange of fire had been observed accompanied by raids carried out by Israeli aircraft along the cease-fire line. The report added that Israeli forces had occupied Observation Post Sierra that day at 1230 GMT and had asked the United Nations military observers to cease radio transmissions. Protests had been filed with Israeli authorities. Later that day, Israeli forces had withdrawn from the area of the post. A further report (S/7930/Add.802) indicated that, as a result of the intense firing exchange, the installations and equipment at several United Nations observation posts had been damaged. The Chief of Staff stated in the same report that there had been further intensification of aerial activity in the Israel-Syria sector, involving the flight of Israeli jet aircraft over Syrian lines attacking Syrian positions and troops. During those attacks, the observers reported that anti-aircraft fire from the Syrian forces had been heard. The report added that Israeli authorities had informed the Chief of Staff that during those incidents ten Israeli soldiers had been killed and 32 wounded, in addition to one aircraft lost. Cease-fire arrangements proposed by the United Nations military observers, although accepted by the parties on several occasions, had not been effective.

42. In further supplemental information issued by the Secretary-General from the end of June until the end of December 1970 (S/7930/Add. 804, 806, 808, 810, 812, 814, 816, 818, 820, 822, 824, 826, 828, 830, 832,

834, 836, 838, 841, 843, 845, 847, 849, 851, 853, 855, 857, 859, 861, 863, 865, 867, 869, 871, 873, 876, 878, 880, 882, 884, 886, 888-892, 894-906, 908-914, 916-937, 939-1030), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that sporadic firing incidents in the Israel-Syria sector had continued to take place almost daily, and that, in almost all cases, the firing had been initiated by Israeli forces. During the same period, there had been light aerial activity and, on some occasions, installations and equipment of United Nations military observation posts had received slight damage as a result of the firing.

43. In supplemental information dated 7 January 1971 (S/7930/Add.1038), the Secretary-General circulated a report received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO regarding an incident that had taken place at United Nations Observation Post Four in the Israel-Syria sector. At 2305 GMT on 2 January, United Nations military observers had been held up in their living caravan by three persons carrying sub-machine-guns of an unidentified type. Before leaving 20 minutes later, the three intruders had taken a number of items from the caravan and had ripped the radio communication set. Subsequently, the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission had reported the incident to the Syrian delegate, who had promised to inform the Syrian authorities. All inquiry conducted by UNTSO on 3 January, the report continued, had failed to establish the identity of the intruders and the UNTSO findings had been communicated to the authorities of Syria and Israel with the request that they provide the results of their inquiries. On 5 January, Israel had reported that, a search conducted on 3 January at the site of the post, had revealed tracks of three persons wearing regular Syrian boots leading towards Syrian territory. The Israeli investigators had found some of the items that had been taken from the United Nations caravan. On the following day, the Syrian authorities had informed the Mixed Armistice Commission that, as a consequence of their investigations, they could assure the Commission unreservedly that the intruders had not been members of the Syrian regular army. The Chief of

Staff reported that, despite inquiries conducted into the incident, it appeared that the identity of the intruders could not be established. In forwarding the report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General expressed his concern about that type of incident and warned against the serious implications it could entail for the cease-fire observation operations in the sector. The United Nations observers, he added, did not carry arms and depended for their safety on their special status and on the protection provided by the parties to the cease-fire. The Secretary-General concluded by appealing to all concerned to take all possible measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.

44. By a letter dated 18 January (S/10080), Syria denied a charge, broadcast by Radio Israel, to the effect that, on the night of 2/3 January, three regular Syrian soldiers had entered United Nations Observation Post Four and stolen some items from the room. In a letter dated 23 January (S/10088), Israel stated that an investigation carried out by Israeli authorities following the raid on the observation post had revealed that tracks of three persons wearing regular Syrian boots had led investigators towards Syrian territory. Those findings had been published in document S/7930/Add.1038. As the Syrian lines were well guarded by a network of military positions, Israel's letter stated, no armed elements could operate from within the Syrian military zone without the knowledge of the Syrian authorities. Syria's responsibility for all violations of United Nations observation posts by elements operating from within its lines were clearly evident. By a letter dated 26 January (S/10090), Syria stated that the "investigation" carried out by Israel and its allegation that Syria had been responsible for violations of United Nations observation posts were one-sided and constituted an attempt to distort facts. Furthermore, the supplemental information report of 7 January referred to by Israel had denied the Israeli allegation and had, in fact, concluded that the identity of the armed intruders could not be established.

45. During the period from 1 January to 15 June 1971, the Chief of Staff continued to

issue reports containing supplemental information (S/7930/Add. 1031–1037, 1039–1042, 1044–1065, 1067–1084, 1086–1103, 1105–1110, 1112–1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1121–1127, 1129, 1131–1133, 1135–1137, 1139–1143, 1145–1152, 1155–1161, 1163, 1165, 1167, 1169–1173, 1175–1178, 1180, 1181, 1183–1185, 1187, 1189–1208, 1210, 1212–1219, 1221, 1222). Those reports indicated that light and sporadic firing incidents had taken place in the Israel-Syria sector and that, in almost all cases, the firing had been initiated by Israel. The reports also indicated that aerial activity in the sector had been very light and that no damage had been inflicted upon the United Nations observation posts or their installations and equipment.

## **B. Question concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israeli-occupied territories and related matters**

*Communications to the Council from 16 June 1970 to 15 June 1971*

46. During the period covered by this report, the Security Council and the Secretary-General received a number of communications from Arab countries protesting Israel's policies regarding the treatment of the civilian population in the territories it occupied, alleging the arrest, detention, dispossession and expulsion of civilians and the confiscation or expropriation of Arab lands. Israel rejected some of these charges and made other charges.

47. In a letter dated 18 June 1970 (S/9841), addressed to the Secretary-General, Israel referred to its letters of 9 June (S/9832 and S/9833) concerning the composition of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and reiterated its stand that the Committee was irregular and biased in character, inasmuch as two members of that Committee, Somalia and Yugoslavia, had fully identified themselves with Arab belligerence against it. It further stated that, on 14 June, the third member, Ceylon, had announced its decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Israel.

48. By letters dated 16 and 23 July, 12 and 27 August 1970 and 8 January 1971 (S/9868,

S/9885, S/9904, S/9919, S/10013 and S/10073), addressed to the Secretary-General, Jordan charged Israel with having forcibly expelled Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories in violation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. With each letter, Jordan submitted a list that included the names, ages and the villages or towns of those who had been expelled by Israel, some after arbitrary detention and torture; and with its letter of 8 January 1971 (S/10073), Jordan submitted a cumulative list of 329 civilians who it stated, had been expelled during the year 1970 from Gaza and the West Bank of Jordan.

49. By a note dated 27 July (S/9888), the President of the Security Council drew the attention of members of the Council to resolution 10 (XXVI) on the question of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East, including the report of the Special Working Group of Experts, which had been adopted on 23 March 1970 by the Commission on Human Rights. In that resolution, the Commission had requested the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council the text of that resolution and the report of the Special Working Group of Experts established under the Commission's resolution 6 (XXV) to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 in the occupied territories.

50. In a letter dated 3 August 1970 (S/9897), Jordan stated that on the previous morning Israeli tanks had opened a barrage of artillery fire aimed at the Coptic convent and other neighbouring convents in the occupied area of Jericho, resulting in the destruction of parts of the convent and damage to other properties. Jordan added that Israeli authorities had been forcing Moslem worshippers to evacuate the Ibrahim Mosque in Al-Khalil (Hebron) to make room for Jewish fanatics and Israeli soldiers and, as part of the policy of changing the character of the occupied area, had taken over two Islamic shrines, the Mosque of Rachel's Tomb on the Jerusalem-Al-Khalil road and Joseph's Shrine in Nablus.

51. In a reply dated 17 August (S/9913), Israel denied the Jordanian charge, stating that, since 1968, Christian monasteries in the area of the Baptism Site on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line had been harassed by firing from saboteurs. The Coptic convent had been the target of an attack on 24 May 1969 and had later been damaged by explosive charges laid by saboteurs from Jordan on 4 August and 11 December 1969. As a result, the monastery had been abandoned, and, on the night of 1/2 August 1970, it had been occupied by a terrorist squad which had been driven out by Israeli forces.

52. By a letter dated 16 September (S/9941), representatives of 14 Arab States stated that reports in the world press had indicated that hundreds of men and women had been arbitrarily arrested in the Israeli-occupied Arab territories and that the entire population of those areas was being threatened with further measures of repression. They pointed out that, in view of the persistent refusal of the Israeli authorities to permit international fact-finding missions to visit the occupied territories in fulfilment of their mandate under various United Nations resolutions, press reports remained the principal means by which the world community could be informed about Israeli measures. They added that Israeli actions constituted a grave escalation of its violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and all relevant United Nations resolutions.

53. In a letter dated 23 September (S/9948), Israel rejected the charges of the Arab States and stated that, during the month of September, five attempts at hijacking civil passenger aircraft had been committed by members of an Arab terrorist organization operating in and from Arab countries bordering on Israel. The four planes successfully hijacked had subsequently been blown up in Arab countries, and their passengers had been held hostage. Faced with that situation, Israel had no choice but to take precautionary measures against the activities of the terrorist organizations and apprehended suspected associates for questioning, all of whom had been freed by 18 September.

54. By a letter dated 15 October (S/9963),

the representative of Syria transmitted the text of an article published on 11 October in the *Sunday Times* of London which stated that a report released by the International Committee of the Red Cross had accused Israel of blowing up Arab towns, villages, camps and houses in the occupied territories in defiance of the Geneva Conventions, acts which the International Committee of the Red Cross had protested to Israel.

55. By a letter dated 8 February 1971 (S/10105) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the United Arab Republic charged Israel with acts of repression and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. In support of his charges, he transmitted the text of an article published on 2 February 1971 in *The New York Times*, as well as excerpts from articles published in an Israeli newspaper and from the Israeli Parliament Protocol.

56. In a reply dated 9 February (S/10107), the representative of Israel described the charges of the United Arab Republic as unfounded and unsubstantiated. His Government's policy was to ensure normal life and development for all the inhabitants under its control, including those of the Gaza Strip and Sinai, despite the efforts of Arab terrorist organizations to make life intolerable for the local populations.

57. In a letter dated 10 February (S/10111), the representative of 14 Arab States charged that Israel was intensifying its oppressive measures against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by imposing long and intolerable curfews on several areas, including a refugee camp called "Beech Camp", which had been under total curfew since the end of December 1970. Moreover, several thousand Arab inhabitants had been arrested and taken to detention areas in the Sinai desert, where they had suffered cruel interrogation and inhuman punishment.

58. In a reply dated 11 February (S/10113), the representative of Israel again rejected the charges and stated that the repetition of allegations by the 14 Arab States had not brought those allegations nearer reality.

59. By a letter dated 12 February (S/10119), the representatives of Jordan and

Lebanon transmitted excerpts from a dispatch published on 11 February in the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, which reported that 10 Israeli soldiers had been tried for "unjustified violence" in the Gaza Strip and that three officers had been reprimanded for having failed to quell "excesses committed by soldiers" belonging to their unit.

60. In a reply dated 19 February (S/10128), the representative of Israel stated that the Arab Governments, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, had been directly responsible for the acts of terror and murder carried out in the Gaza area because they allowed the existence of bases on their territory from which terrorist operations had been carried out. That had been admitted by many captured terrorist squads; thus, the Israeli Government had no choice but to take measures to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the population of the Gaza area and to maintain public order there.

61. In a letter dated 26 February (S/10133), the representative of Jordan stated that Israel had carried out arbitrary measures of confiscation of lands and mass transfer of population within the occupied territories. The Israeli Military Governor had informed leaders of the few villages north of Ramallah that his Government intended to confiscate lands with the aim of resettling a number of Palestinian refugees from Gaza. Such measures were against the will of the people, in total disregard of United Nations resolutions and in violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

62. In a reply dated 3 March (S/10142), the representative of Israel stated that no confiscation or expropriation of lands had occurred in the areas cited by Jordan and that his Government had no intention of taking such steps in the future.

63. In a letter dated 26 March (S/10165), the representative of Jordan, referring to his letters of 8 January 1971 (S/10073 and S/10074) pertaining to the forcible deportation by Israel of Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories, stated that from 8 December 1970 to 24 February 1971, 111 Arab inhabitants from Gaza and the West Bank of Jordan, whose names he attached, had been

forcibly expelled and deported to the East Bank of Jordan under inhuman conditions.

64. In a letter dated 21 May (S/10203), the representative of Jordan said that Israel continued to intimidate, harass and suppress the inhabitants of the occupied territories, to confiscate their property and to deport them in great numbers to the East Bank of Jordan. The letter gave a list of names of 28 persons who had been expelled by Israel on 18 March and 20 April and requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

65. In a letter dated 25 May (S/10210), the representative of Israel stated that, because of its policy of ensuring the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas referred to in the Jordanian letter, Israel had taken steps to prevent terrorism and to hinder individuals engaged in terrorist activities from disturbing peace in those areas.

66. By a letter dated 28 May (S/10213), the representative of Syria stated that, in violation of relevant United Nations resolutions and of article 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Israel had continued its policy of colonizing Arab lands with intensive settlement, coupled with the demolition of Syrian towns and villages in the Golan Heights and the forcible eviction of the inhabitants from those areas. Citing an official Israeli publication and press reports on Israeli building activities in the area, Syria requested that its letter be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

67. In a further letter dated 8 June (S/10219), the representative of Syria stated that, according to reports published by competent organizations, Israel had been barring the distribution by the International Committee of the Red Cross of medicaments to the population in occupied territories. That report had been confirmed by resolution

WHA 24.33, adopted on 18 May 1971 by the Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly, which had drawn attention to Israel's violation of the basic human rights of the refugees and the inhabitants of the occupied territories, constituting a severe impediment to their health, and had called upon Israel to refrain from any interference with the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the occupied territories. After stating that Israel's actions in the occupied territories constituted acts of genocide in terms of Israeli legislation itself, Syria requested that its letter be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

68. In a letter dated 10 June (S/10220 and Corr.1), the representative of Israel stated that the charges contained in the letters from Syria only reflected the belligerent attitude of Syria towards Israel and towards the peace-making efforts under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. In rejecting the Syrian letter of 28 May, Israel stated that its true character was illustrated by its charge that four students from the Syrian University had been arrested by Israel but its failure to mention that the captured students were members of the Al-Fatah organization. With regard to the letter in which Syria referred to resolution WHA 24.33 adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 18 May 1971, accusing Israel of barring the distribution of medicaments, Israel denied the charge and stated that the resolution had been adopted by only 43 member States and that the majority of the WHO membership had dissociated itself from its text. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had also denied that charge in a letter to WHO, a copy of which was attached to Israel's letter.

69. In a reply dated 15 June 1971 (S/10224), the representative of Syria stated that Israel's policy of lawlessness had been condemned or deplored in no less than 39 United Nations resolutions since 14 June 1967. On 15 March 1971, the Commission

on Human Rights had condemned Israel for its continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including its policies aimed at changing the status of those territories. Moreover, since 1 July 1970, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had reported, in no less than 320 supplemental information reports to the Security Council, acts of aggression invariably committed by Israel against Syria. Unable to reject any of the facts brought to the attention of the Security Council concerning its activities in the occupied Golan Heights in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, Israel had sought to veil them by referring to Arab resistance to its occupation of the West Bank of Jordan and by attacking the Christian leaders of Syrian churches. In transmitting a letter from the International Committee of the Red Cross to refute the WHO resolution, Israel had overlooked the fact that the ICRC letter had not contested paragraph 3 of the resolution, which had drawn Israel's attention to the violation of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and inhabitants of the occupied territories that constituted a serious impediment to their health.

### **C. Communications and reports concerning the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places**

#### **1. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL FROM 15 JUNE 1970 TO 18 FEBRUARY 1971**

70. During the period covered by this report, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General received a number of communications related to the status of the city of Jerusalem. The Arab countries in general, and Jordan in particular, protested changes in the status of the city, charging that Israel had violated the resolutions of the United Nations on the matter. Israel, for its part, denied those charges. The Secretary-General issued two reports on the subject. These communications and the reports of the Secretary-General are noted briefly below:

71. In a letter dated 22 July 1970 (S/9883), addressed to the Secretary-General,

Jordan protested the levying by Israel of defence taxes on Jordanian citizens in the occupied city of Jerusalem, as well as measures taken by Israel to change the Arab character of the city. Jordan pointed out that in violation of Security Council resolution 267 (1969), which had condemned all measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city, Israel had neither rescinded those measures nor refrained from taking new measures to change the political, legal and demographic status of the city. In view of Israel's non-compliance with that resolution, Jordan added that the Security Council must take effective measures to stop such irresponsible behaviour.

72. By a letter dated 28 October (S/9969), Jordan, after reiterating that Israel was continuing its defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, forwarded the text of an article published in the *International Herald Tribune* of 17/18 October, depicting some of Israel's construction plans in the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem. Jordan added that the only way that those illegal measures could be stopped was to end Israeli occupation of Jerusalem.

73. In a joint letter dated 8 January 1971 (S/10075), Jordan and the United Arab Republic protested Israeli measures to change the character of the city of Jerusalem and drew attention to a so-called "master plan" of Jerusalem providing for the settlement of 200,000 Jewish people in the occupied lands in and around Jerusalem, which had been criticized by such leading journals as the *Economist* and *The Times* of London. They also pointed out that the process of establishing Israeli settlements was not limited to Jerusalem and the area around it but was being extended to the rest of the occupied territories with the intention of making them permanent Jewish villages. After quoting from statements of Israeli authorities as reported in the press, they pointed out that those statements made it clear that Israel had no intention of withdrawing from the occupied territories and was doing everything to obstruct Ambassador Jarring's peace mission.

74. In a letter dated 17 February (S/10123), Jordan stated that, according to information

it had received, Israel had bulldozed parts of the premises of Government House, the headquarters of UNTSO situated in no-man's land in Jerusalem, and requested a report by the Secretary-General on that violation, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969).

75. In a reply dated 18 February (S/10126), Israel stated that the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem had not been affected in any way by development activities being undertaken in Jerusalem. In another letter dated 19 February (S/10127), Israel recalled that it was Jordan, in fact, which, on 5 June 1967, had violated and occupied the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem and that the Secretary-General had reported on that issue to the Security Council during its 1347th meeting.

## 2. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

76. On 18 February, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 256 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), submitted a report (S/10124) concerning Jerusalem that included texts of his notes to the representative of Israel and Israel's replies thereto.

77. In his note of 10 December 1970, the Secretary-General stated that, after publication of a press report on 19 August 1970 concerning a master plan for an area within and outside the Old City walls in which the Government House area had been classified as a residential area, the representatives of UNTSO, on instructions from the Secretary-General, had approached the Israeli authorities on the matter and, on 12 November, had been informed that the plan in question had not yet been made public. The Israeli authorities, however, gave no reply to the question whether the plan affected the Government House premises. In order to meet his responsibilities to the Security Council and to the General Assembly in relation to the status of the City of Jerusalem, the Secretary-General requested Israel to supply him with detailed information and a copy of the reported master plan. The Secretary-General underscored the im-

portance he attached to the status of the United Nations premises at Government House and requested clarification from the Israeli authorities on whether the reported master plan envisaged any development affecting those premises, either in its current limits or those before June 1967.

78. In a reply dated 8 January 1971, Israel indicated that its position as regards Government House continued to be the same as in August 1967 and that no changes were contemplated in the arrangements made then.

79. On 26 January, the report continued, the Secretary-General had sent two further notes to Israel. In the first note, after referring to his request of 10 December 1970 for a copy and information on the reported Jerusalem master plan, he recalled that, in its reply of 8 January, Israel had not responded to that request. After calling Israel's attention to his reporting responsibilities under the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the Secretary-General again requested a copy of the plan, together with detailed information thereon.

80. The second note dealt with the United Nations premises at Government House. The Secretary-General stated that in so far as the assurances proffered by the Government of Israel in reply to his note of 10 December did not safeguard the right of the United Nations to possession of the whole of the Government House premises as constituted on 5 June 1967, they did not cover the obligations of the Secretary-General in that matter. The Secretary-General had been informed by UNTSO that, on 3 January 1971, a bulldozer had commenced working on the south-eastern side of those premises. That activity, together with the recent press reports about the immediate implementation of a housing project in the area, indicated a further and serious violation of the inviolability of the United Nations premises under the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In view of the irreparable physical change that the work currently undertaken might bring to those premises, the Secretary-General, while reserving the

right of the United Nations to claim compensation for any ensuing loss or damage, requested suspension of those works. The Secretary-General continued to maintain that there was no basis for any curtailment of United Nations rights to Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967. Accordingly, in the exercise of his responsibility in the matter, he requested the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises. The report stated that no reply had been received by the Secretary-General to the above two notes as of 18 February 1971.

### 3. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL FROM 19 FEBRUARY TO 19 APRIL 1971

81. By a joint letter dated 23 February (S/10130 and Corr.1), Jordan and the United Arab Republic addressed the Secretary-General concerning Israel's continued confiscation of Arab land and property and construction of settlements, housing, hotels and industrial projects in violation of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. They stated that, according to Israeli press reports, Israel was planning to build 3,000 housing units and 13 hotels on confiscated Arab land in East Jerusalem and that Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem were being evacuated to be replaced by Jewish families. Those measures appeared to be a prelude to the so-called master plan for Jerusalem, which envisaged the construction of a total of 35,000 units on confiscated private and public Arab lands. They were designed to accommodate 122,000 new Jewish immigrants and to make Jerusalem a "Jewish city". Israel's declared intention to annex Jerusalem and its environs was in disregard of the will of the people and in complete defiance of the United Nations.

82. In a reply dated 1 March (S/10138), Israel stated that, contrary to the charges in the above letter, Jewish and Arab lands alike had been expropriated without discrimination for public development and housing and that some Arab and Jewish owners had already received full compensation. With regard to the existence of a "master plan" for Jerusalem, the preparation of a



development plan for any city was a customary procedure of planning throughout the world, and the municipal authorities of Jerusalem were doing their best in that direction through consultations with world-renowned experts and architects.

83. In letters dated 2 and 8 March (S/10139 and S/10149), Jordan charged Israel with further confiscation of Arab property. It stated that, according to an Israeli press report, Israel authorities had issued an order transferring the shares of the Electricity Company of the District of Jerusalem belonging to the Jordanian municipality to the Israeli municipality. That action constituted a change in the status of Jerusalem forbidden by United Nations resolutions.

84. In a reply dated 5 March (S/10146), Israel stated that it had been necessary to change the status of certain elements of the public ownership of the Electricity Company in order to ensure the continuity and operation of electrical services to the people of Jerusalem. However, no change had taken place in the ownership status of private persons.

85. In a letter dated 2 March (S/10140), Syria recalled the request made by the Secretary-General to Israel for information and a copy of the "master plan" for Jerusalem and stated that Israel had so far failed to reply to the two notes of the Secretary-General. Moreover, Syria protested, according to press reports Israel was continuing to implement the "master plan" in Jerusalem, including work being carried out within United Nations premises.

86. By a letter dated 9 March (S/10152), Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a resolution on the Palestine question adopted at a joint meeting of the International Muslim Organizations held at Mecca, Saudi Arabia, from 11 to 15 February 1971. The resolution, after urging that efforts should be continued for the liquidation of all traces of Israel's aggressions, expressed the fullest support for the Palestinian commandos. It also appealed for "a halt to the continuance of the inhuman Zionist aggres-

sion, specially to save the Holy City of Jerusalem from Judaization and to save the Arab citizens of the Holy City from becoming refugees".

87. In a reply dated 16 March (S/10158), Israel stated that the seven-Power letter contained allegations that were misleading and reflected the belligerent policies pursued by the Arab States against Israel. Despite the abnormal conditions in the region and the security problems caused by those policies, Moslem institutions in Jerusalem and its Moslem residents and visitors enjoyed the liberty and facilities to pursue their normal activities. After rejecting the charge that it was "Judaizing" Jerusalem, Israel stated that for generations Jews had constituted the majority of the population of the City, where the Jewish ethos was deeply marked. Israel had been treating with reverence all that was related to the Holy Places of all faiths and had made great efforts to ensure their improvement and safety.

88. In a letter dated 15 March (S/10159), Spain took the position that Israel's continued occupation of Jerusalem could not justify certain measures of assimilation designed to change the nature and alter the status of the city, and urged that Israel should be required to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular resolution 267 (1969). Spain's concern, it was stated, arose from its traditional interest in the situation and problems of the Holy Places.

89. In a reply dated 19 March (S/10160), Israel stated that Spain's letter reflected a persistently pro-Arab policy; it denied having taken any measures of assimilation in Jerusalem and stated that urban improvements were designed to serve all its residents.

90. In a letter dated 23 March (S/10163), Spain, recalling its support of the implementation of resolution 242 (1967), stated that Israel, contrary to relevant United Nations resolutions, had been taking advantage of its occupation of Jerusalem in order to alter the status and character of that city through so-called urban improvements.

91. In a reply dated 29 March (S/10167), Israel stated that Spain had overlooked

aggression against Jerusalem by Jordan and the United Arab Republic and the uprooting of the Jewish population and destruction of the Jewish quarter of the Holy City during the Jordanian occupation. Ignoring those facts, Spain had continued to pursue a pro-Arab policy in the Middle East.

92. In a reply dated 30 March (S/10168), Spain stated that Israel had not cited examples of any United Nations resolutions violated by Jordan or the United Arab Republic in so far as they related to the character and status of Jerusalem. Spain's expression of concern about measures to change the true nature and alter the status of Jerusalem was in agreement with a comment made in *l'Osservatore Romano*.

93. In a letter dated 1 April (S/10169), Jordan stated that excavations by Israel adjacent to the southern and western walls of Haram-Esh-Sharif were endangering Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Moslem Museum and El-Fakhriyya Minaret. Jordan also cited reports that Israel might enact a law confining the Moslem Holy Places in the Haram-Esh-Sharif area to Al-Aqsa and the Dome of Rock Mosques, thus placing the Plaza of Haram-Esh-Sharif and other religious and cultural places, which were held sacred by Moslems all over the world, outside the designation of Holy Places and subject to Israeli regulations and excavations. Israel's excavations and the contemplated legislation violated the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954. They were also contrary to the resolution adopted on 10 October 1962 by the Executive Board of UNESCO with regard to cultural properties, particularly in the Old City of Jerusalem, calling on Israel to desist from any archaeological excavations, transfer of such properties and any change of their cultural and historical character.

#### 4. FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

94. On 20 April, the Secretary-General issued an addendum (S/10124/Add.1) to his report of 18 February concerning a further exchange of communications between

him and Israel concerning the status of Jerusalem and the United Nations premises at Government House. He stated that on 8 March he had received a note from Israel in reply to his two notes of 26 January, in which Israel stated that its position remained as it had been conveyed to the Secretary-General in previous communications on the subject. The Israel Government placed on record its reservations to the various legal and other considerations advanced by the Secretary-General, particularly to claims of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises of Government House. The addendum also set forth the reply that the Secretary-General had addressed to Israel on 12 April noting that, presumably because of the reservations referred to in its note of 8 March, Israel had not provided a copy of the reported Jerusalem master plan or any information about it and that Israel's reply had contained neither a direct response to his request to return the whole of the United Nations premises at Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967 nor any precise information on the exact terms of the reservations held by Israel with regard to that request. Furthermore, the Secretary-General observed that the reservations made in Israel's note had been raised for the first time and had not been mentioned when part of the Government House premises had been returned to the United Nations. In fact, in its letter of 22 August 1967, Israel had not mentioned any reservations, although the Secretary-General had expressly preserved the rights of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the Government House premises as constituted when UNTSO had been forced to evacuate them on 5 June 1967. He further observed that it was in reliance on the preservation of those United Nations rights that he had authorized the return of the UNTSO staff to a lesser area. He added that as Israel's reservations related in part to legal considerations, one way of resolving any differences would be to resort to the procedure of settlement provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In view

of Israel's current works within and bordering upon Government House property as constituted on 5 June 1967 and the absence of a direct reply to his specific request in his notes of 26 January 1971, the Secretary-General was constrained to reiterate his request for the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises.

95. By a letter dated 1 June (S/10215), Syria transmitted the text of an appeal made by the spiritual leaders of the Christian community of Syria, drawing to the attention of the Christians of the world the illegal measures taken by Israeli authorities in order to "Zionize" the City of Jerusalem and to expel its Christian and Moslem inhabitants in violation of United Nations resolutions. In a reply dated 10 June (S/10220 and Corr.1), Israel stated that the visits of 80,000 Arabs to Israeli-held territories and Jerusalem the previous summer did not lend credence to the Syrian charges.

**D. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East**

96. During the period covered by this report, general statements concerning the situation in the Middle East were brought to the attention of the Security Council, which are briefly noted below.

97. By letters dated 21 July, 22 and 24 September and 9 October 1970 (S/9881, S/9947, S/9949 and S/9958), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Security Council the texts of statements made on the situation in the Middle East by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, TASS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

98. In its statement on 21 July, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, after expressing its concern at the situation in the Middle East, stated that Israel, with encouragement from imperialist Powers, had not complied with a single United Nations resolution and thus was obstructing all efforts towards a political settlement.

99. In the statements transmitted on 22 and

24 September, TASS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, respectively, expressed concern at the reported concentration of the United States Sixth Fleet in the eastern part of the Mediterranean in conjunction with the clashes then taking place in Jordan between Jordanian army units and Palestinian detachments and warned that any intervention in Jordan from outside would be a threat to the independence of the countries of the Middle East and would complicate the international situation.

100. In the statement transmitted on 9 October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated that the campaign of slander launched against the Soviet Union in the United States with regard to alleged violations of the cease-fire agreement in the Suez Canal sector was a deliberate attempt to mislead the world public opinion and to provide Israel with another pretext for breaking its contacts with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East.

101. By a letter dated 9 October (S/9962), the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its meeting in Addis Ababa from 1 to 3 September 1970. In one of those resolutions, OAU had called for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and appealed to all States members of OAU to support the efforts made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In another resolution, OAU condemned the illegal arrest and detention of two Algerian citizens by Israel authorities in violation of international conventions on civil aviation and requested their immediate and unconditional release.

102. In a letter dated 8 December (S/10031), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement on the Middle East situation that had been adopted in Berlin on 2 December by the participants in the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the

Warsaw Treaty. The statement expressed concern about the increased tension in the Middle East as a result of Israel's policy and urged effective support for the Arab peoples, including the Palestinians, in their struggle to liberate their occupied territories.

103. In a letter dated 28 February 1971 (S/10136), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement of the Soviet Government concerning the situation in the Middle East. The statement noted that, in its reply dated 21 February to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, Israel had refused to commit itself to withdrawal from all occupied territories, thus showing its unwillingness to assume a part of the commitments required for a political settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

104. In a letter dated 4 March (S/10144 and Corr.1), the representative of Bulgaria transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement issued by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it was stated that the United Arab Republic's readiness to conclude a peace treaty with Israel and its constructive proposals provided a basis for a political solution of the Middle East crisis. On the other hand, Israel's rejection of those proposals and its refusal to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territories had shown that Israel was persisting in its policy of aggression and its defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

105. By a note dated 11 March (S/10154) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Iran transmitted the text of a statement made by his Government on the situation in the Middle East. After pointing out that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories was an essential factor for the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the statement welcomed the Rogers plan of 1 October 1970 and the positive attitude taken by the Government of the United Arab Republic towards implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Iran hoped that Israel would reciprocate by taking similar steps, so that an agreement might be reached and warned that if Israel were to persist in maintaining

its negative attitude, Iran would have no alternative but to condemn Israel's unconciliatory attitude.

106. By a letter dated 6 May (S/10188), the representative of Iraq transmitted the text of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Grand Rabbi of the Jewish community in Iraq, in which it was stated that Israel had been waging a vicious campaign against Iraq and its Jewish citizens. The Grand Rabbi confirmed the loyalty of Jewish-Iraqi citizens to Iraq and stated that Zionism was a political and racial ideology and had all too often done Judaism and its followers disservices by distorting its conceptions and history and even resorting to violence against Iraqi Jews in order to force them to emigrate to Israel.

#### **E. Activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East**

107. In a note to the Security Council dated 7 August 1970 (S/9902), the Secretary-General stated that a peace proposal initiated by the Government of the United States of America had been accepted by Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic. Ambassador Jarring, his Special Representative to the Middle East, having received confirmation of those acceptances, had, accordingly, informed the Secretary-General by letter that the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel had advised him of their agreement (a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, they would designate representatives to discussions to be held under his auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as he might recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties; (b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions was to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and

(2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with resolution 242 (1967); (c) that, to facilitate his task of promoting agreement as set forth in resolution 242 (1967) the parties would strictly observe, effective 7 August until at least 5 November, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. The Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring therefore believed that there was a reasonable basis on which to renew immediately the Special Representatives' contacts with the parties.

108. In a report dated 4 January 1971 (S/10070), the Secretary-General described the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East since the Security Council's adoption of resolution 242 (1967). After recalling his previous reports on the subject issued on 22 December 1967, 17 January, 29 March, 29 July and 3 December 1968 (S/8309 and Add.1-4), the Secretary-General stated that, in the first meeting between the parties and the Special Representative in December 1967, Israel had expressed the view that a settlement of the Middle East question could be reached only through direct negotiations and that there could be no question of withdrawal of its forces prior to such a settlement. The United Arab Republic and Jordan had insisted that there could be no question of discussion between the parties until Israel had withdrawn its forces to positions prior to 5 June 1967. Faced with those conflicting positions, Ambassador Jarring had sought to obtain from the parties an assurance that they would implement resolution 242 (1967), in the hope that such a declaration would be regarded as a basis for discussions. Subsequently, he had received from the parties a number of formulations of their position on the issues. Although Israel considered direct negotiations the best way to achieve the objectives of resolution 242 (1967), it was willing that that be done in a meeting convened by the Special Representative. The United Arab Republic would accept indirect negotiations, provided Israel first declared clearly that it would implement the resolution. Jordan had expressed a similar

view. After consulting the Secretary-General at Headquarters, the Special Representative had returned to the area at the beginning of March 1968 and made efforts designed to hold conferences within the framework of the Security Council's resolution in Nicosia or elsewhere. Returning to New York, he had pursued his contacts with the representatives of the parties. However, those contacts had failed to break the deadlock between the parties both as regards the interpretation of the resolution and the manner in which it should be implemented. After a short visit to various capitals in Europe, where he had met with the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, he had returned to New York on 22 July, then had again returned to the Middle East, where he had undertaken a second round of discussions in August 1968, which had taken the form of an exchange of questions and comments between the parties through him. The opening of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in New York had provided the Special Representative with another opportunity to hold meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the parties, who, however, had restated the positions of their respective Governments.

109. After resuming for a time his duties as Ambassador of Sweden to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Jarring had returned to Headquarters on 29 January 1969 and undertaken personal contacts with the permanent representatives of the parties and of other Member States. In a further visit to the Middle East in March and April 1969, he had submitted to the parties a series of questions designed to elicit their attitudes towards Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The texts of the questions and replies were annexed to the report. However, the replies he had received from the parties continued to show serious divergencies between them. He had therefore been compelled to conclude that the conditions for convening a useful series of meetings at that time did not exist. Consequently, he had returned to Moscow to resume his duties. However, he had returned to Headquarters from 12 September to 8 October

1969 and from 10 to 26 March 1970 but had found no new elements that would permit him to organize active discussions with the parties.

110. On 3 April 1969, the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America had begun a series of meetings on the Middle East question that had continued at various intervals up to the date of the report. After each such meeting, the Chairman had reported to the Secretary-General on the substance of the discussions, and the Secretary-General had kept Ambassador Jarring informed.

111. The report also gave an account of the United States peace initiative undertaken in June 1970 and of its acceptance by the parties in August, as noted above, and also referred to the arrangements made by the United States Government and accepted by the United Arab Republic and Israel for a standstill cease-fire.

112. Subsequently, Ambassador Jarring had invited the parties to take part in discussions opening at New York on 25 August and had met on that day with each of their representatives. However, the representative of Israel had stated that he had been instructed by his Government to return to Israel. On his return on 8 September, he had informed Ambassador Jarring that Israel's acceptance of the United States peace initiative was still in effect but that, in view of Egypt's grave violation of the cease-fire standstill agreement and inasmuch as the strictest observance of the cease-fire standstill agreement was one of the central elements of the American peace initiative, Israel would be unable to participate in the talks under the auspices of the Special Representative so long as the cease-fire standstill agreement was not observed in its entirety and the original situation restored.

113. While the Special Representative's talks with the representatives of the Arab States had continued, they could not be productive because of lack of contact with the Israeli representative. However, he had held a wide range of contacts with representa-

tives of the parties and of other Member States during the commemorative session of the General Assembly and during the Assembly debate on the Middle East.

114. After the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) the Special Representative had invited representatives of the parties to resume talks under his auspices. Although the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic had informed him of their willingness to do so, the representative of Israel had stated that the matter was under consideration by his Government. On 19 November, the Special Representative had addressed a letter to Israel's Foreign Minister formally inviting the Israeli Government to resume its participation in the discussions. On 30 December, Ambassador Jarring had received in Moscow, where he had returned to resume his duties as Sweden's Ambassador, a letter from Israel's Foreign Minister stating his Government's readiness to resume its participation in the talks. The texts of those communications were annexed to the report.

115. In letters dated 20 and 25 January 1971 (S/10083 and 10089), the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Jordan transmitted to the Security Council the texts of an aide-mémoire and a statement submitted respectively by their Governments to Ambassador Jarring. After reiterating their willingness to implement resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, they stated that it was essential that Israel should also express such willingness, particularly with respect to its withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by its forces since 5 June 1967. In order to reach a lasting settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), Israel must repudiate its policy of territorial expansion and must agree to a just settlement for the Palestine refugees, in accordance with United Nations resolutions; the termination of all claims or states of belligerence; and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area. The two States considered that the Security Council should provide security to all States in the area through establishment of a United Nations peace-

keeping force, with the possible participation of the four permanent members of the Security Council, and of demilitarized zones astride the borders.

116. On 1 February, the Secretary-General reported (S/10070/Add.1) to the Security Council that his Special Representative had resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January. At the request of the Israeli Government, meetings had been held in Jerusalem with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from 8 to 10 January. The Israeli Government had presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "essentials of peace", and, subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan had presented papers containing their views concerning the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Ambassador Jarring had also held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, whose Government was directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

117. The Secretary-General stated that while recognizing that the resumed discussions were still at an early stage, he had found grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the parties had resumed the talks through his Special Representative in a serious manner and that there had been some progress in the definition of their positions. The parties, who had already indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967), were describing in greater detail their view of their obligations under that resolution. After expressing the hope that the talks would continue in a constructive manner, the Secretary-General appealed to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

118. By a letter dated 2 February (S/10098), the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Security Council the text of an aide-mémoire he had communicated the previous day to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, contrasting the United Arab Republic's readiness to implement resolution 242 (1967) as a

"package deal" with Israel's continued refusal to implement that resolution and its evasion of the issue of total withdrawal. It was therefore incumbent on the Security Council to take the necessary measures required to assist the Special Representative in the discharge of his mandate.

119. In a letter dated 2 March (S/10141) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of the United Arab Republic, after referring to the appeal by the Secretary-General to the parties to withhold fire and exercise military restraint, stated that, in that connexion, he was forwarding relevant portions of a statement made on 4 February by the President of the United Arab Republic. In that statement, the President, declaring that the United Arab Republic could not let the cease-fire be renewed automatically as long as no progress had been made in Ambassador Jarring's efforts, but noting the "cautious optimism" of the Secretary-General and the views of some members of the Security Council that there was a possibility of achieving real progress, stated that he had decided to maintain the cease-fire for a period not exceeding 30 days, ending 7 March.

120. In a further report dated 5 March 1971 (S/10070/Add.2), the Secretary-General, after referring to his report of 1 February, in which he had appealed to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970, stated that, in response to that appeal, Israel had announced on 2 February its intention to preserve the cease-fire on a mutual basis and that the President of the United Arab Republic had declared his decision to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March. The Secretary-General further stated that his Special Representative shared his cautious optimism that the parties had seriously been defining their positions and wished to move forward to a permanent peace, but noted with growing concern that each side had been insisting that the other should make certain commitments before it would formulate the provisions of a final peace settlement. Israel had insisted

that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards it the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement had been reached on those points, it would then be possible to discuss other points, including the refugee problems, questions relating to secure and recognized boundaries and withdrawal and other arrangements. The United Arab Republic had continued to maintain that resolution 242 (1967) contained provisions to be implemented by the parties and for its part had once again expressed its readiness to carry out its obligations on a reciprocal basis. In the view of the United Arab Republic, Israel had persisted in its refusal to implement resolution 242 (1967), inasmuch as it would not commit itself to withdraw its forces from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967; nor would it commit itself to implement the resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem.

121. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan had shown similar divergence of views. Israel had stressed that Jordan should enter into a peace agreement that would specify each party's direct and reciprocal obligation; and Jordan, after emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, had expressed the view that an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories was the essential first step towards peace.

122. At that stage of the talks, the Secretary-General stated, his Special Representative had reached the conclusion, which he shared, that the only possibility of breaking the imminent deadlock arising from the different views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments that seemed to be the inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement. Thereafter, it would be possible to proceed to formulate the terms of a peace agreement not only for the topics covered by the commitments made by the parties

but for other topics, in particular the refugee question.

123. In an identical aide-mémoire to Israel and the United Arab Republic on 8 February 1971, Ambassador Jarring had requested them to make to him certain prior commitments. His initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement. Israel would commit itself to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would commit itself to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of resolution 242 (1967).

124. In an aide-mémoire received by the Special Representative on 15 February, the United Arab Republic indicated that it would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly from resolution 242 (1967), and that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, provided Israel would likewise give commitments covering its own obligations under resolution 242 (1967), including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

125. On 17 February, the Special Representative had informed Israel of the United Arab Republic's reply to his aide-mémoire, and, on 26 February, he had received from Israel a paper in which, without reference to the commitment that he had sought from Israel, it was stated that Israel had viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and had reiterated its readiness for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement. Israel also had given details of the undertakings which, in its opinion,



should be given by the two countries in that peace agreement. Israel considered that the stage had been reached when the two sides should pursue the negotiations in a concrete manner without prior conditions. On the crucial question of withdrawal, on which the Special Representative had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israel position was that it would give an undertaking to withdraw from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement and that it would not withdraw to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967. Israel's reply had been communicated to the United Arab Republic on 28 February.

126. After pointing out that, as a result of the above initiative, the problems to be settled had been more clearly identified and that there had been general agreement on some, the Secretary-General stated that he wished to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Government of Israel had not so far responded to the request of the Special Representative that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic. In view of that, the Secretary-General appealed to Israel to give further consideration to that question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative.

127. The Secretary-General concluded his report by appealing again to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

#### **F. Information concerning the consultations among the representatives of the four permanent members of the Security Council on the question of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East**

128. During the period under review, the representatives on the Security Council were regularly informed by the presiding member at the consultative meetings of the representatives of the four permanent members of

the Council—France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States—on the progress of those consultations on the question of promoting a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 in all its parts. In such cases all representatives taking part in the four-Power consultations were present.

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#### **Annual Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency Commissioner-General, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971 (Introduction)<sup>1</sup>**

##### **September, 1971**

1. In May 1971, the Agency completed twenty-one years of aid to the Palestine refugees,<sup>2</sup> under a mandate from the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> amid continuing uncertainty about

<sup>1</sup> Introduction, summarizing the contents of the full report, to the UNRWA Commissioner-General's Report as transmitted by Sir John Rennie on September 11; U.N. doc. A/8413, paras. 1–35.

(The remainder of calendar year 1971 is covered in the Commissioner-General's 1971–1972 annual report, relevant portions of which are to be included in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.)

<sup>2</sup> A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA's working definition, is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and means of livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition or the children or grandchildren of such refugees are eligible for agency assistance if they are (a) registered with UNRWA, (b) living in the area of UNRWA's operations, and (c) in need. [This and subsequent footnotes are part of the report.]

<sup>3</sup> Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work will be found in the following annual reports and other United Nations documents:

A. Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC. 25/6, parts I and II).

B. Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees: *Official Records of the General*

its ability to maintain its essential programmes. Finance was, as in the previous two years, a persistent preoccupation of the Commissioner-General, and developments in the financial position are described below (see paragraphs 5 to 10 below). Latterly, the Commissioner-General was able to share this preoccupation with the Working Group established by General Assembly resolution

*Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes*, vol. II (A/1060), p. 14.

C. Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (A/4121).

D. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787).

E. Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:

- (i) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/1451/Rev. 1);
- (ii) *Ibid.*, *Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A* (A/1905 and Add.1);
- (iii) *Ibid.*, *Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A* (A/2171 and Add.1);
- (iv) *Ibid.*, *Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A* (A/2470 and Add.1);
- (v) *Ibid.*, *Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A* (A/2717 and Add.1);
- (vi) *Ibid.*, *Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A* (A/2978 and Add.1);
- (vii) *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A* (A/3212 and Add.1);
- (viii) *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3686 and A/3735);
- (ix) *Ibid.*, *Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3931 and A/3948);
- (x) *Ibid.*, *Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4213);
- (xi) *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4478);
- (xii) *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4861);
- (xiii) *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/5214);
- (xiv) *Ibid.*, *Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5513);
- (xv) *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5813);
- (xvi) *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6013);
- (xvii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6313);
- (xviii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6713);
- (xix) A/6723 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security*

2656 (XXV) "to study all aspects of the financing of the Agency"; "to present an interim report to the General Assembly, not later than 14 December 1970, containing its recommendations on possible measures to be taken to prevent a reduction of the Agency's services in 1971"; "in the interval between the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly, to assist,

*Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*, documents S/8001 and Add.1;

(xx) A/6787 and Corr.1;

(xxi) A/7060;

(xxii) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/7213);

(xxiii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/7614);

(xxiv) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8013);

(xxv) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 35, documents A/8084 and Add.1.

F. Report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (A/8264).

G. Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

- 194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 212 (III) of 19 November 1948;
- 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December 1950;
- 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952;
- 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954;
- 916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957;
- 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958;
- 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959; 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961;
- 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962;
- 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965;
- 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966;
- 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967;
- 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968; 2535 (XXIV) of 10 December 1969;
- 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2672 (XXV) of 8 December 1970;
- 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970.

H. Pertinent Security Council resolutions:

- 237 (14 June 1967); 242 (22 November 1967).

I. Pertinent Economic and Social Council resolution:

- 1565 (I) of 3 May 1971.

as appropriate, the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in reaching solutions to the problems posed by the Agency's financial crisis," and "in consultation with the Secretary-General, the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the specialized agencies, to present a comprehensive report on all aspects of the financing of the Agency to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session." Since the Working Group's establishment, the Commissioner-General has maintained close contact, either directly or through the Agency's Liaison Office at United Nations Headquarters in New York, with the Chairman (Ambassador Nuri Eren of Turkey) and representatives of the other Member States in the Group (France, Ghana, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America). In May 1971, Dr. Laurence Michelmore retired as Commissioner-General after more than seven years' service in this capacity and 25 years' service with the United Nations. He was succeeded by Sir John Rennie, who had been Deputy Commissioner-General since November 1968.

2. The Commissioner-General hopes that the Agency's financial crisis and the concern for the Agency's future it has generated may have led to a wider understanding both of the plight of the Palestine refugees and of the nature of the Agency's operations. An emphasis on "UNRWA camps" and on "relief," while correctly conveying an impression of the refugees' displacement from their traditional homes and of their continuing need for help, has also contributed to certain misconceptions. It has not always been realized that UNRWA provides services in rather than administers "camps" (in which only 40 per cent of registered refugees live); that the "camps" are not extra-territorial areas under United Nations jurisdiction; that the inhabitants are normally free to move in and out now, as in the past; and that the responsibility for the maintenance

of law and order rests not with UNRWA, but with the Governments of the host countries of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and with the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Emphasis on "relief," on the other hand, has sometimes been taken to imply that the Palestine refugees have been maintained in idleness, a misconception that should have been dispelled by chapter III, section "O," of the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization for 1967-1968.<sup>1</sup> This emphasis has also tended to obscure the Agency's constructive programmes of education and training, which in 1971 account for about 47 per cent of expenditure and which both form the foundation for individual rehabilitation and contribute to economic and social development in many Arab countries. The threat to these programmes presented by the financial crisis has at least made better known their scale and their importance to the Palestine refugees.

3. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, the resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission and other moves towards the negotiation of a peaceful settlement, the varying fortunes of the *fedayeen* movements and the reactions of Governments in the region, the death of President Abdel Nasser, the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; these events and others that stirred the emotions of the Palestine refugees, raising or dashing their hopes, formed the background against which the Agency pursued its task. As is now usual, on several occasions during the year the Agency's operations were disrupted by violence.

4. Despite more frequent public recognition of the need to take account of the legitimate rights of the Palestine refugees in any political settlement, and the adoption of resolution 2672 C (XXV) by which the General Assembly recognized the entitlement of the people of Palestine to "equal rights and self-determination in accordance

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/7201)*, chapter III, section O.

with the Charter of the United Nations” and declared that “full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” there was by the end of the year little to lessen the frustrations of the refugees. The General Assembly at the same session called again on the Government of Israel to take immediate steps for the return of those displaced from their homes and camps but, although many were able to visit the occupied West Bank from east Jordan, there was, apart from the issue of a limited number of permits in cases of family reunion or special hardship, no change in the situation as regards return for residence; and a fifth year of separation from the West Bank, Gaza and the Quneitra area of Syria began in June for over 200,000 registered refugees (and for large numbers of other displaced persons) in east Jordan and in Syria. The day seemed as distant as ever when effect would be given to the General Assembly’s resolution (paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III)), adopted over 20 years ago, on 11 December 1948, and referred to in subsequent resolutions, “that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible....”

#### *Finance*

5. The nature of the Agency’s financial problem was described in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the report for 1968–1969<sup>1</sup> and paragraph 9 of the report for 1969–1970:<sup>2</sup> a growing school population and rising unit costs set against an income which had been increasing less rapidly and a declining working reserve, with, as a result, a precarious

cash position and the threat of substantial reductions in services. In view of the consequences for the Palestine refugees, the Governments of the host countries and the Agency if this threat became a reality, the Commissioner-General welcomed the establishment by the General Assembly of the Working Group whose terms of reference are given in paragraph 1 above.

6. The Working Group made an interim report<sup>3</sup> to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session after having held five meetings between 9 and 14 December 1970. The Group agreed that there should be concentration on the formulation of recommendations on possible measures to prevent reduction of the Agency’s services. It noted the existence of a cash or liquidity crisis as well as a longer-term budgetary problem and recommended, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly should make a renewed appeal to Governments to contribute for the first time or to increase their contributions and to make early payments; that the General Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to make advances from the Working Capital Fund for short-term assistance to meet the liquidity crisis; that the Secretary-General should be requested to make available to the maximum extent possible facilities of the Office of Public Information in order to disseminate information on the Agency’s humanitarian work; and that the General Assembly should urge all organizations of the United Nations system to study ways by which they might assist UNRWA or undertake activities helpful to the refugees which would lessen the financial burden of UNRWA, and also should request the Working Group to continue consultations with executive heads of other international agencies and United Nations programmes. The General Assembly, in resolution 2728 (XXV), endorsed the Working Group’s recommendations.

7. On 1 January 1971, the Director-General of UNESCO, with the authority of the Executive Board of UNESCO, launched an appeal for the funds necessary for

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda item 35, document A/8264.

maintaining and expanding the education services for Palestine refugees, which he described as "the most ambitious educational undertaking under international administration"; and in which UNESCO has been associated with UNRWA for over 20 years, "in order to provide these refugees with the education to which they have a right and thus equip them intellectually and morally to assume their basic human dignity and freedom despite the adverse circumstances in which they are fated to live."<sup>1</sup> The Director-General appointed, as a Special Consultant in connexion with his appeal, Ambassador Mansour Khalid (Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations), who has since been undertaking a series of visits to solicit contributions from Governments and private organizations. By 30 June 1971, contributions amounting to \$964,083 had been received or pledged in specific response to the appeal, in addition to other contributions on which the appeal may also have had an influence.

8. The Agency's financial year 1970 eventually closed with a deficit of nearly \$4.9 million,<sup>2</sup> income being above earlier estimates, but expenditure also being higher because of increased prices and wages and unforeseen emergency costs arising out of local disturbances. Thanks to early payment by a number of Governments of all or part of their contributions for 1971, the threatened cash crisis at the beginning of 1971 was averted, but the Agency entered the new financial year with a prospective deficit of about \$5.5 million.<sup>2</sup> By 30 June 1971, on the best estimate then possible, the deficit had been reduced to about \$2.4 million.<sup>2</sup> This encouraging improvement was the result of the various appeals made in the course of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, action by UNESCO, and the efforts of the Chairman and his colleagues on the Working

Group, which were together responsible for an increase in estimated income of \$4.6 million, against which had to be offset an estimated increase in expenditure of \$1.5 million. This increase in income included an allocation of food-stuffs from the World Food Programme's emergency resources made in response to an agreed application by one of the Governments of the host countries after consultation between the Chairman of the Working Group, the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme.

9. Other helpful developments were two resolutions, one Economic and Social Council resolution 1565 (L), adopted on 3 May 1971, "requesting the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the executive heads of specialized agencies, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the non-governmental organizations concerned to continue to consider appropriate ways and means of rendering all possible assistance to the Palestine refugees" and further requesting them "to include in their annual reports information on their possible present and future assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and on their activities that benefit the Palestine refugees;" the other, resolution WHA24.32, adopted on 18 May 1971 by the World Health Assembly, requesting "the Director-General of WHO to intensify and expand its programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East to the amount of at least one million dollars" from funds to be provided outside WHO's regular budget by means of special voluntary contributions, and deciding that "meanwhile emergency assistance to the maximum extent possible be given to the refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the appeal, see UNESCO document 87 EX/9, annex.

<sup>2</sup> These figures take account of the inclusion in expenditure of provision for subsidies to certain Governments (see paragraphs 199 and 200 of section F in chapter I [in the text of the report]).

<sup>4</sup> For the texts of the resolutions, [published as annex II to the report, see Documents 432 and 437 below].

10. In view of the progress made towards reducing the Agency's deficit for 1971, and after consultation with the Chairman of the Working Group at Agency headquarters in Beirut in March, the Commissioner-General deferred new reductions in services in order to allow time for the efforts of the Working Group and others to fructify. Bearing in mind that subsidies to Governments were already being withheld and that the orderly transfer of sanitation services to Governments would be dependent on their consent, the amount that could have been saved (at the expense of the refugees' welfare) by new reductions at that stage without touching either basic health services or education services would have been less than \$0.5 million in 1971. (In reference to reductions in administrative expenses attention is invited to paragraph 32 of the introduction to the report of the Commissioner-General for 1968-1969.)<sup>1</sup> The Commissioner-General believes that, especially in the circumstances described in the preceding paragraph, such reductions would have been regarded as an unjustified prejudgement of the success that might attend the Working Group's efforts and would have aroused controversy and turmoil detrimental to those efforts. It must be recognized, however, that the price of continued deferment may be further inroads into the Agency's slender working reserve.

11. In reporting to the Working Group on the financial situation at the end of May, the Commissioner-General invited the Group's attention to the ominous outlook for 1972. The budget estimates in chapter II below show that, on the basis of the programmes in the 1971 budget, expenditure will be of the order of \$51.1 million because of the increase in school population and higher costs, including an expected increase in the price of flour that will add over \$1 million. Assuming income at the level now estimated for 1971 (but deducting the one-time World Food Programme allocation of food-stuffs), there will be on that basis a deficit in excess of \$6 million.<sup>2</sup> It is clear,

therefore, that unless there is the assurance of a substantial increase in the Agency's income, most of the reductions referred to in the statement made by the Commissioner-General to the Special Political Committee on 1 December 1970<sup>3</sup> will be inevitable and that, as he then emphasized, education services will necessarily be included.

#### *General operations*

12. In Lebanon, the occupation of Agency property, to which reference was made in paragraph 16 of the introduction to the report for 1969-1970<sup>4</sup> continues. The Agency has made repeated representations to the Government on this matter, so far without effect, and has also drawn attention to the risks to which the withdrawal of Government authority from camp areas has exposed the Agency and its staff and to their longer-term implications for the efficiency of operations.

13. On the positive side, there has been an improvement in the situation at the Sibilin Training Centre in Lebanon, where, as mentioned in last year's report,<sup>5</sup> strikes by students and staff and a virtual breakdown in discipline were a cause of concern. For the academic year 1970-1971, the Centre was placed on a non-residential basis and there was no new intake. The Centre has operated satisfactorily during the year and a new intake of students can be accepted in 1971-1972.

14. In the Syrian Arab Republic, construction of concrete block shelters for the refugees in the Syrian emergency camps<sup>6</sup> was begun in February this year at the Sbneih Camp (outside Damascus), and the programme will be extended to other camps as well to replace worn-out tents. The project will cost approximately \$400,000 and will be financed partly from the special contribution for 1971 made by the Government of the

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the statement, see A/SPC/SR.738.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8013), para. 16.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 17.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 14.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/7614), para. 32.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote to paragraph 8.

Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup> and partly from private donations.

15. The confrontation between the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian organizations referred to in last year's report<sup>2</sup> reached a climax in September 1970, when there was sustained fighting between the Army and the *fedayeen* on a scale that involved the use of artillery and tanks. The Agency's operations in east Jordan were completely suspended for a period of 10 days, from 17 to 27 September 1970.

16. The Amman area was particularly affected by the conflict. There were heavy casualties, many of them among refugees, and large parts of the New Amman (Wahdat) Camp and its periphery were very severely damaged. There were casualties and damage also in the Jebel Hussein Camp in Amman and in Zerka and Irbed Camps, though not to the same extent as in the New Amman Camp. Public services, such as the telephone service and the electricity, power and water supplies ceased, and movement on the streets was prevented by fighting and, later, curfews. Agency staff in Jordan were unable to communicate with each other, or indeed anyone else, during those 10 days. In all, 13 Agency employees were killed between September and November.

17. From past experience with emergency situations, the Agency knew that the most valuable contribution it could make would be to restore its essential services. As quickly as possible, therefore, the Jordan Field Office set about restoring the food, medical and health services on which a large part of east Jordan's population—and almost half, and the needier half of the population of Amman—are, to a greater or lesser degree, dependent. Agency flour was also made available to needy non-refugees against eventual replacement by the Government, so as to tide the general population over the crisis. At the beginning of the emergency, there was a

pressing need for prepared meals, as many people had neither fuel, water nor the time to bake bread from their flour rations and the main bakeries were out of action. In these circumstances, UNRWA's emergency convoys from the West Bank, under the protection of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met a vital need. The first convoys, which brought sandwiches or hot meals and fresh food, also included gifts and voluntary contributions by many groups and individual Palestinians in the West Bank, including Agency staff members. The UNRWA/UNESCO Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre, just outside Amman, was made available as a temporary convalescent hospital. Schools were reopened as quickly as possible in tents, pending the urgent repair of school buildings, some of which had suffered severe damage. (For the extent of damage and losses incurred by the Agency, see paragraph 59.) The Irbed area was directly supplied with flour from the Agency's stocks in Damascus, owing to difficulties of movement between Amman and Irbed. The Agency was also able to help in other ways, such as by advising and co-operating with other agencies in emergency work, by lending supplies and vehicles and by making available its facilities for distribution.

18. It is an indication of the seriousness of the situation at the time in Jordan that the Agency was completely immobilized for a longer period than ever before (even at the time of the hostilities in June 1967 the suspension of Agency operations in the affected areas was of very limited duration and communications were hardly interrupted). The emergency in Jordan clearly showed the importance to the whole community of the Agency's logistical services.

19. During the year under report, members of the Agency's staff in Jordan were detained for varying periods, all but three after the September fighting. In some instances, the authorities entered the Agency's premises to make the arrests. There have been other instances of entry into and even occupation of Agency premises by both sides during the fighting in September. Parts of some premises were under occupation by the

<sup>1</sup> For further details, see chapter I, "Camps and shelter" [of the text of the report].

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013), para. 18.*

Jordanian authorities on 30 June 1971. Protests have been made to the Government.

20. A significant development for the Agency has been the return of Palestine refugees to the irrigated part of the Jordan valley, which had been abandoned by them in 1968 because of military activities there. The Agency was asked by the Jordanian Government to retore services to refugees in the area, but was obliged to reply that, while it would transfer services where possible, it could not in its present financial situation afford to establish new services. Elsewhere in Jordan, which has the highest number of refugees, the events of September and their consequences adversely affected prospects for employment.

21. The Agency's operations in Gaza were affected in January 1971 by the impact of security measures of unusual severity taken by the Israeli authorities after a deterioration in the security situation caused by persisting violence in which both Arabs and Israelis lost their lives. Stringent curfews were imposed, and part of the Beach Camp was cordoned off from 4 to 30 January 1971 while interrogations and searches, involving some demolition of shelters, took place. A number of refugees left the camp, but were allowed to return later. The Israeli authorities also issued an order declaring all camps to be closed areas, entry into and exit out of which would be regulated, but it has not so far been enforced strictly except when security operations have been in progress. Agency services in Beach Camp were interrupted between 4 and 7 January, but it was possible thereafter to distribute monthly rations at the normal level, and to increase supplementary feeding during the period of greatest difficulty.

22. The problems, referred to in last year's report,<sup>1</sup> relating to the arrest and detention of staff members in occupied territories continued to concern the Agency, but there were fewer cases. There were again several instances of violation of the Agency's privileges and immunities in these territories, particularly in Gaza. The Israeli authorities, on some

occasions, used Agency school compounds for screening refugees and, on other occasions, entered into other Agency installations without authority.

23. In the West Bank, which has now a smaller labour force than before 1967, the rate of economic activity continued its revival and unemployment diminished. To some extent this diminution was due to the increasing employment of workers from the West Bank in Israel. Against higher wage rates must be set a substantially higher cost of living, which rose again sharply as a result of fiscal measures in August 1970 and bore heavily on those unable to work. A feature of the Gaza economy also was increased employment in Israel, and citrus production was higher. There was no significant movement of refugees from Gaza to the West Bank.

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24. In addition to the information given in chapter I below, it may be appropriate to refer briefly in this introduction to health, education and the Agency's relations with other organizations.

### *Health*

25. The Agency's health programme, comprising preventive, curative and environmental sanitation services, has been maintained, as in past years, at a level comparable with the provision made by the Governments of the Arab host countries for their own populations. These services are buttressed by the programme of supplementary feeding and milk distribution designed to protect the nutritional state of such vulnerable groups as children and nursing mothers, with special attention to the emergency camps. (It should be noted that because of ration ceilings, many children do not receive the basic ration.) The value of the health programme was well demonstrated by the relatively low incidence of cholera among the refugees during the outbreak in the Middle East in the latter half of 1970. The network of Agency clinics, the school health service, and the environmental sanitation services enabled greater vigilance to be exercised in community and personal hygiene and mass vaccination to be

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 13. For the number of cases of arrests and detention of staff members in the year under report, see paragraph 161 [of the text of the report].



rapidly carried out. These preventive measures have continued in 1971. The Commissioner-General would like to record his appreciation of the co-operation received by the Agency in this matter from the Ministries of Health of the Governments of the host countries and the Israeli health authorities in the occupied territories. Given the crowded conditions of refugee camps, the risk to the health both of the refugee population and the population at large in the host countries would be serious if the Agency's health services had to be reduced.

### *Education*

26. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the difficulties experienced in the previous school year, the UNRWA/UNESCO education and training services had on the whole a good record of work and achievement in 1970-1971 despite the disturbances in east Jordan, which reached a climax in September, and a continuing tense security situation in Gaza throughout the year. A compensating factor in the Agency's schools in the Strip was the delivery of large quantities of school texts from the United Arab Republic, which undoubtedly boosted the morale of both teachers and students. The West Bank schools also benefited from text book deliveries and, in total, UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories received approximately half a million copies of the texts they had lacked since 1967. These deliveries, made with the agreement of the Government of Israel, and representing what the Director-General of UNESCO described as an "85 per cent success" so far, were the result of his persistent efforts to break the deadlock, described in previous reports, in the dispute over textbooks banned by the Government of Israel.

27. Throughout the Agency's area of operations, the steady growth pattern of the education and training services, to which reference was made in last year's report, continued in 1970-1971; total enrolments in all sectors of the Agency's own programme is approaching the quarter million mark, the number of class teachers, teacher-training and vocational-training instructors has passed

the 7,000 mark and the number of schools and centres exceeds 500. Details of the Agency's school and training centre building programmes, which are given in paragraph 105 below, underline perhaps better than anything else the paradoxical situation in which the Agency now finds itself: on the one hand, in doubt whether sufficient funds can be found to meet the recurrent cost of maintaining in its entirety the education system necessary for the admission to its schools of all eligible children seeking entry; on the other, committed by need and the availability of funds from special contributions to a large programme of capital works.

28. Details are given in paragraphs 133 to 135 below of the Agency's in-service teacher training programme operated by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education from its headquarters in Beirut. The Institute had a very successful year's work; it has now involved about three-quarters of the Agency's teaching force and is progressively extending its training to the higher cadres. It is beginning, also, to exercise a professional influence beyond the limits of the Agency's own operations. Reference is made in paragraph 141 below to the assistance rendered this year to the Jordanian Ministry of Education, which sent a team of its officials to Beirut in May 1971 to study the Institute's methods and techniques with a view to applying a similar pattern of in-service teacher training in Jordan in 1971-1972 and subsequent years.

### *Relations with other organs of the United Nations system*

29. As in the past, UNESCO and WHO have collaborated with UNRWA in the conduct of the education and health programmes, and their participation has assured the professional competence of UNRWA's policy and activities in these two fields. For the second year in succession UNRWA and UNESCO co-operated closely in the supervision under UNESCO responsibility of the Gaza secondary school examination. Details of the 1970 examination are given in paragraph 111 below and plans are far advanced to hold the third of this series of

examinations in July 1971. The assistance by the Institute of Education to the Ministry of Education of the Government of Jordan mentioned in the preceding paragraph was given in co-operation with UNICEF.

30. As has been described in paragraphs 7 to 9 above, UNESCO and FAO (through the World Food Programme) contributed to the reduction in the Agency's deficit for 1971. In the light of a World Health Assembly resolution, WHO is considering how the Agency could be further helped, and discussions are taking place with UNDP on the possibility of financial assistance for appropriate UNRWA projects from the Special Fund.

31. The Agency's accounts for 1970<sup>1</sup> have been audited by the United Nations Board of Auditors and their report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

*Assistance from voluntary agencies and other non-governmental organizations*

32. In his report of last year, the Commissioner-General recorded his gratitude to the many voluntary agencies, organizations and individuals who, in response to appeals for assistance, made it possible for the Agency to carry out programmes which might otherwise have been allowed to lapse. The names of the donors are noted in the appropriate sections throughout this report and include the Near East Emergency Donations, Inc. (NEED), an American organization; the Australian Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the French Red Cross; the Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO), New Zealand; the Norwegian Refugee Council; The Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen); the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); OXFAM, the United Kingdom; the American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Lutheran World Federation; the World Council of Churches; the

Near East Council of Churches; and the Pontifical Mission for Palestine. Contributions made direct to UNRWA from all non-governmental sources are shown in table 21 of annex I.

33. The Commissioner-General wishes to pay tribute to the prompt and effective help rendered by the voluntary agencies operating in the region (see table 18 of annex I) and those based elsewhere. Their continued, generous assistance is deeply appreciated.

*Summary and conclusion*

34. While the pressures referred to in paragraph 30 of the previous year's report<sup>2</sup> eased, operational difficulties again beset the Agency during the 12 months ending on 30 June 1971. These difficulties were on occasion acute and the Agency once more demonstrated its ability to serve the Palestine refugees well in time of emergency. The need for the Agency's regular programmes continued to be felt by the refugees and to be acknowledged by the authorities in all areas of operation. In the absence of tangible progress towards a peaceful settlement, it seems inconceivable that these programmes could be dispensed with, and that, for instance, children could be turned away from the schools or protective feeding and other health care denied to them. Nevertheless, the threat to the maintenance of Agency programmes has not receded, expenditure on them cannot be held steady while numbers and costs continue to rise, and special appeals are likely to show diminishing returns if repeated year after year.

35. The current mandate of the Agency will expire on 30 June 1972. It will therefore fall to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session to decide whether the mandate should be renewed and, if so, for how long. The Assembly will also have before it the report of the Working Group on the Agency's finances. The one item can hardly be considered in isolation from the other. An assurance of adequate finance over the period of the mandate is required if the Assembly's

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 7C (A/8407/Add.3).*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013), para. 30.*

view is that the Agency should continue on its present lines and with its present programmes because it is necessary so long as the future of the Palestine refugees is not

resolved, and its disappearance would cause unacceptable hardship and remove an essential element of stability. To meet deficits from the working balance is no longer possible.

# Special Documents Submitted to the General Assembly

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## Report of the United Nations Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories<sup>1</sup>

September, 1971

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II. LIST OF WITNESSES APPEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN OPEN MEETING	[not published here]

<sup>1</sup> Text (excluding the annexes which are not reproduced here) of the 1971 report of the Special Committee as transmitted by Chairman H.S. Amerasinghe on September 17 to Secretary-General U Thant and in turn by him to the General Assembly, and published on October 5, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8389.

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

17 September 1971

His Excellency  
U Thant  
Secretary-General of the United Nations  
New York, New York

Sir,

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has the honour to present the attached report to you as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 2727 (XXV). The report has been formulated in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV).

In operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2727 (XXV) the General Assembly urged the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work. The Special Committee has to report with regret that the Government of Israel continues to ignore this appeal for its co-operation, as well as a similar appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII).

Although the Government of Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee and allow it access to the occupied territories has constituted a major obstacle in the discharge of its mandate, other means of ascertaining facts regarding the situation in the occupied territories, and of executing the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly, have been available. The Special Committee has not allowed itself, therefore, to be deterred from discharging what it considers to be an essentially humanitarian duty. It has consciously sought to separate the humanitarian aspects of the problem, which are its primary concern, from the political issues involved.

The Special Committee has kept abreast of developments in the occupied territories throughout the period since its first visit to the Middle East in 1970. Persistent and serious allegations by the Jordanian Government regarding the continued violation of the human rights of the population of the

occupied territories, and the express desire of the Jordanian Government that the Special Committee should visit Jordan in order to hear further evidence of persons who had been deported and of persons who complained of ill-treatment at the hands of the occupying authorities, led the Special Committee to decide on a visit to Amman and Beirut in order to record such evidence.

The evidence presented to the Special Committee during its investigation in 1971 has confirmed its impression that policies and practices violating the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, which it discovered in 1970, have continued and have become even more manifest. This applies especially to the policies of settlement and of annexation of certain territories at present under the Israeli occupation; examples of the policy of settlement are the Golan Heights and certain parts of the West Bank, while Eastern Jerusalem provides a clear instance of the policy of annexation. The very fact of the existence of such policies, openly admitted and proclaimed by members of the Government of Israel and by Israeli leaders, is, in the Special Committee's opinion, a grave violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

The Special Committee is convinced that the most pressing need at the moment is an effective arrangement to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. If such an arrangement is to fulfil its real purpose it must provide for the representation of the interests of all parties concerned, including those persons who are not nationals of any State party to the conflict and whose rights are subject to violation by the occupation authorities.

In paragraph 3 of resolution 2727 (XXV) the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In accordance with this request the Special Committee addressed the ICRC, requesting certain information as well as the ICRC's views on "the possibility of a concerted effort . . . being made in order to secure

an arrangement that would contribute towards a more effective implementation of human rights without, of course, unduly hampering the Occupying Power in the execution of its obligations". The correspondence which was exchanged between the Special Committee and the ICRC is reproduced in the report. Despite the Special Committee's efforts, it was not possible to hold formal meetings with the ICRC. The informal exchange of views suggested by the ICRC is not, in the Special Committee's view, an appropriate way of dealing with a subject of this importance.

The plight of the refugees—persons who have been deprived of their homes and denied the right to return to them and who are, therefore, victims of the violation of the most fundamental of human rights—and the tone of bitterness and despair which marked every reference of theirs to the United Nations' failure to protect their human rights, have created a profound and disturbing impression on the Special Committee.

The Special Committee has continued to receive from you and from the members of the staff of the United Nations who have been associated with it in its work a degree of co-operation and a measure of assistance in the best traditions of the international civil service, and acknowledges with sincere thanks this valuable contribution to the fulfilment of its mandate.

Accept, Sir, on my behalf and on behalf of my two colleagues on the Special Committee, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE  
Chairman

Special Committee to Investigate  
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights  
of the Population of the Occupied Territories

## INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII), adopted at its 1748th plenary meeting on 19 December 1968. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

2. The Government of Ceylon appointed Mr. H.S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative of Ceylon to the United Nations, to represent Ceylon on the Special Committee. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic appointed Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, to represent Somalia on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Dr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and member of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the representative of Yugoslavia on the Special Committee. On 24 June 1971, the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic informed the Secretary-General that Mr. Hussein Nur-Elmi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, had been appointed to act instead of Mr. A.A. Farah on the Special Committee.

3. The General Assembly in resolution 2546 (XXIV), adopted at its 1829th plenary meeting on 11 December 1969, reaffirmed its resolutions relating to the violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel; expressed its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of human rights in those territories; and condemned such policies and practices as collective and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel. The General Assembly urgently called upon the Government of Israel:

"to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in the occupied territories and to comply with its obligations

under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations”.

The Assembly requested the Special Committee to take cognizance of the provisions of resolution 2546 (XXIV).

4. In pursuance of its mandate, the Special Committee in 1970 conducted an investigation of the allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Hearings were held by the Special Committee in London, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Geneva and New York, and the evidence of persons who claimed to have first-hand experience of breaches of human rights was recorded. The Special Committee also examined statements made by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli political leaders, relevant to the allegations with which the Special Committee was concerned.

5. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee presented its first report to the Secretary-General in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII). The Secretary-General made the report available to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup> and, in accordance with the decision of the Assembly's General Committee, the report was referred to the Special Political Committee. It was discussed in that Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings from 7 to 11 December 1970 (A/SPC/SR.744-751). The report which the Special Political Committee presented to the General Assembly<sup>2</sup> on 11 December 1970 included a draft resolution which the Committee recommended for adoption. On 15 December 1970, at its 1931st plenary meeting, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2727 (XXV), *inter alia* renewing the mandate of the Special Committee. Resolution 2727 (XXV) reads as follows:

“*The General Assembly,*

“*Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,*

“*Bearing in mind the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,*”<sup>3</sup>

“*Recalling Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968,*

“*Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2443 (XXIII) and 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970,*

“*Further recalling Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968,<sup>4</sup> 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969<sup>5</sup> and 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970,<sup>6</sup> the telegram of 8 March 1968 dispatched by the Commission to the Israeli authorities,<sup>7</sup> the relevant resolutions of the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,<sup>8</sup> Economic and Social Council resolution 1515 (XLVIII), adopted on 28 May 1970 on the recommendation of the Commission on the Status of Women,<sup>9</sup> and the other relevant resolutions of the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization,*

“*Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices*

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475)*, chapter XVIII.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, *Forty-sixth Session*, document E/4621, chapter XVIII.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, *Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 5 (E/4816)*, chapter XXIII.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, *Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475)*, para. 400.

<sup>8</sup> *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 68.XIV.2), chapter III.

<sup>9</sup> See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 6 (E/4831)*, chapter XIII, draft resolution VII.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session*, agenda item 101, document A/8089.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Annexes*, agenda item 101, document A/8237.

### Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>1</sup>

"*Noting with regret* that the provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions have not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,

"*Gravely concerned* for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel,

"1. *Expresses its sincere appreciation* to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and to its members for their efforts in performing the task assigned to them;

"2. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel immediately to implement the recommendations of the Special Committee embodied in its report and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations;

"3. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

"4. *Urges* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work;

"5. *Requests* the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

"6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the continued performance of its tasks;

"7. *Decides* to inscribe on the provisional agenda of its twenty-sixth session an item entitled 'Report (or reports) of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories'."

### I. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

6. The Special Committee held a series of informal meetings at United Nations Headquarters in New York in January 1971, at which it was decided to request the parties concerned to furnish such further information concerning the policies and practices of the Government of Israel affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories as had become available since April 1970, when the Special Committee had visited the Middle East. The Special Committee also decided to reconvene in May to examine the information made available and to decide whether it was necessary to undertake another field mission for the purpose of hearing further evidence.

7. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure reproduced in annex III of its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089).

8. On 19 February 1971, the Special Committee addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic.

9. In its letter to the Permanent Representative of Israel, the Special Committee stated:

"The Special Committee has taken note that, according to statements made by delegates of Israel in the Third Committee and the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Government of Israel was in possession of information in rebuttal of certain allegations made before the Special Committee. Particular reference was made to the case of Mr. Mohammed Derbas (A/C.3/SR. 1782, page 16). The Special Committee invites the Government of Israel to make available to it all evidence in its possession concerning Mr. Derbas as well as those cases referred to in its report to the General Assembly (A/8089), and those contained in the records of testimony received by the Special Committee (A/AC. 145/RT. 1-41).

"The Special Committee feels that it is imperative, particularly in view of the nature of the evidence before it, to obtain all evidence

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089.*



possible that might help to establish, in a convincing manner, the reality that exists in the occupied territories. In view of the above considerations, the Special Committee reiterates its request to the Government of Israel for its co-operation in the execution of the mandate to enter Israel and Israeli-held territories in order to carry out the appropriate investigations."

10. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of Jordan as follows:

"The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and, in this connexion, it would appreciate receiving from your Government any information which has become available since the Special Committee's visit to Amman in April 1970, relevant to its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.

"The Special Committee has taken note of the various letters addressed by your Government to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General, which have been circulated as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, in particular those communications in which names of individuals who had allegedly been deported after being ill-treated were mentioned (S/9868, S/9885, S/9919, S/10073 and S/10074). The Special Committee would appreciate receiving any statements recorded from the individuals mentioned in these documents indicating, where possible, sources where such statements could be corroborated. The Special Committee would also be grateful to have any indication of the whereabouts of Mr. Taysir Kuba'a who, according to a report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 18 January 1971, was deported after serving a three-year jail term."

11. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of Lebanon as follows:

"The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and, in this connexion, would appreciate receiving from

your Government any information which has become available since the Special Committee's visit to Beirut in April 1970, relevant to its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970."

12. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of Syria as follows:

"The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and it would appreciate receiving from your Government information concerning any developments that have taken place since the Special Committee's visit to Damascus in April 1970, which have a bearing on the mandate of the Special Committee as embodied in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.

"In particular, the Special Committee would appreciate receiving in summary form, the nature and substance of such evidence and, if possible, indications of any corroborative evidence that may exist."

13. The Special Committee wrote to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic as follows:

"The Special Committee is in the course of organizing its work for 1971 and, in this connexion, it would appreciate receiving from your Government any information which has become available since the Special Committee's visit to Cairo in April 1970, relevant to its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV), with particular reference to incidents occurring during the period since April 1970.

"The Special Committee has taken note of the communications of the Government of the United Arab Republic, which have been circulated as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council and concerning matters which are within the terms of reference of the Special Committee. In particular, the Special Committee would appreciate receiving any information con-

cerning the recent incidents reported in the Gaza Strip and mentioned in documents S/10105 and S/10107. The Special Committee also requests your Government to make available to it those medical reports concerning the allegations brought before it during the course of the hearings held in Cairo last year, which are available, as, for instance, the case of Miss Hejazi (A/AC.145/RT. 26) and Miss L. Zirbawi (A/AC.145/RT.27), and the whereabouts of Professor Muhammed Safwat who, as your Government may be aware, had been mentioned as the person responsible for a medical report dated 28 July 1966 concerning Mr. Derbas (A/AC.145/RT. 26).

14. In a note verbale addressed to the Secretary-General on 7 April 1971, the Permanent Representative of Israel communicated the following:

"On 22 February 1971, a communication was addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel by Ambassador H.S. Amerasinghe of Ceylon, in his capacity of Chairman of the 'Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories'. On 10 February 1971, a communication was addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel by Ambassador Ibrahim Boye, of Senegal, in his capacity of Chairman of the 'Special Working Group of Experts established under resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights'. Those two letters gave some information regarding projected activities of the two bodies in question in the course of the year 1971.

"The views of the Israel Government regarding the illegal constitution, biased terms of reference and incompetence of organs in question to carry out the tasks sought to be imposed upon them by resolutions adopted by a minority of the General Assembly on the one hand, as well as on the superrerogatory duplicity of effort are a matter of record.

"Aside from its statements and votes in the twenty-third, twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly, the views of the Government of Israel on the unconstitutionality of the Committee presided over

by Ambassador Boye appear in the note of the Permanent Representative of Israel of 25 June 1969 (E/CN.4/1016, paragraph 9).

"Furthermore, experience which had been gained of the 'accomplishments' of both these bodies, and of the extensive travel in which they have been engaged, endorses Israel's views regarding their unconstitutionality and biased character.

"The Government of Israel has no further comment to make at this stage on the activities of these two organs except to reiterate its views as indicated above.

"It would therefore be appreciated if the Secretary-General would transmit copies of this note verbale to Ambassador Amerasinghe and Ambassador Boye."

15. On 26 April 1971, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic furnished the Special Committee with a list of some of the houses allegedly destroyed by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip and another list giving the names of some Arab prisoners and detainees in the Gaza Strip, together with some details concerning their identity, duration of their sentence and place of confinement.

16. On 27 April 1971, the Permanent Representative of Jordan informed the Special Committee as follows:

"Some relevant information to the mandate and task of the Committee has already been addressed to the President of the Security Council and/or to the Secretary-General and has been circulated as documents of the Security Council and General Assembly. As you have already stated, the Committee has taken note of information therein.

"Pertaining to Mr. Taysir Kuba'a, who was deported by the Israeli authorities after serving a three-year jail sentence, the appropriate authorities in Jordan were unable to indicate his whereabouts.

"As to statements by individuals expelled by the Israeli occupying authorities, my Government believes that such and other information concerning Israel's violations of human rights in the occupied territories may be best obtained and reviewed on the spot by a visit of the Special Committee to Amman, Jordan. I would like to express our

earnest hope that Israel will, this time, comply with operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV) which:

“*Urges* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work’.

“On our part we take the opportunity to welcome the Special Committee and to extend to it every co-operation possible in an attempt to facilitate its task. In the meantime we will furnish Your Excellency with any new information in that regard.”

17. On 27 May 1971, the Special Committee addressed the Permanent Representative of Jordan as follows:

“I have the honour to refer to your letter of 27 April concerning the work of the Special Committee for 1971, and to thank your Government for the kind expression of its readiness to co-operate with the Special Committee.

“The letter refers to the statements, requested by the Special Committee in its letter of 19 February, recorded from individuals mentioned in the letters of the Jordanian Government which have been reproduced as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Your Government suggests that such statements ‘may best be obtained and reviewed by a visit of the Special Committee to Amman’. The Special Committee notes that the communications of the Jordanian Government list a considerable number of persons which the Special Committee does not have the resources to process individually. The Special Committee also feels that the recording of the evidence of every person who has made allegations of infringement of human rights is not necessitated by its mandate, namely to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee therefore requests the co-operation of the Jordanian Government and it would appreciate receiving a list showing the types of allegations that are being made, their frequency and, if possible, the date when the alleged infringement took place, together with names of individuals affected. This would help the Special Committee to decide whether it would be necessary

to visit Jordan and, in that event, to fix the period and the duration of such a visit. In view of the lack of time at the disposal of the members of the Special Committee it would be greatly appreciated if the information requested could be forwarded at your earliest convenience.”

18. In June 1971, the Permanent Representative of Syria wrote as follows:

“In response to your request for ‘information concerning any developments that have taken place since the Special Committee’s visit to Damascus in April 1970...’, as well as ‘corroborative evidence’, I should like to draw Your Excellency’s attention to a number of letters that were addressed after April 1970 to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General and circulated as official documents, a list of which is annexed to this letter, relating to Israeli practices in occupied territories in violation of Humanitarian International Law and relevant United Nations resolutions. The latest of these letters are contained in documents S/10213 dated 28 May 1971 and S/10215 dated 1 June 1971.

“Moreover, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic shall continue to bring to the attention of the Special Committee any additional information and evidence regarding Israeli violation of human rights in occupied territories.”

19. As there were indications that further evidence of a material nature was available, the Special Committee decided to visit Amman and Beirut to collect and examine such evidence, particularly from persons having direct knowledge of the developments since the Special Committee’s earlier visit to the area.

20. The Special Committee was in Amman from 7 to 12 July 1971 and in Beirut from 13 to 16 July 1971. During this period it held a series of meetings for the purpose of hearing witnesses. It heard a total of 49 witnesses, two of them in closed session, and received a number of written communications. The Special Committee also met at Geneva from 16 to 23 July and in New York from 7 to 17 September 1971 to discuss and adopt its draft report.

21. The Special Committee had before it written communications from the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic concerning allegations of violations of human rights. These had been reproduced as documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and are listed in annex I.

22. In addition to the oral testimony and the information communicated by Governments, the Special Committee examined information communicated to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross existing in publications of the ICRC, and information contained in Israeli newspapers, in reports of the Institute for Palestine Studies and the Palestine Research Centre, as well as information contained in memoranda presented to the Special Committee in the course of its visit to Amman and Beirut.

23. As the Special Committee was unable to obtain the permission of the Government of Israel to visit the occupied territories, it was obliged once again to pay particular attention to official pronouncements by members of the Israeli Government and other Israeli leaders concerning Israeli practices in the occupied territories. The authenticity of this evidence is beyond question and the evidence itself, therefore, irrefutable.

24. In paragraph 3 of resolution 2727 (XXV) the General Assembly requested the Special Committee,

“pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories”.

25. On 19 February 1971, in a confidential communication addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Special Committee made reference to its mandate as contained in resolution 2727 (XXV) and requested the ICRC to inform it:

“as to whether it [the ICRC] had any knowledge of certain trials, especially in view of what is stated at page 499 of the September 1970 issue of the *International*

*Review of the Red Cross*, under the title ‘Notifications of Prosecution’”.

The Special Committee drew the attention of the ICRC to a list of 20 trials which had taken place between 25 November 1970 and 5 February 1971 and about which it desired further information. In the same letter the Special Committee also requested information “as to the number of persons that have been allowed to return to the occupied areas under the various repatriation schemes since 30 April 1970”. In addition, the Special Committee requested information concerning “certain incidents that have taken place recently in Gaza subsequent to the calling in of Border Police to help the security forces in the area”.

26. On 18 March 1971, the International Committee of the Red Cross replied as follows:

“In reply to the questions contained in your letter, I have the honour to state as follows:

(a) *Trials*

The International Committee of the Red Cross is continuing its work for the benefit of persons resident in the occupied territories and against whom penal proceedings are being taken. That activity is carried on under the conditions described in the September 1970 issue of the *International Review of the Red Cross* to which you refer. However, so far efforts to ensure that penal proceedings for activities connected with the occupation are systematically notified to the ICRC delegation in Israel have not been successful. For that reason I am unable to reply to the questions relating to the various trials mentioned in your letter.

(b) *Repatriation to the occupied territories*

You will find herewith a number of issues in English and French of our news bulletin entitled ‘The ICRC in Action’. The various repatriation operations carried out since 30 April 1970 under the auspices of and with the participation of the ICRC delegation, are related therein. As you may see, the number of persons repatriated to the occupied territories of the Golan Heights is 81, from the United Arab Republic to the occupied territory of Gaza 265, and from the east bank of the Suez Canal to the west bank 750.

(c) *Incidents in Gaza*

As a result of certain incidents which occurred in 1971 in Gaza, the ICRC and its delegates have had to intervene for the benefit of the victims of those events and our delegate in Cairo has had occasion to inform the United Arab Republic authorities concerned about the demarches undertaken by the ICRC in that connexion."

27. The Special Committee addressed another letter to the ICRC on 2 June 1971, in which it made reference to the *ad hoc* arrangements proposed by it in its report (A/8089, paras. 150, 151 and 155). It also referred to the fact that the allegations made to the Special Committee had not ceased and stated:

"It appears to the Special Committee, in the light of these considerations, and especially in view of the serious nature of the allegations that have continued to be presented to the Special Committee, that it is imperative to come to some arrangement, such as that envisaged in the protecting power formula, which would enable complaints to be verified and remedial measures taken.

"Accordingly, I have been empowered by the Special Committee to inquire of you the views of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the possibility of a concerted effort being made in order to secure an arrangement that would contribute towards a more effective implementation of human rights in the occupied territories without, of course, unduly hampering the occupying power in the execution of its obligations."

28. The ICRC replied by letter dated 18 June 1971 in which it stated:

"We are aware of the recommendation made by the Special Committee last year in its report to the Secretary-General (document A/8089) and of the debate which took place in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

"As you no doubt know, the International Committee of the Red Cross recently convened a Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in

Armed Conflicts. While it was not the purpose of this conference to consider specific situations, one of its committees dealt with problems of implementation of existing humanitarian law. The discussion was of a general character and dealt with the principles involved, including the designation of Protecting Powers or substitutes to Protecting Powers. The report of the Conference of Government Experts will in due course be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who will in turn report to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under the item 'Human Rights in Armed Conflicts'." In the same letter the International Committee also expressed its readiness to meet informally with the Chairman of the Special Committee for "a personal exchange of views on these matters."

29. At the conclusion of its visit to the Middle East and in the course of considering the evidence that it had heard, the Special Committee decided to address the International Committee of the Red Cross in a further effort to secure certain information that would help assess the credibility of witnesses who appeared before it. The letter, dated 23 July, states:

"During the hearings held by the Special Committee in Amman from 7 to 12 July 1971 and in Beirut from 13 to 16 July 1971, as well as during the hearings held last year, several references were made by witnesses to delegates of the ICRC visiting various prisons and places of detention in the occupied territories. It would help the Committee considerably in verifying the accuracy of evidence if the ICRC could furnish it with a list of its delegates who were assigned to the occupied territories since the occupation in June 1967 showing the areas to which these delegates were assigned and the periods of their duty.

"The Committee would also be glad if the ICRC could furnish the Special Committee with statistics regarding deportation, demolition of houses, as well as other practices which may be termed violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

"The Special Committee assures the ICRC that it will avoid using any materials so

furnished in any manner that the ICRC may deem prejudicial to the humanitarian tasks that it is accomplishing at the moment in the occupied territories. The Committee wishes to stress, however, that the ICRC is the only body of recognized and acknowledged impartiality to which the Special Committee can turn for information.

"The Special Committee would like to draw your attention to its letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross of 2 June 1971, in which it sought the views of the ICRC on the possibility of a concerted effort being made to secure an arrangement to contribute towards a more effective implementation of human rights in the occupied territories without, of course, unduly hampering the occupying power in the execution of its obligations.

"The Special Committee would have wished to discuss the subject matter of this letter with your organization at a meeting. However, circumstances did not seem to permit this at the present moment. The Committee will be meeting in New York during the period 7 to 17 September 1971 and it would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with your organization at that time; alternatively, the ICRC may wish to furnish the information indicated in this letter prior to that date. This information would help the Special Committee in its assessment of the evidence before it."

30. The International Committee of the Red Cross replied on 2 August 1971 as follows:

"In reply to the request of the Special Committee for a list of ICRC delegates assigned to the occupied territories since 1967 and statistics on practices which may determine violations of human rights, we wish to recall that in conformity with ICRC established practice, reports on the situation in the occupied territories are submitted to the occupying power as well as to governments of the countries of origin of those people whose rights appear to have been violated. The ICRC does not feel it can detract from this practice by making such reports more widely available. On the other hand, the ICRC has been pleased to make available to your Committee its information

bulletin (up to issue number 164 of 14 July 1971), copies of the *International Review of the Red Cross* (up to issue 630 of June 1971) and occasional press releases. Moreover, the annual report on the activities of the ICRC in 1970, which will shortly come off the press, will likewise be made available to the Special Committee.

"In response to the question raised in the Special Committee's letter of 2 June 1971 regarding efforts to secure an arrangement towards a more effective implementation of human rights in the occupied territories, M. Pilloud has already had the honour to inform you in a letter of 18 June, that he, together with some of his colleagues, would be glad to have an informal exchange of views with you on these matters. We hope that a mutually convenient time can be found during your current stay in Geneva. In the meantime, we have been pleased to place at the disposal of the Special Committee the documentation prepared for the ICRC Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and the Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict. Volume II of that documentation deals particularly with implementation of existing international instruments.

"We note that the Special Committee will be meeting in New York during the period 7 to 14 September 1971. We do not believe that the ICRC would be in a position to furnish at that time more information than is already contained in the documents referred to in this letter.

"We note the assurance in your letter that the Special Committee appreciates the conditions under which the ICRC seeks to accomplish its humanitarian task. We trust that the Special Committee understands also the limitations within which it is advisable for the ICRC to meet requests for information."

31. On 6 August 1971, the Chairman of the Special Committee referred to the letter of 2 August 1971 of the ICRC and stated as follows:

"In my letter of 23 July 1971, I addressed a request for the co-operation of the International Red Cross in accordance with opera-

tive paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV).

"It would appear that there is some misunderstanding with regard to the request for certain information contained in my letter of 23 July 1971. The Special Committee requested two types of information:

- (a) A list of ICRC delegates assigned to the occupied territories since the occupation in June of 1967, showing the areas to which the delegates were assigned and the periods of their duty;
- (b) Statistics regarding deportation, demolition of houses, as well as other practices which may be termed violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

"The first was required in order to verify several statements made by former prisoners and detainees, to the effect that they were visited at a certain time in a certain prison by an ICRC delegate. In nearly all cases, the person concerned did not know the name of the person whom he recognized as the ICRC delegate. The Special Committee, in requesting this information from the ICRC, was merely attempting to check such statements of witnesses as one measure of credibility in the Special Committee's task of assessing evidence before it. The Special Committee was not aware that the disclosure of ICRC delegates' assignments came within the same category as 'reports' referred to in Mr. Micheli's letter, that 'are submitted to the occupying power as well as to the country of origin of the person whose rights appear to have been violated,' and fails to understand in what manner they can be so considered.

"The second type of information requested was statistics regarding deportation, demolition of houses, as well as other practices which may be termed violations of human rights. In the course of carrying out its investigation, the Special Committee found that certain statistics, such as those referred to above, did not quite tally. The Special Committee felt that the ICRC would presumably have statistics which would help it to form a more precise idea of the extent of certain practices, such as demolition of houses and deportation.

"Again, in this regard, the Special Committee was not aware that the disclosure of this kind of information ran counter to ICRC policy, particularly in view of the fact that it is not the first time that the ICRC has disclosed information of this nature, as for example that contained in the *International Review of the Red Cross*, August 1970, page 455.

"In resolution 2727 (XXV), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Special Committee interprets this mandate as imposing upon it the duty to carry out formal consultation, the outcome of which could be used in a formal manner in the report of the Special Committee to the Secretary-General, unless the ICRC felt otherwise. The informal exchange of views suggested in the letters of the ICRC is not, in the view of the Special Committee, a satisfactory way of dealing with a subject of this importance. In this context, the Special Committee would like to stress that it remains available for formal consultation, should the ICRC feel so disposed."

On 16 August 1971, the ICRC replied as follows:

"To reply to your request, we would briefly explain ICRC's line of conduct concerning the delegates' findings. When the ICRC carries out its humanitarian mission in a country rent by armed conflict, it fully informs that country's authorities. The same information is sent also to the government of nationals who benefit from that mission (for example prisoners of war, internees, persons under assigned residence, displaced persons, etc.). In occupied countries, such information is given to the government whose nationals are assisted by ICRC delegates.

"It is a rule that the information conveyed to the ICRC by its delegates is not communicated to anyone but the governments concerned. The ICRC does, however, regularly publish a news bulletin, as well as press releases and an annual report, in which its delegates' work is described in general terms.

"The rule mentioned above has for a very long time been constantly applied by the ICRC. As long ago as 1936, for instance,

it explained its special position to a League of Nations Commission concerned with the Italo-Abyssinian War. That position is appropriate to the nature of the ICRC which is first and last humanitarian and apolitic. The International Committee must above all else endeavour to alleviate the suffering of war's victims. To do so, it must abide strictly by a policy which enables it to conserve the confidence of parties in conflict. It must, *inter alia*, abstain from any action which might be construed as an enquiry and hence jeopardize its primary activity of providing protection and assistance.

"It is for that reason that we have stated our willingness to make available to the Special Investigating Committee over which you preside all information published by our institution as well as the general details which you require. We have therefore sent you a full set of such documents and have endeavoured to reply to your queries of a general nature.

"In view of the foregoing, we trust that you will understand that the ICRC must set certain limits to its co-operation with commissions of enquiry."

## II. MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

33. The first report of the Special Committee to the Secretary-General (A/8089, chapter II) contains its interpretation of its mandate as laid down in the relevant General Assembly resolutions and in other international instruments. The Special Committee reiterates the interpretation it gave to its mandate in that report, and has conducted its second mission in strict accordance with that interpretation.

34. The Special Committee finds further confirmation of the validity of this interpretation in the spirit and the text of the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations (adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970 at its 1883rd plenary meeting—resolution 2627 (XXV)) and would draw special attention to the following passage from paragraph 8 of this Declaration, which states:

"The United Nations has endeavoured in its first twenty-five years to further the Charter objectives of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. The international conventions and declarations concluded under its auspices give expression to the moral conscience of mankind and represent humanitarian standards for all members of the international community. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, ... constitute a landmark in international co-operation and in the recognition and protection of the rights of every individual without any distinction."

## III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

35. During 1970, the Special Committee received oral and written testimony which served as a basis for its report to the Secretary-General (A/8089). In order to determine the measures necessary for the effective discharge of its renewed mandate in General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV), the Special Committee addressed letters to the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic requesting further information as well as information on certain cases that had been brought to the attention of the Special Committee during 1970 (see paras. 8 to 13 above). The Government of Israel had indicated through its representative on the Third Committee, in the course of the debate on the item "Respect for human rights in armed conflicts" at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, that it had in its possession information in rebuttal of the allegations which had been brought before the Special Committee, in particular those relating to ill-treatment of prisoners (A/C.3/SR.1782, pp. 15–17). The representative of Israel in the Third Committee had made specific reference to the case of Mr. Mohammad Derbas, who had stated in evidence before the Special Committee in Cairo in April 1970 that he had been castrated by surgery by an Israeli surgeon while in Israeli custody in Atlit Prison on or about 15 July 1967. In its letter to the Government of Israel on 20 February 1971,



the Special Committee referred to the statement that had been made by the Israeli representative in the Third Committee at its 1782nd meeting that his Government had in its possession a medical report of 28 July 1966 by Professor Mohammed Safwat to the effect that the same operation had already been performed by that date. The Special Committee invited the Government of Israel to make available to the Special Committee all evidence in its possession concerning Mr. Derbas, as well as those cases referred to in the report of the Special Committee (see para. 9 above). The Special Committee also addressed a request to the United Arab Republic for information regarding the whereabouts of Professor Mohammad Safwat. The Government of Israel has not so far furnished to the Special Committee the information in rebuttal that it claimed to possess, nor has the Special Committee been able to trace the whereabouts of Professor Mohammad Safwat (see also para. 65 below).

36. The Special Committee sought to hear persons who had been mentioned by witnesses who had appeared before it during 1970, as such evidence would have been of value as corroboration and would have contributed to a conclusive assessment of the allegations that had been made before it, especially those concerning ill-treatment while under detention. For this purpose, so far as allegations of ill-treatment of individuals were concerned, the Special Committee set itself the task of hearing evidence of a qualitative and corroborative nature rather than accumulating more allegations in addition to those that it had heard during 1970. The Special Committee stressed the need for documentary evidence, especially in the form of medical reports, concerning previous testimony.

37. In the oral evidence given before the Special Committee this year, several allegations were made of forcible expulsion or deportation, ill-treatment while under detention, and demolition of houses. Other evidence collected by the Special Committee also concerned these allegations as well as allegations regarding the policy of annexation

and settlement of the occupied territories through expropriation, establishment of Israeli settlements, coupled with deportation and denial of the right to return of those inhabitants of the occupied territories who had left these territories. This evidence is analysed in this chapter (paras. 44 to 71 below).

38. The Special Committee took note of the allegations made in letters addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, which were published as documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Many of these allegations were brought to the attention of the Special Committee on the specific request of the Government concerned. The Special Committee at the same time took note of the Government of Israel's replies to these allegations which also appeared as Security Council and General Assembly documents.

39. The allegations made in these letters concern, mainly, deportation of individuals, establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, brutality by the Border Police in Gaza during the beginning of 1971, Israeli measures taken in Jerusalem and confiscation of land, as well as drastic changes in the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied territories. The documents in which the letters are reproduced are listed in annex I to this report.

40. In addition to the above, the Special Committee has taken note of the discussions in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly (A/SPC/SR. 744-751), reports of the debates in the Commission on Human Rights at its twenty-seventh session on the question of violation of human rights in the occupied territories in the Middle East (E/CN.4/SR. 1115-1120) and Commission on Human Rights resolution 9 (XXVII), where reference is made to the report of the Special Committee.

41. The Special Committee had before it a number of written communications from organizations and individuals in which viola-

tions of human rights were alleged. Among these are reports in Israeli and Arab newspapers concerning various aspects of violations of human rights in the occupied territories, and submissions by religious authorities on other aspects of the occupation.

42. The Special Committee was shown a documentary film made inside the occupied territories. The Special Committee had no reasonable grounds for questioning the authenticity of the film. It supplemented in visual form the evidence received by the Special Committee of the situation in the occupied territories, particularly as regards the establishment of Israeli settlements, the eradication of Arab villages and the state of feeling among both Arabs and Israelis in the occupied territories. The sound track of the film purported to record statements by Arabs and Israelis, both leaders and members of the public, made in the course of interviews by the producers of the film and giving their version of the occupation.

43. The Special Committee's mandate is to investigate Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Bearing this in mind, the Special Committee has analysed the evidence before it in the following manner: it has first sought to assess, according to the criterion of reasonable doubt, the value of the individual allegations and, once this was established, it has sought to determine whether they reflect a policy or a practice affecting human rights. In some cases, the evidence as a whole reveals a clear pattern of policy. For example, the scale on which Israeli settlements are being established in the occupied territories, taken in conjunction with deportations and the refusal to repatriate any significant or substantial number of the inhabitants of the territories who had left these territories due to the 1967 hostilities, is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the Government of Israel has adopted a policy of annexation which would deprive the persons concerned of their fundamental right to return or frustrate the exercise of that right.

#### A. ALLEGATIONS OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT

44. The evidence, including testimony before the Special Committee regarding annexation and settlement, supports the allegation that the Government of Israel is following a policy of annexing and settling occupied territories in a manner calculated to exclude all possibility of restitution to lawful ownership. In the view of the Special Committee evidence of annexation is stronger with respect to some areas, such as Jerusalem, while in others occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 the evidence justifies the conclusion that, irrespective of the ultimate objectives of Israel's policy, the Government of Israel is engaged in practices constituting a violation of human rights.

45. The distinction between annexation of conquered territory and occupation of territory in wartime is clarified in the following passage in the Commentary published by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the Fourth Geneva Convention:<sup>1</sup>

"As was emphasized in the commentary on Article 4, the occupation of territory in wartime is essentially a temporary, *de facto* situation, which deprives the occupied Power of neither its statehood nor its sovereignty; it merely interferes with its power to exercise its rights. That is what distinguishes occupation from annexation, whereby the Occupying Power acquires all or part of the occupied territory and incorporates it in its own territory.<sup>2</sup>

"Consequently occupation as a result of war, while representing actual possession to all appearances, cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of territory. As long as hostilities continue the Occupying Power cannot therefore annex the occupied territory, even if it occupies the whole of the territory concerned. A decision on that point can only be reached in the peace treaty. That

<sup>1</sup> *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958), pages 275 and 276.

<sup>2</sup> The annexing State "succeeds" to all the sovereign rights of the dismembered State in the territory annexed.

is a universally recognized rule which is endorsed by jurists and confirmed by numerous rulings of international and national courts.

"...

"A fundamental principle emerges from the foregoing considerations; an Occupying Power continues to be bound to apply the Convention as a whole even when, in disregard of the rules of international law, it claims during a conflict to have annexed all or part of an occupied territory...."

46. The Special Committee reaffirms the validity of this proposition. It would furthermore reiterate that every attempt on the part of the Government of Israel at carrying out a policy of annexation and settlement amounts to a denial of the fundamental human rights of the local inhabitants, in particular the right of self-determination and the right to retain their homeland, and a repudiation by the Government of Israel of accepted norms of international law.

47. The following facts tend to support the conclusion that it is the Government of Israel's policy to annex and settle the occupied territories:

(a) The existence, in the Government of Israel, of a "Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the Territories";

(b) Express pronouncements to this effect by Israeli Ministers and leaders;

(c) A memorandum presented on 8 July 1971 to the Special Committee by Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem at the time of the June 1967 hostilities, the facts of which are confirmed by other evidence;

(d) Uncontradicted reports, appearing in the information media, of the planned establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories;

(e) Allegations, as yet unrefuted but consistent with other facts, and contained in several letters addressed by the Governments of Jordan and Syria, concerning measures by the Government of Israel in violation of the human rights of the persons living in occupied territories;

(f) The absence of any serious attempt at repatriation of the refugees to their homes in the occupied territories;

(g) The mass expulsion and continued deportation of individuals from the occupied territories;

(h) The continued transfer of the population of the occupied territories to other areas within the occupied territories.

48. The Special Committee will now deal with the evidence cited in the preceding paragraph.

(a) *The existence, in the Government of Israel, of a "Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the Territories"*

The Chairman of this committee is Mr. Israeli Galili, Minister without Portfolio, referred to in the *Jerusalem Post* on 3 January 1971. In the view of the Special Committee, the very existence of such a committee headed by a person of ministerial rank shows, beyond doubt, that it is a policy of the Government to settle the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

(b) *Express pronouncements by Israeli Ministers and leaders*

Some of these statements, even when made by Israeli Ministers and leaders, purport to be personal opinions while others have been made by private individuals who have no official standing in the Government of Israel. On the other hand, their general tenor, the frequency with which they have been repeated and the various measures adopted by the Government of Israel, such as establishment of settlements, justify in the Special Committee's opinion the conclusion that these statements are a faithful reflection of official Israeli policy.

The following are statements of special significance:

(i) A statement by Housing Minister Ze'ev Sharef on 18 February 1971, broadcast on television and reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 19 February 1971, that the Government of Israel would not bow to international pressures to halt the building of housing developments across the cease-fire line in Jerusalem. In the same report the Minister is reported as saying that these housing developments are taking place on expropriated lands.

(ii) A statement by a spokesman for the

Jewish National Fund, reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 5 April 1971, according to whom the Fund had been purchasing land in the occupied territories for the past two years. The areas mentioned include Nebi Samwil, Jerusalem and the Etzion Bloc.

(iii) A report in the *Jerusalem Post* of 21 March 1971 summarizing a statement by former Minister of Transport and present Chairman of the Herut Executive, Ezra Weizman, in a television interview, that "according to Mr. Weizman, the Jordan River would make the best eastern border for Israel; Judaea and Samaria (the West Bank) must remain under Israeli control; Sharm e-Sheikh is vital for the aerial protection of Israel; and whoever controls northern Sinai... controls the security of Israel".

(iv) A statement by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, as reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 March 1971, in which expressing his own personal opinion, he "called for urban, rather than agricultural settlements within the administered areas [since]... urban settlements would bring more people to the areas than would farming communities".

(v) A statement by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in a report, appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 7 January 1971, of an address to students of Haifa University and the Technion to the effect that:

"We are able to turn [the 200,000 refugees in Gaza] into full-fledged citizens. We must establish Jewish settlements in the Strip, turn the sand dunes into fertile farming land, integrate them into our economy, give them jobs, health services and education, and give Israeli citizenship to all who want it."

(vi) A statement made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan on 19 August 1971 (subsequently described as an expression of Mr. Dayan's personal views), reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 20 August 1971, in which Mr. Dayan calls for "emphasis [to] be put on [Israel's] taking unilateral and immediate measures" in the occupied territories. Mr. Dayan is reported as having stated, "We should regard our role also in the administered territories as that of the established government—to plan and implement whatever can be done without leaving 'options open' for the day

of peace—which may be distant". On 27 August 1971 the *Jerusalem Post* reported a broadcast interview with Mr. Moshe Dayan in which he sought to clarify the remarks made in the statement referred to above. In this interview Mr. Dayan is reported as stating that "after an arrangement we will also remain in most of the areas: the Golan Heights, and the West Bank". Mr. Dayan called for Israelis to "devote [their] best efforts to these areas." Referring to the refugee problem in the Gaza Strip, Mr. Dayan stated:

"What we can do, should do, and are doing in the Gaza Strip is solving the problem of the *human status* of the refugees.... When they are working and earning a decent wage, their standard of living will rise. The style of their housing has to be changed, so that they will live in quarters fit for human beings....

"At this time, we can't change the formal status of the refugees.... But we can do, and are doing, something about changing their human situation, about removing the stigma of 'refugeeism' from them—the stigma of living on charity and in miserable conditions.... This we can change—humanly speaking to remove them from refugee status and transform them into working people.

"...

"I do not propose annexation, and I do not suggest that we alter the citizenship status of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These are formal matters. What I am speaking of is the *content* of their lives, and not their formal status. What I suggest is that we do our best—and I am very glad that that is what they wish, too.

"They are ready to come out of the camps and go to work, to live as human beings. Let's do this much, and not worry about their documents, their passports, their Refugee Cards.

"...

"I don't see any reason that we should expel the Arab residents of Hebron, just as I cannot imagine that it should be prohibited for Jews to settle permanently—within the framework of the status to be ultimately

agreed upon—anywhere at all in the West Bank.

“...  
“But until there is a peace settlement, I think that there has to be ‘unilateral action’.”

“...  
“And we should long since have been establishing settlements.”

“...  
“I don’t think that can be a basis for dialogue. I don’t think that we ought to leave in *their* hands the decision about the future of the areas between the Jordan River, the mountains and Little Israel.

“But beyond that, in the sphere of day-to-day life, I am in favour of trying as hard as possible to achieve dialogue with them, and to give them as much autonomy as possible, on the communal-life level, in matters of education ... and in our common life with them.”

(vii) A statement by the President of Israel, Dr. Shazar, speaking at the opening ceremony of the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the Jewish National Fund on 12 January 1971 (reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 13 January 1971) that “the Jewish National Fund’s work in preparing land in the Golan Heights for settlement strengthens our firm determination that the Golan remain in Israeli territory”.

(viii) A statement by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon in the Knesset on 2 December 1970 (reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 3 December 1970) in the course of a debate on a motion on “the establishment of Jewish suburbs in cities” in the occupied territories, that he was in opposition to the establishment of such suburbs because of political and other reasons. Mr. Allon is reported as stating that the Government of Israel pursued a “realistic policy based on Middle East and International political possibilities”. He is also reported as stating that the Government had already decided on the establishment of a further four Nahal settlements and of a semi-urban settlement; on the sequestration of 11,400 dunams of land of East Jerusalem and southwards for the setting up of residential areas for both Jews and Arabs; as well as development of a Jewish Quarter at Hebron.

In the course of the debate reference was also made to what are referred to as “Basic Principles”, as endorsed by the Labour Party, National Religious Party and Gahal. According to Mr. M. Begin, who was presenting the motion which was the subject of this discussion, these “Basic Principles” called for the “acceleration of permanent settlement, rural and urban, on the soil of the Homeland”. The same report cites the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Allon, as stating with reference to Mr. Begin’s remarks on the historical rights to the Land of Israel, that this was the moral basis for the renaissance of the Jewish State, but “historiographical or theological absolutes cannot replace policy. The future map of Israel, in the framework of a peace treaty, was to be founded on historical rights as the moral basis, defensible borders as a security basis, a Jewish and Democratic State as national and social basis”.

The report makes further reference to the statement of Mr. Begin during this debate. The report states:

“Mr. Begin, presenting his motion, said experience had proved there was no reason why Jew and Arab could not live, work, trade and send their children to schools together. It would be good for peace, security and understanding between the people, he said. No people in history had suffered as much as Israel on behalf of its land. He said a recent ‘non-sensical’ decision of the United Nations General Assembly made out as though Israel were depriving someone (Palestine Arabs) of self-determination. Israel’s rights were solely over this Land, while the Arabs had fourteen sovereign States. ‘We liberated the city of the Land of Israel, and there is no reason why Jews should not live in Jericho, Hebron, Bethlehem, Shechem, Tulkarm and Ramallah.’”

At the heart of the Middle East problem is the “Homeland doctrine” enunciated by the Government of Israel and supported by the Opposition. According to this doctrine even the United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel did not restore to the Jewish people what they were convinced was their territory. The State of Israel as created by the

United Nations has expanded territorially from time to time; according to the Government of Israel, this expansion has been justified by considerations of security. The Special Committee finds it difficult to reconcile this claim with pronouncements by Israeli leaders, proclaiming a faith and belief in what are asserted to be the ancient boundaries of the Land of Israel. Against such a strongly held belief international law or even the norms of international conduct can prove of no avail. In any event the Special Committee is unable to accept any argument whereby considerations of security may be invoked to depopulate occupied territories, to deprive hundreds of thousands of persons of their ancestral home, and somehow sought to be justified on the ground that there exist 14 Arab States that are in their opinion required to receive them.

In light of the declared policy of the Government of Israel as expressed categorically by Israeli leaders, the Special Committee has no doubt that the policy of annexation and settlement is dictated by considerations alien to those of national security. No such considerations, however, would in any event offer the least justification for measures that are contrary to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Defence Minister Moshe Dayan's avowed purpose, as quoted in item (v) above, of transforming sand dunes into fertile farming land and providing jobs, health services and education would be an admirable and imaginative policy if it were consistent with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Even the best of policies are not warranted if they are founded on injustice and if they follow on forcible acquisition of territory and confiscation of property by an occupying Power which has no title other than the unrecognized and inadmissible title of conquest. The same observation applies to Mr. Dayan's statements referred to in (vi) above.

- (c) *A memorandum presented to the Special Committee by Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem at the time of the June 1967 hostilities*

Mr. El-Khatib maintains that he is still

the *de jure* holder of the office of Mayor. This memorandum contains further statements regarding alleged violations of human rights in Jerusalem committed in the period between 16 April 1970 and 30 June 1971. The memorandum classifies these alleged violations as follows:

- (i) *"Evacuation of Arabs from (occupied) Jerusalem"*

The memorandum quotes a statement by Mayor T. Kollek, announced on Israeli radio and reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1971, according to which over 4,000 Arabs have been evacuated from their homes in Jerusalem since 1967. The memorandum states that Arab sources in Jerusalem reveal that around 70 per cent of these persons were evicted from their homes last year, including more than 200 from the village of Nebi Samwil, a northern Arab suburb of Jerusalem. The memorandum adds that the Minister of Defence ordered the bulldozing of 52 houses on 22 March 1971, in Nebi Samwil. The demolition of 46 of these houses was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 21 June 1971.

- (ii) *"Expropriation of more Arab lands in (occupied) Jerusalem"*

The memorandum quotes the Israeli *Official Gazette* No. 1656 of 30 August 1970 according to which the Israeli Minister of Finance, Mr. Pinhas Sapir, ordered the expropriation of Arab lands in and around Jerusalem. According to the memorandum the total area of the new land expropriated under this order is 11,680 dunams, the equivalent of 2,920 acres. The memorandum also states that these lands belong to over 10,000 Arabs in seven villages around Jerusalem who are mainly dependent for their livelihood on the income derived either through their work in plants in these areas or in cultivating some of this land. It states that the people concerned are liable to suffer evacuation in the same way as the inhabitants of the village of Nebi Samwil, which was bulldozed on 22 March 1971.

- (iii) *"More threats to the Arab population from continuation of illegal Israeli archaeological excavations around the walls of Al-Aqsa Mosque"*

The memorandum states that the "Osmani

School Mosque", near the Western Wall in Jerusalem, has cracked because of excavations being carried out under it by an archaeological team from the Israeli Ministry of Religions. These excavations have so far extended through the basement of over 20 large Arab religious, cultural or residential buildings inhabited by no less than 300 persons, connected to another 80 buildings accommodating an additional 700 persons. The memorandum states that these buildings too are in danger of demolition and their inhabitants in danger of dispersion, in the same manner as the 4,000 evacuees referred to by Mayor Kollek on 17 May 1971. The memorandum alleges that these acts are in defiance of a UNESCO resolution adopted on 10 October 1969 [E.B.4.3.1].

(iv) "*Arab human rights threatened by the new master plan for Jerusalem*"

The memorandum refers to the new master plan for Jerusalem, announced by Mayor Kollek in December 1970, and states that the master plan calls for the expansion of the area of Jerusalem to eight times its present size to include three Arab cities and 23 Arab villages, which house altogether more than 100,000 Arab inhabitants.

(v) "*Israeli housing and industrial projects on the confiscated Arab lands lead to mass exodus of Arab population from Jerusalem*"

The memorandum makes reference to a statement made by Mr. Z. Sharef, Israeli Minister of Housing, on 15 February 1971, in which the Minister announced the new Israeli settlements which will be constructed on the hillside confiscated from Arabs in and around Jerusalem. The memorandum also makes reference to a report in *Ha'aretz* on 9 March 1971 to the effect that the Hebrew University in Jerusalem was planning two large building projects on the Mount of Olives, to be completed by the end of 1980. The same newspaper, according to the memorandum, reported on 6 July 1970 that 13 Israeli hotels, with 4,200 rooms, were planned for Jerusalem before the end of 1975. According to the memorandum seven of these hotels will be built on confiscated Arab land. The memorandum also makes reference to a report appearing in *Ha'aretz* on 19 February

1971, according to which 30 new Israeli industrial projects are to be set up on Arab confiscated land near Jerusalem Airport, and the zones planned will absorb 100 new Jewish industrial projects. The memorandum maintains that these measures are being taken in accordance with the policy enunciated by Mr. Sharef on 15 February 1971, which is "to settle new immigrants as quickly as possible in order to keep Jerusalem [a Jewish city]". The memorandum claims that this policy is tantamount to plundering the land from their original proprietors by force and under different illegal measures and on "false pretences". It states further that the aim of this policy is to clear these persons from their land and to group all in an Arab ghetto, as has already been done in Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, Nazareth and other Palestinian Arab cities taken in 1948. The memorandum states that the primary aim is to force the remaining Arabs into a "third mass Exodus", as has already been done during and after the two wars of 1948 and 1967. Under these circumstances, the memorandum states, "the Israeli military occupation is not observing the human rights of the Arab population of the occupied territories".

(vi) "*The new challenge of compensation*"

The memorandum makes reference to a "recent statement" made on 29 June 1971 by Mr. Shapiro, Israeli Minister of Justice, according to which the Israeli Government announced its policy to compensate Jerusalem Arabs for properties confiscated after 1948. It may be noted that the fact of confiscation is admitted. The memorandum makes reference to the "Law and Administration Ordinance, 1968". Under article 5 of that Law, immovable property owned by Jews, which the Jordanian Government administered between 1948 and 1967, shall be released to the original owners or their heirs. The memorandum points out that the same law does not release Jerusalem Arab property confiscated under the Israeli Absentees Law of 1950, and maintains that it constitutes a form of racial discrimination. It refers to General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which defines the occupying authorities' obligations with respect

to evacuation, repatriation of Palestine refugees, restitution of their property and payment of compensation in lieu of return and restitution. The memorandum states that the policy of compensation denies the human right of Jerusalem Arabs to return to their homes. It points to a "most absurd contradiction", since, on the one hand, the Government of Israel claims a right to return "to the land of their alleged ancestors of 2,000 years ago, while on the other hand, they are denying to Jerusalem Arab refugees—who are part of the Palestine Arab refugees—their natural right to return to their own homes". The memorandum states that "the compensation offered will be limited to nearly one third of the main population, namely those who are still living in Jerusalem", but that "it does not apply to those who were driven out of their homes, or who were for one reason or another absent from Jerusalem at the time of occupation of the major part of Jerusalem in 1948". The memorandum states that as the law does not apply to those who were forced to leave during the 1967 hostilities, or who were absent on temporary visits outside Jerusalem, such persons are classified as absentees. According to the memorandum they number over 100,000 persons who, under the proposed Israeli Compensation Law, are not covered by it. The memorandum also refers to a statement by Mr. Shapiro on 29 June 1971, to the effect that compensation will be based on the evaluation of these properties as of 1948 together with an additional 25 per cent, to be paid to the Arab proprietors only, on a yearly instalment basis within 20 years from the date of the enactment of the law. The memorandum draws the attention of the Special Committee to the following possible consequences of this law:

"1. It will place the remaining Arabs of Jerusalem under constant duress to sell their confiscated properties after 1948 to Israel through a so-called 'legal transaction'.

"2. It will give rise later, for the interpretation before international circles and world opinion, that the Arabs of Jerusalem have willingly sold their properties to Israel or Israeli citizens.

"3. These former stages may be widely

publicized by the occupying authorities to support their claim to the annexation of Jerusalem and to their subsequent allegation that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.

"4. It will wipe out the rights of return and restitution of property to the Arabs of Jerusalem.

"5. It will be considered as a precedent to apply the same rules to the rest of the occupied territories.

"6. It will finalize [*sic*] Jerusalem Arab population, and later the rest of the Palestinian Arab population in the occupied territories in Arab ghettos.

"7. Finally it will liquidate Jerusalem Arab people, the Palestine people and the Palestine case."

(d) *Uncontradicted reports, appearing in the information media, of the planned establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories*

Examples of such reports are:

(i) The master plan for construction of housing units in occupied Jerusalem, which was made public earlier this year. This plan involves not only the construction of approximately 21,000 units inside occupied territory but also construction of these units on expropriated land of which 74 to 80 per cent belonged to Arabs. The information on the housing units was given by Housing Minister Ze'ev Sharef during a press conference which was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 5 March 1971. The information concerning the expropriated lands was contained in a report of a press conference given by Mayor Teddy Kollek reported on 29 January 1971. In this connexion, the Special Committee also had occasion to view a film which is purported to have been taken recently in the area where the construction is in progress (see para. 42 above).

(ii) Announcements, such as that reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 1 March 1971, that two more settlements were planned for the Golan Heights during 1972 and one more settlement was planned in Rafah.

(iii) The reports carried on 5 January 1971 in the *Jerusalem Post*, according to which the first "*moshav shitufi*" (settlement) in Sinai



was established on 4 January 1971. The settlement was established near Rafah.

(iv) The report carried on 30 December 1970 in the *Jerusalem Post*, according to which industrial buildings in Hebron were to be constructed in the new Jewish Quarter that was being built. The area of the construction of these industrial buildings extended to 1,500 square metres, according to the reported statement of Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir. The Minister was further reported as stating that this was only the first phase, and that when part of these buildings had been occupied, construction of additional structures would begin, totalling 4,000 square metres.

(v) Reports, such as the one appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 30 December 1970, in which the establishment of two civilian settlements in the Jordan Valley and on the Golan Heights during 1971 was announced.

(vi) The announcement carried on 3 December 1970 according to which a settlement, Kfar Darom, was re-established in the Gaza Strip. According to this report this settlement had existed prior to 1948 and it had been overrun by the Egyptian Army during the 1948 war.

(vii) The report carried on 30 December 1970 according to which a settlement which had been founded by the Jewish Agencies Settlement Department near Latrun was becoming permanent.

(viii) Reports, such as that appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 15 June 1971, according to which the first permanent Jewish civilian settlement in Hebron was inaugurated. The report also states that the first 50 families will be moving into the estate in Hebron at the beginning of September 1971. At the present moment, according to the report, they are housed in temporary quarters in the grounds of military government buildings. The Special Committee was shown a film purporting to be evidence of this statement (see para. 42 above).

(ix) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 December 1970 according to which Acting Prime Minister Yigal Allon disclosed that the Government of Israel had decided

on the establishment of five more Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

(e) *Several letters addressed by the Governments of Jordan and Syria concerning measures by the Government of Israel in violation of the human rights of the persons living in occupied Jerusalem*

These appear in documents S/9969, S/10123, S/10130, S/10139, S/10149 and S/10169. The Government of Israel has answered some of the allegations in letters circulated as documents S/10138, S/10142 and S/10146, and has sought to rebut them. Since the Government of Israel's rebuttal of the allegations made by the Government of Jordan is based on the claim that occupied Jerusalem has been annexed to Israel, and as the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have rejected this claim, the Special Committee feels that the rebuttal is devoid of force or substance.

A number of letters also concern the question of settlements in the Golan Heights. These are contained in documents S/9823, S/10213 and S/10300. The letter circulated as document S/10213 in turn gave rise to further communications addressed to the Secretary-General by Israel and Syria. The Syrian letters are circulated in documents S/10224, S/10232 and S/10238. The Israeli letters are contained in documents S/10220, S/10228 and S/10234. The Special Committee has considerable evidence to show that the eviction of the civilian population on a substantial scale occurred in the period immediately following the hostilities of June 1967, although the process had commenced even during the hostilities. The Special Committee made reference to this aspect of the violation of the human rights of the civilian population in the Golan Heights in its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089). The Special Committee is aware of the statements made by Israeli leaders to the effect that the Golan Heights will be annexed by Israel. It also has evidence to show that settlements have been established in the Golan Heights area (see para. 48 (a), (b) and (d) above), on or near the sites of villages that had been forcibly evacuated during or

after the hostilities. The Special Committee considers this to be a violation of the right of return of those persons who had fled before, during and after the June 1967 hostilities. Irrespective of any political settlement that is in contemplation or that is ultimately reached, the people whose home is in the Golan Heights have an immediate and incontestable right to return to their homes.

- (f) *The absence of any serious attempt at repatriation of the refugees to their homes in the occupied territories*

On the basis of the testimony of several of the persons forcibly evicted, heard by the Special Committee in Damascus in 1970 (A/8089, para. 75), the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its activities in the Middle East (June 1967 to June 1970) reproduced in *The International Review of the Red Cross*, August and September 1970, Nos. 113 and 114, as well as reports in the Israeli press, the Special Committee has concluded that there has been no serious attempt by the Israeli authorities at repatriation of civilians whose homes are in the Golan Heights and certainly no policy to that end. Subsequent press releases by the International Committee of the Red Cross indicate that, apart from sporadic efforts through schemes of repatriation designed to reunite families and schemes involving but a few score of persons, there has since June 1967 been no repatriation on any significant scale to warrant the conclusion that the Government of Israel is acting in recognition of the human right of the refugees to return to their homes.

- (g) *The mass expulsion and continued deportation of individuals from the occupied territories*

The Special Committee confirms the finding reached in its first report (A/8089, paras. 75-77) that in several cases, particularly in the Golan Heights and in the Latrun area (West Bank), whole village populations were forcibly expelled by Israeli forces and have not so far been allowed to return. The Special Committee notes that the allegations made by the Government of Jordan in its letters circulated as documents of the Security

Council and the General Assembly have not been refuted by the Government of Israel (see paras. 49-51 below).

- (h) *The continued transfer of the population of the occupied territories to other areas within the occupied territories*

Such transfers of population have occurred in the case of several villages that were systematically destroyed in 1967: the population of these villages was either expelled or forced to live elsewhere in the occupied territories. The same practice has been followed in occupied Jerusalem. According to a report in the *Jerusalem Post* of 17 May 1971, Mr. Teddy Kollek, Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem, stated that 4,000 Arabs had been evacuated from Jerusalem. Likewise, in the case of Gaza, according to reports appearing in several newspapers and in letters addressed by Governments, several thousands of persons were displaced from the three major refugee camps in Gaza. Official Israeli sources have stated that these transfers of population were necessitated by new security measures, such as the construction of wider roads inside the camps in order to facilitate patrolling and the maintenance of law and order in the camps. Most of the persons whose refugee accommodation was destroyed to permit of the construction of these roads were forced to leave for the West Bank and El Arish, while a few were said to have sought refuge with other families inside Gaza.

The Special Committee considers that the transfers were unwarranted and that even if the construction of new roads was considered indispensable for the maintenance of law and order, the arbitrary transfer of population was unnecessary, unjustified and in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

#### B. ALLEGATIONS OF DEPORTATION

49. Allegations of deportation of individuals from the occupied territories were made by the Jordanian Government in letters circulated in the following documents: S/9868, S/9885, S/9904, S/9919, S/10073, S/10074, S/10165 and S/10203. According to these letters, forcible expulsion took place after

arbitrary detention and ill-treatment. The Government of Israel's only reply to these allegations was made in a letter circulated as document S/9879. It refers to the allegation of forcible deportation made by the Jordanian Government in document S/9868, but, in the Special Committee's view, does not refute the allegation. The Government of Israel merely states that "letters such as those addressed... by the Permanent Representative of Jordan... are obviously designed to serve as a smoke-screen to conceal Jordan's heavy responsibility for the continued bloodshed and suffering on both sides". The Special Committee has seen for itself some of the persons mentioned in the Security Council documents, who alleged that they had been deported. It had before it letters from the ICRC to the President of the Jordan Red Crescent Society in which it is stated that "the ICRC deeply deplores the fact" (i.e., expulsion of civilians from the West Bank) and that "ICRC delegates in the West Bank made many interventions during the last three years" (i.e., three years ending November 1970) "protesting against the fact of the expulsion and pleading in favour of individual cases". The letter goes on to state as follows: "I can assure you that they will continue strenuously to interfere in favour of these expelled persons". The Special Committee has no doubt that a large number of persons have been forcibly deported regularly from the occupied territories by the Israeli authorities. The fact of deportation is established beyond all reasonable doubt in the view of the Special Committee, and the frequency with which it has taken place since the June 1967 hostilities leads the Special Committee to believe that this is part of the Government of Israel's policy. The Government of Israel has not commented on allegations of deportation contained in the letters of the Jordanian Government and referred to earlier in this paragraph.

50. Unlike the policy of annexation, which is openly admitted and declared by members of the Government of Israel and by Israeli leaders, there is no similar admission or declaration of policy in regard to deportation. The oral evidence of witnesses appearing

before the Special Committee, together with the established fact that a substantial number of individuals have been deported, clearly demonstrates the existence of a policy of deportation on the part of the Government of Israel. Although, in effecting these deportations, the Government of Israel invokes the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which have been extended to the occupied territories, such deportations constitute a breach of the provisions of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Special Committee has already pronounced itself on these Regulations in its first report (A/8089, paras. 57-60) and it maintains the same opinion it held then, namely, that the Regulations are *ultra vires* the Fourth Geneva Convention.

51. On the question of deportation, the Special Committee also notes the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as High Court of Justice in the case of Azmi Ibrahim Marar versus Minister of Defence *et al.*, (H.C. 17/71). Marar had petitioned the High Court of Justice for an order *nisi* calling upon the Minister of Defence to show cause why he should not rescind his decision to deport the petitioner from the country. The petitioner had been detained for a considerable time under Regulation III (1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which provides that: "A Military Commander may by order direct that any person shall be detained in such place of detention as may be specified by the Military Commander in the order". Later the Minister of Defence, by virtue of the powers vested in him by Regulation 112 of the Emergency Regulations, issued an order for his deportation. Regulation 112 provides that: "(1) the Minister of Defence shall have power to make an order, under his hand, for the deportation of any person from Israel. A person in respect of whom a deportation order has been made shall remain out of Israel so long as the order remains in force". The Regulation also provides for an advisory committee, appointed under the Regulations, which is empowered to consider and make recommendations to the Government in respect of any deportation order, if requested

to do so by any person whose deportation has been ordered under the Regulations. In this case, the petitioner had asked the advisory committee to consider the deportation order. The Advisory Committee, having considered the order, recommended that it remain in force. The Court dismissed the petition, basing itself *inter alia* on the argument that it was not within the competence of the High Court to consider the argument brought by the petitioner since this is entrusted exclusively to the Advisory Committee in virtue of Regulation 112, "whether this be desirable or not". The decision was given on 20 January 1971.

#### C. DEMOLITION OF HOUSES AND ERADICATION OF VILLAGES

52. In addition to the evidence heard by the Special Committee in the course of its investigation in 1970 concerning demolition of houses, further evidence was presented on the same subject in 1971. In particular, the Special Committee takes note of regular reports appearing in the Israeli press regarding demolition of houses.

53. Some witnesses appearing before the Special Committee also alleged demolition of houses:

(a) *Shafik Ahmad Hassan Shteivi*, 20 years of age, who was arrested on 24 April 1970. According to Shteivi, his brother was a member of the resistance movement and the Israelis had threatened to subject his mother and two sisters, who had been arrested, to harsher treatment if he did not give information about his brother. Shteivi testified that their house had been demolished, his mother and one sister killed and the other sister detained in prison. He also testified that his house had been one of seven demolished by the Israeli Army.

(b) *Saber Mohammed Abdul Latif*, head of the local council of the village of Beit Fajjar, in the Hebron District, testified that after his arrest on 1 November 1969, his village had been besieged for about four months, no water had been allowed in and some 70 houses had been blown up. Abdul Latif had been deported on 28 August 1970.

54. The Special Committee also noted the following reports of demolition appearing in the Israeli press; this is not a complete list of such reports on the subject, but they are quoted by way of illustration:

- 10 May 1970, *Ha'aretz*—3 houses in Hebron.
- 20 May 1970, *Ha'aretz*—70 houses—Marj Na'Jeh (North Jordan Valley).
- 27 May 1970, *Jerusalem Post*—5 houses—Ashkar Refugee Camp near Nablus.
- 21 December 1970, *Jerusalem Post*—5 houses, Gaza.
- 12 January 1971, *Jerusalem Post*—7 houses—West Bank, Kafir Tayasir (near Jenin).
- 28 February 1971, *Jerusalem Post*—6 houses, Burin Village (Nablus area).
- 31 March 1971, *Jerusalem Post*—3 houses, Sillet e-Dahr, near Janin; Atzira e-Kebliyyeh, near Nablus.
- 2 April 1971, *Jerusalem Post*—10 houses, Gaza.

55. The Special Committee also received from the Government of the United Arab Republic a statement containing a list of 34 houses that were demolished, with details of ownership, the size of the buildings, and the dates of demolition. According to this list, these demolitions took place during December 1970.

56. The Special Committee has not been able to ascertain the exact number of houses that have been demolished, but the fact that demolition of houses takes place is undeniable. On 13 November 1969, the Prime Minister of Israel declared to the press that the destruction of buildings at Halhoul and Gaza was in pursuance of her Government's policy of destroying the houses of persons helping members of Al Fatah. This same statement, according to a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, was communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the ICRC delegation on 23 December 1969 (*International Review of the Red Cross*, September 1970, No. 114, pages 488 and 489).

57. In addition to allegations of demolition of houses, the Special Committee received reports that a number of villages have been entirely destroyed by the Israeli authorities

in the occupied territories. This is acknowledged in the aforementioned report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (pages 485-486) and newspaper reports such as those, for example, appearing in the *Sunday Times* (London) on 11 October 1970, where reference is made not only to the villages of Jalou, Beit Nuba, and Imwas, also referred to by the Special Committee in its first report, but in addition to villages like Surit, Beit Awwa, Beit Mirsem and El-Shuyoukh in the Hebron area and Jiflik, Agarith and Huseirat, in the Jordan Valley. The Special Committee has ascertained that all these villages have been completely destroyed. The Special Committee would also recall the case of Halhul, in regard to which it stated in its first report (A/8089, para. 73):

“... It is an established fact that Halhul was the scene of extensive destruction, that the destruction was inflicted as a collective punishment by way of reprisal, and that the Israeli authorities were responsible for the destruction that took place.”

The Special Committee heard allegations of the destruction of over 400 Arab villages, but no evidence in corroboration has been furnished to the Special Committee.

58. In a letter addressed to the Jordan National Red Crescent Society on 23 June 1971, the ICRC delegate in Jordan stated:

“...I would like to inform you that, according to our delegation in the West Bank, the village of Nebi Samwil was in fact destroyed by Israeli armed forces on March 22, 1971.

“The president of the ICRC, Mr. Naville, has recently sent a letter to Mrs. Golda Meir in which he expresses the ICRC's grave concern about the destruction of buildings in the occupied territories. In this letter, which was transmitted at the end of May, he underlines the negative effect of these destructions on families and reaffirms the ICRC's position—already expressed many times before—as to the serious violation of humanitarian principles that they represent.”

#### D. ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT WHILE UNDER DETENTION

59. In its first report, the Special Committee referred to the testimony of some witnesses who had appeared before it and who had made allegations of ill-treatment suffered while under detention (A/8089, paras. 78-111). In the course of the evidence heard during its visit to Amman and Beirut in 1971, the Special Committee heard further allegations of ill-treatment by individuals appearing before it. The Special Committee received a number of written communications in which allegations of ill-treatment were made.

60. In carrying out its investigation in 1971, the Special Committee sought evidence of a corroborative nature rather than a repetition of the allegations made at the Special Committee's hearings in 1970. The Special Committee heard as many witnesses as possible in the time available and was informed of many others who were apparently ready to give evidence of their personal experiences in prison and detention camps in the occupied territories. In certain cases these statements were supported by other evidence, in the form of medical reports or visible marks of mutilation, physical injury or impairment of faculties. The Special Committee can neither accept nor reject such allegations in the absence of further corroborative evidence.

61. The Special Committee realizes the practical difficulties involved in obtaining evidence concerning allegations, such as those involving ill-treatment, which, by the very nature of the allegation, takes place in circumstances where corroborative evidence is not likely to be available. The serious nature of allegations of this type necessitates a most thorough examination of all relevant evidence before the Special Committee could pronounce itself further as to whether the individual allegations have been proven or whether a *prima facie* case has been established in regard to them and, secondly, as to whether these incidents do establish a pattern of action tantamount to a regular practice on the part of the Israeli authorities.

62. The ICRC expressed similar difficulties in its report (*International Review of*

*the Red Cross*, September 1970, No. 114), in particular with regard to the approximately 300 prisoners who were being held for interrogation (as of the end of May 1970) and to whom it had no access. In that report, the ICRC stated that in May 1969 its delegate had been authorized by the Minister of Defence to talk in private with prisoners whose interrogation was finished and that delegates could, in the presence of an Israeli officer, also see prisoners held for interrogation, to check their state of health, while a few detainees held incommunicado could not be visited. The ICRC also stated that this procedure referred only to prisons and that "police stations and military camps remained closed to the delegates". The ICRC reports that visits were carried out under this procedure from April to September 1969. The report states:

"However, in the autumn of 1969, the Israeli authorities informed the ICRC that the number of prisoners had so increased that they were obliged to change visiting arrangements; from that time on, the delegates would not be able to see any detainee held incommunicado . . . even if his 'isolation' was not necessarily solitary confinement but was shared with other prisoners in the same category.

"The ICRC rejoined that such a procedure was unacceptable and it endeavoured to find a solution consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Even though its delegates thought that there had been some improvement in interrogation conditions, the ICRC considered that the visiting procedure laid down by the Israeli authorities no longer permitted it to ensure that interrogation methods at variance with humanitarian law did not occur.

"On 19 April 1970, the Israeli Government authorized the delegates to carry out their visits subject to the following conditions: each prisoner would continue to be visited about once a month; no detainee would remain in a detention centre without being seen by the delegates on their second visit after the arrest of the prisoner, unless, in exceptional circumstances and for imperative security reasons, he was denied such a visit, in which

case his name would be communicated to the delegation."

63. The Special Committee notes that the greater part of allegations concerning ill-treatment while under detention, including those made this year, relate to experiences of prisoners or detainees while under interrogation in police stations or military camps. The prison most seriously and most frequently implicated in these allegations was Sarafand. Among those witnesses who stated that they had been ill-treated in Sarafand Military Camp were the following: Suleiman Mohammed Abu Tair, 22 years old, who had been arrested on 2 February 1969 and deported on 15 June 1971; a witness arrested in June 1970 (and later deported) who testified in closed meeting; Mohammed Ali Omar Abu Bakri, 35 years old, who was arrested on 9 February 1970 and deported on 18 March 1971; Hamdi Khalil Mahmoud Kassab, 50 years of age, who was arrested on 6 April 1969 and deported in May 1971.

64. Among the cases mentioned by the Special Committee in its first report, the Committee would like to refer to the case of Moayyad Osman Badawi El-Bahsh, 22 years of age, who was arrested in December 1967 in Nablus and deported on 7 September 1970. El-Bahsh appeared before the Special Committee in Beirut on 14 July 1971. He was at that time undergoing treatment in London. The witness' left arm showed signs of complete paralysis when he appeared before the Special Committee. He alleged that this was due to the ill-treatment that he had suffered upon his arrest and that the arm had become paralysed on 9 March 1968. El-Bahsh said that he had been subjected to electrical torture, with clips placed on his ears and genitals and a band around the head, and that he had also been stretched with one arm tied to a post and another to a door which had been constantly opened and closed. The Special Committee observed scars, which could have been caused by cigarette burns, on the witness' legs, knees, thighs, ankles and penis. The witness stated that he had been suspended by the wrists from a window and a soldier had jumped up and down on the shackles holding his legs together, causing

paralysis of the left arm. The witness also stated that he had been visited in 1968 by a representative of Amnesty International. Giving evidence before the Special Committee on 16 April 1970 (A/AC. 145/RT.19, page 67), Najib El-Ahmed stated that he had met El-Bahsh in the infirmary in Nablus Prison in 1968, that they had spent more than 30 days together in the infirmary, that El-Bahsh had developed "partial paralysis of the left side right up to the shoulder", which El-Ahmed attributed to torture to which El-Bahsh had been subjected at Sarafand. Amnesty International is said to have sent a report on this case to the Government of Israel. Although this report itself has not been produced, the Special Committee has received from Amnesty International a copy of the Government of Israel's comments on the case. In the opinion of the Israeli doctors, "medical tests had proved that from an objective point of view there were no signs of paralysis or injury caused to the left arm as claimed" and El-Bahsh's condition appeared to be one of hysterical paralysis, "where the mental state of the patient seemingly causes paralysis, without there being any objective evidence of damage to the nerves". The report states:

"From the X-ray taken of Moayid [El-Bahsh] on 18 February 1968 and subsequent medical tests, it is apparent that there is no basis to the complaint that his left arm had been broken 'in camp' between 24 and 29 January 1968.

"It was similarly proved by the medical evidence that during the period between 24 January and 8 March 1968, Moayid had not suffered from a break or fracture in his left shoulder or arm."

At the time of writing the Special Committee still awaits the reports of the doctors by whom El-Bahsh was being treated when he appeared before the Special Committee.

65. The Special Committee has already cited in its first report certain cases of alleged ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees (A/8089, paras. 78-111). The Government of Israel's delegate stated in the Third Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly (A/C.3/SR.1782) that

they had information in rebuttal of the allegations. The delegate of Israel referred to the case of Mr. Mohammed Derbas, who had told the Special Committee that he had been castrated by surgery by an Israeli doctor (A/8089, para. 104); the Israeli delegate stated that he had information to prove that Mr. Derbas had been operated on earlier by an Egyptian doctor. The Special Committee accordingly requested the Government of Israel to furnish this information (see para. 9 above). The Government of Israel has not so far furnished this evidence.

66. There are other cases which were cited last year where the evidence is compelling, namely those of Mr. Sadaddin Kamal (A/AC.145/RT.11, A/8089, paras. 78 and 79), Mr. Youssef Salahat (A/AC.145/RT.21, A/8089, paras. 78, 96, 100), Mr. Abu Ras (A/AC.145/RT.20, A/8089, paras. 93-95), Mr. Najeb Mohammed Issa El-Khattab (A/AC.145/RT.23, A/8089, paras. 96, 100), Mr. Suleiman M. Sheikh-Eid (A/AC.145/RT. 24, A/8089, paras. 98 and 99), Mr. Munir Abdullah Ghannam (A/AC.145/RT.23, A/8089, para. 102), Mr. Abu Rumeile (A/8089, paras. 80 and 86), Mr. Ismael Abu Mayaleh and his wife, Mrs. Abla Tahha (A/AC.145/RT.22, A/8089, paras. 78, 85, 101). These cases provided strong evidence which, in the Special Committee's judgement as expressed in its first report (A/8089, para. 108), justified the conclusion that there is in several prisons, especially in Sarafand Military Camp, a regular practice of ill-treating inmates, mainly during interrogation.

67. Since the first report of the Special Committee was issued, Mr. Abu Rumeile was sentenced on 25 December 1970 to ten years' imprisonment. This, according to the President of the Court, as reported in the *Jerusalem Post*, was a light sentence "in view of the fact that Rumeile had admitted to the charges and had fallen ill during his detention". The evidence before the Special Committee shows that Mr. Abu Rumeile, who had been arrested on 8 March 1969, had been so ill-treated that his mental faculties were affected (see A/8089, para. 86, and appendix to annex VII). In a letter dated 27 January 1970, in annex VII to the Special

Committee's report, the lawyer for Mr. Rumeile, Mrs. Felicia Langer, wrote to the Minister of Security:

"My client was arrested on 8.3.69 and charged at Lydda by the Chief Military Prosecutor (Asgan Aluf Cadmi—file; Lydda 24, A6921) with various offences under the Defence Regulations (Emergency) 1945. According to evidence given by members of his family and the lawyer who acted on his behalf before me, my client was in full possession of his faculties until the 20th June 1969. He claimed that during the period between his arrest and this date he was severely tortured while being investigated for a month in Jerusalem, and that he suffered both physical and mental injuries. He described how he had been beaten, tortured with an electrical apparatus, and burned with lighted cigarettes. The marks of the latter are still fairly visible on his left arm. According to evidence my client suffered severe mental damage, and lost possession of his faculties after the 20th June 1969—a state which persists to this day. A medical examination was made by Dr. J. Streich, deputy district psychiatrist, and Director of the Mental Health Institution at Peta Tiqva, which revealed that my client is no longer able to control his bowel movements, is unable to identify people around him, and cannot speak coherently. In consequence, Dr. Streich declared him unfit to appear in court. On 14 October 1969, the military court in Lydda declared that 'there appears to be no possibility of bringing the accused to trial on account of his mental state'. My client had been in good physical and mental health both before and for a period after his arrest. There are witnesses who knew him before his arrest—both Jews and Arabs—as a successful business man. There are also witnesses who can testify about the state in which he was brought back to his prison cell after interrogation. My client's health has not improved. He has not even been put into a suitable hospital, but is still in Ramele Prison. On 16 January I saw him and he appeared as a man who was quite insane, 'who had become a piece of broken pottery'. According to claims made by my client while he was still mentally fit, claims which are

upheld by members of his family as well as the witnesses already mentioned, my client's state was caused by illegal methods of investigation, including blows and torture. In view of the seriousness of this case, in which the police and/or the security service are suspected of transforming a healthy man into a physical and mental wreck, I urgently appeal to you to appoint a commission of inquiry so that those responsible may be punished. I can provide names of witnesses, together with their addresses, any time you wish."

#### E. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

68. The Special Committee notes that the practice of administrative detention of individuals continues. Under this practice a considerable number of persons are still deprived of their liberty without charges being brought against them. According to a report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 15 June 1971, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan informed the Knesset that in May 1970 the number of administrative detainees was 1,131 and that in June 1971 the number had decreased to 560. Of these, 229 came from the West Bank, 303 from the Gaza Strip, 14 from Jerusalem and 14 from Israel. The then Commander of the Israeli forces in Gaza, Menahem Aviram, addressing the press on 1 February 1971, on the day after the month-long, 22-hours a day curfew in Shati Refugee Camp was lifted and journalists allowed to tour the area, stated that local lock-ups in Gaza were filled to their 700-bed capacity and that 160 Gaza Palestinians, mostly administrative detainees, were kept in a prison camp in the Sinai. In addition, according to the same report (*Jerusalem Post*, 2 February 1971) and the same source, there were 24 families of wanted persons living in specially constructed quarters in the Sinai. They were exiled to prevent them from aiding and abetting their relatives who were wanted, and they would be returned as soon as the wanted persons were captured. The report states that Commander Shlomo Gazit, Military Commander of the occupied territories, "flatly rejected journalist requests to visit the Sinai detention camp". The report



quotes him as saying "it would not be good for Israeli public relations."

#### F. OTHER ALLEGATIONS

69. Several other allegations have been made before the Special Committee, such as intimidation of the local population by the imposition of harsh curfews for prolonged periods, mass arrests and changes in school curricula of Arab children. The Special Committee commented on these allegations in its first report (A/8089, paras. 71-77, 112-122). The Special Committee would refer particularly to the curfew imposed in the Shati Refugee Camp in Gaza in January 1971 following the death of two Israeli children as a result of the throwing of a hand grenade in a public street. The curfew lasted for a period of four weeks for 22 hours a day. A complementary measure was the calling into the area by the Israeli authorities of the so-called Border Police, whose treatment of the civilian population was alleged to have been inordinately harsh and even brutal. These allegations regarding the behaviour of the Border Police find corroboration in a statement made by the Commander of the Israeli forces in Gaza, as reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 2 February 1971, soon after the curfew in Shati Refugee Camp was lifted and visiting journalists were allowed to tour the area. The report states: "Speaking to journalists, Commander Aviram also admitted that there had been several cases of Israeli troops beating up and robbing Arab suspects, and said the men responsible were disciplined in every case after the charges were substantiated."

70. The Special Committee notes that periodic mass arrests of young men, in groups ranging between 21 and 50, continue. These round-ups are usually justified on the ground of some act of violence attributed to the resistance. Examples of such mass arrests are: the arrest of 25 young men in Jenin, reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 21 March 1971; of 28 men in Gaza, reported on 25 February 1971; and of 45 in Hebron on 10 February 1971. Oral evidence given before the Special Committee indicates that such arrests are effected in a random manner.

71. The Special Committee's attention has been drawn to what are alleged to be instances of radical changes in the educational curricula of Arab children apparently designed to weaken their national consciousness or to obscure the identity of the Palestinian people.

#### IV. FINDINGS

72. The evidence that the Special Committee has received reflects a policy on the part of the Government of Israel designed to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the territory under occupation by the progressive and systematic elimination of every vestige of Palestinian presence in these areas. It would have the effect of obliterating Arab culture and the Arab way of life in the area, and, contrary to international law, of transforming it into a Jewish State. Measures taken under this policy include the establishment of settlements for Israeli Jews in, for example, occupied Jerusalem, Hebron, certain parts of the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, Gaza, Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh. Such a policy will render more difficult any eventual restoration of the Palestinian people's property and other rights. Besides denying the right of Palestinians who have fled the occupied territories to return to those territories, it also threatens the right of Palestinians who have remained in the occupied territories to continue to live there. In the Special Committee's view the right of the inhabitants of the occupied territories to remain in their homeland is unqualified and inalienable.

73. The special Committee is of the opinion that the practice of deportation of persons from occupied territories, as carried out by Israel, is not only contrary to article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention but is also part of a total policy of depriving the people of the occupied territory of their right to remain in their homeland. The Special Committee has made the same finding with regard to the practice whereby Israeli nationals are transferred to the occupied territories, as is the case in East Jerusalem, Hebron, the Golan Heights, certain parts of the Jordan

Valley, Gaza, Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh.

74. In the debate on the Special Committee's report in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the delegate of Israel, referring to his Government's policy in the occupied territories, stated that several thousands of Arab visitors had been allowed into the territories during the summer of 1970 (A/SPC/SR. 744-751; A/C.3/SR.1782). According to reports in the Israeli press, several more thousand visitors have been permitted this year. Although this may be considered as a positive aspect of Israeli policy towards the territories it occupies, it is no remedy in the circumstances. The summer visitors' programme is no substitute for recognition of the right of the refugees to return to their home—a right that is continued to be denied to them by the Government of Israel—nor does it have any bearing whatsoever on the declared policy of the Government of Israel to settle occupied territories and on the fact that several hundred persons had been deported from their home in the occupied territories on official deportation orders purporting to be issued by the Israeli authorities under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. No statistics are available of the number of persons who have been forcibly expelled without any such formality. These facts remain true, irrespective of what the Israeli authorities claim to be a liberal policy of granting visiting permits or of lifting travel restrictions. The same observation would apply to the statement frequently made that Israeli policy in the occupied territories is to keep the Israeli presence as unobtrusive as possible, not interfering with the conduct of local affairs and keeping intervention by the occupation government to a minimum. It is difficult to reconcile the latter statement with the recurring curfews imposed for periods ranging from dawn-to-dusk over a stretch of 22 hours and the habitual intervention of Israeli troops to deal with acts of resistance to the occupation. The fact remains that (a) the Government of Israel still refuses the population of the occupied territories the right to return to their home; (b) the declared

policy of the Government of Israel is to settle occupied territories with Israeli citizens; (c) the Government of Israel regularly deports civilians from the occupied territories.

75. The Special Committee has shown in paragraphs 52 and 58 above that the Government of Israel's declared policy is to destroy the houses of persons suspected of helping members of the resistance. This policy is in violation of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also violates the fundamental right of the protected persons to a home. The evidence before the Special Committee shows, moreover, that the destruction of houses takes place arbitrarily and that it has not ceased. The Special Committee notes the efforts of the ICRC to aid victims, whose houses have been demolished, by providing relief supplies and temporary shelter. The Special Committee notes that many persons whose houses have been demolished have left the occupied territories. The Special Committee is of the view that the policy of demolition of houses in this manner and a demonstrated policy of deportation, as parts of a general policy of annexation and settlement, can have but one result: the elimination of any possibility of the fulfilment of the Palestinian people's right of self-determination within the confines of their own homeland.

76. It is clear that the right of the Palestinian people to their own homeland was sanctioned by the United Nations in all resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council, including resolution 181 (II) by virtue of which the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as spelled out in the resolution. The Plan of Partition, in the same manner as other United Nations resolutions and declarations on the question, has acknowledged the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The concern of the international community for this basic right was further manifested when the General Assembly adopted the International Covenants on Human Rights, article 1 of each of which proclaims the right to self-determination. The Israeli policy would have the effect

of extinguishing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The Special Committee considers any act in furtherance of that policy to be a violation of a fundamental human right to which all peoples are equally entitled.

77. Numerous allegations of ill-treatment while under detention have been made before the Special Committee. In the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence, the Special Committee is unable to reach a conclusive finding in regard to these cases. The Special Committee is convinced however that, apart from general prison conditions which, despite reported efforts at improvement, are stated to be bad, mainly due to overcrowding, interrogation procedures very frequently involve physical violence (see *International Review of the Red Cross*, September 1970, No. 114, pages 504–505; and *The Red Cross in Action*, news bulletin No. 164, 14 July 1971).

78. The evidence shows that the practice of imposing harsh curfews continues. In regard to the four weeks' long curfew imposed on the Shati Refugee Camp following the grenade incident in January 1971, the conditions of curfew make it appear to have been more of a form of reprisal than a necessary means of either preventing similar incidences or bringing the offenders to book.

79. In regard to allegations of mass arrests, the Special Committee has reached the conclusion that whatever their avowed purpose, the arrests were clearly calculated in part to be a means of destroying the morale of the people of the occupied territories.

80. For lack of evidence, the Special Committee is unable to arrive at a finding on the allegation that radical changes have been made in the education curricula of Arab children of the occupied territories. The Special Committee understands that UNESCO has interested itself in securing for the children of the occupied territories the quality and type of education to which they are entitled.

81. On the basis of the testimony placed before it or obtained by it in the course of its investigations, the Special Committee had been led to conclude that the Government of Israel is deliberately carrying out policies

aimed at preventing the population of the occupied territories from returning to their homes and forcing those who are in their homes in the occupied territories to leave, either by direct means such as deportation or indirectly by attempts at undermining their morale or through the offer of special inducements, all with the ultimate object of annexing and settling the occupied territories. The Special Committee considers the acts of the Government of Israel in furtherance of these policies to be the most serious violation of human rights that has come to its attention. The evidence shows that this situation has deteriorated since the last mission of the Special Committee in 1970.

82. The Special Committee must emphasize once again the importance of having an arrangement for implementing the provisions of the Geneva Conventions which would be acceptable to all parties and which would thereby better ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee regards its task as essentially a humanitarian and not a political one, despite the fact that there are certain political and juridical problems that necessarily arise from the nature of the Middle East question as a whole. It is, however, clear to the Committee that the arrangement it recommended in its report to the Secretary-General (A/8089, para. 155) should be implemented if any progress is to be achieved in safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee would like to draw particular attention to the recommendation which provides for the representation under this arrangement of the large population within the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination. The Special Committee in no way intends to enter into the question of the status of any of the States vis-à-vis one another nor is the arrangement it proposed in any way meant to prejudice whatever political attitudes these States have taken in relation to one another until now. The arrangement envisaged by the Special Committee is designed to ensure that the persons in the occupied territory

are guaranteed the protection of their rights, namely, the primary right to remain in or return to their home and other rights consistent with their status as the civilian population of an occupied territory.

83. The Special Committee has already stated in its first report (A/8089, para. 146) that it considers that in this case the fundamental violation of human rights lies in the very fact of occupation. The most effective way of safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, therefore, is to end the occupation of these territories. Occupation constitutes an infringement of the principle of territorial integrity which has been accepted and repeatedly endorsed by the family of nations and has been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The same principle has been further recognized and elaborated by the United Nations in the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session (resolution 2625 (XXV)) on 24 October 1970. The principle that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible has been expressly reaffirmed by the General Assembly in paragraph 1 of resolution 2628 (XXV) relating to the situation in the Middle East. The evidence received by the Special Committee since its mission to the Middle East in 1970 strengthens its conviction that, failing an end to the occupation itself and if the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are to be enforced, the States concerned will have to agree to an arrangement that would remove any suspicion regarding violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

84. The Special Committee, having examined the evidence before it, reiterates the recommendations that it made in its first report (A/8089, paras. 145-156) with the modifications indicated below.

85. The Special Committee notes that the declared Israeli policy of annexing Jerusalem

has become even more manifest in the construction of large housing projects on the occupied eastern limits of the city undertaken as an apparent instrument of that policy. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly call upon the Government of Israel to desist from all measures for the annexation of the occupied part of Jerusalem.

86. The Special Committee also notes that since the presentation of its first report certain policies and practices which the Special Committee found to exist in the occupied territories have been continued, in some instances on an even wider scale. This is especially so in regard to the policy of encouraging the movement of Israeli settlers into such settlements. The Special Committee recommends that the Government of Israel be called upon to discontinue this policy.

87. The Special Committee must also draw attention to the fact that the practice of deportation of civilians from the occupied territories has continued unabated, and must record its grave concern that this practice, together with the policy of establishing settlements in the occupied territories, seems calculated to eliminate an identifiable Palestinian community altogether from the occupied territories. The Special Committee, therefore, recommends that the General Assembly at the same time call upon the Government of Israel to permit, unconditionally, all persons who have fled the occupied territories, or who have been deported or expelled therefrom, to return to their homes.

88. The Special Committee still maintains that the existing arrangements for the enforcement of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are, in the circumstances, inadequate as they neither enable complete and exhaustive investigation of allegations of violations of these Conventions nor do they in a positive sense ensure their scrupulous observance. Such an investigation can be effective only if the parties concerned extend their willing co-operation.

89. The evidence before the Special Committee shows that the practices and policies found to exist in the occupied territories

in 1970 have not ceased, and for this reason the Special Committee would reiterate the recommendation contained in paragraph 155 of its first report (A/8089) regarding the establishment of a mechanism to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In renewing this recommendation the Special Committee must emphasize that it attaches the highest importance to the proper representation of the interests of the Palestinian population, which has not yet been given the right of self-determination. The Special Committee wishes to emphasize the need for effective implementation of the Geneva Conventions; and that humanitarian considerations should transcend all political differences and difficulties. Humanitarian considerations and the importance of protecting rights accorded under international law can and should be kept separate and distinct from the political issues. The Special Committee is satisfied that the arrangement it proposes does not and cannot prejudice any final settlement of the political problem involved in accordance with the terms of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

90. The Special Committee, therefore, commends to the States parties to the conflict in the Middle East the adoption of the arrangement proposed by it in its first report. The merit of that proposal is that it conforms to the spirit of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions while avoiding certain political problems inherent in the present situation. For such an arrangement to be effective, three elements are essential:

- (a) There must be supervision of the conditions of occupation;
- (b) This supervision must be exercised by an independent and impartial body;
- (c) The investigating body must enjoy freedom of operation in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions.

91. The arrangement proposed by the Special Committee in its first report (A/8089) and recommended by it again is as follows: The General Assembly might recommend:

- (a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international

organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the occupied territories;

- (b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement. The Special Committee recommends that the State or States or international organization duly nominated under this arrangement might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

- (a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

- (c) To report to the States concerned, and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.

## VI. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

92. Approved and signed by the Special Committee in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure as follows:

- [Signed] H.S. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon)
- [Signed] HUSSEIN NUR-ELMI (Somalia)
- [Signed] B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

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**Special Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency Commissioner-General on the Effect on Palestine Refugees of Recent Operations Carried Out by the Israeli Military Authorities in the Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>**

September, 1971

1. The Commissioner-General submits the following special report on the effect on Palestine refugees of recent operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip, in which shelters in refugee camps were demolished and about 15,000 persons displaced, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip. This report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV).

2. On 8 July 1971, while the Minister of Defence of the Government of Israel was in Gaza, he asked to see the Agency's Field Director for the Gaza Strip and told him that in view of the ineffectiveness of other measures in dealing with violence in Jabalia refugee camp, the Israeli authorities intended in the near future to move numbers of the inhabitants from the camp so that roads could be built or widened for security purposes. The Minister said it was not intended that the refugees should be left without shelter, but, because of the urgency of the measure, new housing outside Jabalia could not be provided in advance of demolition. Displaced persons would have to be accommodated in other camps or in Gaza town or in El Arish outside the Gaza Strip. The Minister also expressed the hope that the Agency would continue to provide services in these new locations to refugees who were moved.

3. United Nations Headquarters were informed by the Agency of this and other developments. There was no question of the Agency's being asked to agree to this measure, which was taken on the sole initiative and

responsibility of the Occupying Power. Without further reference to the Agency, the demolition of shelters began on 20 July in Jabalia camp.

4. At a meeting in Gaza, on 28 July, at which the Commissioner-General expressed his concern and sought more information, the Military Governor of the Gaza Strip said that the operations were limited to Jabalia camp, that the numbers involved would not be out of proportion to the numbers involved in earlier road-widening in other camps (where housing had been provided in advance in the same camp); that there were plans for new housing in the Strip, but action was urgent in view of the killing of 80 persons in a period of five months; that El Arish was being used only because alternative housing was not available in the Gaza Strip; and, further, that refugees who have moved to El Arish would be able to return when the new housing was available. On the basis of this information, it appeared that about 600 to 800 families, and in Jabalia only, would be affected by the operations. Without notification to the Agency, however, the operations were extended to Shati (Beach) camp on 2 August and to Rafah camp on or about 15 August.

5. On 6 August, the Commissioner-General drew the attention of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the extreme hardship being inflicted on the refugees by the sudden demolition of their homes and their forcible removal at short notice.

6. In a *note verbale* of 8 August, the Agency formally protested at the action being taken by the Israeli authorities, which appeared to be contrary to General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV), which affirmed a number of basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, and also to the provisions of articles 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

7. On 14 August, the Commissioner-General pointed out to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs that demolition appeared to be much in excess of the alternative accommodation available. He asked that a

<sup>1</sup> Text of the special report on Gaza submitted by UNRWA Commissioner-General Sir John Rennie, transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by Secretary-General U Thant and issued on September 17; U.N. doc. A/8383.

halt be called to the operations and action urgently taken to provide adequate shelter within the Gaza Strip for those who had lost their homes.

8. On 19 August, at a meeting in the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Commissioner-General was informed that the operations had been completed in Jabalia and would be completed that day in Shati (Beach) camp, but that they were still in progress in Rafah and would continue as long as alternative accommodation in the Gaza Strip or in El Arish or, also, in the West Bank of Jordan was available. The Commissioner-General was informed that at that stage the homes of 1,515 families, comprising over 10,000 persons, had been demolished. He again called for a halt to the operations, but was told that they must go on. He was also informed that a second phase would take place after up to 800 new houses had been built in four separate areas in the Strip: Khan Younis, Rafah, Deir-el-Balah and the area between Deir-el-Balah and Gaza town.

9. The operations continued in Rafah camp until 26 August. According to the best information at present available to the Agency, about 2,900 families, comprising some 15,000 persons, have been displaced from the three camps in these operations, of whom about 350 families have gone to El Arish, about 30 families to the West Bank, and the rest remain elsewhere in the Gaza Strip. For precise information checks must be made at all Agency distribution centres and this will take some time.

10. Despite assurances given by the Israeli military authorities in the course of the operations, by 14 August about 70 Agency staff members had had their shelters demolished, and some had been obliged to move to El Arish owing to the absence of readily available alternative accommodation in the vicinity.

11. The Agency was asked by the Israeli military authorities to continue to provide services to refugees who were moved. Refugees who are still resident in the Strip are eligible for the medical and educational services provided there and can ask to have their rations transferred to a nearer distri-

bution centre in accordance with normal practice. This applies also to those who have had to move to the West Bank of Jordan. As regards El Arish, which is outside the area in which the Agency operates programmes, the Agency has been unable to agree to the request by the Israeli authorities that it should provide services there. A refugee family at El Arish may, however, still pick up its monthly rations at its former distribution centre or, if it so requests the Agency, have them temporarily transferred to a more convenient centre within the Strip. The Agency will also give whatever assistance it can to enable displaced refugees to re-establish themselves within the Gaza Strip.

12. According to reports received by the Agency from the refugees and from its staff, the Israeli military authorities carried out these security operations, in general, in the following way. Israeli soldiers arrived in the camp (on some occasions, at least, at night), marked shelters for demolition and gave the inhabitants notice ranging from two to forty-eight hours to leave with all their belongings. The identity cards of the heads of the families affected were taken away by the soldiers in exchange for receipts. The refugees were told that there was good accommodation for them in El Arish, but that, if they preferred, they could go to the West Bank of Jordan, or remain in Gaza if they could find unoccupied accommodation there outside their camp and produce the owner's written agreement for its use. They were also told that free transport would be provided for those agreeing to go to El Arish or the West Bank of Jordan, that accommodation there would be rent-free for a period and employment was available, and that compensation would be paid for demolished additions they had made to Agency shelters and for privately-built shelters. The Agency understands that compensation was also paid for other private property belonging to refugees and affected by demolition, that food for several days was given to those who moved to El Arish, and that medical attention is available there.

13. The Agency has not yet had full information on the effects of the operations described above. It believes that about

4,360 rooms built by the Agency, or with its assistance, have been demolished, and the Government of Israel has been notified of a claim for compensation in respect of them. In addition, it is estimated that over 2,000 privately-built rooms have been demolished. There has been some dislocation of services, but the extent cannot yet be assessed. From such information as is available on the whereabouts of refugees displaced by the demolition of their shelters, about 2,500 families must have remained in the Strip, occupying such other empty housing or other permanent shelter as they could find, doubling-up with friends or relatives, or improvising make-shift shelter on vacant land. It is evident that for many their present living conditions must be worse than before and that the health hazard must be greater.

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### **Supplement to the Special Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency Commissioner-General on the Effect on Palestine Refugees of Operations Carried Out in July and August 1971 by the Israeli Military Authorities in the Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>**

November, 1971

1. On the basis of the information now available to him the Commissioner-General confirms that the figures given in the special report for the number of persons affected and the number of rooms constructed by the Agency or with its assistance are approximately correct: the figures he now has are 14,704 persons (against "about 15,000") and 4,428 rooms (against 4,360). He confirms that, in addition, between 2,000 and 3,000 privately built rooms were demolished. The number of families involved is lower: 2,410 against the figure of "about 2,900" given in the special report. The number of staff members involved is higher: 165 against the figure

of "about 70" in the special report.

2. The breakdown by camp is as follows:

	Persons	Families	Agency-built or assisted rooms
Jabalia	6,349	1,050	2,179
Beach (Shati)	4,680	789	1,205
Rafah	3,675	571	1,044

3. The present whereabouts of the displaced refugees is believed to be as follows: about 270 families are in El Arish, about 130 having returned from there to the Gaza Strip; about 30 are in the West Bank of Jordan; about 830 are in the same camps; and the remainder, about 1,280, are elsewhere in the Gaza Strip. Those at El Arish have been provided with accommodation by the Israeli authorities and those in the West Bank who had no other accommodation have been admitted to vacant UNRWA shelters. Some families remaining in the same camp have found vacant shelters but the majority have been taken in by relations and friends. Families who left their camp but did not go to El Arish or to the West Bank have found accommodation by renting vacant buildings or constructing temporary shelters or lodging with relations or friends, many of them having received compensation from the Israeli authorities for their property which was destroyed. The Commissioner-General has no information from official sources about the plans of the Israeli authorities for further payment of compensation to refugees whose property was destroyed or for assistance with the construction of housing for them.

4. The Agency has submitted a claim for compensation to the Israeli authorities amounting to about \$400,000 in respect of Agency-built or Agency-assisted shelters and about \$36,500 in respect of public and private latrines, garbage platforms and bins, and water points and drains demolished in the course of the security operations with which the special report dealt.

5. Refugees whose dwellings were demolished and who have remained in the Gaza Strip continue to receive all Agency services, as do those who moved to the West Bank of Jordan. Those who remain at El Arish are collecting their rations monthly at distribution centres in the Strip.

<sup>1</sup> Text of UNRWA Commissioner-General Rennie's supplementary special report as transmitted by Secretary-General U Thant to the General Assembly and issued on November 23, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8383/Add. 1.



# Supplementary Report of the United Nations Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories<sup>1</sup>

December, 1971

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<sup>1</sup> Text (excluding the annexes which are not reproduced here) of the supplementary report submitted by the Special Committee, transmitted to the General Assembly by Secretary-General U Thant and issued on December 9, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8389/Add. 1.

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

10 December 1971

His Excellency  
U Thant  
Secretary-General of the United Nations  
New York, New York

Sir,

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV), a report supplementing the second report, which it adopted and presented to you on 17 September 1971 (A/8389 and Corr.1). The supplementary report has been prepared in order to bring to your attention, and the attention of the General Assembly, certain information which was not available at the time the second report was prepared.

In the view of the Special Committee, the most important development that has taken place since the Special Committee adopted its second report was the announcement by the International Committee of the Red Cross that it had reconsidered its position as a potential Protecting Power in terms of the Geneva Conventions. The International Committee has now announced that it is prepared to take upon itself all the tasks envisaged for the Protecting Power in these Conventions. As the Government of Israel has refused to receive the Special Committee or to co-operate with it, but has allowed the International Committee to function within the occupied territories, the Special Committee considers it most desirable and necessary that appropriate arrangements be made to enable the International Committee to begin forthwith the exercise of the functions of a Protecting Power in the occupied territories in the Middle East.

Once the International Committee begins in fact to function as a Protecting Power, the General Assembly might wish to consider whether or not there is a need for the continuation of the Special Committee's activities.

Accept Sir, on my behalf and on behalf of my two colleagues on the Special Committee, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE  
Chairman

Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories

## INTRODUCTION

1. In resolution 2727 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, the Special Committee was requested by the General Assembly to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter".

2. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee presented its second report to the Secretary-General (A/8389 and Corr.1) based on information available to the Committee up to that date. Since that date, a number of developments relevant to its mandate have come to the attention of the Special Committee. The Special Committee has therefore drawn up the present supplement to its second report.

3. The information in the present report supplements that appearing in chapter III of the second report (A/8389 and Corr.1). In addition, the Special Committee has added some remarks concerning chapter V of that report, containing the recommendations of the Special Committee.

4. The Special Committee has taken note of the statement released by the Permanent Mission of Israel on 15 October 1971 (A/8472) in connexion with the publication of the second report of the Special Committee. In this statement, the Government of Israel reiterated its reasons for refusing to co-operate with the Special Committee. In addition, the Government of Israel charged that witnesses "appeared before the Committee with heart-rending stories to the effect that their disabilities, such as for example blindness, were due to 'Israeli tortures', and the Committee appears to have

willingly accepted such nonsense". The statement calls "utter falsehood" the "tales of mass deportation of Arabs" from the occupied territories and charges that the Special Committee "has given currency to [these] tales".

5. The statement asserts that the Arab population in the occupied territories "enjoys tranquillity, prosperity and respect for their human rights, to a degree unknown there before 1967". The statement also refers to the summer visitors scheme as "another fact which by itself should be sufficient to illustrate the falsehood of the testimony on which the Committee so readily relies in its report". Under this programme, Arab visitors are allowed to visit their relatives and friends in the occupied territories and to tour Israel itself. The statement of the Permanent Mission of Israel puts the number of these visitors for 1971 as "over 100,000", compared with 17,000 in 1968, 23,000 in 1969 and 55,000 in 1970.

6. The Special Committee has also taken note of the statement issued by the Jordan Mission to the United Nations, on 21 October 1971, in connexion with the report of the Special Committee (A/8478). The statement characterizes the report as "factual and objective".

7. Without indulging in acrimonious exchanges, the Special Committee deems it necessary, in the interest of objectivity, to point out that the accusations contained in the statement of the Israeli Mission are too vague for detailed rebuttal. The Israeli Mission does not refer to any specific cases mentioned in the Special Committee's report, nor has it furnished any information that could help establish the facts. As the Special Committee has stated repeatedly, it would welcome such information. As regards the Israeli Mission's contention that the summer visitors programme "should be sufficient to illustrate the falsehood of the testimony" before the Committee, the Special Committee would refer to its comments made in this connexion in its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 74) and to paragraphs 21 and 22 of the present report.

8. As stated in both its first and second

reports (A/8089<sup>1</sup> and A/8389 and Corr. 1), the Special Committee's mandate requires it to receive evidence that relates to the existence or otherwise of policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities of 1967. The Special Committee has interpreted its mandate in the first report<sup>2</sup> and reiterated that interpretation in its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, chap. II). The same interpretation applies to the present supplementary report. Briefly stated, the Special Committee considers that it has been requested by the General Assembly to investigate the practices and policies of the Government of Israel affecting the human rights—namely, those which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable" in its resolution 237 (1967) and those embodied in certain instruments of international law, such as the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions,<sup>3</sup>—of the population of those territories that Israel occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

9. In this context, the Special Committee has carried out its investigation of allegations of violations of human rights in the occupied territories. In carrying out its mandate this year, the Special Committee gave priority to evidence in corroboration of evidence previously given before it and to evidence which itself could be corroborated.

10. In drawing up the present report, the Special Committee has continued to take note of newspaper reports of incidents in the Israeli and foreign press, as well as reports by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. The Special Committee has also taken into account the information appearing in recent United Nations documents, such as the special reports of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on the operations in the Gaza refugee camps (A/8383

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session*, agenda item 101, document A/8089.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. II.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, paras. 36–38; see also United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 972 and 973.

and Add.1) and related statements such as those issued by the Government of Israel (A/8432) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (A/8395-S/10328). In addition, the Special Committee has received certain additional information on cases referred to in its second report.

## I. ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS THEREON

### A. ALLEGATIONS OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT

11. In its second report, the Special Committee expressed the conviction that it was the policy of the Government of Israel to annex and settle the occupied territories. It cited a number of facts that tended to support this conclusion (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 47), among which were express pronouncements by Israeli Ministers and leaders in which this policy, in the view of the Special Committee, was made manifest. Since the adoption of its report, the Special Committee has become aware of additional statements to the same effect, such as that made by the Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, which was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 October 1971. According to this report, the Prime Minister stated:

“Our borders are fixed by the people who live along them. If we retreat, the borders will retreat with us. The danger is then that somebody else will fix the boundaries for us.”

12. The Special Committee has received new reports of the establishment of settlements by Israelis in the occupied territories. The Special Committee had cited similar information in its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 48 (d)). The Special Committee feels that the following additional reports should be mentioned by way of further evidence of the existence of the policy to annex and settle the occupied territories:

(a) The report appearing in the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv*, on 13 September 1971, which quotes the Director of the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization as stating that, since the hostilities of June 1967, 32 settlements had been set up in the

occupied territories, seven of which were set up in the past year. The same report states that six new settlements were being planned for the next year, three in the Golan Heights, two in the Jordan Valley and one in the Gaza Strip.

(b) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 14 September 1971, concerning the establishment of settlements in Kfar Etzion.

(c) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post*, on 20 October 1971, to the effect that the Israeli authorities had completed the fencing off of 4,000 dunams of land near Deir Iel-Balah, in the Gaza Strip, “as part of a larger project to establish six Jewish settlements in the Strip”. The report states that the total area of the settlements will be 34,000 dunams.

(d) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post*, on 10 November 1971, that the thirteenth settlement in the Golan Heights had been established; and

(e) The report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post*, on 28 September 1971, of the continued expansion of the settlements in Hebron, known as Kiryat Arba. According to this report, the Housing Ministry of the Government of Israel has a master plan providing accommodation for 900 families. The same report refers to the founder and spokesman of the original group which moved into the Park Hotel in Hebron for Passover in 1968 “and stayed on”. In this connexion, the Special Committee took note of the letter, dated 3 June 1968, from the Representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General (A/7103),<sup>1</sup> which states:

“ In April 1968, about eighty Orthodox Jews moved into the Park Hotel on the northern outskirts of the city (Hebron), ostensibly to celebrate the Passover holiday, but then announced that they had come to stay. They soon tried to rent houses and shops. The citizens did not comply with these wishes. The Mayor of Al Khalil (Hebron) cabled the Israel Prime Minister and asked for the removal of this group of Jews. Con-

<sup>1</sup> Issued in printed form in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1968*, document S/8609.

sequently, they abused the Mayor and asked him to withdraw his cable. Upon refusing their demand, they demonstrated in the streets and claimed that they were there to stay and their task was part of the 'redemption of the Land of Israel'. Their acts of provocation continued and the Israel Government was inactive on this matter."

13. The letter states that a delegation appointed by the inhabitants of Hebron met the Military Governor on 9 May 1968 and protested against the settlement of Jews in the city, "emphasizing that their presence was potentially dangerous for public security and that their stay would have grave consequences". The letter of the Representative of Jordan makes reference to a visit by the then Labour Minister, Yigal Allon, to the religious group when, according to the letter, the Minister "voiced his full support for them".

14. The Special Committee also noted the reply of the Government of Israel to the allegations contained in the letter of the Government of Jordan. The letter states (A/7105):<sup>1</sup>

"This letter magnifies and distorts the matter in question.

"A small group of pious Jews and their families have on their own spontaneous initiative taken up residence in Hebron, a town with venerable Jewish historical and religious associations.

"There is no good reason why their neighbours should not live on peaceful and amicable terms with them and so help to heal the tragic memories of the massacre of Hebron Jews in 1929."

15. In addition to the above reports, the *Jerusalem Post*, on 6 October 1971, reported a protest by the Mayor of Hebron, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Ja'abari, against the requisitioning of 1,000 dunams of land "for the expansion of the Jewish settlement of Kiryat Arba in the area". The same report, however, quotes an Israel radio report of a statement by a Military Government official

to the effect that only 230 dunams were taken over "for security reasons" and that, in fact, only six dunams were actually seized, for which the owners had been adequately compensated.

16. In the view of the Special Committee, these letters, the reports quoted above, as well as those reports concerning the settlements in Hebron referred to in the Special Committee's second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 48 (d), (iv) and (viii)), confirm the existence of a policy of annexation and settlement.

#### B. ALLEGATIONS OF TRANSFER OF POPULATION AND OF THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO RETURN

17. In its second report, the Special Committee took note of a number of newspaper reports according to which several thousands of persons were displaced from the three major camps in Gaza. The Special Committee noted that official Israeli sources had stated that these transfers of population were necessitated by new security measures, such as the construction of wider roads inside the camps in order to facilitate patrolling and the maintenance of law and order in these camps. The Special Committee noted the fact that most of the persons whose refugee accommodation had been destroyed to permit the construction of these roads, were forced to leave for the West Bank and El Arish, while a few were said to have sought refuge with other families inside Gaza (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 48 (h)).

18. Since the adoption of its second report, on 17 September 1971, the Special Committee has taken note of reports appearing subsequently in several newspapers, in letters addressed by Governments, as well as in two special reports prepared by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA on the effect on Palestine refugees of these operations (A/8383 and Add. 1). These reports show that thousands of dwellings have been demolished in the three major refugee camps in Gaza and that their inhabitants dispersed to various areas and, in many instances [were] deprived of the humanitarian assistance they were receiving from UNRWA. This was later confirmed in the statement made by the delegate of

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/8626.

Israel in the Special Political Committee at its 788th meeting, on 26 November 1971.

19. Subsequent to the above reports, another report, which appeared in the *Jerusalem Post* on 21 October 1971, stated that the Israeli authorities had decided to move, "on a voluntary basis", in 1972, another 3,000 families from the refugee camps in Gaza to permanent housing. According to this report, 2,000 families were to be resettled in the suburbs of Gaza Strip towns and about another 1,000 families would be moved to the West Bank. The report states that this move was to be completed by the spring of 1972 with a view to relieving congestion in the camps. The same report quotes the authorities as stating that they would be forced to resume "thinning out" operations in the refugee camps if this resettlement plan were opposed. According to the report, the new homes would cost LI 3,000 each and would be financed by the Military Government, UNRWA and the refugees themselves. In a report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 22 October 1971, a spokesman for the Defence Ministry was quoted as denying the manner in which the alternative housing was being provided and the source of the financing of these new homes. The Special Committee notes that this official spokesman does not, however, deny the avowed intention of the Government of Israel to move 3,000 families from the refugee camps by next spring.

20. In this context, the Special Committee considers that these proposed transfers, as well as those that have taken place so far during the "thinning out" operations, are unwarranted. The Special Committee would wish to reiterate the view expressed in its second report that security reasons offer no justification for the arbitrary transfer of population to enable the Occupying Power to construct new roads in the area so evacuated. The Special Committee considers the arbitrary transfer of population as unnecessary, unjustified and in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

21. In its second report, the Special Committee made reference to the so-called summer visitors programme, which permits Palestin-

ians living outside the occupied territories to visit relatives and friends during the three-month summer period. The Special Committee noted that the delegate of Israel, in the debate on the Special Committee's report during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, had referred to this programme as an indication of his Government's policy in the occupied territories. In its second report, the Special Committee stated that, although the summer visitors programme may be considered as a positive aspect of Israeli policy towards the territories it occupies, it is no substitute for recognition of the right of the refugees to return to their home, nor does it have any bearing whatsoever on the declared policy of the Government of Israel to settle occupied territories and on the fact that several hundred persons had been deported from their homes in the occupied territories on official deportation orders purporting to be issued by the Israeli authorities under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 74).

22. In this connexion, the Special Committee notes the statement made by the delegate of Israel in the Special Political Committee at its 788th meeting, as well as reports according to which the summer visitors programme for 1971 had been between 80,000 and 106,000 visitors. The Special Committee notes that the programme ended in mid-September 1971 and that all visitors had left the occupied territories. On 3 October 1971, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that several thousand Arab summer visitors before leaving, had asked to remain in the occupied territories. The report quotes the Military Governor of the West Bank as stating that such requests would be given consideration under the family reunion arrangements.

#### C. ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT WHILE UNDER DETENTION

23. In its second report to the Secretary-General, (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 64) the Special Committee referred, *inter alia*, to the case of Moayyad Osman Badawi El-Bahsh, 22 years of age, who was arrested in December 1967 in Nablus and deported on 7 September

1970. The Special Committee stated that El-Bahsh had appeared before it at Beirut, on 14 July 1971. At the time, he was still undergoing treatment in London. The witness' left arm showed signs of complete paralysis and he alleged that this was due to the ill-treatment that he had suffered upon his arrest. El-Bahsh had informed the Committee that he had been subjected to electric torture, with clips placed on his ears and genitals and a band around the head, and that he had also been stretched with one arm tied to a post and another to a door which had been constantly opened and closed. He stated that he had been suspended by the wrists from a window and that a soldier had jumped up and down on the shackles holding his legs together, causing paralysis of the left arm. In this connexion, the Special Committee made reference to the evidence of Najib El-Ahmed, who appeared before it on 16 April 1970 and who had stated that he had met El-Bahsh in the infirmary in Nablus Prison in 1968, where they had spent more than 30 days together and that El-Bahsh had developed "partial paralysis of the left side right up to the shoulder". El-Bahsh informed the Special Committee that, in 1968, he had been visited in prison by a representative of Amnesty International.

24. In its second report, the Special Committee also stated that Amnesty International had sent a report on the case of El-Bahsh to the Government of Israel and, although this report had not been produced at that time, the Special Committee had received from Amnesty International a copy of the Government of Israel's comments on the case. The Special Committee quoted the opinion of the Israeli doctors as contained in the Government of Israel's reply to Amnesty International according to which, "medical tests had proved that from an objective point of view there were no signs of paralysis or injury caused to the left arm as claimed" and El-Bahsh's condition appeared to be one of hysterical paralysis, "where the mental state of the patient seemingly causes paralysis, without there being any objective evidence of damage to the nerves". Furthermore, the Special Committee quoted the report of the

Israeli doctors which stated,

"From the X-ray taken of Moayid [El-Bahsh] on 18 February 1968 and subsequent medical tests, it is apparent that there is no basis to the complaint that his left arm had been broken 'in camp' between 24 and 29 January 1968.

"It was similarly proved by the medical evidence that during the period between 24 January and 8 March 1968, Moayid had not suffered from a break or fracture in his left shoulder or arm."

25. As of 17 September 1971, the Special Committee was still awaiting the report of the doctors by whom El-Bahsh was being treated when he appeared before the Special Committee. Since the date of the adoption of its second report (17 September 1971), the Special Committee has received a copy of the original report that Amnesty International sent to the Government of Israel, as well as the report of Dr. T.H.H. Wade, dated 8 July 1971, both of which were on El-Bahsh. In his report, Dr. Wade diagnosed the condition as one of hysterical paralysis as far as the left arm was concerned; Dr. Wade further stated that, regarding the left arm, a second doctor, Mr. Donal Brooks, had independently made the diagnosis of hysterical or feigned paralysis. The report of Dr. Wade also contained a description of his observations as a result of a complete examination of El-Bahsh.

26. In the light of the evidence available, the Special Committee does not feel that it is in a position to determine whether or not, in fact, El-Bahsh had been subjected to the extreme forms of ill-treatment that he alleged before the Special Committee. The Special Committee cannot, however, rule out the possibility that paralysis was due to a mental state that was itself the result of some form of physical ill-treatment or psychological strain while under detention. The report of Amnesty International to the Government of Israel, the report communicated by the Government of Israel to Amnesty International, and the report by Dr. T.H.H. Wade, appear as annexes I, II and III below.

27. In the interim period since 17 September 1971, the Special Committee has received reports that a riot occurred in Ashkelon Prison on 30 September. According to these reports, the riot lasted for three hours and it was staged by the 480 prisoners who are held at Ashkelon. A report on this riot appearing in the *Jerusalem Post*, on 3 October 1971, attributes it to the lack of suitable facilities for the prisoners who serve long sentences of 15 years and over. The report attributes to Mr. Arye Nir, Prison Commissioner, a statement to the effect that the only workshop facility for the prison was outside the prison walls and that this could only accommodate about half the prison population, which was approximately 500 men. The Commissioner is reported as stating that this meant that between 250 and 300 inmates spend 23 hours a day in their cells. The same report states that most of the prisoners at Ashkelon are serving life sentences.

28. The Special Committee notes that, in an interview reported on 12 October 1971, the Minister of Police, Mr. Shlomo Hillel, was reported as stating that the Prison Commissioner, Mr. A. Nir, had appointed a special committee to investigate the riot and that the report of this investigation would be "internal and technical" and that it would not be released to the public. The report quotes the Minister as stating that the immediate causes of the riot were overcrowding, a shortage of staff, and the fact that the prisoners at Ashkelon consisted of "senior terrorist leaders and other dangerous types".

29. The Special Committee has no evidence that confirms or refutes the allegations made by persons who subsequently visited the prison at Ashkelon that the inmates had been ill-treated by way of reprisal for the riot. No disclosure has been made of the results of the investigation conducted at the behest of the Prison Commissioner. The Special Committee notes that a request by mayors from West Bank towns to visit the prison was turned down, as well as a request by a public delegation of citizens from Nablus, headed by the Mayor of Nablus, Mr. Haj Ma'azoud Al-Masri, which urged that the Knesset Committee of "neutral" parliamen-

tarians be formed to investigate the conditions at the Ashkelon Prison. According to a report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 15 October 1971, the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, rejected this request and he is reported to have stated that he was opposed to the appointment of a public investigation committee. The same report states that, following two sit-down strikes by relatives of inmates, and as a reprisal for these demonstrations, the Defence Minister decided that no citizens of Nablus would be allowed to visit relatives being held in Israeli prisons on the next scheduled visit, which was due in two weeks' time.

30. In its second report, the Special Committee expressed its conviction that general prison conditions, despite reported efforts at improvement, were stated to be bad and that this was mainly due to overcrowding (A/8389 and Corr.1, para. 77). The information quoted above confirms this finding.

#### D. OTHER ALLEGATIONS

31. In its second report, the Special Committee noted that periodic mass arrests of young men were continuing and quoted instances where such arrests had taken place (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 70).

32. The Special Committee notes further reports appearing in the press, according to which this practice has not ceased. On 27 September 1971, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 90 persons had been arrested during the month of September in the area north of Hebron. These arrests, according to the report, were made in groups of 19, 36 and 35. According to the Israeli news agency *Itim*, in the four months ending September 1971, approximately 400 residents of the West Bank had been detained on suspicion of various illegal acts.

33. In this connexion, the Special Committee would reiterate the conclusion reached in its second report that, whatever their avowed purpose, these mass arrests were clearly calculated in part to be a means of destroying the morale of the people of the occupied territories (A/8389 and Corr. 1, para. 79).



## II. ADDITION TO RECOMMENDATION MADE IN CHAPTER V OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S SECOND REPORT

34. In its report, presented to the Secretary-General on 17 September 1971, the Special Committee recommended an arrangement (A/8389 and Corr.1, para. 91) whereby:

(a) The States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

(b) Suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

(c) A neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement.

35. The Special Committee further recommended that, under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of any other applicable international instruments;

(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.

36. The Special Committee made this recommendation in the hope that the investigation of allegations of violations of human rights could be conducted on the spot, inside the occupied territories, something which could not be accomplished by the Special Committee itself owing to the Government of Israel's refusal to receive the Committee or

to co-operate with it. Since making this recommendation, the Special Committee notes that the International Committee of the Red Cross, after giving careful consideration to the question of the reinforcement of the implementation of the existing (Geneva) Conventions, has arrived at the conclusion that all tasks falling to a Protecting Power under the Conventions could be considered humanitarian functions and also notes that ICRC expressed itself ready to assume all the functions envisaged for Protecting Powers in the Conventions.<sup>1</sup> The Special Committee, while acknowledging the conclusion reached by the International Committee regarding its new role as Protecting Power, considers that the humanitarian duties at present being carried out by ICRC in the occupied territories, even [with] the limitations imposed upon it, should continue. As understood by the Special Committee, the role of a Protecting Power under the Conventions goes beyond the scope of the humanitarian duties performed by ICRC in its traditional role. The effective discharge of the Protecting Power's duties and responsibilities as contemplated by the Geneva Conventions would require ICRC, in its role as a Protecting Power, to free itself from the restraints which it has found necessary to observe in order to preserve its privileged position under its traditional role. The various resolutions adopted by the organs of the United Nations since 1967 indicate the interest, concern and sense of responsibility of the United Nations in relation to the question of alleged violations of human rights in the occupied territories in the Middle East. The Special Committee is of the view, therefore, that it would be necessary and proper for ICRC to keep the United Nations fully informed, through the Secretary-General, of its activities as a Protecting Power in addition to reporting to the States whose nationals it has been appointed to protect.

37. The Special Committee welcomes ICRC's expression of its willingness to assume

<sup>1</sup> See the *Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts* (Geneva, 24 May-12 June 1971), para. 553.

the role of a Protecting Power as a development that facilitates the implementation of the recommendation contained in its first<sup>1</sup> and second (A/8389 and Corr. 1) reports and it would hope that the appropriate arrangements would be made to enable ICRC to begin forthwith the exercise of the functions of a Protecting Power in the interests of safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories in the Middle East.

38. For these reasons, the Special Committee feels that the General Assembly might:

(a) Request the Secretary-General to inform the parties concerned of ICRC's readiness to take upon itself all the functions envisaged for Protecting Powers in the Geneva Conventions, and to invite them to avail themselves of the services of ICRC in dealing with the application of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in the occupied territories in the Middle East;

(b) Request ICRC to consider the need for keeping the United Nations fully informed, through the Secretary-General, of its activities as a Protecting Power, in addition to reporting to the parties concerned;

(c) Reconsider the mandate of the Special Committee as to whether or not there is need for the continuation of its activities, once ICRC begins, in fact, to function as a Protecting Power.

### III. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

39. This supplementary report was adopted unanimously by the Special Committee on 11 December 1971 after it had met from 7 to 11 December 1971 to consider supplementary information reaching the Special Committee after 17 September 1971, when it adopted its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1).

(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon)  
Chairman

(Signed) A.A. FARAH (Somalia)

(Signed) B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089.*

# Documents Submitted to the Security Council

413

## Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East<sup>1</sup>

November, 1971

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<sup>1</sup> Text excluding Annex II (which appears above as Document 277) and Annex III (which appears above as Document 42), of Secretary-General U Thant's report on the 1971 activities of Special Representative Jarring (incorporating the substance of his reports of February 1 and March 5), issued on November 30, 1971; U.N. doc. A/8541-S/10403. (For the Secretary-General's report on the progress of the Jarring mission up to January 1971, see U.N. doc. S/10070 published as Document 329 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.)

## INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, the Security Council affirmed the principles and provisions which should be applied in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and requested me to designate a special representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with these provisions and principles. I designated Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden as my Special Representative and submitted progress reports from time to time to the Security Council on his efforts (S/8309 and Add. 1-5 and S/9902).

2. By its resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 1970, the General Assembly, after expressing its views on the principles which should govern the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and requested me to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

3. In accordance with my responsibilities under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), I submitted to the Security Council on 4 January 1971 a comprehensive report (S/10070) on the activities of the Special Representative up to that date. Subsequently, on 1 February and 5 March, I submitted further progress reports (S/10070/Add.1 and Add.2) on his activities.

4. In view of the fact that the General Assembly is about to debate again the situation in the Middle East and of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) that I should report to it as appropriate on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), I am arranging

to have my report of 4 January 1971 (S/10070) available to the Members of the General Assembly; I am also submitting the present report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) to both the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to give a more comprehensive account of the activities of the Special Representative at the beginning of 1971 than that given in documents S/10070/Add.1 and Add.2 and to bring that account up to date.

## I. THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S AUSPICES (JANUARY-MARCH 1971)

5. It will be recalled that at the close of 1970 it was possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic<sup>1</sup> for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them.

6. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and pursued them actively. He held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also one of the States directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

7. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "Essentials of Peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

<sup>1</sup> The name of the United Arab Republic was changed to the Arab Republic of Egypt on 2 September 1971. [This footnote is part of the report].

8. During the remainder of January, Ambassador Jarring held further meetings with the representatives of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in the course of which he received further memoranda elaborating the positions of the parties. Unfortunately, these indicated that the parties held differing views on the order in which items should be discussed. More importantly, each side was insisting that the other should be ready to make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a peace settlement.

9. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

10. The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement to the refugee problem.

11. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace

lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories.

12. Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the only possibility of breaking the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seemed to him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks—was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

13. In identical aide mémoires handed to the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments. Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). (For the full text of the aide-mémoires, see annex I.)

14. On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967. (For the full text of the United Arab Republic reply, see annex II.)<sup>1</sup>

15. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to his aide-mémoire.

16. On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a communication from the representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties, having presented their basic positions, should now pursue the nego-

tiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

17. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israeli position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. (For the full text of the Israeli paper, see annex III.)<sup>2</sup>

18. On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli communication. The latter held that it was improper for the Israeli authorities to have responded to his Government's reply, which had been addressed to Ambassador Jarring and would have full effect only if the Israeli authorities would give the commitment requested of them by Ambassador Jarring.

19. In accepting the United States proposal for renewed discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices (see S/10070, paras. 33 and 34), the parties had agreed that they would observe strictly, for a period of 90 days from 7 August 1970, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. In response to the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 2628 (XXV), the cease-fire had been extended for a further period of three months. In my report of 1 February submitted as that period was expiring, I appealed to the parties at that stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

20. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would observe the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 277 above.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 42 above.

21. In submitting my report of 5 March 1971, I commented as follows:

“Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative. However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

“While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring’s attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative.

“To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the way forward may be reopened, I once appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970.”<sup>1</sup>

## II. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1971)

22. In response to my appeal, the Israeli Government once again made clear its willingness to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. The President of the United Arab Republic, in a statement to the nation on 7 March 1971, declared that his country no longer considered itself further committed to a cease-fire or to withholding fire. This did not, however, mean that political action would cease.

23. On 11 March, the Israeli representative informed Ambassador Jarring that his Government was awaiting the reaction of

the United Arab Republic Government to the Israeli invitation in its reply of 26 February to enter into detailed and concrete discussions (see paragraph 16 above). When that statement of the Israeli representative was brought to the attention of the United Arab Republic representative, he maintained that his Government was still awaiting an Israeli reply to Ambassador Jarring’s aide-mémoire.

24. Subsequently, the talks under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices lapsed. He therefore left Headquarters to resume his post as Ambassador of Sweden in Moscow on 25 March.

25. Although he returned to Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October and has held certain consultations elsewhere, he has found himself faced with the same deadlock and with no possibility of actively pursuing his mission.

26. Indeed, during much of this time the promotion of agreement between the parties was the object of two separate initiatives, first, an effort by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, which has not, so far, achieved any positive results, and, secondly, a mission of inquiry conducted by certain African Heads of States on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, which is still in progress as this report is being prepared. Both initiatives were described to Ambassador Jarring and myself by the sponsors as designed to facilitate the resumption of Ambassador Jarring’s mission. Nevertheless, while they were being pursued, they obviously constituted an additional reason for him not to take personal initiatives.

27. In the introduction to my report on the work of the Organization (A/8401/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1), I expressed certain views on the situation in the Middle East. After recalling the responses of the United Arab Republic and Israel to Ambassador Jarring’s initiative of 8 February, I said that I continued to hope—as I still do—that Israel would find it possible before too long to make a response that would enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices to continue.

28. After noting the relative quiet which

<sup>1</sup> S/10070/Add.2, paras. 14–16. [This and the subsequent footnotes are part of the report.]

has continued to exist in the area, I went on to say:

"It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East.

"I see no other way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality than by intensifying the search for a peaceful and agreed settlement. I believe there is still a chance of achieving such a settlement. I do not overlook the formidable difficulty of the problems to be tackled, but there exist several important assets on the side of peace efforts as well. The Security Council's cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 and its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, if implemented simultaneously and fully, should provide the framework for achieving a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict. To promote agreement for such a settlement, we are fortunate to have the services of Ambassador Jarring, who is uniquely qualified for this almost impossible task.

"Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned."<sup>3</sup>

29. Recent developments have added to the urgency of my remarks. It therefore seems to me that the appropriate organs of

the United Nations must review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward.

ANNEX I  
AIDE-MEMOIRE PRESENTED TO  
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB  
REPUBLIC BY AMBASSADOR JARRING  
ON 8 FEBRUARY 1971<sup>1</sup>

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussion under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question.

My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace.

My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock as existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility—is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to

<sup>1</sup> In presenting the aide-mémoire, Ambassador Jarring added the following interpretation: "I interpret practical security measures in the Sharm el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United Nations force in the area for this purpose."

<sup>3</sup> A/8401/Add.1, paras. 221–223.



be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them.

It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the U.A.R. to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem:

ISRAEL would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied U.A.R. territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

- (a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
- (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el-Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran; and
- (c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

The U.A.R. would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgments covering the following subjects:

- (a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
- (b) Respect for and acknowledgment of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- (c) Respect for and acknowledgment of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and

- (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.

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### **Report by the United Nations Secretary-General on Attempts To Implement Security Council Resolution 298 Exploring the Failure of Israel To Respect U.N. Resolutions Prohibiting Measures To Alter the Status of Jerusalem<sup>1</sup>**

**November, 1971**

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 concerning Jerusalem, which requested the Secretary-General "in consultation with the President of the Security Council, and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative

<sup>1</sup> Text of Secretary-General U Thant's report submitted under the terms of Security Council Resolution 298 (which appears as Document 431 below) and issued November 19, 1971; U.N. doc. S/10392.

Other reports on Jerusalem submitted under the terms of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) (1967) which call upon Israel to desist from or rescind measures altering the status of Jerusalem and request the Secretary-General to report on implementation were issued on February 18, April 20 and August 20, 1971. These reports review correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of Israel, dealing mainly with the Secretary-General's request for clarifications on the Israeli "Master Plan" for Jerusalem and the status of U.N. property in the city. The original report (U.N. doc. S/10124) and the April 20 addendum (S/10124/Add. 1) are summarized in paras. 76-80 and 94 of the 1970-71 *Report of the Security Council* (U.N. doc. A/8402) which appears as Document 407 above. The addendum of August 20 (U.N. doc. S/10124/Add. 2) is summarized in para. 179 of the 1971-72 *Report of the Security Council* (U.N. doc. A/8702) to be included in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution". I communicated this resolution to the Government of Israel by cable on the day of its adoption.

2. On 27 September, I met the President of the Security Council Mr. Toru Nakagawa of Japan, and discussed with him the implementation of Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

3. On 28 September, I addressed a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, informing him that, in accordance with the request addressed to me by the Security Council, it was my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and at an early date, a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit provided in that resolution.

4. On 1 October, at a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, I indicated to him that I had in mind as members of the mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone.

5. During the first half of October, after consultation with the President of the Security Council, Mr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa of Nicaragua, I approached the permanent representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone and inquired about the willingness of their respective Governments to serve on the mission. All three Governments signified to me their willingness to serve on the mission in the event that circumstances arose in which it would be desirable to establish it.

6. On 18 October, I addressed another letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel in which, after referring to my letter of 28 September and to our meeting on 1 October, I indicated that the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone had signified to me the willingness of their Governments to serve on such a mission in the event that circumstances arose in which it would be desirable to establish it. This letter was handed by me to the representative of

Israel on the same day. On this occasion, the representative indicated that Israel would be forwarding its comments on the Security Council resolution in due course and I reminded him that, under this resolution, I had a sixty-day time-limit for reporting and was bound to report within that period.

7. On 19 October, and again on 27 October, I met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss my reporting responsibility under Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

8. Following the meeting of 27 October, the President of the Security Council saw the representative of Israel and discussed this matter with him.

9. On 28 October, having received no reply from the Government of Israel, I addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, drawing his attention to the fact that a month had passed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) which, among other things, requested me to report to the Security Council "as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution." I added that in view of that stipulation by the Security Council, I would be grateful to receive the comments of the Government of Israel as soon as possible. I also stated that I had, as a matter of course, been in consultation both with the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone who had signified their willingness to serve on the mission and, as required by the resolution, with the President of the Security Council regarding this matter.

10. Subsequently, I received a note dated 2 November 1971 from the representative of Israel stating that the comments of the Government of Israel were under preparation and would be conveyed to me as soon as possible.

11. On 11 November, the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Security Council Affairs and for Special Political Affairs, on my behalf, met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss again the implementation of the

Security Council resolution. In an oral message conveyed to the representative of Israel on 11 November, the President of the Security Council, Mr. Eugeniusz Kulaga of Poland, and myself expressed our concern over the absence of a reply from the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

12. On 15 November, the representative of Israel transmitted to me a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel. In his letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel referred to my cable of 25 September 1971, transmitting the text of resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council, and gave his Government's views concerning paragraph 4 of the resolution which calls upon Israel "to rescind all previous measures and actions and take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace". However, the letter did not touch upon the question of the Government of Israel's response to my proposal for a mission to Jerusalem in order to enable me to discharge my mandate under paragraph 5 of resolution 298 (1971).

13. On 16 November, in a letter addressed to the representative of Israel, I acknowledged receipt of the letter of 15 November from the Government of Israel and noted that the reply of the Israel Government did not refer to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution in which the possibility of a mission was mentioned; nor did it refer to my letter of 28 September and subsequent letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, regarding the mission proposed by me, in consultation with the President of the Council. I stated that in the absence of a response by the Government of Israel on this matter, and in view of the fact that the time-limit for my report was to expire on 24 November 1971, I had no alternative but to submit my report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the mission of the three members of the Council mentioned in my

earlier letters.

14. It will be recalled that since the termination of the mission of my Personal Representative in Jerusalem, Mr. Ernesto A. Thalmann, in September 1967, I have had no means of obtaining first-hand information which is required to fulfil the reporting responsibilities conferred upon me by Security Council resolution 298 (1971). After careful consideration of this resolution, the President of the Security Council and myself concluded that the best way of fulfilling my reporting responsibilities under the resolution was through a mission of three members of the Security Council. It is obvious that the co-operation of the Israel Government is required for such a mission to function usefully.

15. As will be seen from the above account of the exchange of correspondence with the Government of Israel, the texts of which are annexed to this report, there has been no indication on the part of the Government of Israel of its willingness to comply with Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

16. In the light of the failure of the Government of Israel to abide by the decision of the Security Council, I have not been able to fulfil my mandate under Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

## ANNEX

### **Exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Government of Israel**

#### **1. LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL**

As you will recall, paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1582nd meeting on 25 September 1971 "requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution".

I wish to inform you that, in accordance with the request addressed to me by the

Security Council, it is my intention to nominate in consultation with the President of the Security Council and at an early date a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit provided in that resolution.

2. LETTER DATED 18 OCTOBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 28 September 1971 concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971). In that letter I informed you that it was my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council, a mission consisting of three members of the Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Council on the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution.

In our meeting on 1 October I indicated to you that I had in mind as members of this mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone. These members have now signified to me their willingness to serve on such a mission in the event that circumstances arise in which it would be desirable to establish it.

3. LETTER DATED 28 OCTOBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

I have the honour to refer to my cable of 25 September and to my letters of 28 September and 18 October 1971 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

You will recall that, in our meeting on 1 October, the Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook to transmit to me his detailed comments on this matter. More than one month has now passed since the adoption by the Security Council of the above-mentioned resolution, which, among other things, requests me to report to the Security Council "as appropriate and in any event within sixty

days on the implementation of this resolution." In view of this stipulation by the Security Council, I would be grateful to receive the comments of the Government of Israel as soon as possible.

You will also recall that in my letter of 18 October I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel of the willingness of the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to serve on a mission to assist me in my reporting duties under the Security Council resolution. I have, as a matter of course, been in consultation both with the three representatives concerned and, as required by the resolution, with the President of the Security Council. The present letter is sent with their full knowledge and agreement.

4. LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1971 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 28 October 1971, the contents of which I have transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am instructed to inform you that the comments of the Government of Israel are under preparation and will be conveyed to you as soon as possible.

5. LETTER DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1971 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to reply to your telegram of 26 September 1971, transmitting the text of resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1582nd meeting on the previous day. The central operative paragraph of the resolution calls upon Israel "to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the city, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace". I propose to analyse the main provisions of this paragraph in order to place the situation in Jerusalem in its true light.

(a) *The status of the city*

If the "status of the city" referred to in the resolution means the situation existing before 5 June 1967, the renewal of that "status" would involve the restoration of a military demarcation line and other barriers cutting through the centre of the city, the cancellation of free access to their Holy Places for Jews and Israeli Moslems, which has prevailed only since June 1967, and the re-imposition of a ban on residence or visit by anyone of Jewish faith in the Old City. Moreover, in order to restore the previous status Israel would have to demolish the synagogues and other sites destroyed by the Jordan authorities and restored since then, and to close the cultural, humanitarian and educational institutions on Mount Scopus which have been reopened since June 1967. Thus the restoration of the previous status would involve rescinding the unity, peace and sanctity of Jerusalem today in order to restore the divisions, conflict and sacrilege which made the period 1948-1967 one of the darkest ages in Jerusalem's long history.

It is inconceivable that the majority of Security Council members could wish to restore that situation. Some of them have indicated that they do not.

The position of Jordan in a part of Jerusalem for 19 years resulted from an aggressive invasion carried out against the injunctions of the Security Council in the first half of 1948. That position was never recognized by the world community. Thus it is not the case that an internationally accepted or valid status for Jerusalem has been set aside by anything done in the city since 1967.

If one dismisses as inherently untenable the proposition that the Security Council wishes to tear Jerusalem apart again, one is left with the assumption that the concern expressed by the Council is for the effective status of the ethnic and religious communities. It has been asserted in some quarters that Israel is undertaking or planning action with the aim of annulling the present heterogeneous character of the population. I can give assurance that this is not the case. Since 1967 the flight of Christian Arabs from Jerusa-

lem under Jordanian occupation has been stemmed. The figures in 1967 were 10,800. Today they are 11,500. At the same time the Moslem population has grown from 54,963 in 1967 to 61,600 at the end of 1970, while the Jews, who numbered 195,700 in 1967 are now 215,500. There is nothing to indicate that these relative proportions are likely to be substantially changed in the coming years, and in absolute terms the Christian and Moslem populations are likely to increase and not to dwindle. Israel's view is that development by the city's services and amenities should be undertaken for all its communities, and not for one community alone.

(b) *The rights of the inhabitants*

Jerusalem has a population of 300,000, about three quarters of which are Jews; 61,600 are Moslems and 11,500 are Christians. For the past 200 years the Jews have formed the largest community. The "rights of the inhabitants", whether Jews, Arabs or Moslems, include the right to administer their own city, to develop it, and to repair the havoc of war. Jerusalem has the right to normal existence. As a living city its life and institutions must be allowed to grow in the interests of all its inhabitants, and it cannot be artificially frozen at the point which it had reached over four years ago.

Since 1967, all Jerusalem's citizens have had their due voice in the administration of the city. In the last municipal election under the Jordan occupation in 1963 there were only 5,000 eligible voters in a total Arab population of some 60,000. Only males over 21, property owners and rate-payers could vote. No political parties were permitted. Irrespective of the results of the voting the Mayor was appointed by the Jordanian Government in Amman. On the other hand, in the 1969 election for the municipal council, universal suffrage for those over 18 years ago was introduced in the sector formerly under Jordanian occupation. The number of Arab citizens who actually cast their vote for the administration of the united city in that election was greater than the total of those eligible to vote in 1963 during the Jordanian occupation.

All the citizens of Jerusalem, both in the western and eastern parts of the city, have the right to normal municipal services. All the city's inhabitants now receive such services, which were non-existent or inadequate during the 19 years of illegal Jordanian military occupation.

Since 1967 compulsory education laws have been strictly applied. A system of kindergartens, which did not exist under the Jordanian conquest, has been extended to the eastern part of the city. Vocational training has been expanded, including the opening of a night school for working boys. The network of free medical services for school children, new mothers and babies has spread to this section of Jerusalem. In a special programme carried out in 1967, all children in east Jerusalem were given thorough medical check-ups, including skin, tuberculosis and eye tests, as well as vaccinations against diphtheria and tetanus and second shots against smallpox. Trachoma and malnutrition have now all but been eliminated. A new 300-bed hospital on Mount Scopus, to serve the northern and eastern parts of the city, will soon be opened.

The eastern section has been connected to the Jerusalem water-mains, providing round-the-clock water supply for the first time in history. A central sewage system has been introduced. The municipality of Jerusalem has provided play-grounds, parks, libraries and youth clubs where there were none before. An Arabic language theatre has begun performances. A developed social welfare system has been applied for the first time to this part of the city. The citizens living in eastern Jerusalem have the services of a Government Labour Exchange; 40 per cent of the section's workers have joined and are protected by the Israel Labour Federation. There is no unemployment in Jerusalem. Low-cost public housing and generous mortgage opportunities are being provided by the municipality to Arab residents.

Nothing, therefore, could be more inaccurate than to assert that the rights of the inhabitants of Jerusalem have been adversely affected by anything done or planned by Israel. Their rights to peaceful life and development

and to a voice in Jerusalem's affairs, have been fully respected and indeed advanced only since June 1967.

(c) *The interests of the international community*

For 22 years Jerusalem has been Israel's capital and seat of Government. It is the unique spiritual centre of Judaism, as of no other faith. At the same time the Government has always been conscious of the fact that the city is of deep concern to other faiths. Its religious and historical sites are precious to Christians and Moslems, as well as to Jews. This concern was expressed by the Prime Minister of Israel on 27 June 1967:

"All the Holy Places in Jerusalem are now open to all who wish to pray in them and to the faithful of all religions without discrimination. It is our intention to place the internal administration and arrangements for the Holy Places in the hands of the religious leaders of the communities to which these places belong."

The protection of the Holy Places is ensured by law. The Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967, states in its first paragraph:

"The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the place sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places."

No such law protected the Holy Places during the Jordanian occupation. The intentions expressed by the Prime Minister, as well as the dispositions of the law, are now part of the new reality in Jerusalem. The desecration of historic synagogues in the Old City and of the ancient cemetery on the Mount of Olives was carried out by the Jordanian authorities, and the denial of free access stopped. The churches, mosques, synagogues and other shrines are administered by each religious community. In Jerusalem today everyone is free to visit and pray at the Holy Places of the three great faiths. Pilgrims and visitors to the city, Government leaders, church dignitaries, parliamentarians, journalists, men of letters, tourists in their thousands have testified that Jerusalem and the

Holy Places are secure and open to all. In developing the living city of Jerusalem we are and shall be constantly mindful of its historical treasures and spiritual heritage and care is and will be taken to preserve them for the inhabitants and for the world.

The policy of Israel concerning universal spiritual interests in Jerusalem is as follows: the measures taken to secure the protection of the Holy Places are only a part of Israel's effort to ensure respect for universal interests in Jerusalem. It is evident from United Nations discussions and documents that the international interest in Jerusalem has always been understood to derive from the presence of the Holy Places. Israel does not doubt her own will and capacity to secure the respect of universal spiritual interests. It has forthwith ensured that the Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam be administered under the responsibility of the religions which hold them sacred.

In addition, in a spirit of concern for historic and spiritual traditions my Government has taken steps with a view to reaching arrangements to assure the universal character of the Holy Places. In pursuance of this objective the Government of Israel has now embarked on a constructive and detailed dialogue with universal religious interests. If these explorations are as fruitful as we hope, the universal character of the Holy Places will for the first time in recent decades find comprehensive expression.

As I informed you on 10 July 1967 [see S/8052], Israel does not wish to exercise unilateral jurisdiction or exclusive responsibility in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam, and is willing in consultation with the religious interests traditionally concerned to give due expression to that principle.

The changes which have affected Jerusalem's life and destiny as a result of the measures recently adopted may, therefore, be summarized as follows: where there was a hostile separation there is now intermingling and constructive civic union; where there was a constant threat of violence there is now peace; where there was once an assertion of exclusive and unilateral control over the Holy Places exercised in sacrilegious dis-

crimination there is a willingness to work out arrangements with the world's religious bodies, Christian, Moslem and Jewish, which will ensure the universal religious character of the Holy Places.

This is the first time that a Government in Jerusalem offers special expression for universal interests in Jerusalem instead of asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over all of them. The apprehension expressed in the resolution that the interests of the international community, or the principles of peaceful coexistence may have been adversely affected is thus without any foundation whatever.

(d) *A just and lasting peace*

The previous division of the city did not bring the Middle East closer to peace. On the contrary that division was an open wound constantly exacerbated by outbursts of hostility and by recurrent Jordanian violation of the fragile armistice which caused the murder of Jerusalem citizens and made life in the city a frequent terror for many residents on both sides of the barbed wire.

Today, for the first time since 1948, Jerusalem is a city in which Jews and Arabs live together in peace and mingle in their thousands in the daily pursuits of their lives. Jerusalem has become an example of communal civic and regional existence and is thus an augury of just and lasting peace to which enlightened men aspire.

Jerusalem is for Israel the focal point of Jewish history, the symbol of ancient glory, of longing, of prayer, of modern renewal. It is also a source of universal inspiration.

Israel's policy is to promote the rights of Jerusalem's inhabitants to advance the interests of the international community and thus to contribute to the promotion of a just and lasting peace. The sharp discrepancy between the Jerusalem reality and the resolution presented by Jordan and adopted by the Security Council has profoundly shocked the people of Jerusalem. This sentiment was expressed in the Prime Minister's statement of 26 October 1971 which remains valid.

At the same time I can give assurance that nothing has been done or will be done to violate the rights of the inhabitants, the in-

terests of international community or the principles of peaceful coexistence. There are many difficulties in Jerusalem as elsewhere arising from regional tensions and hostilities as well as from economic and social factors. But in general men of peace and goodwill will have reason to be gratified by the peace, serenity, union and spiritual harmony which have been strengthened in Jerusalem since the barbed wire fence went down and the Jews and Arabs of Jerusalem came together in a common devotion to their city.

6. LETTER DATED 16 NOVEMBER 1971 FROM  
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED  
NATIONS

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 15 November 1971 in which you transmit to me the reply of the Government of Israel to my telegram of 26 September 1971 concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971) on Jerusalem. The reply of the Government of Israel will be included

in the report on this matter which I am required by the above-mentioned resolution to make to the Security Council.

I note that the reply of the Israel Government does not refer to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution in which the possibility of a mission is mentioned; nor does it refer to my letter of 28 September 1971 and subsequent letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel which include, among other things, the announcement of my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council, a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report under the terms of resolution 298 (1971).

In the absence of a response by the Government of Israel on this matter, and in view of the fact that the time-limit for my report will expire on 24 November 1971, I have no alternative but to submit my report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the mission of three members of the Security Council mentioned in my letters referred to above.



## PART II: STATEMENTS BY DELEGATES

415

### **Statements Accusing Israel of Hindering Middle East Peace Efforts and Expressing Soviet Support for the Arab Cause, Made by U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 28, 1971

The events in the Middle East centre around the same problem: will the legitimate rights of the Arab States which were subjected to aggression be respected, will territories seized by force be returned, or will the policy of aggression be allowed to triumph? Israel and those who protect it are clearly counting on the second alternative. That is why they have paralysed the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations who was charged with the task of facilitating a political settlement in accordance with the well-known decision of the Security Council. That is why the consultations between the representatives of the four Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, have gone into a neutral gear, since to be effective they require the co-operation of all the participants.

But Israel is miscalculating. The policy-makers of that country have gone too far in laying bare their plans of conquest for them to obtain support in the international arena. Nobody can now any longer believe Israel's allegation that it is defending its "existence." The false arguments with which Israeli ruling circles have been seeking to cover up the real meaning of their policy have fallen through, one after another.

Israel refused to liberate the occupied territories until the Arab countries would

agree to end the state of war. But the Arabs are ready to do so. Israel insisted on a peace agreement being concluded, but the Arab States do not object to this either, provided, of course, that all the occupied territories are returned to them. Israel displayed concern over its security. It is now clear that within the framework of a political settlement in the Middle East the appropriate guarantees, including guarantees by the Security Council, can be provided. These are the strongest guarantees conceivable in the modern world.

Now there can be no more uncertainty in anybody's mind. Israel does not want peace, and even if it does, it is an annexationist peace. But this runs counter to the Charter of the United Nations and to the most elementary principles of international law and it must be ruled out. The Israeli rulers seem to think that if they have managed to hold on to the seized territories for four years this situation can continue indefinitely. But they cannot be unaware of the alternative to a political settlement in the Middle East.

Is the United Nations in a position to make a contribution to the settlement of the problem of the Middle East? Yes, it is, provided it does not limit itself to adopting yet another resolution expressing pious wishes without reinforcing them with effective measures, and provided it utilizes the full scope of its capacities in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet Union wants to see peace in the Middle East. It will continue to support the Arab States, victims of aggression, as well as their efforts aimed at liberating their territories. The just cause of the Arab peoples, including the people of Palestine, must win.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official U.N. English text (interpreted from Russian) of Gromyko's speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1942/48-50.

## 416

**Statements Calling for Israeli Compliance with U.N. Resolutions on the Middle East, Made by Foreign Minister Abu Hamad of Lebanon in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 29, 1971

In our region, the Middle East, we are at the very heart of a most poignant tragedy—which has continued since the very creation of the United Nations. It is the tragedy of the people of Palestine, robbed of their country and evicted from their homes by the use of violence. This tragedy, which was born of a flagrant injustice more than twenty years ago, continues to affect our region and to inflict upon our population destruction and suffering. Since June 1967, territories belonging to three States Members of the United Nations have been occupied by Israeli forces, and since that date Israel has continued to sabotage all attempts at a political settlement, continuing its military occupation, multiplying its aggressions and subjecting the inhabitants of the occupied territories to a régime of coercion, violence and terror, defying law, equity and the most elementary humanitarian principles.

The situation in Jerusalem is for us a subject of deep concern. The horizon of that city, so peaceful and holy, familiar to millions of human beings, is today disfigured, a systematic plan aimed at depriving Christendom and Islam of their inalienable rights to the Holy City is applied with obstinacy. Pressures of all kinds are exerted on the Christian and Moslem population to force them to expatriate themselves. By expropriation and confiscation, the occupier seizes property which does not belong to him and whose historic and spiritual value is beyond estimation. It carries out massive destruction, construction of new habitations, in order

to present the international community once again with an accomplished fact. But the same community has categorically condemned the acts which have been undertaken by Israel and has declared that they are illegal and invalid. Several resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council have been adopted in that regard.

The most recent resolution, resolution 298 (1971), of the Security Council, adopted on 25 September 1971, is eloquent in that respect. That resolution expresses the firm will of the international community to oppose categorically the acquisition of territory by force and any modification of the sacred and universal character of the Holy City.

Everywhere, in Gaza, in Sinai, in Golan, and on the banks of the Jordan, we find the same affecting spectacle of tortures, demolition, destruction of homes and of whole villages, deportations and expulsions of inhabitants, expropriations and confiscations—all of them contrary to the international conventions and to resolutions of the United Nations.

It is true that Lebanon and Israel are still bound by the Armistice Convention of 1949; yet Lebanon considers that it is directly concerned in the establishment of a just, equitable and lasting peace in the Middle East.

For the establishment of such a peace, Lebanon is convinced that it would be vain to seek an equitable and lasting solution without the total evacuation of Israeli forces from the territories occupied since June 1967, and without due respect for the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Lebanon also considers that until that solution has been achieved, the services, which are already insufficient, provided by UNRWA to the Palestinian refugees, cannot be further reduced without grave consequences, and therefore appeals to all Governments to make up the deficit of the Agency by voluntary contributions. It is necessary to reaffirm once more the responsibility of the international community as a whole in the creation and perpetuation of this human drama, as well as the obligation to alleviate the situation and, in fact, to put an end to it.

At a moment when I am speaking of the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official U.N. English text (interpreted from French) of Abu Hamad's speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1944/47-51.

conflict in the Middle East, how can I fail to recall and to stress that my country has suffered and continues to suffer from Israeli aggressions under the most fallacious pretexts which entail loss of human life, the lives of innocent civilians, destruction of property and migration of populations? The Security Council has been repeatedly seized of these complaints by Lebanon.

Since June 1967 efforts aimed at bringing about a political settlement have been exerted by the United Nations, by the four great Powers and by other countries. These efforts have been sabotaged by Israel.

By its delays, its evasions, its refusals, Israel has in fact brought the mission of Ambassador Jarring to a dead end. Has it not already created in the Middle East a state of tension which threatens international peace and security, a situation which is being aggravated day by day?

It is not enough to speak of Israel's defiance of the United Nations and the international community. It is essential to put an end to it. The United Nations has on several occasions been seized of complaints aimed at putting an end to actions of Israel that violate international law and relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. Invariably the international community has condemned Israel. It has been condemned for its aggression against Lebanon and for its behaviour in Jerusalem and in the other occupied territories. Its policies and actions have always received condemnation, and severe warnings have been addressed to Israel. On some occasions even very specific threats have been formulated to invoke and apply more effective procedures. Unfortunately, all those resolutions have remained dead letters. Israel has never complied with them. It continues to act as though the United Nations did not exist, or as though its resolutions had never been adopted. Our Organization is therefore confronted with a situation involving the risk of its losing all the credit it still retains—not only in the eyes of States but also in the eyes of world public opinion.

## 417

**Statements Reiterating Israeli Insistence on Secure and Recognized Borders and Suggesting Various Techniques for Negotiations with the Arab States, Made by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 30, 1971

Our position, then, is this: We have taken note of the Egyptian proposal on withdrawal. Israel would withdraw its armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Now that both parties have presented their basic positions they should pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior condition to cover all the points I listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement. I continue to adhere to the view which I expressed in the General Assembly in October 1968 that

"It is possible to work out a boundary settlement compatible with the security of Israel and the honour of Arab States. . . . The majority of the United Nations have recognized that the only durable and reasonable solutions are agreed solutions serving the common interests of our peoples. The new peace structure in the Middle East, including the secure and recognized boundaries, must be built by Arab and Israeli hands." (1686th meeting, p. 46)

Thus if Egypt will present its position for negotiation without the unprecedented request for Israel's acceptance of it in advance, we shall be ready for detailed and concrete negotiation on all the matters mentioned in the Egyptian memorandum of 15 February and the Israeli document of 26 February.

Effective and versatile conciliation must include a capacity to move from one direction to another in a tireless pursuit of peace. In March 1968, Ambassador Jarring suggested

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official English text of Eban's speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV.1946/42-47.

a formula for the convening of meetings between the parties in Nicosia on the basis of an agreed term of reference. Egypt rejected that proposal. Those concerned with the conciliation effort did not say that the mission had to be held in suspense until Egypt gave a positive reply to something which its policy did not then allow it to endorse. It would be wrong now to affirm that such a vital objective as the establishment of a negotiated peace between Israel and Egypt will never be possible except on the basis of a working paper which did not happen to secure the agreement of the parties. Egyptian-Israeli peace is too great a cause to be tied and tethered for all time to a single optional memorandum. If Egypt will agree to pursue negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions on all the points listed in the Israeli and Egyptian memoranda of February 1971, this road to meaningful negotiation will lie open.

There are other roads to peace. The Suez Canal agreement and the discussion of an over-all settlement are not the only options available for negotiation. The problem of refugees requires a broad acceptance of regional and international responsibility. We have therefore proposed the convening of a conference of Middle Eastern States, together with Governments which have contributed to refugee relief and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem and the integration of refugees into productive life.

This problem would now be considered against the background of some alleviating developments in recent months. There is a growing disillusion with the irridentist pretensions of the terrorist groups and the air pirates. The dividing wall which once prevented all human contact between Israelis and Palestine Arabs is falling. It is true that this is due so far to Israeli initiative. Last year not a single Israeli set foot in any Arab land, but 110,000 Arabs from countries at "war" with Israel came into contact with Israel across the open Jordan bridges. An open frontier between Israel and its eastern neighbour similar to the community frontiers in Europe would do

much to give human reality to a peace settlement, and indeed might help the settlement to be achieved.

There is a fourth possibility. The problems of boundaries and security are usually considered to be the crux of the negotiation. But there are other unresolved matters in the memoranda presented by Egypt and Israel in February. At first sight there seems to be some proximity between the peace, non-aggression, recognition and navigation clauses suggested by the two Governments. On closer inspection the disparities are substantial, and could become crucial. We suggested in January and later in March that it might be profitable to attempt to draft some of the clauses of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty relating to the principles of peace. It is an accepted negotiating technique to begin with problems in which divergences are less broad and thus to create a favourable atmosphere in which to confront the more acute problems.

There is a fifth road towards negotiating procedure and activity; it concerns the negotiating procedure, but its weight is intensively substantive and not at all procedural. I have said that in the early months of 1968 Ambassador Jarring suggested meetings between the parties, under his auspices, in Nicosia, in accordance with a text setting out the terms of reference for the conferences. On 10 March 1968, Ambassador Jarring informed me that Egypt had rejected that proposal. As the Secretary-General's report in document S/10070 of 4 January 1971 reveals, Dr. Jarring "was informed of Israel's official acceptance, without conditions, of the text."

Now that was the negative turning-point in the history of the Jarring Mission. Since then it has been limited through Egyptian insistence to a bizarre procedure under which Israeli documents are presented to Ambassador Jarring, and by him to the Egyptian representative. If the Israel document contains the words "for communication to the Government of Egypt," the Egyptian representative refuses to take it into his hands; or if he has inadvertently accepted its delivery, he comes back to relinquish it with panic-stricken haste as if it were a hot coal. The Israel document is then divulged by the

Egyptian representative to the Press, accompanied by a burst of invective. Egyptian replies are published without any hint of an intention to communicate them to Israel. The Egyptian position is that Israel may not talk to Egypt directly, may not talk to Egypt indirectly, may not communicate anything to Egypt in writing.

If no other method is available my Government will communicate its views to Egypt by whatever channel or technique is possible. But we cannot conceal our conviction that there is an element of farce in the idea that the word "negotiation" can honestly be applied to the extraordinary procedure followed so far. How can a Government which alleges that it wants a peace agreement with Israel refuse to negotiate the terms of that agreement by a rational method of contact? To say that one is prepared to enter into a peace agreement but not to meet or negotiate even under international chairmanship is to make a mockery of the international community. One thing is clear: no international agreement has been reached on any subject between any States at any time by the methods to which the Jarring mission has so far been confined through Egypt's insistence.

I am convinced that the strongest chance of breaking out of the deadlock lies in a transition to a rational negotiating procedure. The hour is ripe. The gap between the parties is wide, but may not be impossible to bridge. Negotiation is the agent which would transform the potentiality into action.

One of the most important things said about the Middle East in recent days is Sir Alec Douglas-Home's statement yesterday that "distrust . . . of this depth . . . cannot [easily] be removed by long-distance correspondence" (1944th meeting, p. 37) and that "those who are in confrontation must actively help [to provide] dialogue." (*ibid.*) If all those who hold that view would express it with equal candour an international movement in favour of abandoning the illusion of long-range correspondence would come to effective expression.

There is no weight or value in the argument that the Arab Governments would be negotiating from weakness if they accepted direct

contact under international chairmanship. Their point of reference would be not the military situation, but the political forum in which the Arab side would speak from a position of numerical and geographical predominance.

I therefore propose to Foreign Minister Riad that we take our guidance from the spirit which inspires the international life of our age. Let us meet here this month under the auspices of the United States to discuss the details and principles of a Suez Canal settlement; or under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jarring to discuss the establishment of peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on the basis of our respective memoranda of February 1971. Let us break out of devious procedures and sterile polemics into a new vision and a new hope.

. . . . .

#### 418

### **Six-Point Proposal for an Interim Suez Canal Agreement As a Step Towards a Final Settlement in the Middle East, Made by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 4, 1971

. . . . .

The other place where progress is urgently required is the Middle East. Over several years the United Nations has made determined and persistent efforts to achieve a lasting peace in that critical area. None the less, the opportunities for success and the risks of failure remain in precarious balance. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), establishing the principles for a durable peace, was the first major step towards reason after eighteen years of belligerency and a fragile,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official English text of Rogers' speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1950/17-25.

often violated, armistice. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, now nearing its fifteenth month, was the second major step away from war. It is time for a third major step towards peace.

For four years Ambassador Jarring has worked diligently to secure the agreement called for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We support his efforts. We believe his Mission remains the best path to an over-all settlement and to lasting peace. Our views on such a final peace settlement remain those expressed in President Nixon's foreign policy report earlier this year and in my statement of 9 December 1969. Both sides to the conflict are committed to the fundamental and reciprocal principles to which the Jarring Mission is dedicated: living in peace with each other and withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict as set forth in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Despite those commitments a deep gulf of suspicion and distrust remains. Each side is convinced of the justice of its cause. Each is concerned about its future security. A political settlement based on mutual accommodation could assure both. An attempt to achieve these ends by force will destroy all possibilities for either. That is why we believe a third major step towards peace is essential—[a] step that can be taken now; a step that is practical; a step that could help create the confidence and trust which are now lacking; a step towards full and complete implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

That step is an interim Suez Canal agreement. That is why the United States has welcomed the interest of both Egypt and Israel in such an agreement. That is why, at the request of the parties, the United States has undertaken to play a constructive role in the process of arriving at an agreement.

In order to explore the possibilities of each side, we have discussed concrete and specific ideas designed to meet the legitimate needs and concerns of both sides. Those ideas, given willingness and good intentions on both sides, could become the basis for a breakthrough. They require further quiet discussions with the parties, an undertaking we now hope can be expedited along the following lines.

A first point is the relationship between an interim agreement and an over-all settlement. A fair approach should be founded on two basic principles: first, that a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step towards complete and full implementation of resolution 242 (1967) within a reasonable period of time, and not an end in itself—that has to be clearly established in any agreement; also, that neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim settlement, complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an over-all settlement—if it could, there would be no necessity for an interim settlement. Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out through negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agreement was reached, active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices could be renewed.

A second point is the matter of a cease-fire. Its maintenance is in the interest of all of us, of everyone concerned, of everyone in this room, in fact in the interest of the whole world. The ultimate objective, of course, is a permanent end to belligerency, as part of a final, binding peace agreement. But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a cease-fire of short duration be realistic. With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.

Third is the zone of withdrawal. There are, of course, very important strategic considerations involved in this key point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides. Without going into the details, I would merely say that I believe that in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an over-all settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.

Fourth is the nature of the supervisory arrangements. Both sides must have confidence that the agreement will not be violated and that adequate machinery will be provided for prompt detection of any infractions. We are confident that ways reassuring to both

Israel and Egypt can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms that have existed in the area for the past two decades.

Fifth is the question of an Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal. The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the Canal. It is understandable, too, that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible. The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here too, based on our discussion, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise on this issue.

Sixth is the use of the Suez Canal. The United States has long held that the Canal should be open to passage for all nations, without discrimination. This principle is clear in the Security Council resolution of November 1967. What is at present at issue in considering an interim agreement is principally the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe an accommodation on this point is quite possible.

With those six points in mind, let me say this: because the parties have asked us, we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim settlement. This effort, we believe, is imperative because—and I think it is important to keep this in mind—there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue. There are risks to peace but the greater risk is inaction, unwillingness to face up to the hard decisions. A practical step now—an interim agreement—would make the next step toward peace less difficult for all the parties to take. It would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a waterway for international shipping. It would re-establish Egypt's authority over a major national asset. It would separate the combatants. It would produce the first Israeli withdrawal. It would extend the cease-fire. It would diminish the risk of major-Power involvement. It would be an important step toward the complete implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

I submit that the logic for such an agree-

ment is overwhelming. If the leaders of the area would grasp this opportunity, they would give new hope to their peoples for tranquillity, for progress and for peace.

#### 419

### **Statements Reiterating Jordanian Acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242 and Challenging Israel To Declare Willingness To Implement Its Provisions, Made by Foreign Minister Salah of Jordan in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, October 4, 1971**

For, as members all know, shortly after the war the Security Council adopted resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. That resolution was intended to define a just and lasting solution to the problem. Its points were clear, its intent specific. It reaffirmed the established principle that the acquisition of territory by military force is inadmissible and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territory they had occupied. It called for an end to belligerency in the area, it guaranteed the right of all States in the area to live in peace and security within recognized boundaries and it guaranteed freedom of passage for all ships through international waterways. It also called for a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. It struck a balance between the obligations of both sides. It met the natural Arab demand that Israeli occupation of our territory be decisively ended. It provided the guarantees for future peace and security in the area, which the Israelis alleged were the only aim of their policies, and conditions for ending a temporary military occupation.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official English text of Salah's speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1951/58-62, 67-68, 72.

Two principal Arab parties, Jordan and Egypt, accepted the resolution and the obligations devolving upon them therefrom. My Government was repeatedly assured by major Powers in the Council, and especially the United States, that were the resolution accepted its implementation by Israel would be ensured and their full weight would be thrown behind it to assure Israel's compliance. The Arab Republic of Egypt was given similar assurances pertaining to implementation. And that was done even before the resolution was adopted by the Security Council in an attempt to guarantee Arab acceptance of its terms.

It hardly occurred to our Governments that the process of implementation was to be subverted and even sabotaged by a game in semantics and procrastination which continues up to this day. The game went so far as to overtax the patience and hope of even the United Nations representative, Ambassador Jarring, an indomitable and patient diplomat by the most stringent standards.

My Government co-operated fully with Ambassador Jarring, whose terms of reference were defined in the Security Council resolution. Like Egypt and Lebanon, it received him repeatedly and responded positively and sincerely to all his questions and efforts. Without hesitation we announced our acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and expressed readiness to implement our part of it. Israel continued to equivocate about the resolution, sometimes referring only to its "spirit," sometimes only to one element in it, sometimes fully ignoring it. Two whole years were spent in this tragic game.

In the second round of Dr. Jarring's efforts, which climaxed in his series of questions addressed to the parties in the spring of 1969, my Government displayed an equally positive attitude. Reaffirming its commitment to an ultimate just peace, it replied in writing: "Jordan accepts the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force." Furthermore, "Jordan agrees to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency." To another question my Government replied that Jordan

would not oppose the establishment of demilitarized zones. And in reply to yet another question by Ambassador Jarring, we stated that in case demilitarized zones are established, Jordan accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations. The Arab Republic of Egypt gave equally clear commitments to peace. In addition, it gave assurances on freedom of navigation in international waterways in the area.

This explicit Arab commitment to the obligations defined in the Security Council resolution was certainly not matched by Israel. Ambassador Jarring could not get any commitment from Israel on an ultimate total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, even in the context of complete implementation of the Security Council resolution and the achievement of peace.

To forestall a breakdown in the peace efforts, the four big Powers initiated, in the spring of that year, consultations aimed at breaking the deadlock by getting the Security Council to exercise its responsibilities in the matter. Again we welcomed this move in the Council. We regarded it as natural and necessary. Israel vehemently opposed this initiative and opened a violent propaganda campaign against it. It realized that the intervention of the Council was bound to lead to an agreed position that, while peace in the area was the ultimate objective, Israeli evacuation of the occupied territories was a natural prerequisite.

The following year witnessed a deterioration in the situation in the area and frequent resumption of hostilities. It also witnessed a crystallization of a public posture by Israel confirming what we had always warned against: that, peace or no peace, Israel intended to keep the territory it occupied.

It was this position that led to Israel's clumsy and nervous reaction to the American initiative in June 1970 to revive the efforts of Ambassador Jarring on the basis of the Security Council resolution. Israel hesitated, resisted, made angry noises about the prospects of revival of United Nations peace efforts, and finally managed to sabotage the initiative and the renewed Jarring mission. Not



before it stated explicitly, however, that total withdrawal was out of the question.

Foreign occupation of the territories of other States is abhorrent in itself by every internationally recognized standard. But when such an occupation is accompanied by the dispersal and expulsion of the victims from their ancestral homeland, the plundering of their lands and means of livelihood, and the undisguised and openly declared intent to take over that territory irrevocably, sooner or later, then the time has clearly come for the international order and those who wish to be its guardian to take stock of themselves and of the system which they purport to uphold. Has the world reverted again to the jungle status from which it has sought and fought to extricate itself? Does not the world community realize that peace and justice are indivisible, that if Israel is permitted to reap the bitter harvest of its aggression, then which country in the world apart from the super Powers could feel safe about its future and its security? Those are questions—very real questions—which must seriously be pondered by all peoples who have a stake in world peace with justice.

There are three aspects of Israeli occupation which deserve to be highlighted in this context. They are not by any means the only obnoxious ones, but they are the most flagrant.

First, may I draw the attention of this Assembly to the plight and agony of the half a million of our brethren in the Gaza Strip. Twice or possibly more in a lifetime, they have been victims of a life of refuge and squalor, herded in refugee camps. For 20 years they had survived their suffering in the hope that they would eventually be repatriated, to their homes in their homeland.

And now the Israeli forces of occupation are expelling the people of Gaza from their homes, blowing up their houses and forcing them to find shelter in the wilderness of Sinai. This is part of a planned depopulation programme that will eventually lead to Gaza's being incorporated into the Israeli State. What happens to the people is no concern of the Israelis. It is the land they covet.

There is nothing more certain in our minds than that. But if it is the land they want, they will have to struggle for ever to maintain it. As we have said many times, they may choose land or peace. They can never have both.

The second aspect of the occupation has been the ruthless and inhuman treatment meted out to our brethren in all the occupied territories, in flagrant violation of the Declaration of Human Rights, the various Geneva Conventions governing the basic rights of civilians under occupation and, above all, the inherent and natural rights of the indigenous inhabitants in their own homeland. Thousands of homes in towns and villages have been obliterated on the flimsiest pretext that they had been harbouring resistance. Many thousands of youths, young boys and girls, have been languishing in prisons, in numerous instances subjected to torture, off and on for years. Even United Nations investigation of the plight of civilians under occupation was arrogantly denied by the forces of occupation.

But the peak of the tragedy in the Middle East and its greatest manifestation is the tragedy of Jerusalem.

I must pause here to say, in as quiet and unemotional a way as I can, that there will be no peace in the Middle East so long as the Holy City of Jerusalem remains under the domination of Israel. I do not say this emptily; I say it because it is an accepted truth in the mind and heart of every Arab—Moslem and Christian. The liberation of Jerusalem is the corner-stone of peace in the Middle East; it is the essential prerequisite for any move towards the final solution of the problem.

In conclusion, Jordan would like to put itself on record once again as to where it stands. Believing that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is the right basis for an immediate and just peace in the Middle East, Jordan once again pledges itself to its full acceptance. It subscribes to every one of its principles and it agrees to implement its specific provisions. We accept the call for a just and lasting peace contained in that resolution. We are ready

to fulfil our peace obligations as defined in it.

Let Israel declare its acceptance of the obligations required of it and contained in the resolution—that it end its occupation and withdraw its forces from the Arab territories it occupied in June 1967. Let the Israeli Foreign Minister come up to this rostrum and declare in unequivocal terms that, in the context of a peace solution, Israel will withdraw from the West Bank of Jordan, from Arab Jerusalem, from the Gaza Strip, from Sinai, from Sharm el-Sheikh, and from the occupied Syrian heights. Let the Israeli spokesman and his Government declare that Israel wants to live in peace with its neighbours and not to live at our expense, by annexing our Jerusalem, occupying our land and enslaving our people. Let Israel declare all that, and the road to peace in the Middle East will be opened.

#### 420

### **Statements Reviewing Israeli Defiance of U.N. Resolutions and Setting Out Recognition of the Palestinian Right to Land and Self-Determination, and Total Israeli Withdrawal from Occupied Arab Territories As Prerequisites for a Middle East Peace, Made by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 5, 1971

The General Assembly debates yearly the explosive Middle East crisis which threatens not only the security of the area but also world peace. At the heart of this crisis is the cause of the Arab people of Palestine who have been deprived of all rights confirmed by interna-

tional legislation, conventions and the United Nations resolutions. It is the case of the Zionist imperialist aggression against the people of Palestine as well as the whole Arab people, an aggression that has continued unabated for over half a century now.

This hall and this forum have witnessed repeated condemnations of Israel for acts of collective killing and genocide. The majority of Members of the United Nations have endorsed these condemnations, as can be ascertained through reference to numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs and Committees of the United Nations. No Member State has a darker United Nations record and one that is [more] tainted with crimes and violations than Israel.

To set the record clear, the number of resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine question adopted by the General Assembly, the principal organs of the United Nations, and specialized agencies, UNESCO and WHO, from the first cease-fire decision of 6 June 1967 until now, totals 54 resolutions and decisions. Those resolutions and decisions have, on the one hand, affirmed every Arab right and confirmed, on the other, Israel's utter disregard of these rights and its deliberate ignoring of every principle of the Charter, a record which makes Israel a candidate to be expelled from the world Organization in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter. Specifically, of the 54 resolutions referred to, 14 "Condemn" or "Strongly condemn" or "Specifically condemn Israel" for "flagrant violations" of the Charter, including attacks on the Arab countries, its refusal to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention and its violations of human rights. Nineteen of those 54 resolutions either "Deplore" or "Deeply deplore" or "Strongly deplore" or "Note with dismay the refusal of Israel" to co-operate in implementing specific resolutions or "urgently call upon the Government of Israel" to implement the Charter.

Furthermore, Zionist-Israeli propaganda, in utter disregard of world will and the maintenance of international peace and secu-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the English text (furnished by the Syrian Arab Republic delegation) of Khaddam's speech delivered in Arabic in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1952/31, 32-33, 34, 35-36, 36-37, 37.

city, has been attempting continuously to picture Israeli aggression on Arab States as being a conflict between the United States and the USSR in the Middle East. Such an attempt aims at tying the United States and its interest totally to Israeli aggression and to the desire of the expansionist Israeli State to further expand in Arab lands. It is an explosive situation because it aims at pushing ultimately the whole world to the brink of a third world war in order to protect Israeli expansionism and aggression.

We therefore confirm once more that any settlement based on giving a reward to the aggressor is but a call for a further renewal of aggression. It is a dangerous game which threatens the security of the world community. Artificial creations based on racialism and aggression cannot subsist, regardless of the arsenal of offensive destructive arms which they have at their disposal.

The alliance between the United States and Israel, between imperialism and Zionism, which is directed against the uprooted and dispossessed people of Palestine, as well as against the whole of the Arab people who aspire to peace, constitutes a threat to all freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples of the world and is harmful to American interests, which are sacrificed to serve the aggressive aims of Zionism.

The United States so-called policy of "quiet diplomacy for a Middle East settlement" is in effect nothing but a manifestation of the American desire to give the aggressor party the opportunity and the needed "quiet" to enjoy the fruits of aggression and to consolidate its control of the occupied territories through establishing new colonies and the expulsion of the inhabitants of these territories.

The large-scale expulsion from their homes and lands of the Arab inhabitants of the Golan Heights, the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza, Sinai and Jerusalem is a terrible crime that should move the conscience of humanity to intervene to save the threatened peace and security of the world.

The Israeli authorities have gone so far in their defiance of the international community

as to declare openly their colonialist intentions regarding the occupied Arab territories, which the Israeli Minister of Defence has recently demanded should be annexed to Israel, and that Israel should therefore regard itself as the "permanent government" of these territories.

Zionist acts of aggression and expulsion have reduced the Arab people of Palestine to the status of refugees. The failure of the world community to give justice to these refugees and the indifference with which it has regarded their tragic plight has kindled the spirit of resistance in their torn tents and has converted the homeless and dispossessed people of Palestine into freedom fighters struggling to defend the rights which the United Nations Charter has recognized as belonging to all peoples.

The struggle of Palestinian resistance is a struggle for the right of self-determination. International law recognizes this right and consecrates the struggle to achieve it. For it is, indeed, the right for the achievement of which all the peoples of the world represented in this Organization, not excluding the United States of America, have fought to achieve. It is the right recognized by international law and charters, including the United States Declaration of Independence, and is, therefore, the inalienable right of the Palestinian people which the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly recognized and affirmed in resolutions adopted by various sessions of the Assembly, most notably by the anniversary twenty-fifth session.

There are two prerequisites for the establishment of peace in the Middle East: first, recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their lands and homeland and to the free exercise of self-determination; secondly, the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories.

The continued occupation of these territories constitutes a grave danger to peace, a danger for which the Zionist aggressors and the forces of imperialism that support the aggression must be held responsible.

Freedom-loving forces of the world and

all peoples fighting for liberation bear the responsibility to check the aggressor. These forces, acting collectively, can deter aggression, protect the cause of freedom and the sovereignty of peoples, and can ensure a world peace based on justice and equity.

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### **Statements Pointing Out Contradictions in United States Policy and Practice in the Middle East, Calling for Israeli Renunciation of Continued Occupation and Stressing Egyptian Efforts Towards Peace Made by Foreign Minister Riad of Egypt in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, October 6, 1971**

In pursuance of our efforts for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied after 5 June 1967, President Anwar El-Sadat proposed last February an initiative which provides for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of Israeli forces in two stages. President El-Sadat declared that upon Israel's withdrawal to the lines of the first stage, Egypt would be willing to accept a cease-fire for a period of six months, during which Ambassador Jarring would prepare a time-table for the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution. During this stage Egypt would start clearing the Suez Canal with a view to opening it for international navigation. Egyptian forces would cross the Suez Canal to assume their national responsibilities on the Eastern Bank of the Canal and to protect the Canal and the Egyptian cities on the Canal.

The second stage would then follow. Israeli armed forces would be withdrawn from all

the Arab territories occupied after 5 June 1967, and the remaining provisions of the Security Council resolution would be fully carried out in conformity with the time-table prepared by Ambassador Jarring.

Israel rejected this initiative, as it had previously rejected the Jarring initiative. This rejection was expressed once again by the Foreign Minister of Israel on 30 September when he declared that Israel would not withdraw from all the occupied Egyptian territories. Moreover, the Israeli Defence Minister stated on 19 September:

"Israel should keep Sharm El-Sheikh, the Golan Heights of Syria, and the Gaza Strip among the territories captured in 1967, at the same time keeping troops on the Jordan River"—that is, the West Bank of Jordan under Israel's military control—"and retaining new settlements in the occupied areas."

Since the official announcement of its expansionist policy of annexing occupied Egyptian territory, the Israeli leaders have launched an active campaign aimed at resurrecting the principle of military conquest as a means for the acquisition of territory of other States. This principle was at the root of the whole colonial system and led to almost all the wars until the emergence of the United Nations.

Israel's policy of military expansion, its attempts to revive the colonial principle of military conquest, its refusal to agree to permanent peace, and its consistent defiance of the United Nations resolutions are all policies for which Israel finds no support whatever in the international community.

The United States, which provides Israel with military and economic assistance, has repeatedly rejected the principle of military conquest as a means of the acquisition of territory of other States. The United States has, moreover, declared its support of Ambassador Jarring's memorandum of 8 February which calls for Israeli withdrawal to Egypt's international borders and the conclusion of a peace agreement.

In the course of his speech to the General Assembly on Monday, Mr. William Rogers

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official English text of Riad's speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1954/22-23, 24-32.

reaffirmed the position of the United States stated by him on 9 December 1969, in which he said:

“In the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

“Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the United Arab Republic. It would require the United Arab Republic to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from United Arab Republic territory to the international border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half century.”

We note that this position corresponds to the Jarring initiative of 8 February 1971, which was accepted by Egypt on 15 February. We also note that in his speech Mr. Rogers called for a step for complete and full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We consider any attempt to divert such a step into a separate agreement as one of the often used obstacles of Israel to frustrate the realization of peace in the Middle East.

The United States, however, has continued to provide Israel with military and economic aid. At a time when Israel is actively labouring to annex the occupied Arab territories, the American support does not represent a mere retraction of previous American commitments and commitments under the Charter. Moreover, it enables Israel to pursue its policy of frustrating the implementation of the Security Council resolution and to continue its aggression against the Arab countries and its defiance of the United Nations.

There is a basic contradiction between the repeated assertion of the United States of support for the Security Council resolution and its actual policy of providing military and economic aid to Israel, in spite of the latter's rejection of the Jarring memorandum and its insistence on territorial expansion.

As a great Power and a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States bears a heavy responsibility and assumes

definite commitments with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Hence, the United States and the other big Powers should strive for the realization of the steps leading to the achievement of permanent peace in the Middle East.

Wide and important sectors of the international community have defined their position and announced their full support for the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and have called upon Israel to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring and to respond positively to his memorandum. I should like to refer, in particular, to the fair resolution adopted by the Council of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 22 June 1971 at Addis Ababa. In that resolution the African leaders:

Firstly, called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967.

Secondly, expressed their “full support of the efforts of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and his initiative for peace of 8 February 1971.”

Thirdly, reaffirmed their solidarity with the United Arab Republic and appreciated its reply of 15 February to Ambassador Jarring's memorandum as a practical step for establishing a just and lasting peace.

Fourthly, deplored “Israel's defiance of that initiative” and called upon Israel to respond to this initiative.

The African leaders did not confine themselves to the adoption of that important resolution. They requested the President of Mauritania, Moktar Ould Daddah, in his capacity as President of the current session of the Council of the Organization of African Unity, to consult with the other Heads of State to exert their joint influence to secure the full implementation of their resolution. As a result of these consultations, a Committee was established under the chairmanship of President Moktar Ould Daddah and the Heads of State of Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Liberia.

Egypt declared its acceptance of the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization of African Unity. We shall co-operate with the Committee of four African Heads of State led by President Senghor for the success of its mission and in carrying out the collective will of Africa's Heads of State. In deference to this effort Egypt will not request the discussion of the Middle East item in accordance with its established priority on the agenda of the General Assembly, and will await the results of this mission.

The support for Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the Jarring initiative of 8 February is indeed universal. Besides Africa's support, Asian States, non-aligned countries, the socialist countries and Western European countries have strongly supported, on many occasions, Ambassador Jarring's efforts. We are also confident that the Latin American countries, which contributed to laying the foundation of the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force, will no doubt reject Israel's attempts aiming at the acquisition of lands through military conquest and will actively support the Security Council resolution and the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to achieve permanent peace in the Middle East.

The Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 is firmly based on two inseparable foundations, permanent peace and full withdrawal. Ambassador Jarring's Mission is an integral part of that resolution. There are two roads before us which lead to the full implementation of the Security Council resolution and to the establishment of permanent peace in the Middle East: first, the implementation of President El-Sadat's initiative, to which I referred earlier in my speech; and, second, that Israel should agree to enter into a peace agreement in accordance with the memorandum of Ambassador Jarring of 8 February 1971. Egypt has responded positively to this memorandum. It remains for Israel to take the same step, thus enabling Ambassador Jarring to resume his contacts. I would be ready to meet with Ambassador Jarring to discuss with him the implementation of the contents of his

memorandum. I am ready to do this today.

Moreover, we agree that the Security Council should lay down security arrangements to guarantee peace and security and to ensure non-renewal of aggression in the Middle East. These arrangements include the establishment of demilitarized zones on both sides for equal distances and the establishment of an international force to supervise peace in the area.

Israel's refusal to withdraw from the territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967 is a constant threat to peace. Firm international action is now imperative to force Israel to comply with the basic norms of the Charter. The Security Council, particularly its permanent members, bear at present a great responsibility for peace in the Middle East.

The achievement of permanent peace is the most genuine guarantee for security in the Middle East. Territorial expansion does not guarantee the security of any State. Expansion is not the path to security, but it surely is the road to war. There is a fundamental fact which stands out as clearly as the sun, through all the efforts made, through all the projects submitted and through all the accumulated United Nations records on the Middle East. That fact is summed up in the following words: peace in the Middle East depends on Israel's renunciation of its policy of expansion. If Israel announces today that it will withdraw its forces to the 5 June 1967 lines, peace would be achieved forthwith in the Middle East.

The leaders of Israel would be indulging in self-deception if they convinced themselves that they could force the people of Egypt to surrender an inch of Egypt's territory, in any form or under any name. In the Valley of the Nile the people of Egypt offered to the human heritage a civilization of peace. In peace and in tolerance they built their progress. More than once in their long history they stood up to invaders. The invaders were repelled and Egypt remained throughout the length of history.

Today the people in the Valley of the Nile, while looking forward to peace so as to proceed with the tasks of construction and

to meet the challenges of progress, are also committed vis-à-vis the past, the present and the future to stand up to the invaders, to protect the land of Egypt and to insist that peace must rest on justice.

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### **Statements Urging the U.N. To Shoulder Its Responsibility for Assuring the Rights of the People of Palestine and Establishing Peace in the Middle East, Made by Permanent Representative el-Shibib of Iraq in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, October 7, 1971**

From the time of its adoption on 22 November 1967 we did not have much faith in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We suspected its objectives and we doubted the possibility of its implementation. We opposed the resolution's departure from the principle of peace with justice and we resented the fact that it was to all intents and purposes rewarding the aggressor.

The four years which have elapsed since the adoption of that resolution have been enough to justify the worst of our misgivings. We realized that the resolution would never satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of Palestine and ensure their inalienable rights to return to their homes and determine their own future in their own country—rights which were reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970. We felt that any attempt to settle the crisis in the Middle East without restoring and respecting the legitimate rights of the Palestinians was unjust and contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the inalienable rights of peoples to self-determination.

We were also certain that the resolution was impracticable as we were confident that it had not the slightest chance, unjust as it was, of being implemented in the face of the now too obvious Israeli designs of expansion and acquisition of more territory by the use of force. We are not happy to see that it took four years of futile attempts to implement the resolution to prove us right. We are not gloating over the failure, but are rather saddened that the international community has not yet resorted to effective measures to vindicate the purposes of the Charter. Only such measures, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, can establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. That anything short of these measures will not realize any substantial change in Israel's policy has been amply demonstrated by Israel's immediate and defiant rejection of Security Council resolution 298 (1971), the third resolution the Council has taken against Israel's illegal annexation of the city of Jerusalem.

What distresses us most is that we have witnessed since the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly a certain drift on the part of the United Nations into apathy and a willingness to abdicate its responsibilities towards re-establishing peace in the Middle East by allowing one of its Members to assume its functions. The entire authority of the United Nations and even its mandate under resolution 242 (1967) itself have been usurped by one of the major Powers, a permanent member of the Security Council and, at that, the major patron and benefactor of Israel. What makes the situation all the worse is the fact that the United States, in pursuing its alleged objectives of establishing peace in our part of the world, has never ceased appeasing the aggressor and granting Israel one concession after another as an excuse for obtaining a dubious Israeli commitment which Israel has no intention to honour in the first place. There were even reports that the Government of the United States has promised Israel further deliveries of supersonic planes and war materials in return for the promise of a partial withdrawal from the occupied territories of one Arab

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official English text of el-Shibib's speech in the General Assembly General Debate, U.N. doc. A/PV. 1956/19 22.

country. If this pattern of appeasement is to continue Israel will acquire all that it desires at present of weapons and instruments of destruction without yielding an inch of the occupied territories. What makes this all the more alarming is that Israel is now being promised weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads when Israel has obstinately refused to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To modernize and re-equip the war machine of an aggressor in order to make him disgorge his loot seems to me a most curious enterprise. The Nazis would have been reigning supreme in the world today had their aggression been treated in a similar fashion.

We believe that it is high time for the United Nations to shoulder its responsibilities towards the people of Palestine and towards peace in our area. It should reclaim the initiative in the search for solutions and endeavour to put an end to aggression by adopting the very same measures provided for in the Charter. At the same time, I should like to reaffirm from this rostrum the resolute will of my Government to remain behind the people of Palestine in their just struggle to regain their inalienable rights to their country and homeland. We shall remain faithful to the Palestinian resistance and will assure it of our full solidarity against the attempts aimed towards its liquidation. I should also like to assert our firm conviction that no envisaged solution of the problem of the Middle East, whether total or partial, has the flimsiest chance of success without ensuring justice to the Palestinians and restoring to them their elementary human rights to existence and self-determination.

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**Statements Emphasizing the Necessity for Recognition of the Rights of the People of Palestine, Made by Foreign Minister Bouteflika of Algeria in an Address Before the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, October 13, 1971**

Almost all speakers have justly stressed from this rostrum that they are deeply concerned by the situation in the Middle East, by the fact that no progress towards a satisfactory settlement has occurred. Yet, attempts to reach an agreement have been numerous, whether at the level of the super-Powers, at the level of the four big Powers, or within the framework of the mission of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Africa, in turn, is trying to make its contribution to the search for a solution by appointing a mission of four eminent African Heads of State, who would inform themselves on the spot about the state of affairs and the intentions of the main antagonists, and seek ways and means which would lead to proposals acceptable to all parties. Algeria as an African country, is happy to welcome this initiative which is consonant with the idea of the solidarity of our continent with an African country victim of aggression, a part of whose national territory, like a part of that of some Arab countries, is still illegally occupied by Israeli troops.

We have never had the slightest illusion about the aggressive and expansionist character of Israel. Its creation was marred by flagrant injustice, since it was brought about in conditions that are well known, to the prejudice of the Palestinian people expelled from its territory. Its existence is based on the permanent maintenance of this original sin which dooms it to showing continuous hostility towards its neighbours. Finally,

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted from the official English text (interpreted from French) of Bouteflika's speech in the General Assembly General Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 1965/78-81.



its policy dooms it to constantly seeking to expand its territory, thus making its own the notorious theory of *Lebensraum*. The arrogance which has always characterized the attitude of Israel is probably encouraged by the impunity which it has so far enjoyed. We are entitled to wonder, as a Member of this Organization, how far and until when such contempt for our international institution and the principles of our Charter will be condoned. What credence will still attach to our decisions if they can be ignored and trampled on in such a deliberate and constant manner?

But if attempts to reach a solution have failed until now, it is also because an essential element has been forgotten or neglected, an element which is fundamental to any settlement of the situation in the Middle East. I have in mind the Palestinian people, whose inalienable rights have been recognized and reaffirmed by the General Assembly. This people, despoiled of its national territory, is now waging a struggle within the framework of the wide liberation movement evident in the whole world. The echoing solidarity aroused in world public opinion by its struggle confirms the legitimate and just nature of its claims. Indeed, these are founded on sacred notions such as freedom and dignity. They are those for which a people is ready to accept any sacrifice and for which it will always find sufficient resources to attain its objective.

It would therefore be dangerous to neglect this fundamental element in the search for a solution but nothing will prevent it from being strengthened and from developing as it is in line with the normal course of the history of all peoples accidentally deprived of their freedom and their national rights.

To see in the problem of the peoples of Palestine merely a problem of refugees who must be assisted and for whom one implores international charity is a grievous error whose consequences can be tragic. One can easily understand that Israel prefers for reasons of its own to conceal under purely social humanitarian aspects a problem whose political dimensions are just as important and incontrovertible. But—and we shall

never tire of repeating it—a just and lasting peace cannot be established in the Middle East except on the basis of the integral recognition of the rights of the people of Palestine to national independence and sovereign existence.

#### 424

### **Address Made Before the United Nations General Assembly by Permanent Representative Chiao of China Calling for Condemnation of Israeli Aggression and Its U.S. Backing and Reiterating Chinese Support for the Restoration of Territory and National Rights to All Arab Peoples Including the Palestinians<sup>1</sup>**

**New York, December 8, 1971**

Over a long period, particularly since June 1967, the Chinese Government and people have followed with concern the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the aggression committed by Israeli Zionism with the support of United States imperialism and have watched carefully the development of the situation in the Middle East.

The essence of the Middle East question is the aggression against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples by the Israeli Zionists with the support of United States ruling circles. Since the Second World War the Israeli Zionists, fostered and groomed by United States imperialism, with the support of world reactionary aggressive forces, have repeatedly launched wars of aggression against Arab countries. Each time they launched a war they occupied large tracts of Arab territory, driving out of their homeland over one million Palestinian people who had lived there for generations and who have become homeless and destitute. The history of the Middle East over the post-war period of two decades or more has been a history

<sup>1</sup> Official English text (interpreted from Chinese) of Chiao's speech in the General Assembly Middle East Debate; U.N. doc. A/PV. 2006/41-48.

of the continuous expansion and aggression by the Israeli Zionists and a history of the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against expansion and aggression.

Under the control and manipulation of the super-Powers, the United Nations, ignoring the just demands of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and the righteous voice of the people of various countries, has failed to strongly condemn and firmly stop the expansion and aggression by Israeli Zionism and failed to give due support to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples; on the contrary, without distinguishing between right and wrong, between aggression and the victims of aggression, it has adopted a number of resolutions which in effect encouraged aggression and shielded Israeli Zionism in the name of "maintaining peace." These resolutions are unjust to the Arab people and in contravention of the United Nations Charter.

A number of countries which favoured certain resolutions passed by the United Nations on the Middle East question were solely motivated by their good will for peace. However, even these resolutions have up to now remained empty papers. This is clear to everyone if he just takes a look at the sketch map distributed by the delegation of the Arab republic of Egypt which indicates the Arab territory occupied by Israel since 1947. With the support and encouragement of a super-Power and with the connivance and acquiescence of another super-Power, the Israeli Zionists launched in 1967 their biggest war of aggression. Since then, the Israeli Zionists have become all the more arrogant and truculent and have assumed the posture of undisguised fascist aggressors. As for the United States Government, even those United Nations resolutions which it favoured are only being utilized to deceive others when these resolutions suit its needs but they are cast away when they no longer suit its needs.

While talking much about peace, the United States is doing its utmost to arm Israel. Of late the United States Senate has passed a resolution granting Israel a loan of \$500 million, half of which will be used for the purchase of Phantom jet fighters by

Israel. This is a naked support to aggression and a new provocation to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. It is because of the above-mentioned behaviour of the United States and Israel that the Palestinian people and Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries have up to now failed to achieve any result in all their efforts to recover the lost territory.

The Israeli Zionists have advanced a theory of so-called "secure boundaries" in order to perpetuate the occupation of the territory they have seized. This is a typical excuse for expansionism, a gangster's logic. What are "secure boundaries"? According to the logic of the Israeli Zionists, no boundary of well over 100 countries in the world would be secure because the conventional weapons of any country can reach areas within the boundary of a neighbouring country, let alone rockets and nuclear weapons. Does it follow then that the boundaries of all neighbouring countries should be changed? Obviously that is absurd. To put it bluntly, by "secure boundaries" the Israeli Zionists mean that whatever place they invade and occupy, that becomes their boundary. They may consider such boundaries as secure today, but tomorrow they will say that these boundaries are insecure and therefore it will be necessary to embark on further expansion.

The Chinese people had their own bitter experience in this respect. Before the Second World War Japanese militarism first invaded and occupied the north-east of China and set up a "Manchukuo," but later they claimed they were insecure because of "communist threat" and on that pretext they invaded and occupied North China and launched an all-out war of aggression against the whole country. And in the end they even went so far as to unleash the Pacific war. The theory of demanding "secure boundaries" is a theory of the aggressors. To accept that theory is tantamount to recognizing as legal all the aggression and expansion by Israeli Zionism.

At present, one or two super-Powers are trying to frighten people by spreading the idea that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples must not wage armed struggle to resist Israeli aggression. They say that any resistance would immediately lead to a world war and

that whoever supports such armed struggle is provoking confrontation between the two super-Powers. Have we not all heard of such arguments from this rostrum not long ago? Of course this is sheer nonsense. Why did they not worry about the danger of a world war when Israel launched its war of aggression, if resistance to aggression by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples would become a danger that would lead to a world war? According to their logic, the Chinese people should not have waged their war of liberation, the Korean people should not have resisted United States aggression, and the people of the three countries of Indo-China should not wage their war against the United States aggression and for national salvation. According to their logic, no victim of aggression should carry out armed struggle to resist the aggressors. How can such logic stand? It is absolutely just and entirely proper for the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, who are victims of aggression, to be compelled to take up arms to resist aggression, recover their lost territories and restore their right to national existence. Countless facts in the post-war period of the last two decades or more have proved that it is precisely because the people of various countries have continuously waged revolutionary wars against imperialist aggression that the imperialists have not dared lightly to unleash a world war. The United States and another super-Power, echoing each other, are doing their utmost to spread the ideas mentioned above in an attempt to frighten people with the danger of a world war. In so doing, their aim is to bind the hands of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and to prevent them from waging just struggles, so that the two super-Powers can manipulate the situation and achieve their ulterior purposes.

One can see ever more clearly from the development of the Middle East situation that the two super-Powers are contending and colluding with each other there. They are taking advantage of the temporary difficulties facing the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to make dirty political deals in their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of

spheres of influence in the Middle East at the expense of the national rights and territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Herein lies the crux of the matter and that is why the Middle East question has remained unsolved over such a long period. It is well known that the Israeli Zionists, who are obsessed with ambitious designs, cannot exist without the support of United States imperialism. We are not opposed to the Jewish people or the people of Israel, but we are firmly opposed to the Zionist policies of expansion and aggression. We have never recognized Israel, nor have we had any contact with it since the founding of the People's Republic of China. We hold that all the countries and peoples that love peace and uphold justice have the obligation to support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their struggle to restore their right to national existence and recover their occupied land, and that no one has the right to make political deals behind their backs at the expense of their right to national existence and their territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese Government and people always stand on the side of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who are subjected to aggression, firmly support their just struggles and give them assistance within the limits of our capability. The principled stand of our [people] is firm and unshakable.

The imperialists are paper tigers; the super-Powers are also paper tigers. In appearance they are fierce and powerful, but in reality they are not so frightening. So long as the people who are subjected to aggression fear no pressure and blackmail, refuse to be deceived and are determined to take up arms, persevere in struggle and uphold unity, they are fully capable of defeating all imperialist aggressors. Is not the post-war history of the last two decades or more full of such instances?

We call upon the Governments and peoples of all countries to strongly condemn the aggression by the Israeli Zionists, strongly condemn United States imperialism which supports their aggression, and strongly condemn the reactionary forces in Jordan for

their sanguinary repression of the Palestinian people.

We maintain that the Israeli Zionist aggressors must withdraw from the Egyptian, Syrian and all other Arab territories they have occupied. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to national existence and to return to their homeland must be restored. We firmly support the Palestinian, Egyptian, Syrian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to restore their national rights and recover their lost territories.

The destiny of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples must be decided by themselves, their affairs must be handled by themselves. We oppose all conspiratorial activities of aggression, subversion, control and interference carried out by any super-Power against the Arab countries and people.

The aggression by United States imperi-

alism and Israeli Zionism has educated the broad masses of the Arab people by negative example, heightened their political consciousness and enabled them gradually to see who are their enemies and who are their friends, who are their true friends and who are their false friends. At present, from the Persian Gulf in the east to the Atlantic coast in the west, the 100 million and more Arab people are in the midst of an upsurge of the anti-imperialist struggle. The Afro-Asian people and the peoples of the world stand on the side of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. We are deeply convinced that carrying on a protracted struggle and upholding unity against imperialism, the heroic Arab people who have an ancient civilization and the spirit of resistance will surely overcome numerous difficulties on their road of advance and win continuous new victories.

## PART III: RESOLUTIONS

### GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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#### **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2759 D (XXVI) Accepting the Accounts of UNRWA for the Year 1970<sup>1</sup>**

November 8, 1971

*The General Assembly,*

1. *Accepts* the accounts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the year ended 31 December 1970 and the certificates of the Board of Auditors,<sup>2</sup>

2. *Takes note* of the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as set forth in its report.<sup>3</sup>

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#### **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2787 (XXVI) Confirming the Legitimacy of Struggle for Self-Determination by Peoples Under Colonial and Foreign Domination, Including the People of Palestine<sup>4</sup>**

December 6, 1971

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November

1963, 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970 and 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and resolution VIII adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,<sup>5</sup>

*Solemnly reaffirming* that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and colonial exploitation is a violation of the principle of self-determination as well as a denial of basic human rights and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations,

*Concerned* at the fact that many peoples continue to be denied the right to self-determination and are living under conditions of colonial and foreign domination,

*Expressing concern* at the fact that some countries, notably Portugal, with the support

S.S.R., Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against:* 10. Australia, Belgium, France, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom, U.S.A.

*Abstained:* 33. Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Gambia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela.

<sup>5</sup> *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2), p. 9. [This note is part of the resolution.]

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/Res/2759 (XXVI). Adopted without objection at the 1979th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly*, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 7 C (A/8407/Add.3). [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

<sup>3</sup> A/8350, paras. 14–16.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc A/Res/2787 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2001st plenary meeting:

*In favor:* 76. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian

of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, are waging war against the national liberation movement of the colonies and against certain independent States of Africa and Asia and the developing countries,

*Confirming* that colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, including the methods of neo-colonialism, constitutes a gross encroachment on the rights of peoples and the basic human rights and freedoms,

*Convinced* that effective application of the principle of self-determination of peoples is of paramount importance for the promotion of friendly relations between countries and peoples, the guarantee of human rights and the maintenance of peace in the world,

*Affirming* that the future of Zimbabwe cannot be negotiated with an illegal regime and that any settlement must be on the basis of "no independence before majority rule",

*Reaffirming* the inalienable rights of all peoples, and in particular those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and the Palestinian people, to freedom, equality and self-determination, and the legitimacy of their struggles to restore those rights,

*Reaffirming* the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which elaborated the principle of self-determination of peoples,

*Considering* that the establishment of a sovereign and independent State freely determined by the whole people belonging to the territory constitutes a mode of implementing the right of self-determination,

*Further considering* that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State established in accordance with the right of self-determination of its peoples is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

*Mindful* that interference in the internal affairs of States is a violation of the Charter and can pose a serious threat to the maintenance of peace,

1. *Confirms* the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-determination and liberation

from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), as well as the Palestinian people, by all available means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Affirms* man's basic human right to fight for the self-determination of his people under colonial and foreign domination;

3. *Calls upon* all States dedicated to the ideals of freedom and peace to give all their political, moral and material assistance to peoples struggling for liberation, self-determination and independence against colonial and alien domination;

4. *Believes* that the main objectives and principles of international protection of human rights cannot be effectively implemented while some States, particularly Portugal and South Africa, pursue the imperialist policy of colonialism, use force against independent African States and developing countries and peoples fighting for self-determination and support regimes that are applying the criminal policy of racism and *apartheid*;

5. *Condemns* the colonial and usurping Powers that are suppressing the right of peoples to self-determination and hampering the liquidation of the last hotbeds of colonialism and racism in the African and Asian continents and in other parts of the world;

6. *Condemns* the policy of certain States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that contribute to the creation in southern Africa of a military-industrial complex whose aim is to suppress the movement of peoples struggling for their self-determination and to interfere in the affairs of independent African States;

7. *Recalls* that it is the duty of every State to contribute through joint and independent action to the implementation of the principle of self-determination, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to assist the United Nations to discharge the responsibilities vested in it by the Charter for the implementation of this principle;

8. *Urges* the Security Council as well as States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies to take

effective steps to ensure the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the elimination of colonialism and racism, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

9. *Resolves* to devote constant attention to the question of flagrant large-scale violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms resulting from the denial to peoples under colonial and foreign domination of their right to self-determination;

10. *Calls upon* all States to observe the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and respect for their sovereign rights and territorial integrity.

#### 427

### **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2791 (XXVI) Approving the Report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and Requesting It To Continue Its Work<sup>1</sup>**

**December 6, 1971**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970,

*Having considered* the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,<sup>2</sup>

*Taking into account* the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1970 to 30 June 1971,<sup>3</sup>

*Taking note* of the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General on 17 November 1971,<sup>4</sup>

*Recognizing with grave concern* that the financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continues to be acute, thereby imminently endangering the already minimum services being provided to Palestine refugees,

*Emphasizing* the urgent need for extraordinary efforts and exceptional measures in order to maintain, at least at their present level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. *Commends* the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work and approves its report, drawing special attention to the conclusions and recommendations contained in chapter V of that report;

2. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its work for one year in accordance with the provisions of its previous mandate and, as appropriate, to pursue urgently with Governments, both bilaterally and on a regional basis, with specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, and with other organizations and individuals concerned, the implementation of the recommendations approved by the General Assembly in the present resolution, as well as the implementation of other resolutions relating to the mandate of the Working Group;

3. *Endorses* Economic and Social Council resolution 1565 (L) of 3 May 1971, and in particular urges serious consideration and early implementation of paragraph 5 of that resolution;

4. *Supports* the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to Governments to join in the collective effort to solve the financial crisis of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/Res/2791 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2001st plenary meeting:

*In favor:* 114

*Against:* —

*Abstained:* 2

<sup>2</sup> A/8476. [This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413).*

<sup>4</sup> A/8526.

5. *Requests* the Working Group, after consultation with all concerned, in particular the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and taking into account the views expressed in the course of the debate during the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly relevant to the mandate of the Working Group, to prepare and submit a comprehensive report on all aspects of the financing of the Agency to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

#### 428

### **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2792 (XXVI) Extending the Mandate of UNRWA, Deploing Israeli Destruction of Shelters and Displacement of Refugees in Gaza and Calling on Israel To Take Immediate Steps for Their Return, and Expressing Grave Concern at the Denial of Self-Determination to the People of Palestine<sup>1</sup>**

December 6, 1971

#### A

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2672 A (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and all previous resolutions mentioned therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/Res/2792 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2001st plenary meeting:

Resolution A: 112 to 0, with 3 abstentions;

Resolution B: 113 to 0, with 1 abstention;

Resolution C:

*In favor*: 79. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Ceylon, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

*Taking note* of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref-

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against*: 4. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Israel.

*Abstained*: 35. Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Swaziland, Uganda, U.S.A., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire.

#### *Resolution D:*

*In favor*: 53. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against*: 23. Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Liberia, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Swaziland, U.S.A., Uruguay.

*Abstained*: 43. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

#### *Resolution E:*

*In favor*: 88. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,



ugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1970 to 30 June 1971,<sup>1</sup>

*Taking note also of the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General on 17 November 1971,*<sup>2</sup>

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its sincere appreciation* to Mr. Laurence Michelmore, on the occasion of his resignation as Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, for his efficient administration of the Agency during the past seven years and for his dedicated service to the welfare of the refugees;

3. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued

faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but not later than 1 October 1972;

5. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

6. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges noncontributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions;

8. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 1975, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

## B

*Recalling* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970,

Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, U.S.A., Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against:* 3. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Israel.

*Abstained:* 28. Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Swaziland, Uganda, Uruguay, Zaire.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413).* [This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

<sup>2</sup> A/8526.

*Taking note* of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1970 to 30 June 1971,<sup>1</sup>

*Taking note also* of the joint appeal made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General,<sup>2</sup>

*Concerned* about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV) and 2672 B (XXV);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

## C

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the special report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on the effect on Palestine refugees of recent operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities in the Gaza Strip,<sup>3</sup> and the supplement thereto,<sup>4</sup>

*Noting* that both the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East have expressed

great concern about the effect on Palestine refugees of these operations, in which shelters in refugee camps were demolished and about 15,000 persons displaced, some of them to places outside the Gaza Strip,

*Recalling* Commission on Human Rights resolution 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970,<sup>5</sup> in which the Commission deplored all policies and actions aiming at the deportation of the Palestinian refugees from the occupied Gaza Strip and called upon Israel to desist forthwith from deporting the Palestinian civilians from the Gaza Strip,

1. *Declares* that the destruction of refugee shelters and the forcible removal of their occupants to other places, including places outside the Gaza Strip, contravene articles 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949<sup>6</sup> as well as paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970 entitled "Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts";

2. *Deplores* these actions by Israel;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report as soon as possible and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with the provisions of paragraph 3 and on the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the present resolution.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/8413).

<sup>2</sup> A/8526.

<sup>3</sup> A/8383.

<sup>4</sup> A/8383/Add.1.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 5* (E/4816), chap. XXIII.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

## D

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing* that the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Recalling* its resolutions 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970, in which it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination in accordance with the Charter and 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970, in which it recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to the right of self-determination,

*Bearing in mind* the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations<sup>1</sup> and in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,<sup>2</sup>

1. *Recognizes* that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Expresses its grave concern* that the people of Palestine have not been permitted to enjoy their inalienable rights and to exercise their right to self-determination;

3. *Declares* that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

## E

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December

1970, calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General<sup>3</sup> of 27 August 1971 concerning the implementation of resolution 2672 D (XXV),

*Gravely concerned* about the plight of the displaced inhabitants,

*Convinced* that the plight of the displaced persons could be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,

*Emphasizing* the imperative of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced inhabitants,

1. *Considers* that the plight of the displaced inhabitants continues since they have not yet returned to their homes and camps;

2. *Expresses its grave concern* that the displaced inhabitants have not been able to return in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3. *Calls once more upon* the Government of Israel to take immediately and without any further delay effective steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

## 429

**United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI) Noting with Appreciation the Positive Reply of Egypt to the Initiative of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

**December 13, 1971**

*The General Assembly,*

*Deeply concerned* at the continuation of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East, particularly since the conflict of June 1967,

<sup>3</sup> A/8366.

<sup>1</sup> General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

<sup>2</sup> General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc A/Res (XXVI). Adopted at the 2016th plenary meeting;

which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

*Convinced* that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be implemented immediately in all its parts in order to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security,

*Determined* that the territory of a State shall not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to the principles enshrined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as well as in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1970,<sup>1</sup>

*Expressing its appreciation* of the efforts of the Committee of African Heads of State undertaken in pursuance of the resolution adopted on 23 June 1971 by the Assembly of

Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity.

*Gravely concerned* at the continuation of Israel's occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

*Having considered* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

1. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored;

2. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles:

(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971;<sup>2</sup>

4. *Expresses its full support* for all the efforts of the Special Representative to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

5. *Notes with appreciation* the positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative's initiative for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. *Calls upon* Israel to respond favourably to the Special Representative's peace initiative;

7. *Further invites* the parties to the Middle East conflict to give their full co-operation to the Special Representative in order to work out practical measures for:

(a) Guaranteeing freedom of navigation

<sup>2</sup> A/8541. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, document S/10403, annex 1.*

*In favor:* 79. Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against:* 7. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Israel, Nicaragua, Uruguay.

*Abstained:* 36. Algeria, Australia, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ivory Coast, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Syria, U.S.A., Upper Volta, Zaïre.

<sup>1</sup> General Assembly resolution 2734 [of 16 December 1970. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028)*, pp. 22-24]. [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

through international waterways in the area;

(b) Achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress made by the Special Representative in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and of the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to the implementation of its resolution.

#### 430

### **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2851 (XXVI) Strongly Calling Upon Israel To Rescind All Measures To Annex and/or Settle the Occupied Territories and Requesting the Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories To Continue Its Work<sup>1</sup>**

December 20, 1971

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions and principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/Res/2851 (XXVI). Adopted at the 2027th plenary meeting:

*In favor:* 53. Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

as well as the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,<sup>2</sup>

*Recalling* Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, as well as other pertinent resolutions of the United Nations,

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>3</sup>

*Gravely concerned* about the violations of the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories,

*Considering* that the system of investigation and protection is essential for ensuring effective implementation of the international instruments, such as the aforementioned Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, which provide for respect for human rights in armed conflicts,

*Noting with regret* that the relevant provisions of that Convention have not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,

*Recalling* that, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, the States parties have undertaken not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the International Committee of the Red Cross, after giving careful consideration to the question of the reinforcement of the implementation of the

*Against:* 20. Barbados, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Swaziland, U.S.A., Uruguay, Zaire.

*Abstained:* 46. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Luxemburg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 75 (1950), No. 973. [This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

<sup>3</sup> A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2.

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,<sup>1</sup> has arrived at the conclusion that all tasks falling to a protecting Power under those Conventions could be considered humanitarian functions and that the International Committee of the Red Cross has declared itself ready to assume all the functions envisaged for protecting Powers in the Conventions.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and its members for their efforts in performing the task assigned to them;

2. *Strongly calls upon* Israel to rescind forthwith all measures and to desist from all policies and practices such as:

(a) The annexation of any part of the occupied Arab territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on those territories and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the occupied territory;

(c) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property;

(d) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

(f) The ill-treatment and torture of prisoners and detainees;

(g) Collective punishment;

3. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to permit all persons who have fled the occupied territories or have been deported or expelled therefrom to return to their homes;

4. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to settle the occupied territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are completely null and void;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection

of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

6. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult as appropriate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

7. *Urges* the Government of Israel to cooperate with the Special Committee and to facilitate its entry into the occupied territories in order to enable it to perform the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the continued performance of its tasks;

9. *Requests* all States parties to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects and fulfils its obligations under that Convention;

10. *Requests* the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled "Report (or reports) of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories."

#### SECURITY COUNCIL

431

### **United Nations Security Council Resolution 298 Deploring the Failure of Israel To Respect U.N. Resolutions Concerning Measures To Change the Status of Jerusalem<sup>3</sup>**

**September 25, 1971**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) and the earlier General Assembly

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973.

<sup>2</sup> See A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2, para. 36.

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. S/Res/298. Adopted at the 1582nd meeting:

resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section of Jerusalem,

*Having considered* the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8052, S/8146, S/9149 and Add. 1, S/9537 and S/10124 and Add. 1 and 2), and having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

*Reaffirming* the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

*Noting with concern* the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolutions,

*Noting with concern* further that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

1. *Reaffirms* Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem;

3. *Confirms* in the clearest possible terms that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status;

4. *Urgently calls upon* Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace;

*In favor:* 14. Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Republic of China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, U.S.A.

*Against:* —

*Abstained:* 1. Syria.

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within 60 days on the implementation of this resolution.

## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

### 432

#### **United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1565 (L) Calling for Assistance for the Palestine Refugees Through UNRWA and Other U.N. and Related Bodies<sup>1</sup>**

**May 3, 1971**

*The Economic and Social Council,*

*Recognizing* the acute financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East which endangers the minimum services provided to Palestine refugees,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970,

*Recalling further* General Assembly resolution 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 by which the Assembly approved the report<sup>2</sup> of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and endorsed the Working Group's recommendations, thereby, *inter alia*, urging all organizations of the United Nations system to study ways by which they might assist the Agency or undertake activities helpful to the refugees

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/5044 (see *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 1*, pp. 1-2). Adopted unanimously at the 1747th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 35, document A/8264. [This note is part of the resolution.]

which would lessen the financial burden of the Agency, to the maximum extent possible,

*Noting with appreciation* the efforts made so far by the Working Group with regard to the organizations of the United Nations system in soliciting increased assistance to the Palestine refugees,

*Noting also with appreciation* the assistance already offered by some organizations within the United Nations system in response to those efforts, in recognizing that, especially in cases of emergency, concern for human welfare requires an extra interagency solidarity,

*Being convinced*, however, that further contributions and assistance for the benefit of the Palestine refugees are urgently needed,

1. *Welcomes* in particular the decisions already taken under the World Food Programme to provide emergency food aid up to \$2 million;

2. *Welcomes also* the contacts initiated with the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization with a view to obtaining services to the maximum extent possible;

3. *Welcomes further* the positive steps taken by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in launching an appeal for funds to maintain the educational services for Palestine refugees and the encouraging results obtained so far;

4. *Expresses the hope* for an early implementation of the above-mentioned decisions, particularly of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2672 B (XXV), as well as manifestations of concrete results of the above-mentioned contacts and steps in accordance with constitutional procedures;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the executive heads of specialized agencies, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme as well as the non-governmental organizations concerned to continue to consider appropriate ways and means of rendering all possible assistance to the Palestine refugees;

6. *Requests further* all organizations of the United Nations system to include in their

annual reports information on their possible present and future assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and on their activities that benefit the Palestine refugees, and thus lessen the financial burden of the Agency.

## COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

### 433

#### **United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 9 (XXVII) Condemning Continued Violations by Israel of Human Rights in Occupied Arab Territories<sup>1</sup>**

**March 15, 1971**

*The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Guided* by the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Bearing in mind* the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,

*Reaffirming* that the Human Rights and fundamental freedoms as provided for in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949,<sup>2</sup> and in other relevant international instruments, fully apply to all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East, including occupied Jerusalem,

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/4949 (see *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 4*, pp. 79-82). Adopted at the 1120th meeting:

*In favor:* 14. India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* 2. Guatemala, U.S.A.

*Abstained:* 14. Austria, Chile, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Finland, France, Ghana, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 75 (1950), No. 973. [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]



*Recalling* Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968 and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, in which the Council and the General Assembly called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled these areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

*Recalling* General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, 2674 (XXV) of 9 December 1970, and 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970,

*Further recalling* General Assembly resolution 2727 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 in which the Assembly requested the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, pending an early termination of Israeli occupation, to continue its work in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population in the occupied territories,

*Also recalling* its resolution 6 (XXV) by which it decided to establish a special Working Group of Experts to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, and resolution 10 (XXVI) in which it condemned Israel's grave violations of human rights as well as its violations of the Geneva Convention in the occupied territories,

*Having studied* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>1</sup>

*Gravely concerned* by the fact that Israel's violations of human rights in the occupied territories continue unabated, in total disregard of the appeals and resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968 and the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross held in Istanbul in September 1969,

*Alarmed* by the fact that Israel continues the

establishment of settlements in the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem, while it refuses to permit the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes, a right the denial of which by Israel constitutes an affront to humanity and a grave violation of international law,

1. *Condemns* Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including policies aimed at changing the status of these territories;

2. *Condemns* specifically the following policies and practices of Israel:

(a) Denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

(b) Resort to collective punishment;

(c) The deportation and expulsion of the citizens of the occupied territories;

(d) Arbitrary arrest and detention of the citizens of the occupied territories;

(e) Ill treatment and torture of prisoners;

(f) Destruction and demolition of villages, town quarters, houses and confiscation and expropriation of property;

(g) Evacuation and transfer of sections of the population of the occupied territories;

(h) Transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the occupied territories;

3. *Strongly deplores* Israel's policies in the occupied territories aimed at placing the population in a general state of repression, fear and deprivation, and particularly deplores:

(a) Requisition of hospitals and their transformation into police stations;

(b) Abrogation of the national laws and interference with the judicial system;

(c) Refusal to allow the text books approved by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for schools in the occupied territories, and the insistence on forcing upon school children an alien system of education;

4. *Calls upon* Israel once again to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949;

5. *Again calls upon* Israel to enable forthwith the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

<sup>1</sup> A/8089.

6. *Once again calls upon* Israel to heed and to implement the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations organs and the specialized agencies for the safeguarding of human rights in the occupied territories;

7. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to colonize the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem are completely null and void;

8. *Declares* that Israel's continued and increasing violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and its deliberate and persistent refusal to abide by its legal obligations under the United Nations Charter, international law, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, indicate the necessity of collective action on the part of the international community to ensure respect for the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

9. *Urges* the International Committee of the Red Cross to co-operate with the United Nations organs, and particularly with the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in the fulfilment of its task to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to inform the Commission on Human Rights at its twenty-eighth session of the steps it has taken in this regard;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give wide publicity to United Nations documents dealing with the violations of human rights in the occupied territories, and in particular to the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population in the Occupied Territories, and to use United Nations media of information in disseminating information on the conditions of the population of the occupied territories, the refugees and displaced persons;

11. *Decides* to include the question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of high priority on the agenda of the Commission's twenty-eighth session.

UNESCO

434

**United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board Decision 87 EX/4.2.4 Calling Again on Israel To Admit UNRWA/UNESCO Textbooks into Occupied Arab Territories<sup>1</sup>**

1971

## I

*The Executive Board,*

1. *Having examined* the Director-General's report (87 EX/9 and Add. 1 and 2) on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and having heard his oral report on this subject,

2. *Recalling* its previous decisions on this question and in particular decision 4.1.2 of its 85th session,

3. *Commends* the Director-General on his dedicated and tireless efforts to implement these decisions;

4. *Expresses* its satisfaction at the co-operation of the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic with the Director-General to implement the Executive Board's decisions;

5. *Takes note* of the declaration of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic according to which it welcomes any collaboration with the Director-General of UNESCO to secure the education of the children of the refugees and to provide them with the textbooks they need in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools situated in Syrian Arab territory;

6. *Expresses* its concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with the above-mentioned resolution by refusing or delaying the granting of import permits to 12 of the textbooks approved by the Director-General;

7. *Urgently calls* again upon the Government of Israel to authorize the immediate admittance of all textbooks already approved, or to be approved, by the Director-General

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/8413 (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13*, pp. 102-103). Adopted at the 87th session of UNESCO.

into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools therein;

8. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 88th session on the implementation of this resolution.

## II

### *The Executive Board,*

1. *Recalling* its previous decisions 4.2.1 and 4.1.2 adopted at its 84th and 85th sessions respectively on the launching of an international appeal for voluntary contributions to UNRWA,

2. *Affirming* its belief that the only real and effective justice for the Palestine refugees is that based on the recognition of their human rights,

3. *Aware* of the fact that the programmes for the education of the Palestine refugees could be seriously impaired by the precariousness and insufficiency of the resources available to UNRWA,

4. *Commends* the Director-General on his dedicated and most appreciated efforts to implement the decisions of the Executive Board on this subject;

5. *Expresses* its thanks to Ambassador Mansour Khalid for the valuable and fruitful mission he has agreed to undertake on behalf of UNESCO;

6. *Expresses the hope* that the Member States who do not contribute to UNRWA will find it possible to contribute to UNESCO's deposit account for the education of the Palestine refugees;

7. *Invites* the Director-General to continue his efforts to achieve the goal of covering the deficit in UNRWA's resources for the education of Palestine refugees;

8. *Further invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 88th session of the responses to his appeal.

## 435

### **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board Decision 88 EX/4.1.1 Calling Again on Israel To Admit UNRWA/UNESCO Textbooks to Occupied Arab Territories and Commending Arab States for Granting University Scholarships to Palestine Refugees<sup>1</sup>**

1971

### *The Executive Board,*

1. *Having examined* the Director-General's Report (88 EX/3 and Add. 1, 2, 3 and 4) on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and having heard his oral report on this subject,

2. *Recalling* its previous decisions on this question and in particular decisions 4.1.2 and 4.2.4 adopted respectively at the 85th and 87th sessions,

## I

3. *Notes with satisfaction* the substantial results so far obtained thanks to the dedicated and continuous efforts of the Director-General and to the co-operation of the States concerned regarding the settlement of the question of textbooks in the UNRWA/Unesco schools;

4. *Observes* with regret that, in the case of seven of the textbooks approved by the Director-General, the Government of Israel has not yet complied with the above-mentioned resolutions in respect of the granting of the necessary import permits;

5. *Urgently calls* again upon the Government of Israel to authorize the immediate admittance of all textbooks already approved, or to be approved, by the Director-General into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the UNRWA/Unesco schools therein;

6. *Calls on* all concerned governments to pursue their efforts towards securing the implementation of the pertinent Executive Board resolutions;

<sup>1</sup> UNESCO doc. 88 EX/Decisions. Adopted at the 88th session of UNESCO.

## II

7. *Having learned with satisfaction* that, as a result of the voluntary contributions made in response to the appeal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of Unesco, no cuts have so far been necessary in the UNRWA/Unesco educational programme,

8. *Thanks* the Member States which generously responded to these appeals;

9. *Notes with anxiety*, however, that cuts might become inevitable if other resources were not to become available at an early date;

10. *Accordingly addresses* a pressing appeal to Member States to ensure the continuation of this indispensable operation;

11. *Requests* the Director-General to continue his efforts to this end;

## III

12. *Having learned with satisfaction* that, thanks to the Director-General, it proved possible to arrange for the holding of the Arab Republic of Egypt's secondary school leaving examination in the occupied territory of the Gaza strip for seven thousand students in 1971,

13. *Expresses its gratification* at the success of an initiative, so perfectly in accord with Unesco's mission to promote education and peace;

14. *Further notes with satisfaction* the large numbers of grants made by the Governments of the Arab States to enable refugees to continue their studies in the universities of those countries;

## IV

15. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board, as appropriate, on the implementation of this resolution.

## 436

**United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board Decision 88 EX/4.3.1 Calling Upon Israel To Preserve Cultural Properties, Especially Christian and Islamic Religious Sites in the Old City of Jerusalem<sup>1</sup>**

1971

*The Executive Board,*

1. *Recalling* the provisions of The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth session and decisions 4.4.2 and 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd and 83rd sessions respectively,

3. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions 2253 and 2254 of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively, concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

4. *Having considered* the reports contained in documents 87 EX/31, 87 EX/34, 87 EX/35, 88 EX/46 and 88 EX/47,

5. *Reaffirms* Unesco's concern regarding the implementation of its previous decisions in this matter;

6. *Urgently calls* upon Israel to:

(a) see that the necessary measures are taken for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem;

(b) desist from any archaeological excavations, the transfer of such properties and any change of their features or their cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites;

(c) adhere scrupulously to the provisions of the above-mentioned Convention and resolutions;

7. *Invites* the Director-General to ensure the presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem

<sup>1</sup> UNESCO doc. 88 EX/Decisions. Adopted at the 88th session of UNESCO.

with a view to securing an efficient implementation of the resolutions of the General Conference and the Executive Board in this respect;

8. *Further invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 89th session on the implementation of this resolution.

## WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

### 437

#### **World Health Organization Resolution WHA 24.32 Authorizing Expanded Health Assistance to the Palestine Refugees<sup>1</sup>**

**May 18, 1971**

*The Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly,*

Recalling its resolution WHA23.52 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons, operative paragraph 5(b) of which requested its Director-General to take all effective measures to safeguard health conditions amongst refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East;

Noting the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, which *inter alia* established a Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

Noting further the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 by which the Assembly approved the first report of the Working Group and endorsed the Working Group's recommendations, thereby, *inter alia*, urging all organizations of the United Nations system to study ways by which they might assist or undertake activities helpful to the refugees;

Considering the Economic and Social Council resolution 1565 (L) of 6 May 1971, welcoming, *inter alia*, the contacts initiated with the World Health Organization with

a view to obtaining services to the maximum extent possible, and requesting the executive heads of specialized agencies to continue to consider appropriate ways and means of rendering all possible assistance to the Palestine refugees;

Noting with appreciation the report of the Director-General contained in document A24/B/19 and the comments he has supplied on the means of financing outside the regular budget which might be used;

Recognizing the acute financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East which endangers the minimum services provided to the Palestine refugees;

Mindful of the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security; and

Realizing that more material and human aid is urgently needed to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees in the Middle East, in particular in the field of health,

1. *Requests* the Director-General of the World Health Organization to intensify and expand its programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East to the amount of at least one million dollars; and

2. *Decides* that meanwhile emergency assistance to the maximum extent possible be given to the refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East.

### 438

#### **World Health Organization Resolution WHA 24.33 Drawing Attention to Israel's Violations of the Human Rights of the Palestine Refugees and the Inhabitants of Occupied Arab Territories<sup>1</sup>**

**May 18, 1971**

*The Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly,*  
Bearing in mind that the health of all

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/8413 (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13*, p. 98). Adopted at the 16th plenary meeting.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/8413 (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13*, pp. 99–100). Adopted at the 16th plenary meeting.

peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;

Mindful of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights;

Recalling its resolutions WHA21.38, WHA22.43 and WHA23.52 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

Having considered the report of the Director-General (A24/B/19) and the annual report of the Director of Health of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);

Further recalling resolution 9 (XXVII) of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;

Noting that the Commissioner General of UNRWA has drawn attention that any further lowering of the already austere provisions of health services to refugees under his mandate would jeopardize the health of refugees and of the general public with whom they live;

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2672 (XXV) in which attention was drawn to the continuing critical financial position of the UNRWA and the serious effects of this crisis on the health activities of UNRWA;

Noting further that the reports published by competent organizations reveal that the occupying authorities bar the distribution of medicaments by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories,

1. *Reaffirms* that the protection of the life and physical and mental health of the refugees and displaced persons require that they immediately be afforded to return to their homes, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to abide by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which provides for essential safeguards

for the protection of physical and mental health of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories;

3. *Draws the attention* that Israel's violations of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories constitute a serious impediment to the health of the population of the Occupied Territories, a matter the continuation of which would necessitate that the Organization should consider the application of Article 7 of its Constitution;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to refrain from any interference with the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Occupied Territories;

5. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Director-General of the World Health Organization, the Director of Health of UNRWA and to the specialized and other organizations that provide assistance to the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East; and

6. *Requests* the Director-General of the World Health Organization:

(a) to take all other effective measures in his power to safeguard health conditions amongst refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East;

(b) to continue and strengthen his co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide material and human aid to the population of the Occupied Territories;

(c) to submit a comprehensive report to the Twenty-fifth World Health Assembly on the conditions of physical and mental health of the population of the Occupied Territories;

(d) to bring this resolution to the attention of all governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

## INDEX

f = following page

ff = following 2 pages

n = footnote

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